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A STUDY OF  
HISTORY

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# A STUDY OF HISTORY

BY

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Research Professor of International History  
in the University of London  
(both on the Sir Daniel Stevenson Foundation)*

But at my back I always hear  
Time's wingèd chariot hurrying near.

ANDREW MARVELL

ποιεῖν τι δεῖ ἅς γόνυ χλωρόν.

THEOCRITUS: *Κυνίσκος* Ἔρως, l. 70

γηράσκω δ' αἰεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος.

SOLON

My times are in Thy hand.

Ps. xxxi. 15, in the A.V.

But Thou art the same, and Thy  
years shall have no end.

Ps. cii. 27, in the A.V.

901  
Toyn

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## VIII

# HEROIC AGES

### A. THE GENESIS OF A *LIMES*

IN the two preceding Parts of this Study we have been concerned with universal states established by would-be saviours arising in the Dominant Minority<sup>1</sup> and with universal churches created by the Internal Proletariat.<sup>2</sup> Our subject in the present Part is the character of the so-called 'heroic ages' that are episodes in the brief lives of barbarian war-bands.

In another context<sup>3</sup> we have already acquainted ourselves with the conditions under which such 'heroic ages' are generated. We have seen how, when a growing civilization breaks down through the deterioration of an attractively creative into an odiously dominant minority, one of the effects of this sinister change in the broken-down society's leadership is the estrangement of its former proselytes in the once primitive societies round about, which the civilization in its growth stage was influencing in divers degrees by the effect of its cultural radiation. The ex-proselytes' attitude changes from an admiration expressing itself in mimesis to a hostility breaking out into warfare; and we have seen<sup>4</sup> that this warfare between a disintegrating civilization and its alienated external proletariat may have one or other of two alternative outcomes.

On a front on which the local *terrain* offers the aggressive civilization the possibility of advancing, at the militant barbarians' expense, up to a 'natural frontier' in the shape of some unnavigated sea or untraversed desert or unsurmounted mountain range, the barbarians, thus caught in a confined space and compelled to fight with their backs to the wall, may be decisively subjugated or annihilated. But, on fronts where the accidents of the *terrain* do not thus conspire with the prowess and policy of the civilization to bring a definitive victory within its grasp, geography is apt to militate in the barbarians' favour; for, where the retreating barbarian has open to him, in his rear, an unlimited field of manœuvre, the shifting battle front is bound, sooner or later, to arrive at a line at which the aggressive civilization's military superiority—however great this may have been initially, and however much it may have been increased through the dearly purchased experience of fratricidal warfare<sup>5</sup>—will be neutralized at last by the increasing handicap of the ever lengthening distance of the front from the aggressor's base of operations.

Along this line, when it is reached, a war of movement will change into a static war without having resulted in any military decision; and, since both belligerents will still be in the field, the Dominant Minority and the External Proletariat will find themselves at this stage in stationary positions in which they will be living side by side, as the former creative

<sup>1</sup> Part VI.

<sup>2</sup> In V. v. 203-8.

<sup>3</sup> Part VII.

<sup>4</sup> In V. v. 194-210.

<sup>5</sup> See III. iii. 150-7.

minority and its prospective proselytes were living before the breakdown of the civilization set them at variance with one another. This semblance of a return to a happier previous situation is, however, superficial; for, though the military front has now become stationary, the psychological relation between the parties on either side of it has not reverted from a barren mutual hostility to the previous creative interplay of attraction and mimesis, and there has been no restoration, either, of the geographical conditions under which this cultural intercourse once took place. In its growth stage the civilization gradually shaded off into a surrounding barbarism across a broad threshold which offered the outsider an easy access to an inviting vista within. The change from friendship to hostility transformed this conductive cultural threshold (*limen*) into an insulating military front; and the stabilization of this front, so far from mitigating its sharpness, turns out to have severely accentuated it. The fluid front of a running warfare is neither so definite nor so impassable a barrier as is the military frontier (*limes*) into which the fluid front crystallizes when the stage of stationary warfare is reached.<sup>1</sup> The contrast in configuration and character between an original *limen*-zone and an eventual *limes*-line is the geographical expression of the conditions that generate an heroic age.

An heroic age is, in fact, the social and psychological consequence of the crystallization of a *limes*, and our purpose in this Part is to trace this sequence of events by our customary empirical method of investigation. A necessary background to this undertaking is, of course, a survey of the barbarian war-bands that had breasted divers sectors of the *limites* of divers universal states during the history of Man in Process of Civilization up to date. A survey of this kind has already been attempted in a previous Part.<sup>2</sup> In that place a considerable muster of barbarian war-bands has been reviewed, and, in passing, we have also there taken note of their distinctive achievements in the two fields of sectarian religion and epic poetry. In our present inquiry this foregoing survey can be drawn upon for purposes of illustration without having to be recapitulated.

<sup>1</sup> See V. v. 208. Ibn Khaldūn defines the frontier of an empire as the line at which the imperial government's authority peters out. 'A dynasty is much more powerful at its seat of government than it is at the extremities of its empire.' He compares the loss of energy in the radiation of its power to the gradual dying away of rays of light streaming out from some central point, or of the circular ripples which spread over the surface of a piece of water when one strikes it (*Muqaddamāt*, translated by de Slane, Baron McG. (Paris 1863-8, Imprimerie Impériale, 3 vols.), vol. 1, p. 332).

<sup>2</sup> In V. v. 210-337.

## B. A SOCIAL BARRAGE

IF the cultural *limen* of a growing civilization is aptly described as the hospitable threshold of an ever open door, the military *limes* of a disintegrating civilization can no less aptly be likened to a forbidding barrage astride a no longer open valley. A threshold is an unassuming piece of work, in which the human architect has been content to take advantage of a suitable surface and gradient that have been provided for him by Nature; a barrage is the imposing monument of a human skill and power that have set Nature at defiance; yet the magnificent barrage is as precarious as the humble threshold is secure; for the defiance of Nature is a *tour de force* on which Man cannot venture with impunity.

"The Arab-Muslim tradition relates that once upon a time there was to be seen in the Yaman a colossal work of hydraulic engineering known as the dam or dyke of Ma'rib, where the waters descending from the eastern mountains of the Yaman collected in an immense reservoir and thence irrigated a great tract of country, giving life to an intensive system of cultivation and thereby supporting a dense population. After a time, the tradition goes on to relate, this dam broke, and in breaking devastated everything and cast the inhabitants of the country into a state of such dire distress that many tribes were compelled to emigrate."

In the Islamic historical tradition this story—true or legendary—of the literal building and breaking of a barrage has served to account for the initial impulse behind an Arab *Völkerwanderung* that eventually swept out of the Arabian Peninsula with an impetus which carried it across the Tien Shan and the Pyrenees. Translated from this literal rendering into a simile, it becomes the story of every *limes* of every universal state.

"With the internal condition of the exterior barbarians the [sovereign of the universal state] has no concern; but the barrier or pale, whether of masonry or of armed men, obviously exerts a pressure of its own. It acts effectively as a dam against which weight accumulates, and so creates a point of pressure for those outside. In the end the barrier breaks, and with the inundation a new situation is created in which new tribal units are broken up, new individuals awake to self-assertion, and a new redistribution of ownership takes place."<sup>1</sup>

Is this social catastrophe of the bursting of a military dam an inevitable tragedy or an avoidable one? If we are to find the answer to this insistent question, we must analyse the social and psychological effects of the military barrage-builder's imperious interference with the natural course of relations between a civilization and its external proletariat.

The first effect of erecting a barrage is, of course, to create a reservoir

<sup>1</sup> Caetani, L.: *Studi di Storia Orientale*, vol. i (Milan 1911, Hoepli), p. 266.

<sup>2</sup> Teggart, F. J.: *The Processes of History* (New Haven, Conn. 1918, Yale University Press), pp. 97-98.

up-stream above this artificial obstruction to the normal drainage down the valley bottom; and this effect is inexorable even if we can imagine it to have been unintended and unforeseen. The erection of the barrage thus produces a striking differentiation in the physiography of the drainage basin which was non-existent in the antecedent state of Nature. The intervention of the barrage now transforms the valley immediately above it from dry land into a lake with an area that is determined by the height of the barrage's brim. Up to this level the now pent-up waters of the catchment basin will fill the upper portion of the valley and its lateral ravines, but the resultant reservoir, at its maximum, will have only a limited extent. It can never cover more than a fraction even of its own catchment basin, since it is beyond the builder's power to raise a barrage, sited far down the valley, to the altitude of the head waters of the downflowing streams; and, even if these waters could have been dammed back right up to their head, there would still have remained a vast unsubmerged hinterland. This new and sharp distinction between a now submerged tract immediately above the barrage and a region at the back of beyond which is still left high and dry has already come to our notice in the social application of our hydrographic simile.

In a previous context<sup>1</sup> we have observed the contrast between the revolutionary effect of a *limes* on the life of barbarians within point-blank range of it and the undisturbed torpidity of primitive peoples in a more distant hinterland. The Hyperborean Slavs continued placidly to lead their primitive life in the secluded Pripet Marshes throughout the span of two millennia which first saw the Achæan barbarians convulsed by their proximity to the European land-frontier of 'the thalassocracy of Minos' in the basin of the Aegean Sea, and then saw the Teuton barbarians going through the same experience in their turn, some eighteen hundred years later, as a result of their proximity to the European land-frontier which the Roman Empire drew across the breadth of the Continent between the North Sea and the Black Sea.<sup>2</sup> The Achæans and the Teutons were convulsed because they each happened to be engulfed in a reservoir created by the erection of a *limes*; the Slavs remained undisturbed because, on both occasions, their physically water-logged habitat happened to be left culturally high and dry.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In II. ii. 315-22.

<sup>2</sup> The weakness of this frontier, owing to its inordinate length, has been pointed out in V. v. 591-5.

<sup>3</sup> This illuminating conception of the contrast between a social 'reservoir', whose barbarian denizens are decisively affected by the proximity of the *limes* that has dammed back the waters of life, and a more distant hinterland, whose barbarian denizens remain 'unregenerate' because the social influence of the *limes* is ineffective at that longer range, was first expounded by Owen Lattimore in *Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict* (New York 1932, Macmillan), pp. 36-42. The particular instance that gave Lattimore his insight into this generic feature in the human geography of *limites* was the classic case of the Great Wall of China, and the particular stage in the cycle of frontier history at which he first observed and recorded the phenomenon is one at which the 'reservoir' is no longer the undesired menace that it is in the estimation of the *limes*-building Imperial Power, but has become the invaluable *arcnum imperii* of a barbarian successor-state of the empire for whose defence the *limes* was originally constructed.

The barbarian war-lord from a 'reservoir' area who has succeeded in breaking through a *limes* and usurping Caesar's throne finds himself beset by two anxieties: the conquered ex-subjects of the overthrown universal state may revolt against their parvenu barbarian masters; and the 'unregenerate' barbarians in the more distant hinterland and on the

Why are the barbarians in the 'reservoir' area so disturbingly affected by the proximity of a military frontier which is at the same time a cultural barrage? And what is the source of a subsequent access of energy which has enabled them invariably to break through the *limes* sooner or later as a matter of historical fact, whether this break-through is inevitable or is avoidable as a matter of theory? We may find answers to these questions if we follow out our simile in terms of its local Sinic geographical setting.

Let us suppose the imaginary dam that symbolizes a *limes* in our simile to have been built astride some high valley in the region actually traversed by the Great Wall within the latter-day Chinese provinces of Shensi and Shansi. What is the ultimate source of that formidable body of water that we see pressing, in ever increasing volume, upon the dam's up-stream face? Though this water must all manifestly have come downstream from above the dam on the last stage of its journey, the ultimate source of the greater part of it cannot lie in this direction; for the distance between the dam and the headwaters is not very great, and beyond the headwaters there stretches away the boundless Mongolian Plateau, with a dry steppe on its rim and a drier desert at its heart. If this parched region above the dam had been the sole source of the reservoir's water-supply, the present head of water could never have accumulated; and we know, as a matter of fact, that the main source of supply is to be found, not above the dam, but below it: not on the Mongolian Plateau but in the Pacific Ocean.

We also know that water cannot perform the salmon's feat of forcing a passage upstream and vaulting over a weir; and this means that not one drop of the copious supply that has nevertheless succeeded in making its way out of the Pacific into the reservoir can have travelled over the ground in liquid form. In order to rise from sea level to the reservoir's altitude this water must have been transformed by the heat of the Sun from liquid into vapour, been spirited by an east wind over plain and mountain in a volatile cloud, and then been condensed by cold air into rain falling into the catchment basin. Through thus first losing its liquidity and then regaining it, the migrant water deftly turns an adverse

farther side of 'the reservoir' may be tempted by the ease and brilliance of the 'reservoir' barbarians' success to emulate their achievement by pouring through the breach at their heels and trying to snatch a share in the spoils of a derelict world. In these circumstances the ruler of a barbarian successor-state in *partibus civilium* is confronted with the dual task of keeping 'unregenerate' barbarian competitors out and keeping restive civilized subjects down. For both purposes he relies on the military man-power of his comrades who have stayed behind in the reservoir instead of following him through the breach; and these intact reserves of an invading war-band are admirably fitted for performing both duties, since they have retained enough of their pristine barbarian military virtue to be more than a match for a civilized subject population, while they have acquired a sufficient tincture of the culture of their civilized neighbours and subjects to be more than a match for their 'unregenerate' barbarian neighbours and rivals.

In *Inner Asian Frontiers of China* (New York 1940, American Geographical Society), pp. 247-51, Lattimore has developed this concept of a 'reservoir' zone abutting on the outer face of a *limes* by showing that there is a corresponding zone in the rear of a *limes* in which a sub-society of frontiersmen differentiates itself, under the influence of the immediate proximity of the barbarians, from the main body of the civilization which the *limes* both protects and confines. The frontiersmen of the marches and the barbarians of the 'reservoir' zone tend to approximate culturally to one another and eventually to fraternize against both the civilized population of the interior and the 'unregenerate' barbarians in the outer darkness beyond the farther limits of the reservoir. (On this point, see also the present Study, V. v. 459-80, and pp. 14-15, below).



law of gravity to its own advantage; but, like human migrants who take advantage of an estranging sea by temporarily transforming themselves from landlubbers into seamen, the water has to pay a price for its ingeniously contrived passage. The cultural elements of their social heritage that the seafarers take with them on board ship prove to have suffered 'a sea change' by the time when they are landed in the emigrants' new overseas place of settlement;<sup>1</sup> and the physical elements with which the flying water is impregnated suffer a comparable 'sky change' as a result of their journey. The tincture of sea salt is left behind in the process of evaporation which starts the flying water on its travels, and a tincture of rock salt is acquired when the streams begotten by the precipitated rain scour out the ravines in their descent into the reservoir.

The water has accomplished its miraculous aerial voyage, but it is now a different brew from what it originally was; and this physical phenomenon is an accurate and illuminating simile of the psychic phenomenon of the filling of the reservoir of barbarian energy, dammed back by a military *limes*, with the water of life that psychologists call *libido*. The psychic energy that accumulates in the reservoir till its remorseless mounting pressure eventually bursts the barrage is derived only in an inconsiderable measure from the transfrontier barbarians' own exiguous primitive social heritage; the bulk of it is drawn from the vast stores of the civilization which the barrage has been built to protect. This is the source of supply that swells the head of water in the reservoir to a mass that eventually proves too much for the barrage's powers of resistance; and it is one of the ironies of History that the water which then pours through the breach should originally have been supplied by the very region which the cataclysm now devastates. Why has this water returned in a sudden destructive flood and not in a perennial fertilizing stream? The answer is to be found partly in the erection of the *limes* barrage, which has been an audacious human act of interference with the ordinary course of Nature, and partly in the transformation which the migrant psychic energy has undergone in the course of its journey from the cultivated world within the *limes* to the barbarian reservoir beyond it—a transformation that has been Nature's device for surmounting an obstacle which Man has placed in her path.

Some such transformation of psychic energy is, no doubt, the price of every transfer of culture from one society to another; but the degree and the character of the transformation vary with the circumstances in which the transfer takes place.<sup>2</sup> The psychic transformation is at its minimum when the society that is the transmitting agent is a civilization in process of growth and the receiving reagent is a primitive society in a socially static Yin-state; it is at its maximum when both parties are civilizations and both are in disintegration. The case with which we are concerned in this Part manifestly lies somewhere between these two extremes; for a civilization which is transmitting psychic energy to its external proletariat is a civilization that is in process of disintegration *ex hypothesi*, while on the other hand the barbarians in 'the reservoir' beyond the *limes* are ex-primitives whose psychic resistance to the cultural radiation of the

<sup>1</sup> See II. ii, 84-100.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 481-629, below.

adjoining civilization is prompted, not by the positive motive of being up in arms in defence of an alternative civilization of their own, but only by the negative motive of hostility to an alien culture which, in its breakdown, has lost the original savour that once made it attractive to the estranged barbarians' proselyte ancestors.

How is a transformation of psychic energy brought about in any of these diverse degrees? The transforming process is the decomposition of a culture and its recomposition in a new pattern in which the constant component elements will have entered into new relations with one another, even if none of the original elements have been eliminated and no fresh elements have been added. In other contexts<sup>1</sup> we have compared the social radiation of culture to the physical radiation of light, and we shall be reverting to this simile and working out some of its implications in the next Part after this,<sup>2</sup> in which we shall be concerned with encounters in which all parties are societies of the species here called 'civilizations'. In this place we need merely remind ourselves of three radiational 'laws'.

The first law is that an integral culture ray, like an integral light ray, is diffracted into a spectrum of its component elements in the course of penetrating a recalcitrant object—the degree of this diffraction being proportionate to the degree of the resistance that is encountered.

The second law is that the diffraction of a culture may also occur, without any impact on an alien and recalcitrant body social, and indeed at a stage before the emission of the migrant ray by the emitting society, if, before the time of emission, this society has already broken down and begun to disintegrate. The cohesion and the diffraction of the component elements of a culture are, in fact, the respective symptoms of social health and growth and of social sickness and disintegration. A growing civilization can be defined as one in which the components of its culture—an economic element, a political element, and a third which may be called the cultural element *par excellence*—are in harmony with one another; and, on the same principle, a disintegrating civilization can be defined as one in which these same elements have fallen into discord.

Our third law is that the velocity and the penetrative power of an integral culture ray are averages of the diverse velocities and penetrative powers which its economic, political, and cultural components respectively display when, as a result of diffraction, they each travel independently of the others. In isolation the economic ray is the swiftest and most penetrating, the political ray comes next to it in degree, while the cultural ray is surpassed by both its companions on both criteria. The speed and penetrative power of an isolated political ray, as well as those of an isolated economic ray, are higher than those of an integral ray, whereas the speed and penetrative power of an isolated cultural ray are lower than those of an integral ray in which it is borne on the wings of its two sisters. This is one reason why the diffraction of a culture ray is a social disaster; for the social values of the three elements, as we find when we assess them, are exactly inverse to their capacities for covering distance and for making their way into foreign bodies.

<sup>1</sup> In III. iii. 151-2 and V. v. 199-201.

<sup>2</sup> On pp. 481-629, below.

In the social intercourse between a disintegrating civilization and its alienated external proletariat across a military *limes*, the diffracted radiation of the civilization suffers a woeful impoverishment in the course of its arduous journey; for the respective states of the two parties conspire with the artificial barrier between them virtually to eliminate all relations except those of war and trade, and, of these two, it is war that plays the predominant role.<sup>1</sup>

It is true that the passage of a barbarian personnel through the *limes* into the civilization's domain, first as prisoners of war, then as hostages, next as mercenaries, and finally as conquerors,<sup>2</sup> is reflected on the economic plane in a counter-flow of money—through the diverse channels of loot, military pay, and subsidies—out of the world within the *limes* into the barbarian 'reservoir' outside; and this money eventually flows back to its source in payment for goods purchased by its barbarian recipients from marchmen-merchants who venture out beyond the *limes* to peddle the wares of Civilization. There have been situations in which a community of transfrontier barbarians has come in this way to play an appreciable part in the domestic economy of the society on which they have been preying. A classic example is the apparent economic effect of the subsidies paid by the Constantinopolitan Roman Imperial Government to Attila (*dominabatur*, A.D. 434–53), the war-lord of a confederacy of Hun Nomad war-bands cantoned in the Hungarian Alföld. This remittance of money in specie from the Imperial Treasury at Constantinople to Attila's *ordu* beyond the *limes* seems to have operated as a roundabout way of transferring purchasing power from the agrarian interests in the Empire, whose taxes provided the means of payment, to the manufacturing and commercial interests, which earned profits by making and marketing goods for purchase by the Huns with the money that they had exacted.<sup>3</sup> This commercial intercourse across a military *limes* is, however, apt to be discouraged and restricted by the imperial authorities because the manifest profitableness of the transfrontier trade to the traders on both sides is a plain and pointed indication that, in the social situation created by the erection of a *limes*, the marchmen just inside the barrage may acquire a common interest with the barbarians just outside it in the exploitation of the marchmen's fellow citizens in the interior of the world which the *limes* is intended to protect; and, since a common interest might assert itself in concerted action between marchmen and barbarians which would be a deadly danger to the fenced-in civilization,

'an imperial boundary . . . has in fact a double function: it serves not only to keep the outsiders from getting in but to prevent the insiders from getting out . . . It was necessary to restrict Chinese enterprise beyond the Great Wall . . . because Chinese who ventured too far beyond the Great Wall became a liability to the state; the business in which they engaged,

<sup>1</sup> See V. v. 202–3 and 208–9.

<sup>2</sup> See V. v. 459–60, and Chadwick, H. M.: *The Heroic Age* (Cambridge 1912, University Press), pp. 445–6.

<sup>3</sup> An illuminating and entertaining analysis of this three-cornered economic relationship will be found in Thompson, E. A.: *A History of Attila and the Huns* (Oxford 1948, Clarendon Press), pp. 184–97.

whether farming or trade, contributed more to the barbarian community than it did to the Chinese community. They passed out of the Chinese orbit . . . [and] Chinese who left the Chinese orbit and accommodated themselves to an un-Chinese economic and social order inevitably began either to adhere to barbarian rulers or to practise barbarian forms of rule themselves—to the disadvantage of China.<sup>1</sup>

These considerations move an imperial government to restrict the flow of trade between their own marchmen and the transfrontier barbarians; and such trade as there is tends to confine itself to an exchange of imperial specie in barbarian hands for two classes of imperial products: luxuries for the barbarian war-lords and their lieutenants and weapons both for them and for the rank-and-file of their followers.<sup>2</sup> The trade across the *limes* is, in fact, sickly as well as precarious, while border warfare flourishes perennially because Mars is master of the situation in which a disintegrating civilization and an alienated external proletariat face one another across a static military frontier.

Under these sinister auspices, such selective mimesis of the Dominant Minority by the External Proletariat as does occur takes place on the barbarians' initiative because the barbarians are politically free.

'The needs and motives of the cisfrontier society and state must make concessions to those of the transfrontier peoples. The very act of drawing a boundary is an acknowledgement that the peoples excluded are not under control and cannot be ruled by command.'<sup>3</sup>

The barbarians show their initiative by transmuting those culture elements that they do accept from the cisfrontier civilization. The lines which this transmutation follows are determined partly by an hostility to the transmitting civilization which makes the barbarian recipients of its cultural radiation disinclined to adopt what they borrow in a form that would stamp it as being a loan from this distasteful source; but this negative motive of aversion is reinforced by a positive incentive to turn a loan to practical account by adapting it to suit the needs of local barbarian life in 'the reservoir'.

The adaptations thus prompted by xenophobia and by utilitarianism go to different lengths in different fields of activity. The cultural products of a psychic energy flowing into a transfrontier barbarian society out of a civilization within the *limes* are modified in the process in some cases only to an extent that does not wholly disguise their exotic origin, while

<sup>1</sup> Lattimore, O.: *Inner Asian Frontiers of China* (New York 1940, American Geographical Society), pp. 240 and 242. See also Thompson, op. cit., pp. 174-6, and the present Study, V. v. 471-6.

<sup>2</sup> Classic instances are the Roman weapons of the Imperial Age that have been found by Modern Western archaeologists in graves and hoards in the North European hinterland of the Continental European Roman frontier, and the Greek luxury goods (some of them manufactured especially to suit the taste of this particular barbarian market) that have been found in tombs of the Scythian Age in the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe. In the social structure of the Hun Power in the Hungarian Alföld in Attila's day the importation of luxury goods was as important from the political point of view as the importation of arms from the military; for the effectiveness of Attila's authority depended on the loyalty of his lieutenants, and his ability to retain their loyalty was dependent, in its turn, on his being able to put them in possession of luxuries which were symbols of wealth and honour in Nomad eyes (see Thompson, op. cit., especially pp. 170-2 and 176-7).

<sup>3</sup> Lattimore, op. cit., p. 243.

in other cases the transmutation goes so far as to be equivalent to an original act of creation through which the barbarians make the borrowed psychic raw materials completely their own spiritual property. Examples both of recognizable adaptations and of virtually new creations have been given already in a previous survey which need not be recapitulated. In this place we need only remind ourselves that the 'reservoir' barbarians are apt to borrow the higher religion of an adjoining civilization in the form of a heresy<sup>1</sup> and the Caesarism of an adjoining universal state in the form of 'an irresponsible type of kingship, resting not upon tribal or national law . . . but upon military prestige,' . . . in which 'the king and his *comitatus* form the nucleus of the organism',<sup>2</sup> while the barbarians' capacity for original creation is displayed in heroic poetry<sup>3</sup> and in a pantheon that is the Olympian counterpart of the human *comitatus* of a barbarian war-lord.<sup>4</sup>

These creative achievements of a barbarian society beyond the pale of a disintegrating civilization are impressive; yet the cunningly re-minted metal still bears a tell-tale mark of its alien origin. The cultural

<sup>1</sup> See V. v. 227-9, for the Arianism of the East Teuton barbarian converts to Christianity beyond the Continental European frontier of the Roman Empire; p. 230 for the distinctive ecclesiastical practices of the Celtic barbarian converts to Christianity in the British Isles; p. 230 for the original presentation of Islam as a special revelation of the truths of Judaism and Christianity for the benefit of the Arab barbarians beyond the Syrian frontier of the Roman Empire; p. 250 for the adoption of Manichaeism and Nestorian Christianity by the barbarians beyond the pale of the Syriac World in Central Asia; pp. 251-2 for the hold won by the heretical Shi'i version of Islam over the Berber, Iranian, and Arab barbarian neighbours of the 'Abbasid Caliphate in North-West Africa, in the fastnesses between the Elburz Range and the south coast of the Caspian Sea, and in Hasi; p. 295 for the conversion of the Bosniak barbarians first to Bogomilism and then to Islam in preference either to Eastern Orthodox or to Western Catholic Christianity; p. 295 for the Bektashism of the Albanian barbarian converts to Islam on the fringe of the Ottoman Empire; and pp. 295-6 for the dissident Islamic Puritanism of the Wahhābi, Idrisi, Mahdist, and Sanūsī Arab barbarians adjoining the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire in Arabia, the Eastern Sudan, and the hinterland of Cyrenaica.

<sup>2</sup> Chadwick, *op. cit.*, pp. 391 and 377; compare eundem: *The Origin of the English Nation* (Cambridge 1907, University Press), pp. 295-300. See also the present Study, V. vi. 4, n. 4, and 228-34.

<sup>3</sup> See V. v. 233 and 237-8 for the Homeric Epic of the Achaean barbarians beyond the Continental European frontier of 'the thalassocracy of Minos'; p. 233 for the Saga of the Scandinavian barbarian neighbours of an infant Western Christendom; p. 233 for the Epic of the Teuton barbarians beyond the Continental frontiers of the Roman Empire; pp. 233-4 and 265 (together with V. v. 596-606) for the Epic of the Aryas beyond the north-eastern frontiers of the Sumeric Empire of the Four Quarters and the north-western frontiers of the domain of the Indus Culture; p. 234 for the heroic poetry of the Arab barbarians beyond the Syrian frontier of the Roman Empire and the 'Irāqi frontier of the Sasanian Empire; pp. 253-8 for the Greek Epic of the East Roman Akritai beyond the Anatolian frontier of the 'Abbasid Caliphate; pp. 259-60 for the French Epic of the Frank barbarians beyond the Pyrenean frontier of the Umayyad Caliphate in the Iberian Peninsula; pp. 288-9 for the Epic of the Russian barbarians beyond the north-west frontier of the Golden Horde; pp. 296-9 for the Greek and Serb heroic poetry of barbarians on the European fringes of the Ottoman Empire; p. 310 for the heroic poetry of the Mongol barbarians beyond the Central Asian frontiers of the Ming and Manchu Empires; p. 325 for the heroic poetry of the Bosniak barbarians beyond the south-east frontier of the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy.

<sup>4</sup> See V. v. 230-3 for barbarian pantheons in general; p. 232 for the pantheons of the Achaeans, the Scandinavians, and the Aryas; p. 233 for the pantheon of the continental Teuton barbarians beyond the European frontiers of the Roman Empire; and pp. 328-32 for the religious teaching of the prophets who arose, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of the Christian Era, among North American Indians whose traditional way of life was being destroyed by the impact of invaders from the European side of the Atlantic. These American Indian barbarian religions were noteworthy, as we have observed, in being gospels of non-violence in response to the aggression of the Indians' European assailants.

products of the transfrontier barbarian are scarred by that 'schism in the soul' which the malady of social disintegration brings with it as its counterpart and concomitant.<sup>1</sup> In the psychological revolution which coins Barbarism out of Primitive Human Nature, the traditional harmony of Primitive Life in its static Yin-state is disrupted into a tension between the two poles of a more sophisticated individualism and a likewise more sophisticated sense of unity.

<sup>1</sup> See V. v. 376-568 and vi. 1-168.



## C. THE ACCUMULATION OF PRESSURE

### 'The Wreckful Siege of Battering Days'

THE *linen* that lies open between the domain of a growing civilization and the homelands of its barbarian proselytes is like a gentle tree-clad slope on which the roots preserve the soil from erosion, so that the descending waters seep through gradually without scouring out gullies and pouring down them in torrents. This landscape is weather-proof, and it is consequently an insurance against a cataclysm so long as it is not convulsed through the civilization's breaking down. By contrast, a static military frontier between a disintegrating civilization and its alienated external proletariat is intrinsically impermanent. The barrage is doomed to burst sooner or later. Premonitions of its ultimate fate are to be found in the avalanches of barbarian counter-invasion which are apt to descend on a civilization in the course of its history, before the establishment of its universal state, on fronts where its representatives have first extended its bounds by force at the adjoining barbarians' expense and have then broken off their offensive without having arrived at a 'natural' frontier.<sup>1</sup>

The social barrage created by the establishment of a *limes* is subject to the same law of Nature as the physical barrage created by the construction of a dam. When Man's obstruction of such a natural drainage system has brought into existence two artificially separated bodies of water at two different levels, this human interference with Nature provokes on Nature's side an impulse to correct it. The water piled up above the dam seeks to regain a common level with the water below the barrier, and the degree of the consequent pressure is determined by the quotient of the difference in height between the two levels and the mass of the water held at the higher level of the two. In the structure of a physical dam the engineer introduces safety-valves in the form of sluices which can be opened, to whatever the necessary extent may be, whenever the pressure of the head of water in the reservoir threatens to exceed the limits of the dam's capacity to resist it; and this obvious device for safeguarding the dam against catastrophe by providing for a regulated release of the pent-up waters is not overlooked by the political engineers of a military *limes*, as we shall see. In this case, however, the attempted remedy merely precipitates the cataclysm that it is designed to forestall, for the social and psychological materials of which a *limes* is constructed are so frail and friable that, if once this sandstone masonry is breached, the outpouring waters of barbarian energy quickly sweep the whole structure away. In the maintenance of a social barrage the relief of pressure by a regulated release of water is, in fact, impracticable; there can be no discharge from the reservoir without the barrage being destroyed; and, since, from the moment when the barrage is erected, the head of water above it keeps on accumulating inexorably *ex hypothesi* through the transfer of energy from the civilization below the barrage

<sup>1</sup> For examples of such barbarian avalanches, see V. v. 209, n. 3.

and its transformation into barbarian energy in the reservoir above, sooner or later the time is bound to come when breaking-point will have been reached, and at that juncture a catastrophe will inevitably occur.

The day of doom may be postponed by attempts to strengthen the structure of the barrage as an alternative to the impracticable expedient of piercing it with sluices; but this cruder countermeasure can at best put off the evil day without being equal to averting it; for, as we shall also see, each arithmetical increase in the pressure of transferred and transformed energy upon the *limes* increases the cost of proportionately reinforcing the barrage by a geometrical progression. In this race between attack and defence, the attack cannot fail to win in the long run; and thus, on a static *limes*, Time works inexorably on the barbarian's side, as we have observed already by anticipation.<sup>1</sup> This 'law' also signifies, however, that it does take time for barbarians barred out by a *limes* to achieve their inevitable eventual break-through into the long-coveted domain of a disintegrating civilization which looks to them like an earthly paradise so long as 'distance lends enchantment to the view'.<sup>2</sup> 'A long period of "education", in which a semi-civilized people has been profoundly affected from without by the influence of a civilized people,'<sup>3</sup> is the necessary prelude<sup>4</sup> to the 'heroic age' in which the barbarians have their fling when a sagging and tottering *limes* at last collapses.

#### *The Impracticability of a Policy of Non-Intercourse*

Thus the erection of a *limes* sets in motion a play of social forces which is bound to end disastrously for the builders; and, for them, the only way of avoiding ultimate disaster would be to preclude this fatal course of events by insulating completely from one another the two incompatible societies whose respective domains the *limes* artificially demarcates. A policy of non-intercourse is, indeed, the counsel of perfection in the mind of any imperial government that is burdened with the responsibility for keeping a *limes* in being. In practice, however, an arbitrarily drawn military barrier can never perfectly or permanently produce the effect of a 'natural' frontier provided by some untraversed

<sup>1</sup> In V. v. 209.

<sup>2</sup> Campbell, Thomas: *Pleasures of Hope*, Part I, l. 7.

<sup>3</sup> Chadwick, *The Heroic Age*, p. 458.

<sup>4</sup> Apropos of the Serb heroic age at the climax of an Orthodox Christian Time of Troubles, after the collapse of the Bulgarian and East Roman Empires and before the imposition of a *Pax Ottomanica*, Chadwick points out in op. cit., on p. 448, that, 'here again . . . as in the Teutonic and Cumbrian heroic ages, we have the case of a semi-civilized and "juvenile" nation exposed for a long period to the influence of a civilized but decaying empire'. Chadwick has, in fact, established an historical 'law' to the effect that the precipitation of an heroic age is normally the cumulative effect of the radiation of a decaying civilization into a primitive society over a period of time that is to be measured, not in years, but in generations. Since the publication of Chadwick's *The Heroic Age* in A.D. 1912 it had, however, been demonstrated by Hitler that a diabolically perverse process of mis-education can artificially produce the same psychological effect in a community that has advanced as far along the path of civilization as pre-Nazi Germany, and that, under these artificial conditions, the process of barbarization can be so greatly speeded up as to be 'telescoped' into the span of a single generation. The deliberate uprooting of the boys and youths of Nazi Germany from the habit, expectation, and love of a settled life by the systematic application of Modern Western methods of mass-suggestion had evoked a caricature of an heroic age by a process of 'speeding-up' that was a counterpart, on the psychological plane, of the visual effect produced by speeding up the display of a film.



sea or desert or mountain-range, because the wardens of the *limes* find themselves unable effectively to control either the transfrontier barbarians or the cisfrontier marchmen.

'The very fact that the "barbarians" of the excluded territory are always described as aggressive raiders, attackers and invaders shows that geographical limits that appear "natural" and inevitable to one society are not necessarily regarded as geographical obstacles by other societies, which may in fact treat them as merely political obstacles.'

And, conversely,

'While the general policy of the [universal] state seeks to establish the limit at which its interests can remain centripetal, and to prevent excessive expansion from passing over into centrifugal dispersion, this policy is resisted and evaded by the particular interests of traders, would-be colonisers, ambitious political and military careerists, and so forth, who see opportunities for themselves across the border. Thus there grows up a nexus of border interests which resents and works against the central interest.'

A striking illustration of this tendency among the marchmen of a universal state to make common cause with the barbarians beyond the pale is afforded by the history of the relations between the Roman Empire and the Hun Eurasian Nomads who broke out of the heart of the Eurasian Steppe towards the end of the third quarter of the fourth century of the Christian Era and established themselves on the Hungarian Alföld.<sup>3</sup> Though the Huns were unusually ferocious barbarians from the back of beyond, and though their ascendancy along the European *limes* of the Roman Empire was ephemeral, a record of three notable cases of fraternization had survived among the fragmentary remnants of the contemporary accounts of this brief episode. Attila's secretary of state was a Pannonian subject of the Roman Empire named Orestes, whose son Romulus Augustulus was to make his name by the facile achievement of being the last Roman Emperor in the West.<sup>4</sup> The renegade Greek business man from Viminacium whom the Greek historian and Roman diplomatist Priscus encountered in Attila's *ordu* on the Alföld in A.D. 449 has already come to our notice.<sup>5</sup> This adventurous Greek was not even a marchman by birth. He had migrated to Viminacium, on the Danubian *limes* of the Empire, from the interior of the Hellenic World before being deported beyond the pale when his adopted city was captured by the Huns in A.D. 441. The third member of the trio is 'Eustace, a merchant of Apamea', who, 'about the year A.D. 484, long after Attila was dead, is found accompanying a band of Hun marauders in the role of their chief adviser on a plundering expedition against Persia'.<sup>6</sup>

The Hun Power in Europe came and went too quickly for this fraterni-

<sup>1</sup> Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*, p. 239.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 243-4.

<sup>3</sup> The occupation of the Alföld by the Western Huns is dated tentatively on the morrow of the Battle of Adrianople (*commisum* A.D. 378) by Thompson, E. A.: *A History of Attila and the Huns* (Oxford 1948, Clarendon Press), p. 26.

<sup>4</sup> 'Orestes Pannonius, qui eo tempore quando Attila ad Italiam venit se illi iunxit, et eius notarius factus fuerat' (Anonymus Valesianus, chap. 38, quoted by Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 163).

<sup>5</sup> In V. v. 473-4.

<sup>6</sup> Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 175, quoting Zachariah of Mytilene, p. 152.

zation between the aggressive barbarians and the renegade children of the civilization that was their victim to produce any lasting historical effect. It is, however, significant that it should have gone to such lengths in so short a time between parties which, at their first encounter, had been poles apart in their respective ways of life; and, in cases in which the barbarian Power with whom the renegades had thrown in their lot had been built on more durable foundations, this unholy alliance had sometimes begotten noteworthy political offspring. The residuary continental European successor-state of the Roman Empire in the West was born of a partnership between Frankish *laeti* and Gallic bishops and landlords who were the local representatives of the Roman Senatorial Order. The Manchu Empire, which provided the main body of the Far Eastern Society with a second instalment of its universal state, was born of a similar partnership between Manchu transfrontier barbarians and Chinese marchmen settled beyond the Great Wall but within the Willow Palisade.<sup>1</sup>

Thus the existence of a *limes* always in practice generates social intercourse—and this in both directions—between the parties whom the barrier is designed to insulate from one another. In this intercourse, as we have seen,<sup>2</sup> war predominates over trade; and war is a relation which is technologically educative in spite of being psychologically estranging. A universal state cannot hold the transfrontier barbarians in check along the line of the *limes* without fighting them, and it cannot fight them without involuntarily training them in its own superior way of doing this sinister work. The art of war radiates more rapidly and penetratingly than any other branch of technique; in the outflow of exports, weapons are apt to arrive earlier and make their way farther afield than non-lethal tools;<sup>3</sup> and the imported weapons of an adjoining civilization are copied by barbarian artificers with an adroitness that is proportionate to the eagerness of the demand in the local barbarian market.

The Eurasian Nomad barbarians 'could not arm themselves at all for purposes of large-scale offensive operations without the assistance of imported weapons. . . . Even the Mongols of the twelfth century—a military nation if ever there was one—had to import their weapons, chiefly from China and Khurasan.'<sup>4</sup> On the North-West Frontier of the British Indian Empire from about A.D. 1890 onwards 'the influx of rifles and ammunition into tribal territory . . . completely changed the nature of border warfare';<sup>5</sup> and, while the transfrontier Pathans' and Balūchīs' earliest source of supply of up-to-date Western small-arms was systematic robbery from the British Indian troops on the other side of the line, 'there would . . . have been small cause for apprehension, had it not been for the enormous growth of the arms traffic in the Persian Gulf, which, both at Bushire and [at] Muscat, was at first in the hands of British

<sup>1</sup> See VI. vii. 128–9 and 332.

<sup>2</sup> On pp. 8–9, above.

<sup>3</sup> 'We may refer in particular to the Roman helmets and the large number of Roman swords and shield-bosses found in deposits on the east side of the province of Slesvig—a district remote from the Roman frontiers' (Chadwick, *op. cit.*, pp. 444–5).

<sup>4</sup> Thompson, E. A.: *A History of Attila and the Huns* (Oxford 1948, Clarendon Press), pp. 173 and 172.

<sup>5</sup> Davies, C.C.: *The Problem of the North-West Frontier, 1890–1908* (Cambridge 1932, University Press), p. 176.

traders'<sup>1</sup>—a striking example of the tendency for the private interests of the empire's subjects in doing business with the transfrontier barbarians to militate against the public interest of the imperial government in keeping the barbarians at bay. 'When these methods failed, there still remained the Kohat rifle factory, owned by Pathans, and situated in the strip of independent territory which separates Peshawar from Kohat.'<sup>2</sup> 'The possession of arms of precision has also produced a change in Pathan tactics, for, with the exception of certain *ghāzi* rushes, there has been a tendency for the recklessness which characterized the earlier struggles to disappear.'<sup>3</sup>

*The Barbarians' Exploitation of their Civilized Neighbours' Weapons*

The transfrontier barbarian is not, however, content simply to practise the superior tactics which he has learnt from an adjoining civilization without proceeding to adapt them to the local *terrain*. *Ex hypothesi* he already has the initial advantage of being at home in a theatre of military operations in which his opponent is a stranger, since the *limes* is situated in barbarian territory which the civilization has occupied, up to this line, by force of arms in an aggressive previous chapter of its history. When the barbarian combines his hereditary mastery of the local situation with a creative adaptation of borrowed weapons and tactics, superior to his own, to suit the local conditions of warfare, he becomes formidable indeed. His best opportunities for putting his civilized adversary at this military disadvantage arise where the local *terrain* displays some strongly pronounced physical characteristic which is unfamiliar and adverse to the civilized belligerent and yet at the same time lends itself to the employment, with adroit modifications, of weapons and tactics that have been borrowed from him by his barbarian antagonist.

For example, on the maritime frontiers of the Carolingian Empire and the Kingdom of Wessex the Scandinavian pirates turned to such good account a technique of shipbuilding and seamanship which they had acquired, perhaps, from the Frisian maritime marchmen of a nascent Western Christendom that they captured the command of the sea and, with it, the initiative in the offensive warfare which they proceeded to wage along the coasts and up the rivers of the Western Christian countries that were their victims.<sup>4</sup> When, in pushing up the rivers of the British Isles and France, the Scandinavian raiders reached the limit beyond which they could not make their way farther by water even in their shallow and slender dragon-ships, they exchanged one borrowed weapon for another and continued their aggressive campaign on horse-back instead of on ship-board, since the invaded countries were stocked with horses for them to seize and they had mastered the Frankish art<sup>5</sup> of cavalry-fighting as well as the Frisian art of navigation. The Cossack barbarians proved equally ubiquitous and elusive in their attacks on the steppe-empire of the Golden Horde when these river-pirates, lurking on islands among cataracts where the Nomad was out of his element, added

<sup>1</sup> Davies, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 176.

<sup>3</sup> Frankish by adoption, Sarmatian by origin (see IV. iv. 439-45).

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> See II. ii. 344-6.

a second string to their bow by also mastering the Tatar art of horsemanship.<sup>1</sup> Conversely the Saka Nomad barbarian invaders of an Hellenic empire in India in the second and the last century B.C. added a second string to their bow by exchanging the saddle for the deck in order to take advantage of the waterways offered to an invader by the River Indus and its tributaries.<sup>2</sup>

The militarily decisive employment of the horse by sedentary barbarians beyond the frontier of a Nomad steppe-empire had had counterparts in cases of the more usual type in which the Nomad had been the representative of Barbarism and the husbandman the representative of Civilization. The original domestication of the horse appears to have been achieved by Aryan Nomad barbarians from the Transcasian fringe of the Great Eurasian Steppe who mounted the Iranian Plateau and broke across it, in the eighteenth or the seventeenth century B.C.,<sup>3</sup> into the domain of an Empire of Sumer and Akkad that had been reconstituted by Hammurabi. At this tempestuous first entry of the war-horse upon the stage of History the new-fangled animate weapon makes its appearance, not as a cavalryman's mount, but as a charioteer's tractor; and the two-wheeled battle-car, drawn by a pair of draught-animals under the yoke, is shown by the archaeological evidence to have been a weapon which the Aryan Nomad barbarians had borrowed from the Sumeric Society against which these invaders eventually employed it with such deadly effect.

"In the . . . Early Dynastic reliefs from Ur and Kafajah, and on the famous inlaid "standard" from the royal tombs of Ur, . . . ass-drawn chariots are shown in great detail, with solid wheels made of two half-discs dowelled together against the hub . . . It looks . . . as if the battle-car was an invention of Early Dynastic Sumer and that its use was adopted, with other technological devices such as metallurgy and the shaft-hole axe . . . , by the Indo-Europeans on the northerly fringes of the Kingdom of Sumer and Akkad soon after 2000 B.C., [and was] given added speed and lightness by the use of horses and the invention of the spoked wheel."<sup>4</sup>

On the Syrian *limes* of the Roman Empire the ground had been prepared for the titanic irruption of the transfrontier Arab Nomad barbarians in the seventh century of the Christian Era by the recent introduction of the war-horse into the Arabian Peninsula some sixteen or seventeen centuries after its arrival in the adjoining 'Fertile Crescent' from its place of origin somewhere in Central Asia.<sup>5</sup> The less dramatic, yet also momentous, irruption of the Berber Nomad barbarians across the Empire's North-West African *limes* in the preceding century had been a similar consequence of the recent introduction of the camel from Arabia into North Africa.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See II. ii. 154-7 and V. v. 282-4.

<sup>2</sup> See Tarn, W.W.: *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge 1938, University Press), pp. 320, 322, and 328-30.

<sup>3</sup> See the Note on Chronology in vol. x, pp. 167-212, below.

<sup>4</sup> Piggott, Stuart: *Prehistoric India* (London 1950, Pelican), pp. 274 and 276.

<sup>5</sup> i.e. at about the beginning of the Christian Era, according to Caetani, L.: *Studi di Storia Orientale*, vol. i (Milan 1911, Hoepli), p. 346.

<sup>6</sup> See Gautier, E.F.: *Les Siècles Obscurs du Maghreb* (Paris 1927, Payot), pp. 165-79.

The most dramatic case in the history of the war-horse in which this weapon had been turned by a barbarian against the civilization from which he had acquired it was to be found in the New World, where the horse had been unknown till it had been imported by post-Columbian Western Christian intruders from the European side of the Atlantic. Owing to this lack of a domesticated animal which, in the Old World, had been the making of the Nomad stock-breeder's way of life, the Great Plains of the Mississippi Basin,<sup>1</sup> which would have been a herdsman's paradise, had remained the hunting-grounds of tribes who followed their game laboriously on foot over these great open spaces. The belated advent of the horse in this ideal horse-country had effects on the life of the immigrant and the life of the native which, while in both cases revolutionary, were different in every other respect. The introduction of the horse on to the plains of Texas, Venezuela, and Argentina made Nomad stock-breeders out of the descendants of 150 generations of husbandmen;<sup>2</sup> the same potent technological revolution made mobile mounted war-bands out of the Indian hunting-tribes on the Great Plains of North America beyond the northern frontier of the Spanish viceroyalty of New Spain<sup>3</sup> and beyond the western frontier of the English colonies that eventually became the United States. In this case the borrowed weapon, mated with a local *terrain* that was ideal for its employment, did not give the transfrontier barbarian the ultimate victory against an adversary equipped with the far more potent weapons of Industrialism; but it did enable him to postpone the day of his final discomfiture and to inflict one signal disaster on the aggressive civilization in the last chapter of this North American frontier's history.<sup>4</sup>

While the nineteenth century of the Christian Era saw the prairie Indian of North America turn one of the European intruder's weapons against its original owner by disputing the possession of the Plains with the aid of the horse, the eighteenth century had already seen the forest Indian turn the European musket to account in a new-fangled warfare of sniping and ambushes which, with the screening forest as the Indian sharp-shooter's confederate, had proved more than a match for the tactics of the Potsdam parade ground, whose close formation, precise evolutions, and steady volleys—designed for polite hostilities on European battle-fields—courted destruction when unimaginatively employed against adversaries who had mated the European musket with the American forest.<sup>5</sup> In days before the invention of fire-arms, correspond-

<sup>1</sup> See Webb, W.P.: *The Great Plains* (New York 1931, Ginn).

<sup>2</sup> See II. i. 255-6.

<sup>3</sup> The enterprisingness of the nineteenth-century Apaches and Comanches in mounting on horse-back is in piquant contrast to the conservatism of their Spanish antagonists, whom the turn of the century found still using the lance and shield and even the bow-and-arrows—apart from an *élite* armed with fire-locks of a sixteenth-century pattern (see III. iii. 136, n. 1).

<sup>4</sup> The history of the Indian frontier of the United States is examined further on pp. 630-50, below.

<sup>5</sup> In thus turning to account the military potentialities of the North American forest the Indians merely postponed the date of their extermination at the hands of their assailants from beyond the Atlantic. If, before the Europeans' advent, they had managed to turn the forest's economic potentialities to account by cutting it down and replacing it by a populous agricultural country-side, they might not merely have postponed their



ing adaptations of the current weapons of an aggressive civilization to the opportunities offered by forest warfare had enabled the barbarian denizens of the Russian forests to bend, without breaking, before the blast of repeated explosions of Nomad aggression from the Eurasian Steppe, and to survive the ephemeral dominions of successive Nomad lords of the Steppe's Great Western Bay, from the Royal Scythians to the Golden Horde.<sup>1</sup> A similar response to a comparable challenge had enabled the barbarian denizens of the Transrhenane forests of Northern Europe to save a still-forest-clad Germany from the Roman conquest that had overtaken an already partially cleared and cultivated Gaul by inflicting on the Romans a decisively deterrent disaster in the Teutoburgerwald in A.D. 9.

### *The Barbarians' Exploitation of their Native Terrain*

The line along which the military frontier between the Roman Empire and the Continental North European Barbarians consequently came to rest for the next four centuries carries its own explanation on the face of it in terms of *terrain* and tactics. It was the line beyond which a forest that had reigned here since the end of the latest bout of glaciation was still decisively preponderant over the works of *Homo Agricola* which had opened the way for the march of the Roman legions from the Mediterranean up to the Rhine and the Danube. This line, however, also happened, as we have observed,<sup>2</sup> to be the longest alinement that could have been found for a Roman military frontier across Continental Europe by a surveyor perversely seeking to draw the frontier out to the maximum possible length; and, even if the *tracée* had been drawn, not from the mouth of the Rhine to the burdensomely distant mouth of the Danube, but along the shortest line between the Baltic and the Black Sea or between the North Sea and the Adriatic, we may surmise that, in the long run, this hypothetical shortest practicable Roman *limes* in Continental Europe would have suffered the fate that actually overtook the long-drawn-out historic line between Batavia and the Dobruja; for, while it is evident that the burden of maintaining a *limes* varies in weight in proportion to the frontier's length, the fatal weakness of a *limes* is not its length but its stationariness and rigidity, and this weakness, being intrinsic, is irremediable.

On the local anti-barbarian frontiers of the still surviving parochial states of a Westernizing World which, at the time of writing, embraced all but a fraction of the total habitable and traversable surface of the planet, two of the recalcitrant barbarian's faithful non-human allies had already been outmanœuvred by a Modern Western industrial technique. The Forest had long since fallen a victim to cold steel, while the Steppe, from its parkland fringe to its desert heart, had been penetrated by the petrol-driven internal combustion engine of the aeroplane and the terrestrial motor vehicle travelling on the treads of a revolving belt over

doom but have averted it at the price of losing their political independence (see II. ii. 277-8). A thickly settled Central American and Andean peasantry did survive a Spanish conquest.

<sup>1</sup> See V. v. 281-9.

<sup>2</sup> In V. v. 591-5.

*terrain* where wheels could no longer convey it. The barbarian's mountain ally, however, had proved a harder nut to crack, and the nineteenth-century Russian feat of taming the Caucasus and twentieth-century French feat of taming the Atlas and the Rif had not yet been emulated by any corresponding domestication of either the western or the eastern rim of the Iranian Plateau. At this date the serried tiers of the Zagros Range, astride a theoretical Perso-Turkish and Perso-'Irāqī frontier, were still serving as fastnesses for wild Kurds, Lūrs, Bakhti-yārīs, and the motley wild highlanders of Fars, while the Sulaymān Range and its ramifications were performing the same service for wild Pathans and Balūchīs who were hardly conscious of a theoretical Indo-Afghan frontier that had been drawn across the map of their homelands in A.D. 1893 and had been inherited in A.D. 1947 from a British Indian Empire by a Pakistan that was one of its three successor-states.

This highlander rear-guard of a Barbarism which, in a ubiquitously Westernizing World, was now fighting with its back to the same advancing wall that it was confronting, had been displaying, in its latest forlorn hopes, an impressive ingenuity in turning to its own advantage, on its own *terrain*, some of the latter-day devices of an industrial Western military technique. By this *tour de force* the Rifī highlanders astride the theoretical boundary between the Spanish and French zones of Morocco had inflicted on the Spaniards at Anwāl in the summer of A.D. 1921 a disaster<sup>1</sup> comparable to the annihilation of Varus's three legions by the Cherusci and their neighbours in the Teutoburgerwald in A.D. 9, and had left their mark on History by making the Romanesque structure of French Power in North-West Africa rock on its foundations in the summer of A.D. 1925. By the same sleight of hand the Mahsūds of Wazīristan had baffled repeated British attempts to subdue them during the ninety-eight years that had elapsed between A.D. 1849, when the British had inherited this anti-barbarian frontier from the Sikhs as a penalty for having annexed the Sikh Rāj, and A.D. 1947, when the British had disencumbered themselves of a still unsolved Indian North-West Frontier problem by bequeathing this unwelcome legacy to a fully self-governing Dominion of Pakistan.

In the trial of strength in A.D. 1925 between the Rifī barbarian warlord 'Abd-al-Karīm and the great French soldier and administrator Marshal Lyautey,

'the prospective scene of operations, like the adjoining parts of the Spanish Zone, was an arid treeless country, covered with a thorny undergrowth, broken up by ravines, and cursed with a scanty water-supply; and this was almost an ideal *terrain* for the Rifī forces, who were thoroughly at home in their native environment and at the same time had adopted such elements in the Western art of war as could be employed there to good purpose. Every Rifī fighting-man was an adept at taking cover, and, notwithstanding the brokenness of the country, he was disconcertingly mobile, since he lived in the open and carried no impedimenta except a handful of food, in the hood of his cloak, and his rifle and ammunition. With rifles, machine-guns, and small-arms ammunition the Rifīs had

<sup>1</sup> For details see Toynbee, A.J.: *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, vol. i (London 1927, Milford), pp. 115-16.

supplied themselves abundantly at the Spaniards' expense; and, although the captured Spanish artillery was clumsily served and there was no air force on the Rif side, these were luxuries and not necessities under the local conditions. On the other hand the Rifi High Command had not only captured but [had] learnt to utilise field telephones, and by means of these they were able to keep in touch with their widely scattered and constantly moving units, and to execute concerted manoeuvres over as wide a field as their opponents. They appear to have established district depots of rifles and ammunition, to which the tribesmen could be called up at short notice, fitted out, and then dispatched to any point where they were needed. The bulk of their forces was extremely fluid—the men being perpetually called up in relays and perpetually released (as far as the course of the campaign allowed) to work in the fields. Every tribe, however, appears to have been required to supply a permanent contingent, and the tribal levies were stiffened by a small standing army of regulars<sup>1</sup> (mostly drawn from 'Abd-al-Karim's own tribe, the Banu Wuryāghal of Ajdir) who were uniformly trained and equipped and were in receipt of pay and rations—in consideration of which they had to hand over their booty to the Government.

'The Rifi tactics (which were directed by 'Abd-al-Karim's brother, Mahammad, the mining engineer, as Commander-in-Chief) were to send forward a screen of irregulars who filtered through the enemy's line and raised the tribes in his rear—if necessary by coercion. By this means the Rifi army grew like a snowball as it advanced, each tribe whose territory became the scene of fighting being called out *en masse*. The tendency towards desultoriness and incoherence, which was to be looked for in an army recruited in this way, was guarded against by placing all the tribal contingents under the command of regulars, but the main body of the regular troops was carefully husbanded and kept in reserve. Advancing behind the screen of tribesmen they dug themselves in, provided a support upon which the skirmishers could fall back, and resisted enemy counter-attacks in hand-to-hand fighting,<sup>2</sup> with a tenacity which reminded their French adversaries of European warfare.'<sup>3</sup>

Through this skilful adaptation of tactics to *terrain* the Rifi offensive in the summer of A.D. 1925 came within an ace of cutting the corridor, traversed by a railway, which linked the effectively occupied part of the French Zone of Morocco, along the Atlantic seaboard, with the main body of French North-West Africa in Algeria and Tunisia, and which thereby insulated the still unsubdued Rifis astride the boundary between the French and Spanish zones of Morocco from the likewise still unsubdued *tache de Taza*, immediately south of the French corridor, and from the much larger unsubdued area, farther south again, in the fastnesses of the Atlas. The threat to the corridor at the crisis of the campaign may be said, without exaggeration, to have put in jeopardy the

<sup>1</sup> Estimated at from 6,000 to 10,000 men (*Foreign Affairs* of New York, January 1926).

<sup>2</sup> 'Marshal Lyautey has found himself in the presence, not indeed of highly scientific armies, but of a remarkable infantry, which is the equal of any infantry in the World in courage, character and marksmanship' (M. Painlevé in the French Chamber, 9th July, 1925). For accounts of the military organization and tactics of the Rifi forces, see *The Times*, 19th May, 1925; *Le Temps*, 21st and 23rd May, and 22nd June; three articles by M. Réginald Kann in *Le Temps*, 7th, 9th, and 13th August; and an article by Signor Luciano Magrini in the *Corriere della Sera*, 30th August.

<sup>3</sup> Toynbee, *Survey*, 1925, vol. i, pp. 135-6.



whole French position in the Maghrib; for if the Rifis had broken through they might have raised the Atlas tribes, and such an extension of hostilities would have immeasurably increased the strain on French military resources.

Interests of comparable magnitude were at stake for the British Rāj in India in the trial of strength between the Mahsūd barbarians and the armed forces of the British Indian Empire in the Waziristan campaign of A.D. 1919-20; for, if in this contest the Mahsūds had got the better of the Great Power whom they were audaciously defying, the conflagration might have spread through the length and breadth of the unsubdued country astride the theoretical Indo-Afghan frontier. In this campaign likewise the barbarian belligerent's strength lay in his skilful adaptation of Modern Western arms and tactics to a *terrain* that was unpropitious for their use on the lines that were orthodox for their Western inventors.

"The elaborate and costly equipment which had been invented on the European battlefields of the General War [of A.D. 1914-1918], in operations on level ground between two highly organised armies, was very much less effective when employed against parties of tribesmen lurking in a tangle of mountains."<sup>1</sup>

On the other hand,

'as a fighting man the Wazīr and the Mahsūd, always more particularly the latter, when in his own country, may be classed very high. Agile and enduring, he is possessed on his own hillsides of an astonishing mobility, which is intensified by complete disregard of impedimenta, as well as by a natural hardiness that greatly simplifies all supply problems. His skill with the small-bore rifle is considerable, and is only surpassed by a great capacity to exploit the slightest weakness shown by his enemy. Disregard of methods of security on the one hand, a too slavish routine in their enforcement on the other, miscalculations as to time and space, all these faults have been repeatedly penalized by the Mahsūd and Wazīr. The tribesman is gifted with untiring patience and vigilance in observing an enemy when the latter is on the move, a characteristic which makes it extremely difficult to outflank or to surprise him. He is an expert in the attack of detached posts and in the surprise of small parties. This skill may be enhanced by the employment of ruses which can justly be stigmatized as closely akin to treachery.'<sup>2</sup>

In order to defeat, even inconclusively, transfrontier barbarians who have attained the degree of military *expertise* shown by the Mahsūds in A.D. 1919 and by the Rifis in A.D. 1925, the Power behind the threatened *limes* has to exert an effort that—measured in terms either of manpower or of equipment or of money—is quite disproportionate to the modest challenge from its gadfly opponents to which this ponderous counter-attack is the irreducible minimum of response.

"The maximum fighting strength of the Mahsūds was estimated at 16,000 and that of the Wana Wazīrs (who did not follow the example of

<sup>1</sup> Toynbee, *op. cit.*, p. 557.

<sup>2</sup> de Wetteville, H.: *Waziristan, 1919-1920* (London 1925, Constable), p. 23. Evidence bearing out this appreciation will be found *pagim*. There are striking examples on pp. 130, 156, 207-9, and 213. The quotations from this book have been made with the permission of the publishers.

the Tochi Wazirs in submitting) at 7,000; but the effective number of combatants was limited by the number of efficient breach-loading rifles at their disposal, and this was estimated at not more than 8,000 in the case of the Mahsûds and 3,000 in that of the Wana Wazirs. Moreover, the number of small-bore rifles burning smokeless powder which the recalcitrant tribesmen possessed was estimated (even after their capture in May 1919) at not more than 3,500 in all, and this limited the size of the tribal force which would be under arms at any given moment, since throughout the campaign the tribesmen rigidly refrained, in daylight operations, from using rifles burning black powder, in order not to reveal their positions to the enemy. The largest force ever actually assembled at one moment was believed to have numbered 4,500, but this number was quite exceptional.<sup>1</sup>

'On the other side the Indian Expeditionary Force numbered 29,256 combatants and 34,987 non-combatants on the 13th November, 1919, and rose to an eventual daily average of 41,800 combatants and 37,900 non-combatants approximately . . . [But] less than a fifth of the total force, and hardly more than a fifth of the combatants, could be included in the Striking Force, which consisted on the 8th November of 8,500 combatants, 6,500 followers, 1,400 horses and equipment animals, and 7,300 transport animals'.<sup>2</sup>

The four years of arduous fighting between the forces of the British Indian Empire and the barbarians of Waziristan in A.D. 1919-23 were the significantly paradoxical consequence of a Third Anglo-Afghan War in which the barbarian belligerent had been defeated in a nine-days' campaign (9th-17th May, 1919). The Afghan aggressors' performance had been as ignominious as the British victors' had been brilliant;<sup>3</sup> but this relatively easy victory over a vulnerably organized barbarian principality<sup>4</sup> had to be purchased by the civilized belligerent at the cost of a disproportionate effort of the same relative order of magnitude that was afterwards to be exacted by the harder task of chastising the elusive Mahsûds. On the Afghan side the concentration of regular troops at the end of April 1919 was estimated by the British military intelligence at a total figure of not more than 35,260 sabres and rifles,<sup>5</sup> while on the Indian side 'at one time the strength of the force employed trans-Indus amounted to 340,000 men and 158,000 animals, and it will readily be understood that the maintenance of these numbers with depleted means of transportation was a problem of considerable difficulty'.<sup>6</sup> The difficulties were increased by an epidemic of cholera and a heat wave,<sup>7</sup> and by

<sup>1</sup> See de Watteville, *op. cit.*, pp. 24-25.—A.J.T.

<sup>2</sup> Toynbee, *op. cit.*, pp. 556-7, following de Watteville, *op. cit.*

<sup>3</sup> A brief account of this war will be found in Toynbee, A. J.: *Survey of International Affairs, 1920-1923* (London 1925, Milford), pp. 376-84.

<sup>4</sup> In terms of the barbarian reservoir beyond the *limes* of the Roman Empire on the European Continent the war-bands of Waziristan might be compared with those of the Transrhene German tribes that annihilated Varus's army in A.D. 9, whereas the principality of Afghanistan might be compared with the Bohemian principality of Maroboduus, which was saved from Roman attack in A.D. 6 by the outbreak of a Pannonian revolt, or with the Transylvanian principality of Decebalus, which was conquered by the Romans in A.D. 101-6.

<sup>5</sup> Dispatch, dated the 1st November, 1919, from General Sir C. C. Monro, Commander-in-Chief in India (printed as Second Supplement to the *London Gazette* of the 12th March, 1920), §§ 20-21.

<sup>6</sup> Monro, *op. cit.*, § 5.

<sup>7</sup> See *ibid.*, §§ 16-17.

the size of the theatre of operations. This problem of geographical scale was given prominence in the report of the British Commander-in-Chief.

'During the course of the war our troops were engaged on a front extending along the whole length of the Afghan frontier from Chitral on the north-east to Seistan on the south-west, a total distance of about 1,000 miles; indeed, the fighting front may be said to have extended still further, for our line of communication defence troops on the 300 miles of road between Robat and Rui Khaf were kept constantly on their guard against raids from across the border and were at one time directly threatened by a small Afghan force which was detached from Herat towards the Persian frontier. Never before have simultaneous operations been undertaken on the frontier of India which have covered so wide an extent of front.'<sup>1</sup>

The ascertained maximum trans-Indus British strength of 340,000, unlike the estimated Afghan strength of 35,260, included, of course, non-combatants, and the Afghans were thought to have been counting in A.D. 1919 on raising the unsubdued barbarians, on either side of the theoretical Indo-Afghan frontier, whose total strength in a *levée en masse* was estimated at approximately 120,000 rifles. Yet, even if Amānallāh had not been disappointed in this hope (as in A.D. 1925 'Abd-al-Karīm was to be disappointed in his similar hope of raising the tribesmen of the Atlas), and if the forces of the British Indian Empire had had to meet a combined force of 150,000 Afghan regular and tribal irregular barbarian fighting-men, their maximum total number of men employed trans-Indus would still have been more than double the total number of their adversaries; and, if the ratio of non-combatants to combatants in General Monro's force in the spring of A.D. 1919 was the same, or thereabouts, as it was in the expeditionary force that was operating in Waziristan later in the same year,<sup>2</sup> this immense mobilization of manpower would only have enabled the British Indian Empire to meet the Afghan regular army and tribal levy with a combatant strength that, if the tribesmen had actually risen *en masse*, would have been no more than just equal to the barbarian enemy's combined total.

The most significant point about this disparity between the efforts respectively required of the British and of their opponents on the North-West frontier of India in A.D. 1919 was that the disparity had recently begun to increase, as is revealed by a comparison of the Waziristan campaigns of A.D. 1917 and A.D. 1919 with their predecessors in the series.

'In spite of the ease with which the campaign of 1917 was brought to its conclusion, certain facts were already becoming patent. Whereas in 1860 a single brigade had marched right through Waziristan without grave hindrance, and whereas in 1894 and 1901 widely separated columns were employed with impunity, yet for many years it was beginning to be believed that an invader of Waziristan must employ greater forces and observe greater precautions. Further, just as the Mahsūds were acquiring more rifles of range and precision firing smokeless powder, and also exhibiting greater skill in their use, so the invader was ever inclined to

<sup>1</sup> Monro, *op. cit.*, § 27.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 22-23, above.

resort to more scientific equipment and more impedimenta. In addition, public opinion now demanded more comforts for the troops, while a fresh difficulty was accruing out of the increasing number of medical units accompanying any expedition. Circumstances were thus all tending to complicate the transport problem and to augment the size of supply trains. Yet the lines of communication were unquestionably becoming more vulnerable than they were before the tribesmen possessed modern weapons. It was still necessary to employ long convoys of primitive pack transport; even in 1919 motor transport was impracticable above the lower valleys.<sup>1</sup>

The same tale is told by the history of the Roman Imperial Army, which had, as we have seen,<sup>2</sup> to be progressively increased in numerical strength to offset the progressive increase in the military efficiency of the transfrontier barbarians whom it was its duty to hold at bay. When, early in the third century of the Empire's existence, Septimius Severus (*imperabat* A.D. 193-211) added three new legions<sup>3</sup> to the thirty that had been maintained since A.D. 83<sup>4</sup> for the defence of the static frontiers that had been first marked out by Augustus (*imperabat* 31 B.C.-A.D. 14), the consequent additional strain on the Empire's man-power and revenue was not very serious; but it was quite another matter when, early in the fourth century of the Empire's existence, Diocletian (*imperabat* A.D. 284-304) found himself compelled to raise the Army's strength again, and this time from about 300,000 men to about 500,000.

*The Besieged Civilization's Inability to Redress the Balance by Recourse to Organization and Technique*

In an economically complex civilization with a money economy, any increase in the numerical strength of a regular standing army entails a corresponding increase in the pressure of taxation upon national income. The diversion of an intolerably large, and still insatiably growing, proportion of a dwindling national income to meet rising costs of public services is the most conspicuous of the social maladies that were the death of the Roman Empire in the West in the fifth century and in the Centre and East in the seventh century of the Christian Era; and, while one cause of this cancerous growth of the fiscal burden on the backs of the Roman Imperial Government's subjects was an increase in the personnel of the Imperial Civil Service to fill an administrative vacuum arising from the progressive decay of local self-government,<sup>5</sup> a second cause—which would probably turn out to have been by far the more potent of the two, if all the relevant figures were known to us—was the increase in the man-power of the Imperial Army which was required in order to meet the increase in the transfrontier barbarians' military efficiency. We do know that, in the annual budgets of the British Rāj in India during the last century of its existence, the cost of defence (which, in practice, meant the defence of the North-West Frontier) was an item that absorbed a disconcerting proportion of the revenue.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> de Watteville, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-44.

<sup>2</sup> In VI. vii. 156; 321, n. 2; and 323, n. 5.

<sup>3</sup> See VI. vii. 321, n. 2.

<sup>4</sup> See VI. vii. 156.

<sup>5</sup> See VI. vii. 59-60 and 166.

<sup>6</sup> 'The most striking feature on the expenditure side of the central budget is the very

Thus, if the chronic warfare between the defenders and assailants of a *limes* is waged in terms of competitive staying power, the defence is bound to collapse sooner or later, since, so far as it is able to hold its own, it can achieve this only by exerting an effort which becomes more and more disproportionate to the effort exacted from its increasingly efficient barbarian adversaries.<sup>1</sup> In this situation there are two obvious courses to which the defence may resort in the hope of arresting, by one means or the other, this progressive deterioration of its own position. It can mobilize for the defence of the *limes* either its own capacity for organization and technique, in which a civilization is superior to its barbarian neighbours almost *ex hypothesi*, or its barbarian adversaries' capacity for taking military advantage of the local *terrain* through which the *limes* runs. These two policies of elaborating its own organization and armaments and of recruiting barbarian man-power are not, of course, mutually exclusive, and a harassed Power behind a *limes* had usually resorted to both in its desperate search for some means of reversing the accelerating inclination of the scales of war in its barbarian opponents' favour which is the inexorable effect of the passage of Time on a frontier where the civilized party is content to remain passive.

In the last struggle for life of an Hellenic Civilization which had never been technical-minded and which had long since lost any faint proclivities in this direction that it might occasionally have displayed in earlier chapters of its history, it was not technique but organization that was called into play by Diocletian in his heroic attempt to solve a problem of defence which had been shown to have become a question of life and death for the Roman Empire by the break-through of the trans-frontier barbarians into the interior of the Empire on all fronts during the anarchic years A.D. 235-84.

Diocletian's solution was to reorganize completely the Roman Imperial system of defence which had been left unchanged in principle during the three centuries that had elapsed since its original institution by Augustus. Augustus's first concern had been to give the Hellenic

high proportion of the expenditure on defence, which, under a scheme introduced in 1928-29, has been stabilised for a period of 4 years at Rs. 55 crores per year. This figure is over 60 per cent. of the total central revenues, and nearly a third of the total net central and provincial revenues of the country taken together' (*Report of the Indian Statutory Commission*, presented May 1930, vol. i (London 1930, H.M. Stationery Office, Cmd. 3568), § 413, p. 362).

<sup>1</sup> The difference in the degree of the effort required from a civilized army and from a barbarian war-band in order to produce an equal quantum of military effect was once expressed in quaintly concrete financial terms by a correspondent of the present writer's in a comparison between the respective performances of the British Army and the Hijāzi Army against the Turkish Army in the General War of A.D. 1914-18. 'From first to last, the military operations of the Hijāzi Army accounted for 65,000 Turkish troops at the cost of less than £100 per head of subsidy, whereas, in the British Army's operations against the Turks, each Turkish casualty or prisoner cost from £1,500 to £2,000' (Toynbee, A. J.: *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, vol. i (London 1927, Milford), p. 283, n. 2).

Ibn Khaldūn (*Muqaddamāt*, translated by de Slane, Baron Mc.G. (Paris 1863-8, Imprimerie Impériale, 3 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 92-94), propounds, as a general 'law', a tendency for the burden of taxation in an empire to grow heavier with the lapse of time, but (thinking, as he does, exclusively in terms of empires founded by Nomad barbarians) he attributes this tendency to increasing demands of the imperial government for defraying rising costs of living incurred by the ruling elements. He makes no mention in this passage of rising costs of imperial defence.



World the maximum opportunity of recuperating from the exhaustion produced by a hundred years of social revolution rankling into civil war, and one of his measures for attaining this end had been to reduce to a minimum the swollen armies that had been mobilized for this fratricidal warfare in the last paroxysm of an Hellenic Time of Troubles. Apart from a modest personal body-guard, he had provided in his permanent military establishment for nothing in the nature of a reserve. His troops of the line barely sufficed to demarcate the Imperial frontiers; they were, in fact, little more than a police-cordon; and, for the security of the interior of the Empire, the Augustan régime relied, in lieu of an adequate provision for defence, on the superiority of its professional army over the transfrontier barbarians in military quality and on the awe inspired by Roman power, which might be expected to deter the barbarians from putting the Imperial defences to any serious practical test.<sup>1</sup> By Diocletian's day this hazardously economical security system had long since gone bankrupt; for the military efficiency which the barbarians had been progressively acquiring in the school which the *limes* afforded had eventually given them both the nerve and the skill to break through the cordon confining them; and in such an emergency the Imperial Government's only means of repairing one breach was to risk another by denuding some distant sector of the frontier that happened at the moment to be quiescent. Though the Romans held the interior lines and could avail themselves of easy and rapid water-transport across the maritime heart of their empire for shuttling troops from one breached frontier to another, the system was radically unsound, and Diocletian reformed it by taking a cue which Septimius Severus had given to his successors when he had placed one of his three new legions in reserve at Albano. Diocletian organized a reserve which amounted in numbers to perhaps not much less than two-fifths of the total strength of a military establishment that was perhaps larger by two-thirds than the Severan;<sup>2</sup> the best units in the Army were assigned to this new force;<sup>3</sup> and it was designed to be as mobile as the raiding barbarian war-bands which it was its task to overtake, bring to battle, and destroy.<sup>4</sup>

From the scientific standpoint of a professional soldier, this Diocletianic system of substituting defence in depth for linear defence by organizing a mobile reserve in support of the front line represents a notable advance in the art of war; and it was no doubt partly owing to this military reform that the Empire—which had seemed to be in the throes of dissolution during the half century immediately preceding Diocletian's accession—actually held out for a hundred years longer in the West and for three hundred years longer in the East and Centre. Yet, though the civilian population might find the conditions of the Diocletianic Age a relief from those of the foregoing bout of anarchy, they would have been happy indeed to exchange them for those of the militarily archaic Augustan Principate.

<sup>1</sup> 'The greatness of the Roman People has propagated an awe of them beyond the Rhine and beyond the Empire's established limits' (Tacitus: *Germania*, chap. xxix, § 3, apropos of the relation of a transfrontier Teuton community, the Mattiisci, to the Roman Empire in the writer's day).

<sup>2</sup> See VI. vii. 323, n. 5.

<sup>3</sup> See VI. vii. 322.

<sup>4</sup> See VI. vii. 323.

The truth is that Diocletian's professionally admirable military reorganization dealt the civilian population a double blow. On the one hand the belated provision of a numerically sufficient mobile reserve accounted for that huge increase in the total military establishment which had, as we have seen,<sup>1</sup> to be paid for by the higher taxation of a lower national income. On the other hand the concentration of the *élite* of the Army in the mobile reserve still further lowered the *moral*, as well as the efficiency, of the cordon-troops (now explicitly called *limitanei*, to distinguish them invidiously from the *comitatenses* serving in the Emperor's counter-war-band); the last pretence of the Army's being able to hold the barbarians at the *limes* was now virtually abandoned; and it came to be taken for granted that the war-zone, in the warfare between the Roman Imperial Army and its barbarian adversaries, was no longer the *glacis* on the barbarians' side of the *limes*, and no longer even the marches of the Empire in the *limes'* immediate rear, but territories in the interior that were the Empire's economic and cultural vitals. The scientifically impeccable watchword of 'defence in depth' was, in fact, a euphemism for glozing over the humiliating and disastrous fact that the civilian producer of the national income, after he had been fleeced once by the Imperial inland revenue authorities to pay for a vast increase in the Imperial military establishment, was now exposed to the additional affliction of being fleeced for a second time by barbarian raiders whom the Diocletianic new-model army could not, after all, prevent from ravaging the Empire's heartlands.<sup>2</sup>

This attempt to solve the problem of defence by an improvement in organization, which was such a brilliant failure in the military history of the Diocletianic Roman Empire, had brought in better returns to Powers burdened with anti-barbarian frontiers in a Modern Western World. General Sir C. C. Monro's lightning victory over the Afghans in A.D. 1919 was a triumph of organization in a sudden emergency; Marshal Lyautey's gradual pacification of the Atlas highlands between A.D. 1907 and A.D. 1934<sup>3</sup> was a still more signal triumph of organization applied to the deliberate execution of a long-term plan; and these are merely two illustrations out of a multitude lying ready to the historian's hand. In the policy of Modern Western imperial governments, however, the resort to organization as a means of redressing an unfavourably inclining balance in the defence of a *limes* was overshadowed by the resort to technique in an age when Western technology was advancing at an unprecedented pace into a previously undreamed-of wonderland of scientific discovery and practical 'know-how'.

In such circumstances the Western parties to the conflict between Civilization and Barbarism might well feel confident of being able to set so hot a pace in the progressive application of technology to border warfare that their barbarian competitors would find themselves run off their

<sup>1</sup> On p. 25, above.

<sup>2</sup> This is the burden of Zosimus's critique of the Diocletianic reorganization of the Roman system of imperial defence (see VI. vii. 320, n. 6).

<sup>3</sup> Marshal Lyautey himself retired in A.D. 1925, nine years before his work was completed by his successors; but the credit for the whole achievement morally belongs to him.

feet. If the barbarian had shown himself able to procure from abroad and even passably imitate at home a relatively simple product of the Modern Western technique, such as an up-to-date breach-loading rifle, was it not the obvious retort for his Western adversary to raise the technological level of competition in armaments from small-arms to artillery, from fire-arms to the aeroplane, and—in terms of the release of atomic energy—from the non-fissile to the fissile type of explosive for the manufacture of bombs? For, even if the barbarian could procure aeroplanes from abroad and could learn to become as skilful an air-pilot as he had already become a marksman, it was hardly conceivable that he could provide for the servicing of aeroplanes, not to speak of installing the plant for manufacturing them, and it was virtually out of the question for him to procure atom bombs from abroad, and quite out of the question for him to acquire and apply the 'know-how' of manufacturing them and detonating them. When Western Man had crowned a century of scientific achievement by discovering how to harness atomic energy to the service of War, it looked indeed as if it now lay in his power (if he could reconcile this with his conscience) literally to annihilate the last surviving rearguards of Barbarism in their last remaining pockets of unsubdued territory—always supposing that these condemned barbarian prisoners of a ubiquitous industrial Western Civilization were not reprieved, after all, by seeing the Western masters of the World destroy one another first in an atomic fratricidal warfare.

This thesis that technique is a winning card in Civilization's hand is forcefully presented in a passage from the pen of a brilliant observer of a campaign in which a Modern Western Power overthrew a barbarian opponent on his own ground by bringing into action against him the Western technique of the Pre-Atomic Age.

'Halfa is nearly four hundred miles from the Atbara; yet it was the decisive point of the campaign; for in Halfa was being forged the deadliest weapon that Britain has ever used against Mahdism—the Sudan Military Railway. In the existence of the railway lay all the difference between the extempore, amateur scrambles of Wolseley's campaign and the machine-like precision of Kitchener's. When Civilisation fights with Barbarism it must fight with civilised weapons; for with his own arts on his own ground the barbarian is almost certain to be the better man. To go into the Sudan without complete transport and certain communications is as near madness as to go with spears and shields. Time has been on the Sirdar's side, whereas it was dead against Lord Wolseley; and of that, as of every point in his game, the Sirdar has known how to ensure the full advantage. There was fine marching and fine fighting in the campaign of the Atbara; the campaign would have failed without them; but without the railway there could never have been any campaign at all. The battle of the Atbara was won in the workshops of Wady Halfa.'<sup>1</sup>

By thus availing himself of a modern Western technology's earliest achievement in the field of mechanical transport, a British general who had been trained as a military engineer was able, in A.D. 1898, to conquer, in little more than six months, an Eastern Sudan whose war-

<sup>1</sup> Steevens, G. W.: *With Kitchener to Khartum* (Edinburgh and London 1898, Blackwood), chap. 3, *ad init.*, pp. 22–23.



like barbarian denizens, in A.D. 1881-5, had thrown off a sixty-years-old Egyptian domination and had signally defeated the hazardously amateur efforts which Egypt's British conquerors had made at the eleventh hour to salvage a crumbling Egyptian régime without having time to employ those scientific methods by which Kitchener was subsequently to retrieve his predecessors' disastrous failures. This victory of a British-built railway over the Madhist barbarians of the Eastern Sudan in A.D. 1898 had been anticipated by the victory of a Russian-built railway over the Türkmen barbarians of Transcaspia in A.D. 1873-86,<sup>1</sup> and that triumph of Western technique in the hands of Orthodox Christian converts to a Western technological civilization was still more impressive than its subsequent emulation by the countrymen of George Stevenson, who might have been expected to be the first in the field in any application of a technical device that was an English invention.

A generation later, when this Western feat of harnessing steam-power had been eclipsed by the more extraordinary feat of harnessing atomic energy, it was a temptation for Western minds to assume that the problem of anti-barbarian frontiers had now been solved decisively by the progress of Western technology up to date. At the time of writing, however, atomic energy had not yet been used for the destruction of either Barbarism or Civilization; and the recent experience of Western Powers in trying to offset their barbarian opponents' skill in adapting the use of Modern Western weapons and tactics to the local *terrain* by bringing into action, on their own side, additional Modern Western weapons, of ever more elaborate kinds, had demonstrated that the elaboration of technique, like the elaboration of organization, carried with it certain inherent drawbacks in addition to the untoward social effect of its crushingly heavy cost to the tax-payer and the untoward educational effect of its initiation of the barbarian into the ever more formidable tricks of his civilized adversary's trade.<sup>2</sup> These inherent drawbacks to an elaboration of technique might go far towards neutralizing even the military effect of this expedient for redressing the balance of power between Civilization and Barbarism along a static *limes*.

These limitations upon the effectiveness of Technology as one of Civilization's weapons against Barbarism are illustrated by the history of the Waziristan campaign of A.D. 1919-20. At the opening of these operations 'the efficiency of the troops in India had sunk to a lamentably low ebb,'<sup>3</sup> and 'it became manifest, soon after the expedition set out, that there was no alternative but to rely on a liberal employment of artillery and on a lavish expenditure of ammunition and of engineer stores to counterbalance the initial lack of skill displayed by the troops'.<sup>4</sup> In this campaign, in the end, 'the aeroplane, the howitzer, the gun, and the

<sup>1</sup> See V. v. 323, n. 3, and p. 139, below.

<sup>2</sup> 'The development of any strategic perception or of a more far-seeing or reasoned leading among the frontier tribes is perhaps improbable. On the other hand, should any such tendencies creep into their conduct of war, and should the tribesmen ever, by any chance, be supported by skilled advice, or find themselves in the possession of efficient artillery, numerous machine guns or stocks of grenades and analogous adjuncts of war, the prospect of entering on a campaign of this nature without highly trained troops is not alluring' (de Watteville, *op. cit.*, p. 210).

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 91.

grenade' duly 'redressed the balance' which had been inclined in the Mahsūd barbarian's favour by his superiority to the British Indian soldier in individual prowess as a fighting-man using a Modern Western rifle on his own intractable ground. But the British expeditionary force's dependence on an elaborate equipment proved a source of weakness in two respects. In the first place, 'under conditions where the capacity of the transport constitutes a dominant factor, the greater the skill and mobility of the troops, the smaller the amount of stores and of transport required, and the greater the resultant freedom of action in the conduct of the operations.'<sup>2</sup> The British expeditionary force's dependence on equipment tied it by the leg,<sup>3</sup> and in the second place the military advantage purchased at this high cost in loss of mobility was at a minimum on this *terrain*. 'The tactical methods permissible in the great struggle in Flanders' did not 'turn out appropriate to the nature of Indian mountain warfare'.<sup>4</sup>

'Where large masses can be used, where artillery and high explosive predominate, certain tactical processes of a rather crude nature can be employed, and the training of the individual can remain more elementary. . . . But on the Indian frontier the case is very different. In mountain warfare, as it still remains in spite of all progress achieved in modern military equipment, numbers will rarely be present, while the enemy is particularly expert in the use of ground and of the rifle. Those who attack such a formidable fighting man, over *terrain* of his own choosing, must be able to compete with him individually on more or less level terms. Otherwise the handicap becomes too great. . . . The soldier required for frontier warfare must be trained for the end in view.'<sup>5</sup> . . . The incidents of the campaign of 1919-20 . . . prove in the most unmistakable fashion the value, or rather the absolute necessity, of a very high standard of individual training among all combatant troops employed in a mountain expedition.'<sup>6</sup>

### *The Barbarians' Military Elusiveness and Economic Parasitism*

The technique which thus proved to be no adequate substitute for personal skill and prowess on the civilized belligerent's side had a further drawback that was still more disconcerting: its hammer-blows were apt to beat the air<sup>7</sup> without inflicting any decisive damage on a target which was as elusive and intangible as the armaments brought to bear against it were unwieldy.

While, at the time of writing, it seemed possible, as has been suggested,<sup>8</sup> that the recent Western invention of the atom bomb might prove physically capable of eliminating once for all a pocket of unsubdued Barbarism, even in trackless mountain country, by literally annihilating all life within the recalcitrant area, it was perhaps doubtful whether even this tremendous weapon, however ruthlessly employed,

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 208.

<sup>3</sup> See Toynbee, A. J.: *Survey of International Affairs, 1925*, vol. i (London 1927, Milford), pp. 557-8.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 209.

<sup>7</sup> The civilized belligerent's difficulty in deciding upon his military objective—not to speak of attaining it when it has been fixed—is touched upon in de Watteville, op. cit., pp. 89 and 166.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 91.

<sup>4</sup> de Watteville, op. cit., p. 209.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., p. 208.

<sup>8</sup> On p. 30, above.

could exterminate the Nomad barbarians of Arabia and the Sahara who were still eluding effective control by the sedentary Powers that were their nominal sovereigns. The taming of these Afrasian Nomads had been facilitated, as we have seen,<sup>1</sup> by the pre-atomic Western invention of mechanically driven vehicles whose caterpillar tracks could carry them over mud and sand; but the Nomad denizen of the Steppe enjoyed a social advantage in his contest with a sedentary antagonist which could not be impaired by any technical change in the conditions of warfare on his *terrain*. In the past, this Nomad type of transfrontier barbarian had notoriously been the most difficult for the Power behind the *limes* to cope with, because he was unhampered by the possession of immovable property, so that his civilized assailant had no definite objective at which to aim and no power of bringing this mobile enemy to battle by threatening some fixed asset of his which he could not afford to leave undefended. The classical exposition of this invincible elusiveness of the Nomad is given in Herodotus's account of the Achaemenian empire-builder Darius the Great's unsuccessful attempt to incorporate in his dominions the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe by subduing its Scythian rangers of that day. After marching and counter-marching over the face of the Steppe without coming any nearer to bringing the Scythians to battle,

'Darius sent a despatch-rider to the King of the Scythians, Idanthysrus, with the following message: "You are a queer fellow! I cannot understand why you keep perpetually on the run when you have two alternatives. If you consider yourself a match for my force, for God's sake stop this dodging, stand your ground, and fight; but, if you know in your heart that you are outclassed, then, if that is the position, again I say: for God's sake stop trekking, bring me offerings of earth and water as acknowledgments that I am your lord and master, and then we can start talking." Idanthysrus's answer to this overture was as follows: "Master Persian, I will put my cards on the table. Never in my life have I run away from anybody out of fear—never in the past, and not now from you. What you have found me doing now is exactly what I habitually do in peace-time; I have made no change. And now I will explain, too, why I do not promptly give you battle. The reason is that we possess neither cities that we might be afraid of your capturing nor plantations that we might be afraid of your cutting down, so there is nothing to push us into fighting a pitched battle with you. But, if you really have to be in such a hurry to seek a decision, let me tell you that we do have tombs in which our ancestors lie buried. Now, just you find those tombs and try to desecrate them, and then you will discover whether we shall fight you for those tombs or not. Short of that, we shall not engage you unless we see reason for doing so."<sup>2</sup>

While the Nomad herdsman on the Steppe thus provides a classical illustration of the transfrontier barbarian's elusiveness, the sedentary highlander barbarian's way of life neutralizes the effect of the elaborate weapons of Civilization to a hardly lesser degree by the same retort of denying them an adequate target. It is true that the sedentary barbarian

<sup>1</sup> On p. 19, above.

<sup>2</sup> Herodotus: Book IV, chaps. 126-7.

has given some vulnerable hostages to Fortune. The Power behind the *limes* may retaliate for the wild highlander's raids into imperial territory by destroying the offending war-band's villages and burning its crops; and in the Air Age the champions of Civilization could take these punitive measures without having to follow the toilsome and risky traditional course of marching an expeditionary force on foot into the highlander's fastness. They could send over a few aircraft to do, in a few minutes, without hazard to themselves, a stint of destruction that might have cost a ground-force weeks of fighting and hundreds of casualties; yet nothing is gained by any improvement in the technical means of executing a military operation when the operation itself is intrinsically futile in the sense of being ineffective for producing its intended political result; and punitive measures against even a sedentary transfrontier barbarian are apt to achieve the very opposite of their purpose—which is to turn a brigand into a good neighbour.

Depriving the barbarian of one season's crop is an ineffectual measure of coercion so long as the barbarian himself lives to raise another crop next year (as he will, unless the work of destruction is repeated annually); and burning or bombing his house is likewise ineffectual when he is capable of rebuilding this crude structure of wattle and daub, or of unhewn stones plastered over with mud, with his own hands in one winter, during spare months in which he can neither work in the fields nor go on the war-path.<sup>1</sup> This capacity of his for quickly repairing, by self-help, any material damage inflicted on him by the fortunes of war is one example of a general social 'law' that we have encountered in another context.<sup>2</sup> In warfare between antagonists that are not on an equality in their level of civilization, the more highly civilized belligerent is apt to win victories that are pyrrhic because they leave the victor exhausted, while his less highly civilized opponent is apt to suffer defeats that are

<sup>1</sup> As the writer was penning these lines, he was having a vivid recollection of two meetings of his with a Turkish peasant in a village in Western Anatolia. When this kindly Turk first gave the writer hospitality in his house in the winter of A.D. 1920-1, the house and the whole village were intact, and, when the same host gave the same guest hospitality for the second time in the spring of A.D. 1923, he again had a house in which to receive a visitor, and this house was again surrounded by a cluster of other simple houses of the kind. If the visitor had not happened to know that, since his previous visit, the whole village had been rased to the ground in the last phase of the Graeco-Turkish war of A.D. 1919-22, he would never have guessed that the house in which he was being received on this second occasion was not physically the same house that had given him a night's shelter before. The change that was manifest even to a foreigner's eye was not the loss and replacement of the house but the difference in the spirits of its owner. On the first occasion the Turkish householder had been patently depressed by the experience of living under enemy occupation—the village being at that time on the Greek side of a Graeco-Turkish military front. On the second occasion, which was after the eventual Greek débâcle, the village was free and the householder's spirits were high. 'All is well now, you see', he said. 'Those Greek soldiers are not here any longer. Yes, they burnt the village before they left, and my house with the rest—the house in which I had the pleasure of entertaining you last time you were passing this way. But, you see, we all built new houses for ourselves last winter, and now we have done our spring sowing, so the damage has been repaired and—we are also free men once more.'

The material standard of life in this West Anatolian Turkish village, which seemed primitive to a West European eye, would have seemed lordly to a contemporary Kurd from Dersim or Mahsūd from Waziristan; and thus the ability of this Turkish village community to reconstruct the material basis of its life in a single season gives the measure of the Kurd's and the Pathan's capacity for economic recuperation on their own lower economic level.

<sup>2</sup> In IV. iv. 393-4.

inconclusive because of the recuperative power that is Nature's compensation for the handicap of backwardness in organization.

The operation of this law as between the East Roman Empire and Bulgaria in the tenth and eleventh centuries of the Christian Era proved to be the key to the subsequent collapse of the victor and revival of his victim, and we noticed in this connexion how, in the General War of A.D. 1914-18 and its immediate sequel, a highly organized Germany remained prostrate owing to the exhausting effect of her barren victories long after a relatively primitive Turkey and Russia had managed to take the field again notwithstanding their recent shattering defeats. The same 'law' can be seen at work in the warfare between transfrontier barbarians and the Power behind the *limes*. So long as the people themselves are not physically annihilated—and a transfrontier barbarian has the proverbial nine lives of a cat—the barbarian belligerent cannot be brought to heel by destroying his rudimentary and readily replaceable property. So far from being an effective sanction, this punitive destruction of property has the effect of confirming him in the predatory way of life from which it is intended to deter him; for if the barbarian is exasperated—and, still more, if he is both exasperated and starved through being deprived by hostile military action of the product of even the modicum of peaceful handiwork that he has still been carrying on side by side with a guerrilla warfare that has already become his major occupation—the double pressure of necessity and resentment will move him more than ever to look for his livelihood to the deeds of war instead of to the works of peace.

A consciousness of this 'boomerang' effect of punitive action perplexed the British guardians of the North-West Frontier of India during the last chapter of their stewardship.

'In common with all other peoples in a similar stage of social development, the Mahsûds possessed no organic centres, the destruction of which could so far impair their economic or social welfare as would infallibly bring them to their knees. Makin, one of their main centres of population, in addition to countless other villages, had been devastated during previous campaigns by way of punitive retaliation, yet such measures had never effectually put an end to their perennial acts of brigandage. Fines had been levied, but the tribesmen had continued to retrieve such losses by plundering their weaker neighbours. Rifles had been confiscated (!), yet in the end this measure seemed only to encourage further thefts and murders in order to replace the (not numerous) surrendered weapons. There is a point beyond which reprisals cannot be carried without provoking undue exasperation or else bringing the subjects of this treatment to partial starvation, unless, indeed, the regular forces imitate the Germans when they methodically drove the Hottentots into the Omaheke Desert—there to die of thirst. But on the [North-West] Frontier [of India], even apart from the ethical side of the question, such action is not practicable. . . . The success of any punitive expedition is best gauged by the permanence of the moral impression which it leaves on the uncivilised mind. . . . In the case of the Mahsûds, punitive expeditions had failed to cause the desired moral impression for any length of time.'<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> de Watteville, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-93.



The ineffectiveness of the expedient of destroying a recalcitrant barbarian's property was indeed demonstrated afresh in the Waziristan campaign of A.D. 1919-20 when a British column at last reached the Mahsūd 'town' of Kaniguram at the cost of nearly twelve weeks' marching and fighting.

'Previous history . . . lends colour to the belief that the Mahsūds were convinced that the Striking Force had now nearly achieved its worst; it might still destroy Kaniguram, but must then retire. These things had happened before, and in any case would not very deeply affect any but the inhabitants of the place itself. The rifles would thus remain, while raiding and looting would eventually make good the losses incurred by the tribesmen during the campaign.'<sup>1</sup>

'Much the same difficulty was to be experienced at Wana as had been encountered at Kaniguram. . . . The destruction of towers and of principal houses belonging to those sections [of the Wana Wazirs] known to be hostile was then taken in hand. But such measures did not appear to accelerate the rate of payment of the fine or of surrender of rifles. . . . Moreover, the majority of the more distant tribal sections, inhabiting districts bordering on Afghanistan, are virtually nomads owning no landed property, no dwellings, nor crops. They wander among the mountains of Waziristan and can take refuge across the Afghan border if hard pressed. The problem of bringing these people to submission seemed insoluble.'<sup>2</sup>

The fact is that punitive measures defeat their own object by accentuating an already prevalent tendency in the transfrontier barbarian's social evolution which is precisely what has made him such an awkward neighbour.<sup>3</sup> If the transfrontier barbarian had remained an unmodified primitive man living in the static Yin-state in which the genuinely primitive societies were found as far back in Time as the existing evidence carried a twentieth-century Western historian's knowledge of them, a decidedly greater proportion of his total energies would have been devoted to the arts of peace and a correspondingly greater coercive effect would have been produced upon him by the punitive destruction of the products of his pacific labours. The tragedy of a *ci-devant* primitive society's moral alienation from an adjoining civilization by which it has previously been attracted is that the consequent deterioration of their relation from one of progressive cultural radiation-and-mimesis to one of chronic hostilities leads the barbarian to neglect his former peaceful avocations in order to specialize in the art of border warfare—first in self-defence, in order to save himself from subjugation or annihilation at the hands of a civilization that has turned savage, and later—when his growth in military efficiency on his own *terrain* has gradually reversed the balance of military advantage in his favour—as an alternative means of making his livelihood. To plough and reap vicariously with sword and spear<sup>4</sup> is more lucrative for the barbarian now that a civilization which has been thrown on the defensive can be mulcted of its wealth by way of either loot or subsidies, and this is also more congenial to him now that the

<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 165.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., pp. 175-6.

<sup>3</sup> This distinctive social evolution of the transfrontier barbarian has been touched upon by anticipation, in V. v. 230-3, apropos of its reflection in the field of religion.

<sup>4</sup> See Gilbert Murray's translation of the song of Hybris—an heir of barbarian Greek conquerors of a Minoan Crete—in III. iii. 87, n. 1.

barbarian has become a warrior first and foremost and has remained only secondarily a husbandman. The barbarian adjoining a *limes* thus ceases to be economically self-supporting and becomes an economic parasite on the civilization on the other side of the military front.<sup>1</sup>

A classical illustration of this characteristic economic regression of the estranged barbarian proselyte of a disintegrating civilization is afforded by Tacitus's description of the German denizens of the barbarian 'reservoir' adjoining the Continental European *limes* of the Roman

<sup>1</sup> While this economic retrogression of the barbarian in a 'reservoir' dammed back by a *limes* is one of the general effects of the erection of a *limes* in any physical environment, the effect naturally varies in degree in proportion to the extent of the difference between the regions segregated from one another by the *limes* in point of relative economic attractiveness or unattractiveness. Evidently the 'reservoir' barbarian will be the more prone to seek his livelihood by plundering his civilized neighbour's garden than to seek it by cultivating his own wilderness, the more forbidding the wilderness is, and the more smiling the garden. A case in point is the poverty of the Pathan highlands by comparison with the adjoining lowlands of Afghanistan as well as Pakistan (see Toynbee, A. J.: *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, vol. 1 (London 1927, Milford), pp. 546-7).

This point is of some importance, because one of the considerations that are apt to decide an empire-builder to draw his *limes* along a particular line, short of having reached 'a natural frontier', is that, along this line, he has found himself at the limit of the area that he can reckon on being able to exploit economically, with profit to himself, by means of the economic technique of which he is master—at whatever stage of technological 'know-how' he may happen to be at the time when he is choosing the line for his *limes*. This last qualification has to be added because a country-side that is economically profitable for a society at one level of economic technique may be economically unprofitable for a society at another level. For the Romans round about the beginning of the Christian Era it was economically unprofitable to saddle themselves either with North European territories in which the post-glacial forest still had the upper hand over a primitive agriculturist's attempts to clear it, or with an Arabian desert which the sedentary husbandman could never hope to dispute with the stock-breeding Nomad. Accordingly the Romans drew their European *limes* just short of the coal-deposits in the Ruhr, and their Syrian *limes* short of the oil-deposits in Arabia.

The Romans did not live to regret this economic blindness of theirs, since their empire came and went before the technique for turning coal and mineral oil to economic account was discovered by the latter-day children of a Western Civilization sprung from the Roman Empire's ruins. On the other hand, there were Modern Western Governments that had had the provoking experience of seeing territories in which they had lightheartedly disinterested themselves, in the belief that they were valueless, turn out to be of inestimable economic value in terms of new technological discoveries. The Powers more or less interested in a latter-day Arabia had no sooner completed the delimitation of frontiers in that peninsula after the General War of A.D. 1914-18 than they were made aware, by the subsequent pioneer work of Western oil-prospectors, that the sub-soil of the deserts which they had been dividing between them by drawing imaginary straight lines on a small-scale non-geological map was oozing with oil. An equally undreamed-of wealth of oil had likewise belatedly been discovered to underlie the surface of lands in the eastern part of the State of Oklahoma that had become the property of Indians descended from 'the five civilized nations' who had been relegated there since A.D. 1825 in the belief that, for the White Man, this was the least desirable piece of country within the whole vast area of the United States. In A.D. 1952 there was a strange irony in the contrast between the respective current economic values of these oil-lands in Oklahoma, to which 'the five nations' had been deported, and the cotton-lands in Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi, from which they had been evicted. A similar reflection was suggested at the same date in England by the grass-clad solitudes that had replaced, on the Downs, the cultivation which the Roman had once found there in an age when the forest-clad plains of Britain were as inaccessible to the Celtic husbandman as the forest-clad plains of North America were to the Indian hunter at the time of the arrival of the White Man in the New World.

On the morrow of a latter-day Western discovery of the technique of splitting the atom of one particular chemical element, it looked as if a revaluation of the planet's wealth in terms of uranium instead of gold might produce even more sensational surprises; and such surprises were bound to evoke correspondingly poignant regrets in the hearts of the makers of frontiers in a politically divided society embracing the entire surface of the globe.

Empire at a date by which this *limes* had been in existence for about a century and a half and had therefore had time to produce a *limes*' typical social effects. Tacitus affirms<sup>1</sup> that cattle is the Germans' sole form of wealth; but the relative unimportance of agriculture in the German economy of that day, which is implied in this and other passages of the Roman observer's work, cannot have been due to ignorance or even to inexperience.

'Archaeological investigation has now proved that the cultivation of cereals in the North of Europe goes back to the Stone Age. Of still greater importance is the discovery of the representation of a plough with two oxen among the rock-carvings at Tegneby in Bohuslän, which date from the Bronze Age. However sceptical one may feel towards the dates fixed by archaeologists, this discovery shows without doubt that a highly developed system of agriculture was practised in Sweden before the beginning of the Christian Era. Some other explanation of the accounts given by Caesar and Tacitus must therefore be found. What the true explanation is has been clearly shown by a careful examination of the various passages in which these writers refer to the subject.<sup>2</sup> The growth of the military spirit had led to a neglect of agriculture, as both writers<sup>3</sup> expressly state.'<sup>4</sup>

This interpretation of the unimportance of agriculture 'in the economy of those Germans who were within range of Roman observation in Tacitus's day as being evidence, not of an infantile economic backwardness, but of a recent economic relapse from a higher pristine

<sup>1</sup> Tacitus: *Germania*, chap. 5.

<sup>2</sup> 'During the intervals between bouts of war, [the Germans] spend a little of their time in hunting, but most of it in doing nothing. They give themselves up to sleeping and eating, and it is precisely the bravest and most warlike of them that are the most idle. They leave it to the women, the old men, and the unfit members of the family to look after the home, the household, and the fields, while the warriors laze. It is a curious incongruity in their character that they should so love sloth and at the same time so hate tranquility' (Tacitus: *Germania*, chap. 15).

<sup>3</sup> Whereas Tacitus attributes this neglect of agriculture to the Germans in general, without distinguishing in this matter between one Teutonic people and another, Caesar (*Bellum Gallicum*, Book IV, chap. 1; cp. Book VI, chap. 22) attributes it to the Suebi in particular. The method, here ascribed by Caesar to the Suebi, of moving their quarters every year and never cultivating the same piece of land a second time was reminiscent of the primitive agriculture which Modern Western observers had seen practised by Mayas in Yucatan (see II. ii. 418) and by Bantu peoples in Tropical Africa (see II. ii. 26-7). The Suebi were more remote from the Roman *limes* than the kindred Teutonic peoples to the west of them, and the explanation of their slovenliness in agriculture as being an effect of the *limes* is proportionately less convincing. At the same time, the hypothesis that they were recent initiates into the art of agriculture is untenable, in view of the fact that agriculture was long since well established among their northern neighbours in Scandinavia and their north-eastern neighbours in Estonia. A possible alternative explanation is suggested by a passage in Strabo (*Geographica*, Book VII, chap. i, § 3, p. C 291) in which this Hellenic observer in the next generation after Caesar's ascribes to the Suebi a way of life which is not that of primitive cultivators but is that of the Eurasian Nomad stock-breeders. In Caesar's and Strabo's day the Suebi lived in a region between the south-eastern corner of the Baltic Sea and the north-western shore of the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe which, in the subsequent map of Western Christendom, was to be occupied by Lithuania and Poland; and the local Polish and Lithuanian variety of a Western culture was to be markedly affected by the radiation of cultural influences from an adjoining Nomadic World. Might not the Suebi have previously succumbed, in the same habitat, to the same influences from the same quarter?—A.J.T.

<sup>4</sup> Chadwick, H. M.: *The Origin of the English Nation* (Cambridge 1907, University Press), pp. 286-7. The quotations from this book have been made with the permission of the publishers.



state, is confirmed by Tacitus's own observation that the Ests (*Aestii*)—who were living then, as now, on the eastern seaboard of the Baltic—'cultivate cereals and the other fruits of the Earth with an assiduity that stands out in contrast to the typical German sloth'.<sup>1</sup> The habitat of these virtuous Estonian husbandmen lay to the north-east of the Teutonic peoples' domain and was thus at a farther remove from the birthplace of agriculture somewhere in South-Western Asia. In travelling from Asia into Europe round the head of the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe, which was the western tip of Nomad's Land, the technique of agriculture could have reached Estonia only by way of Germany, and the German peoples who had passed the art on to the Ests must once have been not less good husbandmen than the Ests still were when they were observed by Tacitus's informants. When we ask ourselves why Tacitus's Ests should have retained their hold on agriculture while Tacitus's Germans had lost theirs, the obvious answer is that, by comparison with Tacitus's Germans, the Ests were remote, not only from the South-East Asian birthplace of the ancient invention of agriculture, but also from the Central European location of a recently established *limes* of the Roman Empire. While the Germans adjoining this *limes* had had their lives turned upside-down by the experience of living at close quarters with it, the Ests had been left still high and dry on the farther side of the 'reservoir' which the erection of the *limes* had created. The Ests were still industriously practising agriculture for the same reason that explains why the Suebi, Goths, and Swedes were still remaining loyal to a patriarchal form of kingship, in contrast to the political instability which the south-western Germans in the recently created 'reservoir' had been exhibiting when they had abandoned this same traditional form of government, first for an Hellenic-inspired oligarchy and latterly for the likewise Hellenic-inspired dictatorship of a war-lord backed by his war-band.<sup>2</sup>

Moreover, there is evidence that these north-eastern Germans out of range of the Roman *limes* had preserved not only their pristine political institutions but also the pristine devotion to agriculture that was characteristic of their eastern neighbours the Ests in Tacitus's time. When, some three or four hundred years later, the Germans in 'the reservoir' adjoining the Roman *limes* at last broke through the dam and flooded Gaul and Britain, the social and economic devastation which was the first effect of this cataclysm was followed, after the human flood waters had soaked into the social soil, by an economic advance that was the reward of a new agricultural technique, and this new technique had been introduced by the barbarian invaders. The Frankish and

<sup>1</sup> Tacitus: *Germania*, chap. 45, § 4.

<sup>2</sup> For the survival of a primitive patriarchal monarchy among the Teutonic peoples out of range of the Roman *limes*, see Dawson, Christopher: *Religion and the Rise of Western Culture* (London 1950, Sheed & Ward), pp. 79–81, as well as the present Study, V. v. 213, n. 1—citing Chadwick, *op. cit.*, pp. 298–9 (a passage which is based on Tacitus: *Germania*, chap. 44)—and V. vi. 230–2. The interpretation of the war-lord in the barbarian 'reservoir' as a counterpart of the Caesar on the other side of a *limes* will be found in V. vi. 4, n. 4, and on p. 10, above. The general contrast between the revolution that overtakes the transfrontier barbarians of 'the reservoir' and the still undisturbed life of the transreservoir barbarians in a Hyperborean 'back of beyond' has been noticed in II. ii. 315–22, and on p. 4, above.

English war-bands brought with them into Northern Gaul and Eastern Britain the potent mould-board plough which, in the course of the Dark and Middle Ages, was to bring to fruition the latent fertility of heavy North European soils which had been impervious to the light plough used by Celts and Romans. Though, at the time of writing, Archaeology had not yet detected exactly when or where in Northern Europe this revolutionary technological invention had been made, it was manifest that it could not have been introduced into the former north-western provinces of the Roman Empire by transfrontier German invaders in the fifth century of the Christian Era unless these economically regressive barbarians had been able to learn—or re-learn—its use from north-eastern neighbours of theirs whose remoteness from a subversive Roman *limes* had permitted them still to follow their traditional way of life in an age in which the Germans in 'the reservoir' had been demoralized by the military frontier's proximity.

A people that was still giving hostages to Fortune by still leading the pristine agricultural sedentary life of the Ests and Swedes of Tacitus's day would evidently be more amenable than the elusive barbarians in 'the reservoir' to the punitive action of a 'civilized' Power employing ponderous weapons; but the Power behind a *limes* has no quarrel with Hyperboreans who are not only innocent of offence against its imperial peace but are also insulated from any direct contact with its armed forces by 'the reservoir' that lies between the *limes* and 'the back of beyond'. The denizens of 'the reservoir' are the barbarians with whom the Power behind the *limes* is in a state of chronic war, and in this warfare the economic regression that is the reverse side of the 'reservoir' barbarians' militarization is the trump card in their hand. Thanks to this economic relapse, they have little material wealth to lose; and, having little to lose by war with the neighbouring civilization, they have little to fear from the continuance of hostilities, or indeed from their intensification.

### *The Self-Defeat of a Policy of Setting a Thief to Catch a Thief*

This striking inequality in the material consequences of border warfare for the two belligerents is reflected in a great and growing inequality between them in *moral*. For the children of a disintegrating civilization that is standing on the defensive—at any rate for a demilitarized majority of them in the interior, as distinct from a barbarized minority in the marches—the interminable border warfare with the barbarians beyond the *limes* spells the burden of an ever-increasing financial charge and the anxiety of a never solved military and political problem. For the barbarian belligerent, on the other hand, the same warfare has the very opposite psychological associations. For him it is not a burden but an opportunity, not an anxiety but an exhilaration. A contest that is always harassing for the civilized party—and utterly devastating for him when he finds himself no nearer to being within sight of the end of it after he has mobilized all his resources of organization and technique—is the very breath of life for the militarized barbarian. This great and always

increasing inequality in 'psychological armament' makes the discomfiture of the civilized belligerent inevitable sooner or later.<sup>1</sup>

In this situation it is not surprising that the party who is both author and victim of the *limes* should not resign himself to his doom without trying a last expedient. If his own resources have proved disappointingly inefficacious for redressing a balance that has been remorselessly inclining against him, might he not be able to avert an otherwise manifest destiny by enlisting his barbarian adversary's disastrously demonstrated prowess in a tottering civilization's defence? If Brennus insolently threw his sword into the scale of Barbarism, why should not the scale of Civilization be saved, at the eleventh hour, from kicking the beam by deftly inserting into it the swords of a legendary Gallic barbarian's living Teuton, Sarmatian, Hun, and Arab counterparts?

This subtle policy of setting a thief to catch a thief might seem, indeed, to have everything to recommend it. The barbarian warrior is the citizen soldier's superior in the art of border warfare because the barbarian is fighting here on his own familiar ground; and he has come to be also the citizen-soldier's superior in personal prowess because he has acquired a zest for the profession of arms which his adversary has lost. This better military material can be purchased at a very much lower cost to the citizen-taxpayer;<sup>2</sup> and this cheap conversion of an enemy warrior into a friendly mercenary will doubly relieve the pressure on the *limes* by reducing *pari passu* both the power of the 'reservoir' barbarian to take the offensive and his incentive for going on the war-path. His power will

<sup>1</sup> This difference in attitude towards the ordeal of War likewise comes to light between parties who are sundered from one another by a less deep and less sharply cut psychological gulf than that which divides the transfrontier barbarians from the Power behind the *limes*.

In the summer of A.D. 1914, for example, the outbreak of war in Europe was taken more tragically by the peoples of the West than it was by the Serbs—though the Serbs had only just emerged from two successive Balkan Wars and were being called upon, this time, to face, not just Turkey or Bulgaria, but the overwhelmingly superior power of Austria-Hungary. Yet the Serbs were less dismayed by the prospect of this third war against enormous odds than they were exhilarated by the hope of this time being able—at the price of a holocaust—to complete the achievement of their national aspirations.

The same spirit had been displayed repeatedly by the Poles, who were culturally much closer akin than the Serbs were to the Western Europeans. During the Peace Conference of A.D. 1919 a friend of the writer's, Mr. Laurence Hammond, who was in Paris for the occasion as the special correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, was talking one day about the peace settlement to a member of the Polish Delegation with a baffling sense that they were speaking at cross purposes. His Polish interlocutor must have had the same feeling; for, in the middle of the conversation, he remarked on this to the following effect: 'The truth is that you and I are approaching these questions from entirely different points of view. For you Westerners, as I have realized, the war that we have just been through has been a hideous and disastrous break in the peace which you have come to think of as being the normal condition of civilized life; and, in your ideas about a peace settlement, the paramount consideration in your minds is to avoid anything that might threaten to involve you in another catastrophe of the kind. If you could not persuade yourselves that this last war was "a war to end war", you would hardly be able to face the future. We Poles look at things quite differently. For us, War, not Peace, is the normal condition of life. We have been through many wars before this last one, and we expect to have to go through many more; but this does not dismay us, and it certainly does not deter us from pressing our national claims. If we get what we are asking for, I agree that this may well involve us in future wars with our neighbours; but, for us, that is all in the day's work. No doubt we shall again find ourselves at war; no doubt we shall again suffer catastrophes that would seem crushing to you English and French; and no doubt, in the next chapter of the story after that, there will still be a Poland on the map.'

<sup>2</sup> See p. 26, n. 1, above.

be reduced because his forces will now be divided (and every enlisted barbarian will count twice over in this redistribution of man-power, since he will be leaving one warrior the less to Barbarism in bringing one soldier the more to Civilization). At the same time the unenlisted barbarian's temptation to plunder his civilized neighbours will be appreciably diminished. Economic distress in a poverty-stricken and hitherto over-populated 'reservoir' will be mitigated by an outflow of man-power into the imperial forces on the other side of the *limes* and a consequent inflow of remittances from these mercenary barbarian soldiers' pay (a payment for services rendered which is decidedly preferable, from the Imperial Power's point of view, to the humiliating subsidies or plunderings that are the only too familiar alternative ways of effecting a transfer of purchasing-power which, in some form or other, is inevitable). If nevertheless an insatiable cupidity should entice the non-enlisted barbarian warriors into reverting to their traditional malpractices, they will now find themselves confronted, no longer by citizen-soldiers with no stomach for fighting, but by barbarian mercenaries who may be expected to give a good account of themselves—not only because they enjoy fighting and thirst for the fame that is the non-material reward of barbarian military prowess, but also because they will now have property of their own, on the civilized side of the *limes*, to defend against the covetous hands of their still predatory kinsmen from beyond the pale.

This impressive consensus of considerations had frequently led the rulers of universal states both to enlist transfrontier barbarian soldiers in their standing armies and to plant transfrontier barbarian settlers on the imperial side of the *limes*, in the marches or even in the interior. These would-be measures of imperial defence have been examined in other contexts,<sup>1</sup> and the details need not be recapitulated here. In this place we need only recall our previous finding<sup>2</sup> that this alluring expedient for averting a collapse of the *limes* actually precipitates the catastrophe which it is designed to forestall, and we may proceed to inquire into the explanation of this apparent paradox.

Part of the explanation is, of course, to be found in the consideration that, in taking the barbarians into its service, the Power behind the *limes* is also taking them into its confidence and is thereby subjecting them to an intensive course of instruction in a military and political 'know-how' which they can afterwards employ, if they choose, to their own profit at their teachers' expense.

'It can be said of the Roman, Chinese, and British Indian empires alike that the method that worked best was one of enlisting the services of the very tribes that were supposedly excluded by the boundary, thus turning them about so that they faced away from the boundary instead of toward it. . . . Nevertheless, it was a method that haunted the imperial state responsible for it, because it created a sword of two edges capable of striking outward when held in a strong hand but of cutting inward when the hand weakened. From border societies of this kind, linked with boundary-maintaining empires, were drawn the "barbarian auxiliaries"

<sup>1</sup> In V. v. 459–80, especially pp. 460 and 464, and VI. vii. 335–8. See also Chadwick, H. M.: *The Heroic Age* (Cambridge 1912, University Press), p. 445.

<sup>2</sup> On pp. 12–13, above.

of Rome and the "tributary barbarians" of China; from a similar society the British Empire in India recruits both regular troops and tribal levies. From the same societies came invaders and conquerors of both Rome and China; and the people of the same kind with whom the British now<sup>1</sup> deal are as dangerous as they are useful.<sup>2</sup>

This last point is pertinently illustrated by a feature of the Waziristan campaign of A.D. 1919-20.

'The presence in Waziristan of not less than eighteen hundred fighting men—consisting of deserters from the two militia forces and ex-soldiers of the Indian Regular Army—who had received some form of British training had familiarised the tribesmen with the most modern tactics in rifle-fighting, and they now possessed sufficient stocks of ammunition to employ these tactics effectively.'<sup>3</sup>

In the history of the Roman Empire's long-drawn-out struggle to arrest an inexorable inclination of the scales in the transfrontier barbarians' favour, a comparable policy of enlisting barbarians to keep their fellow barbarians at bay similarly defeated itself—if we are to believe a hostile critic of the Emperor Theodosius I's administration—by initiating the barbarians into the Roman art of war and at the same time apprising them of the Roman Empire's weakness.

'In the Roman forces, discipline was now at an end, and all distinction between Roman and barbarian had broken down. The troops of both categories were all completely intermingled with one another in the ranks; for even the register of the soldiers borne on the strength of the military units was now no longer being kept up to date. The [barbarian] deserters [from the transfrontier barbarian war-bands to the Roman Imperial Army] thus found themselves free, after having been enrolled in Roman formations, to go home again and send off substitutes to take their place until, at their own good time, they might choose to resume their personal service under the Romans. This extreme disorganization that was thus now prevalent in the Roman military formations was no secret to the barbarians, since—with the door thrown wide open, as it had been, for intercourse—the deserters were able to give them full intelligence. The barbarians' conclusion was that the Roman body politic was being so grossly mismanaged as positively to invite attack.'<sup>4</sup>

When such well-instructed mercenaries change sides *en masse*, it is no wonder that they are often able to give the *coup de grâce* to a tottering Power behind the *lines*, which has enlisted their services as a last resort. But we have still to explain why they should be moved, as they so frequently are, to turn against their employers. When once they have been taken into the Imperial Power's service, does not their personal interest coincide with their professional duty? The regular pay that they are now drawing from the Imperial Treasury is both more lucrative and more secure than the plunder that they used to snatch at the risk of their lives in occasional raids; the rich land assigned to them by the Imperial

<sup>1</sup> This passage was written in or before A.D. 1940.—A.J.T.

<sup>2</sup> Lattimore, O.: *Inner Asian Frontiers of China* (New York 1940, American Geographical Society), pp. 245-6.

<sup>3</sup> Toynbee, A. J.: *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, vol. i (London 1927, Milford), p. 557.

<sup>4</sup> Zosimus: *Historiae*, Book IV, chap. xxxi, §§ 1-3.



authorities inside the *limes* is an equally advantageous exchange for the wretched land beyond the pale that was too poor to keep them alive if they did not eke out its scanty produce by lifting crops and cattle, on the civilized side of the *limes*, which are now theirs to enjoy by right. Does not this change in their fortunes give them a stake in the survival of the empire thanks to whose patronage the change has come about? If they turn against the masters whom they have contracted to serve on such favourable terms as these, are they not virtually inviting their kinsmen who have stayed beyond the pale to scramble with them for benefits that remain their own monopoly so long as they keep the *limes* inviolate? Why, then, turn traitor? *Cui bono*?

The single answer to all these questions is that, in turning against the empire which he has been hired to defend, the barbarian mercenary is indeed acting against his own material interests, but that in doing this he is not doing anything peculiar. Man seldom behaves primarily as *homo economicus*, and the behaviour of a transfrontier barbarian in the service of the Power behind the *limes* is determined by an impulse that is stronger than any economic considerations. The governing factor in the situation is that the barbarian beyond the pale has long since become estranged from a broken-down neighbouring civilization. This moral breach between the two parties cannot be mended by a business deal—however profitable to both sides the bargain may be. An unreconciled estrangement will prevent the barbarian who has enlisted in the Imperial Government's service from being assimilated to the culture of the society which he has contracted to defend by force of arms; and, if enlistment will not lead to assimilation, the policy of enlistment cannot succeed.

The truth is that, in enlisting the barbarian in its service, the Power behind the *limes* is attempting, under altogether unpropitious psychological conditions, to recapture the relation between Barbarism and Civilization that prevailed in days when the civilization had not yet broken down and the *limes* had not yet come into existence. The defence of the civilization by an inner ring of barbarians against an outer ring of barbarians was something that happened of itself, without any contract between the parties, so long as a growing civilization was attracting the barbarians by its charm. Under these psychological conditions an inner ring of barbarians served spontaneously both as a conductor through which the civilization radiated its cultural influence into barbarian societies at a farther remove and as a buffer which absorbed the shocks of these outer barbarians' attempts to take by force<sup>1</sup> a cultural kingdom which, in its heyday, had for them the fascination of the Kingdom of Heaven. In these happy psychological circumstances the inner barbarian proselytes of one day became the cultural converts of the next, while today's outer barbarian assailants became tomorrow's inner barbarian proselytes. The growing civilization progressively extended its borders through the successive assimilation of one ring after another of its barbarian neighbours—a very different story from the subsequent history of a broken-down civilization's expansion by force, up to the

<sup>1</sup> Matt. xi. 12.

limit to which sheer force could carry it, at the expense of barbarians whom it has ceased to charm.

The reason why, after the breakdown of the civilization and the erection of the *limes*, the enlisted barbarians do not remain loyal is that, in the mercenary barbarian's soul, his business contract with his civilized employer is not underwritten by any desire to share in the civilization which he has undertaken to defend in return for a material *quid pro quo*. The direction of the current of mimesis has indeed, as we have seen,<sup>1</sup> long since been reversed, and, so far from Civilization's retaining any prestige in the barbarian's eyes, it is the barbarian who now enjoys prestige in the eyes of the representative of Civilization.

'Early Roman history has been described as the history of ordinary people doing extraordinary things. In the Later Empire it took an extraordinary man to do anything at all, except carry on a routine, and, as the Empire had for centuries devoted itself to the breeding and training of ordinary men, the extraordinary men of its last ages—Stilicho, Aëtius, and their like—were increasingly drawn from the Barbarian World.'<sup>2</sup>

While Stilicho was a barbarian, and an exceptionally loyal one, in the Roman Imperial service, Aëtius was a barbarized Roman marchman;<sup>3</sup> and it was not only in the Roman Empire *in extremis* that this assimilation of the marchman to the barbarian occurred. On the Central Asian *limes* of the Han Empire and its avatars, 'in entering "un-Chinese" *terrain* the Chinese had to modify or abandon their Chinese economy, thus weakening their attachment to other Chinese'.<sup>4</sup> This reversal of the direction of the current of mimesis is fatal for a policy of enlisting Barbarism in Civilization's defence. In these psychological circumstances a corps of barbarian *foederati* will never turn into a unit of the Imperial Regular Army; it will remain an unassimilated barbarian war-band retaining its own weapons and tactics, taking its orders from its own war-lord, feeling its own *esprit de corps*, nursing its own ambitions. In the same circumstances a settlement of barbarian *laeti*<sup>5</sup> will never turn into a civil community of imperial citizens; it will remain an unassimilated *imperium in imperio* which, short of being annihilated, will find its political destiny sooner or later in becoming the nucleus of a dissident successor-state. In short, the policy of hiring barbarians to keep their kinsmen out is foredoomed to failure; and, as this expedient is the last forlorn hope of the tottering Power behind the *limes*, its failure is immediately followed by the *limes'* collapse.

<sup>1</sup> In V. v. 459-80, and on pp. 14-15, above.

<sup>2</sup> Collingwood, R. G., in Collingwood, R. G., and Myres, J. N. L.: *Roman Britain and the English Settlements*, 2nd ed. (Oxford 1937, Clarendon Press), p. 307.

<sup>3</sup> See the passage quoted from Lot in V. v. 472.

<sup>4</sup> Lattimore, O.: *Inner Asian Frontiers of China* (New York 1940, American Geographical Society), pp. 243-4. Cp. the passage already quoted on p. 14, above.

<sup>5</sup> See VII. vi. 138-9.

## D. THE CATACLYSM AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

### *A Reversal of Roles*

WHEN a barrage bursts, the whole body of water that has been gradually accumulating in the reservoir above the dam runs violently down a steep place into the sea<sup>1</sup> in the twinkling of an eye, and this sudden release of a long-pent-up and ever-mounting force produces a threefold catastrophe. In the first place the flood destroys the works of Man in the cultivated lands below the broken barrage. In the second place the potentially life-giving water that has made this devastating passage pours into the sea and becomes lost in the sea-water's saline mass, without ever having served Man for his human purposes of irrigation or navigation or the generation of hydraulic power. In the third place the discharge of the accumulated waters empties the artificial lake above the barrage and leaves its margin high and dry, and this flight of the waters from above the dam dooms the exotic vegetation which had found an unexpected possibility of life at the stored-up water's edge to wither away without propagating its kind on a mountain-side that has now relapsed into its pristine barrenness. In short, the waters which fructified so long as the barrage held, make havoc everywhere, in the lands that they lay bare as well as in those that they submerge, so soon as the bursting of the barrage releases them from the control which the existence of the barrage had imposed upon them.

This episode in Man's contest with Physical Nature is an apt simile of what happens in Man's struggle with Human Nature, in his neighbours and in himself, upon the collapse of the military barrage of a *limes*. The resulting social cataclysm is a calamity for all concerned; but in the human, as in the physical, disaster the incidence of the devastation is unequal, and in this case likewise the distribution of the damage is the reverse of what might have been expected *a priori*. There is, in fact, here a paradoxical reversal of roles.<sup>2</sup> So long as the representatives of a disintegrating civilization were successful in saving a tottering *limes* from collapse, the tribulation which it cost them to perform this *tour de force* was progressively aggravated, as we have seen,<sup>3</sup> out of all proportion to the progressive increase in the pressure exerted by the transfrontier barbarians. On the other hand, now that the disaster, so long dreaded and so long averted by the Power behind the *limes*, has at last duly descended upon the doomed civilization's devoted head, the principal sufferers are no longer the ex-subjects of the defunct universal state, over whose fields and cities the deluge of barbarian invasion now rolls unchecked, but the ostensibly triumphant barbarians themselves. The hour of their triumph, for which they have thirsted so long, proves to be

<sup>1</sup> Matt. viii. 32; Mark v. 13; Luke viii. 33.

<sup>2</sup> The play of this ironical motif in human affairs—for which Aristotle coined the term *περιπέτεια*—has been discussed in IV. iv. 245–61.

<sup>3</sup> On pp. 12, 25–26, and 39–40, above.



the occasion of a discomfiture which neither they nor their defeated adversaries had foreseen.

*The Demoralization of the Barbarian Conquerors*

What is the explanation of this apparent paradox? The answer is that the *limes*, whose resistance the transfrontier barbarian has been seeking all the time to overcome, has served, not only as the bulwark of Civilization that its builders and defenders had intended it to provide against an outer Barbarism, but also as a providential safeguard for the aggressive barbarian himself against demonically self-destructive psychological forces within his own bosom.

We have seen<sup>1</sup> that the proximity of a *limes* induces a malaise among the transfrontier barbarians within range of it because their previously primitive economy and institutions are disintegrated by a rain of psychic energy, generated by the civilization within the *limes*, that is wafted across a barrier which is an obstacle to the fuller and more fruitful intercourse characteristic of the relations between a growing civilization and the primitive proselytes beyond its open and inviting *limen*. We have also seen<sup>2</sup> that, so long as the barbarian is confined beyond the pale, he succeeds in transmuting some, at least, of this disturbing influx of alien psychic energy into cultural products—political, artistic, and religious—which are partly adaptations of institutions created by the civilization from which the intrusive cultural influence comes, and partly new creations of the barbarian's own. This capacity for adaptation and even creation, that is thus displayed by the barbarian while he is still beyond the pale, is a symptom that the psychological disturbance to which he is being exposed is being kept within bounds within which it can produce a partially stimulating and not wholly demoralizing effect; and this saving curb is provided by the existence of the very *limes* which the barbarian is bent on destroying; for the *limes*, so long as it holds, supplies a substitute, in some measure, for the indispensable discipline of which Primitive Man is deprived when the breaking of his cake of primitive custom<sup>3</sup> converts him into a transfrontier barbarian. This discipline is partly imposed on him externally; for, so long as the perennial border warfare continues, the barbarian belligerent, whether his role be that of raider, hostage, or mercenary, is being trained continually perforce in a stern yet at the same time instructive military school; but the *limes* disciplines him most effectively in the psychological sense of giving him tasks to perform, objectives to reach, and difficulties to contend with that call forth his highest powers and constantly keep his efforts up to the mark.

When the sudden collapse of the *limes* sweeps this safeguard away, the nascent creative powers that have been evoked in the transfrontier barbarian by the challenge of the *limes* are daunted and defeated by being called upon, suddenly and prematurely, to perform new tasks that are altogether too great and too difficult for them to cope with; and in this hour of bewilderment, when there is no more spirit in them,<sup>4</sup> these frail

<sup>1</sup> On pp. 4-9 and 35-39, above.

<sup>3</sup> See the phrase quoted from Bagehot in II. i. 192.

<sup>2</sup> On pp. 9-11, above.

<sup>4</sup> 2 Chron. ix. 4.

shoots of tender wheat are quickly stifled by the tares in the spiritual field of the barbarian's soul—his *abandon*<sup>1</sup> and his ferocity—which find boundless opportunities for luxuriant growth now that the former raider and mercenary has entered into his long-coveted kingdom. If the trans-frontier barbarian is a more brutal, as well as a more sophisticated, being than his ancestor the primitive tribesman, the latter-day barbarian who has broken through the *limes* and carved a successor-state out of the derelict domain of a defunct universal state becomes differentiated from his already barbarian predecessor beyond the pale in the same two senses in a still higher degree. As soon as the barbarian has left no-man's-land behind him and set foot in a ruined world which is for him an earthly paradise, his malaise rankles into demoralization. This demonic revolution in the barbarian's soul is illustrated by the spiritual catastrophe which overtook the Scandinavians when they overran the Carolingian Empire.<sup>2</sup> When, in the Viking Age, they tore their life up from its static primitive roots and launched it into pure adventure, the price of an excessive liberation was a fatal loss of balance.<sup>3</sup>

'When the King's hall was transplanted into a foreign country and his luck plucked out of the fields and grazing grounds surrounding his manor, life necessarily became a round of battles and drinking feasts.'<sup>4</sup>

In this exotic environment the barbarian's previously manifest vices become flagrant, and his previously latent vices become manifest.

For example, the tendency towards parasitism,<sup>5</sup> revealed in the barbarian's loss of grip upon the economic arts of peace through which his primitive forebears earned their livelihood,<sup>6</sup> is kept in check, so long as the *limes* stands, by the parasite's finding himself compelled to pay by fighting—either as a raider or as a mercenary set to catch the thief that his brother has continued to be—for the living that he has ceased to earn by productive labour. But this last shred of economic respectability falls from the barbarian's shoulders when his eventual acquisition of provinces which he has plundered or policed in the past gives him an effortless command over the wreckage of a civilization which, for him, still amounts to fabulous wealth. Hybrias the unchallenged master of a prostrate Minoan serfdom is a more odious parasite than Hybrias' father, who had to snatch his booty or draw his pay from imperial Minos' store at the cost of putting his own life in jeopardy.

Again, the tendency towards sloth which the transfrontier barbarian already displays is, beyond the pale, likewise confined, as Tacitus

<sup>1</sup> The passive way of behaviour, produced by schism in the soul, which we have called *abandon* (alias *ἀπαρέα*), has been discussed in V. v. 377 and 399-403.

<sup>2</sup> See II. ii. 340-60.

<sup>3</sup> See Grönbech, V.: *The Culture of the Teutons* (London 1931, Milford, 3 vols. in 2), vols. ii-iii, pp. 304-5.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 305.

<sup>5</sup> A hermit-crab, which is the arch-parasite, is the antithesis of a chrysalis; and this contrast gives the measure of the gulf between the barrenness of the External Proletariat and the creativity of the Internal Proletariat—considering that the role of chrysalis bridging the transition to an affiliated from an apparent civilization, which had sometimes been played by churches created by internal proletariats, proves not to have been more than an incidental deviation from a higher religion's true calling (see VII. vii. 392-419).

<sup>6</sup> See pp. 35-38, above.

observed,<sup>1</sup> to bouts of idleness spent in consuming a windfall acquired in the warrior's latest raid or latest term of mercenary service; and the idler takes it for granted all the time that he will have to go on the war-path again as soon as his momentary gains have been spent—whereas the barbarian master of a successor-state feels himself dispensed from living from hand to mouth and joyfully lapses into vegetating as a boorish sybarite, with no forebodings of a day of judgement on which the strong man<sup>2</sup> who has thus heedlessly laid aside his arms may be despoiled of his ill-gotten goods by a stronger than he—as the Vandals were overtaken by a Roman *revanche* and the Visigoths by the swoop of fellow barbarian Arab raiders who had not yet had time, since their passage of the Roman Empire's Syrian *limes*, to tread the barbarian conqueror's demoralizing road all the way to its miserable journey's end. The alternative route to the same dismal goal is the even less romantic path that was trodden by the Kassites and the Merovingians, who were denied the comparatively honourable exit of a violent death in order to be sentenced in the bankruptcy court of History when they had run through the wasting assets of a civilization which had already gone into disintegration before they had arrived on the scene to speed the course of its ruin by making a bonfire out of a dead society's derelict social heritage.

In whichever of these two alternative ways they meet their end,<sup>3</sup> the barbarians in *partibus civilium* cast themselves, as we have observed by anticipation,<sup>4</sup> for the sordid role of vultures feeding on carrion or maggots crawling in a carcass; and it has been noticed by Ibn Khaldūn that they are apt to display a most unheroic prudence in keeping at a safe distance from their dying victim's body until the life has so far gone out of him that there is no danger any longer of his being able to offer any resistance.

'[The future founders of a successor-state] give way to baseless fears whenever they hear talk of the [flourishing] state of the existing empire and of the vast resources that it has at its command. This is enough to deter them from attacking it, and so their chief is obliged to have patience and to bide his time. But, when the empire has fallen into complete decadence, as invariably happens, and when its military and financial strength has suffered mortal injuries, this chief is rewarded for having waited so long by now finding himself able to take advantage of the opportunity of conquering the empire. . . . When the will of God has made itself manifest, and the old empire is on the point of collapse, after having reached the term of its existence, and has become disorganised in all its parts, its feebleness and exhaustion attract its adversary's notice. . . . Encouraged by this discovery, the people of the new empire prepare with one accord to open the attack; the imaginary dangers that had shaken their resolution up to that moment now disappear, the period of waiting comes to an end, and the conquest is accomplished by force of arms.'<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In the passage quoted on p. 37, n. 2, above.

<sup>2</sup> Luke xi. 21-22; cp. Matt. xii. 29; Mark iii. 27.

<sup>3</sup> These alternative endings of the barbarians' adventures have been touched upon in I. i. 58-59 and in IV. iv. 484-6, and are surveyed at greater length at the close of the present chapter.

<sup>4</sup> In I. i. 62.

<sup>5</sup> Ibn Khaldūn: *Muqaddamāt*, translated by de Slane, Baron McG. (Paris 1863-8, Imprimerie Impériale, 3 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 134-5.

As examples of this circumspect method of 'conquering' a moribund universal state, Ibn Khaldūn cites the eviction of the Umayyads by the 'Abbasids; the supplanting of the 'Abbasids in their turn by the Tabarī 'Alids in Daylam and by the Daylamīs in the two 'Irāqs and in Fars; the eviction of the 'Abbasids' local successors in Egypt by the Katāma Berbers ('the Fātimids'), of the Ghaznavids by the Saljūq Turks, and of the last of the 'Abbasids and their supplanters east of the Euphrates by the Mongols, who, as he points out, took forty years (A.D. 1220-60) to build their empire up; the eviction of the Far Western Umayyads' successors by the Lamtūna Berbers (the Murābits), of the Lamtūna by the Masmūda (the Muwāhids), and of the Masmūda by the Zanāta (the Marinids).<sup>1</sup> After presenting his readers with this survey, Ibn Khaldūn anticipates a pious Muslim's objection that the Primitive Muslim Arabs' conquest of the Romans and the Sasanidae was a genuine—and tremendous—feat of arms, and he concedes that this is a miraculous exception of the kind that proves a rule. A more sceptical student of this at first sight astonishing achievement may be inclined to question whether Ibn Khaldūn need have feared that it might seem to invalidate his thesis; for, when all allowance has been made for the *élan* of a Khālid b. Walid, a satisfactory and sufficient explanation of the rapidity and ease of the Arab conquests is to be found in the fact that, immediately before the Arabs' eruption, the Roman and Sasanian empires had bled one another white and fought one another to a standstill in the internecine wars of A.D. 572-91 and A.D. 603-28, and that the Monophysite Christian subjects of the Roman Empire south of the Taurus were at least as deeply alienated from their 'Melchite' Orthodox Christian rulers as the Nestorian Christian subjects of the Sasanian Empire in 'Irāq were from their Zoroastrian rulers.

If the parasitism and the idleness already displayed by the barbarian while still beyond the pale are apt to luxuriate as soon as the collapse of a moribund universal state's last powers of resistance removes the last check on this cautiously predatory scavenger's perpetual temptation to take his ease, other vices, previously latent, become flagrantly manifest in the barbarian as soon as he brings upon himself, by breaking through the *limes*, the fantastic experience of 'Alice through the Looking Glass'. The origin of this revolting array of moral disorders is to be found in a sudden emancipation for which the victim-beneficiary is morally unprepared. Liberation from the restraint imposed by the existence of the *limes*, and of the Power behind it, is as demoralizing for the barbarian as, in the would-be civilized society that he overruns, is an adolescent's escape from the control of parents and pedagogues before the creature has acquired the will or power to attempt to control itself.

'The qualities exhibited by these societies, virtues and defects alike, are clearly those of adolescence. . . . The characteristic feature . . . is emancipation—social, political, and religious—from the bonds of tribal law. . . . The characteristics of heroic ages in general are those neither of infancy nor of maturity. . . . The typical man of the Heroic Age is to be compared rather with a youth. . . . For a true analogy we must turn to

<sup>1</sup> Ibid., pp. 135-7.

the case of a youth who has outgrown both the ideas and the control of his parents—such a case as may be found among the sons of unsophisticated parents who through outside influence, at school or elsewhere, have acquired knowledge which places them in a position of superiority to their surroundings.<sup>1</sup>

The latent weakness of the abruptly emancipated adolescent comes out conspicuously on the social and political plane. As we have noticed already,<sup>2</sup>

'in social organisation the distinguishing feature of the Heroic Age is in the nature of a revolt or emancipation from those tribal obligations and ideas by which the society of primitive peoples is everywhere governed. The same remark applies in principle to political organisation: the princes of the Heroic Age appear to have freed themselves to a large extent from any public control on the part of the tribe or community. The changes which we have noted in Religion have a similar tendency. Tribal ideas give way to universalism both in the cult of higher powers and in the conception of immortality; and in both the Teutonic and Greek heroic ages these changes seem to be associated with a weakening in the force of Religion. . . . It will be seen that the emancipation of which we are speaking is partly of an intellectual character. This applies both to Religion and to those ideas which govern social relations. On the other hand it is also partly in the nature of a freedom from outside control, both in social relations and in government. The force formerly exercised by the kindred is now largely transferred to the *comitatus*, a body of chosen adherents pledged to personal loyalty to their chief. So also, in government, the council of the tribe or community has come to be nothing more than a *comitatus* or court. The result of the change is that the man who possesses a *comitatus* becomes largely free from the control of his kindred, while the chief similarly becomes free from control within his community.'<sup>3</sup>

#### *The Bankruptcy of a Fallen Civilized Empire's Barbarian Successor-states.*

On the barbarian's native heath beyond the pale, this social and political revolution wears the aspect of an act of creation opportunely filling a vacuum produced by the disintegration of primitive institutions under the corroding influence of the civilization behind the *limes*; and in this relatively simple social environment the new régime duly serves its turn well enough sometimes to move the statesmen of the adjoining universal state to utilize it for their own purpose of transforming a no-man's-land into a glacis for a *Festung-Oikoumenê*. The capacity of a barbarian war-lord and his *comitatus* to perform, on occasion, the service of providing a buffer-state for a universal state in the last phase of its history was demonstrated in the histories of the Ghassanid Arab principality, covering the Syrian desert frontier of the Roman Empire,<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Chadwick, H. M.: *The Heroic Age* (Cambridge 1912, University Press), pp. 442-4.

<sup>2</sup> On pp. 10 and 38, above.

<sup>3</sup> Chadwick, op. cit., p. 443.

<sup>4</sup> L'empereur leur conféra le titre de patrice, qui les hissait au sommet de la hiérarchie byzantine. Il créa pour eux la dignité de *phylarche* ou commandant des tribus. C'était rattacher au phylarchat ghassânide tous les Bédouins, placés sous la mouvance plus ou moins directe de l'empire, en Syrie et dans les déserts limitrophes. Représentants officiels de César auprès de leurs compatriotes, les émirs assumaient la surveillance du *limes*, de la frontière syro-palestinienne. Ils devaient favoriser la pénétration de l'in-



and its counterpart and adversary the Lakhmid Arab principality, covering the 'Irāqī desert frontier of the Sasanian Empire, during the last hundred years before both these buffer-states were swept away by the Primitive Muslim Arabs' onslaught<sup>1</sup> on the imperial Powers whom the Ghassanids and the Lakhmids had served so well for so long.<sup>2</sup> The same tale is told by the history of the Salian Frankish guardians of the Roman Empire's Lower Rhenish frontier during the century following their plantation in Toxandria as *dediticii* by the Emperor Julian in A.D. 358;<sup>3</sup> and the principality of Afghanistan served the British Indian Empire in a similar capacity during the forty years A.D. 1879-1919.

*fluence romaine, derrière la ligne de fortins et de castella, tendue depuis le Nord de la Palmyrène jusque vers Aila, pour protéger les agglomérations de sédentaires. Cette institution du phylarcat gassanide, mécanisme souple et peu coûteux, fut une des plus heureuses inspirations de la pénétration pacifique. Elle garantissait à la fois la sécurité des frontières, le prestige de l'Empire, tout en ménageant l'amour-propre ombrageux des Bédouins' (Lammens, S.J., Père H.: La Mecque à la Veille de l'Hégire (Bayrūt 1924, Imprimerie Catholique), p. 244).*

<sup>1</sup> The Muslim Arab conquerors found the two Christian march states themselves less difficult to liquidate than the historic feud between them. In the civil war between 'Alī and Mu'āwiyah which followed close on the heels of the conquest (see the present chapter, p. 64, below), 'Alī, from his capital at Kūfah, was playing the prince of Hīrah's traditional part, and Mu'āwiyah, from his capital at Damascus, the Ghassanid phylarch's (see VI. vii. 131, n. 3).

<sup>2</sup> The Roman Empire's Ghassanid Arab march was organized by the Emperor Justinian circa A.D. 530-1, and, according to Lammens, op. cit., pp. 244-5, this initiative on the Roman Imperial Government's part led the Sasanian Imperial Government to confer a corresponding status on its own Arab protégés and political agents, the Lakhmids. This change in the Lakhmids' position seems to have been formal rather than substantial, since, *de facto*, the Lakhmids had already been serving as the wardens of the Sasanids' desert march, and this going concern was no doubt the model which Justinian had before his eyes when he created his own Ghassanid phylarchy. According to de Lacy O'Leary, *Arabia before Muhammad* (London 1927, Kegan Paul), p. 155, the Lakhmids had been the Sasanids' Arab agents since the time of the second Sasanian emperor, Shapur I (*accessit* A.D. 241). During the decadence of the foregoing Parthian Arsacid régime which the Persian Sasanidae had now swept away, there had been an infiltration of Nomad Arabs, not only into the North Mesopotamian Steppe, but into the cultivated lands in 'Irāq, and the newly established Sasanian Power found itself confronted with the task of reducing these interlopers to order. When Shapur I inherited this formidable task from his father Ardashir I, the founder of the Sasanian Empire, he forbore to carry out to the bitter end the policy of subjugating these recalcitrant Arabs within his frontiers by force of arms, and resorted to the alternative policy of indirect rule through an Arab deputy—a compromise which vindicated the Sasanian Imperial Government's suzerainty without depriving the Arabs of their autonomy. The deputy whom Shapur I appointed was the Lakhmid 'Amr b. 'Adī, and this appointment was the origin of the Sasanian Arab march with its administrative centre at Hīrah. This Sasanian march, like its Roman counterpart, was still in existence at the time of the Muslim Arab conquest, though the Lakhmid dynasty had been deposed by the Sasanian Emperor Khusrū II Parwiz. According to O'Leary, op. cit., pp. 160-1, the last of the Lakhmid princes of Hīrah, a Nu'man, fled to the desert, for fear of the Sasanian Government's hostility, in A.D. 605, and returned and was put to death by Parwiz circa A.D. 620 (*sic*). After putting Nu'man to death, Parwiz replaced him on the throne of Hīrah by Iyas of the tribe of Tayy, and then, after Iyas' death, annexed Hīrah, in A.D. 614 (*sic*), to the territories under the Sasanian Crown's direct administration. According to Christensen, A.: *Iran sous les Sassanides* (Copenhagen 1936, Levin & Munkegaard), p. 447, the date at which Nu'man was put to death by Parwiz was some time between A.D. 595 and A.D. 604.

<sup>3</sup> Though Salian Frankish war-bands under Merovingian leadership began, as early as the fifth decade of the fifth century, to encroach upon Roman Imperial domain-lands in Northern Gaul beyond the limits of the territory originally assigned to them by the Roman authorities, another Salian war-lord, Clogio, was defeated by Aëtius at Vicus Helena (Helesmes) in an attempt to seize Cambrai. The diplomatic Roman victor rewarded the defeated Salians for their misdemeanours by allowing them to retain the conquests that they had made up to that point, and by raising their status from that of *dediticii* (who, at least in theory, were required to do their military service for the Empire as regular soldiers enrolled in units of the Imperial Army) to the status of

These examples show that a barbarian military monarchy may prove equal to the task of holding the wardenship of a march, against its fellow barbarians beyond the pale, under a universal state's auspices. But the fates of the successor-states established by barbarian conquerors in the interior of an extinct universal state's former domain show still more clearly that this equivocal achievement of a jejune barbarian political genius is quite unequal to the task of bearing burdens and solving problems that are thrown upon it because they have proved too much for the statesmanship of an oecumenical Power that has been heir to the cumulative political experience of an entire civilization. How, indeed, could a challenge that has defeated the efforts of even a broken-down civilization be expected to receive a victorious response from barbarian interlopers? If the god Helios himself had lost command of his fiery steeds, the catastrophic outcome of a mortal Phaethon's audacious endeavour to stay the hazardous course would have been doubly inevitable.

A barbarian successor-state blindly goes into business on the strength of the dishonoured credits of a universal state that has already gone into bankruptcy; and these boons in office hasten the advent of their inevitable doom by a self-betrayal through the outbreak, under stress of a moral ordeal, of something fatally false within;<sup>1</sup> for a polity based solely on a gang of armed desperados' fickle loyalty to an irresponsible military leader,<sup>2</sup> while it may be adequate for the organization of a raid or, at a pinch, for the administration and defence of a march, is morally unfit for the government of a community that has made even an unsuccessful attempt at civilization.<sup>3</sup> It is far more unfit than would have been the unsophisticated yet respectable primitive rule of custom interpreted by the living elders of the tribe<sup>4</sup> into whose swept and gar-

*foederati* (whose privilege it was to serve in national units of their own). Under this new arrangement the Salians duly fought on the Roman side against Attila at the Campus Mauriacus in A.D. 451: *quondam milites Romani, tunc vero iam in numero auxiliarium exquisiti* (Jordanes: *Getica*, 191). After Aëtius's death in A.D. 454 Clogio took Cambrai and advanced to the Somme, but the Imperial Government's authority was once again established over the *foederati* in Gaul by the Emperor Majorian (*imperabat* A.D. 457-61), and thereafter the Salians continued, at least formally, to recognize the authority of Aegidius, Majorian's *magister militum per Gallias*, who held on at Soissons after Majorian's assassination. It was not till A.D. 486/7, when Merovech's grandson Clovis (Chlodovech) attacked and overthrew Aegidius's successor Syagrius, that the Merovingian buffer-state of the Roman Empire openly asserted its independence (see Schmidt, L.: 'Aus den Anfängen des Salfränkischen Königums', in *Klio*, vol. xxxiv, pp. 306-27).

<sup>1</sup> Meredith, George, quoted in IV. iv. 120 and VI. vii. 46.

<sup>2</sup> 'Irresponsible power, uncontrolled by any settled traditions of ordered freedom, will often assert itself or defend itself by savage cruelty. The catalogue of such enormities is too long and monotonous to be told in detail' (Dill, S.: *Roman Society in Gaul in the Merovingian Age* (London 1926, Macmillan), p. 133, introducing an anthology of Merovingian atrocities).

<sup>3</sup> The failure of the barbarian successor-states of a fallen civilized empire to carry out their self-imposed mandate is the more signal, considering that they are apt, at their inauguration, to be presented with the invaluable unearned asset of a fund of good will in the hearts of their newly acquired civilized subjects. These ex-citizens of a fallen universal state are so utterly disillusioned with the decadent imperial régime from whose incompetence and corruption they and their forebears have suffered for many generations past, that they are inclined to greet even a barbarian alternative régime as a welcome alleviation. See Orosius: *Historiae Adversum Paganos*, Book VII, chap. xli, § 7, and Salvian: *De Gubernatione Dei*, Book V, §§ 21-22 and 36-37, quoted by E. M. Pickman in *The Mind of Latin Christendom* (London 1937, Oxford University Press), pp. 273-4.

+ See II. i. 191-2.

nished house<sup>1</sup> this gangster-constitution has forced its entry since the radiation of a disintegrating civilization has perverted that decadent society's once primitive neighbours into bands of adolescent barbarians.<sup>2</sup>

When these barbarian war-bands have entered into their kingdom in the former domain of a fallen universal state, the dissolution of the primitive kin-group in the barbarian *comitatus* is swiftly followed by the dissolution of the *comitatus* itself in the alien subject population.

"The Arabs who have settled in . . . regions which afford rich pastures for their flocks, and which provide everything required for making life agreeable, have allowed the purity of their race to be corrupted by marriages with foreign families. This has been the history of the Lakhm, the Judhām, the Ghassān, the Tayy, the Khuzā'ah, the Ayyad and the other tribes descended from Himyar and Kahlan. . . . The Caliph Umar said: 'Learn your genealogies, and do not be like the Nabataeans [settled Arabs] of As-Sawād [the alluvial plain of 'Irāq]; when one asks one of them where he comes from, he answers: *From such and such a village*.'" But the Arabs established in fertile countries with fat pastures found themselves in contact with other peoples, and this led to an intermingling of race and blood. Indeed, from the first days of Islam, people began to name the [interloping Arab] tribes after the countries of which they were in occupation. People spoke, for example, of the *jund* [cantonment] of Qinnasrīn, the *jund* of Damascus, the *jund* of the 'Awāsīm. The same usage made its way into Andalusia. The Arabs had not, as a matter of fact, renounced the custom of calling themselves by the name of the tribe to which they belonged; they were merely adopting an additional surname, in order to make it easier for their war-lords to distinguish them. Thereafter, [however,] they mixed with the inhabitants of the towns—people mostly of foreign race—and in this way they lost their purity of blood entirely. From that time onwards, family ties became so weak among them that they lost their sense of nationality. . . . Next, the tribes themselves became extinct, and their liquidation brought with it the disappearance of all *esprit de corps*.<sup>3</sup>

### *The Restraining Influences of Aidōs, Nemesis, and Hilm.*

The barbarian trespassers in *partibus civilium* have, in fact, condemned themselves to suffer a moral breakdown as an inevitable consequence of their own adventurous act.<sup>4</sup> Yet they do not yield to their

<sup>1</sup> Matt. xii. 44; Luke xi. 25.

<sup>2</sup> The moral inferiority of the adolescent barbarian to his primitive predecessor has been pointed out by H. G. Wells in *The Outline of History* (London 1920, Cassell), p. 298, in a passage which is a fine example of his intuitive genius. (In order to transpose this passage into the terminology of the present Study, Wells' term 'barbarism' has, of course, to be construed as 'primitive life', and his term 'savage' as 'primitive'.)

<sup>3</sup> It is frequently said that Europe in the sixth and seventh centuries relapsed into barbarism, but that does not express the reality of the case very well. Barbarism is a social order of an elementary type, orderly within its limits; the state of Europe beneath its political fragmentation was a social disorder. Its *moral* was not that of a kraal, but that of a slum. In a savage kraal a savage knows that he belongs to a community, and lives and acts accordingly; in a slum the individual neither knows of, nor acts in relation to, any greater being.

<sup>4</sup> Ibn Khaldūn: *Muqaddamāt*, translated by de Slane, Baron McG. (Paris 1863-8, Imprimerie Impériale, 3 vols.), vol. i, pp. 272-3.

<sup>5</sup> Ibn Khaldūn traces the stages of this demoralization with a masterly hand, and with a wealth of illustrations from the histories of Arab and Berber barbarian interlopers, in op. cit., vol. i, especially pp. 292-7 and 342-59.



self-decreed doom without a spiritual struggle that has left its traces in their literary records of myth and ritual and standards of conduct.

The barbarians' ubiquitous master-myth describes the hero's victorious fight with a monster for the acquisition of a treasure which the unearthly enemy is withholding from Mankind in order to devour it or to hoard it for his own bestial satisfaction. This is the common *motif* of the tales of Beowulf's fight with Grendel and Grendel's mother; Siegfried's fight with the dragon; Perseus' feat of slaying and decapitating a gorgon the sight of whose head would have turned him to stone if he had not skilfully avoided setting eyes on it, and his subsequent feat of winning Andromeda for his bride by slaying the sea-monster who was threatening to devour her. The *motif* reappears in Jason's outmanœuvring of the serpent-guardian of the Golden Fleece and in Hēraklēs' kidnapping of Cerberus. This myth looks like a projection, on to the outer world, of a psychological struggle, in the barbarian's own soul, for the rescue of Man's supreme spiritual treasure, his rational will, from a demonic spiritual force released in the abyss of the unconscious depths of the Psyche by the shattering experience of passing, at one step, from a familiar no-man's-land outside the *limes* into the enchanted world laid open by the barrier's collapse. The myth may indeed be a translation into literary narrative of a ritual act of exorcism in which a militarily triumphant but spiritually afflicted barbarian has attempted to find a practical remedy for his devastating psychological malady.<sup>1</sup>

In the emergence of special standards of conduct applicable to the peculiar circumstances of an heroic age we can see a further attempt, from another line of approach, to set moral bounds to the ravages of a demon that has been let loose in the souls of the barbarian lords and masters of a prostrate civilization by the fall of the material barrier of the *limes*. Conspicuous examples are the Achaeans' Homeric *Aidōs* and *Nemesis* ('Shame' and 'Indignation') and the Umayyads' historic *Hilm* (a studied Self-Restraint).

"The great characteristic of [*Aidōs* and *Nemesis*], as of Honour generally, is that they only come into operation when a man is free: when there is no compulsion. If you take people . . . who have broken away from all their old sanctions and select among them some strong and turbulent chief who fears no one, you will first think that such a man is free to do whatever enters his head. And then, as a matter of fact, you find that, amid his lawlessness, there will crop up some possible action which somehow makes him feel uncomfortable. If he has done it, he "rues" the deed and is haunted by it. If he has not done it, he "shrinks" from doing it. And this, not because anyone forces him, nor yet because any particular result will accrue to him afterwards, but simply because he feels *aidōs*. . . ."<sup>2</sup>

*Aidōs* is what you feel about an act of your own; *Nemesis* is what you

<sup>1</sup> This fascinating subject has been explored by Gustav Hübener in a series of studies: *England und die Gesittungsgrundlage der Europäischen Frühgeschichte* (Frankfurt am Main 1930); 'Der Heroische Exorzismus der Nordischen Rasse und der Winckelried-sagenkreis am Vierwaldstättersee', in *Germanisch-Romanische Monatsschrift*, 1931; 'Beowulf and German Exorcism', in *Review of English Studies*, vol. xi, No. 42, 1935; 'Beowulf's "Seax", the Saxons, and an Indian Exorcism', *ibid.*, vol. xii, No. 48, 1936.

<sup>2</sup> It will be seen that, in H. G. Wells' terms (see the passage quoted on p. 53, n. 2, above), *Aidōs* is essentially a virtue of 'a slum' in which 'the individual neither knows of, nor acts in relation to, any greater being.'—A.J.T.

feel for the act of another. Or, most often, it is what you imagine that others will feel about you. . . . But suppose no one sees. The act, as you know well, remains *νεμεσιπτόν*—a thing to feel *nemesis* about: only there is no one there to feel it. Yet, if you yourself dislike what you have done, and feel *aidós* for it, you inevitably are conscious that somebody or something dislikes or disapproves of you. . . . The Earth, Water, and Air [are] full of living eyes; of *theoi*, of *daimones*, of *kêres*. . . . And it is they who have seen you and are wroth with you for the thing which you have done.<sup>1</sup>

In a post-Minoan heroic age, as depicted in the Homeric Epic, the actions that evoke feelings of *Aidós* and *Nemesis* are those implying cowardice, lying, and perjury, lack of reverence, and cruelty or treachery towards the helpless.<sup>2</sup>

Apart from any question of wrong acts done to them, there are certain classes of people more *αἰδοῖοι*, objects of *aidós*, than others. There are people in whose presence a man feels shame, self-consciousness, awe, a sense keener than usual of the importance of behaving well. And what sort of people chiefly excite this *aidós*? Of course there are kings, elders and sages, princes and ambassadors: *αἰδοῖοι βασιλῆες, γέροντες*, and the like: all of them people for whom you naturally feel reverence, and whose good or bad opinion is important in the World. Yet . . . you will find that it is not these people, but quite others, who are most deeply charged, as it were, with *Aidós*—before whom you feel still more keenly conscious of your unworthiness, and whose good or ill opinion weighs somehow inexplicably more in the last account: the disinherited of the Earth, the injured, the helpless, and, among them the most utterly helpless of all, the dead.<sup>3</sup>

In contrast to *Aidós* and *Nemesis*, which enter into all aspects of social life, *Hilm* is a *vertu des politiques*.<sup>4</sup> Before the inauguration of Islam the practice of *Hilm* had been learnt by Abu Sufyān, the father of a Mu'āwiyah who was to found the Umayyad Power, in the school of the mercantile republic of Mecca:<sup>5</sup> a cultural as well as physical oasis in the desert of Arab barbarism where the rudiments of city-state life had been propagated by a radiation of Syriac and Hellenic influences which, at earlier dates, had produced more brilliant fruits of the kind at Palmyra and at Petra.<sup>6</sup> Abu Sufyān's son the Caliph Mu'āwiyah I claimed that *Hilm* was an Umayyad family virtue,<sup>7</sup> and Mu'āwiyah himself came to figure as the classical exponent of it.<sup>8</sup> One of Mu'āwiyah's dicta was that '*Hilm* would be universal if everyone had Abu Sufyān for his ancestor'.<sup>9</sup> But 'the qualities which, when found in combination, the Arabs designated by the name of *Hilm*' were 'as rarely met with as

<sup>1</sup> Murray, Gilbert: *The Rise of the Greek Epic*, 3rd ed. (Oxford 1924, Clarendon Press), pp. 83-84.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 85-87.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 87-88.

<sup>4</sup> Lammens, S.J., Père H.: *Études sur le Règne du Calife Omayyade Mo'awia Ier* (Bayrūt 1908, Imprimerie Catholique; Paris 1908, Geuthner), p. 81, n. 2. The quotations from this book have been made with the permission of the publishers.

<sup>5</sup> See Lammens, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

<sup>6</sup> See I. i. 74, n. 4, and II. ii. 9-12.

<sup>7</sup> See Lammens, *op. cit.*, p. 88, n. 3.

<sup>8</sup> See Lammens, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-67. A monograph entitled *The Hilm of Mu'āwiyah* is one of the lost works of the Classical Arabic Literature (Lammens, *op. cit.*, p. 89), but Lammens has collected anecdotes on the subject, from surviving works, in *op. cit.* pp. 91-103.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 88, n. 3.

they were highly prized among a passionate people whose temperament was a bundle of nerves—nerves almost showing through the skin and reacting to the slightest external shock'.<sup>1</sup>

*Hilm* is neither patience nor moderation nor clemency nor long-suffering nor self-possession nor maturity of character. It merely borrows from each of these qualities certain external traits, to an extent just sufficient to take in an observer who is not on the alert. The product of these superficial loans is a virtue that is specifically Arab.<sup>2</sup>

*Hilm* is thus something more sophisticated than *Aidós* and *Nemesis*, and consequently also something less attractive. *Hilm* is emphatically not an expression of humility; 'its aim is rather to humiliate an adversary: to confound him by presenting the contrast of one's own superiority; to surprise him by displaying the dignity and calm of one's own attitude'.<sup>3</sup> The practice of *Hilm* is not incompatible with inward feelings of resentment, animus, and vindictiveness.<sup>4</sup> *Hilm* is not within the competence of anyone who is not rich and powerful, and it presupposes not only the possession of power but the possibility of abusing it in order to injure one's neighbour without having to fear the consequences of one's action.<sup>5</sup>

'In the desert, every true "gentleman" must have in his moral coach-house (*remise*)—or, as we are tempted to say, in his moral stable (*écurie*)—two steeds to choose between at his pleasure. On the one, he makes a parade of clemency. The other—and this is the one which he prefers to mount—allows him to show himself in his true colours. . . .<sup>6</sup>

'At bottom, *Hilm*, like most Arab qualities, is a virtue for bravado and display, with more ostentation in it than real substance: one form of Nomad stoicism—a stoicism tinged with pharisaism. Among a theatrical people that is the devitalised heir of a race which has been initiated into civilisation at a very early date, but which has since relapsed into the state of nature, a reputation for *Hilm* can be acquired at the cheap price of an elegant gesture or a sonorous *mot*: it does not pre-suppose a serious spiritual struggle against angry passions, against pride, or against the desire for vengeance. It can be combined with brutality in daily life . . .<sup>7</sup>

'In reality *Hilm* (as Ahnaf has remarked with profound insight) was not so much a virtue as an attitude—a prudent opportunism serving as a safeguard against abuses of authority, which are always regrettable, under a régime which in principle was democratic; opportune above all in an anarchic *milieu*, such as the Arab Society was, where every act of violence remorselessly provoked a retaliation. It was no feeling of humanity, but a fear of the *thar* (*émeute*), that inspired the Badawi with a horror of bloodshed. And thus the virtue of *Hilm* was revealed to him by the disagreeableness of the consequences of a passionate word or gesture. From this point of view, *Hilm* was something that could not be ignored by the chiefs, who were obliged by their situation to maintain an equilibrium between the elements of disorder that were rife within the bosom of the tribe. Given the parliamentary institutions [of the Arab heroic age], *Hilm* became, for the depositary of [political] power, a virtue of the first order. . . .<sup>8</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Lammens, op. cit., p. 69.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 68.

<sup>3</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 72 and 79.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 81.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 67.

<sup>6</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 69.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 76.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., p. 87.

'*Hilm*, as practised by [Mu'āwiyah's Umayyad successors], facilitated their task of giving the Arabs a political education; it sweetened for their pupils the bitterness of having to sacrifice the anarchic liberty of the Desert in favour of sovereigns who were condescending enough to draw a velvet glove over the iron hand with which they ruled their empire.'<sup>1</sup>

These acute characterizations of the nature of *Hilm*, *Aidōs*, and *Nemesis* from the masterly hands of sensitive students of the surviving records show how nicely adapted these standards of conduct are to the peculiar political, social, and psychological circumstances of the Heroic Age; and, if, as we have intimated already, the Heroic Age is intrinsically 'a transient phase',<sup>2</sup> the surest sign of its advent and its recession are the epiphany and the eclipse of ideals that are its specific attendant moral luminaries. Stars whose faint but precious glimmer through the evening twilight has been the only consolation for the setting of the Sun cease to be visible in the darkness before dawn,

'and then, at long last, shall those spirits go their way to Olympus from the wide-wayed Earth, with their beautiful faces veiled in white raiment, seeking the company of the immortals and leaving behind them the company of men—even the spirits of Shame and Indignation.'<sup>3</sup>

As *Aidōs* and *Nemesis* thus fade from view, their disappearance draws a cry of despair from the weary watcher of the skies. 'Pain and grief are the portion that shall be left for mortal men, and there shall be no defence against the evil day.'<sup>4</sup> Hesiod is harrowed by his illusory conviction—which it never occurs to him to doubt—that the withdrawal of the glimmering light that has sustained the children of the Dark Age through their vigil is a portent of the onset of an unmitigated and perpetual night; and he has no inkling that, on the contrary, this extinguishing of beacons is a harbinger of the return of day. The truth is that *Aidōs* and *Nemesis* reascend into Heaven as soon as the imperceptible emergence of a nascent new civilization has made their sojourn on Earth superfluous by bringing into currency other virtues that are socially more constructive though aesthetically they may be less attractive. The Iron Age into which Hesiod lamented that he had been born, because it was the age that had seen *Aidōs* and *Nemesis* shake the dust of this Earth from off their feet, was in fact the age in which a living Hellenic Civilization was arising out of a dead Minoan Civilization's ruins; and the 'Abbasids, who had no use for the *Hilm* that had been their Umayyad predecessors' *arcanum imperii*, were the statesmen who set the seal on the Umayyads' *tour de force* of profiting by the obliteration of the Syrian *limes* of the Roman Empire through the demonic outbreak of the Primitive Muslim Arabs in order to inaugurate a Syriac universal state that had been prematurely overthrown, a thousand years before, by Alexander the Great.<sup>5</sup>

'With the 'Abbasids, *Hilm* will lose its value in the sphere of government, to become a virtue of private life. After the destruction of the former

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 103.

<sup>2</sup> Chadwick, H. M.: *The Heroic Age* (Cambridge 1912, University Press), p. 442.

<sup>3</sup> Hesiod: *Works and Days*, ll. 197–200.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, ll. 200–1.

<sup>5</sup> See I. i. 77.

Arab supremacy and Arab society . . . , absolutism, now firmly established from one end of the Islamic World to the other, no longer felt the necessity of resorting to *Hilm* in order to overcome the recalcitrance of a public opinion which, thenceforward, was condemned to silence. . . . In undermining, at its foundations, the organisation of the former Arab Society, and in forcing all necks to bow beneath the dead level of despotism, the 'Abbasid régime was to obtain more decisive results than the lectures (*mercuriales*) delivered [by Umayyad governors] from the tribunals at Kûfah and Basrah.<sup>1</sup>

It was significant that, in order to ensure the salvaging of the Syriac Civilization from the chaos of a post-Hellenic Arab heroic age, there had to be a change of political régime, and that the barbaric turbulence of the Arab war-bands could be reduced to order only at the price of also suppressing their aristocratic freedom; for the Primitive Muslim Arabs had been perhaps the most gifted of all barbarian warriors, and the Umayyads of all barbarian statesmen, that had so far flitted across the stage of History. Umayyad statesmanship had achieved the unparalleled feat of transforming an Arab barbarian successor-state of the Roman Empire in Syria into an avatar of the universal state that had originally been provided for the Syriac Civilization, eleven hundred years before, by the Empire of the Achaemenidae. This was an achievement of which the Umayyads' Ghassanid forerunners had never dreamed, and to which the Ghassanids' Palmyrene predecessors had aspired with disastrous consequences for themselves. Yet the raw material of Arab barbarism proved so intractable even to the Umayyad genius<sup>2</sup> that an Umayyad David's work had to be completed by an 'Abbasid Solomon. The exacting, though misguided, task of evoking, in a nascent Far Eastern and noscent Western Christian Society, a ghost of the antecedent civilization's universal state was likewise beyond the interloping barbarians' powers. It is not surprising that, before this task could be taken in hand

<sup>1</sup> Lammens, S.J., Père H.: *Études sur le Règne du Calife Omayyade Mo'awia I<sup>er</sup>* (Paris 1908, Geuthner), pp. 106 and 86-87. For the anti-aristocratic egalitarianism of the despotic 'Abbasid régime, see the present Study, VI. vii. 149-52.

<sup>2</sup> 'Quand on étudie les origines et l'organisation de l'Empire Arabe, on ne tarde pas à découvrir l'inconsistance de la base appuyant cette énorme machine; la contradiction perpétuelle entre la grandeur de l'entreprise et l'impropriété des moyens destinés à la faire aboutir: véritable tare originelle, dont les effets n'ont pas cessé de se faire sentir . . . Il faut tenir compte de la matière ingrate sur laquelle opéra le grand calife [Mu'awiyah], de la résistance opposée à son action par l'irréductible individualisme des Arabes. Il parvint non seulement à les discipliner; mais il les transforma en conquérants, capables de dominer des peuples supérieurs à eux par l'intelligence et par la civilisation. . . . Pour comprendre à quoi aurait abouti entre leurs mains la direction de l'Islâm sans l'intervention des Omayyades [the Umayyads], il suffit de considérer la situation de l'Iraq et des provinces orientales au moment où elles échurent en partage à Mu'awiyah. Dans les métropoles, Kûfah et Basrah, le meurtre, le vol et l'incendie étaient des faits quotidiens. 'Umar et 'Uthmân avaient dû renoncer à y établir un semblant d'ordre. La voix de 'Alî n'arriva pas à dominer le tumulte. Impuissant à se faire respecter, il échoua dans la tentative d'imposer son prestige de gendre du Prophète, son ancienneté dans l'Islâm, qu'il ne cessait de mettre en avant; traîné à la remorque des bandes arabes dont il était le chef nominal, fréquemment abandonné, parfois menacé de mort. Sans l'intervention des Omayyades et de leurs énergiques représentants—les Ziyâd, les 'Ubaydallâh, les Hajjâj, les Khâlid al-Qasrî—tout l'Empire Musulman se fût transformé, comme l'Iraq, en un champ-clos où les Arabes seraient venus vider leurs mesquines querelles de tribus (Lammens, S.J., Le Père H.: *Études sur le Règne du Calife Omayyade Mo'awia I<sup>er</sup>* (Paris 1908, Geuthner), pp. 273, 274, and 278). [The transliteration of the Arabic proper names has been brought into line with the usage followed in this Study.—A.J.T.]



in Western Christendom, the *fainéant* Merovingian epigoni of Clovis had to make way for the Carolingians. It is more remarkable that, in the Far East, the epigoni of the Eurasian Nomad barbarian interlopers, who had been so receptive in their attitude towards the legacy of the Sinic culture,<sup>1</sup> should have had likewise to make way for the sedentary barbarian To Pa, and these still more receptive barbarians,<sup>2</sup> in their turn, for successor-states which were harbingers of the imperial Sui and T'ang.

### *The Outbreak of an Invincible Criminality*

The demon who takes possession of the barbarian's soul as soon as the barbarian's foot has crossed the fallen *limes* is indeed difficult to exorcise, because he contrives to pervert the very virtues with which his victim has armed himself in order to keep the demon at bay.

'Just as the athlete of asceticism strives to outdo himself because he has lost the sane measure of social intercourse, so the viking is tempted to overshoot his own mark: his honour becomes more exacting and often roars like a rapacious beast that never knows when it has had its fill.'

When the barbarian's own peculiar virtue of *Aidós* thus treacherously ministers to the frenzy which it is its mission to curb, the barbarian has lost his desperate battle with himself, and his moral discomfiture is advertised in an orgy of violence which eventually cures itself by the drastic remedy of devouring its authors.

To employ the terminology of the post-Hellenic Arab heroic age, *Hilm* is worsted—and is bound to be worsted—sooner or later by its antithesis and adversary *Jahl*. While the literal meaning of this Arabic word is 'ignorance', it has a connotation of 'passionateness (*emportement*), violence, and a brutality which, among the Arabs, was sometimes confused with virility'.<sup>4</sup> The nick-name *Abu Jahl* means, not 'the ignorant', but 'the impetuous' or 'the emotional (*le passionné*)'.<sup>5</sup>

'In its usage as conveying the antithesis of *Hilm*, *Jahl* incarnates all the faults deriving from rusticity and from lack of *savoir-vivre*, all the passionateness (*l'emportement*) of youth, all the excesses committed by brute force when it escapes from the control of the Reason. The *jāhil* is the enemy of the peace-lovers or peace-makers,<sup>6</sup> he is destitute of the strict idea of justice,<sup>7</sup> he is the victim of pleasure, and allows himself to be captivated by the seductive charms of women.<sup>8</sup> He is also the unreflective character, the *impotens sui* of the Latins—incapable of mastering the angry passions. *Jahl* is . . . the roughness of the manners of the Desert, the absence of restraint in language, an obliviousness of decorum. It is *Jahl* that betrays its addict into violations of the code of honour laid down in the customs of the Desert, and into failures to live up to the *convenances* of social inter-

<sup>1</sup> See Franke, O.: *Geschichte des Chinesischen Reiches*, vol. ii (Berlin and Leipzig 1936, de Gruyter), pp. 40-41.

<sup>2</sup> For an example of the Sinophilism of the To Pa, see V. v. 477-8. A masterly treatment of the subject will be found in Eberhard, W.: *Das Toba-Reich Nord-Chinas* (Leiden 1949, Brill).

<sup>3</sup> Grönbech, V.: *The Culture of the Teutons* (London 1931, Milford, 3 vols. in 2), vols. ii-iii, p. 305.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 85.

<sup>5</sup> *Qur'ān*, xxxiii. 72.

<sup>6</sup> Lammens, op. cit., p. 84.

<sup>7</sup> *Qur'ān*, xxv. 64.

<sup>8</sup> *Qur'ān*, xii. 33; xxviii. 55.

course, the laws of hospitality, the duties of friendship, and, in short, "the new spirit", inaugurated by Islam, to which . . . the Badu never succeeded in conforming.<sup>1</sup>

Indeed, the Badawī frankly looked back to the *ḡhīlīyah* as 'the good old times when people were able to live without constraint, "without suspecting the existence of Muhammad"'.<sup>2</sup> In the social and psychological landscape of the Arab heroic age the *ḡhīl* and the *halīm* were complementary characterizations which, between them, provided a temperamental classification for the whole of Mankind;<sup>3</sup> but the issue of the struggle between the two temperaments was a foregone conclusion, since the weights in the respective scales were utterly unequal. Not only did the *ḡhālā* outnumber the *hulamā*, and this by an overwhelming majority; the most deadly weakness of the exponents of *Hilm* was not their numerical inferiority but their lack of genuine belief in, and sincere devotion to, their own principle. *Hilm*, as we have seen,<sup>4</sup> 'was not so much a virtue as an attitude'. For Mu'āwīyah himself, who was the *halīm* par excellence,

'*Hilm* was something that appealed to the ambition of this man of genius, not as an end, but as a means: not so much as a moral quality perfecting [the character of] the individual as for its utility as an instrument of government.'<sup>5</sup>

When the *halīm* himself is *ḡhīl* at heart, it is evident that an attitude thus struck, without conviction, by a sceptically sophisticated minority has no prospect of prevailing.

The works of a *ḡhīl* that *Hilm* has failed to chasten and that *Aidōs* and *Nemesis* have been impotent to abash have left scars which are the barbarian's authentic marks in the record of history. His characteristic brutality declares itself at his first break-through. The classic example is the obliteration of urban life in Transoxania and Khurāsān by the Mongols when they burst out of the heart of the Eurasian Steppe; but the same wanton delight in destruction, and the same desperate fear of further visitations that a first experience of these horrors has inspired in their victims, are attested hardly less emphatically by the archaeological evidence from the Hellenic World of the third century of the Christian Era. In the walls built on the morrow of the disaster round the citadel of Ankara,<sup>6</sup> across the agora at Athens and round the cities of Gaul, to provide shelter within a shrunken *enceinte* for a decimated population, the stones cry out<sup>7</sup> as they are wrenched from their original emplacements—tomb-stone and altar and column-drum—and are piled together in an alinement that cuts across the previous lay-out of the city as ruthlessly as if the hands that have thrown up these hasty defences had been those of the barbarian destroyer himself.<sup>8</sup> Still more shocking

<sup>1</sup> Lammens, *op. cit.*, pp. 85-86.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 83, quoting Ahtal, 321. 4.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 82, quoting Al-Mubarrad: *Kamīl*, 425. 9.

<sup>4</sup> In the passage quoted, on p. 56, above, from Lammens, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 91.

<sup>6</sup> See V. vi. 206, with n. 4.

<sup>7</sup> Hab. ii. 11; Luke xix. 40.

<sup>8</sup> A few days before writing these lines in London on the 17th December, 1948, the writer had revisited the citadel of Ankara and had seen for the first time the so-called



than the tempestuous storming of Dexippus's Athens by the Goths is the deliberate burning of Xerxes' apadāna at Persepolis by the Macedonians; for, while it is true that Alexander did not put the inhabitants to the sword, but, on the contrary, doled out the *largesse* which it had been customary for an Achaemenian emperor to distribute when he visited his dynasty's homeland,<sup>1</sup> the destruction of a noble work of architecture is an inexcusable act of vandalism in a barbarian whose conversion to Hellenism estops, for him, the Gothic plea of invincible ignorance.

Such wholesale atrocities are the overtures to individual crimes of violence that are the outstanding features of the Heroic Age both in history and in legend. The demoralized barbarian society in which these dark deeds are perpetrated is so familiar with their performance and so obtuse to their horror<sup>2</sup> that the bards whose task it is to immortalize the memory of the war-lords do not hesitate to saddle their heroes and heroines with sins of which they have been innocent in real life, when a blackening of their characters can heighten the artistic merit of the story.<sup>3</sup> This readiness to magnify a character's artistic interest at the cost of his moral reputation might incline the latter-day critic to discount the evidence of legend unsupported by independent historical testimony, were it not that almost every enormity celebrated in epic and saga is accredited by historically recorded parallels for which the evidence is impeccable.

For example, the legendary murder of Priam King of Troy by Achilles' son Pyrrhus is accredited by the historical murder of Atahualpa, the last Imperial Inca, by his Spanish barbarian conqueror Pizarro, and of Husayn, the last emperor of the Safawi House, by his Afghan barbarian

<sup>1</sup> 'Valerian' city-wall at Athens cutting across an agora that had been excavated, since his last visit to Athens in A.D. 1921, by American archaeological enterprise. A striking visual impression of the extremeness of the disparity in size between the areas enclosed within the Valerian Wall and within the antecedent Hadrianic Wall, respectively, is given in the map facing p. 376 of E. P. Blegen's 'News Items from Athens' in the *American Journal of Archaeology*, vol. I, No. 3, July-September, 1946.

<sup>2</sup> See VI. vii. 209.

<sup>3</sup> The extent of the barbarians' capacity for the moral digestion of their war-lords' crimes can be measured by the length of the rope that was given by the Franks to the Merovingians.

The arbitrary and even savage assertion of their power . . . never for generations seems to have weakened the hold of the Merovingian race on the mass of their subjects, whether Frank or Roman. The Merovingian family had some secret spell which guarded them and gave them a longer permanence than was conceded to other conquering German tribes. The Visigoths had the evil custom of murdering their kings. If Frank kings were murdered, it was by the will of some rival of their house. The appeal of Guntram, in the church at Orleans in A.D. 585, that his house should be guarded from violence and extinction, as the sole defenders of the people, was powerful and probably effective. It was a startling appeal for loyalty from a family stained with all the crimes of Pelopid legend. It seemed like setting wolves to guard the fold. And yet this would not represent the facts and sentiment of the time. . . . The conquests of Childeric and Clovis had made a wandering band of warriors masters of Gaul and Western Germany, and shed new lustre on the line of Francion and Merovechus. These exploits, chanted round the watch-fires, invested the ruling house with an imaginative halo, which is the surest power of kingship' (Dill, S.: *Roman Society in Gaul in the Merovingian Age* (London 1926, Macmillan), pp. 121-2).

<sup>4</sup> For instances of such uncomplimentary poetic fiction, see Chadwick, H. M.: *The Heroic Age* (Cambridge 1912, University Press), pp. 156-7. For the tendency of 'heroic' tradition to part company with historical fact in the interests of art for art's sake, see the present Study, V. v. 607-14.

jailor Ashraf. The criminality of the Afghans during their seven years' occupation of the Safawī imperial capital, Ispahan, was peculiarly cold-blooded.<sup>1</sup> When Husayn Shāh Safawī was murdered by the barbarians in A.D. 1729, he had not only been their captive since his capitulation to their first war-lord Mīr Mahmūd on the 21st October, 1722; he had lived to see the previous extermination of his household and his family.

'In A.D. 1723 [Mahmūd] put to death in cold blood some three hundred of the nobles and chief citizens, and followed up this bloody deed with the murder of about two hundred children of their families. He also killed some three thousand of the deposed Shah's bodyguard, together with many other persons whose sentiments he mistrusted or whose influence he feared.'<sup>2</sup>

On the 7th February, 1725, Mahmūd went on to murder all surviving members of the imperial family except Husayn himself and two of his younger children—a crime which was overtaken by poetic justice when, on the 22nd April following, Mahmūd in his turn was assassinated by his own cousin Ashraf for the prize of an usurped Iranian imperial crown.<sup>3</sup>

The murder of a defenceless defeated prince is the highest rung on a descending ladder of barbarian criminality. At the next level below this in the inferno of the Heroic Age we behold the barbarian war-band murdering, not an enemy prince, but their own leader—in violation of the personal duty of the retainer to his chief which is the most sacred obligation in the barbarian moral code. This offence is so outrageous in the eyes even of a barbarian bard and his audience that it might be difficult to find a legendary counterpart of the historic murder of the Caliph 'Uthmān by a soldiery who had been thrown off their balance by the intoxication of victory.<sup>4</sup> At the next level below this we see a drunken Alexander murdering a drunken Cleitus who can boast of having saved his slayer-leader's life at the battle of the Granicus—and this in the presence of Hellenes whose already decadent civilization still shines so bright by contrast with a Macedonian barbarism that it makes these horrified witnesses look like demi-gods.<sup>5</sup> From the murder of a foster-kinsman<sup>6</sup> comrade-in-arms it is a short step downwards in the progressive demoralization of the Heroic Age to the murder of a kinsman by blood.

'Instances of the slaying of kinsmen seem to have been by no means uncommon in the Heroic Age. In *Beowulf* the spokesman of the Danish kings, Unferth, is said to have killed his brothers, and, though the fact

<sup>1</sup> See Browne, E. G.: *A Literary History of Persia*, vol. iv (Cambridge 1928, University Press), pp. 130-3.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 130.

<sup>3</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 131.

<sup>4</sup> The closest parallel is perhaps to be found in the mutiny of an Indian Sepoy Army against the British employers under whose military leadership they had achieved the conquest of a sub-continent within the Time-span of half a century.

<sup>5</sup> During the first phase of the drunken altercation between Alexander and Cleitus that was to have this dreadful denouement, Alexander himself turned to two non-Macedonian Greek guests of his and asked them: 'How do Hellenes in Macedonian company look to you? Don't you feel like demigods among beasts?' (Plutarch's *Life of Alexander*, chap. 51).

<sup>6</sup> Cleitus was the brother of Alexander's foster-mother Lānicē.

was a reproach to him, it apparently did not prevent him from holding an important office at court. In the same poem we hear of dissensions within the Swedish royal family, which ended in death for both Onela and Eanmund. According to the legends preserved in *Ynglingatal*, this family had had a very bad record for such quarrels in the past. Among the Goths we have the case of Eormenric [Hermanaric], who put his nephews Embrica and Fritla to death. And it is by no means only in poetry or tradition that we meet with such cases; historians also furnish numerous examples. Thus, according to Gregory of Tours,<sup>1</sup> the Burgundian King Hilperic was killed by his brother Gundobad, while Sigismund, son of the latter, had his own son, Sigiric, put to death.<sup>2</sup> The Thuringian King Irminfrith slew his brother Berhthari;<sup>3</sup> the Frankish King Sigiberht was murdered by the orders of his son Hlothric.<sup>4</sup> Clovis is said to have put to death a number of his relatives, while his sons and grandsons were repeatedly involved in deadly strife.<sup>5</sup> In view of such evidence we must conclude that the primitive sanctity of the family was giving way in the Heroic Age.<sup>6</sup>

The Merovingian evidence is, indeed, lavish.

"The faithlessness attributed to the Franks in ancient writers reached its height in the relations of the Frank kings even with their nearest kin. Clovis by treachery and ruthlessness had swept from his path rivals probably equally treacherous at Cologne and Cambrai. His sons and grandsons, in insidious attacks on one another and shameless perfidy, almost improved on his example. . . . To this strange race, crime and perfidy were the most natural things in the world, and their mean avidity seems to have been equal to their treachery. Brothers as they were, proud of their blood and race, they appear to have regarded sworn alliances as only made for convenience and to be broken at pleasure. They were like wild animals, watching one another in mutual fear, and always ready to spring. Among a race so faithless, perfidy was often the only means of safety. The crimes of the second generation make perhaps even a darker tale than those of the first."<sup>7</sup>

In the sinister light of Teutonic barbarian legend and history, the Achæan barbarian tale of the curse on the House of Atreus falls into social and psychological perspective. Both its agonizing crescendo movement and its merciful *finale* become comprehensible. The progressive heightening of the horror, from the ghastly banquet of Thyestes, through the murder of a husband by his unfaithful wife, to the slaying of a mother by her distracted son, follows the rhythm of the Heroic Age as the iniquity of the fathers is visited upon the children unto the third and fourth generation<sup>8</sup>—not because they have been condemned to suffer by the fiat of a god whose wrath they have provoked by hating him, but because they have been robbed of the moral raiment of primitive custom by the radiation of a decadent civilization and then have run

<sup>1</sup> Gregorius Turonensis: *Historia Francorum*, Book II, chap. 28.

<sup>2</sup> See *ibid.*, Book III, chap. 5.

<sup>3</sup> See *ibid.*, Book III, chap. 4.

<sup>4</sup> See *ibid.*, Book II, chap. 40.

<sup>5</sup> In some cases the deed was certainly done by the relative's own hand. Such was the case with Lothair and the sons of Chlodomer (Gregory of Tours, *op. cit.*, Book III, chap. 18).

<sup>6</sup> Chadwick, H. M.: *The Heroic Age* (Cambridge 1912, University Press), pp. 346-7.

<sup>7</sup> Dill, S.: *Roman Society in Gaul in the Merovingian Age* (London 1926, Macmillan), pp. 281-3.

<sup>8</sup> Exod. xx. 5.

wild to wander naked in the moral wilderness left by this neighbour society's collapse. The lifting of the curse after its operation has come to an intolerable climax is one of the first-fruits of the banning of the post-Minoan Heroic Age by the beneficent Attic genius of a nascent Hellenic Civilization<sup>1</sup> at the dawn following a darkness which an epimethean Hesiod had mistaken for eternal night.<sup>2</sup>

When the members of a barbarian war-lord's kin-group turn their murderous hands against one another, it is not surprising to see a dead leader's royal brood exterminated by the hands of impious alien usurpers in the next chapter of the story—as the family of Alexander was liquidated by Cassander, and the grandson of Muhammad by the Umayyads.<sup>3</sup> A slaughtered Husayn received the posthumous recompense of being idealized as a martyr whose etherialized blood mingled with his father's<sup>4</sup> to become the seed of a Shi'i Church; but Olympias, Roxana, and the child Alexander IV did not even find a pagan bard to make poetry of their painful deaths.

Such mass-murders are mere incidents in civil strife within the bosom of barbarian communities that are highly enough organized to be capable of it. Long and deadly civil wars were the immediate sequel to swift and facile conquests of derelict worlds in the heroic ages of the Western Christian Spanish conquerors of the Aztecs and the Incas, the Hellenized Macedonian conquerors of the Achaemenidae, the subsequent Hellenic conquerors of the Mauryan Empire in India,<sup>5</sup> and the Primitive Muslim Arab conquerors of the Romans and the Sasanidae—Arabs who, to damn them with faint praise, had been perhaps the least barbarous of all barbarians up to date. These episodes need not be recapitulated here, since they have been surveyed already, in a different context,<sup>6</sup> as examples of the militarist's 'burden of Nineveh'. In this place we need only point to the manifest conclusion that 'every kingdom divided against itself is brought to desolation, and every city or house divided against itself shall not stand'.<sup>7</sup>

### *The Débâcle of an Ephemeral Barbarian Ascendancy*

A sensationally sudden fall from an apparent omnipotence to an unmistakable impotence is, indeed, the characteristic fate of an Heroic-Age

<sup>1</sup> The sovereign virtue of Hellenism was the moderation that is exemplified in the judgement given by the Athenian jurors and their presiding Goddess Athena at the dénouement of Aeschylus's Atreidai trilogy; and it is significant that the psychological talisman through which Hellenism succeeded in overcoming the demonic spirit of a post-Minoan heroic age was likewise the key to the exorcism of a post-Hellenic heroic age by the nascent civilization of a Western Christendom. In this chapter of history, 'moderation . . . is the outstanding virtue of the chivalrous type that succeeded the heroic type of the earlier ages' (Menéndez Pidal, Ramón: *The Cid and his Spain*, English translation (London 1934, John Murray), p. 422).

<sup>2</sup> See p. 57, above.

<sup>3</sup> In justice to the Umayyads it should not be forgotten that Husayn brought his death upon himself by his own folly. The Umayyad Government would have given a fortune to see him die in his bed as their pensioner, like his elder brother Hasan after his abdication from the succession to their father 'Ali (the allegation that Hasan met his death, not by disease, but by poison, has been dismissed as non-proven by Lammens, S.J., *Le Père H.: Études sur le Règne du Calife Omayyade Mo'awia 1<sup>er</sup>* (Paris, 1908, Geuthner), pp. 149-53).

<sup>4</sup> 'Ali's assassin was a fellow Arab, but, so far from being an agent of Mu'awiyah's, he was a Kharijite.

<sup>5</sup> See I. i. 86.

<sup>6</sup> In IV. iv. 484-6.

<sup>7</sup> Matt. xii. 25. Cp. Mark iii. 24-25; Luke xi. 17.

barbarian Power. Striking historical examples of this play of the ironic law of *περίτρεψις* are the eclipse of the Western Huns after the death of Attila, the eclipse of the Vandals after the death of Genseric, the eclipse of the Ostrogoths after the death of Theodoric, and the eclipse of the Serbs after the death of Stephen Dushan. These well-attested instances lend credibility to the tradition that the wave of Achaean conquest likewise broke and collapsed immediately after engulfing Troy, and that a murdered Agamemnon was the last Pan-Achaean war-lord. The same fate sometimes overtakes the legacies even of those more constructive empire-builders who sweep away decadent barbarian principalities in order to clear the ground for the appearance of the first green shoots of a new civilization. The eclipse of the Timurids after the death of Timur Lenk and the eclipse of the Carolingians after the death of Charlemagne were as abrupt and complete as those of any sheerly barbarian Power.

The Huns under Attila had terrorized Europe from its Baltic to its Mediterranean coast; the Vandals under Genseric had similarly terrorized the Mediterranean from its African to its European shores; the Ostrogoths under Theodoric had been masters of Italy; the Serbs under Stephen Dushan had dominated the Balkan Peninsula; the Achaeans under Agamemnon are reputed to have held a 'thalassocracy' in the Aegean which they had wrested from the Minoans or from the Minoan World's Mycenaean marchmen. The sudden paralysis of the energies that had been manifesting themselves in these exhibitions of power is to be explained by the utter incapacity of the barbarians for creating stable and enduring political institutions. Their political potency hangs on the thread of the single life of some war-lord of genius; and, as soon as this thread snaps, they relapse into anarchy. Sometimes the war-lord himself reveals the limitations of his own political sense by ineptly providing in his testament for the partition of his dominions among his heirs, and it was this that was the bane of the Merovingians and the Carolingians in succession. The testator's apologia would be that, if he did not make provision for an orderly division in his will, his kindred would assuredly take the law into their own violent hands by fighting one another for the prize of his inheritance; and such forebodings are borne out by a host of historical instances. Sometimes, again, a barbarian principality may fall to pieces owing to the death or unduly prolonged absence of the war-lord on some too ambitiously distant or difficult military adventure. This is the situation depicted in the opening books of the *Odyssey*. In the twentieth year of the interregnum arising from the absence of Odysseus, every budding squire in the realm is already playing the king;<sup>1</sup> and the comparable break-up of the Scandinavian barbarian principality of Kiev in the twelfth century of the Christian Era<sup>2</sup> authenticates the verisimilitude of the Homeric picture presented in the *Telemacheia* without encouraging us to believe in the happy ending which the poet's plot requires him to give to his story.

<sup>1</sup> A catalogue of 108 suitors for the hand of Penelope from the several isles of Odysseus' kingdom is given by Telemachus in *Odyssey*, Book XVI, ll. 245-55.

<sup>2</sup> See Kliutschewskij, W. [Kluchewski, V.]: *Geschichte Russlands*, vol. 1 (Berlin 1925, Obelisk-Verlag), pp. 191-2.



In real life the divided house does fall; and an identical denouement is produced by three variations on one theme. The barbarian successor-state of a moribund universal state may be laid low by a counter-blow from its expiring victim; or it may meet the same violent death at the hands of fellow barbarians; or it may languish in impotence, after coming to the end of its prodigal feast on carrion flesh, till it is swept off the stage of History to make way either for the re-entry of an old civilization or for the entry of a new one. A scrutiny of our table of barbarian war-bands<sup>1</sup> yields the following catalogue of instances of these alternative evil ends.

A *revanche* on the part of a civilization so far gone in the downward course of its decline as to have been unable to prevent the barbarians from breaking in, yet not so far gone as to be incapable of hitting back, is rare at the final relapse, when a universal state is breaking up, but less uncommon in the earlier chapter of the story in which the establishment of a universal state is evoked by a Time of Troubles rising to its climax.

The most signal examples of the crushing of a barbarian invader by a moribund civilization are to be found in Egyptian history. The Egyptian Society actually rose, like Osiris, from the dead, to confound the apparently triumphant barbarian successors of 'the Middle Empire', when the Hyksos were expelled from the Delta, and their survivors were pursued and subjugated, in their Syrian asylum, by a fresh breed of Theban empire-builders who brought the Egyptian universal state to life again in the form of 'the New Empire'.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, this *revanche* upon the Hyksos, in which 'the New Empire' came to birth, is matched by the feat on which, some four hundred years later, this resuscitated Egyptian universal state expended its last expiring energies. The decisive victory of 'the New Empire' of Egypt over the Achaeans and the other 'peoples of the sea' in the first decade of the twelfth century B.C. brought the barbarians to a dead halt at the threshold of the invaded Egyptian World's heartland in the Lower Nile Valley; and the lesson was so severe that, though the survivors of the foiled barbarian war-bands were able to encamp on 'the New Empire's' South Syrian glaxis, we have no evidence of their ever having ventured to attack the Delta again.

Ramses III's triumph over 'the peoples of the sea' has a counterpart in Hellenic history in Justinian's successive triumphs over the Vandals and the Ostrogoths; and in this case the audacious barbarian invaders paid the price of annihilation for a sensational temporary success. The Roman Imperial Government in the West had failed to prevent the Vandals from crossing the Straits of Gibraltar and seizing transmarine

<sup>1</sup> Reproduced in the present volume, on pp. 734-5, from vol. vi, pp. 330-1, above.

<sup>2</sup> The expulsion of the Hyksos from the Delta in the sixteenth century B.C. had a second-century echo in the reaction at that date against the Ptolemaic Macedonian domination. These two Egyptian revolts against barbarian rule were animated by an identical spirit of 'Zealotism', though their fortunes differed in the respective degrees of their outward success. On the later occasion the Egyptian 'Zealots' had to acquiesce in leaving the Ptolemies on their shaken throne and to content themselves with extorting from them far-reaching concessions to Egyptian sentiment. If, in the next chapter of the story, the Ptolemaic Kingdom of Egypt had not been incorporated into an Hellenic universal state in the shape of the Roman Empire, the Coptic triumph over Hellenism in the *Kulturkampf* of the fifth and sixth centuries of the Christian Era might have come five or six hundred years sooner than it did.



Roman dominions in North-West Africa which ought to have been the Empire's impregnable citadel against barbarian invaders from the north of Continental Europe;<sup>1</sup> and subsequently the Imperial Government at Constantinople had been constrained to divert the Ostrogoths from harrying the European suburbs of the new imperial capital by actually inviting them to invade Italy and occupy Rome. In the blood feud between the Romans and these two Teutonic barbarian war-bands the vindictiveness of the injured empire's eventual counter-blow was proportionate to the painfulness of its previous humiliations. This chastisement of the Vandals and the Ostrogoths by Justinian has Ottoman parallels in Mehmed 'Alī Pasha's chastisement of the Wahhābis and Sultan Mahmūd II's chastisement of the Kurds—with the difference that these Ottoman 'Herodians'<sup>2</sup> overthrew their barbarian adversaries with the aid of a Western military technique imparted by French and Prussian instructors, whereas Justinian mobilized the martial virtue of his home-grown Isaurian barbarians and the military equipment of the Sarmatian Nomads<sup>3</sup> for his victorious counter-offensive against the epigoni of Genseric and Theodoric.

There is a longer list of barbarian invaders of a civilization in its Time of Troubles who have been evicted or annihilated by the founders of the affiliated civilization's universal state, or by those founders' forerunners. This retribution was exacted from the Gutæan invaders of Sumer and Akkad by Utu-khegal of Erech, the forerunner of Ur-Engur's (*alias* Ur-Nammu's) Sumeric 'Empire of the Four Quarters', and from the Scythian invaders of South-Western Asia by the Median forerunners of the Achaemenian Empire. We may place in the same general category the eviction of the Afghan invaders of Iran by Nādir Shāh, and the eviction of the Mongol invaders of China by the Ming in revenge for the intolerable service which these Eurasian Nomad barbarians had performed for the main body of the Far Eastern Civilization in imposing on it a universal state which it had failed to provide for itself. The Serb barbarians who aspired to perform the same service for the main body of Orthodox Christendom were overthrown, without ever having set foot within the imperial city of Constantinople, by 'Osmanli competitors whose Spartan discipline assured their victory over the unruly epigoni of Stephen Dushan.

The premature timing of an offensive, which was the undoing of the Serbs, the Scyths, and the Gutæans, had twice been similarly fatal to Celtic barbarian trespassers. The Continental Celts who, on the morrow of the breakdown of the Hellenic Civilization, overwhelmed the perilously exposed Etruscan advance-guard of Hellenism in the Po Basin, and who subsequently thrust their way across Gaul into the Iberian Peninsula and across the Balkan Peninsula into the heart of Anatolia, were successively brought to book by the Roman builders of an Hellenic universal state.<sup>4</sup> The Insular Celts who attempted to create a Far

<sup>1</sup> See X. ix. 658, n. 3, and 659-62.

<sup>2</sup> For the use of this term in this study, see pp. 580-623, below.

<sup>3</sup> See the passage quoted from Procopius in III. iii. 163.

<sup>4</sup> See II. ii. 279-82.

Western Christian alternative to a nascent Romanesque Western Christian Civilization found themselves constrained, like their Scandinavian counterparts, to acquiesce in being assimilated to the more puissant rival culture.<sup>1</sup> The grimmer fate that might have been theirs if they had shown themselves recalcitrant is indicated by the chastisement that the unconscionable Continental Saxon barbarians did incur at the hands of a Carolingian Power which had not brushed aside the effete barbarism of its Merovingian predecessors in order to open the way for an unseasonable Saxon repetition of the Teutonic Völkerwanderung that had weltered, four hundred years earlier, over the western provinces of the Roman Empire.

The fratricidal warfare, through which the barbarians save Civilization the trouble of having to put them down by ridding the World of one another, is perhaps the only beneficent form of 'genocide'.<sup>2</sup> By this salutary method of progressive elimination the number of the competing Macedonian barbarian successor-states of the Achaemenian Empire was eventually reduced to three through the overthrow of Antigonos at Ipsus<sup>3</sup> and of Lysimachus at Corupedium; and, by the same process, the trio of Turkish and Tungus barbarian successor-states of the Sinic universal state was reduced to unity within 120 years of the fall of the régime of the United Tsin,<sup>4</sup> and the 'heptarchy' of English barbarian successor-states of the Roman Empire in Britain was eventually converted into a 'dyarchy' in which the whole island, except for Wales, was partitioned between a Wessex that had entered into the heritage of Mercia and a Lothian that had taken its Scottish conquerors captive.<sup>5</sup> In the Continental European arena of a post-Hellenic barbarian Völkerwanderung the Burgundian squatters on the left bank of the Rhine were almost exterminated by the Western Huns—before the Hun Power, in its turn, was broken by a revolt of its satellite Teuton war-bands after Attila's death—and a Burgundian remnant which had found asylum in Savoy was subsequently subjugated there by the Merovingian Franks.<sup>6</sup> The Visigoths evicted the Vandals and Alans from the Iberian

<sup>1</sup> The histories of the abortive Far Western Christian and abortive Scandinavian civilizations have been sketched in II. ii. 322–60.

<sup>2</sup> Instances have been cited, by anticipation, in I. i. 58 and in IV. iv. 486.

<sup>3</sup> In spite of this disaster, in which the first Antigonos met his death, his grandson and namesake did, of course, succeed in securing for his house the throne of one of the three surviving Macedonian polities; but the Macedonian homeland, which thus became Antigonos Gonatas' domain, was a modest prize compared with Antigonos Monophthalmus's abortive Asiatic empire.

<sup>4</sup> Upon the collapse, at the turn of the third and fourth centuries of the Christian Era, of the Sinic imperial régime of 'the United Tsin', which had momentarily re-established the Sinic universal state in A.D. 280, after a century of disunion, three barbarian war-bands carved successor-states out of the northern fringes of the former imperial dominions: the Southern Hiongnu and the To Pa in Shansi, and the Sienpi in Liaotung. The Hiongnu principality of 'Pei Han' came into collision with the To Pa in A.D. 312 (within a year of the sack of the eastern imperial capital, Loyang, by these Hiongnu in A.D. 311). In A.D. 318 'Pei Han' broke up (two years after the sack of the western imperial capital, Ch'ang-ngan, by these Hiongnu in A.D. 316). In A.D. 338 the Hiongnu principality was reconstituted, under the name of 'Chao', only to be conquered in A.D. 352 by 'Yen', the Sienpi principality in Liaotung. 'Yen', in its turn, was conquered in A.D. 436 by 'Wei'—the classical name that had been assumed by the victorious principality of the Tungus To Pa (see Cordier, H.: *Histoire Générale de la Chine* (Paris 1920–1, Geuthner, 4 vols.), vol. i, pp. 306–23).

<sup>5</sup> See II. ii. 190–3.

<sup>6</sup> In A.D. 413 the main body of the Burgundians had settled, by agreement with the

Peninsula before they were themselves evicted by the Franks from Gaul, and they subsequently subjugated the Sueves in Galicia before being driven, by their own Arab conquerors, into the adjoining mountain fastness of Asturias. The Arabs, on their way to conquering all but a fragment of the Iberian Peninsula from their Visigothic fellow barbarians, subjugated in North-West Africa the Berber barbarians who had plagued both the Romans and the Vandals with impunity.

The 'face' which the Roman Empire had lost when Odovacer broke the rules of the political game in a disintegrating universal state<sup>1</sup> by deposing Romulus Augustulus, the puppet emperor in the West, and undisguisedly taking the reins of government into his own hands, was recovered, without any military exertion on the Constantinopolitan Imperial Government's part, when the tactless Scirian barbarian war-lord Odovacer was treacherously murdered by the faithless Ostrogothic barbarian war-lord Theodoric. Odovacer had opened the gates of an impregnable Ravenna to his hereditary enemy in consideration of a solemn undertaking, on Theodoric's part, to share the possession of Italy with Odovacer on equal terms. Theodoric's murderous breach of faith is characteristic of the methods by which the barbarian 'heroes' snatch an ephemeral dominion from one another; and retribution overtook this crime when Theodoric's ill-gotten dominion over Italy was wrested from his epigoni by the Constantinopolitan Imperial Government that had instigated Theodoric himself to move on to Italy from Illyricum. In reconquering Italy from the Ostrogoths at the cost of disastrously depleting the man-power of Illyricum and the wealth of the Oriental provinces of the Empire, Justinian was unwittingly working, not for himself nor for his heirs, but for the Lombard war-lord Alboin, who was the ultimate beneficiary of the Great Romano-Gothic War of A.D. 537-53. Before posthumously avenging the extermination of the Ostrogoths by making an easy entry into a devastated Italy, Alboin, in concert with the Avars, had exterminated the Ostrogoths' kinsmen the Gepidae, who had been the principal beneficiaries of the previous extermination of the Avars' fellow Nomads the Western Huns.

This auspicious proclivity of the barbarians for liquidating one another is likewise illustrated in the histories of the break-up of the Arab Caliphate and the break-up of the Khazar Empire in the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe. When the collapse of the Far Western Umayyad Caliphate created a political vacuum in Andalusia which sucked in Berber Muslim barbarians from Africa and Frankish Christian barbarians from Europe, the Murābit Lamtūna Berber inter-

Roman authorities, on the left bank of the middle Rhine, round Worms. In A.D. 437 these Burgundians were attacked and crushed by the Huns at the instigation of the Roman war-lord Aëtius. In thus serving as the Romans' executioners the Huns were taking a vicarious revenge for a severe reverse that they had suffered in A.D. 430 at the hands of a trans-Rhenane rearguard of the Burgundians in the mountainous country between Rhine, Main, and Neckar. This obscure concatenation of inter-barbarian conflicts is elucidated by E. A. Thompson: *A History of Attila and the Huns* (Oxford 1948, Clarendon Press), pp. 65-67. The Burgundians who settled in Savoy in A.D. 443 were survivors of the disaster of A.D. 437. This Burgundy on the Rhône was conquered by the Merovingians in A.D. 532.

<sup>1</sup> The role of a universal state, in the last chapter of its history, as a source of legitimization for its *de facto* successors has been examined in VI. vii. 12-16.

lopers were overthrown, as we have seen,<sup>1</sup> by the Muwahhid Masmūda, and the Masmūda by the Marinid Zanāta. On the frontier of a disintegrating 'Abbasid Caliphate over against the Eurasian Steppe, a Turkish wave of Nomad barbarian invaders was similarly pursued and submerged by a following Mongol wave, while the survivors of a founded Khazar Empire lived to witness, from their asylum in the mountain fastnesses of the Crimea, the transformation of the Khazars' own former imperial domain in the Eurasian Steppe's Great Western Bay into a maelström where successive waves of Magyar, Pecheneg, Ghuzz, Cuman, and Mongol Nomad barbarian invaders, breaking westward out of the depths of the vast steppe-ocean, were shattered by their impact on one another. At the Far Eastern extremity of the Old World the Khitan Nomad invaders of a disintegrating China were evicted by the Kin highlanders from Manchuria, as the Lamtūna Nomads were supplanted in the Maghrib and Andalusia by the Masmūda highlanders from the Atlas; and the Kin, in their turn, suffered at the Mongols' hands the retribution that was meted out to the Masmūda by the Zanāta.

The ignominious fate of lingering on to be snuffed out eventually, unregretted, by scavenger-harbingers of a resurgent civilization was reserved for the Kassite squatters in Babylonia; the Merovingian and Lombard interlopers in Roman Gaul and Italy; the Umayyad successors of the Romans *trans Taurum* and of the Sasanidae; the Libyan squatters in the homeland of 'the New Empire' of Egypt; the Chaghatāy Mongol Eurasian Nomad overlords of Transoxania; the Mongol Il-Khans of Hūlāgū's line who had liquidated the 'Turkish successor-states of the 'Abbasid Caliphate, and the remnant of the 'Abbasid Power itself, in Iran and 'Irāq; and the 'Parthian' Eurasian Nomad Parni who, in their day, had wrested the same territories from the weakening grasp of the epigoni of Seleucus Nicator. The Kassites were cleared away by native representatives of a nascent Babylonian Civilization, the Merovingians and the Lombard successors of Alboin by the Carolingians, the Umayyads by the 'Abbasids, the Libyans by the Deltaic Egyptian Pharaohs of the Twenty-Sixth Dynasty with the aid of Carian and Ionian 'brazen men from the sea'; the Chaghatāy Mongols by Timur Lenk, the Il-Khans by a litter of ephemeral successor-states, the 'Parthian' Arsacidae by the Sasanidae from Fars. The Arsacids, Umayyads, Lombards, and Chaghatāy Mongols partially retrieved the humiliation of their exit by fighting a losing battle against their suppressors; and the survivors of the 'Abbasids' Umayyad victims who succeeded in re-establishing an Umayyad Caliphate in miniature in Andalusia, beyond their Khurāsānī adversaries' reach, were emulating the spirit of that uncharacteristically stiff-necked minority among the descendants of the Libyan squatters in Egypt who preferred to trek up the Nile into the Sudanese Gazīrah rather than submit to the rule of the apostles of an archaising Egyptian reaction.<sup>2</sup> A majority of the Libyan trespassers in Egypt preferred, like the Kassites and the Merovingians, to die 'the cow's death' that, in the

<sup>1</sup> On p. 49, above.

<sup>2</sup> This incident has been touched upon in VI. vii. 118-19.

barbarian's own eyes, is the worst disgrace that he can bring upon himself.

The only barbarians who had escaped all these alternative evil ends were those whose incursion into the domain of a disintegrating civilization beyond a fallen *limes* had been accompanied by their conversion to some still vigorous civilization in their rear. The Macedonians, for example, were Greek-speaking barbarians<sup>1</sup> who had been exposed to the radiation of the Hellenic Civilization, created by the Greek city-states round the shores of the Aegean, for many generations before the date of Alexander's crossing of the Hellespont. The deliberate Hellenization of Macedonia by Alexander's father Philip was the prelude to the Macedonians' conquest of the Achaemenian Empire as apostles of Hellenism; and, though, as we have seen, the Achaemenian Empire's Macedonian successor-states all, in different ways, displayed the political instability that is characteristic of principalities set up by barbarian war-bands, these *peritura regna* did, nevertheless, succeed in performing one piece of creative work in sowing seeds of Hellenism on Oriental ground that were subsequently harvested by the Roman Empire. This Macedonian story had been repeated in the cultural history of the Asturian and Pyrenaean barbarians who had emulated the Macedonians' feat of overrunning the domains of several disintegrating civilizations.<sup>2</sup> The Visigoth refugees in Asturias and their Basque neighbours in the Western Pyrenees started life imbued with a tincture of a then already nascent Western Christian Civilization; and this tincture was successively reinforced in the ninth century of the Christian Era, when the southern foothills of the Central and Eastern Pyrenees were conquered from the Umayyads by the Carolingians, and in the eleventh century, when Leonese and Castilian war-bands began to encroach in earnest on the indigenous successor-states of an Andalusian Umayyad Caliphate.

'When in A.D. 1002 Northern Spain eventually emancipated herself from Islam, she applied herself to the task of restoring her weakened links with the rest of Europe. The liturgy, clergy, monasteries, handwriting—all her institutions and customs—were reformed in the time of the Cid and brought into line with the standards prevailing in Western Europe. This great change was helped forward by the influx of knights, clerics, burghers and settlers from beyond the Pyrenees, who filled the places of those inhabitants of Castile and Leon who had moved southwards.'<sup>3</sup>

In a similar way the Scandinavian barbarian intruders on the forest fringes of the Khazar Empire in the Dniepr Basin were salvaged by their conversion to Eastern Orthodox Christianity; the Cossack barbarians who followed the Russian rivers out of the Forest into the Steppe and ventured to beard the epigoni of the Golden Horde on the Eurasian

<sup>1</sup> See III. iii. 477-89.

<sup>2</sup> The Macedonians overran the domains of the Hittite, Syriac, Egyptian, Babylonian, and Indic civilizations; the Spaniards overran the domains of the Syriac Civilization in the Iberian Peninsula and of the Central American and Andean civilizations in the New World.

<sup>3</sup> Menéndez Pidal, Ramón: *The Cid and His Spain*, English translation (London 1934, Murray), p. 452. See also the present Study, V. v. 242, n. 4.

Nomads' own element were incorporated into the universal state which was provided for the Russian offshoot of Orthodox Christendom by Muscovy; and the Serb and the Rumeliot and Maniot Greek barbarian carvers of successor-states out of the carcass of the Ottoman Empire were converted in the act, *more Macedonico*, to the secular civilization of a Modern Western World.<sup>1</sup>

These instances of salvation through conversion, rare though they are, show that even the barbarian interloper on the domain of a moribund civilization is not inexorably doomed.

<sup>1</sup> See II. ii. 181-6.



## E. DICHTUNG UND WAHRHEIT

### (I) A PHANTASY OF HEROISM

IF there is truth in the picture presented in the preceding chapter, the verdict on the Heroic Age can only be a severe one. The mildest judgement will convict it of having been a futile escapade, while sterner judges will denounce it as a criminal outrage.

The verdict of futility was once pronounced, in tragic circumstances, by a conquered barbarian war-lord whose previous station and subsequent personal experiences entitled him to speak on this point with unchallengeable authority. In A.D. 534 Gelimir, the ex-king of an ephemeral Vandal barbarian successor-state of the Roman Empire in North-West Africa, could not forget, while he was dragging his feet through the streets of Constantinople in a Roman triumphal procession to celebrate his own overthrow, that he was the fifth successor of a Genseric who had conquered Carthage less than a hundred years back<sup>1</sup> and had sacked Rome herself in A.D. 455.

"The prisoners led in triumph were Gelimir himself, with a purple robe of some sort draped round his shoulders, and the whole of his family, together with the very tallest and physically handsomest of the Vandal rank-and-file. When Gelimir had arrived at the Hippodrome and beheld the Emperor enthroned on a lofty tribune, with the people standing on either side of him, and when, as he took in the scene, he realised the extremity of his own plight, he did not relieve his feelings by weeping or groaning aloud, but repeated over and over again a phrase from the Hebrew scriptures: "Vanity of vanities; all is vanity."<sup>2</sup> When he reached the Emperor's tribune they stripped him of his purple and forced him to fall on his face and grovel in adoration of Justinian's imperial majesty (*προσκυνεῖν Ἰουστινιανὸν βασιλέα*)."<sup>3</sup>

If the unhappy Gelimir had been further humiliated on that day by being made to carry a placard epitomizing his experience, the Roman official epigrammatist commissioned to compose the headline could not have done better than to anticipate three lines written by a latter-day Western poet:

Sown in the Moon shall with the Moon decay,  
Loved in the Moon shall die at touch of day;  
And spring be cold, and roses ashen grey.<sup>4</sup>

And the same stark verdict of futility likewise makes itself heard through the mellow poetry of a Victorian man of letters who had lived on to feel the frost of a neo-barbarian age.

Follow the path of those fair warriors, the tall Goths  
from the day when they led their blue-eyed families

<sup>1</sup> The Vandals had conquered Carthage in A.D. 439, only ten years after their passage, in A.D. 429, from Spain to Africa.

<sup>2</sup> Eccl. i. 2.

<sup>3</sup> Procopius: *A History of the Wars of Justinian*, Book IV, chap. 9, cited in IV. iv. 389.

<sup>4</sup> Gilbert Murray, on the title-page of *Moonseed*, by Rosalind Murray (London 1911, Sidgwick and Jackson).

off Vistula's cold pasture-lands, their murky home  
 by the amber-strewn foreshore of the Baltic sea,  
 and, in the incontaminat vigor of manliness  
 feeling their rumour'd way to an unknown promised land,  
 tore at the ravel'd fringes of the purple power,  
 and trampling its wide skirts, defeating its armies,  
 slaying its Emperor, and burning his cities,  
 sack'd Athens and Rome; until supplanting Caesar  
 they ruled the world where Romans reigned before:—  
 Yet from those three long centuries of rapin and blood,  
 inhumanity of heart and wanton cruelty of hand,  
 ther is little left. . . . Those Goths wer strong but to destroy;  
 they neither wrote nor wrought, thought not nor created;  
 but, since the field was rank with tares and mildew'd wheat,  
 their scything won some praise: Else have they left no trace.<sup>1</sup>

This measured judgement, which is the ripe fruit of a still undisturbed detachment from the realities of the Heroic Age, could not have been delivered by an Hellenic poet who was bitterly conscious of still living in a moral slum made by barbarian successors of 'the thalassocracy of Minos'. Criminality, and not mere futility, is the burden of Hesiod's indictment against a post-Minoan heroic age that, in his day, was still haunting a nascent Hellenic Civilization; and, if he had been required to give his black picture a 'caption', we may guess that he would have quoted from the *Odyssey*<sup>2</sup> the goddess Athena's comment on Zeus's tale of Aegisthus.

καὶ λίην κείνός γε εἰκότι κείται δλέθρῳ  
 ὥς ἀπόλοιτο καὶ ἄλλος ὅτις τοιαῦτά γε ῥέζοι.<sup>3</sup>

Hesiod's own judgement on the barbarians is indeed a merciless one:

'And Father Zeus made yet a third race of mortal men—a Race of Bronze, in no wise like unto the Silver, fashioned from ash-stems,<sup>4</sup> mighty and terrible. Their delight was in the grievous deeds of Ares and in the trespasses of Pride (*ὑβριες*). No bread ever passed their lips, but their hearts in their breasts were strong as adamant, and none might approach them. Great was their strength and unconquerable were the arms which grew from their shoulders upon their stalwart frames. Of bronze were their panoplies, of bronze their houses, and with bronze they tilled the land (dark iron was not yet). These were brought low by their own hands and went their way to the mouldering house of chilly Hades, nameless. For all their mighty valour, Death took them in his dark grip, and they left the bright light of the Sun.'<sup>5</sup>

In Posterity's judgement on the overflowing measure of suffering which the barbarians bring upon themselves by their own criminal

<sup>1</sup> Bridges, Robert: *The Testament of Beauty* (Oxford 1929, Clarendon Press), Book I, ll. 535-55.

<sup>2</sup> Book I, ll. 46-47.

<sup>3</sup> 'All too [fearfully] befitting is the doom that has laid that monster low; thus perish any other wretch who dares such deeds as those.' The second of these two lines was quoted by Scipio Aemilianus when, in his camp beleaguering Numantia, he received intelligence of the violent end which Tiberius Gracchus had met at Rome (Plutarch: *Life of Tiberius Gracchus*, chap. 21).

<sup>4</sup> Ash was the wood from which spear-shafts were made.—A.J.T.

<sup>5</sup> Hesiod: *Works and Days*, ll. 143-55.

follies,<sup>1</sup> this passage in Hesiod's poem might have stood as the last word, had not the poet himself run on as follows:

'Now when this race also had been covered by Earth, yet a fourth race was made, again, upon the face of the All-Mother, by Zeus son of Cronos—a better race and more righteous, the divine race of men heroic (*ἀνδρῶν ἡρώων θεῖον γένος*), who are called demigods (*ἡμίθεοι*), a race that was aforetime upon the boundless Earth. These were destroyed by evil War and dread Battle—some below Seven-Gate Thebes in the land of Cadmus, as they fought for the flocks of Oedipus, while others were carried for destruction to Troy in ships over the great gulf of the sea, for the sake of Helen of the lovely hair. There verily they met their end and vanished in the embrace of Death; yet a few there were that were granted a life and a dwelling-place, apart from Mankind, by Zeus son of Cronos, who made them to abide at the ends of the Earth. So there they abide, with hearts free from care, in the Isles of the Blessed beside the deep eddies of Ocean Stream—happy heroes, for whom a harvest honey-sweet, thrice ripening every year, is yielded by fruitful fields.'<sup>2</sup>

What is the relation of this passage to the one that immediately precedes it, and indeed to the whole catalogue of races in which it is imbedded? This episode breaks the sequence of the catalogue in two respects. In the first place the race here passed in review, unlike the preceding races of gold, silver, and bronze and the succeeding race of iron, is not identified with any metal, and, in the second place, all the other four races are made to follow one another in a declining order of merit which is symbolized in the descending gradation of the metals from gold to iron through silver and bronze. Moreover, the destinies of the three preceding races after death are consonant with the tenour of their lives on Earth. The Race of Gold 'became good spirits (*δαίμονες . . . ἑσθλοί*) by the will of great Zeus—spirits *above* the ground, guardians of mortal men, givers of wealth (for they had gotten even that prerogative of kings).'<sup>3</sup> The inferior Race of Silver still 'gained among mortals the name of blessed ones *beneath* the ground—second in glory; and yet, even so, they too are attended with honour'.<sup>4</sup> When we come, however, to the Race of Bronze, we find, as we have seen, that their fate after death is passed over in a grimly ominous silence. In a catalogue woven on this pattern, we should expect to find the next race condemned, after death, to suffer, at the lightest, the torments of the damned in the House of Hades; yet, so far from that, we find at least a chosen few of them transported after death, not to Hell, but to Elysium—where they live, above ground, the very life that had been lived by the Race of Gold before tasting of a death which these supremely favoured heroes are, it would seem, to be spared.

Manifestly the insertion of a Race of Heroes between the Race of Bronze and the Race of Iron is an afterthought. Both in form and in substance the passages describing the races of these two baser metals

<sup>1</sup> σφῆσιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ὑπὲρ μέτρον ἄλγε' ἔχουσιν.—*Odyssey*, Book I, l. 34.

<sup>2</sup> Hesiod: *Works and Days*, ll. 156–73, following Rzach, A.: *Hesiodi Carmina*, editio altera (Leipzig 1908, Teubner), in existing ll. 169–92 as a later variant for ll. 172–3.

<sup>3</sup> Hesiod: *Works and Days*, ll. 122–6, following Rzach in excising ll. 124–5.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, ll. 141–2.

ought to stand in immediate juxtaposition to one another. If we do bring them together by allowing the episode of the heroes to drop out, the poem then runs smooth, with no perceptible hiatus at the point where we have excised the incongruous parenthesis. The parenthetic heroes break the poem's sequence, symmetry, and sense; and this discord must have grated as painfully on the aesthetic sensibilities of the poet as it grates on ours. What moved the poet to make this clumsy insertion at this cost to his work of art? The answer must be that the picture, here presented, of a Race of Heroes was so vividly impressed on the imagination of the poet and his public that some place had to be found for it in any catalogue of the successive ages in their vista of past history; and the irony of the poet's predicament is that this massacre of a work of art for the sake of paying tribute to an historical reminiscence turns out really to have been an unnecessary atrocity. It was unnecessary because the Race of Heroes was already ensconced in the original catalogue under the sign of the third metal of the four. In other words, the Race of Heroes is identical with the Race of Bronze; and the insertion describing the heroes is thus, in truth, not an indispensable supplement, but a superfluous doublet.

The identity of the two races becomes transparent as soon as we compare the two passages. In the first place the Heroes' unnamed metal must, in fact, be bronze, since iron only comes in with their successors, while their brazen predecessors have already superseded the earlier races of silver and gold; and in truth the Homeric Epic is corroborated by the researches of Modern Western archaeologists in setting the Achæan heroes of a post-Minoan *Völkerwanderung* in the technological environment of the Bronze Age. In the second place the ascription of the responsibility for the destruction of the Heroes to the ostensibly impersonal demonic forces of 'War' and 'Battle' is manifestly a euphemistic periphrasis for the poet's previous brutal statement of the truth that the Race of Bronze 'were brought low by their own hands'. The nameless fratricidal struggles in which the brazen men liquidate themselves are none other than the wars in which the Heroes are destroyed at the gates of Thebes and under the walls of Troy—and therewith the curtain falls on the war-ridden lives, not only of the Men of Bronze, but likewise of the Heroes with the exception of a privileged élite. The majority of the Heroes, who 'met their end' in warfare 'and vanished in the embrace of Death', are the self-same brazen warriors who 'left the bright light of the Sun' and 'went their way to the mouldering house of chilly Hades, nameless', when 'Death took them in his dark grip'. If we leave out of account Menelaus and the handful of other fortunate Heroes whom Zeus, in his sovereign caprice, has elected to transport to Elysium, the deeds and sufferings and destinies of the two races, as described by the poet in these passages, prove, on examination, to be the same.

This discovery is surprising, because the impression made on our minds by the two passages, before we thus analyse them, is one not of identity but of contrast; and the difference, as well as the likeness, is indeed a reality; but, in distinction from the likeness, which is a likeness

of statements about alleged matters of fact, the difference is a difference of aesthetic and emotional atmosphere. The Race of Bronze and the Race of Heroes are the same people seen through different mental glasses: a lens of faint yet authentic historical reminiscence and a lens of vivid but hallucinatory poetic imagination. A single race has, in fact, been portrayed by the poet twice over in two pictures which he has been constrained to present side by side because he is afflicted—or endowed—with an astigmatic vision which he is unable to reduce to a single focus.

How has this dual vision arisen? An answer to this riddle is suggested by a literary phenomenon which we have already had occasion to notice in another context.<sup>1</sup> We have observed that an historical personage or event that happens also to become a character or topic of 'heroic' poetry or saga acquires, in this 'other world' of the barbarian poetic imagination, a life of its own whose career, as it develops, is apt to part company with the statically authentic historical facts of 'real life' until sometimes the original identity of the two pictures is almost entirely obscured—as can be verified in cases in which the historical truth or falsehood of the barbarian poet's picture can be gauged by comparison with the prosaic statements of some historian, belonging to a neighbouring civilization, who is, himself, a contemporary of the facts that he has put on record. On this analogy we may perhaps explain the puzzling dittography in our Hesiodic catalogue of the successive races of men by concluding that, in this canto, the poet has played for us the historian's part as well as his own. In his grim delineation of the Race of Bronze he has given us, in advance, the prose version of his immediately following poetic idyll of a Race of Heroes—a fantasy in which the sordid historical facts have undergone their characteristic metamorphosis in the radio-active medium of a Homeric poetical tradition to which Hesiod is the heir.

It would be an error, of course, to suppose that our conscientious Hesiod is deliberately laying a glossy coat of moral whitewash over his heroes' crude historical criminality. His presentation of the damning truth side by side with an ideal picture is evidence of his naïve good faith; and, indeed, we have noticed above<sup>2</sup> that the barbarian bard who has posthumously made a Hesiod his dupe is quite as ready to paint his picture darker than the reality of his living model as he is to paint it lighter. The notorious creation, in the *Nibelungenlied*, of an imaginary paladin, Dietrich of Bern, out of an historical Theodoric who, 'in real life', won Verona by his treacherous murder of Odovacer, is offset by the transformation of respectable historical characters into villains. The Classical School of Serb 'heroic' poetry, which made the counterpart of an imaginary chivalrous Dietrich out of the historical traitor Marko Kraljević, simultaneously made the counterpart of an authentic dastardly Theodoric out of the historical paladin Vuk Branković.<sup>3</sup> The epic poet's concern is, not for his heroes' and heroines' moral reputation, but for his poetry's aesthetic merit; and even in this endeavour, professionally in earnest though he is, he is at the same time entirely unselfconscious.

This admirable unselfconsciousness is one of the secrets of the epic poet's dazzling artistic success; and this triumph of a barbarian art is

<sup>1</sup> In V. v. 607-14.

<sup>2</sup> On p. 61, above.

<sup>3</sup> See V. v. 609.

the solitary creative achievement amid the welter of catastrophic failures which a barbarian war-band brings upon itself when it steps across a fallen *limes* to make a moral slum out of the social ruins among which it squats. In politics, in religion, and in all the other fields in which the barbarians have shown rudimentary signs of possessing creative power so long as they have been pent back behind the *limes*-barrage,<sup>1</sup> these rudiments of creativity are blighted, as we have seen,<sup>2</sup> by the demoralization that overtakes the barbarians when the collapse of the *limes* spills them out of Limbo into the Promised Land. In the slum of a barbarian successor-state the barbarian's embryonic gift for poetry is the only one of his potentialities that comes to flower; and this bud blossoms so wonderfully that it lends the waste-land the illusory appearance of a paradise. The barbarian bard's magically successful art casts over the barbarian war-lord's commonplace misconduct and failure 'in real life' a glamour that deludes a captivated Posterity—as our physical vision is enraptured by the iridescent colours that radiate, in patterns of inimitable harmony, over the surface of a broken piece of Roman glass or of a puddle of oil that has collected in a pot-hole from the leaking sump of some limping car.<sup>3</sup>

In social terms the Heroic Age is a great folly, and an even greater crime; but in emotional terms it is a great experience: the thrilling experience of breaking through a barrier which has baffled the barbarian invaders' forebears for many generations past, and bursting out into an apparently boundless world that offers what seem to be infinite possibilities. With one glorious exception, all these possibilities turn out, as we have seen, to be Dead Sea fruit; the barbarian war-lords and warriors throw away their splendid opportunities in crimes and follies that swiftly revenge themselves; yet this sensational completeness of the barbarians' misconduct and failure on the social and political planes paradoxically ministers to the success of their bards' creative work; for in art, in illuminating antithesis to 'practical life', there is more to be made out of failure than out of success.<sup>4</sup>

The exhilaration generated by the experience of the *Völkerwanderung*

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 9-10, above.

<sup>2</sup> On pp. 46-47, above.

<sup>3</sup> To be transfigured by this poetic glamour in the imagination of contemporaries and epigoni was the supreme ambition of the barbarian war-lord—the one prize accessible to him that, in his disillusioned eyes, still shone like gold against the drab foil of a material power and wealth which had been proved mockingly unrewarding by a bitter experience of tasting their fruits and finding them dust and ashes. The poet's tenure of the keys of the war-lord's hall of fame, which was the only heaven to which the war-lord aspired, conferred on the poet a potential political 'pull' which the sophisticated war-lord Mu'awiyah had the acumen to appreciate and the adroitness to turn to his own account (see Lammens, S.J., *Le Père H.: Études sur le Règne du Calife Mo'awia I<sup>er</sup>* (Paris 1908, Geuthner), pp. 252-66).

<sup>4</sup> On this point see V. v. 607-14. This truth is illustrated, not only by the choice of themes in the primary epic poetry that is evoked by a barbarian *Völkerwanderung*, but also by the history of the secondary epic poetry in which a sophisticated civilization proclaims its admiration for a barbarian art by trying its hand at an artificial reproduction of the barbarian poet's genre. Like the original epic, the literary epic is apt to be the swan-song of an age that is petering out in disillusionment and failure—as has been pointed out by C. M. Bowra in *From Virgil to Milton* (London 1945, Macmillan), pp. 28-32. This creative potentiality of failure, which had thus proved itself a gold mine for poets who worked it as a vein of inspiration, was also, of course, one of the mysteries that had been revealed in the higher religions through the passions of the Prophets and the Saints.



—an exhilaration that breaks down into demoralization in the intoxicated souls of the barbarian men of action—inspires the barbarian poet serenely to transmute the memory of his heroes' wickedness and ineptitude into a song that will live on Posterity's lips. In the enchanted realm of a poetry that thus magically transfigures the sordid crimes and follies by which it is evoked, the barbarian *conquistadores* achieve vicariously the success that eludes their grasp in real life; and herein the bard does the hero an even greater service than Horace avers.<sup>1</sup> He does not merely preserve his subject's memory; he actually creates his character by making dead history blossom into immortal romance; and, while the effect, as often as not, on his hero's moral reputation may be to present him as a blacker villain than he has actually shown himself to be while he has been rollicking, in flesh and blood, across the stage of History, one invariable result of the poet's artistic alchemy is to enhance immeasurably the aesthetic attractiveness of the historical lay figure that he has taken as his cobbler's last. Thanks to the barbarian poet's wizardry the squalid realities of the barbarian warrior's slum exhale a phantasy of heroism that long outlives its ephemeral source in the sump of authentic history.

This pearl of Barbarism is appreciated and appropriated by a Posterity that has little use for anything else in the barbarian's otherwise uninviting legacy; and the barbarian bard, in the posthumous literary life that is thus conferred on him by the canonization of his works, slyly avenges his discreditable comrades the barbarian war-lord and warrior by investing them with an unmerited reputation through an artistic conjuring trick. The fascination exercised by heroic poetry over its latter-day admirers deludes them, as we have observed,<sup>2</sup> into mistaking an Heroic Age which is the changeling child of a poet's imagination for the very different historical reality by which the poet's creative activity has been called into play. The poet's magic touch conjures a 'light that never was, on sea or land',<sup>3</sup> out of the baleful glare of a conflagration kindled by the barbarian incendiaries of a devastated world; and this theatrical lighting makes a slum look like Valhalla.

The earliest victim of this illusion is, as we have seen,<sup>4</sup> the poet of a Dark Age which is 'the Heroic Age's' sequel. As is manifest in retrospect, this later age has no need to be ashamed of a darkness which signifies that the barbarian incendiaries' bonfire has at last burnt itself out; and, though, after the expiry of that ghastly artificial illumination, a bed of ashes smothers the surface of the flame-seared ground, the Dark Age proves to be as creative as 'the Heroic Age' has been destructive. When the fire is extinct and the clamour hushed, the Spirit moves again upon the face of the waters; and, in the fullness of time, new life duly arises from the abyss to clothe the fertile ash-field with shoots of tender green. The poetry of Hesiod is one of these harbingers of a returning spring-time; yet this honest chanticleer of the darkness before dawn is still so blindly infatuated with a poetry inspired by an act of nocturnal

<sup>1</sup> Horace: *Carmina*, Book IV, Ode ix.

<sup>2</sup> On p. 78, above.

<sup>3</sup> Wordsworth, William: *Elegiac Stanzas suggested by a Picture of Peele Castle in a Storm*.

<sup>4</sup> On p. 57, above.

incendiarism that he takes on faith, as gospel truth, an imaginary Homeric picture of a Race of Heroes and is consequently betrayed into despairing of the age of promise into which he himself has been born—without realizing that any age of history that is experienced 'in real life' is bound to seem desperately inferior to an Heroic Age whose idyllic beauty has never had any existence outside a barbarian poet's imagination.

Hesiod's illusion seems strange, considering that, in his picture of the Race of Bronze, he has preserved for us, side by side with his confiding reproduction of an Homeric fantasy, a merciless portrait of the barbarian as he really is. Yet, even without this clue, the heroic myth can be exploded by detonating the internal evidence. The Heroes turn out, as we have perceived, to live the evil lives and die the cruel deaths of the Race of Bronze, and Valhalla turns out likewise to be a slum when we switch off all the artificial lights and scrutinize dispassionately, in the sober light of day, this poetic idealization of the riotous feasting and turbulent fighting that, between them, make up the historical barbarians' daily round and common task. The warriors who qualify for admission to Valhalla by losing their lives in battle are in truth identical with the demons against whom they are called upon to exercise their prowess as members of Odin's ghostly war-band; and, in perishing from off the face of the Earth by mutual destruction, the Vikings have already done their best to relieve the World of a pandemonium of their own making by staging a *ragnarök* with an ending that is a happy one from every point of view except their own. In the Aesir's mythical last stand, Odin and his divine *comitatus* are *Doppelgänger* of the overwhelming powers of darkness to which they are fabled to succumb; for this heroic forlorn hope is the cunning *sagaman's* version of Odin's 'Wild Ride'—a tempestuous rout of unbridled passion that brings doom on any unhappy mortal who happens to be caught in its hideous blast.

The hallucination to which a Hesiod succumbs in the archaic prelude to a nascent civilization can also take in a sceptical historian in the sophisticated intellectual environment of a civilization that has reached, and perhaps passed, its maturity—as is attested by the following passage which Gibbon has allowed himself to write in *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*:

"The sublime Longinus, who . . . in the court of a Syrian queen preserved the spirit of ancient Athens, observes and laments [the] degeneracy of his contemporaries, which debased their sentiments, enervated their courage, and depressed their talents. "In the same manner," says he, "as some children always remain pigmies, whose infant limbs have been too closely confined; thus our tender minds, fettered by the prejudices and habits of a just servitude, are unable to expand themselves, or to attain that well-proportioned greatness which we admire in the Ancients, who, living under a popular government, wrote with the same freedom as they acted." This diminutive stature of Mankind, if we pur-

<sup>1</sup> ὥσπερ οὖν, εἴ γε . . . τοῦτο πιστὸν ἀκούω, τὰ γλαυττόκομα, ἐν οἷς οἱ πυγμαῖοι καλούμενοι δὲ νάνοι τρέφονται, οὐ μόνον κωλύει τῶν ἐγκεκλεισμένων τὰς αὐξήσεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ σκωραῖοι [?] διὰ τὸν περικείμενον τοῖς σώμασι δεσμόν, οὕτως, ἀπασαν δουλείαν, καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη, ψυχῆς γλαυττόκομον καὶ κοινὸν ἂν τις ἀποφίηται δεσμοκτήριον.—Longinus [?]: *Περὶ Ὑψους*, chap. xliv, § 5.

sue the metaphor, was daily sinking below the old standard, and the Roman World was indeed peopled by a race of pigmies, when the fierce giants of the North broke in and mended the puny breed. They restored a manly spirit of freedom; and, after the revolution of ten centuries, freedom became the happy parent of taste and science.<sup>1</sup>

After this awe-inspiring exhibition of the barbarian poet-conjurer's power to hoax a giant eighteenth-century intellect, we can hardly be surprised to see a nineteenth-century philosopher-mountebank launching his myth of a salutarily barbarian 'Nordic Race' whose blood—unique in this among all brews of human ichor—acts as an infallible elixir of youth when it is injected into the veins of an 'effete' society.<sup>2</sup> Yet we may still be cut to the heart as we watch the lively French aristocrat's political *jeu d'esprit* being keyed up into a racial myth by the criminal prophets of a demonic German Neobarbarism that surpasses in wickedness the original Barbarism which it seeks to revive in the measure in which a wilful apostate from a higher religious faith surpasses in perversity the invincibly ignorant heathen.<sup>3</sup>

## (II) A GENUINE HUMBLE SERVICE

While the criminality of a barbarian *Völkerwanderung* can thus work posthumous moral havoc on the strength of its brilliant poetic masquerade as an idyllic heroism, there have also been occasions on which an unbridled barbarian interloper has performed a humble service for Posterity that proves, in retrospect, to have been of genuine value. At the transition from the civilizations of the first generation to those of the second, the interloping barbarian war-bands that established themselves in a dying civilization's former domain did in some cases provide a link between the defunct civilization and its newborn successor, as, in the subsequent transition from the civilizations of the second generation to those of the third, a link was provided by chrysalis-churches created by the secondary civilizations' internal proletariats.<sup>4</sup> The Syriac and Hellenic civilizations, for instance, were thus linked with an antecedent Minoan Civilization through this Minoan Society's external proletariat, and the Hittite Civilization stood in the same historical relation to an antecedent Sumeric Civilization, the Indic Civilization to an antecedent Indus Culture (supposing that this Indus Culture were to turn out to have been independent of the Sumeric Civilization), and the Sinic Civilization to an antecedent Shang Culture (supposing that the progress of archaeological research were to confirm this Shang Culture's title to rank as a full-blown civilization of the first generation).

The modesty of the service that these particular barbarian war-bands

<sup>1</sup> Gibbon, E.: *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chap. ii, *ad fin.*

<sup>2</sup> The fallacy of ascribing to societies a senescence that is a property of individual living organisms has been criticized in IV. iv. 7-13.

<sup>3</sup> Count de Gobineau's fantasy and its consequences in real life have been touched upon in II. i. 216-19.

<sup>4</sup> See the table of primitive societies, civilizations, and higher religions, arranged in serial order, facing p. 47 of volume vii.

performed is brought out by our comparison of it with the role of the chrysalis-churches. While the Internal Proletariat that builds the churches, like the External Proletariat that breeds the war-bands, is the offspring of a psychological secession from a disintegrating civilization, and while neither branch of the Proletariat carries this repudiation of its former cultural allegiance so far as to make no use at all of the Dominant Minority's cultural heritage in creating the rudiments of a new culture with a distinctive character of its own, the Internal Proletariat is apt to make a much greater success than the External Proletariat ever makes of the cultural enterprise of 'spoiling the Egyptians'. In the higher religions which had been the Internal Proletariat's *chefs-d'œuvre*, the cultural spoils of a disintegrating civilization had been transmuted into new creations to a far greater extent, and with a far more telling effect, than in the new social and political institutions, the new religions, or even the new poetry of the barbarians beyond the pale; and this difference in degree of cultural assimilative power could be gauged by the difference in the strength of the link between a successor civilization and its predecessor when this link had been supplied by a chrysalis-church and when it had been supplied by a barbarian war-band.

For example, the Orthodox Christian and the Western Civilization, which were affiliated to the antecedent Hellenic Civilization through the Christian Church, had always been on far more intimate terms with their Hellenic predecessor than the Hellenic Civilization ever had been with a Minoan predecessor with which it had been affiliated solely through the Achaean barbarians. Through this non-conductive barbarian medium the Hellenic Civilization's reception of the antecedent Minoan Civilization's posthumous radiation of its cultural influence had been so faint and fragmentary that, in contrast to the Christian civilizations' intimacy with an antecedent Hellenism, the Hellenic Civilization gave the impression of being oblivious of its Minoan predecessor. It was, indeed, so little conscious of its Minoan antecedents that it might almost be mistaken—as its two 'Hellenistic' Christian successors never could be—for one of those civilizations of the earliest generation that had had no previous civilization at all in their cultural background. The Hellenic Society's living cultural heritage from the Achaean barbarians included no institutions of Minoan or post-Minoan origin, and no authentic contemporary records of any periods of the antecedent civilization's history. The sole fount of Hellenic knowledge of a pre-Hellenic past was the Homeric Epic; and, for the history of an antecedent civilization, the poetry bequeathed by barbarians is a doubly deceptive source of information. In general the barbarian poet creates his work of art by taking unlimited liberties with the record of authentic facts;<sup>1</sup> and, in particular, this intuitive artistic criterion governing the poet's treatment of his subject leads him to ignore the moribund civilization whose death agonies have precipitated the barbarian *Völkerwanderung* as a matter of historical fact, but whose tragedy is incomprehensible to barbarian minds.<sup>2</sup> Eschewing such intractable matter, the barbarian bard presents the barbarian Heroic Age *in vacuo*, with no more than a casual reference,

<sup>1</sup> See V. v. 607-14, and pp. 77-79, above.

<sup>2</sup> See V. v. 610-14.

here and there, to the mighty carcass on which the bard's vulture-heroes have gathered together to make their carrion feasts.

On this showing, the service with which we have credited the Achaeans and the other barbarians of their generation who played the same transmissive role might seem at first sight to dwindle almost to vanishing-point. What did it really amount to? Its reality becomes evident when we compare the destinies of those civilizations of the second generation that were affiliated to predecessors by this tenuous barbarian link with the destinies of the rest of the secondary civilizations. As we have observed in previous contexts,<sup>1</sup> any secondary civilizations that were not affiliated to their primary predecessors through these predecessors' external proletariats were affiliated to them through their dominant minorities; and these were the only two alternative lines of affiliation in this chapter of history, since no chrysalis-churches came out of the rudimentary higher religions—a worship of Tammuz and Ishtar and a worship of Osiris and Isis—that had been created or adopted by some of the primary civilizations' internal proletariats. Secondary civilizations affiliated through external proletariats and secondary civilizations affiliated through dominant minorities are the only civilizations of this generation that are known to us; and, when we compare these two types, we observe a difference in their destinies corresponding to a difference in their characters.


In character these two types of secondary civilization stand at opposite poles. Whereas those secondary civilizations that were affiliated through external proletariats were connected with their predecessors by a link that is so tenuous that it hardly serves to distinguish them from civilizations of the primary class that had no predecessors at all of their own social species, the rest of the secondary civilizations, which were affiliated through dominant minorities, were, on the other hand, so closely welded thereby to their predecessors of the first generation that we have found ourselves wondering whether we ought not to treat their histories as mere epilogues to those of the antecedent civilizations instead of according them the status of separate civilizations with histories of their own.<sup>2</sup> Whichever of the two possible answers to this question may be the nearer to the truth, there is no ambiguity about the destinies of these 'supra-affiliated secondary civilizations' or 'dead trunks of primary civilizations'—to give the societies of this type their two alternative labels. There were three known examples of the type—the Babylonian Civilization, affiliated to the Sumerian Civilization, and the Yucatec and Mexic civilizations, affiliated to the Mayan—and none of these three 'supra-affiliated secondary civilizations' had come to serve, in its disintegration, as the chrysalis of any living higher religion. All the living higher religions had been created by the internal proletariats of other civilizations of the second generation—the Syriac Civilization, the Hellenic, the Indic, the Sinic—whose own affiliation with their predecessors of the first generation had run, not through the Dominant Minority, but through the External Proletariat.

<sup>1</sup> In I. i. 115-18 and 131-2, and VII. vii. 421, above.

<sup>2</sup> This question has been raised in I. i. 117-18 and 133-6.



If we call to mind, in this connexion, our conclusion, reached in the preceding Part of this Study,<sup>1</sup> that our serial order of chronologically successive types of society is at the same time an ascending order of value, in which the higher religions would be the highest term so far attained, we shall now observe that the barbarian chrysalises of civilizations of the second generation would have to their credit the honour of having participated in the higher religions' procreation. They would have been, so to speak, the higher religions' 'grandparents';<sup>2</sup> for the higher religions that had come to flower had all been created by the internal proletariats of civilizations of the second generation which had been affiliated with their own predecessors of the first generation through barbarian war-bands. These contributions of these barbarians to the geneses of the higher religions can be conveyed most simply and clearly in the form of genealogical tables.



If the failures of the civilizations of the first generation to produce full-fledged higher religions had been followed only by the geneses of secondary civilizations affiliated to their primary predecessors solely through these predecessors' dominant minorities, the actual subsequent sterility of all the secondary civilizations of this type suggests that a second opportunity for the creation of higher religions might then never have presented itself. The actual recurrence of the opportunity, and the flowering, in this second spring, of Christianity, Islam, the Mahāyāna, and Hinduism, seem to have been historical consequences of the geneses of other secondary civilizations that were affiliated with their primary predecessors through barbarians; and these barbarian foster-parents of the Syriac, Hellenic, and Indic civilizations would thus appear to have played a positive, and perhaps indispensable, part in Mankind's gradual and laborious advance towards the goal of human endeavours.

Yet, when we have taken due note of this service and estimated it at its full value, we shall find ourselves still rating it as a modest one on a comparative view. Our conclusion that the role of serving as a cultural chrysalis is the highest to which any barbarian war-band had ever

<sup>1</sup> See VII. vii. 448-9.

<sup>2</sup> For the sake of brevity, we may perhaps allow ourselves here the perilous licence of describing a process of social growth in terms of the procreation of organic life—without forgetting that, in truth, societies are not living organisms (see III. iii. 219-23 and IV. iv. 11-12).



attained presents a significant contrast to our conclusion<sup>1</sup> that a church, when it had played the same role, had been digressing from its proper course on a charitable errand which, at the best, would delay, and, at the worst, might frustrate, the accomplishment of the church's own proper spiritual mission. If this role is a *pis-aller* for a performer that plays it so admirably as a church does play the chrysalis-role when it charitably condescends to it, the very much less effective performance of the same part by a barbarian war-band cannot be rated as being anything more than modestly meritorious. And even this slight compensation for the enormous social havoc that every barbarian war-band had worked had been paid only by a tiny minority of the war-bands that had made their devastating cyclone-passages through history.

Even at the transition from the first to the second generation of civilizations the barbarians bred by the primary civilizations' disintegration did not by any means always play even the moderately creative part of fostering a secondary civilization's birth.

The Hyksos barbarians who assembled their forces in Palestine and the Philistine and Achaean barbarian foster-fathers of the Syriac and Hellenic civilizations produced, for example, the very opposite of a creative effect in their impacts on the Egyptiac World. In these Nilotic escapades, so far from promoting the genesis of a new civilization, the barbarians performed the most untoward miracle of galvanizing a moribund civilization into a long protracted life-in-death by goading it into a fanatically archaistic reaction against their provocative trespasses. The Hyksos' successful invasion of the Egyptiac World from an Asian no-man's-land<sup>2</sup> blighted any creative potentialities that might have been latent in an embryonic Osirian Church by driving the internal proletariat into the arms of the dominant minority in an *union sacrée* which achieved the forcible expulsion of the interloping barbarians at the cost of sterilizing a nascent higher religion;<sup>3</sup> and the Philistines' and Achaeans' unsuccessful attempt to invade the Egyptiac World some four hundred years after the eviction of the Hyksos had a comparably maleficent effect on the course of Egyptiac history. By evoking Ramses III's *tour de force* of flinging them back from the coast of the Delta, 'the Sea Peoples' not only provoked the Egyptiac Society into expending the last reserves of its already depleted energy; they inflicted on their victim a still graver injury by rekindling in him a fanaticism that kept the patient anaemically alive at a moment when the senile Egyptiac body social was being offered a second chance of a merciful release from life through the natural decay of 'the New Empire'. The inopportune intervention of the Hyksos had already doubled the term of the Egyptiac Society's penal servitude in the prison-house of a universal state by conjuring up 'the New Empire' to repeat the course which 'the Middle Empire' had by then already run. The equally inopportune intervention of 'the Sea Peoples' cheated the prisoner of the belated discharge that he might have expected to

<sup>1</sup> In VII. vii. 447-8.

<sup>2</sup> Alternative views on the Hyksos' provenance are noticed in the note on Chronology in x. 167-212.

<sup>3</sup> See I. i. 143-5.

receive after the expiry of the second instalment of his life-in-death sentence.<sup>1</sup>

On this showing, we may put down to the barbarians' account the difference between the sequels to Egyptian and Sumeric history. While the provocativeness of the Hyksos and the turbulence of 'the Sea Peoples' deterred a moribund Egyptian society from duly dying and thereby leaving the field free for a successor to take its place, the Sumeric Society was more fortunate in being afflicted on its deathbed with less stimulating barbarian parasites. The Mitanni barbarians, *en route* from the Eurasian Steppe to Syria, seem to have passed the Land of Shinar by, and the raid in which the Hittite barbarians sacked Babylon seems to have been as brief as it was devastating. The maggots that fastened on the carcass of a moribund Sumeric Society were the sluggish Kassites, whose intrusion did not arouse sufficient antagonism to arrest the process of nature. Unimpeded by the Kassite incubus, the transformation of a moribund Sumeric Society into a nascent Babylonian Society, through the agency of the Sumeric dominant minority, is gradually accomplished before our eyes; and this spectacle raises the question whether the Egyptian Society might not have succeeded in similarly making way for a new society of the 'supra-affiliated' type exemplified in the Babylonian Civilization, if only, at the psychologically favourable moment, when 'the Middle Empire' was *in extremis*, the Egyptian World had had the good fortune to be invaded, not, as was its actual fate, by the perversely stimulating Hyksos, but by those Kassite-like Libyans who eventually drifted in, after 'the Sea Peoples' had come and gone, so uneventfully that their intrusion failed to produce the usual bout of militant Egyptian xenophobia.

If the inauspicious influence of the Hyksos and 'the Sea Peoples' on the course of Egyptian history has to be set against the merit with which the barbarians of the first breed are to be credited for their service as foster-parents of creative secondary civilizations, what verdict are we to pass on those barbarians of the second breed who were part of the offspring of the secondary civilizations in their disintegration? While the internal proletariats of the creative secondary civilizations were bringing the living higher religions to birth, a fresh litter of barbarian war-bands was being spawned by the external proletariats of secondary civilizations of both the creative and the uncreative type. If we are right in regarding the epiphany of the higher religions as being the highest reach of Mankind's progress so far, we shall have to pass the same verdict on the second crop of barbarian war-bands that we have passed on the third crop of secular civilizations. Our verdict on these tertiary civilizations that broke out of chrysalis-churches has been that, at the best, they were 'vain repetitions of the heathen'<sup>2</sup> and, at the worst, pernicious backslidings from the ideals and endeavours of the higher religions for which the creative secondary civilizations had served as chrysalises.<sup>3</sup> In fostering the birth of the higher religions, those chrysalis-civilizations of the

<sup>1</sup> This recurrent galvanization of a moribund Egyptian Society into renewed bouts of life-in-death by repeated blows from alien assailants has been noticed in VI. vii. 49-50.

<sup>2</sup> Matt. vi. 7.

<sup>3</sup> See VII. vii. 445.

second generation had fulfilled the highest mission of which their species was capable, and had thereby rendered superfluous any further reproduction of their kind. On the same line of reasoning, any further reproduction of barbarian war-bands must be pronounced to be superfluous after one litter of war-bands had fulfilled the highest mission open to their kind by fostering the birth of the chrysalis-civilizations.

This anticipatory judgement by analogy is confirmed by the evidence of the secondary barbarians' actual histories; for these barbarians of the second breed had had no opportunity of performing even the modestly creative role of their predecessors the barbarian foster-fathers of the Syriac, Hellenic, and Indic civilizations. The secondary barbarians whose genesis had been coeval with the epiphany of the living higher religions had faded out ingloriously in the presence of these great lights.<sup>1</sup> The dayspring from on high

restinxit stellas, exortus ut aetherius sol.<sup>2</sup>

If this is our verdict on the barbarians of the second breed, what are we to say of the barbarians of a third breed that had been generated by the disintegration of civilizations of the third generation? At the time of writing it looked, as we have already observed,<sup>3</sup> as if these latter-day barbarians were all fated to be swept off the board by the irresistibly superior military force of a mechanically armed Western Civilization whose own doom likewise might be heralded by the military triumph of a technology in which a Modern Western Man had wilfully put his treasure. In a Westernizing World in the Age of the World Wars the formidable barbarism—and this was formidable indeed—was an archaistic Neobarbarism that was menacing a hard-pressed society, not from outside, but from within.<sup>4</sup>

This Modern Western Neobarbarism has come to our attention in another context.<sup>5</sup> Our subject in the present Part of this Study has been the less sinister Barbarism that is a perversion, not of a civilization in decay, but of a primitive society whose traditional way of life has been broken up by a decadent civilization's impact; and the conclusion that we have reached is that a barbarian war-band spawned by a disintegrating civilization's external proletariat, like a universal state constructed by a dominant minority, achieves its highest possible destiny in meeting a fate that we should have accounted a supreme disaster if it had overtaken any of the higher religions. Whereas a church puts its mission in jeopardy by serving as a chrysalis, a war-band, like a universal state, fulfills its mission by immolating itself as a Phoenix in order that a new and higher life may spring from its quickening ashes.<sup>6</sup> The barbarian war-bands that had 'made history' were those few that had died in giving birth to civilizations that had died in their turn to give birth to higher religions; for in the higher religions God had revealed to Mankind—through a glass, darkly<sup>7</sup>—a gleam of the light of His countenance.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>1</sup> On this point, see I. i. 58-62 and 449, n. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book III, l. 1044.

<sup>3</sup> See V. v. 334-7.

<sup>4</sup> For this role of a universal state, see VI. vii. 53-55.

<sup>5</sup> 1 Cor. xiii. 12.

<sup>6</sup> In V. v. 332-4.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Psalm iv. 6; xlv. 3; lxxxix. 15; xc. 8.

## IX

# CONTACTS BETWEEN CIVILIZATIONS IN SPACE

(*Encounters between Contemporaries*)

## A. AN EXPANSION OF THE FIELD OF STUDY

### (I) THE SELF-TRANSCENDENCE OF CIVILIZATIONS

IN the three immediately preceding parts of this book<sup>1</sup> we have followed up our general study of the problem, nature, and process of the disintegrations of civilizations by making particular studies of the institutions created by each of the three factions into which the body social of a disintegrating civilization splits up. We have studied successively the universal states, the universal churches, and the barbarian war-bands that are the characteristic creations of the dominant minorities and the internal and external proletariats of societies that have convicted themselves of having broken down by falling into schism; and the conclusion of these three supplementary historical inquiries would have brought us to the end of our study of History itself if our initial working hypothesis that civilizations are intelligible fields of study<sup>2</sup> had proved to hold good for a study of all phases of their histories.

Actually we have found that a civilization can be studied intelligibly in isolation so long as we are considering its genesis, its growth, or its breakdown. Indeed, the historical evidence that has presented itself in our empirical survey of breakdowns has seemed to warrant the conclusion that the breakdown of a civilization is invariably due to some inward failure of self-determination and never due to blows delivered by external agencies.<sup>3</sup> After passing, however, from our study of breakdowns to our study of disintegrations, we have found ourselves unable to understand this last phase of a broken-down civilization's history without extending our mental range of vision, beyond the bounds of the disintegrating civilization itself, to take account of the impact of external forces.<sup>4</sup> Even if we ignore the tell-tale label that we have affixed to the barbarians beyond a disintegrating civilization's *limes*, and decide to treat this 'External Proletariat' as an integral part of the society on which it preys—on the ground that the barbarian is not so much an alien as an alienated proselyte from a primitive way of life<sup>5</sup>—we cannot deny the alien origin of those elements in an internal proletariat that have been incorporated through conquests at the expense of an alien civilization, and cannot overlook the importance of the part that has been

<sup>1</sup> Parts VI–VIII.

<sup>2</sup> The considerations that have led us to work on this hypothesis up to this point have been set out in I. i. 17–50.

<sup>3</sup> See IV. iv, *passim*.

<sup>4</sup> See V. v. 339–40.

<sup>5</sup> See V. v. 194–210 and VIII, *passim*.

played by creative inspirations from this alien source in the geneses of some of those higher religions that the Internal Proletariat has brought to birth.<sup>1</sup>

Thus the history of a single civilization ceases to be intelligible in isolation when it enters its disintegration-phase; and this discovery that our initial working hypothesis is not valid for the study of all historical situations has been confirmed by our subsequent investigations into universal states, universal churches, and heroic ages; for each of these investigations has carried us beyond the limits, in both Space and Time, of the particular civilizations whose declines and falls have generated the institutions that we have been investigating. Our conclusion has been that the barbarians bred by the disintegration of one civilization have made a mark on history in so far as they have succeeded in fostering the birth of another civilization which eventually, after breaking down and disintegrating in its turn, has ministered to the rise of one of the higher religions by providing a framework for it in the shape of a universal state. Universal states, like barbarian war-bands, have made their mark by unintentionally and unconsciously working, not for themselves, but for other beneficiaries; and these beneficiaries have all been alien in the sense of being foreign to the particular civilization in the history of whose disintegration the particular universal state has been an episode. The higher religions have proved to be new societies of a different species from the civilizations under the aegis of whose universal states they have made their epiphanies; and, in so far as universal states have not made their mark by performing services for universal churches, they have made it by performing them for barbarians or for alien civilizations.

These alien civilizations, like the barbarians beyond the pale, have been certified as being alien by the simple and obvious geographical fact that their places of origin have lain outside the frontiers of the universal state on whose domain they have eventually trespassed and whose installations and institutions they have taken over. Yet some—and these not the least notable—of the higher religions that have made their epiphany inside those frontiers have been no less alien on that account, for their adherents have felt themselves, and been felt by their pagan neighbours, to be 'in but not of' the disintegrating society within whose body social, in its universal state, the religion has made its first appearance; and, as we have just reminded ourselves, this aloofness, where it has displayed itself, has been a psychological expression of the historical fact that the source of the religion's creative inspiration has been alien to the tradition of the society within whose universal state the new religion has first presented itself to Mankind. The Roman Empire provided an Hellenic-made cradle for a Syriac-inspired Christianity, while the Kushan barbarian successor-state of the Bactrian Greek Empire provided a likewise Hellenic-made cradle for an Indic-inspired Mahāyāna; and, though it is true, on the other hand, that, unlike Christianity and the Mahāyāna, Islam and Hinduism each drew its inspiration from a civilization that provided it with its political cradle as

<sup>1</sup> See I. i. 57 and V. v. 359-63.



well, it is also true that, in the geneses of these two higher religions likewise, there had been a previous chapter in which more than one civilization had been concerned. A Syriac-inspired Islam and its Syriac-made cradle the Caliphate were Syriac reactions on the religious and on the political plane to a foregoing intrusion of Hellenism on the Syriac World; and a subsequent intrusion of Hellenism on the Indic World had similarly evoked both an Indic-inspired Hinduism and its Indic-made cradle the Guptan Empire. It thus appears that the genesis of each of the higher religions that were still alive in the twentieth century of the Christian Era becomes intelligible only when we expand our field of study from the ambit of a single civilization to embrace encounters between two civilizations or more.<sup>1</sup>

## (II) BIRTHPLACES OF RELIGIONS IN MEETINGPLACES OF CIVILIZATIONS

The importance of the part played in the geneses of higher religions by encounters between different civilizations is indicated by one of the commonplaces of historical geography which is as remarkable as it is familiar. When we mark down the birthplaces of the higher religions on a map, we find them clustering in and round two relatively small patches<sup>2</sup> of the total land-surface of the Old World—on the one hand the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin and on the other hand Syria (in the broad sense in which this term had been used, in the vocabulary of physical geography, to cover an area bounded by the North Arabian Steppe, the Mediterranean Sea, and the southern escarpments of the Anatolian and Armenian plateaux).<sup>3</sup> The Oxus-Jaxartes Basin was the birthplace of the Mahāyāna in the form in which this religion spread from there over the Far Eastern World; and, before that, it had been the birthplace of Zoroastrianism—as appeared to be generally agreed among Modern Western scholars, however widely they might differ in their dating of the epiphany of the Prophet Zarathustra. In Syria, Christianity acquired at Antioch the form in which it spread from there over the Hellenic World as a new religion, after having made its first appearance, as a variety of Pharisaic Judaism, in Galilee. Judaism itself and the sister religion of the Samaritans arose in Southern Syria, in the hill country between the Mediterranean coastal plain and the Jordan cañon. The Monothelete Christianity of the Maronites and the Hākim-worshipping Shi'ism of

<sup>1</sup> This conclusion has been anticipated in V. v. 372-6. The same point is made in a letter, dated the 16th December, 1950, and published in *The New York Times* of the 20th December, 1950, from Professor Th. H. von Laue of Swarthmore College, Pennsylvania, in which this Western historian contends that the current competition between rival cultures and ideologies in a coalescing *Oikoumenē* cannot be made intelligible to students of History in the United States if their field of study is confined to the history of their own Western Civilization.

<sup>2</sup> See xi, maps 21 A and B.

<sup>3</sup> It will be seen that Syria, in this physical sense of the term, is approximately coterminous with the combined area of four successor-states of the Ottoman Empire—Syria, Transjordan, the Lebanon, and Palestine—that were carved out in the peace-settlement following the General War of A.D. 1914-18. After the close of the General War of A.D. 1939-45, Palestine was partitioned *de facto* between a new Jewish state which took the name 'Israel', a Transjordan which re-named itself 'Jordan', and an Egypt which made a lodgment in the south-west corner of the partitioned territory.



the Druses both came to birth in Central Syria—the Druse Church in the fastnesses of Mount Hermon and the Maronite Church in those of the Lebanon.

This geographical concentration of the birthplaces of higher religions becomes still more conspicuous when we extend our horizon to take in regions adjacent to the two core-areas. Both the Nestorian and the Monophysite variety of the Syrian version of a Hellenized Christianity took shape in and round Urfa-Edessa, in the Mesopotamian prolongation of Syria towards the East between the North Arabian Steppe and Mount Masius, while the Hijāzī prolongation of Syria towards the South, along the highlands between the Red Sea coastal plain and the steppes of the Najd, saw the birth, at Mecca and Medina, of a Christian heresy which became the new religion of Islam. The Shī'ī heretical form of Islam, like the Manichaean heretical form of Zoroastrianism,<sup>1</sup> was born on the eastern shore of the North Arabian Steppe, in a borderland between 'the Desert' and 'the Sown' in which the radiation of religious influences from Syria and the Hijāz through the conductive medium of the Steppe impinged upon the Euphratean marches of 'Irāq. When we similarly extend the radius of our observation of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin, we locate the birthplace of the Mahāyāna, in its first appearance as a variation on the philosophy of Primitive Buddhism, in the adjacent Basin of the Indus; the birthplace of this Primitive Buddhism in the Middle Ganges Basin, and the birthplace of a post-Buddhaic Hinduism in the same quarter of the Indian Sub-Continent.

What is the explanation of these remarkable facts? When we look into the characteristics of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin and Syria and compare them with one another, we perceive a feature, prominent in both, which accounts for their historic role in the geneses of higher religions and makes it clear that the likeness between their histories had been the outcome, not of some freakish play of Chance, but of an underlying likeness between their geographical locations.

This prominent common feature of Syria and the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin is the capacity, with which each of them had been endowed by Nature, for serving as a 'roundabout' where traffic coming in from any point of the compass could be switched to any other point of the compass in any number of alternative combinations and permutations.<sup>2</sup> On the Syrian 'roundabout', routes converged from the Nile Basin, from the Mediterranean, from Anatolia with its South-East European continental hinterland, from the Tigris-Euphrates Basin, and from an Arabian Steppe which, in the purview of human geography, may be regarded as 'a waterless sea' in virtue of its sea-like cultural conductivity.<sup>3</sup> On the Central Asian 'roundabout', similarly, routes converged from the Tigris-Euphrates Basin via the Iranian Plateau, from India through the passes over the Hindu Kush, from the Far East via the Tarim Basin, and from an adjacent Eurasian Steppe that had taken the place, and inherited

<sup>1</sup> See V. v. 575-80.

<sup>2</sup> This function of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin in the human geography of the Old World has been noticed in V. v. 131-40.

<sup>3</sup> This analogy between the Steppe and the Sea has been noticed in I. i. 64; III. iii. 7-8, 278, n. 1, 391-4, and 399.

the conductivity, of a now desiccated 'Second Mediterranean' whose former presence there was attested by its fragmentary survival in the Caspian, the Sea of Aral, and Lake Balkash.

The role for which Nature had thus designed these two potential traffic-centres had actually, as we know, been played by each of them again and again during the five or six thousand years that had passed since the emergence of the earliest civilizations. Syria had been the scene of encounters between the Sumeric and Egyptiac civilizations before the dissolution of the Sumeric Civilization in the seventeenth century B.C.; between the Egyptiac, abortive First Syriac, Hittite, and Minoan civilizations from the sixteenth to the twelfth century B.C.; between the Syriac, Babylonian, Egyptiac, and Hellenic civilizations and a fossil remnant of the Hittite Civilization from the twelfth century B.C. to the seventh century of the Christian Era; between the Syriac, Orthodox Christian, and Western Christian civilizations from the seventh to the thirteenth century of the Christian Era; and between the Arabic, Iranian, and Western since the thirteenth century, while the Nomadic Civilization of the Afrasian and Eurasian steppes has been an additional party to all these encounters.<sup>1</sup> The corresponding record of Central Asia's geographical service as a cultural meeting-point would also be impressive if Syria's record were not so extraordinary. The Oxus-Jaxartes Basin had been the scene of encounters between the Syriac and Indic civilizations from the sixth century B.C. to the eighth century of the Christian Era; between the Syriac, Indic, Hellenic, and Sinic from the fourth century B.C. to the fifth century of the Christian Era; and between the Syriac Civilization, the main body of the Far Eastern Civilization, and the Tantric Mahayanian Buddhist fossil of a by-then-extinct Indic Civilization from the fifth century of the Christian Era to the thirteenth.

These series of encounters between divers civilizations on Syrian and on Central Asian ground, which had borne spiritual fruit in the births of higher religions, had been registered on the political plane in the repeated inclusion of each of these two peculiarly 'numiniferous' regions in universal states, or in other empires performing similar social functions, that had been thrown up by these colliding civilizations in the course of their histories.

Syria appears to have been included alternately in the Sumeric 'Empire of the Four Quarters' and in the Egyptiac 'Middle Empire' from the twenty-first to the seventeenth century B.C.; in the seventeenth century it formed part of a Hyksos successor-state of 'the Empire of the Four Quarters' which had flooded over the derelict domain of 'the Middle Empire' and had established its headquarters in the Nile Delta; from the sixteenth to the fourteenth century B.C. it was included in 'the New Empire' of Egypt; in the thirteenth century B.C. it was partitioned between this 'New Empire' of Egypt and the Hittite Power; in the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. it was incorporated progressively into the Assyrian Empire, and in the sixth century it was annexed in its

<sup>1</sup> These encounters between a number of civilizations on Syrian ground have been noticed, in passing, in V. v. 117-18 and 488.

entirety (including the southern principalities of Judah, Edom, and Moab, which had just escaped falling under the Assyrian yoke) to a Neo-Babylonian Empire which, in the course of the same century, was swallowed up, entire, in the vaster empire of the Achaemenidae. From the fourth to the second century B.C. Syria was a bone of contention between the Achaemenids' Seleucid and Ptolemaic successor-states; but in the last century B.C. it was politically reunited, without being liberated from alien rule, through being annexed to the Roman Empire, and thereafter it continued to form part of the Roman imperial body politic for seven hundred years—till, in the seventh century of the Christian Era, its conquest from the Roman Empire by the Primitive Muslim Arabs resulted in its inclusion, without any interval of independence, in a Caliphate which was a revival of the Achaemenian Empire. Upon the breakdown of the 'Abbasid imperial régime in the tenth century of the Christian Era, Syria became once more a bone of contention between successor-states. The harpies in this chapter of Syrian history were the Katāma Berbers (masquerading as a 'Fātimid' Caliphate), the East Roman Empire, the Western Christian Crusaders, and an Ayyubid Power whose Cairene Mamlūk successors succeeded, before the close of the thirteenth century, in reuniting the whole of Syria under their rule—to remain under it throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, until, in the sixteenth century, the Cairene Mamlūks' dominions were swallowed up, entire, in the vaster empire of the 'Osmanlis. The Ottoman régime in Syria lasted for four hundred years (A.D. 1516–1918)—till the break-up of the Ottoman Empire's Asiatic dominions as a result of the General War of A.D. 1914–18.

This summary recapitulation of Syria's political history brings out the fact that, over a span of four thousand years—from the twenty-first century B.C. to the twentieth century of the Christian Era—the usual political fate of Syria had been to find herself included in the dominions of some universal state. Even when one of these oecumenical empires embracing Syria had broken up, Syria's destiny, as often as not, had been immediately to be annexed entire to some other empire of the kind—as she was taken over from the Neo-Babylonian Empire by the Achaemenian Empire, from the Roman Empire by the Arab Caliphate, and from the Egyptian Mamlūk Power by the Ottoman Empire. Even at times when Syria had not been included as a whole within the frontiers of some single empire, her most frequent alternative fate had been to be partitioned between two empires embracing other regions besides their portions of Syrian territory. In the course of the last four thousand years, reckoning back from the twentieth century of the Christian Era, Syria had been partitioned in this way between an Egyptiac 'Middle Empire' and a Sumeric 'Empire of the Four Quarters'; between an Egyptiac 'New Empire' and a Hittite Power with its political centre of gravity in East Central Anatolia; between an African Ptolemaic and an Asiatic Seleucid successor-state of the Achaemenian Empire; and between an African 'Fātimid' Caliphate and an Anatolian East Roman Empire.

The intervals during which Syria had been under the sovereignty of

local Syrian states had been few and far between; indeed, there were no more than four historical instances of this political dispensation: during an interregnum between the evaporation of 'the New Empire' of Egypt in the twelfth century B.C. and the final onset of Assyria in the eighth century;<sup>1</sup> during the shorter period of relief from external pressure between the collapse of the Seleucid Power in the second century B.C. and the Romans' entry into the Seleucids' heritage in the last century B.C.;<sup>2</sup> during the bout of anarchy which intervened between the collapse of the 'Fātimid' and East Roman Powers in the eleventh century of the Christian Era and the establishment of the Cairene Mamlūk Power in the thirteenth century; and since the liquidation of the Ottoman Empire in South-West Asia in and after the General War of A.D. 1914-18. During each of these exceptional periods, Syria had been in the hands of a number of parochial sovereign states; yet, though these local principalities had been governed from Syrian capitals, their rulers had, for the most part, been recent arrivals from abroad—Philistines, Greeks, Crusaders, or Zionists from the European shores of the Mediterranean; Hebrews or Arabs from the North Arabian Steppe; and Kurds from the Zagros—and, under the rule of these intrusive *mulūk-at-tawā'if*, the political and cultural atmosphere in Syria had still been redolent of an oecumenical régime that had been the Syrians' normal experience in most of the chapters in their history.

The degree to which Syria's political history had been dominated by her geographical location at a meeting-point of natural thoroughfares was the more impressive, considering that Syria's physical structure was inimical to the imperialism to which Syria had usually been subject, while it was favourable to the *Kleinstaaterei* in which she had so seldom been free to indulge. Syria was not only bounded by 'natural frontiers' that demarcated her *vis-à-vis* the regions round about; she was also articulated internally, like Greece, into a multitude of small physically self-contained 'pockets' and 'perches', and a number of the 'perches'—for instance, the Jabal 'Āmil, the Lebanon, the Jabal Ansariyah, the Jabal Hawrān and Mount Gerizim—had served as fastnesses for fossilized politico-religious communities.<sup>3</sup> Imāmī Shi'is, Maronite Monothelites, 'Alī-worshipping Nusayris, Hākim-worshipping Druses, and dissidently Yahweh-worshipping Samaritans. If Syria's geographical location had insulated her from the outer world, as Nature had insulated New Guinea, instead of exposing her, like the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin, to the play of external influences and pressures from all quarters of the compass, her physiography, with its strongly pronounced internal articulation within clearly defined 'natural frontiers', would have imposed on her, as her normal régime, a political decentralization which the political effects of her location had precluded on all but four occasions in her history during the last four thousand years.

This Syrian pattern of political history recurs in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin. Whether it was the Median or the Persian successor-state of the

<sup>1</sup> See IV. iv. 473, n. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Tacitus's remark on this point has been quoted in V. v. 390, n. 3.

<sup>3</sup> See I. i. 362; II. ii. 55-57; and V. v. 118 and 125, n. 1.

Assyrian Empire that salvaged this borderland from a Scythian Nomad domination in the sixth century B.C.,<sup>1</sup> the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin comes into the full light of history as part of the oecumenical empire of the Achaemenidae,<sup>2</sup> and it failed in an attempt to assert its independence when the Achaemenian régime was overthrown by Alexander the Great. A prowess acquired in holding the north-east frontier of the Syriac World against the Eurasian Nomads did not avail the Bactrian and Sogdian border barons in their gallant struggle against the Macedonian invader. After two campaigns they found themselves compelled to capitulate on terms;<sup>3</sup> and, after Alexander's death, their country passed into the hands of the Achaemenids' Seleucid successors. The political independence for which the native Iranian population had fought in 330-328 B.C. was attained by the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin only some ninety years later, and, even then, it was not won by native hands and was not long-lived.

In the third quarter of the third century B.C. the Greek garrisons in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin—finding themselves cut off from the main body of the Seleucid Empire by the intrusion of the Nomad Parni from the Transcasian Steppe into Parthia, on the north-eastern edge of the Iranian Plateau astride the Great North-East Road from Babylonia<sup>4</sup>—erected a Seleucid province into an independent local Greek principality of their own;<sup>5</sup> but, after two generations, these local Greek princes of Bactria deliberately remerged the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin in a vaster body politic by crossing the Hindu Kush *circa* 183 B.C. and annexing the north-western territories of the Mauryan Empire in India;<sup>6</sup> and, though the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin became a separate political entity again for a season when, less than half a century after the Bactrian Greeks' conquest of North-Western India, their home territory on the north-west side of the Hindu Kush was overrun by Saka and Kushan Nomad invaders,<sup>7</sup> the Kushans eventually followed the example of their Greek predecessors by crossing the Hindu Kush in their turn and annexing North-Western India to their Central Asian dominions in the course of the first century of the Christian Era.<sup>8</sup> This political reunion of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin with the Indus and Ganges basins under a Kushan Rāj was followed up, during the reign of the Kushan empire-builder Kanishka (*regnabat circa* A.D. 78-123), by the annexation of the Tarim Basin<sup>9</sup>—an eastward prolongation of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin which had been under the Sinic rule of the Prior Han Dynasty from 101 B.C. to A.D. 16, and had been reconquered by the Posterior Han between A.D. 73 and A.D. 102.<sup>10</sup> During the second century of the Christian Era the Tarim Basin seems to have been a debatable territory between the Kushan and the Posterior Han Power.<sup>11</sup>

As for the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin itself, it relapsed into local indepen-

<sup>1</sup> See II. ii. 138.

<sup>2</sup> See II. ii. 139-40.

<sup>3</sup> See II. ii. 143 and 371. The transition from province to principality seems to have been a gradual one (see Tarn, W. W.: *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge 1938, University Press), pp. 72-74).

<sup>4</sup> See II. ii. 141, n. 2, and 372, and V. v. 133, n. 1.

<sup>5</sup> See V. v. 133, n. 1.

<sup>6</sup> See V. v. 142-4.

<sup>7</sup> See II. ii. 139.

<sup>8</sup> For this road, see VI. vii. 200.

<sup>9</sup> See I. i. 86 and II. ii. 371-2.

<sup>10</sup> See V. v. 144-5.

<sup>11</sup> See II. ii. 373 and V. v. 145 and 363, n. 1.



dence after the decay of the Kushan Power in the third century of the Christian Era; but, after its Kushan masters had been submerged, at the turn of the fourth and fifth centuries, by an Ephthalite Hun wave of Eurasian Nomad invaders, and the Ephthalites had succumbed, in the sixth century, to a following wave of Turks,<sup>1</sup> the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin was incorporated, once again, into a universal state through its annexation, in the eighth century, to the Arab Caliphate;<sup>2</sup> and thereafter the set pattern of its political history continued to repeat itself. After passing through the hands of the Sāmānid, Saljūq, Qāra Qitay, and Kwārizmī successors of the 'Abbasids, the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin was engulfed in the Mongol Empire in the thirteenth century of the Christian Era;<sup>3</sup> and, after the liberator, Timur Lenk, had been betrayed by a demonic militarism into a dispersal of his energies which lost him his chance of making Transoxania the headquarters of a universal state embracing all the shores of the Eurasian Steppe,<sup>4</sup> the opportunity which Timur had failed to seize in the fourteenth century for Transoxania was successfully seized in the nineteenth century by a Muscovite Power which had provided a disintegrating Russian offshoot of Orthodox Christendom with its universal state.

At the time of writing, the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin formed part of the dominions of the Russian Empire's successor the U.S.S.R., and the links of steel with which Soviet Central Asia had been bound to the Soviet territories on the opposite shores of the Eurasian Steppe by the construction of the Transcaspian, Orenburg-Tashkend, and 'Turk-Sib' railways<sup>5</sup> were constantly being reinforced through a progressive industrialization of the Central Asian Soviet Republics on a plan designed to integrate them, economically as well as politically, with the rest of the Soviet Union.

It will be seen that, since the sixth century B.C., the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin had been included successively in four full-blown universal states—the Achaemenian Empire, the Arab Caliphate, the Mongol Empire, and the Russian Empire—and in three other empires—the Seleucid, the Bactrian Greek, and the Kushan—which had performed the social and cultural functions of universal states, even if they did not qualify technically for being given the title. The adjoining Tarim Basin, which prolonged the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin towards the east, had been included successively in three universal states—the Han Empire, the Mongol Empire, and the Manchu Empire—as well as in the Kushan dominions. Syria had been included in no less than eight universal states—the Sumeric 'Empire of the Four Quarters', 'the Middle Empire' and 'the New Empire' of Egypt, the Neo-Babylonian Empire, the Achaemenian Empire, the Roman Empire, the Arab Caliphate, and the Ottoman Empire—without counting in the Hyksos, Hittite, Assyrian, Seleucid, 'Fātimid', East Roman, and Mamlūk episodes in Syrian political history. This political record was so much evidence of encounters between a

<sup>1</sup> See II. ii. 141, n. 2.

<sup>2</sup> See II. ii. 141 and 375-84.

<sup>4</sup> See II. ii. 146-8 and IV. iv. 491-501.

<sup>5</sup> The first two of these three railways had been built before the Revolution of A.D. 1917.

<sup>3</sup> See II. ii. 142.



number of different civilizations on Syrian and Central Asian ground; and this exceptionally active intercourse between civilizations in these two areas explains the extraordinary concentration, within their limits, of birthplaces of higher religions.

### (III) A CLASSIFICATION OF TYPES OF CONTACT BETWEEN CIVILIZATIONS

On the strength of this testimony from the histories of Syria and the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin we may venture to propound a 'law' to the effect that, for a study of higher religions, the minimum intelligible field must be larger than the domain of any single civilization, since it must be a field in which two or more civilizations have encountered one another. Our next step will be to take a wider survey of those encounters that, in certain historic instances, have had the effect of bringing higher religions to birth; but, before embarking on this survey, we must define more closely the type of encounter with which we are immediately concerned.

The encounters here in question are contacts in the Space-dimension between civilizations which, *ex hypothesi*, must be contemporaries in order to be able to meet one another face to face at some particular place on the Earth's surface; but this contact in the Space-dimension between contemporaries is not the only form of contact between different civilizations that has come to our notice in this Study. We have also come across contacts in the medium, not of Space, but of Time.

One kind of contact between civilizations in the Time-dimension is the relation between two civilizations of different generations which we have labelled 'Apparentation-and-Affiliation'.<sup>1</sup> In this relation the two parties overlap with one another in the Time-dimension, as contemporary civilizations overlap with one another in the Space-dimension when they meet on common geographical ground. After the body social of a disintegrating civilization has split up into a dominant minority and a proletariat, the embryo of a new civilization may be germinating in the womb of the Internal Proletariat while the Dominant Minority is still fighting a stubborn losing battle to keep the old civilization alive; and in this way two civilizations that are not of the same generation will overlap in Time—as contemporary civilizations with mutually exclusive geographical habitats will overlap in Space when part of the domain of one of them is annexed, whether by conquest or by peaceful penetration, to the domain of another.

The relation of Apparentation-and-Affiliation is by definition, as will be evident, a relation in the Time-dimension which can only arise when each of the parties is in one particular phase of its history: the phase of disintegration in the apparented society's case and, in the affiliated society's, the phase of pre-natal gestation. In other words, this is a relation between two civilizations which, at the time when they are establishing it, are as remote from one another in terms of their respective current stages of existence as any two civilizations can ever be.

<sup>1</sup> See I. i. 44.

There is, however, another kind of contact in the Time-dimension that an affiliated civilization can make, in after life, with a by now extinct civilization to which the living civilization is already related in virtue of an original contact made when the still living civilization was in embryo and the now dead civilization was *in extremis*. This original contact in the form of Apparentation-and-Affiliation will have started the younger civilization in life with a stock of practices and ideas derived from the older civilization's cultural heritage; and, on the strength of the memories of the older civilization which have thus become embedded in the younger civilization's own cultural tradition, the younger civilization can evoke its elder's ghost after the younger civilization has come to birth and the elder has passed out of existence.

Such an encounter between a living civilization and the ghost of a dead predecessor is manifestly different in kind from the previous relation between the same living civilization when it was in the embryo stage and the same predecessor when it was still alive, though moribund. The difference may be compared with that between an adult Hamlet's encounter with his father's ghost and an infant Hamlet's relation with the same father in the flesh. The relation between the child and his living father has more life in it than the relation between the grown man and his dead father's apparition; for in the earlier relation both parties are alive and there is therefore a reciprocal action of each on the other, whereas, in the encounter between man and ghost, the man alone is capable of being affected by the experience, since the apparition with which an adult Hamlet holds converse is not in truth another living personality, but is a 'projection' or 'objectivization' of feelings and ideas, latent in Hamlet's own psyche, that have been recalled by his own memory and clothed with life by his own imagination. Hamlet conversing with the ghost is like a ventriloquist in colloquy with his lay figure; a single party is actually playing simultaneously both the parts in what purports to be a dialogue between two actors. Yet, though in this sense the 'renaissance' of an extinct culture in the life of a living civilization is no more than the simulation of a genuine encounter between one living civilization and another, there is also a sense in which it can be a more intimate communion than the relation of Apparentation-and-Affiliation between one civilization that is already senile, though still alive, and another that, though already alive, is still in embryo.

In the relation of Apparentation-and-Affiliation the extent of the difference in age between the two living parties severely limits their capacity for appreciating one another's point of view and profiting by one another's experience. There are many treasures of experience in a moribund civilization's storehouse which an embryonic civilization finds valueless, because it finds them incomprehensible; but, if the prestige of the elder civilization in the younger civilization's eyes avails to induce the younger to take up into its own tradition this apparently useless lumber from its elder's cultural heritage, this act of blind faith may eventually earn its reward. 'When I was a child, I spake as a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a child; but, when I became a man,

I put away childish things.<sup>1</sup> When the younger civilization has come of age in its turn, it will have become capable of understanding, by analogy from adult experience of its own, the adult experience of its now dead predecessor which was incomprehensible to it in a previous chapter of its history in which the elder civilization was still alive, but the younger was not yet grown to man's estate. Though, no doubt, an experience of life can be imparted more vividly to a receptive recipient through living contact in the flesh with the subject of that experience than through a recollection derived at second hand from the subject's literary remains at a date when their author is dead, the receptivity of the recipient is a condition *sine qua non* for the success of any experiment in the transmission of cultural treasure; and a recipient who has grown to be receptive will be capable of deriving more cultural benefit from a 'renaissance' of the culture of a predecessor who is long since dead than the same recipient will have found himself able to derive, in his own uncomprehending infancy, from his elder when he was still present in the flesh.<sup>2</sup>

A point thus put in general terms is perhaps easier to apprehend in a concrete illustration taken from the history of the Western Civilization's relations with Hellenism. In Western cultural history the generations that had understood Hellenism best, and had made the most of it for the benefit of their own Western Society, had not been those that had been contemporary with Hellenism in the last days of its life; they had been the later generations that had cast their eyes back to a long since dead Hellenic World across a span of time which the West had turned to account for accumulating an experience of its own, akin to the stored-up experience of its Hellenic predecessor. The possession of this adult yardstick had enabled an Erasmus to appreciate and appropriate the treasures of a Classical Greek and Latin literature that had been virtually a closed book to a Gregory of Tours—though the Western Christian chronicler had been the contemporary of a Latin poet Venantius Fortunatus who had been linked by a continuous chain of poetic tradition with the Virgilian Age. In the strength of the same ripe Western experience a Gibbon was able to savour the Hellenic culture of the Antonine Age with a surer taste and a keener zest than a Gregory the Great;<sup>3</sup> though, in the generation in which this Pope had been nursing an infant Western Civilization through its first convulsions,<sup>4</sup> the City of Rome had still been living under the sovereignty of the same Roman Imperial Government that had once been directed by the enlightened mind of a

<sup>1</sup> 1 Cor. xiii. 11.

<sup>2</sup> See further X. ix. 124-30.

<sup>3</sup> 'Je ne déteste pas de généraliser la notion de moderne et de donner ce nom à certain mode d'existence, au lieu d'en faire un pur synonyme de *contemporain*. Il y a dans l'histoire des moments et des lieux où nous pourrions nous introduire, nous modernes, sans troubler excessivement l'harmonie de ces temps-là, et sans y paraître des objets infiniment curieux, infiniment visibles, des êtres choquants, dissonants, inassimilables. Où notre entrée ferait le moins de sensation, là nous sommes presque chez nous. Il est clair que la Rome de Trajan et que l'Alexandrie des Ptolémées nous absorberaient plus facilement que bien des localités moins reculées dans le temps, mais plus spécialisées dans un seul type de mœurs et entièrement consacrées à une seule race, à une seule culture et à un seul système de vie' (Valéry, Paul: 'La Crise de l'Esprit', in *Variété* (Paris 1924, Gallimard, éditions de la Nouvelle Revue Française), pp. 18-19).

<sup>4</sup> See III. iii. 267-9.

Hadrian, a Pius, and a Marcus. For the same reason the fathers of the American and French revolutions were able to draw on political experiences of Republican Rome, of the Lycian and Achaean confederacies, and of Periclean Athens, which had remained beyond the political horizon of a Dante or a Rienzi.<sup>1</sup>

The children of a growing Western Civilization had, in fact, met with the experience that awaits travellers setting out south-westwards from the spot where Caesarea Mazaca nestles at the foot of Mount Argæus. In the early stages of their journey the wayfarers are still too close to the foothills, and too low down in the plain, to be able to see the mighty peak; and, in their eyes at this stage, the soaring volcano is fallaciously represented by the last and lowest waves of its petrified lava-flow. It is not till the caravan has made its passage of the salt-flats and has begun to climb the flank of the South Cappadocian Plateau that Argæus begins to reveal his stature, in its majesty, to the travellers' view. From that vantage point they see him, across the intervening hollows, in better

<sup>1</sup> This widening of a Western mental horizon in one direction had, of course, to be paid for by its contraction in another. The Early Modern Western Humanists' aesthetic appreciation of the Hellenic literature of the Periclean Age made them aliens in the intellectual realm of the Late Medieval Western Schoolmen in which their fathers had been freemen born. The Late Modern Western rationalist orientation of Gibbon's and Bury's intellects inhibited their imaginations from entering into the feelings of souls born into a post-Hellenic interregnum and an Early Medieval Western 'Dark Age' which these eminent Late Modern Western historians had, perhaps perversely, made it their life-work to study and interpret.

This eclipse of insight by rationalism is manifest in Bury's dogmatic rejection of a contemporary account of the way in which the Emperor Heraclius spent his time on the eve of a bold and perilous enterprise that was going to decide, not merely the Emperor's fate, but the fates of the Empire and the Church as well.

'The winter before his departure [on his daring counter-offensive campaign of A.D. 622] was spent by Heraclius in retirement. He was probably engaged in studying strategy and geography and planning his first campaign. Those who look upon him as an inspired enthusiast would like to see in this retirement the imperative need of communion with his own soul and with God; they suppose that he was like John the Baptist, or that, like Jesus, he retired to a mountain to pray. To support this idea they can appeal to George of Pisidia, who, speaking of this retreat, says that the Emperor "imitated Elias of old", and uses many other expressions which may be interpreted in a similar manner. It is probable that Heraclius was fain to possess his soul in silence for a few months; but it is hazardous to press the theological word-painting of a poetical ecclesiastic into the service of the theory that Heraclius was a semi-prophetic enthusiast with a naturally weak will. When George of Pisidia mentions in another place (*Heracliad*, Book II, ll. 120 and 136 seqq.) that the Emperor studied treatises on tactics and rehearsed plans of battle, we feel that we are on surer ground. The *Strategikon* of [the Emperor] Maurice, doubtless, was constantly in his hands' (Bury, J. B.: *A History of the Later Roman Empire* (London 1889, Macmillan), 2 vols., vol. II, pp. 224-5).

In this passage the Late Modern historian-rationalist lays himself open to the censure of a post-Modern historian-philosopher.

'Historical inquiry reveals to the historian the powers of his own mind. Since all he can know historically is thoughts that he can re-think for himself, the fact of his coming to know them shows him that his mind is able (or, by the very effort of studying them, has become able) to think in these ways. And conversely, whenever he finds certain historical matters unintelligible, he has discovered a limitation of his own mind; he has discovered that there are certain ways in which he is not, or no longer, or not yet, able to think. Certain historians, sometimes whole generations of historians, find in certain periods of history nothing intelligible, and call them 'dark ages'; but such phrases tell us nothing about those ages themselves, though they tell us a great deal about the persons who use them, namely that they are unable to re-think the thoughts which were fundamental to their life. It has been said that *die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht*; and it is true, but in a sense not always recognized. It is the historian himself who stands at the bar of judgement, and there reveals his own mind in its strength and weakness, its virtues and its vices' (Collingwood, R. G.: *The Idea of History* (Oxford 1946, Clarendon Press), pp. 218-19).

perspective than was possible for them at the earlier stage in their journey when their road was actually traversing the mountains' spurs and when the peak was therefore towering sheer above them—so close that it was still invisible.

There is thus a clear distinction to be drawn between the relation of 'Apparentation-and-Affiliation' and another form of contact in the Time-dimension between an adult living civilization and a dead civilization whose cultural legacy the living civilization appropriates for its own use and profit by the creative act of recollection that is known as a 'renaissance'. The phenomenon of 'Apparentation-and-Affiliation' has been sufficiently examined already in our study of the disintegrations of civilizations and of the resulting universal states, universal churches, and heroic ages.<sup>1</sup> The phenomenon of a 'renaissance', in which an affiliated civilization evokes its predecessor's 'ghost', requires further consideration, as it has been noticed here only incidentally so far. Accordingly our study, in the present Part, of encounters between contemporaries will be followed in the next Part by a study of contacts in the Time-dimension in the particular form of 'renaissances'.

Before we proceed with our present inquiry into encounters between contemporaries in the Space-dimension, we have, however, still to elucidate one point and to take note of another.

The point to be elucidated is the relation of Archaism—one of the symptoms of the malady of schism in the Soul which we have examined in a previous Part of this Study<sup>2</sup>—to Apparentation-and-Affiliation on the one hand and to renaissances on the other. In terms of renaissances, Archaism might perhaps be described as being a kind of renaissance in which the commerce between the living and the dead is transacted, not between two different civilizations representing two different generations of their species of society, but between two different phases in the history of one and the same civilization.<sup>3</sup> While Archaism thus has in common with renaissances the feature of being the evocation of a ghost, it differs from renaissances and resembles Apparentation-and-Affiliation in being a relation between parties whose respective experiences and outlooks are, not similar, but diverse.

The other point that we have to consider before proceeding with the inquiry that is the subject of the present Part of this Study is a compound form of contact in which an encounter between two contemporaries that are, both of them, affiliated to the same dead predecessor leads to a renaissance, in the life of one of these two living civilizations, of an element in the dead civilization's cultural legacy which has been preserved 'in cold storage' in the tradition of the other living civilization and has been imparted by this 'carrier' to her contemporary and sister

<sup>1</sup> See V-VIII of the present Study, *passim*.

<sup>2</sup> In V. vi. 49-97.

<sup>3</sup> In this aspect in which it appears to be a kind of renaissance, Archaism is the counterpart, in the field of relations in the Time-dimension, of those encounters between a 'fossil' and the body social that has precipitated it, or between a creative minority and an uncreative rank-and-file, which, in the field of relations in the Space-dimension, may be described as being a kind of encounter between contemporaries in which the parties are representatives, not of two different contemporary civilizations, but of two different contemporary elements in the body social of one and the same society (see pp. 109-10, below).



through their contact with one another in the Space-dimension. A classical example of this rather complicated concatenation of contacts in divers dimensions is the part played in the 'renaissance' of the Hellenic culture in the life of the Western Civilization in its Modern Age by the Western Civilization's contact with the main body of the sister civilization of Orthodox Christendom.

The importance of the Byzantine contribution to this Western achievement must not, it is true, be over-estimated; for the West's own native tradition was fraught, like the Byzantine tradition, with the cultural heritage of a Hellenism which was the common cultural background of both these affiliated civilizations; and, no doubt, the Western Society, as it came to maturity, would have conjured a renaissance of Hellenism out of its own tradition in any event, even if it had never come into contact with its Byzantine sister. A Western renaissance of Hellenism from the native Western tradition was in fact already taking place on Western ground in Northern and Central Italy<sup>1</sup>—the precocious nursery-garden of the Western Civilization in its modern phase<sup>2</sup>—before the medieval encounter between the Western and Byzantine worlds took the cultural form of conveying a knowledge of the Classical Greek language, and the texts of works of Hellenic literature written in Greek, to Italy from Constantinople. This conveyance of intellectual treasure did not, indeed, take place till the fifteenth century of the Christian Era, when the encounter between the two sister civilizations was already four hundred years old and had produced such a bitter estrangement that the Byzantine peoples were by then already acquiescing in an Ottoman domination over the main body of Orthodox Christendom as a less unpleasant fate than the Western domination which was the practical alternative then confronting all Orthodox Christians except the Russians. Thus the fifteenth-century intellectual commerce between Constantinople and Italy did not originate the Western renaissance of Hellenism. Yet, though it did not originate it, it did enrich it—and this to an extent that greatly heightened its potency.

The sample of the Hellenic cultural heritage that had been carried in the native Western tradition was merely the jejune secondhand version of it in the Latin language; and, if the West had been able to draw only on these Greekless cultural resources of its own, the Western renaissance of Hellenism would have been a revocation of the *Magnus Annus* without its quickening spring. The Western scholar-necromancers who were

<sup>1</sup> As has been pointed out in IV. iv. 275, n. 2, it was no accident that this native Western renaissance of Hellenism occurred in a province of the Medieval Western Christian World that had previously forged ahead of the main body of Western Christendom by making successful responses to local challenges.

<sup>2</sup> See I. i. 19. The cultural revolution in Transalpine Europe at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of the Christian Era, which had come to be called 'the Renaissance', had been, in reality, not an evocation of a ghost of the dead Hellenic culture, but a reception of a contemporary variation of the Western culture that had arisen in Northern Italy and that had by that time forged so far ahead of the contemporary Transalpine version of the same Western culture as to have become virtually a distinct civilization. This sixteenth-century reception of a contemporary Italian culture in the Transalpine provinces of the Western World had acquired its misnomer 'renaissance' because the Italian culture which was received at this time beyond the Alps had recently enriched itself through a local Italian renaissance of Hellenism—first in its Latin dress and thereafter in its original Greek embodiment (see IV. iv. 275, n. 1).



striving to evoke a ghost of Hellenism to inspire a Modern Western way of life would hardly have produced the profound effect that they did produce on Western history if the dingy changeling Latin dress in which Hellenism had re-emerged from a Western store-cupboard had not been supplemented by the authentic original garments of a dazzling Greek texture which the West acquired from Byzantium at the eleventh hour. The passive service which Byzantium thus performed for the West as the 'carrier' of a treasure which the West did not merely take over but succeeded in turning to profitable account had been estimated in the following terms by a Modern Western humanist man of letters:

'The Byzantines had grave limitations for the work of *transmissio*. But they had the wisdom and the humility to see what their duty was, and the constancy of mind to do it. They did preserve the old literature, though they could not understand its value. They believed it was beautiful even if they could not see the beauty. They believed it was full of wisdom and virtue and the search for truth and for some forgotten thing called freedom. And, though they understood neither the drama, nor the poetry, nor the philosophy, nor even the history, they did at least copy letter by letter the great books, which were destined, when they met with readers capable of comprehending them, to bring about the rebirth of Civilization.'<sup>1</sup>

If the Byzantine Greek scholars could have risen from the dead to read this Western judgement on their work, no doubt they would have been both surprised and incensed at finding themselves commended as conscientious players of the part of a servant who, in the Parable of the Talents,<sup>2</sup> is denounced by his master as 'slothful' and 'wicked'. They would have pointed out that, even if the five talents originally entrusted to them to invest did eventually pass into the hands of an acquisitive Western fellow servant of theirs who had received a beggarly single talent as his own original allocation, the implication that they had allowed those five talents to lie idle while they were in their keeping was refuted by patent historical facts. How could the Byzantines be accused of having laid up their legacy from Hellenism in a napkin or of having hidden it in the earth, when the renaissances which they had actually conjured out of it were commemorated by such eloquent monuments? Did not the Byzantine ivory-carving of the eleventh and twelfth centuries of the Christian Era bear witness to a renaissance, at least in miniature, of an Hellenic art of sculpture in bas-relief? Was not the legislation of the Macedonian Dynasty inspired by a Justinianean Hellenic *Corpus Iuris*? And was not the establishment of the East Roman Empire by Leo Syrus the revival of a Constantinian Hellenic universal state? In the light of these artistic, juristic, and political Byzantine achievements,<sup>3</sup> was it fair to convict the Byzantines, on an exclusively literary test, of having failed to bring about a rebirth of Civilization?

But, even (our Byzantine apologists might have gone on to protest) if this Western indictment could have been proved against them, a culpable omission, on their own part, to turn the talents entrusted to

<sup>1</sup> Murray, Gilbert: *Greek Studies* (Oxford 1946, University Press), pp. 104-5.

<sup>2</sup> Matt. xxv. 14-30; Luke xix. 12-26.

<sup>3</sup> A critique, from a Western standpoint, of these renaissances of Hellenism in Orthodox Christendom will be found in IV, iv. 363, n. 1.

them to due account would not have automatically pilloried them in the role of serving as 'carriers' of these talents for eventual transfer to their Western neighbours. To have existed for the benefit of the West was not (the Byzantines would insist) the Orthodox Christian Civilization's *raison d'être*.<sup>1</sup> To minister to the West's convenience was not an object that any good Byzantines had ever intended to work for; and, if it should turn out that Fate had played them the malicious trick of having set them to work for the West inadvertently, either by transmitting to the West the Byzantine legacy of Hellenism or by shielding the West against direct assaults on the Arab Caliphate's part from the Caliphate's South-West Asian base of operations,<sup>2</sup> this would be, for them, a cause of more acute *chagrin* than any other incident in their tragic history.

To such Byzantine protests, however, a Westerner could make a maliciously telling retort by demurely putting on record his sincere testimonial to the benefits which the West had in fact received from the main body of Orthodox Christendom both as a military shield against the Arab Caliphate and as a cultural 'carrier' of Hellenism; and he could point out both that, in the appraisal of benefits, the beneficiary necessarily has the last word, and that the West's own estimate of the benefits that she had received from Byzantium would not be invalidated by a Byzantine *affidavit* that the benefaction had been inadvertent or even contrary to intent. It was a plain matter of historical fact that a Western World which had been endeavouring to profit by the single talent of Hellenic treasure that had been its own meagre trust fund had been suddenly and enormously enriched in the fifteenth century by a delivery from Byzantine into Western hands of the five talents that had been the original portion of the more generously endowed sister society. It was also (the Westerner would add) a matter of historical fact that the transfer had been justified in the event by the cultural productivity which the West had achieved after its cultural working capital had been thus augmented by this transfer of an unexpended balance in the Orthodox Christian Society's cultural deposit account.

Whatever the final verdict might be on this cultural controversy between Byzantium and the West, it was manifest that the episode out of which it had arisen had been a concatenation of contacts between three civilizations in two dimensions. An historical plot of this complicated pattern is not likely to present itself frequently, yet the particular performance on which our attention has been fixed up to this point was not the only one known to History. The role of serving as a cultural 'carrier', which Byzantium had performed for the West in transmitting to her the legacy of Hellenism in its original Greek embodiment, had likewise been performed—through the transmission of comparable cultural treasures—by the Arabic Muslim Civilization for the Ottoman province of an Iranic Muslim World, and by the main body of the Far Eastern Society for an offshoot of the Far Eastern Civilization in Japan.

When, in the course of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era,

<sup>1</sup> For this naïvely egocentric conventional Western view of the East Roman Empire's historical role, see I. i. 156, with n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> See I. i. 156, with n. 1, and II. ii. 367-8.

almost the whole of the Arabic World, with the one notable exception of Morocco, was progressively annexed by the 'Osmanlis,' the cultural effect was to transmit to the Ottoman province of the Iranic World, in the original classical Arabic form,<sup>2</sup> a legacy from a common Syriac past which this Iranic sister civilization had inherited in a Persian dress in its own native tradition.<sup>3</sup> It will be seen that this concatenation of cultural contacts between the Iranic Muslim, Arabic Muslim, and Syriac civilizations is formally parallel to the contemporary interplay between the Western Christian, Orthodox Christian, and Hellenic civilizations, though these two outwardly similar cultural episodes not only took place in quite different political circumstances, but also produced substantially different cultural effects, owing to a difference in relative degree of vitality between cultural treasures that were transmitted respectively by the Egyptians to the 'Osmanlis and by the Byzantines to the Italians.<sup>4</sup> The cultural treasure that the 'Osmanlis received via Cairo from a dead Syriac culture's Islamic last phase consisted mainly of desiccated classical Islamic theology; and a corresponding legacy of desiccated classical Confucian philosophy, from the treasure-house of a dead Sinic Society, was all the Sinic treasure that was obtained in the Tokugawa Age by a Japanese offshoot of the affiliated Far Eastern Civilization via the main body of the same Far Eastern Civilization in contemporary China.

These three episodes are examples of a compound type of contact between civilizations which may be distinguished, as such, from other kinds; but we shall find it more convenient to deal with these episodes analytically, under the two heads of 'encounters between contemporaries' and 'renaissances', than to reserve them for separate study; and we may now embark on our survey of 'encounters between contemporaries' without further preliminaries.

<sup>1</sup> See I. i. 348. Syria was conquered by the Ottoman Empire in A.D. 1516, and Egypt (carrying with it the Hijāz) in A.D. 1517. Algeria was acquired in A.D. 1516-18 (see pp. 220-1, below), 'Irāq in A.D. 1534, and Tunisia (definitively) in A.D. 1574. The conquest of the Yaman was completed in A.D. 1570. See further X. ix. 37-38.

<sup>2</sup> See I. i. 395-6.

<sup>3</sup> See I. i. 71.

<sup>4</sup> See I. i. 396.

## B. A SURVEY OF ENCOUNTERS BETWEEN CONTEMPORARY CIVILIZATIONS

### (I) A PLAN OF OPERATIONS

IN setting out to make a survey of encounters between contemporary civilizations, we are confronted, as we were in attempting our original survey of the societies between whom these encounters take place,<sup>1</sup> with a formidably intricate maze of history; and now, as then, we shall be well advised to look, before plunging into the thicket, for a favourable point of entry. In our present enterprise this preliminary reconnaissance is perhaps even more necessary than we found it to be on the earlier occasion, since there is a considerably larger number of trees in the wood which we have now to explore.

The number of civilizations that we originally located on our cultural map was only twenty-one;<sup>2</sup> and, even if the progress of archaeological discovery were to warrant us in regarding the Indus Culture as a separate society from the Sumeric Civilization<sup>3</sup> and the Shang Culture as a civilization antecedent to the Sinic, this change in our reckoning would raise our total muster of civilizations only to twenty-three.

These twenty-one or twenty-three civilizations fall into two groups—one originating in the Old World and the other in the New World—if we classify them by their birthplaces; and either of these geographical groups is distributed chronologically between more generations than one—the actual number of generations up to date being two in the New World and three in the Old World. In the earliest generation of the Old-World series there are in any case four societies—the Egyptian, the Sumeric, the Minoan, and either the Sinic or else the Shang, if we assign the Sinic to the second generation, instead of the first, on the strength of the twentieth-century archaeologists' achievement of disinterring an antecedent Shang Culture—and the number rises to five if we are to regard the Indus Culture as a distinct society and not as a mere variety of the Sumeric Civilization. In the second generation of the same series there are in any case five societies—the Hellenic, the Syriac, the Hittite, the Babylonian, and the Indic—and possibly six, if the Sinic Society is to be classified as being a civilization with a predecessor. In the third generation there are eight societies:<sup>4</sup> the Western, the main body of Orthodox Christendom, an offshoot of Orthodox Christendom in Russia, the Iranian Muslim, the Arabic Muslim, the Hindu, the main body of the Far Eastern Society in China, and an offshoot of the Far Eastern Society in Korea and Japan. In the New-World series there are two societies in the first generation—the Andean and the Mayan—and two in the second: the Yucatec and the Mexic.

<sup>1</sup> See I. i. 51-129.

<sup>2</sup> See I. i. 133.

<sup>3</sup> Alternatively, the Indus Culture might be regarded as a mere 'colonial' variation on the Sumeric (see I. i. 107-8).

<sup>4</sup> A criticism of this count has been made by Prince Dmitri Obolensky (see pp. 669-70 and 671, below).

Manifestly the possible number of geographical encounters between contemporary civilizations will have been restricted by the geographical segregation of the civilizations on our list into two groups and by the chronological segregation of the societies belonging to either geographical group into different generations. Nevertheless, the total number of encounters between civilizations that have been one another's contemporaries is notably larger than the total number of civilizations of all generations in both geographical groups taken together. This at first sight perhaps surprising arithmetical fact is accounted for by several considerations.

In the first place it is possible for contemporary civilizations to have more than one encounter with one another in the course of their histories, and this possibility had been actually fulfilled not infrequently. For example, the encounter between the Western, Orthodox Christian, and Islamic societies, which was such a prominent *motif* in current history at the time of writing, had been preceded by an encounter between the same three parties during the so-called 'medieval' phase of Western history; and this earlier encounter will prove to be a separate story (though we shall find, as might be expected, that the two stories have a connecting link).

The number of encounters between contemporary civilizations had been further increased by chronological overlaps between the life-spans of Old-World civilizations belonging to different generations. The Egyptian Civilization, for instance, was galvanized, as we have seen, by the successive impacts of Hyksos, 'Sea Peoples', Assyrians, Persians, and Macedonians into going on living so long beyond its normal expectation of life that it encountered as contemporaries, not only two civilizations of its own generation—the Sumeric and the Minoan—but also four civilizations of the next generation: the Babylonian, Hittite, Syriac, and Hellenic.

Again, the civilizations belonging to this second generation in the Old-World series did not all come to birth or all go into dissolution at exactly the same date. The Babylonian, Indic, and Hittite civilizations seemed to have emerged from a post-Sumeric interregnum in the fourteenth century B.C.; the Syriac and Hellenic civilizations emerged from a post-Minoan interregnum in the twelfth century B.C.; and the emergence of the Sinic Civilization might have to be dated as late as the ninth or the eighth century B.C. if it proved to have been preceded by a distinctively separate Shang Culture whose universal state had gone into dissolution in either the twelfth or the eleventh century B.C., according to our choice between two alternative traditional Sinic chronologies. The dates at which these six Old-World civilizations of the second generation went into dissolution were still farther removed from one another than the dates of their births. While the Hittite Civilization was overwhelmed as early as the twelfth millennium B.C. by the very *Völkerwanderung* that preceded the Hellenic and the Syriac Society's emergence, the Babylonian Society did not go into dissolution till the first century of the Christian Era, the Sinic Society not till the second century of the same era, and the Hellenic Society not till the fourth

century. As for the Syriac and Indic societies, they lived on, like the Egyptian, beyond their normal expectation of life, and this for the same reason. The course of their disintegration was interrupted by the impact of an alien society, and this interruption, in which the intruder was the Hellenic Society in both cases, prolonged the life of the Indic Society into the fifth century of the Christian Era and the life of the Syriac Society into the tenth century.<sup>1</sup> In consequence, the Syriac Society encountered as contemporaries not only one civilization of an older generation than its own—the Egyptian—and other civilizations of its own generation—the Hellenic, Babylonian, and Indic—but also some of the civilizations of the succeeding generation—the Western Christian, the Orthodox Christian both in its main body and in its Russian offshoot, the Hindu, and the main body of the Far Eastern Society.

Moreover, some of the debris of disintegrating civilizations of the second generation in the Old World had been preserved, as we have seen, in a 'fossilized' state. The oldest example was the fossil of the Hittite Civilization which had survived, after that society's premature extinction, astride the Taurus and Antitaurus mountain ranges in South-Eastern Anatolia and Northern Syria. These fossil remains of the Hittite Society were eventually absorbed into the bodies social of the Syriac and Hellenic societies, but other extinct civilizations had left fossils that were still extant at the time of writing. The Jews and Parsees and the Nestorian, Monophysite, and Monothelete Christians were fossils of the Syriac Civilization deposited in two strata representing two stages in an encounter between the Syriac Society and Hellenism in the course of the Syriac Society's disintegration, while the Hinayanian Buddhists of Ceylon, Burma, Siam, and Cambodia and the Tantric Mahayanian Buddhists of Tibet and Mongolia were similar fossils representing corresponding stages in the parallel history of an Indic Society whose disintegration had likewise been interrupted and retarded by an encounter with the same Hellenic intruder.

These fossils had survived to encounter, as contemporaries, civilizations that had not emerged until after the death of those civilizations by which the fossils themselves had been precipitated. The fossil of the Hittite Civilization, for instance, had lingered on to encounter the Syriac, Babylonian, and Hellenic civilizations; the Jewish relic of the Syriac Civilization had encountered the Arabic Muslim, Iranian Muslim, Orthodox Christian, and Western civilizations; the Parsees had encountered the Hindu, Iranian Muslim, and Western civilizations; the Nestorians had encountered not only the same three civilizations as the Parsees, but the Arabic Muslim and Far Eastern civilizations and the Tantric Mahayanian fossil of the Indic Civilization as well; the Monophysites had encountered the Arabic Muslim, Orthodox Christian, Western, and Hindu civilizations; the Monotheletes, the Arabic Muslim, Orthodox Christian, and Western; the Hinayanian relics of the Indic Civilization

<sup>1</sup> Reckoning the interregnum following the break-up of a restored Syriac universal state to have begun, in the domain of the 'Abbasid Caliphate, with the Fātimid Katāma Berbers' occupation of Egypt in A.D. 969, and, in the domain of the Andalusian Umayyad Caliphate, with the break-up of the Umayyad realm into indigenous parochial successor-states in the early years of the eleventh century of the Christian Era.



had encountered the Hindu, Far Eastern, Western, and Arabic; the Tantric Mahayanian Buddhists had encountered the Hindu, Far Eastern, Western, and Iranic.

This long list of multiple collisions and contacts does not tell the whole tale of encounters to which a 'fossil' had been one of the parties. In the histories of the Syriac and the Indic Civilization, for example, in which fossils had been deposited during the lifetime of the society in strata representing stages in an encounter between this society and an intrusive Hellenism, the divers fossil forms that the victimized society had assumed under the impact of an alien social force had in either case had subsequent encounters with a later form that the same society had assumed in the act of eventually ejecting the alien intruder. The Jewish and Parsee fossils and the Nestorian, Monophysite, and Monothelete Christian fossils of the Syriac Society all encountered the Syriac Society itself in its last phase under the régime of an Islamic Caliphate that was a post-Hellenic resumption of the Achaemenian Empire. Similarly, the Hinayanian Buddhist and the Tantric Mahayanian Buddhist fossils of the Indic Society encountered the Indic Society itself in its corresponding last phase under the régime of a Hindu Guptan Empire that was a post-Hellenic resumption of the Empire of the Mauryas.

In these two cases we see an encounter between contemporaries taking place within the bosom of a single society between different sub-societies into which this society has articulated itself, and this 'internal' type of encounter is not represented solely by cases in which one of the parties to it is a fossil. In studying the growths of civilizations, we have found<sup>1</sup> that the regular social process through which a growing society advances from one stage in its growth to another is a compound movement in which a creative individual or minority first withdraws from the common life of the society, then works out, in seclusion, a solution for some problem with which the society as a whole is confronted, and finally re-enters into communion with the rest of the society in order to help it forward on its road by imparting to it the results of the creative work which the temporarily secluded individual or minority has accomplished during the interval between withdrawal and return. Manifestly the impact of the returning creative individual or minority on the uncreative rank-and-file of the society within whose bosom the process of withdrawal-and-return occurs is another form of encounter between contemporaries in which the parties are all members of a single civilization. Cases in point, which have come to our attention already,<sup>2</sup> are the 'Ionization' of the Hellenic Society, in the transition from a first to a second chapter of its growth, through the impact of a temporarily secluded Ionian creative minority on the rest of the Hellenic body social; the 'Atticization' of the same Hellenic Society, in the transition from the second to a third chapter of its growth, by the similar impact of a likewise temporarily secluded Athenian creative minority; the 'Italianization' of the Western Society, in the transition from a second to a third chapter of its growth, by the impact of a temporarily secluded North Italian creative minority; and the 'Anglicization' of the same Western

<sup>1</sup> In III. iii. 248-377.

<sup>2</sup> In III. iii. 336-63.

Society, in the transition from the third to a fourth chapter of its growth, by the impact of a temporarily secluded English creative minority.

Such encounters within the bosom of a single society are authentic instances of the phenomenon of contact between contemporaries, whether the internal articulation of the society which makes this type of encounter possible has been produced by the withdrawal of a creative individual or minority or by the precipitation of a fossil. We have also still to take note of a further set of encounters between contemporaries of the more usual kind, in which the parties to the encounters are different civilizations and not merely different representatives of a single civilization.

The last factor that had multiplied the number of geographical encounters between different contemporary societies had been the fusion of the New-World with the Old-World group as a result of the conquest of the Ocean by the Western Christian Civilization in the 'modern' chapter of its history (*currebat circa* A.D. 1475-1875). The impact of this Old-World society on the Mexic, Yucatec, and Andean societies across the Atlantic had been the first notable case, if not the first known case, of 'inter-hemispheric' contact.<sup>1</sup>

This achievement of the Modern Western Civilization is an historical landmark; and it may give us a clue to finding our point of entry into the historical maze that we have undertaken to explore.

When, in the course of the fifteenth century of the Christian Era, West European mariners mastered the technique of oceanic navigation, they thereby won a means of physical access to all the inhabited and habitable lands on the face of the planet; and their conquest of the Ocean had in fact resulted, by the time of writing, in the establishment of contact between a Western Society that had originated on the North Atlantic seaboard of the Old World and all other living societies—not excluding those primitive societies that, before Western explorers tracked them down, had been secluded in a virtual isolation in such natural fastnesses as the tropical forests in the heart of Africa, Borneo, and New Guinea, the jungle-clad mountains in the borderland between India, China, and Tibet, and the uninviting extremities of Asia and South America: an Arctic North-Eastern Siberia and an Antarctic Tierra del Fuego.<sup>2</sup> In the lives of all these other living societies the impact of the West had come to be the paramount social force and 'the Western Question' had come to be the fateful issue. As the Western pressure on them had increased—and, so far, it had been increasing in a geometrical progression of growing severity—their lives had been turned upside down; and it was not only the frail social fabric of the surviving primi-

<sup>1</sup> The possibility that, in a pre-Columbian Age, the Plains Indians of North America had already borrowed the composite bow from an Old-World Eurasian Nomad Society is noticed on p. 638, below.

<sup>2</sup> These holes and corners in the *Oikoumené*—which had afforded an asylum for a rearguard of primitive Mankind because their inaccessibility or unattractiveness had exempted them from invasion by any of the civilizations before the literally world-wide expansion of a Modern Western representative of this aggressive parvenue species of human society—had also served as preserves for religious practices and beliefs which might perhaps prove to be relics of a purer, as well as older, religion than the idolatry to which Man in Process of Civilization had succumbed before the eventual epiphany of the historic higher religions (see VII. vii. 759-68).

tive societies that had been pulverized; the living non-Western civilizations had been convulsed, and even the petrified fossils of a previous generation of civilizations had been corroded, by this literally world-wide revolution of Western origin. The Western Society alone had appeared at first to remain unaffected, in its own life, by the havoc that it was thus making of the rest of the World; but, within the lifetime of the writer of this Study, one of the encounters between the West and its contemporaries had come to darken the horizon of the Western Society itself.

The dominating role in Western affairs that had thus come to be played by a collision between the West and a foreign body social was a novel feature in recent Western history; and the date at which this new situation had arisen could be established with some precision by a reading of the index of power politics. From the failure of the second Ottoman assault on Vienna in A.D. 1683 to the defeat of Germany in the General War of A.D. 1939-45, the West as a whole had been so overwhelmingly superior in power to the rest of the World in the aggregate<sup>1</sup> that the fluctuations in a balance of power between Great Powers that were all either Western or Westernized in their culture had been the most important military, political, and economic phenomena in the World during that quarter of a millennium.<sup>2</sup> Throughout that period the Western Powers virtually had nobody to reckon with outside their own circle, and, on the material plane, the destiny of all Mankind outside that circle was therefore determined, in that age, by the course of the mutual relations between those Western Powers. This Western monopoly of power in the World came to an end, however, when, after the war of A.D. 1939-45, Germany's bid for world domination, which had been the previous *Leitmotiv* in the play of power politics, gave place to the new *Leitmotiv* of a competition for the same prize between the United States and the Soviet Union. In itself, of course, this reversal of the relation between the two principal victors in a war in which their principal adversary had suffered a crushing defeat was an incident in the play of political dynamics that, so far from being unusual, might have been predicted as almost inevitable in the light of past precedents. A drastic change in the balance was always apt to be reflected in a correspondingly drastic change in the constellation of political forces. If, however, we go beyond this rather superficial consideration of the formal dynamics of the Balance of Power to take account of the characters of

<sup>1</sup> See III. iii. 200.

<sup>2</sup> In I. i. 33-34 it has been pointed out that, in this age, the Western Society had become so sure of its own predominance in the World that it had ceased to have any collective name of its own in its own vocabulary. The West now no longer felt a need to distinguish itself by a proper name from other societies which it no longer regarded as its equals. When all the members of all the living non-Western societies were confounded together in Western minds under the negative label 'Natives', the correlative term on Western lips could only be 'civilized people'—with the implication that there could be no such thing as Civilization in any non-Western way of life. This Modern Western identification of Civilization with Western Civilization was a secularized version of the Primitive Western Christian proposition: 'Nemini salus . . . nisi in Ecclesiâ' (Cyprianus, Th. C.: Ep. iv, chap. 4. Cp. *De Catholicae Ecclesiae Unitate*, chap. 6: 'Habere non potest Deum patrem qui Ecclesiam non habet matrem.'—'Salus', inquit [Cyprianus], 'extra Ecclesiam non est'—Saint Augustine: *De Baptismo contra Donatistas*, Book IV, chap. xvii (29)).

the *dramatis personae*, we shall see that, in one vital point, the realignment of political forces in and after A.D. 1945 was different in kind from any previous alinement since the Ottoman Empire's fall out of the race for world power in A.D. 1683. After 1945, for the first time since 1683 in the histories of the West and of the World, one of the protagonists in power politics was once again a Power of a non-Western complexion.

There was, it is true, an ambiguity, that has come to our notice in previous contexts,<sup>1</sup> in the relation of both the Soviet Union and the Communist ideology to the Western Civilization.

The Soviet Union was the political heir of a Petrine Russian Empire which had become a voluntary convert to the Western way of life at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and had participated thereafter in the Western game of power politics as a proselyte admitted on a tacit understanding that he would abide by the accepted Western rules. Communism, again, was in origin, like Liberalism<sup>2</sup> and Fascism, one of the secular ideologies that had arisen in the Modern West as substitutes for a Christianity which the West had, in effect, discarded. And thus, from one point of view, the competition which, since A.D. 1945, had arisen between the Soviet Union and the United States for hegemony in the World, and between Communism and Liberalism for the ideological allegiance of Mankind, might still be regarded as a domestic issue within the household of a Western Society that had opened its doors to admit a Russian apostate from the civilization of Orthodox Christendom to become an adopted member of the Western family.

From another point of view, however, the Soviet Union could be looked upon, like its Petrine predecessor, as a Russian Orthodox Christian universal state clinging to life in a Western dress which it had been led to adopt, not by any positive desire to change its cultural allegiance, but by its very will to go on living a distinctive life of its own in an *Oikoumenê* whose cultural climate had latterly become so bleakly Westernized that life on Earth was now no longer possible without some measure of adaptation to Western ways. From the same angle of vision, Communism could be looked upon as an ideological substitute, not for Western, but for Orthodox, Christianity, in ex-Orthodox Christian hearts that had become so far Westernized that they had ceased to find their ancestral religion tenable without having lost the traditional Russian repugnance towards accepting any faith that was held orthodox in the West. On this interpretation the failure of Liberalism, in the long run, to win the Russians' allegiance would be accounted for by its being branded as a secular Modern Western Society's orthodox ideology,<sup>3</sup> while the victory of Communism in Russia would be accounted for by its being signalized as a secular Modern Western creed which was a revolutionary

<sup>1</sup> See III. iii. 200-2 and 363-5.

<sup>2</sup> Using the term, not in the narrower sense in which, in the nineteenth-century party politics of the United Kingdom, it had stood for the opposite of 'Conservatism', but in the wider meaning of the Modern Western way of life which was called 'Capitalism' by its critics and 'Free Enterprise' by its advocates.

<sup>3</sup> From the standpoint of Christianity, of course, Liberalism, as well as Communism and Fascism, was a heresy.

critique of the orthodox secular Modern Western way of life and was therefore an abominable heresy in orthodox secular Modern Western eyes. On this showing, Communism would be an ideally convenient and attractive faith for Russians whose only recourse was to fight the Modern West with its own weapons in a conflict between contending civilizations in which the Russians were still determined not to lay down their arms, but in which none but Modern Western weapons were any longer of any avail.

At the time of writing, each of these two alternative interpretations of the spirit of Soviet Communism and the role of the Soviet Union manifestly expressed some measure of the truth, and at the same time it was still impossible to forecast whether the Westernizing or the anti-Western tendency would ultimately prevail in Russian life. Short of that, however, it was unquestionable that a sharp re-accentuation of the anti-Western tendency in Russian feeling and thought had been one consequence of the Russian Communist Revolution of A.D. 1917, and that, in view of the potency of this phobia in the Russian Communist *ethos*, the emergence of the Soviet Union from the General War of A.D. 1939-45 as one of two rival World Powers had reintroduced a cultural conflict into a political arena which, for some 250 years past, had been reserved for domestic political quarrels between Powers that had, all alike, been of one Modern Western cultural complexion.

At the time of writing, this duel on the political plane between the Soviet Union and the United States and on the cultural plane between Communism and Liberalism was beclouding the whole social horizon of the living generation of Mankind. Yet this concentration of the World's attention and apprehension on this particular encounter between two contemporary civilizations was in no sense presumptive evidence that the Russo-Western conflict would continue to occupy the whole field. In re-engaging in their struggle against Westernization after having apparently long since given up the battle for lost, the Russians were setting an example which had already been followed by the Chinese and which might well be followed, in time, by the Japanese, Hindus, and Muslims, and even by societies that had become so deeply dyed with a Western colour as the main body of Orthodox Christendom in South-Eastern Europe and the three submerged pre-Columbian civilizations in the New World. The reopening of the particular issue between the West and Russia had, in fact, incidentally reopened the general issue between the West and the non-Western majority of Mankind.

These considerations suggest that a scrutiny of the encounters between the Modern West and the other living civilizations might prove a convenient point of departure for embarking on a survey of the whole field of encounters between contemporaries. The next set of encounters that would present itself for examination on this plan of operations would be the encounters of the non-Western living civilizations with one another. And, when we had thus completed our review of encounters between all civilizations still alive, the obvious next step—if our plan had justified itself by its results so far—would be to single out, among civilizations



now extinct, those which, at some stage in their history, had made on their neighbours an impact comparable to the West's impact on its contemporaries—even though, in these earlier cases, the action might not have been literally world-wide. On these lines we might find ourselves able to work our way into the heart of the thicket, break up the tangled *terrain* into manageable tracts, and piece together a general map of the landscape by surveying each tract in turn—without committing ourselves to examining every single encounter between contemporary civilizations that had found its way into our inventory.<sup>1</sup>

If we follow this plan by starting operations with the set of encounters to which the Modern Western Society had been a party, there is, however, still one preliminary point to be settled. We have still to determine the date at which the 'modern' chapter of Western history begins.

Non-Western observers would date its beginning from the moment when the first Western ships made a landfall on their coasts; for, in non-Western eyes, *Homo Occidentalis*, like Life itself according to one Modern Western scientific hypothesis,<sup>2</sup> was a creature of marine origin. Far Eastern scholars, for example, when they set eyes on their first specimens of Western humanity in the Age of the Ming, labelled the new arrivals 'South Sea Barbarians' on the evidence of their immediate geographical provenance and their apparent level of culture. In this and other encounters the ubiquitous Modern Western mariners went through a series of rapid metamorphoses in their human victims' bewildered eyes. At their first landing, they looked like harmless marine animalculae of a previously unknown breed; soon they revealed themselves, by their aggressive behaviour, to be savage sea-monsters; and finally they proved to be predatory amphibians who, unhappily for Mankind, were as mobile on dry land as in their own element. This marine epiphany of a Protean carnivore marks the beginning of the Modern Age of Western history from a non-Western point of view; and this chronological reckoning in the objective terms of the Modern West's impact on the rest of the World tallies closely with the Modern West's own dating of its genesis in the subjective terms of a psychological break, in Modern Western souls, with the Modern West's own past.

From the Modern West's own point of view, its modernity had begun at the moment when Western Man had thanked, not God, but himself that he was as different a being from his 'medieval' predecessor as the Pharisee claimed to be from the publican in the parable.<sup>3</sup> The cultural pharisaism of the Modern Western peoples on the Atlantic seaboard of Europe dated, like their technological conquest of the Ocean, from the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of the Christian Era, and we can name the objective revolutionary event which had brought about this subjective revolution in an ocean-faring Western Man's mind. The Western peoples on the Atlantic seaboard of Europe who, in the sixteenth century, launched out on the face of the deep and made their way as far

<sup>1</sup> For example, the encounters, enumerated on pp. 108-9, above, in which one of the parties had been a 'fossil', are not all examined in IX a (ii), below.

<sup>2</sup> This hypothesis was, of course, couched in a Modern Western scientific idiom, of the Hellenic myth of the genesis of the goddess of procreation, Aphrodite, from the foam of the sea.

<sup>3</sup> Luke xviii. 11.



and wide as its waters could carry them took the same contemptuous view of their own fifteenth-century ancestors as the fifteenth-century Italians had taken of these Transalpine and Transmediterranean Western contemporaries of theirs when they had stigmatized them as 'barbarians';<sup>1</sup> and the sixteenth-century Spaniards, Portuguese, French, English, and Dutch had in fact taken over this point of view from its Italian originators. They had taken it over as part of their reception of a local Italian form of the Western culture that had differentiated itself during the later Middle Ages.<sup>2</sup> It was in virtue of this Italianization that these sixteenth-century Westerners beyond the bounds of Italy had become conscious of a breach of cultural continuity between themselves and their own immediate local predecessors, and this conversion of the non-Italian Western peoples to the Italians' way of life had likewise occurred at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.<sup>3</sup>

Our criteria thus agree in supporting the traditional dating of the emergence of the Modern Western World in the last quarter of the fifteenth century.<sup>4</sup> The Italianization of a 'barbarian' majority of the Western Society, the converts' repudiation of their pre-Italianate past, and the conquest of the Ocean by the Italianized Western peoples on the Atlantic seaboard of Europe all occurred in this generation. On this showing, we need not hesitate to accept this date as marking the emergence of a Modern Western Society that had proceeded to make an

<sup>1</sup> See III. iii. 299-310.

<sup>2</sup> On pp. 109-10, above, we have already noticed that this impact of Northern Italy on the rest of Western Christendom at the transition from the 'medieval' to the 'modern' age of Western history is an instance of the 'internal' type of encounter within the bosom of a single civilization.

<sup>3</sup> See V. vi. 340-1.

<sup>4</sup> On the subjective criterion of feeling, the Italians, of course, had been 'modern' since at least the thirteenth century, and the Flemings since at least the fourteenth; but, for the purpose of the present enterprise of making a survey of encounters between civilizations that have been one another's contemporaries, it would be a mistake to include the Italians' encounters with their non-Western neighbours among the Modern West's encounters on the strength of this subjective criterion alone. In the expansion of the Modern West over the face of the whole World since the last quarter of the fifteenth century of the Christian Era, Italy had played little part beyond Genoa's somewhat passive role as the birthplace of Columbus. While the Western peoples along the European seaboard of the Atlantic were opening up new worlds across the Ocean, the Italians were content to remain landlocked within the shores of the Mediterranean and, within these relatively narrow maritime confines, to play out the last rounds of a game which had already become a losing one by the time when, at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the West European peoples had snatched victory for the West out of defeat in her relations with her neighbours by turning their backs on a familiar Mediterranean and committing themselves to a previously untamed Atlantic. At this turning-point in Western history the Atlantic Western peoples were moved to abandon the Mediterranean, and the Italians to cling to it, not merely by the divergent influences of their respective geographical locations, but also—and this perhaps more imperatively—by the historical fact that, in the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Italians—thanks precisely to their precocious achievement of modernity in this last phase of the 'medieval' chapter of Western history—had succeeded in entering into the labours of their Transalpine and Transmediterranean fellow Western Christians—Catalans, Aragonese, Navarrese, Castilians, Normans, French, English, Germans—whose partners they had been in the aggressive expansion of a Medieval Western Christendom across the Mediterranean at the expense of the East Roman Empire and the successor-states of the Abbasid and Andalusian Umayyad caliphates. Details of this transformation of Crusader principalities into Venetian, Genoese, and Florentine colonial empires will be found in III. iii. 347, n. 1. This Italian epilogue to the history of the medieval encounter between the Western, Syriac, and Orthodox Christian societies dragged on till as late as A.D. 1797, when the termination of Venetian rule over the Ionian Islands liquidated the last remnant of the last Italian colonial empire in the Levant.

impact on all the rest of Mankind. In the light of this chronological conclusion, however, we may prognosticate that, however well this literally world-wide impact of the West may serve our turn as a 'bull-dozer' for forcing an entry into the historical jungle of intertwined cultural entanglements which we have set ourselves to explore, it will be of less avail for our purpose when we pass on from this preliminary survey of the facts to our ulterior enterprises of attempting to analyse, first the plot of the play,<sup>1</sup> and then the process of psychological action and reaction in the relations between the actors.<sup>2</sup>

In these two inquiries, Time is of the essence of the problem, since the psychological reverberations of collisions between contemporary societies do not produce their ultimate social effects until they have travelled down below the upper surface of the Psyche—over which the conscious Will and Intellect skate as swiftly as water-spiders on the surface of an unfathomable tarn—and have stirred the obstinately slow-moving depths of the underlying abyss of the Subconscious. However quickly the conscious element in the psyche of a human being whose social environment has been disturbed by the impact of alien cultural influences may succeed in adjusting its thought and action to the new social predicament that the impact has produced, this superficial re-orientation is not effective in itself, since the Intellect alone moves nothing,<sup>3</sup> while the Will is only effective to the degree in which it succeeds in inducing the Subconscious Reservoir of the Psyche to lend itself to the Will's aim by suffering the Will to draw upon this amorphous yet exclusive source of psychic energy and to put it to work by canalizing it into a deliberate effort to attain some definite objective. The pace at which the subconscious element in the Psyche habitually moves is thus not merely the limiting, but the governing, factor in the determination of the time that an encounter between two contemporary civilizations will take, from first to last, to work itself out; and the usual Time-scale of the workings of the Subconscious in this province of the realm of social life had been of a much higher order of magnitude than the 450 years which, at the time of writing, was the utmost length of time during which the impact of the Modern West had so far been making itself felt in the life of any of its contemporaries.

The relative shortness of a span of not more than four and a half centuries in this particular social and psychological context becomes manifest as soon as we turn our attention from the set of encounters in which a living Modern Western Society had been engaged with other living societies to encounters in which a living historian could feel confident that he was in a position to know the whole story because the parties to these encounters were none of them any longer alive.

If we measure off the history of the impact of the Modern West on its contemporaries, down to the time of writing, against the history of the impact of the Hellenic Civilization, in the corresponding chapter of its history, on the Hittite, Syriac, Egyptian, Babylonian, Indic, and Sinic

<sup>1</sup> In Part IX C, below.

<sup>2</sup> In Part IX D, below.

<sup>3</sup> Διάνοια δ' αὐτῇ οὐδὲν κινεῖ.—Aristotle: *Ethica Nicomachea*, Z, 2 (p. 1139 A), quoted in III. iii. 231, n. 1.

societies, and if, for purposes of this chronological comparison, we equate, as we reasonably may,<sup>1</sup> Alexander's crossing of the Hellespont in 334 B.C. with Columbus's crossing of the Atlantic in A.D. 1492, the four and a half centuries that bring us down to the year A.D. 1952 in the Modern Western record will bring us, in the equivalent 'Modern Hellenic' record, to the year A.D. 126; and this date is only a few years later than the probable date of the correspondence on the question of policy towards the Christians which passed between the Younger Pliny and the Emperor Trajan when Pliny was serving as the Emperor's special high commissioner in the Roman imperial province of Bithynia and Pontus.

In a Hellenizing World early in the second century of the Christian Era the Christian Church loomed no larger, in the sight of an Hellenically educated dominant minority, than the Bahā'i and Ahmadi sects<sup>2</sup> were figuring in the sight of the corresponding class in a Westernizing World mid-way through the twentieth century. In a generation in which the supremacy of a sceptical philosophy was 'palpable and audible' on the intellectual surface of Hellenic life, what rational Hellene could have divined that, in a subconscious psychic abyss below the seemingly well-founded basis of his own philosophical *Weltanschauung*, a 'determination' was 'slowly maturing' in the hearts of the people of his world 'to put themselves under the authority of a new dogma',<sup>3</sup> and that this slow long-term spiritual tendency was moving, with a current as powerful as it was imperceptible, towards a triumph of Christianity over Hellenism within two hundred years of Pliny's and Trajan's day? This historical parallel—and it is a legitimate one—indicates how utterly the future might be hidden in A.D. 1952 from the mental vision of a Western student of the impact of the West on the World who happened to have been born only four hundred years after the beginning of this set of encounters between living civilizations.

Moreover, our parallel between a Modern Western and an analogous Hellenic impact on a contemporary world gives us the further indication that, in reckoning the Modern Western impact to have been at work for some four hundred and fifty years down to the time of writing, we have been operating with a figure that represents a maximum and is considerably higher than the average.

It was only in the impact of Western Christendom on the indigenous civilizations of the New World that the equivalent of Alexander's conquest of the Achaemenian Empire had occurred at a corresponding date in the Time-chart of Western history. The Spaniards' conquest of

<sup>1</sup> The parallel holds good in subjective, as well as in objective, terms. Objectively, Alexander's march from the Hellespont to the Hydaspes is comparable in scale with da Gama's voyage from Lisbon to India and with Columbus's from Palos to the New World; subjectively, the post-Alexandrine Hellenes took the reception of an Attic version of Hellenism in Macedonia, and the Atticized Macedonians' conquest of the Achaemenian Empire, as marking the beginning of a new era in Hellenic history as definitely as the Western peoples of the Atlantic seaboard of Europe felt their own Modern Age to be marked off from its 'medieval' predecessor by their reception of Italian culture and their conquest of the Ocean (see V. vi. 339 and 342, and VI. vii. 299-300).

<sup>2</sup> See V. v. 174-6.

<sup>3</sup> Bevan, Edwin Robert: *Stoics and Sceptics* (Oxford 1913, Clarendon Press), pp. 140-1, quoted in V. v. 558.

Mexico and the rest of Central America in and after A.D. 1521, and of the Inca Empire and the rest of the Andean World in and after A.D. 1533, had corresponded in its date, as well as in the crude violence of its physical force and the shattering subversiveness of its psychological effect, to the conquest of the Egyptian, Syriac, and Babylonian worlds by Alexander's Macedonians. In the World as a whole, however, the maritime expansion of the Modern West had had to pay for its ubiquity by being slower in taking political and cultural effect than the overland expansion of a post-Alexandrine Hellenism. While the comparatively fragile civilizations of the New World had been overwhelmed at the first onset of the militant landing-parties from ocean-going Spanish ships, not one single province of one single non-Western civilization in the Old World had been conquered, *more Alexandrine*, by Western force of arms before the campaigns (*gerebantur* A.D. 1757-60) which had resulted in the British East India Company's acquiring a virtual sovereignty over Bengal and Bihar, and it had not been till the launching of a British offensive against the Marāthās on all Indian fronts in A.D. 1803 that any Modern Western empire-builders on non-Western ground east of the Atlantic had made lightning conquests on the scale of Alexander of Macedon's sweep from the Hellespont to the Caspian Gates in 334-330 B.C. or Demetrius of Bactria's sweep over Northern India in 183 B.C.

Furthermore, when we pass on from the spectacle of the forcible imposition of an alien civilization through acts of military conquest to consider the voluntary reception of it through a process of cultural conversion, we find that, in this field, the duration of the process down to the year A.D. 1952 had been, in the Old World, not 450 years, but some 250 at the longest.

The attempts of Western intruders in the Early Modern Age of Western history to propagate an integrally Christian Western culture *in partibus Orientis* had, in the end, all been signally defeated, after apparently promising starts, by outbursts of xenophobia in the mission fields that had been as decisive as they had been vehement. The Japanese had put an end to a Western Christian cultural penetration between A.D. 1614 and A.D. 1638;<sup>1</sup> the contemporary Abyssinians had taken parallel action in the fourth decade of the seventeenth century;<sup>2</sup> the Chinese had taken it at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.<sup>3</sup> It had not been till the last quarter of the seventeenth century that the West had begun to make peaceful cultural conquests that, by A.D. 1952, had proved themselves more durable, at least, than the sixteenth-century fiascos, unwarrantable though it would still have been to assume that they were to prove permanent.

The version of the Modern Western culture that had thus at last begun to make headway in the Old World, some two hundred years after the Western conquest of the Ocean, was not the full-blooded Western Christian Civilization which the Abyssinians, Japanese, and Chinese had rejected after making trial of it; it was a secular abstract from it,<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See II. ii. 366, n. 2; V. v. 365; and pp. 316-24, below.

<sup>2</sup> See II. ii. 366.

<sup>3</sup> See V. v. 365-7, and pp. 316-24, below.

<sup>4</sup> As the present writer sees it, an elimination of Religion, not an introduction of

strained off in a cynically negative spirit by a late-seventeenth-century generation of Westerners who had become alienated from Christianity itself in their revulsion from Wars of Religion which, in the domestic life of Western Christendom for 150 years past, had been running an ever more devastating yet never any more conclusive course;<sup>1</sup> and, since an exotic potion is the less hard to swallow, the thinner and more tasteless the brew,<sup>2</sup> it is no surprise—and also assuredly no accident—that the generation which witnessed this spiritual revolution in the bosom of the Western World should also have witnessed a revulsion in the feelings of Orthodox Christian peoples towards the Western culture.

In the fifteenth century, Orthodox Christians had acquiesced in the political domination of the Muslim 'Osmanlis as a less odious alternative than a reception of the Western Christian way of life in the then current religious terms of acknowledging the ecclesiastical supremacy of the Pope. Towards the close of the seventeenth century the descendants of these same Orthodox Christians eagerly inscribed themselves as pupils in a new-model Western school in which Technology had been substituted for Theology as the obligatory principal subject. This revolution in the Orthodox Christian attitude towards the West in response to the West's own revolutionary revaluation of traditional Western spiritual

Science, was the essence of the seventeenth-century Western cultural revolution. The scientific outlook, in itself, was not at that time a novelty in the Western Society's spiritual constitution. It had been an ingredient in the Western *Weltanschauung* ever since the twelfth-century Aristotelian renaissance (see X. ix. 45-48). What was new was the elevation of Science from a subordinate position, in which it had been made to serve as Religion's handmaid, to the throne from which Religion had now been ignominiously ejected; and this revolutionary rise in Science's prestige in Western eyes, and revolutionary liberation of Science in the West from traditional religious checks and balances, were the innovations that now gave the Western Civilization its new ethos and its new penetrative power in its impacts on alien bodies social.

This would be the present writer's commentary on the following striking passage in one of Professor Herbert Butterfield's works:

'The seventeenth century . . . did not merely bring a new factor into history in the way we often assume—one that must just be added, so to speak, to the other permanent factors. The new factor immediately began to elbow at the other ones, pushing them out of their places, and, indeed, began immediately to seek control of the rest, as the apostles of the new movement had declared their intention of doing from the very start. The result was the emergence of a kind of Western Civilization which when transmitted to Japan operates on tradition there as it operates on tradition here—dissolving it and having eyes for nothing save a future of brave new worlds . . . When we speak of Western Civilization being carried to an Oriental country like Japan in recent generations, we do not mean Graeco-Roman philosophy and humanist ideals, we do not mean the Christianising of Japan, we mean the science, the modes of thought and all that apparatus of civilisation which were beginning to change the face of the West in the latter half of the seventeenth century . . . It was a civilisation that could cut itself away from the Graeco-Roman heritage in general, away from Christianity itself—only too confident in its power to exist independent of anything of the kind. We know now that what was emerging towards the end of the seventeenth century was a civilisation exhilaratingly new perhaps, but strange as Nineveh and Babylon. That is why, since the rise of Christianity, there is no landmark in history that is worthy to be compared with this.' (Butterfield, H.: *The Origins of Modern Science, 1300-1800* (London, 1949, Bell), pp. 174, 163, 174).

Why was it that this secularized version of the Western culture had the corrosive effect on the lives of assaulted societies to which Professor Butterfield draws attention in this passage? As the writer of this Study sees it, this corrosiveness was due not to the addition of a new ingredient but to the excision of an old one. In breaking away from the religious core of a fissile Western Civilization, this secular technological flake became a less uninviting and at the same time a more deadly bait for any alien society to which it might be proffered (see further, pp. 330-42, below).

<sup>1</sup> See IV. iv. 142-3, 150, 184, 227-8, and 643-5; V. v. 669-71; and V. vi. 316-17.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 514-21, below.



values would assuredly have produced some equivalent of the Petrine Revolution in Russia, even if the personal genius of Peter the Great<sup>1</sup> had not happened to make its dramatic epiphany on the imperial throne of Muscovy at that historic moment.

The voluntary reception of a secularized form of the Western culture by the Muscovite and Ottoman Orthodox Christians towards the close of the seventeenth century was, however, only the harbinger of a movement in which the other non-Western societies of the Old World took their time over following suit.

In the Islamic Society, for example, such trifling symptoms as a Dutch-inspired passing craze for growing tulips during the chapter of Ottoman history that had consequently won the name of 'the Tulip Period' (*circa* A.D. 1718-36),<sup>2</sup> and an Italian touch in the decoration of mosques built in the eighteenth century of the Christian Era in Constantinople, were the only portents of Westernization until the shock of defeat at the hands of a recently Westernized Orthodox Christian Power in the Great Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1768-74 inspired Sultan Selim III (*imperabat* A.D. 1789-1807) to attempt the serious and controversial enterprise of radically Westernizing the Ottoman military system.<sup>3</sup> Thus in Ottoman history the question of Westernization did not become a live issue till the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of the Christian Era, and the failure of Sultan Selim's first essay was followed by nearly a century and a half of reluctant half-measures and disappointing set-backs before the Ottoman Turkish people were moved, by the supreme shock of defeat in the General War of A.D. 1914-18 and its political and military aftermath, to commit themselves at long last to a whole-hearted adoption of the Westernization policy as the manifest only alternative to national extinction.

The Ottoman Turks who thus lagged so far behind their Serb and Greek Orthodox Christian subjects in taking the path of Westernization were, however, in the vanguard of the Muslim travellers along this cultural road, and were abreast, if not ahead, of the pioneer Westernizers in all other non-Western societies in the Old World with the one exception of Orthodox Christendom. In the Hindu Society the Bengalis began to open their minds to the reception of the Western Civilization before the close of the eighteenth century as a result of their experience of Western rule from A.D. 1757 onwards, but in this they were at least a generation ahead of any other Hindu people, and the Westernization of the Hindu Society as a whole did not set in until after the political reunification of India under a Western *rāj* in the course of the nineteenth century. As for the Far Eastern Society, the reception of the Western Civilization did not begin before the fifth decade of the nineteenth century in China, and not before the sixth decade of the same century in Japan. In the year A.D. 1952 the re-opening of Japan's doors to the West in A.D. 1854, after a lock-out that had lasted for 216 years (A.D. 1638-1854), was not yet a century old.

The relative lowness of these figures in the chronology of the living

<sup>1</sup> See III. iii. 278-83.

<sup>2</sup> See III. iii. 48 and V. vi. 221.

<sup>3</sup> See V. vi. 299.



non-Western civilizations' encounters with the Modern West up to date comes out when we turn to consider the chronology of the cultural relations between a post-Alexandrine Hellenic Civilization and its contemporaries.

At the time of writing in the twentieth century of the Christian Era this encounter between the World and Hellenism was manifestly long since over, so that it was possible for the historian to follow the whole story of it from beginning to end and to ascertain how long it had taken for each of the divers consequences of the encounter to work itself out; and, when the twentieth-century observer felt his way back into the past in quest of the latest discernible cultural interactions between Hellenism and other civilizations, he did not have to probe deeper than the twelfth century of the Christian Era in order to strike the historical evidence for which he was prospecting. In that century both the Far Eastern World in the last days of the Northern Sung Dynasty in China and of 'the Cloistered Emperors' in Japan<sup>1</sup> and the Syriac World in the last days of the successor-states of a foundered Umayyad Caliphate in Andalusia and a foundered 'Abbasid Caliphate in South-Western Asia and Egypt were still reacting to the impact of Hellenism with a vigour that leaves no room for doubt. In the Far East in that age the visual arts were still being inspired by the abiding influence of an Hellenic art which, travelling at the heels of an Alexander of Macedon and a Demetrius of Bactria, had continued, long after these Hellenic conquerors' empires had passed away, to radiate into regions where the earth had never been shaken by the tramp of the Phalanx; and in the Syriac World of the same age an Hellenic philosophy and science that had come to maturity in the mind of Alexander's preceptor Aristotle were working in Oriental minds through the medium of the Arabic language with a creatively stimulating effect which Hellenism had never been able to exert, at this deep cultural level, during a previous millennium of Hellenic military and political domination<sup>2</sup> under which the minds of the Hellenic rulers' non-Hellenic subjects had been prejudiced against the reception of the intellectual fruits of the Hellenic genius by a resentment at the presence in their midst of an alien intruder who had thrust his civilization upon them by force of arms.

Thus in the Syriac as well as in the Far Eastern World the influence of Hellenism in the twelfth century of the Christian Era was still not only vigorous but also fruitful; and this important last phase in the history of the encounter between a post-Alexandrine Hellenism and these two other civilizations was working itself out some fifteen hundred years after Alexander's crossing of the Hellespont in the year 334 B.C. had inaugurated this episode in the story of Hellenic-Syriac relations, and some 1,350 years after Demetrius's passage of the Hindu Kush in 183 B.C. had started a train of historical developments that had resulted in the transit of Greek art, in the service of the Mahāyāna, from the

<sup>1</sup> See IV. iv. 94 and V. vi. 303.

<sup>2</sup> The Time-span between Alexander's conquest of the Achaemenian Empire in the fourth century B.C. and the Primitive Muslim Arabs' liquidation of Roman rule south of the Taurus in the seventh century of the Christian Era.

banks of the Jumna to the banks of the Yellow River. To arrive at corresponding stages in the uncompleted histories of the encounters between the Modern West and its living contemporaries, a twentieth-century student of contacts between civilizations would have to cast forward into the Future some 1,200 years beyond his own day, considering that the history of a contact between the Modern West and Orthodox Christendom, which had begun in the seventeenth century of the Christian Era, would run into the thirty-second century if it were to attain the Time-span of 1,500 years that had been the duration of the encounter between Hellenism and the Syriac Civilization, while the history of a contact between the Modern West and Japan which, in the writer's generation, was still less than a hundred years old, would run into the same thirty-second century if it was to have the 1,350 years' duration of the encounter between Hellenism and the Indic Civilization.

On the index of this Time-scale we can estimate the measure of a twentieth-century observer's inability to foresee the ultimate psychological effects of the impacts of the Modern Western Civilization upon its living contemporaries, when we consider how much of what this same twentieth-century observer did know about the ultimate psychological effects of the corresponding impacts of a post-Alexandrine Hellenism would have been unknown to him if, instead of his being able to watch the whole story unfolding itself over a Time-span of a minimum length of 1,350 years and a maximum of 1,500, the accident of his own position in the chronological series had confronted him with the mental iron curtain of the human mind's ignorance of the Future at a date not much farther removed than two and a half centuries from the beginning of this fifteen-hundred-years-long tale.

If latter-day students of History had been thus compelled to confine their historical vision of the impact of Hellenism within this narrow chronological compass of one quarter of a millennium, then, in that imaginary situation—as they could see, in the light of the knowledge which they actually commanded—not only the last phase but all other really momentous incidents in the story would have been still lying beyond their range of historical vision. On a range as short as 250 years the beginning, as well as the end, of the influence of Hellenic philosophy and science on Arabic philosophy and science, and of Hellenic art on Chinese and Japanese art, would still have been hidden below their historical horizon, and so would the final liquidation of Hellenic rule on Syriac ground by Arab force of arms in the seventh century of the Christian Era, which, as we have seen, was the psychologically requisite prelude to a hearty reception of Greek thought in Arabic dress by Syriac minds. On these thus imaginarily blinkered latter-day observers' side of the close confines of their field of vision, they would just have caught a glimpse of the earliest violent Oriental reactions against an Hellenic political domination—the infiltration of the Parni into Parthia in the third century B.C.; the more militant anti-Hellenic insurrections in Egypt and Judaea in the second century B.C.; and the subsequent collapse of the Seleucid Power—without having been able to guess either that, in the last century B.C., Rome was going to consolidate the political

heritage of the Seleucids and the Ptolemies west of the Euphrates or that, after Syria and Egypt had thus been retained under Hellenic rule for a further 700 years as provinces of the Roman Empire, Roman rule south of the Taurus would eventually be liquidated in its turn by a feat of Arab arms as abruptly as the Achaemenian Empire had been liquidated by a feat of Macedonian arms at the inauguration of this historical episode, a thousand years back.

More than that, these chronologically handicapped Western students of History would have remained uninitiated into the most important of all the consequences that the impact of a post-Alexandrine Hellenism was to bring in its train; for they would have had hardly an inkling of the religious response which, at the point in the story where an imaginary mental iron curtain cut their vista off, the Orientals were about to make to an Hellenic military challenge. What observer—Greek or Jew, Barbarian, Scythian, bond or free<sup>1</sup>—could have guessed, if he had been born into a Hellenizing World no later than 250 years after Alexander's passage of the Hellespont, that the intellectual influence of Hellenic thought on Oriental minds was to be long anticipated in date, and utterly eclipsed in importance as measured by its effect on the terrestrial destiny of Mankind, by a spiritual influence of Oriental religion on Hellenic souls? How could any observer have foreseen, from so premature a chronological station, that there would be, not only a change of plane, from the political to the cultural level, and a change of *êthos*, from violence to gentleness, in the encounter between the Hellenes and their Oriental victims, but also a reversal in the roles of the actors—a reversal in which the initiative would pass from the Hellenic to the Oriental side?

This turning of the tables in the subsequent history of the relations between victors who had won their battle, and vanquished who had lost theirs, on the material plane of physical force was a more marvellous victory than any ever won by an Alexander of Macedon or a Demetrius of Bactria or a S'ad b. abî Waqqās or an 'Amr b. al-'Ās, just because it was not gained over adversaries in a counter-offensive, stimulated by a thirst for a *revanche*, after the pattern of the 'holy war' in which Amosis expelled the Hyksos from the Delta or the Ming the Mongols from China-within-the-Wall. The Oriental evangelists of the higher religions succeeded in taking their Hellenic military conquerors spiritually captive because they approached them, not with animus, as enemies to be overthrown, but with love, as souls to be saved. Alexander of Macedon's military conquest of the Achaemenian Empire and Demetrius of Bactria's pounce upon the Maurya Rāj received this rejoinder in a language that ignored the argument of the sword when Kanishka was converted to the Mahāyāna some two and a half centuries after Demetrius's military exploit, and Constantine to Christianity some six and a half centuries after Alexander's similar triumph over Darius. To translate the story from personal into institutional terms, we may say that the Catholic Mahāyāna was the Indic Society's reply to the Bactrian Greek and Kushan empires, and the Catholic Christian Church the Syriac

<sup>1</sup> Col. iii. 11.

Society's reply to the Seleucid and Roman empires. These universal churches were the new works of creation that were generated by the impacts of Hellenism on the Indic and Syriac worlds; and the average of the lengths of time that the *peripeteia* took to work itself out from Demetrius's day to Kanishka's and from Alexander's to Constantine's was, as will be noticed, just about twice as long as the longest contact, up to date, between the Modern West and any of its living contemporaries.

The course of the past and therefore known encounters between a post-Alexandrine Hellenism and its Syriac and Indic sisters did not warrant any presumption that the still untransacted future passages in the encounters of the Modern West with other living civilizations would follow the same course or anything like it. There were, however, two expectations which this historical parallel might perhaps legitimately suggest. The first was that the two hundred and fifty years during which the Modern West had been making its impact, up to date, on Orthodox Christendom were likely to prove in retrospect to be a small instalment of the whole story by comparison with the length of the instalments which, at that date, were still due to follow. The second legitimate expectation, in the light of the Hellenic precedent, was that, however widely the denouement of the play in which the Modern West was the protagonist might differ from that of the Hellenic drama in substance, it was likely at least to resemble it in the subjective point of being an outcome that would have been utterly surprising to a spectator whose ticket had actually admitted him to witness the performance of only the first act. The astonishment that a miraculous 'pre-view' of the dramatic situation in the thirty-second century would have produced in the mind of a twentieth-century observer of an historical drama entitled 'the World and the West' might be augured by imagining what the feelings of the Hellenic philosopher-historian Poseidonius of Apamea (*vivebat circa* 135-51 B.C.) would have been if he could have foreseen the state of the relations between the Syriac Civilization and Hellenism in the successive generations of Constantine (*imperabat* A.D. 306-337), Mu'āwiyah (*imperabat* A.D. 661-680), and Avicenna (*vivebat* A.D. 980-1037).

On this showing, a twentieth-century student of human affairs might expect to find the history of the encounters between the Modern West and its contemporaries comparatively unilluminating, for the same reason that had condemned the domestic history of the Western Civilization to be comparatively unilluminating for a study of the species of societies of which it was one representative.<sup>1</sup> An imperfect specimen is manifestly not the best choice for the purposes of scientific observation and research; and, in the science of human affairs, there is this blemish of imperfection in any historical episode in which less than the whole story is within the historian's knowledge. Thus, while twentieth-century Western students of History might hope that the set of encounters in which the Modern West had been the hero—or the villain—might offer them a convenient starting-point for a survey of episodes of this category, they could not count on this still unfinished story's proving equally serviceable to them thereafter in the subsequent stages of their inquiry.

<sup>1</sup> See I. i. 36-37.

When we pass on from a preliminary attempt to assemble the relevant facts to our ulterior enterprise of trying to interpret them, our standby will prove to be the parallel set of encounters between a post-Alexandrine Hellenic Civilization and its contemporaries in which a twentieth-century student did know the whole story as it had unfolded itself, from beginning to end, over periods of time of a vastly greater order of magnitude than 250, or even 450, years.

The Time-span of fifteen hundred years over which the history of the Hellenic-Syriac encounter extends, from the Hellenic conquest of the Achaemenian Empire by Alexander the Great to the Syriac reception of Greek thought in Arabic dress, will be shown by our survey to be a performance of unusual length; but we shall be able to draw upon the histories of other encounters which, though considerably shorter than that, had nevertheless likewise been illuminatingly longer than the encounters between the West and other living civilizations up to date. The encounter between the Syriac and Babylonian civilizations, for example, occupied some nine or ten centuries if we reckon that it began with Assurnazirpal's assault on Syria in 876 B.C.<sup>1</sup> and ended with the absorption of the mortal remains of the Babylonian Society into the still living tissues of the Syriac body social<sup>2</sup> in the first century of the Christian Era.<sup>3</sup> Again, the encounter between a Medieval Western Christendom, an Eastern Orthodox Christendom, and the Syriac World occupied some seven or eight centuries if we date its beginning in the eleventh century of the Christian Era, when the Western Christendom launched a general offensive against its two neighbours on a front extending from Compostella to Edessa, and date its end at A.D. 1797, when the liquidation of the Venetian régime in the Ionian Islands liberated the last remnant of a subject Orthodox Christian population from the domination of the Medieval Western Crusaders' Italian successors.<sup>4</sup>

The social and psychological phenomena arising from these relatively long-drawn-out encounters will illuminate our study in later divisions of this Part. Our first task, however, is to carry out the operation of surveying the facts on the plan which we have now worked out.

<sup>1</sup> See IV. iv. 473, n. 3.

<sup>2</sup> See I. i. 79-80 and 119; II. ii. 138; IV. iv. 471; V. v. 94, 122-3, and 370.

<sup>3</sup> At the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, N.J., in June 1952, the writer learnt from Professor O. Neugebauer that the series of cuneiform documents disinterred in Babylonia by Modern Western archaeologists, which had formerly included no documents of any date later than the last century B.C., had now been extended chronologically by a recent discovery of documents of the first century of the Christian Era.

<sup>4</sup> See p. 115, n. 4, above. The terminal date would be, not A.D. 1797, but A.D. 1945, if, in view of the implication of the Russian branch of Orthodox Christendom, as well as the main body, in the medieval encounter between an Orthodox Christendom and her Western sister, we were to reckon the episode as still not being closed so long as, on the continental front between a Russian Orthodox Christendom and the Western World, a remnant of Orthodox or ex-Orthodox Uniate Ukrainians and White Russians still remained under Polish rule. In the following survey, however, the encounter between the Medieval Western Christendom and the Russian offshoot of an Eastern Orthodox Christendom is dealt with as a separate episode from the Medieval Western Christendom's encounter with the main body of its Orthodox Christian sister society.



## (II) OPERATIONS ACCORDING TO PLAN

## (a) ENCOUNTERS WITH THE MODERN WESTERN CIVILIZATION

1. *The Modern West and Russia.*<sup>1</sup>*Russia's 'Western Question'*

If the opening of the 'modern' chapter of Western history is to be dated at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of the Christian Era,<sup>2</sup> and the establishment of a Russian Orthodox Christian universal state in the eighth decade of the fifteenth century—which saw the political unification of Russian Orthodox Christendom through the incorporation of the Republic of Novgorod into the Grand Duchy of Muscovy<sup>3</sup>—this outstanding political event in the history of the Orthodox Christian Society in Russia just anticipated the impact on Russia of the Western Civilization in its 'modern' form, and the subsequent chapter in the history of Russia's 'Western Question' was all transacted while Russia was in her universal state phase.

This 'Western Question' was already familiar to Russian minds in an older shape; for Russia's encounter with the West in and after the sixteenth century was not her first contact with her Western neighbour and sister. A previous contact, in the Medieval Age of Western history, which is examined separately below,<sup>4</sup> had resulted, in the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries of the Christian Era, in the establishment of Western Christian Polish and Lithuanian rule over large stretches of the original patrimony of Russian Orthodox Christendom, including, besides the entire domains of the White Russian and Ukrainian peoples, a western fringe of Great Russian territory round Smolensk;<sup>5</sup> and the Moscow which, at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, had recently become the capital of a Russian universal state had come, before that, to be the frontier fortress of an independent remnant of Russian Orthodox Christendom against a Western Christendom which had made those sweeping encroachments on her sister society's ground. This previous encounter of Russia's with a Medieval Western Christendom had an aftermath in the history of Russia's subsequent relations with the Modern West.

In the course of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries the Western Civilization's hold over the Russian populations in Poland-Lithuania was strengthened by the cumulative cultural consequences of the political union of the Kingdom of Lithuania with the Kingdom of Poland, which was consummated in A.D. 1569,<sup>6</sup> and the ecclesiastical union of a large part of the Russian Orthodox Christian community in Poland-Lithuania with the Roman Catholic Church, which took place in A.D. 1594-6. In the detached fragment of a Russian Orthodox Christendom that was thus clamped on to the Western World by these two institutional bonds, the Western culture, in a Polish dilution of its

<sup>1</sup> See xi, maps 49 and 65.<sup>2</sup> See pp. 114-16, above.<sup>3</sup> See IV. iv. 88; V. v. 312; and VI. vii. 32, with Prince D. Obolensky's comment in n. 2.<sup>4</sup> On pp. 356-7 and pp. 398-403, below.<sup>5</sup> See II. ii. 172 and 175-6.<sup>6</sup> See II. ii. 175.



modern distillation, succeeded—largely thanks to the missionary activities of the Jesuits—in captivating the local land-owning aristocracy which had originally been Ukrainian, White Russian, or Lithuanian in nationality and Orthodox Christian or pagan in religion. While the ex-Orthodox peasantry who came under the ecclesiastical supremacy of the Papacy as a result of the ecclesiastical union of A.D. 1594–6 became members of a Uniate church which was allowed to retain most of its traditional rites and discipline, many members of the ex-Orthodox nobility travelled the whole length of the ecclesiastical road to Westernization by becoming Roman Catholics of the Latin Rite.

At the same time the political sovereignty over ex-Russian territories in which the Modern Western Civilization was gaining these converts was one of the stakes in a fluctuating military contest between a Russian universal state and a succession of Continental European Western Powers. In another connexion it has already been pointed out<sup>1</sup> that, at the moment when an ownerless East Roman Imperial mantle was falling about a Muscovite Grand Duke's shoulders as a consequence of the capture of Constantinople by the 'Osmanlis' in A.D. 1453, the Russian recipients of this ideological legacy from 'the Second Rome' were so exactly preoccupied with the immediate task of arresting the advance of a Western aggressor who was already at their gates, and with the ulterior aspiration of eventually liberating the adjacent Russian Orthodox Christian populations which had fallen under a Western domination, that they were deaf to sly Western suggestions that they should assert their title to their East Roman Imperial heritage by challenging an Ottoman domination over non-Russian Orthodox Christian peoples<sup>2</sup> who were sundered from Muscovy by the double barrier of the Eurasian Steppe<sup>3</sup> and the Black Sea. Meanwhile, at the western approaches to

<sup>1</sup> See the citation from Obolensky and the quotation from Sumner in VI. vii. 37, n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> On the agenda of Muscovite statesmen the first business was to challenge the Western domination over Russian Orthodox Christians in White Russia and the Ukraine. An undertaking to abstain from any form of oppression of Orthodox Christians under Lithuanian and Polish rule was obtained from Poland-Lithuania by Muscovy in A.D. 1686 and was followed up by active Muscovite intervention on these Orthodox Christians' behalf in A.D. 1718–25 (see Sumner, B. H.: *Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire* (Oxford 1949, Blackwell), pp. 32–33; eundem: *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia* (London 1950, English Universities Press), pp. 181 and 183). A corresponding undertaking from the Ottoman Porte was sought by Muscovite diplomacy at Carlowitz in A.D. 1698–9 and at Constantinople in A.D. 1699–1700 (see eundem, *Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire*, p. 32), but in this field the objective was not attained till A.D. 1774. The first manifesto in which Russia declared herself the champion of the Ottoman Christians and called upon them to take up arms in a common struggle against the 'Osmanlis' was Peter the Great's proclamation of March 1711 (see *ibid.*, p. 46), and Peter's ill-starred invasion of Moldavia in the same year was the first appearance of a Russian army within the confines of an Ottoman Orthodox Christendom. On this occasion 'a Russian army entered Moldavia and Russian cavalry watered their horses in the Danube . . . for the first time for more than seven centuries' (*ibid.*, p. 39). In A.D. 969–72, when the pagan Russian war-lord Svyatoslav had passed that way, the valley of the Pruth had not yet been colonized by an Orthodox Christian population.

<sup>3</sup> Sumner points out (in *op. cit.*, pp. 14, 27, and 79) that, so long as the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe remained a Nomad's land, regular armies could not operate across it without risk of disaster, though it was a highly conducive medium for raids by the Crimean Tatar horse (see *ibid.*, p. 15, n. 3). Galitsin's two attempts, in A.D. 1697 and A.D. 1699, to invade the Crimea across the Steppe ended as unsuccessfully (see *ibid.*, p. 15) as the Ottoman attempt in A.D. 1569 to seize and hold the Don-Volga portage (see the present Study, II. ii. 445, and pp. 225–7, below). When Peter the Great invaded

Moscow, the 'irrepressible conflict' between Muscovy and the West over the allegiance of White Russia and the Ukraine went on for some five hundred years, reckoning from the middle of the fifteenth century, which saw the high tide of Lithuania's expansion at the Russian Orthodox Christendom's expense,<sup>1</sup> down to the close of the General War of A.D. 1939-45, when the annexation of Eastern Galicia to the Soviet Union brought back under Russian rule the last still unrecaptured residue of the Russian Orthodox Christian territories that had been conquered for the West in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries by Polish and Lithuanian arms.<sup>2</sup>

*Channels of Western Cultural Radiation into Russia.*

The military and political victory which Russia thus eventually obtained over the West on this Continental European front was offset on the cultural plane by the consequent propagation of Modern Western influences from these semi-Westernized tracts of originally Russian ground into a Muscovy which had exposed herself to this Western cultural contamination by wresting one after another of the infected territories out of the hands of their Western conquerors and uniting them politically with a Muscovite citadel of Russian Orthodox Christendom which had never fallen under Western rule. The most important single event in this long-drawn-out process was Muscovy's acquisition, in A.D. 1667,<sup>3</sup> of Kiev, the Ukrainian city which had been a pre-Muscovite Russia's political and cultural capital, and which, under Polish rule, had latterly become a powerful transmitting-station for Western cultural influences. Under a Polono-Jesuit dispensation at Kiev, even the Orthodox Christian clergy who had rejected the ecclesiastical union of A.D. 1594-6 had nevertheless been deeply affected by the culture and *éthos* of a Tridentine Roman Church; and, after the transfer of Kiev from Polish to Muscovite sovereignty, Peter the Great found

Moldavia in A.D. 1711, he marched, not via the direct route across the Steppe, but via a roundabout route through the Polish Ukraine; and in A.D. 1739 Münich followed the same roundabout route with success, after having been foiled in A.D. 1738 in an attempt to invade Moldavia by the steppe-route (see Sumner, *op. cit.*, p. 39, n. 3). The Steppe remained an obstacle to regular military operations until it had been colonized by a sedentary agricultural population, and this colonization did not begin till the plantation, in A.D. 1754, of a 'New Serbia' between the Dniepr and the Bug, and did not get under way, full swing, till after the Russo-Turkish peace-settlement of A.D. 1774.

<sup>1</sup> See II, ii. 172 and 175-6.

<sup>2</sup> After the War of A.D. 1939-45 the Soviet Union completed the political unification, within her frontiers, of the entire geographical domain of the Ukrainian people by further acquiring Carpatho-Ruthenia: a territory, adjoining Eastern Galicia and likewise inhabited by Ukrainians, which had been attached to Czechoslovakia since the peace settlement after the War of A.D. 1914-18, and to Hungary before that. These Transcarpathian Ukrainians were sundered from the main body of their nation by the barrier of the mountains, and there was no evidence that Carpatho-Ruthenia had ever been associated politically with the rest of the Ukraine in any previous chapter of Ukrainian history.

<sup>3</sup> In the Muscovite-Polish Peace Treaty of Andrusovo, concluded in A.D. 1667, it was agreed that Kiev, which was at that moment in Muscovite hands, should remain under Muscovite occupation for two years longer, notwithstanding the fact that the city lay on the west bank of the River Dniepr, which, by the terms of the Treaty, was to be the permanent frontier between the two contracting parties. The Muscovites, however, did not ever evacuate Kiev, and Poland renounced her claim to it in A.D. 1686 (see Allen, *W. E. D.: The Ukraine, A History* (Cambridge 1940, University Press), pp. 158 and 176).

pliant instruments among this Western-minded Kievan Orthodox clergy<sup>1</sup> for carrying through the measures<sup>2</sup> by which he succeeded in bringing a less tractable Muscovite Orthodox Church into line with his own Westernizing policy.

This originally Russian but latterly semi-Westernized debatable territory on the continental borderland between Muscovy and the Western World had not, however, been the principal field in which the encounter between Russia and the Western Civilization in its modern form had been taking place down to the time of writing on the morrow of the General War of A.D. 1939-45. For one thing, the Polish reflexion of the Modern Western culture was too dim—even when the rustic mirror had been polished up by skilful and assiduous Jesuit hands—to impress itself deeply on Muscovite Russian souls after the political annexation of this border to an expanding Muscovite Empire; and, when the process of Muscovite political expansion overland towards the West had gone on to embrace East European territories whose culture was completely Western in origin, the cultural effect of this political association had likewise been slight. During the hundred years (A.D. 1815-1915) for which 'Congress Poland', for example, had been linked politically with 'All the Russias' under the sovereignty of the Romanovs, Warsaw had exerted little more cultural influence on Moscow and St. Petersburg than Moscow and St. Petersburg had exerted during the same years on Warsaw.<sup>3</sup> In the crucial encounter between Russia and the Modern West the principals on the Western side had never, so far, been the relatively backward representatives of the Modern Western Civilization who were Russia's immediate continental neighbours in Eastern Europe; they had been those maritime peoples on the European shores of the Atlantic who, at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, had taken over from the North Italians the leadership of the Western World and had initiated its successive enterprises in the modern chapter of its history.

This latterly dominant group of maritime Western countries had come to include not only those in Western Europe, but also Russia's immediate maritime neighbours along the east coast of the Baltic, from Courland to Finland inclusive, who all came under Russian sovereignty in the course of the eighteenth century; but, though, from the time of Peter the Great down to the Russian Communist Revolution of A.D. 1917, the German barons and bourgeoisie of the Baltic provinces exercised an influence on Russian life which was out of proportion to their numbers, the influence of the West European peoples counted for much more, and this influence did not merely filter into Russia through Kiev

<sup>1</sup> See Platonov, S.: *Histoire de la Russie des Origines à 1918* (Paris 1929, Payot), pp. 648-50. Cp. Kliutschewskij, W. [Kluchevskii, V.]: *Geschichte Russlands* (Berlin 1925-6, Obelisk-Verlag, 4 vols.), vol. iv, p. 175.

<sup>2</sup> See III. iii. 283, n. 2.

<sup>3</sup> This nineteenth-century experience threw some light on the cultural prospects of a latter-day political situation in which the western limits of Russia's political ascendancy, after having receded, between the First and the Second World War, to the line along which it had run in the years A.D. 1793-5, stood once again on native Western ground—and this time as far westward as a line running from a westerly point on the southern shore of the Baltic Sea to an easterly point on the northern flank of the Austrian Alps (see p. 142, n. 6, below).

and Riga; it was also conveyed direct through ports of entry which the Russian Imperial Government deliberately opened to receive it.

The earliest of these Russian water-gates for the direct reception of the Modern Western Civilization was the mouth of the Northern Dvina on the coast of the White Sea, which was reached by an English ship in A.D. 1553, some eleven years after the first Portuguese landfall on the coast of Japan.<sup>1</sup> The Muscovite Government responded by founding the port-town of Archangel there in A.D. 1584, and the Westerners who entered Russia by this route established an inland outpost in 'the Sloboda'<sup>2</sup> on the threshold of Moscow. The direct intercourse between Western Europe and Russia via the White Sea was thus inaugurated on the initiative of the West European mariners in the course of their sixteenth-century conquest of the Ocean, but the intensity of the influence of the Modern Western Civilization on Russia was keyed up to a higher pitch when, in the opening years of the eighteenth century, the circuitous maritime route between Russia and Western Europe via Archangel was short-circuited, on Russian initiative, by the foundation of St. Petersburg,<sup>3</sup> and when the field within which this alien influence was allowed to exert itself in the interior of the Russian World was simultaneously expanded from the narrow limits of 'the Sloboda' to embrace the entire domain of an empire which, in Peter's day, already stretched all the way from the Baltic to the Pacific.

#### *Alternative Russian Responses to the Challenge of Western Technology*

In an intercourse between Russia and the Modern West which, by the time of writing, had been active for some 250 years at this high pitch of intensity, and, in a lower key, for some two hundred years before that, the plot of the drama was dictated by a perpetual interplay between the demonic technological prowess of the Modern Western World and a no less demonic determination in Russian souls to preserve Russia's independence against all comers. The Russians had their hearts thus set on the independence of their society because their minds were convinced of the uniqueness of Russia's destiny; and this Russian conviction was something more than the common egocentric illusion that afflicts all societies and individuals in some degree.<sup>4</sup> The Russians' peculiar sense of destiny had found expression, as we have seen,<sup>5</sup> in a belief that the mantle of Constantinople had fallen on Moscow's shoulders; and the pretensions of Constantinople—'the Second Rome'—had been greater than those of Rome herself; for the pagan Roman Empire had believed in itself merely on the matter-of-fact mundane ground that Rome had been the ultimate victor in a competition be-

<sup>1</sup> The first English landfall on the White Sea coast of Russia and the first Portuguese landfall on the coast of Japan were, both alike, unintentional achievements of ships that had been driven out of their course by bad weather.

<sup>2</sup> This Western Christian equivalent of a ghetto in pre-Petrine Muscovy has been noticed in II. ii. 230-2 and III. iii. 280-2. 'By the time of Peter's boyhood there may have been some three thousand foreigners in all in Muscovy—almost entirely Protestant.'—Sumner, B. H.: *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia* (London 1950, English Universities Press), p. 12.

<sup>3</sup> See II. ii. 157-8; V. vi. 343; and VI. vii. 221-2.

<sup>4</sup> For this illusion, see I. i. 157-64.

<sup>5</sup> In VI. vii. 31-40.

tween the Great Powers of a post-Alexandrine Hellenic World for providing a disintegrating society with a universal state, whereas the Christian Roman Empire had fortified its Roman self-confidence with the transcendental Christian faith that the Orthodox Church had inherited from Jewry the spiritual privilege of being God's 'Chosen People'.

Moscow's assumption of the role of a unique repository and citadel of Orthodoxy had been a cumulative process, beginning with the consolidation of an effective political power through the political unification of a still independent remnant of Russian Orthodox Christendom in the eighth decade of the fifteenth century<sup>1</sup> and culminating in the acquisition of an imposing ecclesiastical authority through the establishment of an autocephalous Patriarchate of Moscow in A.D. 1589;<sup>2</sup> and this century, which saw Muscovy thus fortified and consecrated, was also the century that saw the Muscovite remnant of Russian independence, in a domain already much reduced by Medieval Western encroachments, threatened more seriously than ever before by a Modern Western World armed with an unprecedented and unrivalled technological equipment. An impregnable Muscovite self-assurance thus found itself assailed by an irresistible Western material force, and this uncanny encounter presented to Russian souls a challenge to which they made three diverse responses.

One Russian response was a totalitarian 'Zealot' reaction which found its typical exponents in 'the Old Believers'. These fanatics broke with the official Muscovite Church and State over the question whether the traditional Muscovite version of Orthodox Christian ritual and discipline should or should not be brought into line with seventeenth-century Greek practice.<sup>3</sup> They obstinately refused to change one jot or tittle of their own parochial Muscovite custom; and the intransigence thus displayed in a family quarrel within the bosom of the Orthodox Church declared itself, *a fortiori*, against a policy of adopting anything at all from a schismatic Western World.<sup>4</sup> They were unwilling to adopt even a Western technology in which the faint virus of a Western spiritual tradition was certified, on the Western exporters' label, to have been thoroughly sterilized. 'The Old Believers' would not harbour this professedly innocuous alien technology even for the laudable purpose of safeguarding Holy Russia's independence by fighting a formidable assailant with his own lethal weapons.

This totalitarian 'Zealot' reaction in Russia to the pressure of a Modern Western World was as sincere as it was logical. Trusting, as they did, wholly in God and not in Man, the Russian 'Zealots' were willing to stake the existence of their Russian Orthodox Christendom on their belief that God would faithfully save His people so long as they loyally kept His law; but they never came within sight of winning the power to put their belief to a practical test; for they remained an impotent minority which, when the moment came for action, was always

<sup>1</sup> See VI. vii. 31.

<sup>2</sup> See VI. vii. 34-35.

<sup>3</sup> See VI. vii. 36-38.

<sup>4</sup> See Sumner, B. H.: *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia* (London 1950, English Universities Press), p. 17.



brushed aside—not because the majority did not share the ‘Zealots’ zeal for Russia’s independence, but because they did not believe that their common aim could be attained solely through faith without works. The making of Russia’s policy towards the Modern West never came into the ‘Zealots’ hands; yet, though their reaction was repressed, it was not without effect as a subterranean influence when the exponents of an alternative policy were in the saddle. For example, ‘the Slavophil Movement’ which was one of the nineteenth-century cultural phenomena of the ‘Herodian’ Petrine régime, and which could be explained, in these ‘Herodian’ terms, as a Russian variation on the contemporary Romantic Movement in the West, revealed itself at the same time, from another standpoint, as being a muted expression of the native Russian ‘Zealot’ hostility to the Western culture—a hostility which, in an age when a Westernizing tendency was in the ascendant in Russia, found itself compelled to masquerade in some Western garb or other,<sup>1</sup> and therefore fastened upon an archaizing Western movement which was a native Western criticism of a latter-day industrial Western way of life.<sup>2</sup>

The thorough-going ‘Herodianism’ which was at the opposite extreme of the psychological gamut from the totalitarian ‘Zealotism’ of ‘the Old Believers’ was first translated from aspiration into act by the genius of the Russian ‘Zealots’ bugbear Peter the Great.<sup>3</sup> The Petrine policy was to convert the Russian Empire from a Russian Orthodox Christian universal state into one of the parochial states of a Modern Western World, in which the Russian people was to take its place as one among a number of Western and Westernized nations. This policy sought to save Russia’s political independence and cultural autonomy, in a world in which the Modern Western way of life was the rule, by gaining admission for Russia to membership in a Westerners’ club in which eighteenth-century enlightened monarchs did not carry their indulgence in ‘the sport of kings’ beyond the point of exercising their forces ‘by temperate and undecisive contests’.<sup>4</sup> The modesty and practicality of these aims, which were the objective merits of the policy, were also, however, its inherent subjective weaknesses; for, from the Russian standpoint, the Petrine policy could be denounced as a pursuit of certain means towards Russian ends at the cost of sacrificing the very ends which these means presupposed, and in virtue of which alone they were of any value or sig-

<sup>1</sup> See VI. vii. 38–39.

<sup>2</sup> For this aspect of the Modern Western Romantic Movement, see V. vi. 60.

<sup>3</sup> Sumner points out that one of the evidences of Peter’s genius, and secrets of his success, is to be found in the fact that, in his Westernizing reforms, he was giving practical effect to a Westernizing tendency which was already in the air in Muscovy by the time when he came into power. ‘The greatness of Peter lies in the fact that to a large extent he gave shape to needs and aspirations growing within Muscovite Society of the late seventeenth century’ (*Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia* (London 1950, English Universities Press), p. 3). Peter’s father Alexis (*imperabat* A.D. 1645–76) had already gone far enough in this direction to be branded by ‘the Old Believers’ as Anti-christ (see *ibid.*, p. 19) before he was relieved of this invidious identification by the transfer of the epithet to his still more objectionable son (see *ibid.*, p. 66, and the present Study, III. iii. 281). ‘It is tragically ironic that [Prince V. v. Galitsin, one of the principal ministers of Peter’s half-sister Sophia during her regency (*currebat* A.D. 1682–9)], whose ideas were so close to Peter’s, had no share whatever in carrying into effect Peter’s reforms’ (*ibid.*, p. 26).

<sup>4</sup> Gibbon, E.: *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chap. xxxviii, *ad fin.*, quoted in IV. iv. 148.



nificance in Russian eyes. In acquiescing in the Petrine policy the Russians were, in fact, resigning themselves to being, after all, 'like all the nations',<sup>1</sup> and were implicitly renouncing Moscow's pretension to the unique destiny of being the citadel of Orthodoxy: the one society in the World that was pregnant with the future hopes of Mankind. This implication did not prevent Peter's policy from being tried in Russia—and this over a period of more than two hundred years—but it did prevent it from ever winning the Russian people's wholehearted support; and the long-suppressed insistence on the uniqueness of Russia's destiny reasserted itself in a Communist Russian reaction to the Modern West which found its opportunity in the Petrine reaction's failure.

Russian Communism was an attempt to reconcile this irrepressible Russian sense of destiny with the ineluctable necessity of coping with the Modern West's technological prowess if Russia was to have any destiny at all.<sup>2</sup> The Communist solution for Russia's perennial 'Western Question' was to harness the horse-power of the West's redoubtable technique to the chariot of Russia's incomparable destiny, instead of either subordinating Russia's destiny, as the 'Herodians' were ready to subordinate it, to the exigencies of Westernization, or leaving it, as the 'Zealots' were ready to leave it, in the hands of God; and, of all the three Russian answers to 'the Western Question', this was the only one that appeared to offer any chance of reconciling Russian faith with Western facts. This Russian Communist policy was, however, based on an implicit assumption that it was practically possible to appropriate one element in an alien culture without having to adopt the rest of it, and this postulate that a culture is not indivisible remained to be proved.<sup>3</sup> Meanwhile, it was impugned by the significant fact that, in making this very assumption, the Russian Communists were already following a Western lead. Their belief that cultural and political phenomena could all be reduced to economic terms, and that economic facts alone were realities and not illusions, was taken by them on faith from the Western philosopher-prophet Karl Marx; and, in seeking to rationalize the content of the Modern Western Civilization by discarding the element of liberal idealism and retaining nothing but an economic materialism, Marx had only been going one step farther along a road on which his liberal predecessors had entered when, in a revulsion from the Western Wars of Religion, they had sought to jettison the religious element in the Western tradition, while still retaining a secularized liberalism as an idealistic counter-weight to a banalistic technology.

The adoption of a Western ideology of any kind was indeed a paradoxical way of reasserting, against the Modern Western World, Russia's pretension to be the heir to a unique destiny; and this paradox was a striking testimony to the strength—frankly recognized in the Petrine 'Herodian' movement—of a current, carrying Russia in a Western direction, which had not ceased to make its flow felt beneath the surface

<sup>1</sup> 1 Sam. viii. 5 and 20.

<sup>2</sup> In virtue of thus striving to reconcile two conflicting exigencies which were both imperious, Russian Communism had in it an intrinsic ambivalence which is examined further on pp. 607-8, below.

<sup>3</sup> This question is discussed on pp. 542-64, below.

when the Petrine régime had been discredited and liquidated. The substitution of a Marxian ideology derived from the West for an Orthodox Christianity derived from Byzantium, as the true faith of which Russia was the hallowed repository, was a paradox that was at the same time an inevitable corollary of the militant reaction towards Western pressure for which Russian Communism stood.

Lenin and his successors divined that a policy of fighting the West with its own weapons could not hope to succeed if the weapons in question were conceived of in exclusively material terms; for, while Technology was the spear-head of the Modern West's assault on the rest of the contemporary world, the assailants might not have penetrated farther than the outer defences of their neighbours' castles if they had delivered their attack with material weapons alone. The secret of the Modern Western Civilization's amazing success in propagating itself to the ends of the Earth during the last 250 years before the Russian Communist Revolution of A.D. 1917 had lain in a masterly co-operation of the spiritual with the temporal arm. The breaches blown by the blast of a Modern Western technology had opened a passage for the spirit of a Modern Western Liberalism; and the voluntary capitulation of alien souls, *imprimis* Peter the Great's, to the charm of the Modern Western secular culture had done more to make its fortune in the World than all the military conquests of a Cortés, Pizarro, Clive, or Wellesley. The latter-day leaders of the militant Russian reaction against the West well understood that, if Russia was to reassert against the West her own claim to be the child of Destiny, it would not be enough for her to make herself the equal of the West in the mastery of the contemporary Western technique; she must also be the champion of a faith that could contend on equal terms with a Modern Western Liberalism; and she must not be content simply to preserve in its pristine purity, within a Holy Russian citadel, the distinctive faith to which she was to dedicate herself; she must enter into active competition with the Western faith of Liberalism in that literally world-wide mission-field which the Modern West had created by knitting together the whole habitable and traversable surface of the Earth in a Western-manufactured net-work of communications and commerce. Russia must compete with the West for the spiritual allegiance of all the living societies that were neither Western nor Russian in their native cultural tradition, and—not content even with that—she must have the supreme audacity to carry the war into the enemy's camp by preaching the Russian faith in the West's own homeland.

Granting the necessity of the strategy outlined in these general terms for a Russia who was bent on reasserting herself, the particular faith to which a spiritually militant Russia was to attempt to convert the World still remained to be found, and this was the point at which the ascendancy of the Modern Western culture in the contemporary world revealed its strength by driving the Russians into the paradoxical course on which, after Lenin's death, the policy of the Soviet Union was set in consequence of Stalin's victory over Trotsky. Stalin's appropriation of the international flag of Marxism to serve as a new banner for Russian nationalism was a paradox because it was as illogical as it was statesman-

like. In logic the question was not an open one at all. The one faith that a militant Russia could logically pit against a Modern Western Liberalism was the traditional Russian version of Orthodox Christianity, since Russia's claim to be the sole surviving repository of a perfect Christian Orthodoxy constituted her title to be 'the Third Rome' who was 'the Heir of the Promise'. To throw over Orthodox Christianity was to throw away the credentials on which the whole of her pretension to uniqueness rested. Mated with any faith other than this traditional one—and, above all, when the substituted novel faith was a creed whose 'chosen People' was, not the Russian nation, but an international proletariat—the pretension was deprived of even that shadow of historical justification with which it was covered in the setting of its original associations. On the other hand the idea that Russia should attempt to compete for the spiritual allegiance of Mankind against a Modern Western Liberalism in the name of a traditional Orthodox Christianity had only to be formulated in order to put itself out of court by the glaring obviousness of its impracticability. Manifestly that cock would not fight in a twentieth-century oecumenical cockpit. By that date the World was already so far Westernized that the one hope of challenging the prevailing liberal Western ideological orthodoxy lay in pitting against it an ideological heresy that was likewise of Western origin; and for this militant Russian purpose the Marxian ideology was particularly well suited<sup>1</sup> in two ways.

In the first place Marxism was a Western 'futurist' criticism of a latter-day industrial form of Modern Western life which the Western Romantic Movement had attacked from an 'archaistic' angle;<sup>2</sup> and a twentieth-century Russian Communist adaptation of this Western vein of Futurism promised to be a more effective move than a nineteenth-century Russian Slavophil adaptation of Romanticism had proved to be, since Futurism was intrinsically a more positive line of attack than Archaism was against an established dispensation. Marxism was thus a telling ideological weapon for a militant Russia to adopt for use on a world-wide spiritual arena; and, in the second place, it was likely to minister to Russia's other purpose—which was a prior need—of holding her own against the West in the mastery of a Modern Western technology; for Marxism exalted the economic factor in life above all others and would therefore be an apt instrument for serving its Russian users' purpose in the domestic field, where their task was to drive a traditionally un-economic-minded Russian people into catching up with their Western contemporaries, by forced marches, in a technological race in which the Westerners had a long start and in which the stakes of the event were life and death. These practical arguments in favour of substituting Marxism for Orthodox Christianity<sup>3</sup> as the faith to which

<sup>1</sup> The Russians' adoption of the Marxian Western heresy as their weapon for assailing the Western orthodoxy of the age may be compared with the Safawis' adoption of Imāmi Shi'ism as their weapon for assailing the Sunnism that was the orthodox version of Islam in the Iranic World of Shah Ismā'il's generation (see I. i. 359-65). The choice of weapon was in both cases adroit without being cynical, because in both cases the motive was subconscious.

<sup>2</sup> For Archaism and Futurism, see V. vi. 49-132.

<sup>3</sup> This adoption of an alien atheistic and materialist philosophy as a psychological substitute for a native religion had a precedent in the hardly less strange transformation

Russia was to pin her pretension to be the heir to a unique destiny outweighed the academic consideration that the pretension itself logically fell to the ground with the repudiation of its traditional religious foundation, while the flagrancy of this betrayal of tradition and logic at the dictation of *raison d'état* showed how near the Modern Western Civilization had already come to captivating the contemporary world, Russia included, by the time when the Russian Communists raised their horn.

*The Race between the West's Technological Advance and Russia's Technological Westernization*

The practical choice between the three theoretically alternative Russian reactions to the aggression of the Modern West was not, of course, ever decided by an academic debate<sup>1</sup> in the style of the discussion of the respective merits of Democracy, Oligarchy, and Monarchy which Herodotus puts into the mouths of Darius and his fellow assassins in the political vacuum which they had created by their success in murdering Smerdis.<sup>2</sup> The Russian choice was made, for the most part, unreflectively and unselfconsciously, from hand to mouth, in improvised responses to successive Western challenges in the crude form of aggressive military attacks, and, on this analysis, the encounter between Russia and the Modern West presented itself as a drama in which, down to the time of writing, one plot had been recurring in successive performances. The initial event in this recurrent plot was a sensational Western military success at Russia's expense which was patently accounted for by the West's technological superiority at the time; the second event was an effort on Russia's part to save her independence by mastering the technique of the West up to the contemporary level at which it had vindicated itself in Western hands so dangerously from Russia's standpoint; the third event was a fresh ordeal by battle in which Russia demonstrated, by successfully repulsing another Western attack, that she had achieved her own latest technological objective; the fourth event was a sensational fresh advance in Western technology which rang up the curtain for a fresh performance of the drama by confronting Russia, all over again, with a problem which, in the outgoing act, she had solved *ad hoc* without (as now appeared) having succeeded in solving it permanently.<sup>3</sup>

In Russian history<sup>4</sup> the first performance of this repetitive drama was

of a Primitive Buddhist philosophy into the Mahāyāna in the course of its passage from India to the Far East.

<sup>1</sup> The nearest approach to this was the Marxian theological warfare—in which texts from Marx's, Engels', and Lenin's canonical works were hurled from both sides as missile weapons—that was an accompaniment of the struggle between Stalin and Trotsky, after Lenin's death, for control over the Soviet Government.

<sup>2</sup> See Herodotus, Book III, chaps. 80–83.

<sup>3</sup> See Annex I, pp. 674–5, below.

<sup>4</sup> While the Russo-Western heat was the classical instance of a race between the Modern West's technological advance and a contemporary non-Western society's technological Westernization, Russia was not the only non-Western society in this age that was goaded into running this race by a recurring threat from a perpetually advancing Western competitor.

"The greatest danger to the independent strength and freedom of initiative of a nation like China (or Turkey) which is making an effort to adapt itself to the standards of the West is that it thereby admits, at least by implication, the superior authority of the

opened by the first establishment of contact between Russia and the Modern West at the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries of the Christian Era and was closed in 1812 by the victory of a Russia that had been Westernized by Peter the Great over a Napoleon who was the greatest Modern Western soldier up to date.

At the beginning of this performance the Russians were hardly yet aware of the existence of 'the Western Question'; and, on the strength of the political union of Novgorod with Muscovy, and of a casual adoption of a few military applications of the Modern Western technology of the day, such as the use of fire-arms, Tsar Ivan IV rashly provoked his Western neighbours by attempting to win for his united Russia a broader frontage on the Baltic coast through the conquest of the intervening marches of the Western World. A facile initial success against the already disintegrating régime of the Teutonic Order in the Baltic Provinces brought Ivan into collision with Sweden and Lithuania, and the ensuing trial of strength demonstrated the West's contemporary military superiority over Russia. So far from succeeding in extending Russia's frontage on the Baltic, Ivan found himself compelled to cede to Sweden even the strip of coastline at the head of the Gulf of Finland which the Muscovite Empire had inherited from the Republic of Novgorod; this discomfiture of Muscovy in the war of A.D. 1558-83 was followed by the Polono-Lithuanian occupation of Moscow in A.D. 1610-12;<sup>1</sup> and, though, as between Russia and Poland-Lithuania, the eventual balance of territorial gains and losses in this round of warfare was in Russia's favour,<sup>2</sup> it was not to her advantage in her account with Sweden,<sup>3</sup> while the true measure of the relative strengths of Russia and her Western adversaries was given, not by any fluctuations in frontiers, but by the constant ability of sixteenth-century and seventeenth-century Western armies to defeat contemporary Russian armies in the field.

This alarming experience of the inadequacy of native Russian military

West; with the result that, by the time it has mastered Westernization as a thing complete in itself, the West proper, whose Westernism is a living force informed with growth and activity, has progressed spontaneously to a further point—with the result that the nation striving for adaptation, having once admitted the authority of the alien standard, finds itself still chronologically in arrears and accordingly restricted in the faculty of initiative. Even in a nation like Japan, where the process of Westernizing was less an adaptation than a transformation, a genuine phenomenon of rebirth, the effects of this chronological handicap can very definitely be traced' (Lattimore, Owen: *Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict* (New York 1932, Macmillan), pp. 154-5).

<sup>1</sup> See II. ii. 176.

<sup>2</sup> In A.D. 1654 the Ukrainian Cossacks (see II. ii. 154-7) transferred their nominal allegiance from Poland to Muscovy; in A.D. 1667 Muscovy acquired Smolensk and Kiev from Poland-Lithuania by the Peace Treaty of Andrusovo; in A.D. 1686 these territorial terms were confirmed in an 'Eternal Peace' between the two Powers.

<sup>3</sup> The terms of the Russo-Swedish peace treaty concluded at Stolbovo in A.D. 1617 re-enacted those of the treaty of A.D. 1583 by reinstating Sweden in the possession of even the strip of originally Russian coastline, at the head of the Gulf of Finland, which Russia had momentarily recovered from Sweden in the peace treaty concluded at Tyvzhin in A.D. 1595, so that Russia found herself once again completely barred out from access to the Baltic Sea. Even the distant English toyed, in A.D. 1612-13, with a project for the acquisition of at least the north of Russia by the British Crown which was submitted by a Scottish soldier, Captain Thomas Chamberlain, who had served in a force of West European mercenaries sent in A.D. 1609 by the Swedish Government to the Tsar Vasilii Shuiski (see Lubimenko, Inna: 'A Project for the Acquisition of Russia by James I', in *The English Historical Review*, vol. xxix (London 1914, Longmans Green), pp. 246-56).



technique in warfare with Russia's Modern Western neighbours was a challenge which found its response in the Petrine 'Herodian' revolution.<sup>1</sup> Peter the Great's first objective was to Westernize Russia's armed forces, on sea and land, up to the contemporary Western standard of efficiency; to achieve this, he had also to Westernize Russian technology and public administration; this in turn required provision for the higher education of experts and officials up to the Western standard of the day; and Peter, being a man of genius and vision, extended these minimum necessary measures to embrace a comprehensive Westernization of a diluted Muscovite nobility.<sup>2</sup> The success of this Petrine policy was foreshadowed by Peter's own victory, in A.D. 1709, over a rash Swedish invader of the Ukraine,<sup>3</sup> and was demonstrated, eighty-seven years after Peter's death, when, in A.D. 1812, the Petrine Russian Empire brought to the ground a French aggressor who had proved more than a match for all his Western continental adversaries during the preceding fifteen years, and who was invading Russia at the head of the united military forces of Continental Western Europe.

The Napoleonic French Grand Army was a Western military instrument of a vastly higher calibre than the Polish expeditionary force which, two hundred years earlier, had anticipated the French in the fatal feat of momentarily occupying Moscow; and, after dividing with Great Britain the honours of overthrowing Napoleon, Petrine Russia emerged from this ordeal as the leading continental Power and pushed her western continental frontiers so far westward as to include within them the native Western province of 'Congress Poland'. The post-Napoleonic era saw a superficially Westernized Russia standing on a pinnacle of apparent ascendancy; yet this appearance was already an illusion; for the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars of A.D. 1793-1815 were the last Western wars on the grand scale that were fought with the pre-industrial Western technique. By A.D. 1812 the Industrial Revolution was already in full swing in England; and, though, in the Crimean War (*gerebatur* A.D. 1853-6), Russia was still able to fight her Western adversaries on more or less equal technological terms thanks to the conservatism of contemporary French and British professional military minds, in the seventh decade of the nineteenth century the American Civil War (*gerebatur* A.D. 1861-5) and a Bismarckian Prussia's three wars of aggression (*gerebantur* A.D. 1864, 1866, 1870-1) saw the new industrial technique at last duly applied to warfare by Western Powers;<sup>4</sup> and in the nineteenth century, as in the sixteenth century, Russia was caught napping by a sudden sensational advance in her Western neighbours' military technique.

<sup>1</sup> A summary of Peter the Great's work has been given in III. iii. 278-83.

<sup>2</sup> See VI. vii. 358, 360, and 361.

<sup>3</sup> Peter's decisive victory over Charles XII in A.D. 1709 at Poltava, which had been preceded by the conquest of Ingermanland, Narva, and Dorpat in A.D. 1701-4, was followed in A.D. 1710 by the conquest of Karelia, Estland, Livland, and Riga. Peter's recognition that, in acquiring for Muscovy this frontage on the Baltic Sea, he had achieved for her in his twenty-one-years-long war (*gerebatur* A.D. 1700-21) what Ivan IV had been seeking to achieve for her in his twenty-six-years-long war (*gerebatur* A.D. 1558-83) was expressed in the pageantry of his triumphal entry into Moscow after the conclusion of peace in A.D. 1721 (see Sumner, *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia*, p. 202).

<sup>4</sup> See IV. iv. 151-2.



Once again, Russia rather casually adopted a few elements of the new Western technical apparatus. In employing, for example, the device of conquering a desert by building a railway, the Russians in Transcaspia<sup>1</sup> were ahead of the British in the Sudan; but, when, in the Russo-Japanese War of A.D. 1904-5, a still no more than Petrine Russia pitted her eighteenth-century Western armaments against the nineteenth-century western armaments of a Post-Tokugawan Japan, she proved to be a colossus with feet of clay; and, when, undeterred by this warning, she ventured, ten years later, to measure her strength against Germany's in the General War of A.D. 1914-18, the colossus collapsed. This shattering experience of the inadequacy of the Petrine dispensation for enabling Russia to hold her own in an industrialized world was the challenge to which the Communist Marxian revolution was the response. The Petrine régime had been all but overwhelmed by the abortive revolution of A.D. 1905, which had been the Russian people's reaction to the Petrine Russian Empire's defeat by Japan. The utter disaster of A.D. 1914-18, and its remorseless revelation of the extreme industrial backwardness which had made it inevitable, brought the Bolsheviks into power and at the same time determined their programme.

This programme was presented by Stalin in uncompromisingly drastic language in a speech on the tasks of business executives delivered at the First All-Union Conference of Managers of Socialist Industry on the 4th February, 1931,<sup>2</sup> in the early days of his inter-war drive to raise the technological efficiency of the Soviet Union to a new level.

'The main thing is to have the passionate Bolshevik desire to master technique, to master the science of production . . . It is sometimes asked whether it is not possible to slow down the tempo a bit . . . No! . . . On the contrary, we must increase it as much as is within our powers and possibilities. . . . To slacken the tempo would mean falling behind; and those who fall behind get beaten. . . .'

The imperative necessity for these superhuman exertions which he was demanding of the people of the Soviet Union was driven home in Stalin's next words in this speech by an appeal to the lessons of Russian history.

'One feature of the history of old Russia was the continual beating she suffered for falling behind, for her backwardness. She was beaten by the Mongol khans. She was beaten by the Turkish beys. She was beaten by the Swedish feudal lords. She was beaten by the Polish and Lithuanian gentry. She was beaten by the British and French capitalists. She was beaten by the Japanese barons. All beat her—for her backwardness: for military backwardness, for cultural backwardness, for political backwardness, for industrial backwardness, for agricultural backwardness. She was beaten because to do so was profitable and could be done with impunity. . . .

'Do you want our socialist fatherland to be beaten and to lose its independence? If you do not want this, you must put an end to its backwardness in the shortest possible time and develop genuine Bolshevik tempo in building up its socialist system of economy . . . . We are fifty or a

<sup>1</sup> See V. v. 323, n. 3, and p. 30, above.

<sup>2</sup> English text in Stalin, Joseph: *Leninism* (London 1940, Allen and Unwin), pp. 359-67.

hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it, or they crush us.<sup>1</sup>

On the 4th May, 1935, when the urgency of Stalin's technological programme had been pointed by Hitler's advent to power in Germany and by his overt rearmament of the Third Reich, Stalin drove his argument home in an address delivered in the Kremlin to the graduates from the Red Army academies.<sup>1</sup>

'We inherited from the past a technically backward, impoverished, and ruined country. Ruined by four years of imperialist war, and ruined again by three years of civil war, a country with a semi-literate population, with a low technical level, with isolated industrial oases lost in a sea of dwarf peasant farms—such was the country we inherited from the past. The task was to transfer this country from mediaeval darkness to modern industry and mechanised agriculture. . . . The question that confronted us was: *Either we solve this problem in the shortest possible time, and consolidate Socialism in our country, or we do not solve it, in which case our country—weak technically and unenlightened in the cultural sense—will lose its independence and become a stake in the game of the imperialist powers.*'

The dose of Westernization that was administered to Russia by the Bolsheviks differed from Peter's dose in its application. The provinces of Russian life which it affected were a smaller part of the total field; for, whereas Peter had set out to Westernize almost everything in the life of a diluted and expanded Muscovite nobility, the Bolsheviks rigidly confined their attentions to the province of technology, where they started an intensive course of industrialization, and the province of ideology, in which they sought to substitute a Marxian for a Christian orthodoxy. Yet, if they did not range as widely as Peter over the surface of Russian life, they made up for this by digging down far deeper below the surface within the limited area to which they restricted their operations; and in this difference in their Westernizing tactics they were faithfully reflecting a change which had overtaken Western life itself, between Peter the Great's generation and theirs, as a result of the eruption of the two elemental forces of Industrialism and Democracy.<sup>2</sup>

The drive imparted by these forces had made mass-action a condition of efficiency; and this portentous new 'totalitarianism', which was as foreign to the bourgeois as it had been to the aristocratic native Western tradition, was accepted wholeheartedly, and imposed without qualms, by Russian Communists whose assumption of a Marxian heretical Western costume could not erase from their Russian hearts and minds the impress of deeply ingrained Orthodox Christian political habits, however vehemently their Marxian wills might have repudiated the Orthodox Christian tradition. As heirs, *malgré eux*, of an Orthodox Christian cultural heritage, they could not find the principle of 'totalitarianism' either unfamiliar or shocking; for, in evoking a ghost of the Roman Empire and subjecting the Orthodox Church to this resuscitated Hellenic universal state, the main body of the Orthodox Christian Society

<sup>1</sup> English text in Stalin, *op. cit.*, pp. 540-5.

<sup>2</sup> See IV. iv. 141-85.

had forged a despotic institution of high potency;<sup>1</sup> and in the Russian offshoot of Orthodox Christendom a comparable engine of despotism—'heavy as frost and deep almost as life'<sup>2</sup>—had been constructed, since the fourteenth century of the Christian Era, in Muscovy and her successor the Petrine Russian Empire—a Russian state of which the Soviet Union was the heir.<sup>3</sup>

The second bout in the dramatic encounter between Russia and the Modern West accomplished its repetition of the plot of the play within a much shorter span of time than the first bout had taken to illustrate the same *motif*. An interval of no less than two centuries had separated the Polish military occupation of Moscow in A.D. 1610–12, which had been the ultimate stimulus of the Petrine Revolution, from the defeat of Napoleon in A.D. 1812 which had been its final vindication, while there was an interval of no more than thirty years between the German victory over a Petrine Russia in A.D. 1915, which was the genesis of the Soviet régime, and the Soviet Union's victory over Germany in A.D. 1945, by which the Communist Revolution was vindicated in its generation.

This acceleration—which was perhaps to be explained as one of the effects of a Western process of mechanization on the life of a Westernizing World—was as evident in the sequel to the second performance of the Russo-Western tragedy as it was in this second performance's consummation. After her triumph in A.D. 1812 the Petrine Russian Empire had at any rate enjoyed half a century free from care before it had become apparent that the Western World had for the second time stolen a march on Russia by making an advance in technology that had once again revolutionized the art of war. In A.D. 1945, the duration of the Soviet Government's rest-cure in a fool's paradise was limited, by a rocket-swift *Zeitgeist*, to a period of ninety days. Germany had capitulated on the 8th May, 1945; on the 6th August of the same year the first atomic bomb was dropped by the Americans on Japan; and, from that latter date onwards till the time of writing, Russia was again in the presence of the same problem that had confronted her after the disaster of A.D. 1915 and the disaster of A.D. 1610–12. In the never-ending technological race between Russia and her Western sister, the West had again forged ahead of Russia so far as to leave her militarily at the mercy of her Western contemporaries unless and until she could catch up again with her formidable competitors for the third time, as she had succeeded in catching up with them twice before.

### *The Soviet Union's Encounter with the United States*

While this technico-military issue was still on the knees of the Gods, it was already apparent on the political plane that, if the empire which the Grand Duke Ivan III of Muscovy had brought into being by annexing Novgorod to his dominions in the eighth decade of the fifteenth century was to be diagnosed as a Russian universal state, this polity had been kept alive beyond its natural expectation of life by the galvanic effect of the impact of the Modern West, as an expiring 'Middle

<sup>1</sup> See IV. iv. 320–408 and X. ix. 15.

<sup>2</sup> Wordsworth: *Ode on Intimations of Immortality*.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 676–8, below.

Empire' of Egypt had been reanimated by the impact of the Hyksos, and an expiring 'New Empire' by the impact of 'the Sea Peoples'.

On the analogy of the histories of universal states which had run their course without this being appreciably affected by the play of external forces, the Muscovite Russian Empire might have been expected to have lapsed into anarchy, achieved a recovery, and eventually collapsed irretrievably about four hundred years from the date of its original establishment; and symptoms of all these three characteristic experiences in a universal state's normal history duly present themselves in this Russian case. The temporary lapse into anarchy is represented by the rough passage which the Russians themselves had named 'the Time of Troubles' (*instabat* A.D. 1604-12);<sup>1</sup> the recovery by the rally under the new régime of the Romanov Dynasty;<sup>2</sup> and the eventual collapse by the adversity into which the Romanov Empire fell in the course of the thirty-six years beginning with the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in A.D. 1881 and ending with the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II in A.D. 1917.<sup>3</sup> If the tragedy had played itself out to the end in conformity with the conventional plot, this last act would have seen the empire that had been founded by Ivan III and been enlarged by his successors fall to pieces into a number of parochial successor-states of barbarian or indigenous origin; and, after the Bolshevik Revolution of A.D. 1917, there were symptoms of this characteristic denouement likewise. At this stage, however, the tendency for events to take their typical course was overborne by a more powerful current making for the rehabilitation of the foundered universal state in a new shape.

Between A.D. 1917 and A.D. 1922<sup>4</sup> all the momentarily dislocated fragments of the former Russian Empire, except a splinter of Transcaucasia<sup>5</sup> and a belt of border territories on the Empire's western fringe, whose populations were Westerners in their culture, were reintegrated under the rule of a single indigenous successor-state which assumed, on the 30th December, 1922, the title of a 'Union of Soviet Socialist Republics'; and thereafter, as a result of the outcome of the General War of A.D. 1939-45, the Soviet Union not only recovered the lost western dominions of the Romanov Empire but imposed its political ascendancy over Continental European territories still farther to the west, up to a line which the Romanov Empire had never approached—not even at the zenith of its military and political power in A.D. 1814-15.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See I. i. 53, n. 2; II. ii. 157 and 176; IV. iv. 90 and 91-92; V. v. 311, n. 2; V. vi. 195, n. 2, and 311.

<sup>2</sup> See V. vi. 312.

<sup>3</sup> See V. vi. 311, n. 3.

<sup>4</sup> On the 14th November, 1922, the reunification of the non-Western territories formerly embraced in the Russian Empire was completed by the merger of the Far Eastern Republic in the Socialist Federal Soviet Republic of Great Russia.

<sup>5</sup> Consisting of the districts of Qars and Ardahan and a portion of the district of Batum (excluding the port and town of Batum itself), which had been definitively retroceded to Turkey in A.D. 1921.

<sup>6</sup> In A.D. 1945 the western frontier of the Soviet Union itself still embraced less territory inhabited by Westerners than had been included within the western frontier of the Romanov Empire in A.D. 1914; for, while the Soviet Union had now reannexed to Russia the three inter-war republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, Soviet Lithuania overlapped with no more than the north-eastern corner of the former Romanov dominion of 'Congress Poland', and only a fraction of the former Romanov dominion of Finland—the Karelian Isthmus—had been reannexed from the inter-war Finnish Republic. On

This Phoenix-like resurrection of a Romanov Empire in the shape of the Soviet Union with its glacis of satellite states was the response of an obstinately persisting Russian will to independence in face of a menace of extinction which had never been more acute than when, on the morrow of the General War of A.D. 1914-18, a prostrate Russia's recent Western or Westernized allies—France, Great Britain, the United States, and Japan—had followed suit to her recent Western adversary Germany in invading her by force of arms in military operations which, in Russian eyes, were not acquitted of being aggressive in virtue of their being professedly undertaken with the object of putting back a non-Communist Russian régime into the saddle. The cumulative effect of the German military invasion of Russia in and after A.D. 1915, the inter-ally military invasion of Russia in and after A.D. 1918, and the renewed German military invasion of Russia in and after A.D. 1940 had been to conjure back into being a Russian polity which was not merely an unseasonable avatar of a time-expired Russian universal state but was one of two super-great Powers in a Westernizing World, now co-extensive with the whole surface of the planet, in whose political articulation the number of Powers of the highest calibre had been reduced to two from eight in the course of thirty-one years (A.D. 1914-45) as a result of two world wars in one life-time.

What were to be the Soviet Union's role and fate in the next chapter of the history of Russia's encounter with the West? The geographical configuration of human affairs on the morrow of the World War of A.D. 1939-45 might appear to portend the approach of a climax in the history, not only of the Russian and the Western civilizations, but of a species of society—Civilization itself—which, by that date, had been in existence for some five or six thousand years and whose living representatives were civilizations of the third generation.

The Soviet Union and the United States, whose gigantic forms now, between them, overshadowed the political landscape, and whose rival championship of two competing ideologies was gathering the whole of Mankind into two opposing spiritual camps, displayed a resemblance to one another which was not confined to the external point of their common pre-eminence over all their contemporaries in their order of material magnitude; they also possessed in common the more intimate feature of being planted, both alike, on culturally new ground, and of experiencing the stimulus which the conquest of new ground is apt to bring with it.<sup>1</sup>

the other hand the Soviet Union had compensated itself for its comparative moderation in reannexing populations of Western culture by establishing its political ascendancy over a team of satellite Western states whose territories covered, between them, not only the unannexed major part of Finland, but the whole of Continental Eastern Europe between the new western frontier of the Soviet Union and a line running approximately south and north from the northern flank of the Austrian Alps to the southern shore of the Baltic Sea. Within this area, in A.D. 1952, the Soviet Union was effectively dominant over a post-war Poland covering the whole area in which a majority of the population was Polish in nationality, as well as a strip of formerly German-inhabited territory between the Polish-inhabited area and the Oder-Neisse line; over a zone of Germany, west of the Oder, surrounding Berlin; over a zone of Austria, surrounding Vienna; and over Czechoslovakia and Hungary, besides Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania. At that date it remained to be seen whether the Soviet Union would succeed in reasserting its ascendancy over a dissident Communist Yugoslavia and in bringing a compliant Communist régime into power in Greece.

<sup>1</sup> See II. ii. 73-100.



The territory of the United States had been culturally virgin soil, save for a fringe of the Mexic Civilization's former cultural domain in the upper basin of the Rio Grande, before trans-oceanic colonists from Western Europe had begun to take possession of it in the seventeenth century of the Christian Era; and the territory of the Soviet Union and its satellites<sup>1</sup> was comparatively new ground likewise. Apart from the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin and Transcaucasia, hardly any of it had ever been occupied by any sedentary civilization before the turn of the tenth and eleventh centuries of the Christian Era; the Russian occupation of the Donetz, Don, Lower Volga, Urals, and Siberia had not begun till the sixteenth century of the Christian Era, when Muscovy had embarked on an eastward and south-eastward expansion overland that was not incomparable in scale with the contemporary expansion of the maritime peoples of Western Europe overseas; and, as one consequence of the intensive industrialization of the Soviet Union, the centre of gravity of its economic life had latterly been shifting more and more out of the original homeland of the Russian Civilization in the North-East European forests into these recently occupied territories which had been Nomad's land or Primitive Man's preserve before Russian enterprise had opened them up as fresh fields for the cultivation of a different way of life.

While the Soviet Union and the United States were both thus laid out on recently virgin soil, they confronted one another across a belt of territories embracing all the rest of the domains, in the Old World, of all the living civilizations of Old-World origin and the entire domains of all these living civilizations' predecessors of earlier generations. This political and ideological no-man's-land enveloped the Old World's Soviet heartland like an immense crescent-shaped festoon with its extremities in the high latitudes of Northern Japan and Scandinavia and with its bow sagging down below the Equator in Indonesia.<sup>2</sup> This zone contained the Japanese offshoot and the Chinese main body of the Far Eastern Civilization; the Tantric Mahayanian fossils of the extinct Indic Civilization in Mongolia and Tibet; the Hinayanian fossils of the same extinct civilization in Cambodia, Siam, Burma, and Ceylon; the Hindu Civilization; the Islamic Civilization from its eastern outposts in the Southern Philippines and Western China to its western outposts on the Atlantic coast of Africa; the main body of Orthodox Christendom in South-Eastern Europe; and the European homeland of the Western Civilization.

Each of the mansions occupied by these divers bodies social had a continental back door accessible from the Soviet heartland of the Old World and a maritime front door accessible from the Americas across the Ocean. They were thus all open to simultaneous and competitive penetration by the two colossi that were bestriding a post-Hitlerian World; and, impotent though their tenants were to hold their own, should occasion arise, against either of their two gigantic neighbours, their existence was nevertheless the key to the balance of political power, since this balance could hardly fail to incline decisively in favour of the

<sup>1</sup> See xi, map. 49.

<sup>2</sup> See XII. ix. 488-9, and xi, map 65.



giant, whichever of the two it might be, who should succeed in drawing into his own camp a majority of these denizens of an intervening no-man's-land whose bodies were to be the prizes of a political and ideological tug-o'-war.

On the precedent of comparable conjunctures in the histories of other civilizations, this political situation in a Westernizing World on the morrow of a Second World War might be read to mean that the Western Civilization had now arrived at a stage in a losing battle against disintegration at which it was on the eve of entering into a universal state, and that a third world war was the crushingly heavy price that Destiny was going to exact for the barren opportunity of achieving this abortive rally.<sup>1</sup> Whatever may have been the current expectations of the rulers of the Soviet Union and their subjects, there were certainly many people in the Western World at this time who were fatalistically foreboding a third world war in which the United States and the Soviet Union would be the respective principals, and from which a literally world-wide universal state would arise through the elimination, *vi et armis*, of one or other of these two remaining Great Powers. If that was in truth Mankind's unescapable destiny, this would mean that the Bolsheviks had achieved their *tour de force* of resuscitating the Russian Empire at the cost of condemning it to hazard its existence on a venture that must issue in either world power or downfall. As a result of a third world war, should this calamity overtake Mankind, it would seem that the Soviet Union must either win the invidiously brilliant distinction of providing a reluctant Western World with an alien universal state such as the 'Osmanlis had imposed on the main body of Orthodox Christendom, and the Mughals and their British successors on the Hindu World, or alternatively suffer a disaster that would undo the work of Stalin and Lenin and Peter and Ivan III alike by pulverizing this vast body politic into fragments smaller than the fifteenth-century Grand Duchy of Moscow and Republic of Novgorod whose union had been the Russian Empire's genesis.

Was one or other of these extreme alternative denouements inevitable? At the time of writing, it would have been wilful blindness to ignore the signs pointing to a third world war as the line of least resistance for a world whose ability to be master of its own destiny was manifestly at this time an open question. At the same time it would have been wanton 'defeatism' to discount other, perhaps not less convincing, signs of the times which suggested that a shatteringly Wagnerian overture might resolve itself into a prosaically Benthamite anticlimax.

While it was certain, in the minds of Western observers, that the Americans' sense of destiny would never tempt them to take the initiative in going to war with the Soviet Union, there was no warrant for assuming, on the other hand, that the Russians' sense of destiny would betray the inveterately cautious and deliberate Muscovite political chess-players into rushing in where their impulsive American opponents feared to tread. Even if the Soviet Government were one day to convince itself that, in a perpetually recurring race for the goal of technological

<sup>1</sup> These prospects are discussed in XII. ix. 524-36.

efficiency, it had caught up with the United States, as it had once succeeded in catching up with Germany, this reassuring conviction would not necessarily move the Russians to take the offensive. An offensive war against an encompassing world of hostile infidels was not commended either by Soviet mythology or by Russian experience. Marxism had appropriated the Jewish myth of an inoffensive Chosen People which, in a war that it has never sought, is to win a miraculous victory against overwhelming odds over a coalition of enemies who have brought their doom upon themselves by banding together in the pride of their hearts to make an unprovoked assault on Zion.<sup>1</sup> The Russian people had thrice experienced the exultation of snatching victory out of defeat in fighting on their own ground against apparently irresistible Western invaders of Holy Russia, while they had also more than once experienced the humiliation of being checked, or defeated outright, on foreign soil by opponents who were not the Russians' match in numbers or resources—as they had been checked by the Turks in Rumelia in the Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1877–8,<sup>2</sup> and defeated by the Japanese in Manchuria in the Russo-Japanese War of A.D. 1904–5. These considerations suggested that the twentieth-century tension between the Soviet Union and the United States was not bound to result in war in the nineteen-fifties, but might alternatively relax without catastrophe, as the nineteenth-century tension between the Russian Empire and the British Empire had relaxed in the eighteen-eighties.

If this unapocalyptic denouement were in fact to come to pass, the Russian Empire founded by Ivan III and resuscitated by Lenin might be expected to survive at a mezzanine altitude of political eminence. This messianic 'Third Rome' would then find her level as a polity of far lower stature than the alien universal state of a forcibly united Western World which she would have had to become if she was to have escaped destruction in the event of a third world war; but on the other hand she would then stand out head and shoulders above the ordinary parochial states of a politically still divided Western World, instead of joining their ranks in the modest role of an undistinguished recruit for which Muscovy had been cast by Peter the Great, and into which the Soviet Union had appeared to be lapsing in the nineteen-thirties.<sup>3</sup> In a Westernizing World, in which other kingdoms and lands, outside the frontiers of the Soviet Union herself and her involuntary satellites, had found security against their fear of Soviet attack and Communist penetration by voluntarily entering into a free political association with the United States and with one another to the extent required for effective common defence and common pursuit of material and spiritual welfare, the Soviet Union might be expected to play something like the role which the Parthian and Kushan Powers had played in the Transeuphratean continental hinterland of a Hellenizing World<sup>4</sup> when a ring of maritime countries encircling the Mediterranean had been gathered together under the aegis of Rome in a *Pax Augusta*.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For the Marxist version of this apocalyptic Jewish myth, see V. v. 183.

<sup>2</sup> See XII. ix. 512–13.

<sup>3</sup> See V. v. 183–8.

<sup>4</sup> See XII. ix. 528–9.

<sup>5</sup> For the role of the Mediterranean in the human geography of the Roman Empire, see VI. vii. 81, ns. 1, 2, 3, and 4, and X. ix. 657–62.

The Modern Western Civilization, like the Hellenic, had started life as a maritime society and had expanded by seamanship before laying iron rails on land; and, in an age when a world that had thus been Westernized through the conductive medium of the high seas was crystallizing politically round the ocean-girt island of North America, it was hardly to be expected that this process would extend very far beyond the maritime fringes of the Old World into its land-locked heartland, any more than it was to be expected that a land power centred on Moscow would ever be able to establish its dominion over the isles of the sea. These geographical considerations suggested that, if the habitable and traversable surface of the planet were to be unequally divided between the whale and the bear in proportions that would leave to the bear an inalienable residue of intractably continental territory, the two monsters might settle down side by side to live and let live; and, in an age of low political and high technological tension, such as this common-sense division of the World might be expected to inaugurate, it could be forecast that the practical compromises between free enterprise and regimentation covered by the rival ideological labels 'Liberalism' and 'Communism' would gradually become less unlike one another *de facto*,<sup>1</sup> as the rulers of Moscow began to be less tyrannically obsessed by fear, while the Western peoples continued to purchase further instalments of technological efficiency<sup>2</sup> and social justice at the inevitable cost of further self-imposed restrictions on the freedom of individuals to take undue advantage of their neighbours.

In this unsensationally happy event the historical role of the Communist ideology and the Soviet Union might prove in retrospect, from a Western standpoint, to have been that of the Mephistophelian spirit

Die stets das Böse will und stets das Gute schafft.<sup>3</sup>

An abortive Russian challenge to the captivation of the World by a secularized Modern Western Civilization might turn out to have redounded to the benefit of the vast depressed proletarian majority of Mankind—the proletarian civilizations and the proletarian lower orders in a Westernizing World whose Western makers and managers had once reigned, as oecumenical 'lords of creation', over a host of 'Natives'<sup>4</sup> and 'Poor Whites' amounting to an overwhelming majority of the living generation of Mankind.

In the economically unified but morally still divided world of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era, the primitive peasantry of Eastern Europe, Russia, Japan, China, Indo-China, Indonesia, India, South-West Asia, Egypt, Tropical Africa, and Latin America,<sup>5</sup> and even the urban industrial 'working class' in North America and Western Europe, were living, on the material plane, on a level shockingly far below the contemporary level of the North American and West European bourgeoisie; and this evil of provocative inequality between sectional

<sup>1</sup> On this point, see V. v. 188.

<sup>2</sup> Mechanization exacts its price in regimentation, as has been noticed in III. iii. 209-12. See further XII. ix. 563-77.

<sup>3</sup> Goethe: *Faust*, II. 1335-6, quoted in II. i. 282.

<sup>4</sup> See I. i. 151-3.

<sup>5</sup> See Annex I, pp. 684-90, below.

classes, like the twin evil of discord between parochial states, had been a malady by which Civilization had been afflicted since the first emergence of this species of society. Hitherto, Civilization's marvellous material and spiritual fruits had been branded with the mark of Cain; for hitherto they had been the monopoly of a privileged minority whose exclusive enjoyment of them was a practical repudiation of the human social creature's inalienable obligation to be his brother's keeper. The obligation was inalienable because sub-Man had succeeded in becoming human only in virtue of having become a social animal first,<sup>1</sup> and this sociality was so essential an element in Human Life that the energy and genius of even the most active and most gifted individual human being would always have remained barren if it had not been brought to harvest by the co-operative labours of the strong man's weaker brethren.

A privileged minority's refusal to recognise this elemental truth and act upon it had been one cause of the breakdowns and disintegrations of civilizations in the course of the first five or six thousand years in the history of societies of this species; but, in a world that had been unified by the technological prowess of a civilization of the third generation, 'the cornucopia of the engineer', 'shaken over all the Earth' and 'scattering everywhere an endowment of previously unpossessed and unimagined capacities and powers',<sup>2</sup> had estopped the privileged minority's traditional plea that the fruits of Civilization, if they were to be enjoyed at all, must be the monopoly of a small fraction of Mankind because the productive powers of Civilization were unequal to the task of producing enough of these luxuries for distribution to all. By the middle of the twentieth century of the Christian Era an Industrial Revolution that, by this date, had been gathering momentum for more than 150 years had brought within sight a prospect of distributing the fruits of Civilization far more widely, at any rate, than had ever been imagined in the most utopian dreams in the past—however severely it might tax Nature's resources and Man's resourcefulness if Mankind were to set itself the task of raising the Asiatic coolie's material standard of living to the level already attained by a West European working class, not to speak of a North American bourgeoisie. Short of attempting forthwith to fulfil such counsels of perfection, there was manifestly a huge interim payment on account of social justice which a privileged minority already had it in its power to make, if it also had the will; and this was the *gravamen* of a Marxian indictment of 'Capitalism' which had been taken as the text for a Russian denunciation of a secularized Modern Western way of life.

In thus denouncing the children of a Modern Western 'ascendancy' for their failure to pay a moral debt up to the progressively expanding limits of their capacity to discharge it, Communism was proclaiming in a challengingly loud un-Christian voice a commandment of Christ's which, on the Christian Church's lips, had sunk to a discreetly inaudible whisper repeated by churchmen under their breath; and, if Marxism was nevertheless a heresy from a truly Christian point of view, this was because, like most other heresies in their day, it had taken up arms on behalf of one grievously neglected Christian truth to the still

<sup>1</sup> See I. i. 173.

<sup>2</sup> Sir Alfred Ewing, quoted in III. iii. 211.

more grievous neglect of this one Christian truth's Christian setting. Through the militancy and the animus of its ideological offensive, Communism had deprived itself of any prospect of reconverting a privileged minority in the Western World to the social gospel of Christianity in an anti-Christian dress; but, in the act of thus spiking its own guns, it had reopened for Christianity a prospect of reconverting ex-Christian Western souls to the Christian gospel in its integrity, including its social implications. In 'the cold war' which seemed likely to settle the World's fate in the current chapter of the World's history, the decisive weight in the scales would be the sufferings of the vast 'under-privileged'<sup>1</sup> majority of the living generation of Mankind, and this multitude of suffering human beings might be expected to throw in its lot with whichever of the two Powers that were now competing for its allegiance gave practical proof that it was carrying out the social gospel of Christianity *de facto*.

In these circumstances, self-interest would counsel a privileged minority among a dominant Western fraction of Mankind to discard the drill-sergeant's rod and take up Orpheus' lyre.<sup>2</sup> This change of external insignia, however, would be morally sterile so long as the motive for it was one of policy alone; for the Thracian wizard's instrument cannot exert its magic charm unless its music is a genuine expression of the feelings in the player's heart. To achieve its purpose, a calculated policy of philanthropy would have to be caught up and carried away by a spontaneous outburst of love; and, if the grace of God were to bring about this miracle in ex-Christian Western hearts genuinely smitten with contrition, and not merely with a self-interested alarm, by the hammer strokes of a Communist challenge, then an encounter between the Modern Western World and Russia, which had already changed the course of Russian history by prolonging the life-span of a time-expired Russian universal state, might also change the course of Modern Western history by rejuvenating a body social in which the familiar symptoms of disintegration had already made their appearance. If this encounter were to have this outcome, this might prove to be the opening of a wholly new chapter in the history of Mankind.

<sup>1</sup> This term 'under-privileged' was current in an American middle-class vocabulary at this time as a euphemistic substitute for the stark word 'unprivileged'. In American mouths 'under-privileged' was a less palatable term, because it suggested that the difference of level was not very great; that its elimination was already on the agenda; and that 'privilege' itself was, not an abuse which ought to be abolished, but an objective which could and should be attained by Everyman. 'Under-privileged' was, however, a flagrantly illogical term, considering that the conferment of a favoured minority's privileges on members of a depressed class must still leave a residual depressed majority on an implicitly unacceptable lower level or, alternatively, must abolish 'privilege' itself if the whole, or even only a majority, of this hitherto depressed majority were to be brought up to a hitherto privileged minority's standard. A 'privilege' that is shared by everybody, or even only by a majority, is a *contradictio in adjecto*, and a psychologist would perhaps have deduced from this revealingly illogical American euphemism the existence of an unresolved conflict in the souls of middle-class Americans between a natural human desire to retain the relatively high standard of living which they were now enjoying as members of an invidiously privileged minority and a conscience which must reproach itself so long as this stigma of privilege was associated with a standard which, in bourgeois American eyes, was justifiable for middle-class Americans in virtue of its being a natural and normal human right that, by implication, must be Everyman's due.

<sup>2</sup> See IV. iv. 123-4 and 131.



2. *The Modern West and the Main Body of Orthodox Christendom**The difference between the Ottoman Orthodox Christian and the Muscovite Reaction to the West*

The reception of the Modern Western culture in the main body of Orthodox Christendom was coeval with its reception in Russia. In both these Orthodox Christian bodies social, this Westernizing movement set in towards the close of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era. In both cases the movement was a sharp and sudden revulsion from a long-sustained and apparently hard-set attitude of hostility towards a Western World and Western way of life which Orthodox Christians had learnt to detest through a previous experience of the West in an encounter with it in the medieval chapter of its history; and, in both cases again, one cause of this seventeenth-century psychological revolution in Orthodox Christian souls was a no less sharp and sudden antecedent psychological change in the West itself—the inversion of an intolerant religious fanaticism into a cynical irreligious tolerance which reflected a profound disillusionment in Western souls with the inconclusive political and devastating moral consequences of the Early Modern Western domestic Wars of Religion. On the political plane, however, these two contemporary and psychologically similar Orthodox Christian Westernizing movements followed very different courses.

This difference was due to a diversity in the political situation in which the two sister societies found themselves at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when the modern impact of the West on both of them began. At that time, either society was in its universal state; but, whereas the Russian Orthodox Christian universal state was an indigenous one that had been brought into being by the Muscovite Grand Duke Ivan III's annexation of Novgorod to Muscovy in the eighth decade of the fifteenth century, the main body of Orthodox Christendom had had its universal state imposed on it by alien Ottoman hands about a hundred years earlier;<sup>1</sup> and this difference in the origin and character of the two universal states led the two societies to give different political answers to the same 'Western Question'. The seventeenth-century Russian Westernizing movement was evoked, as we have seen,<sup>2</sup> primarily by a fear that an indigenous Russian universal state might be overthrown by Western Powers who had demonstrated their military superiority in the Wars of A.D. 1558–1617; the seventeenth-century Serb and Greek Westernizing movements were evoked not by a fear but by a hope that an alien Ottoman Empire might be overthrown by Western Powers who were demonstrating their military superiority over the 'Osmanlis in the War of A.D. 1682–99. In Russia a Westernizing movement designed to salvage the independence of an existing Russian state was launched from above downwards by a cultural revolutionary who was at the same time the Tsar and who used his sovereign power to impose Westernization on his subjects willy nilly; in the Ottoman Empire, Westernizing move-

<sup>1</sup> The Ottoman dominion over the main body of Orthodox Christendom was effectively established in A.D. 1371–2, when the 'Osmanlis conquered Macedonia (see III. iii. 26).

<sup>2</sup> On pp. 132–4, above.



ments that ultimately aspired to recapture political independence for Serbs, Greeks, and other subject Orthodox Christian peoples by undermining and subverting an existing Ottoman Power were launched from below upwards, not by princes performing acts of state, but through the private enterprise of non-sovereign individuals and communities.

*The Ottoman Greek Orthodox Christian Phobia of the West*

It may be convenient first to examine the seventeenth-century cultural reorientation of Serb and Greek souls from an Ottoman towards a Western *qiblah*; then to trace the course of the consequent Westernizing movement on the cultural, social, and political planes; and finally to consider the eventual effect of Westernization on the relations between these non-Russian Orthodox Christian peoples and a Modern Western World whose impact had turned their lives also upside down.

The seventeenth-century revolution in the attitude of Orthodox Christians towards the West signified an even greater change in Serb and Greek than in Russian hearts if the respective degrees of their previous hostility towards the West can be gauged by the respective lengths to which they had shown themselves willing to go in sacrificing their other interests to an overriding determination not to submit to Western ascendancy in its medieval form of an assertion of Papal supremacy on the ecclesiastical plane. While the Russian 'Zealots' had egged on the Greek 'Zealots' to repudiate the ecclesiastical union of the Eastern Orthodox with the Roman Church that had been achieved on paper at Florence in A.D. 1439, this anti-Western intransigence of theirs had cost them no appreciable sacrifice, since they had not been confronted, as the Greeks had been in this crisis, with the grim prospect of having to pay forthwith for their strict ecclesiastical virtue at the exorbitant political price of forfeiting the last shreds of their independence to a Turkish Muslim conqueror. In the years A.D. 1453-61, which saw Greek rule at Constantinople, in the Morea, and at Trebizond extinguished by the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II the Conqueror, the Tatar tide was already ebbing from the steppe-coast of Muscovy, while, on her opposite frontier, the Lithuanian tide was no longer advancing.<sup>1</sup> Thus the Russians, unlike the Greeks and Serbs, had not been compelled to choose between the Pope's tiara and the Prophet's turban;<sup>2</sup> and, if the Russians nevertheless found it psychologically difficult to reverse their

<sup>1</sup> It had reached its high-water mark in A.D. 1449, and it began to recede in A.D. 1494 (see Spruner, K. von, and Menke, Th.: *Hand-Atlas für die Geschichte des Mittelalters und der Neuere Zeit*, 3rd ed. (Gotha 1880, Perthes), plates 69 and 70).

<sup>2</sup> See the passage, in Edward Gibbon's *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chap. lxviii, that has been cited in I. i. 29 and IV. iv. 71. Κρισιότερόν ἐστιν εἶδέναι ἐν μέσῃ τῇ πόλει τὸ φαυλόλιον βασιλεῖον Τούρκων ἢ κάλυπτραν Λατινικῆν, is the original Greek of the exclamation ascribed to the Grand Duke Loukás Notarás by the Greek historian Dhoúkas: *Historia Byzantina*, ed. by Bekker, I. (Bonn 1834, Weber), p. 264. The corresponding popular catchword was κρείττον ἐμπεσεῖν εἰς χεῖρας Τούρκων ἢ Φράγκων, *ibid.*, p. 291. As early as the twelfth century the same preference in face of the same choice had been indicated by the Oecumenical Patriarch Michael Anghialos (*fungebatur* A.D. 1169-1177) in a passage quoted by Every, G.: *The Byzantine Patriarchate, 451-1204* (London 1947, S.P.C.K.), pp. 182-3. The vehemence of the Orthodox Christians' anti-Western feeling in the fifteenth century is indicated by the fact that such 'slogans' were current in Constantinople in A.D. 1453 when Mehmed the Conqueror was at the gates.

attitude towards the West two hundred years later, it must have been still more difficult for their contemporary Greek and Serb co-religionists to recede from a stand against the West which they had maintained at the cost of subjection to Ottoman rule.

The traditional phobia of the West in Greek Orthodox Christian souls did, indeed, die hard. It cost the life of the Westernizing Cretan Greek Oecumenical Patriarch Cyril Loukakis (*vivebat* A.D. 1572-1638; *munere patriarchali oecumenico fungebatur* A.D. 1620-38), and, some five generations later, it was still strong enough to frustrate the intellectual labours of the Westernizing Greek humanist Evyénios Voulgharis (*vivebat* A.D. 1716-1806).

### *The Defeat of Cyril Loukakis*<sup>1</sup>

Loukakis paid with his life for being the Orthodox Christian pioneer in a first attempt to establish communion between the Orthodox Christian and the Protestant churches; and his fatal failure to carry his own church with him in this ecclesiastical manœuvre is the more remarkable, considering that Loukakis' strategic aim was to establish an Orthodox-Protestant common front against a Roman Catholicism which, in Orthodox Christian eyes in Loukakis' day, was still the classic version of a Western schismatic Christianity.

While Loukakis had been mentally prepared for his role as a Westernizer by having received a Western education on Western ground,<sup>2</sup> his policy of Westernization in the particular form of an entente with Calvinism was the outcome of a mission to Poland-Lithuania on which he was sent in A.D. 1596 by his kinsman and patron Meletios Pighás, the Orthodox Patriarch of Alexandria and at that time also Acting Oecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople. The occasion of this mission was the ecclesiastical crisis precipitated by the move, in A.D. 1594, for a union of the Orthodox Church in Poland-Lithuania with the Roman Church<sup>3</sup> on the terms agreed at Florence in A.D. 1439. One motive for this move was the political problem that would have been created for the Kingdom of Poland-Lithuania by the transfer of these Orthodox Christian subjects of a Western state from the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Oecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, under which they had remained hitherto, to that of the autocephalous Patriarchate of Moscow,<sup>4</sup> newly established in A.D. 1589,<sup>5</sup> which styled itself 'the Patriarchate of all Russia', and whose incumbent was a political subject of the Tsar of Muscovy.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See Meyer, Ph., s.v. 'Lukaris, Kyrillos', in Herzog, J. J., and Hauck, A.: *Realencyklopädie für Protestantische Theologie und Kirche*, vol. xi (Leipzig 1902, Hinrichs), pp. 682-90; Rheniérís, M.: *Kýrillos Loukakis, ó Oikoumenikós Patriárchēs* (Athens 1859, Mavrommátis); Pichler, A.: *Der Patriarch Cyrillus Lukaris und seine Zeit* (Munich 1862, Lentner (Stahl)); Mettetal, A.: *Études Historiques sur le Patriarche Cyrille Lucar* (Strasbourg 1869, Silbermann). Two hundred and sixteen documents concerning Loukakis' life and tenets will be found in Legrand, E.: *Bibliographie Hellénique, ou Description Raisonnée des Ouvrages Publiés par des Grecs au Dix-septième Siècle* (Paris 1894-1903, Picard (vols. i-iv) and Maisonneuve (vol. v)), vol. iv, pp. 175-521.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 171, below.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 128, above.

<sup>4</sup> See Pichler, A.: *Der Patriarch Cyrillus Lukaris und seine Zeit* (Munich 1862, Lentner), p. 34.

<sup>5</sup> See VI. vii. 34-35.

<sup>6</sup> The distance of Russia from Constantinople had made it possible (see pp. 676-7, below) for Russian princes to accept, without having to fear any awkward political consequences in practice, an ecclesiastical jurisdiction which was felt to be an intolerable political

Loúkaris was posted in A.D. 1596 to the rectorship of the Orthodox monastery at Vilna in order to act as Meletios's unofficial observer,<sup>1</sup> and he was Meletios's official exarch in Poland from July 1599 to March 1601.<sup>2</sup> He was present<sup>3</sup> at the anti-Uniate Orthodox synod at Brest in A.D. 1596,<sup>4</sup> and at a joint synod of the Orthodox and Protestant churches of Poland-Lithuania which opened at Vilna on the 15th May, 1599.<sup>5</sup> This attempt at an Orthodox-Protestant union on Polish-Lithuanian soil broke down, in spite of the incentive of a common menace in the shape of the Counter-Reformation, owing to an insistence, on the Orthodox side, that the Protestants should accept the Oecumenical Patriarch's ecclesiastical supremacy;<sup>6</sup> yet this diplomatic failure neither checked Loúkaris' ecclesiastical career nor deterred him from his subsequent Calvinizing course.

In A.D. 1602, before he had turned thirty, Loúkaris succeeded Meletios as Orthodox Patriarch of Alexandria;<sup>7</sup> he became Acting Oecumenical Patriarch in A.D. 1612,<sup>8</sup> and Oecumenical Patriarch in A.D. 1620;<sup>9</sup> and the hostility that he drew upon himself by his courage in using this eminent position as a vantage point for the pursuit of a revolutionary policy made his career stormy and his end tragic. Between his enthronement in A.D. 1620 and his execution in A.D. 1638 he experienced vicissitudes of

menace (see IV. iv. 377-83) by a Khan of Bulgaria whose dominions lay at Constantinople's doors. The fact that in constitutional theory they were acknowledging the political sovereignty of a foreign potentate in accepting the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of an Oecumenical Patriarch who was that foreign potentate's subject and minister did not deter the Russians from declaring themselves the Oecumenical Patriarch's ecclesiastical subjects by receiving a Greek candidate of the Patriarch's as Metropolitan of Kiev in A.D. 1639 (see pp. 399-400, below), though at that date the Oecumenical Patriarch's sovereign lord was the Emperor of an East Roman Empire which, to outward appearance, was then still at the zenith of its power (actually it had already brought both itself and the whole Orthodox Christian body social to ruin, through an internecine war with Bulgaria in A.D. 977-1019). *A fortiori*, in subsequent chapters of history, the Russians had not to fear that the Oecumenical Patriarch's jurisdiction over their church might be used as an effective political lever either by the impotent Palaiológis or by the infidel 'Osmanlis.

A new situation, however, was created in the North by the political partition of Russian Orthodox Christendom between Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy and by the subsequent secession of the Metropolitanate of Moscow from the Patriarchate of Constantinople in A.D. 1441 (see pp. 398, below) and the establishment of an autocephalous Patriarchate of Moscow in A.D. 1589 with a pretension to exercise jurisdiction over All Russia; and this new situation was analogous to that which had arisen in the main body of Orthodox Christendom in the ninth and tenth centuries as a result of the conversion of Bulgaria to Orthodox Christianity. If the Orthodox Christian Russian populations under Polish and Lithuanian sovereignty were to be transferred from the Oecumenical Patriarch's ecclesiastical jurisdiction to the new Patriarch of Moscow's, the King of Poland-Lithuania and his Orthodox Christian subjects of Russian nationality would then find themselves, *vis-à-vis* the Tsar of Muscovy, in the position in which the Khan of Bulgaria had found himself *vis-à-vis* the East Roman Emperor. The Orthodox Christian provinces of a sixteenth-century Poland-Lithuania lay as dangerously near to Moscow as a ninth-century Bulgaria had lain to Constantinople; and a powerful Orthodox Tsar of Muscovy who had the Patriarch of Moscow under his thumb might use the Patriarch of Moscow's pretension to exercise ecclesiastical jurisdiction over Russian Orthodox Christians who were Polish and Lithuanian subjects as an effective instrument for political interference in the affairs of a neighbouring state which he had strong motives for undermining and dominating if he could.

<sup>1</sup> See Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 685; Pichler, *op. cit.*, p. 56; Mettetal, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

<sup>2</sup> See Pichler, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

<sup>3</sup> See Mettetal, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

<sup>4</sup> See Mettetal, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

<sup>5</sup> See Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 685; Pichler, *op. cit.*, p. 67; Rheniérís, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

<sup>6</sup> See Pichler, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

<sup>7</sup> On the 4th November, 1620, according to Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 687. Mettetal, *op. cit.*, p. 63, and Rheniérís, *op. cit.*, p. 25, give the year as 1621.

<sup>8</sup> See p. 128, above.

<sup>9</sup> See Mettetal, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

fortune<sup>1</sup> that were as sharp as the tribulations of his predecessor Photius and were due to the same cause as these. The similarity between the careers of these two distinguished incumbents of the Oecumenical Patriarchate is indeed striking.<sup>2</sup> Both patriarchs ventured to engage in ecclesiastical warfare with the Roman Church;<sup>3</sup> each of them was ultimately at the mercy of an autocratic temporal sovereign to whom he was doubly accountable as a subject who was at the same time also a public servant *ex officio muneris patriarchalis*; and each, in his dealings both with his Roman ecclesiastical adversaries and with his Constantinopolitan sovereign lord, was betrayed by an opposition within the ranks of his own Orthodox Christian community which played into his alien enemies' hands.

The revolutionary feature in Loukaris' policy was not, of course, his anti-Roman stand. In this he was faithfully interpreting the contemporary feelings of an overwhelming majority of his co-religionists under Ottoman rule, and even his opponents within his own flock must have secretly admired his boldness in defying Rome and have felt ashamed, in their heart of hearts, of the timidity or self-interest that deterred them from showing the same spirit. Nor had the Ottoman Government any quarrel with Loukaris on this account, for in Ottoman minds in this age the Roman Church was identified with the Hapsburg Power, which was the Ottoman Power's Western arch-enemy both on the Danubian and on the Mediterranean front.<sup>4</sup> The revolutionary policy that was Loukaris' unpardonable offence in the eyes of his Orthodox critics was his desire for an entente with the Western Protestant secessionists from the ranks of his and their Western Roman Catholic adversaries.<sup>5</sup> In these 'Zealot'

<sup>1</sup> Loukaris was banished in February 1623 (Pichler, *op. cit.*, p. 123) and reinstated in 1624 (p. 124); banished in October 1633 and quickly reinstated (p. 162); banished in March 1634 and reinstated in June 1634 (p. 162); banished in March 1635 and reinstated in July 1636 (pp. 162-3).

<sup>2</sup> Photius's career has been touched upon in IV. iv. 606-7.

<sup>3</sup> In this connexion it should be mentioned that Pichler, one of the authorities cited in this chapter, was a Roman Catholic.

<sup>4</sup> This traditional Ottoman hostility to Catholicism was a serious impediment to the Constantinopolitan Jesuits who ultimately got rid of Loukaris by persuading the Sultan to have him executed. The first Jesuit mission in Constantinople established itself in A.D. 1583-6 (Pichler, *op. cit.*, p. 116). In A.D. 1609 a second Jesuit mission was introduced under the auspices of the French (Pichler, *op. cit.*, p. 117), who were *personae gratae* to the 'Osmanlis as being Roman Catholics who were nevertheless enemies of the Hapsburgs. In A.D. 1628 the Jesuits were actually expelled by the Porte, at the instance of the English and Venetian Ambassadors (Pichler, *op. cit.*, p. 134; Rheniérus, *op. cit.*, p. 49), in the storm raised by the Ottoman authorities' seizure, at the Jesuits' instigation, of a Greek printing press that had been brought to Constantinople from England in June 1627 by Nikódimos Metaxás (see p. 164, n. 1, below). Nevertheless, the Jesuits contrived, not only to find their way back to Constantinople, but to have a hand in the taking of Loukaris' life (see von Hammer, J.: *Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman*, French translation, vol. ix (Paris 1837, Bellizard, Barthès, Dufour, et Lowell), p. 306).

A pro-Loukaran pamphlet, published in A.D. 1633 as an appendix to a polemical work against the Society of Jesus, and dealing with the Jesuits' intrigues against Loukaris at Constantinople in A.D. 1627 and 1628, is cited in Legrand, E.: *Bibliographie Hellénique, ou Description Raisonnée des Ouvrages publiés par des Grecs au Dix-Septième Siècle*, vol. iii (Paris 1895, Picard), No. 706, pp. 87-88.

<sup>5</sup> Both the place and the time of Loukaris' first attraction towards Western Protestant ideas are obscure. He was, of course, in political relations with Polish Protestants during his sojourn in Poland-Lithuania during the years A.D. 1596-1601 (see p. 152, above), but, as we have seen, in this episode of history a common opposition to Roman Catholicism did not avail to bring the Orthodox and Protestant Christian communities in Poland into communion with one another. Loukaris is alleged by some authorities to

Orthodox eyes the Protestants' merit of being anti-Roman was quite eclipsed by their crime of being still Western and therefore still, from an Orthodox standpoint, schismatic; and, in the intricate encounter between Loukaris, the Constantinopolitan Jesuits, the Orthodox Church in the Ottoman Empire, and the Ottoman Government, the Orthodox opposition and the Pādishāh were as blind as the Jesuits were clear-sighted.

The unscrupulousness of the representations through which the Jesuits cajoled the Sultan into putting Loukaris to death was all of a piece with their discernment in divining that, in seeking to redress the balance between Eastern Orthodoxy and Western Roman Catholicism by attracting Protestantism into the Orthodox scale, Loukaris had conjured up a threat to the Tridentine Roman Church which might become deadly if its author were to be allowed an opportunity of putting this revolutionary Orthodox strategy into effect.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, Sultan Murād IV, in allowing himself to be persuaded to order the execution of Loukaris in June 1638,<sup>2</sup> was less well advised than his imperial predecessor the East Roman Emperor Basil I had been when he had disposed of Photius by reinstating him, in A.D. 877, on his

have visited Wittenberg and Geneva (Pichler, op. cit., p. 62) and even France and England (Mettetal, op. cit., p. 23); and Pichler accepts the visits to Wittenberg and Geneva as authentic, and conjectures that Loukaris paid these two visits after his mission in Poland, though he finds no evidence that Loukaris ever travelled farther west than Geneva (op. cit., p. 65). Meyer, on the other hand, believes (op. cit., p. 685) that the alleged visits to Wittenberg and Geneva are also apocryphal, and that Loukaris never visited any of the Protestant centres in Western Christendom at any date—either after his mission in Poland-Lithuania or during his previous sojourn in Venice and Padua. He points out that there is no mention of any such visits in the original historical sources, and that the legend of a visit to Geneva, in particular, is refuted by the absence of any reference to it in a letter, recommending Leger to Loukaris, that was written to Loukaris by the Genevan theologians in A.D. 1628.

The earliest indubitably authentic record of Loukaris' inclination towards Protestantism is in a letter written by Loukaris himself, on the 6th September, 1618, to M. A. de Dominis, in which he writes of his having made a three years' study—presumably at Constantinople—of Protestant theological works (the relevant passage from this letter is quoted by Meyer, op. cit., p. 685, from Legrand, E.: *Bibliographie Hellénique, ou Description Raisonnée des Ouvrages Publiés par de Grecs au XVII<sup>e</sup> Siècle*, vol. iv (Paris 1896, Picard), pp. 333-40). Loukaris does not say which three years these were; but Meyer points out that on the 4th June, 1613, he was finding it necessary to defend himself publicly against a charge of Lutheranism.

<sup>1</sup> As Acting Oecumenical Patriarch, Loukaris paid two visits, one in A.D. 1613 and the second in A.D. 1616 (Pichler, op. cit., pp. 75 and 87) to Wallachia, an autonomous Orthodox Christian principality under Ottoman suzerainty whose population was under the Oecumenical Patriarchate's ecclesiastical jurisdiction. On his second visit he exhorted the people of the city and see of Tergovishte, and the prince of Wallachia, Radul, to resist Roman Catholic propaganda (Pichler, op. cit., pp. 88 and 90). After his installation on the Oecumenical Throne in A.D. 1620, Loukaris issued an encyclical forbidding his ecclesiastical subjects to have intercourse with Roman Catholics (Rheniérís, op. cit., p. 31). The Jesuits' retort to this was to put up a rival candidate for the Patriarchal Throne, and to bring about the first of Loukaris' successive banishments by persuading the Ottoman Government to relegate him to Rhodes on the insinuation that he had been intriguing with the Tuscan Government. Thereupon the Jesuits duly secured their own candidate's installation, but Loukaris then obtained his first reinstatement through the exertions of the English Ambassador, Sir Thomas Roe—after the anti-patriarch had been compelled to retire to Mount Athos, in spite of the French Ambassador's efforts to keep him in office (Rheniérís, op. cit., pp. 31-36). In A.D. 1625 Loukaris was approached by the Vatican with an offer of its protection if he would publicly accept the decisions of the Council of Florence and denounce Protestantism (Pichler, op. cit., p. 125; Rheniérís, op. cit., p. 38). Loukaris left this overture unanswered (Rheniérís, op. cit., p. 40).

<sup>2</sup> See Pichler, op. cit., p. 177; Rheniérís, op. cit., p. 65.



patriarchal throne on the understanding that the policy which the re-installed patriarch would carry out thereafter would be his master's and not his own. The Sultan had not the Orthodox Opposition's excuse for letting himself be led into playing the Jesuits' game, for there were no traditional religious animosities or scruples to deter a Sunni Muslim potentate from combating a Roman Catholic form of infidelity by unleashing against it a Calvinist form of infidelity whose doctrine and ethos had a marked affinity with those of Islam itself; and indeed in Hungary, for a hundred years and more, it had been an axiom of Ottoman policy to champion a liberated Protestant minority against their former Hapsburg Catholic oppressors.

Loukari's enemies contrived nevertheless to infuriate the Sultan with the Patriarch by suggesting to Murād that Loukari was politically responsible for the piratical enterprises of his ecclesiastical subjects, the Don Cossacks, against the Ottoman Empire.<sup>1</sup> In A.D. 1615 the Don Cossacks had made their first naval raid into the Bosphorus;<sup>2</sup> and in A.D. 1638, on the eve of Sultan Murād IV's departure from Constantinople on an Heraclian campaign to recover Asiatic Ottoman provinces that had been overrun by the Persians, the news arrived that the Don Cossacks had seized the strategically important Ottoman fortress of Azov by a *coup de main*.<sup>3</sup> Murād was struggling to retrieve the Ottoman Empire from the anarchy into which it had lapsed since the death of Suleymān the Magnificent,<sup>4</sup> and he was a man of demonic temperament. In his exasperation at this unexpected and untimely military diversion at a moment when it was imperative for him to concentrate all his strength against the Safawi Power, he yielded impulsively to an insidious suggestion that the Oecumenical Patriarch should be made the scapegoat for a Cossack escapade which was not only out of the Patriarch's control *de facto* but was also beyond the limits of his responsibility *de jure*.<sup>5</sup>

The action on Loukari's part that evoked the opposition to him among his own Orthodox co-religionists was his *rapprochement* with the Protestants with a view to a Protestant-Orthodox ecclesiastical union. Loukari proposed to base this union on the two parties' common

<sup>1</sup> For the Cossacks, see II. ii. 155-7. For the seventeenth-century eruption of the Don Cossacks into the Black Sea, see III. iii. 418 and 428.

<sup>2</sup> See Allen, W. E. D.: *The Ukraine, A History* (Cambridge 1940, University Press), p. 93.

<sup>3</sup> See Pichler, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

<sup>4</sup> See V. vi. 207-8.

<sup>5</sup> Sultan Murād would have become aware of Loukari's innocence if he had paused to take account of the difference between his respective jurisdictions and responsibilities as Oecumenical Patriarch and as millet-bāshy of the Ottoman Millet-i Rūm. As the *ex officio* political head of all Orthodox Christians under Ottoman rule, including those who were not within the Oecumenical Patriarchate's ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the Oecumenical Patriarch was in truth responsible to the Sultan for their loyalty to the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand the Oecumenical Patriarch could not reasonably be held accountable politically for the acts of Orthodox Christians who, like the Don Cossacks, were not Ottoman subjects, even though they might be under the Oecumenical Patriarch's ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Since the establishment of an autocephalous Patriarchate of Moscow in A.D. 1589 and the union of a majority of the Orthodox Christian subjects of the Kingdom of Poland-Lithuania with the Roman Church in A.D. 1594-6, the ecclesiastical jurisdiction which the Oecumenical Patriarch had previously exercised over the whole of Russian Orthodox Christendom had contracted almost to vanishing point. It was unlucky for Loukari that the remnant of his Russian flock happened to include Don Cossacks who made themselves obnoxious to Sultan Murād at a critical moment in Murād's as well as in Loukari's career.



acceptance of the Scriptures and the Fathers and to safeguard this existing basis by a mutual undertaking to make no innovations;<sup>1</sup> and in A.D. 1627 proposals to this effect—with the additional stipulation that either party should retain its own existing rites,<sup>2</sup> provided that these were not contrary to religion—are said to have been laid before the Calvinist doctors at Geneva by Mitrophánis Kritópoulos,<sup>3</sup> a disciple of Loukárís' who had been sent by Loukárís to England on an invitation from Abbott, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and had spent seven years (A.D. 1617–24) in the Protestant universities of Oxford and Helmstädt.<sup>4</sup> In A.D. 1629 a *Confessio* was published in Loukárís' name in Western Christendom;<sup>5</sup> and, after this had been denounced by Catholics as a forgery,<sup>6</sup> Loukárís is said to have made a public declaration that he was the author of it.<sup>7</sup> The cardinal points in Loukárís' *Confessio* were the Calvinist doctrines of justification by faith and the non-infallibility of the Church, with a consequent rejection of the Church's pretension to have the last word in the interpretation of the Scriptures.<sup>8</sup>

Meanwhile, the tide had already turned against Loukárís' policy of an Orthodox-Calvinist common front. The Genevan doctors—if the story that Mitrophánis Kritópoulos made proposals to them is true—had proved unwilling to commit themselves without having first obtained

<sup>1</sup> See Mettetal, op. cit., p. 45.

<sup>2</sup> This mutual toleration of diverse rites was presumably inspired by the statesmanlike provisions, on this point, of the Orthodox-Roman Catholic Union of Florence in A.D. 1439.

<sup>3</sup> See Mettetal, op. cit., pp. 76–77. The Roman Catholic authority, Pichler, op. cit., pp. 97–98, admits that Mitrophánis Kritópoulos visited Geneva in October 1627, but discounts, as apocryphal, the story that on this occasion he brought with him formal proposals for union. Kritópoulos certainly took sides against Loukárís at a later stage. He signed the acts of the Synod of Constantinople that condemned Loukárís in A.D. 1638 (Meyer, op. cit., p. 689).

<sup>4</sup> See Pichler, op. cit., pp. 92–94; Rheniérís, op. cit., p. 24.

<sup>5</sup> Particulars of two Latin editions, four French editions, and one English and Latin edition of Loukárís' *Confessio*, all published in Western Christendom in A.D. 1629, will be found in Legrand, E.: *Bibliothèque Hellénique, ou Description Raisonnée des Ouvrages Publiés par des Grecs au Dix-Septième Siècle*, vol. i (Paris 1894, Picard), pp. 267–72. According to Meyer, op. cit., p. 688, a German edition was also published in the same year.

<sup>6</sup> It is certain, nevertheless, that the *Confessio* is an authentic work of the Oecumenical Patriarch in whose name it was published. On p. 8 of one of the two Latin editions of A.D. 1629 (Legrand's No. 189) there appears, over the signature 'Cornelius Haga, Confoederatorum Belgie. Provinciarum pro tempore apud Portam Ottomanicam Imperatoris Orator', the declaration: 'Descripta fuit haec copia ex autographo, quod propria Reverendissimi Domini Patriarchae Cyrilli manu, quam optime cognosco, scriptum penes me manet, et, per me facta collatione, eum cum hoc ipso de verbo ad verbum convenire, attestor.' The Dutch Ambassador to the Porte might perhaps have written this in error or in bad faith. There is, however, a Greek edition of the *Confessio*, published at Geneva in A.D. 1633 by Jean de Tournes (No. 224 in Legrand, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 315–21), which was printed from a manuscript original in Loukárís' hand and bearing his signature. This original manuscript was afterwards preserved in the public library at Geneva, and a facsimile of the first sheet of it will be found in Legrand, op. cit., vol. cit., facing p. 318. In Legrand's judgement (*ibid.*, p. 318) the handwriting is identical with that of other manuscripts known to be from Loukárís' hand. There was an autograph signed copy of the Greek text at Geneva in the same bundle as the original, and another autograph signed copy at Leyden, in A.D. 1894, when this volume of Legrand's was published.

<sup>7</sup> See the Latin preface to the Geneva edition of the Greek text, quoted in Legrand, op. cit., vol. i, p. 316; Pichler, op. cit., pp. 150 and 153.

<sup>8</sup> See Pichler, op. cit., pp. 183–9; Mettetal, op. cit., p. 87. In general the *Confessio* was an exposition of Calvinism in traditional Orthodox Christian theological terms (Meyer, op. cit., p. 688).

the agreement of their co-religionists in Switzerland, Germany, Holland, and England,<sup>1</sup> while on the Orthodox side Yerásimos—Loukárís' successor on the patriarchal throne of Alexandria, which, of all Orthodox sees on Ottoman soil, was second only to the Oecumenical Patriarchate itself in dignity and influence—had immediately come out in public as the leader of a militant opposition.<sup>2</sup> Yerásimos was given his opportunity by an overture from the Dutch Ambassador at Constantinople, who in A.D. 1628 had brought from Geneva a Piedmontese Calvinist theologian, Anton Leger, to propagate Calvinism among the Ottoman Orthodox from a post of vantage as the Ambassador's chaplain.<sup>3</sup> This overture from the Calvinist side was rebuffed by Yerásimos in a public pronouncement on the 8th July, 1629.<sup>4</sup> The Patriarch of Alexandria rejected the plea for an Orthodox-Protestant common front against Roman Catholicism and denounced the translation of the Bible into the vernacular<sup>5</sup> on the ground that God's revelation was intentionally obscure and that it was more important to ensure that the faithful should remain Orthodox than that the Scriptures should be made intelligible.<sup>6</sup> 'The seamless robe of Christ . . . would be torn into a thousand pieces by the Occidentals.'<sup>7</sup> A castigation of 'the *Confessio* circulated in Cyril the Patriarch of Constantinople's name', by John Matthew Karyophyllis, the Orthodox Archbishop of Qōniyeh, was published at Rome in Latin in A.D. 1631 and in Greek, in two versions, in A.D. 1632, and this polemic was dedicated by its Orthodox author to Pope Urban VIII.<sup>8</sup>

This counter-attack on Loukárís within his own camp when he was alive and in occupation of the Oecumenical Throne was vigorously followed up after his final disgrace and death. On the 27th September, 1639, the dead Oecumenical Patriarch was anathematized<sup>9</sup> by a synod which had been convened at Constantinople by Cyril Kōndaris, the Orthodox Bishop of Bercea,<sup>10</sup> and which was attended by three Patriarchs, including Loukárís' disciple Mitrophánis Kritópoulos—now Patriarch of Alexandria.<sup>11</sup> This act was confirmed by a Graeco-Russian synod convened at Jassy, under the presidency of the Oecumenical Patriarch

<sup>1</sup> See Mettetal, op. cit., p. 77.

<sup>2</sup> For this opposition, see Meyer, op. cit., p. 688.

<sup>3</sup> See Meyer, op. cit., p. 688; Pichler, op. cit., p. 143; Rheniérís, op. cit., pp. 51–52. Leger stayed at Constantinople till A.D. 1636.

<sup>4</sup> See Meyer, op. cit., p. 689; Pichler, op. cit., p. 144; Mettetal, op. cit., p. 78.

<sup>5</sup> The Elzevir edition of the Greek text of the Gospels was translated from the Attic κοινή into the Modern Greek δημοτική on Loukárís' orders at Leger's instance (Rheniérís, op. cit., p. 53), though it did not reach Constantinople from Geneva, where it had been published in A.D. 1638, till after Loukárís' death (Meyer, op. cit., p. 688). This was perhaps the first shot fired in a Modern Greek cultural civil war on the issue raised by Linguistic Archaism (see V. vi. 68–71).

<sup>6</sup> See Pichler, op. cit., pp. 145–6. It is significant that similar sentiments had once been expressed by Loukárís. In a letter of the 30th May, 1612, to a Dutch correspondent, J. Uytenbogaert (Wtenbogaert), he had declared that the ruin of Greek education by the Turks had brought with it one benefit, at any rate: it had safeguarded the Greeks against heresy (Pichler, op. cit., p. 72).

<sup>7</sup> Quoted in Mettetal, op. cit., p. 79.

<sup>8</sup> See Legrand, op. cit., vol. i, No. 209 (pp. 288–9) and Nos. 216–17 (pp. 304–6).

<sup>9</sup> See Pichler, op. cit., pp. 217 and 226; Mettetal, op. cit., p. 102. Meyer, op. cit., p. 689, gives the date of the Synod's findings as A.D. 1638.

<sup>10</sup> See Rheniérís, op. cit., p. 59; Pichler, op. cit., p. 215. Kōndaris was an alumnus of the Jesuit College founded at Galata in A.D. 1601 (Rheniérís, op. cit., p. 19).

<sup>11</sup> See Pichler, op. cit., p. 216; Meyer, op. cit., p. 689.

Parthenios's legates, in A.D. 1642,<sup>1</sup> and thereafter by a synod convened at Jerusalem in A.D. 1672<sup>2</sup> which was bitterly anti-Calvinist in its pronouncements<sup>3</sup> but was not widely representative of Orthodoxy in its membership, since, apart from two Russian monks, it was not attended by any fathers not belonging to the hierarchy of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem itself.<sup>4</sup> The final blow was struck at a synod held in Constantinople in A.D. 1691.<sup>5</sup>

If Loukariis had succeeded in persuading his Orthodox flock and his Calvinist friends to enter into an ecclesiastical union with one another under the presidency of the Oecumenical Patriarchate, he would have anticipated, by nearly three hundred years, Stalin's feat of appropriating a Western heresy to serve as a new weapon against the prevailing Western orthodoxy of the day. And who can say what the consequences might have been if, instead of putting Loukariis to death, Sultan Murād had had the wit to follow up a traditionally philo-Protestant Ottoman policy by taking a philo-Protestant Oecumenical Patriarch under his imperial patronage? In its predestinarianism and in its rejection of 'priestcraft' and 'image-worship'—two traditional Christian institutions that were Orthodox as well as Catholic—Calvinism had a decidedly greater affinity with Islam than with Orthodox Christianity;<sup>6</sup> and, if the Orthodox Church in the Ottoman Empire had gone Calvinist in doctrine and ethos as a sequel to a *mariage de convenance* with the Calvinist churches of Western Europe, the intellectual and moral gulf between the Orthodox Christian and the Muslim subjects of the Pādishāh would have been appreciably diminished—instead of being accentuated, as it actually was, when, in the next chapter of the story, the Orthodox Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire succumbed to the attraction of the Modern Western culture in its latter-day secular form. If Cyril Loukariis had had

<sup>1</sup> See Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 689; Rheniérís, *op. cit.*, p. 73. The Greek text of the decree of this synod, condemning the *Confessio*, was published at Jassy on the 20th December, 1642 (Old Style) (Legrand, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, No. 708, p. 89), and was republished, together with a Latin translation, in A.D. 1643, by Sébastien Cramoisy, Printer to the King of France (Legrand, *op. cit.*, vol. i, No. 337, pp. 450-1). The *Confessio* itself, together with the texts of both the Bishop of Bercea's and the Oecumenical Patriarch's synodal strictures, all in both Greek and Latin, was published in A.D. 1645 (Legrand, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, No. 372, p. 14).

The Synod of Jassy is erroneously dated, not A.D. 1642, but A.D. 1644, by N. Jorga: *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, vol. iv (Gotha 1911, Perthes), p. 30. Mettetal, *op. cit.*, pp. 103-4, records a synod held at Constantinople in A.D. 1643 at the instance of Basil Prince of Moldavia and attended by the Metropolitan of Kiev. As this Synod of Constantinople is not mentioned by any of the other authorities, it is possible that it is an erroneous description of the synod actually held in A.D. 1642 at Jassy—unless the participants in the proceedings at Jassy subsequently adjourned to Constantinople.

<sup>2</sup> For this synod of Jerusalem see Pichler, *op. cit.*, pp. 230-5; Mettetal, *op. cit.*, p. 106; Rheniérís, *op. cit.*, p. 75. Anti-Western though it was, it was nevertheless a by-product of a Western religious controversy. In a dispute about Loukariis between the French Huguenots and Port Royal, the Huguenots had boasted that the Orthodox Church was Calvinist, and the French Ambassador at Constantinople, de Nointel, had asked the Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem, Dositheos, for an explanation. The synod of Jerusalem implied, in its findings, that Loukariis was not the author of the *Confessio* attributed to him (Pichler, *op. cit.*, p. 230). A pair of polemics against Calvinism by Meletios Syngchos, one of the two patriarchal legates at Jassy in A.D. 1642, and by Dositheos, were published at Bucarest in A.D. 1690 (Legrand, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, No. 632, pp. 458-473).

<sup>3</sup> See Pichler, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

<sup>4</sup> On this point see Arnold, T. W.: *The Preaching of Islam*, 2nd ed. (London 1913, Constable), p. 163.

<sup>5</sup> See Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 689.

his way, it is conceivable that the trial of strength between the Ottoman Power and the Danubian Hapsburg Power in A.D. 1682-3 might have ended in the discomfiture of Roman Catholicism by the united forces of an Islam and an Orthodoxy that had made contact with one another across a Calvinist bridge.

This possible outcome of Loukakis' policy was ruled out by the combined effects of Jesuit ability, Ottoman blindness, and Orthodox fanaticism. By what lengths Loukakis actually fell short of winning over a majority of his Orthodox co-religionists to his Calvinizing policy it is difficult to judge,<sup>1</sup> but it is significant that the 'Zealot' spirit which defeated a Loukakis in the early decades of the seventeenth century was still strong enough in the middle decades of the eighteenth century to baffle a Voulgcharis.

### *The Frustration of Evyénios Voulgcharis*

Evyénios Voulgcharis<sup>2</sup> (*vivebat* A.D. 1716-1806) was a Greek philosopher-educationalist whose impeccable Orthodoxy<sup>3</sup> did not atone, in contemporary ecclesiastical Greek Orthodox eyes, for his offences of advocating religious toleration and educational reform and cultivating contemporary Western philosophy. On these accounts, Voulgcharis was driven from pillar to post. The hostility of the conservative headmaster of a rival school at Yánnina forced him to relinquish his own school there and retreat to Kózhani. An opportunity that had been opened to him by the foundation of a new academy on Mount Athos was closed, after he had taught there for six years, by the dissolution of the academy at the instance of the ex-Oecumenical Patriarch Cyril, who, unfortunately for Voulgcharis, was then living in retirement on the Holy Mountain; and, after he had had the further disappointment of being forced out of a post to which he had been appointed at the Patriarchal Academy in Constantinople, Voulgcharis accepted, in A.D. 1775, an invitation from a Petrine

<sup>1</sup> Evidence suggesting that Loukakis' following among his own flock was not inconsiderable is presented by Sir Thomas Arnold in *op. cit.*, pp. 163-4. He points out that Loukakis' *Confessio* was adopted by a synod of his Orthodox supporters (*cp. Pichler, op. cit.*, pp. 181 and 228); argues that the very vigour of the opposition, and vehemence of their denunciations, testify to a fear on their part that Loukakis' party might win the day; and discounts, as tendentious, the picture of Loukakis, drawn by his Orthodox opponents, as an isolated figure playing a lone hand (for this picture, see Pichler, *op. cit.*, pp. 211 and 227, and Mettetal, *op. cit.*, p. 101). On the other hand, Mettetal (*op. cit.*, p. 91) estimates that the *Confessio* was received by the Greeks with apathy, and Loukakis himself once wrote, in a letter to David le Leu de Wilhem, a Dutch statesman with whom he was in correspondence in the years A.D. 1618-20: 'Io se puotesse riformare la mia chiesa, lo farei molto volentieri, ma Iddio sa che tractatur de impossibili' (Legrand, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 326, Doc. 109).

<sup>2</sup> For Voulgcharis' career, see Thereianós, D.: *Adhamándios Korais* (Trieste 1889-1890, Austrian Lloyd Press, 3 vols.), vol. i, p. 64, and Finlay, G.: *A History of Greece, B.C. 146 to A.D. 1864* (Oxford 1877, Clarendon Press, 7 vols.), vol. v, pp. 284-5.

<sup>3</sup> Voulgcharis gave evidence of his Orthodox piety in publishing for one of the Phanariot Princes of the House of Ghika, Gregory II (*in Moldaviá fungebatur* A.D. 1764-6 *et* A.D. 1774-7; *in Wallachiá* A.D. 1768-74), an edition of the *Eúpeúvra* of Vryénios—a Byzantine work vindicating the authenticity of miracles—and in eschewing, out of a religious scruple, the new-fangled use of the word 'Ελλην in the sense of an adherent of the living Orthodox Christian Modern Greek nationality in lieu of its traditional usage in the sense of an adherent of the dead pagan Hellenic Civilization (Thereianós, D.: *Adhamándios Korais* (Trieste 1889-90, Austrian Lloyd Press, 3 vols.), vol. i, pp. 73-75 and 66).

Russian Imperial Government which appreciated his qualifications and turned them to good account by making him bishop of the new See of Slavonia and Kherson in territory recently acquired by Russia from the Ottoman Empire in the northern hinterland of the Black Sea.

Voûlgharis' Zealot Greek Orthodox ecclesiastical persecutors were not even content with having thus hounded him out of the domain of Greek Orthodox Christendom. In A.D. 1798 the Greek press at Constantinople published a counterblast, by the Patriarch of Jerusalem, Anthimos, to a tract written by Voûlgharis in favour of religious toleration, and this eighteenth-century fulmination still breathed the authentic spirit of fifteenth-century Orthodox fanaticism. The Patriarch told his readers that

'when the last emperors of Constantinople began to subject the Oriental Church to Papal thralldom, the particular favour of Heaven raised up the Othoman Empire to protect the Greeks against heresy, to be a barrier against the political power of the Western nations, and to be the champion of the Orthodox Church.'<sup>1</sup>

*The Revolution in the Ottoman Orthodox Christians' Attitude towards the West*

This classic exposition of a traditional 'Zealot' thesis was, however, no more than a parting shot in a losing cultural battle which had taken its decisive turn more than a hundred years before the close of the eighteenth century.<sup>2</sup> In the cultural tug-of-war, for the captivation of Greek, Serb, and Rumanian Orthodox Christian souls, between the Ottoman masters of these *ra'iyyeh* and their Western neighbours, the West had won before the seventeenth century was over. The date of this transfer of the Orthodox Christian *ra'iyyeh*'s cultural allegiance can be established, within rather narrow limits, by the at first sight superficial, yet nevertheless psychologically significant, index of changes in fashions of dress, and this sartorial testimony is corroborated by evidence in the religious field. At the same date, conversions of Orthodox Christian *ra'iyyeh* to Islam virtually ceased, and unconverted Orthodox Christian *ra'iyyeh* for the first time showed a preference for Hapsburg over Ottoman rule.

In the seventh decade of the seventeenth century, Ottomanization was still the goal of the *ra'iyyeh*'s social ambition, as was observed by the

<sup>1</sup> Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. cit., loc. cit.

<sup>2</sup> The waning power of the Greek Orthodox ecclesiastical hierarchy, which had still just availed to frustrate Voûlgharis, proved impotent against his intellectual successor Korais, though the life-times of these two Greek apostles of the Western culture overlapped. Korais, too, in his day, had to defend himself against charges of impiety according to a letter published in Korais, Adhamándios: *Ἀπάνθισμα Ἐπιστολῶν* (Athens 1839, Rhállis), p. 216; and, from the clerical standpoint, these charges could perhaps be substantiated on the testimony of Korais' own written words. 'Rebuild your schools not only before your country houses but before your churches', he wrote to the Chioti on the morrow of the catastrophe of A.D. 1822 (letter of the 12th October, 1822, in *Ἀπάνθισμα*, pp. 45-47). 'Monastic estates (*μετόχια*) are an incentive to idleness and ought to be abolished' (the same letter, in *Ἀπάνθισμα*, p. 49). In a letter of the 4th July, 1823, on the constitution of the new Greek national state, Korais prescribes that the ecclesiastical authorities ought to be elected by the laity and to be debarred from participation in politics (*Ἀπάνθισμα*, p. 257)—a French Revolutionary theory that was utterly subversive of the established Ottoman institution of the *Millet-i-Rûm*. Voûlgharis had been censured and thwarted for offences that bore no comparison with these enormities.



shrewd secretary of the English Embassy at Constantinople, Sir Paul Rycaut:

'It is worth a wise man's observation how gladly the Greeks and Armenian Christians imitate the Turkish habit, and come as near to it as they dare; and how proud they are when they are privileged upon some extraordinary occasion to appear without their Christian distinction.'<sup>1</sup>

On the other hand, Demetrius Cantemir, the Ruman grandee who was appointed Prince of Moldavia by the Porte in November 1710<sup>2</sup> and deserted to Peter the Great when the Tsar invaded Moldavia in 1711,<sup>3</sup> is represented in a contemporary portrait wearing a bag wig, coat and waistcoat, and rapier; and, though in this portrait Cantemir's Ottoman antecedents are still betrayed by a turban superimposed on his wig and by a dagger thrust into his girdle to supplement the rapier at his hip,<sup>4</sup> these relics of Ottomanism no longer figure in the frontispiece to an English translation, published in 1734-5, of Cantemir's history of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>5</sup> Nor were there any tell-tale Ottoman accessories in the portraits, painted at Pest or Vienna somewhat later in the eighteenth century, to judge by the cut of the coats and the style of the wigs, which, on the 5th-6th September, 1921, the writer of this Study saw still hanging on the panelled walls of houses in the South-West Macedonian Greek townlet of Shátishta to commemorate the overland trade with the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy and Saxony that was opened up in the eighteenth century by more than one enterprising Rumeliot Greek Orthodox Christian community.<sup>6</sup>

These changes in style of dress were, of course, outward visible signs of corresponding changes in cast of mind. Demetrius Cantemir, for example, could read and write Latin, Italian, and French, as well as his Rumanian mother tongue, the Modern and Attic Greek and the Old Slavonic that were his Orthodox Christian cultural heritage, and the Turkish, Persian, and Arabic that were his cultural stock in trade as an Ottoman officer of state; and, after his desertion to the Russian camp, he added the Russian language to his repertory.<sup>7</sup> His history of the Ottoman Empire, written in Latin and published in French and English simultaneously, was perhaps the first to be presented by an Ottoman subject in the Western manner. The Rumanian Cantemir's older Greek contemporary Alexander Mavrogordáto,<sup>8</sup> who was appointed in A.D.

<sup>1</sup> Rycaut, Sir P.: *The Present State of the Ottoman Empire* (London 1668, Starkey and Brome), p. 82. The sixteenth-century Greek Orthodox Christian residents in the centres of business in Western Christendom 'wore the dress and assumed the manners of Turks; for they found that in Western Europe they were more respected in the character of Ottoman subjects than as schismatic Greeks' (Finlay, G.: *A History of Greece, B.C. 146-A.D. 1864*, vol. v (Oxford 1877, Clarendon Press), pp. 156-7).

<sup>2</sup> See Jorga, N.: *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, vol. iv (Gotha 1911, Perthes), p. 304.

<sup>3</sup> See II. ii. 225, n. 1.

<sup>4</sup> See Jorga, op. cit., vol. cit., pp. 363-4.

<sup>5</sup> Cantemir, Demetrius: *The History of the Growth and Decay of the Ottoman Empire*, written originally in Latin, translated into English from the author's own manuscript—'communicated to the translator by his son, Prince Antiochus Cantemir, Minister Plenipotentiary from the Czarina to his present Majesty King George'—by N. Tindal, M.A., Vicar of Great Waltham in Essex (London 1734-5, Knapton, 2 parts).

<sup>6</sup> For this overland trade, see pp. 180-2, below.

<sup>7</sup> See Jorga, op. cit., vol. cit., loc. cit.; Tindal's translation of Cantemir, op. cit., part ii, p. 460.

<sup>8</sup> See Finlay, op. cit., vol. v, p. 242; Jorga, op. cit., vol. iv, p. 283.



1673 to be the second incumbent of the recently created office of Dragoman of the Porte<sup>1</sup> and who eventually extricated the Ottoman Empire from the disastrous war of A.D. 1682-99 by negotiating the peace settlement of Carlowitz, likewise knew Latin, Italian, and French as well as Greek, 'Slav',<sup>2</sup> Turkish, Persian, and Arabic, and likewise won the freedom of a Modern Western republic of letters.<sup>3</sup>

The Phanariot Greek Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman public service<sup>4</sup> continued to study the classical languages and literatures of the Islamic culture down to the eve of the Greek national uprising of A.D. 1821, and this not merely on account of their utility, but for the sake of their prestige and their intrinsic attractiveness.

'The Phanariots were attentive to education and applied themselves to literary studies, especially the Turkish language, as being superior to others.'

writes one of the fathers of the Greek Revolution in his memoirs.<sup>5</sup> But the qualification which gave the seventeenth-century and eighteenth-century Phanariots their value in the eyes of their Turkish employers was their familiarity, not with Ottoman, but with Western life and letters in an age in which the Ottoman Government had to find competent representatives to negotiate diplomatically with Western Powers whom it could no longer simply defeat in the field<sup>6</sup>—in striking contrast to the Sultans' attitude in the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries of the Christian Era, when they had conscripted an *élite* of their Orthodox Christian subjects into their Slave-Household in order to fit them, by a totalitarian Ottoman education, to govern the Ottoman Empire as professional administrators and to extend its bounds as professional soldiers.<sup>7</sup>

The generation which saw the Ottoman Government begin to appreciate in their Orthodox Christian subjects a familiarity with the Modern West, which these *ra'īyeh* would not have acquired if they had been transformed into *qullar*, was likewise the generation which saw the virtual end of a process of voluntary conversion of Orthodox Christian *ra'īyeh* to Islam that had been in progress since the fourteenth century and had been one of the secrets of the 'Osmanlis' amazing political success. Even the Orthodox Christian 'tribute children' who were educated to be the rulers of the Ottoman Empire became Muslims—as they invariably did—by choice and not by compulsion;<sup>8</sup> and in general the Ottoman régime in the Orthodox Christian World was as scrupulous as the Umayyad régime had been in the Syriac World in

<sup>1</sup> This office had been created by the Grand Vizier Ahmed Köprülü in A.D. 1669.

<sup>2</sup> This vague term 'Slav' might mean either the ninth-century Macedonian Slav dialect which had become the liturgical language of the Slavonic-speaking and Rumanian-speaking Orthodox Christian peoples under the name of 'Old Slavonic', or it might mean one of the living vernacular Slav languages, e.g. Serbo-Croat.

<sup>3</sup> Mavrogordato's contribution to Western literature was a treatise on the seventeenth-century Western scientific discovery of the circulation of the blood (see p. 137, n. 8, below).

<sup>4</sup> See II, ii. 222-8.

<sup>5</sup> Khrysanthópoulos, Ph.: *Ἀπομνημονεύματα περὶ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς Ἐπανάστασεως* (Athens 1899, Sakellarios, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. 37.

<sup>6</sup> On this point, see II, ii. 224.

<sup>7</sup> The classical Ottoman system of education has been described in III, iii. 22-50.

<sup>8</sup> See III, iii. 37, n. 1.

abiding by the Prophet Muhammad's injunction that non-Muslim 'People of the Book' were to be allowed to practise their ancestral religions under Muslim rule in consideration of the payment of a surtax.<sup>1</sup> After the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries a Western Christian who had spent twenty-two years in captivity in Ottoman hands testified that the 'Osmanlis' 'compelled no one to renounce his faith';<sup>2</sup> and, in the judgement of a judicious Modern Western student of the history of the Greeks under Ottoman rule,

'we find that many Greeks of high talent and moral character were so sensible of the superiority of the Mohammadans that, even when they escaped being drafted into the Sultan's household as tribute-children, they voluntarily embraced the faith of Mahomet. The moral superiority of Ottoman society must be allowed to have had as much weight in causing these conversions, which were numerous in the fifteenth century, as the personal ambition of individuals.'<sup>3</sup>

'Towards the middle of the seventeenth century . . . the number of [Greek] renegades from among the middle and lower orders of society is said to have been more considerable than at any other time.'<sup>4</sup> In Crete, the last Greek Orthodox Christian country to be acquired by the 'Osmanlis, the conquest achieved in the long-drawn-out Veneto-Ottoman War of Candia (*gerebatur* A.D. 1645-69) was followed by conversions<sup>5</sup> which, in both their spontaneity and their numbers, were as impressive as any recorded in the heyday of the Ottoman Power; and the Greeks were not alone among the Orthodox Christian *ra'iyyeh* in continuing to be susceptible to the attractions of Islam down to this date. A community of Bulgar Orthodox Christian highlanders in the Rhodope, who came to be known, after their apostasy, as Pomaks, were converted to Islam between A.D. 1656 and A.D. 1661; and among the Albanians the proportion of Muslims in the population seems to have risen from not more than 10 per cent. to more than 50 per cent. between A.D. 1610 and the close of the seventeenth century.<sup>6</sup>

While the descendants of these seventeenth-century Albanian converts betrayed mental reservations by adopting Islam in the crypto-Shi'i form of Bektashism,<sup>7</sup> the descendants of the contemporary Pomak and

<sup>1</sup> See the evidence presented in V. vi. 203-5. It is also noteworthy that, after the seizure, on the 4th January, 1628, by the Janissaries, at the Jesuits' instigation, of a printing-press which had been brought to Constantinople from England in A.D. 1627 by Nikódimos Metaxás, the Sheykh-el-Islám gave the opinion that Christian subjects of the Porte had a right to publish controversial religious literature. It must be added that this ruling did not secure the restitution of the press, though it did secure the temporary banishment of the Jesuits. (For this incident, see Pichler, *op. cit.*, pp. 127-34; Rheniérís, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-8). During the remainder of the seventeenth century the only *ra'iyyeh* permitted to have a printing press at Constantinople were the Jews. As late as A.D. 1698 the Armenians were stopped from using a press which they had imported from Venice. The first press for printing Turkish (of course, in the Arabic Alphabet) was established in Constantinople in A.D. 1727 by the Grand Vizier Ibráhím, who was a Hungarian renegade (Pichler, *op. cit.*, pp. 137-8).

<sup>2</sup> Auctor Anonymus: *Turchicae Spureitiae Suggillatio et Confutatio* (Paris 1514, Badius), fol. xvii (a) in the edition of 1516, quoted in Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

<sup>3</sup> Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 29.

<sup>4</sup> Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 165, citing Scheffler, J.: *Türcken-Schriß: von der Ursachen der Türkischen Ueberziehung und der Zertretung des Volckes Gottes* (1664), §§ 53-6, and Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. 118-19.

<sup>5</sup> For details, see Arnold, *op. cit.*, pp. 153 and 201-5.

<sup>6</sup> See Arnold, *op. cit.*, pp. 177-92, especially p. 180.

<sup>7</sup> See V. v. 295.

Cretan converts displayed the zeal for which their kind are notorious, and survived to give proof of their sincerity in the twentieth century of the Christian Era by choosing to lose their ancestral homes and settle among their Turkish-speaking co-religionists in Anatolia rather than avoid exile by re-embracing the faith of their forefathers whose mother tongue they had never ceased to speak. The seventeenth-century mass conversions of Albanians and Rhodopæan Bulgars, however, unlike those of contemporary Cretans, occurred in new circumstances which portended a change. They appear to have been to a large extent the psychological reaction to a disillusionment experienced by Christian barbarians in fastnesses who had found their 'Osmanli masters still too strong for them when they had prematurely attempted to shake off the Ottoman yoke by force during the temporary lapse of the Ottoman Empire between the death of Süleymân the Magnificent in A.D. 1566 and the advent of the saviour Mehmed Köprülü to power in A.D. 1656.<sup>1</sup> Thereafter, conversions virtually ceased.

'In the eighteenth century, when the condition of the Christians was worse than at any other period, we find hardly any mention of conversions at all, and the Turks themselves are represented as utterly indifferent to the progress of their religion and considerably infected with scepticism and unbelief.'<sup>2</sup>

#### *The Revolution in the West's Attitude towards Orthodox Christianity*

The sufferings of the Orthodox Christian subjects of the Ottoman Porte in the eighteenth century of the Christian Era were due, not to religious persecution—as is witnessed by the fact that in this age the Porte's Muslim subjects suffered equally—but to the misgovernment of the Ottoman Empire during its final lapse towards dissolution after the rally that had been led by the House of Köprülü.<sup>3</sup> By contrast, the religious scepticism and unbelief that infected Western Christendom in the same generation was accompanied by an advance in administrative efficiency and a dawn of political enlightenment. The consequent new Western outlook revealed itself in a sudden conversion of the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy from a Spanish-minded Roman Catholic intolerance towards its Protestant subjects and its Orthodox Christian neighbours to a standard of religious toleration that could compare not unfavourably with the Islamic standard of a contemporary Ottoman régime; and this moral revolution in Hapsburg counsels evoked a political revolution in Protestant and Orthodox hearts.

'The Calvinists of Hungary and Transylvania and the Unitarians of the latter country' had 'long preferred to submit to the Turks rather than fall into the hands of the fanatical House of Hapsburg, and,' as late as the

<sup>1</sup> The insurgent Rhodopæan Bulgars were subjugated and converted by the Grand Vizier Mehmed Köprülü (*fungebatur* A.D. 1656-61). Apostasies of Roman Catholic (not Orthodox) Albanians on the rebound from two unsuccessful insurrections in the fourth and fifth decades of the seventeenth century are noticed in Arnold, *op. cit.*, pp. 188-9. While some of these Catholic apostates opted for Islam, others opted for Orthodoxy. The Orthodox Christian Albanian warriors who seized the fastness of Suli in the last quarter of the seventeenth century succeeded in holding their own till they were overpowered by 'Ali Pasha of Yánnina in A.D. 1803.

<sup>2</sup> Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

<sup>3</sup> See V. vi. 208-9 and 299-300.

seventh decade of the seventeenth century, 'the Protestants of Silesia' looked with longing eyes towards Turkey, and would gladly have purchased religious freedom at the price of submission to the Muslim rule.<sup>12</sup>

The Silesian Protestants' pro-Ottoman proclivities evoked the following lament from a Western observer in a book published in A.D. 1664:

'I hear with great astonishment and consternation that it is not only among the common people that remarks like these go the round: "Life under the Turks is not so bad either; one has only to give a ducat per head, and one would be free"; item, "The Turk leaves religion free; one would recover possession of the churches"; and the like. I also hear that others, who ought to have known better, take pleasure in such talk and rejoice at the thought of their own undoing (*über ihr eigen Unglück frolocken*).'<sup>13</sup>

The extent of the Danubian Hapsburg Government's change of policy, if not of heart, within the next twenty-five years is revealed in their dealings with the Serbs<sup>14</sup> when, in the first rebound from the failure of Ottoman arms to take Vienna in the siege of A.D. 1682-3, Hapsburg armies broke into the domain of an Ottoman Orthodox Christendom and, momentarily penetrating as far south-eastward as Old Serbia, succeeded in A.D. 1689 in occupying Peć, the seat of an autocephalous Serb Patriarchate that had been re-established in A.D. 1557 by the Porte at the instance of a Serb-born Grand Vizier, Mehmed Sököllü.<sup>15</sup>

The first reaction of the Ottoman Pādīshāh's Orthodox Christian subjects to the advent of these new schismatic Western Christian Crusaders was apprehensive and hostile.

'The most striking feature of the appeals to Russia from the Balkan Orthodox is that they were directed quite as much against Catholic Austria as against Muslim Turkey—which did not seek proselytes. The [orthodox] Metropolitan of Skoplje [Ūsküb], who made his way to Moscow in A.D. 1687, inveighed against the dangers of Austrian domination and the ill-treatment of refugee Serbian bishops in Hungary. He was followed next year by Isaiah, Archimandrite of St. Paul's Monastery on Athos, imploring Russia to save the Orthodox from Latin as well as Muslim conquerors, and bringing appeals for help not only from Constantinople and Sherban Cantacuzene, hospodar of Wallachia, but as well from Arsenius [Arsenije III] Krnojević, the Serbian Patriarch of Peć [Ipek].'<sup>16</sup>

Thereafter, however, a touch of adversity brought home to Franks and Serbs alike the expediency of making common cause. When the tide of war turned again in the 'Osmanlis' favour, as it quickly did, the reign-

<sup>12</sup> Silesia had come under Hapsburg rule in A.D. 1526, together with the rest of the Bohemian crown lands (see II. ii. 179). It remained under Hapsburg rule till all but a fragment of it was conquered by Frederick the Great in the War of the Austrian Succession (*gerebatur* A.D. 1740-8).—A.J.T.

<sup>13</sup> Arnold, *op. cit.*, pp. 155-6.

<sup>14</sup> Scheffler, *op. cit.*, § 48, quoted in Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 156, n. 1.

<sup>15</sup> The following account is based on Hadrovics, L.: *L'Eglise Serbe sous la Domination Turque* (Paris 1947, Presses Universitaires de France), pp. 135-46.

<sup>16</sup> See III. iii. 40, n. 1, and IV. iv. 622, n. 6.

<sup>17</sup> Sumner, B. H.: *Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire* (Oxford 1949, Blackwell), p. 34.

ing Patriarch Arsenije III committed himself to the Hapsburg cause by encouraging the Serb and Albanian Orthodox Christians under his ecclesiastical jurisdiction to enlist under the Hapsburg flag; and on the 6th April, 1690, on the advice of Thomas Raspassani—a Franciscan friar who was vicar of the vacant Roman Catholic episcopal see of Scupi (Skoplje, Üsküb)—the Emperor Leopold published a proclamation to all Christian peoples formerly subject to the Hungarian Crown, and to all other Christian peoples now under Ottoman rule, declaring his intention to liberate them, inviting them to take up arms in his cause, and promising them, after liberation, entire religious liberty and a juridical status in accordance with their desires, including the rights of freely electing a prince of their own and of paying no other taxes than those that had been in force before the Ottoman conquest.<sup>1</sup> This proclamation was accompanied by a personal letter of the same date from the Emperor to the Serb Patriarch.

Later in the same year, when, under continuing Ottoman pressure, the Hapsburg armies were compelled to fall back on the Danube, the Patriarch Arsenije evacuated the abandoned territory with them at the head of some seventy thousand or more Serb Orthodox Christian refugees,<sup>2</sup> and a meeting of Serb prelates and lay notables, held at Belgrade, offered their political allegiance to the Hapsburg Crown on condition that in Serb-inhabited territories enumerated by them—some of which were at that moment in Hapsburg, and others in Ottoman, hands—the Hapsburg Government should guarantee to the Serb community the enjoyment of a communal autonomy under the presidency of an archbishop of Serb descent and mother-tongue and of the Greek Orthodox Christian rite who was to be elected by a mixed ecclesiastical and lay assembly. This offer of Serb allegiance, on the basis of these Serb stipulations, was accepted by the Emperor Leopold in a diploma of the 21st August, 1690, followed up by letters patent of the 20th August, 1691, and a confirmatory diploma of the 4th March, 1695.

In this political bargain between the Hapsburg Monarchy and the Serb refugees in territory under Hapsburg rule, what the Serbs were demanding and the Monarchy was granting in substance was that an Orthodox Christian people under the dominion, and in the territory, of a Western Power should continue to enjoy a non-territorial communal autonomy on the temporal as well as the ecclesiastical plane which it had previously enjoyed as a *millet* of the Ottoman Empire,<sup>3</sup> but which was at variance with the Modern Western political principle of territorial

<sup>1</sup> This indiscriminating appeal by a representative of one Christian denomination to representatives of all Christian denominations was a new departure in Western history, and it is significant that the cue thus given in A.D. 1690 by a Catholic Hapsburg Emperor was followed by an Orthodox Romanov Emperor in A.D. 1711. In the proclamation to the Ottoman Christians which Peter the Great issued in March 1711, on the eve of his invasion of Moldavia (see p. 127, n. 3, above), the Tsar, like his Caesarean Majesty, 'came forward avowedly as the liberator of the Christians, Catholic as well as Orthodox' (Sumner, *op. cit.*, p. 46). A professedly 'enlightened' Russia that had entered the field as Austria's competitor in a race for the acquisition of the Ottoman Empire's heritage in South-East Europe was under double pressure not to fall below a Hapsburg standard of religious toleration.

<sup>2</sup> Hadrovics estimates the number at 70,000-100,000 in *op. cit.*, p. 140, n. 1.

<sup>3</sup> For this Ottoman institution, see pp. 184-6, below.



sovereignty. In virtue of thus bringing themselves, in despite of their own traditions, to be as liberal as their Ottoman adversaries had been towards an Orthodox Christian people for whose allegiance they were now competing, the Hapsburgs succeeded in winning the refugee Serbs' loyalty;<sup>1</sup> and, in the sequel, these Serb Orthodox Christian subjects of the Hapsburg Monarchy living in Hungary and in the *Militärgrenzen*<sup>2</sup> under their traditional Ottoman communal constitution became the psychologically conductive medium through which the Modern Western culture penetrated the Serb people as a whole.

*Channels of Western Cultural Penetration into an Ottoman Orthodox Christendom*

What were the geographical channels through which this Modern Western cultural influence seeped into the main body of Orthodox Christendom?

The oldest channel was the fraction of Orthodox Christian territory remaining under Venetian rule in the Levant, which played the same part in the relations between the main body of Orthodox Christendom and the Modern West as was played in the relations between a Russian Orthodox Christendom and the Modern West by the Russian Orthodox Christian territories under the sovereignty of Poland-Lithuania.<sup>3</sup> Crete, for example, by the date of the fall of Candia in A.D. 1669, had been under Venetian rule for more than 450 years<sup>4</sup>—a length of tenure which, in the records of Modern Western colonial empires down to the year A.D. 1952, had been surpassed only by Portugal, and this only in her possessions in and off the west coast of Africa.<sup>5</sup> During the Early Modern chapter that was the last chapter in the history of Venetian rule in Crete, the strength of the Modern Western cultural influence on the local Greek Orthodox Christian population was revealed by their production of a literature in the contemporary Western vein in a Modern Greek linguistic dress; and it is significant that not only the Italianate Modern Greek painter *Dhominikos Theotokópoulos*, *alias* 'El Greco' (*vivebat* A.D. 1541–1614),<sup>6</sup> but the Calvinistic Modern Greek Oecumenical Patriarch *Kýrillos Loukárís* (*vivebat* A.D. 1572–1638), was born in Crete as a Venetian subject.<sup>7</sup>

The cutting off of this Cretan line of cultural communications be-

<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, as late as A.D. 1698, George Kastriotis, an envoy from the Hospodar of Wallachia to Moscow, was writing to Mazepa, the Hetman of the Ukraine, who was at this date in the Muscovite camp: 'We all pray with tears for the Sovereign Monarch [Peter the Great] to save us from the Papists and Jesuits, who rage against the Orthodox more than against the Turks and Jews . . . The secular war may finish some time, but the Jesuit war never.' This extract from Kastriotis' letter is quoted by Sumner, B. H.: *Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire* (Oxford 1950, Blackwell), p. 34.

<sup>2</sup> For these *Militärgrenzen*, see V. v. 462–3 and VI. vii. 117.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 128–9, above.

<sup>4</sup> The effective occupation of Crete by the Venetians had begun in A.D. 1212.

<sup>5</sup> The Portuguese had discovered the Cape Verde Islands in A.D. 1456 and Angola in A.D. 1484. The Spanish as well as the Portuguese colonial empire would, of course, have to be dated back a hundred years earlier than that if the Azores, Madeira, and the Canaries were to be reckoned as colonial acquisitions and not as extensions of Portugal's and Spain's metropolitan territories.

<sup>6</sup> See IV. iv. 360–1.

<sup>7</sup> See Pichler, *op. cit.*, p. 37; Rheniérís, *op. cit.*, p. 4.



tween Greek Orthodox Christendom and the Modern West through the Ottoman conquest of Crete in A.D. 1645-69 was partially offset by the Venetian conquest of the Morea in A.D. 1684-99, which brought under Venetian rule a larger Greek Orthodox Christian population than had been lost to Venice in her successive forfeitures of territory to the Ottoman Empire between A.D. 1463 and A.D. 1669.<sup>1</sup> Though these Venetian acquisitions in Continental Greece were reconquered by the 'Osmanlis in A.D. 1715, an ephemeral political episode had lasting cultural effects<sup>2</sup> because the Venetian Signoria had experienced, between A.D. 1669 and A.D. 1684, the same rather sudden change of heart that overtook the Hapsburg Monarchy in the same generation. The grievances of Venice's Moreot subjects during their thirty years' experience of Venetian rule at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were not religious but fiscal and economic.<sup>3</sup> Orthodox Christian pupils were free to attend the schools and colleges founded by the Venetians in the Morea<sup>4</sup> during an occupation of the peninsula which, so long as it lasted, made it impossible for an obscurantist Oecumenical Patriarch, as well as for his more tolerant master the Ottoman Pādīshāh, to exercise his jurisdiction over the Moreots; and the Moreot Greek municipal institutions, which were so important a factor in the Greek uprising of A.D. 1821 and in the subsequent establishment of an independent Greek national state on a Western pattern, were in part a legacy of a system of municipal government that had been introduced into the Morea during this Venetian occupation on the model of the contemporary régime in the North Italian city-states under Venetian hegemony, though they were also in part a gradual and undesigned product of the Ottoman practice of tax-farming.<sup>5</sup>

After the Morea and Tinos had gone the same way in A.D. 1715 as Crete in A.D. 1669 and Cyprus in A.D. 1571 and Negrepont in A.D. 1474, a remnant of Greek Orthodox Christian population still remained under Venetian rule in the Ionian Islands. The Ionian Islanders, who were subject to a culturally alien political domination from the twelfth and

<sup>1</sup> See IV. iv. 279.

<sup>2</sup> This Venetian occupation of the Morea, and the contemporary and subsequent Hapsburg occupation of Serbia, have been cited in another context (in V. v. 637-8) as examples of ephemeral intrusions, on the part of Modern Western empires, which had been followed, after an equally ephemeral restoration of an *ancien régime*, by the establishment, in the same territory, of a parochial national state on the Modern Western pattern.

<sup>3</sup> See Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. 208-9. According to Sakellarios, M. V.: *Ἡ Πελοπόννησος κατὰ τὴν Δευτέραν Τουρκοκρατίαν (1715-1821)* (Athens 1939, Byzantinisch-Neugriechischen Jahrbücher), pp. 121-2, the Venetians had killed Moreot Greek commerce and, though they had encouraged agriculture in the Morea, they had prohibited the export of the produce (except for wine) to foreign markets. Their financial policy in the Morea had created a currency famine there (see *ibid.*, p. 126). After the Ottoman reconquest of the Morea in A.D. 1715, the trade of the country was thrown open to all nations, and production in the Morea increased (see *ibid.*, pp. 124-5). These financial and economic considerations explain why it was that in A.D. 1715 the Greek Orthodox Christian population of the Morea sided with the Turks against the Venetians (see *ibid.*, p. 41). At the same time, Leondári was the only place in the Morea where the Turkish reconquest in A.D. 1715 was followed by conversions to Islam in appreciable numbers (see *ibid.*, p. 117)—in contrast to the religious sequel to the Turkish conquest of Candia in A.D. 1669 (see p. 164, above).

<sup>4</sup> See Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 212.

<sup>5</sup> See Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. 197-9.

thirteenth centuries<sup>1</sup> to A.D. 1864,<sup>2</sup> were unique in being the only Greek Orthodox Christians to be visited with an almost unbroken succession of Western masters;<sup>3</sup> and the Venetian landowners who constituted the Western 'ascendancy' here were likewise unique, for their part, in having become converts from their ancestral Roman Catholic Christianity to the Orthodoxy of the local Greek peasantry without having become apostates from their ancestral Western culture, and in having learnt to communicate with their agricultural labourers, tenants, body servants, and mistresses in the local Romaic Greek vernacular without having abandoned their traditional use of Italian as the exclusive language of polite society and exclusive linguistic medium for education and literary composition. The death-knell of this remote outpost of a Western *ancien régime* was sounded by the French Revolution; yet, before the merger of an old Ionian landowning aristocracy in a new democratic Greek nation was expedited by the union of the Heptanese with the Kingdom of Greece in A.D. 1864, these seven diminutive plots of common ground between the two Christendoms had given birth to two islanders who each played an eminent part in the transmission of a Modern Western culture to an Ottoman Orthodox Christendom. The first of the two was the Corfiot Greek Westernizing philosopher-educationalist Evyénios Voulgharis (*vivebat* A.D. 1716-1806),<sup>4</sup> who was born a Venetian subject. The second was the Zantiot Italian aristocrat-poetaster Count Dionisio Salomone (*vivebat* A.D. 1798-1857), who died under a British protectorate after having won fame in the West, as well as in a Greek Orthodox Christendom, as the great Greek poet Dhionýsios Solomós.<sup>5</sup>

Even in the Early Modern Age of religious faith and fanaticism, Venice had been appreciably less intolerant than most contemporary Western states,<sup>6</sup> either Catholic or Protestant. The Signoria was no friend of the Society of Jesus; at the University of Padua, which served the Venetian dominions, there was a relative freedom of philosophical thought;<sup>7</sup> it had become customary for Cretans to seek a higher education there;<sup>8</sup> and colleges for Greek students were founded at both Padua and Venice between A.D. 1590 and A.D. 1642.<sup>9</sup> Cyril Loukárís' kinsman

<sup>1</sup> Corfú was seized by the Genoese pirate Vetrano in A.D. 1109 and by the Venetians in A.D. 1206, but was recovered in A.D. 1214, and held till A.D. 1259, by the Epirot Greek successor-state of the East Roman Empire, before being permanently annexed to Western Christendom by Manfred of Sicily. Cefalonia and Zante were seized by the Sicilian Normans *circa* A.D. 1185.

<sup>2</sup> The date at which Great Britain renounced her protectorate and allowed the Ionian Islanders to fulfil their desire for union with the Kingdom of Greece.

<sup>3</sup> This succession was technically broken during the years A.D. 1800-7, when the Ionian Islanders were autonomous under a Russo-Ottoman protectorate. In the heyday of the Ottoman Power the 'Osmanlis had succeeded occasionally in occupying some of the islands temporarily without ever managing to confirm their hold.

<sup>4</sup> See pp. 160-1, above.

<sup>5</sup> See pp. 679-80, below.

<sup>6</sup> Rheniérís, *op. cit.*, p. 4, points out the significance of this fact in the present context.

<sup>7</sup> 'Padua fell under the rule of Venice from A.D. 1404, and Venice was the most successfully anti-clerical state in Europe both at this time and for long afterwards. The freedom of thought enjoyed by Padua attracted the ablest men, not only from the whole of the Italian Peninsula, but also from the rest of Europe—William Hervey . . . being a conspicuous example of this' (Butterfield, H.: *The Origins of Modern Science, 1300-1800* (London 1949, Bell), p. 43). See also Mettetal, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

<sup>8</sup> See Rheniérís, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

<sup>9</sup> See Pichler, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

and patron Meletios Pighás, the Orthodox Patriarch of Alexandria, had studied in Venice, but had been debarred from taking a degree by his refusal to subscribe to Roman Catholic doctrine and recognize Papal supremacy, and had acquired in consequence a strong animus against the Roman Church.<sup>1</sup> Meletios nevertheless sent Loukárís, in his turn, to Venice for his education at the age of twelve;<sup>2</sup> and, after spending four years there, Loukárís went on to spend seven further years as a student at Padua.<sup>3</sup> Loukárís' younger contemporary and outstanding opponent Meletios Syríghos (*natus* A.D. 1585) was likewise a Cretan and likewise an alumnus of the University of Padua, where he studied mathematics, physics, and medicine;<sup>4</sup> but the privilege of studying in the Venetian University of Padua was not confined to Greek Orthodox Christians who were Venetian subjects. At Padua Loukárís made friends with his fellow student Nikiphóros Korydhalléfs of Athens,<sup>5</sup> who in A.D. 1624, after Loukárís had become Oecumenical Patriarch, was to open at Constantinople a school of a Calvinist complexion<sup>6</sup> and was to be anathematized, like Loukárís himself, after Loukárís' final fall and death.<sup>7</sup> The Chiot Alexander Mavrogordáto, too, studied medicine at Padua<sup>8</sup> like the Cretan Syríghos, though, like the Athenian Korydhalléfs, he was an Ottoman subject.

Another channel through which Modern Western influence flowed into the main body of Orthodox Christendom was the Western diplomatic corps at Constantinople, which became a force there during the eclipse of the Ottoman Power after the death of Suleymán the Magnificent in A.D. 1566. During the Thirty Years' War (*gerebatur* A.D. 1618-48) Constantinople, like Berne during the general War of A.D. 1914-18 and Lisbon during the general war of A.D. 1939-45, was a theatre of diplomatic hostilities on militarily neutral ground, and the diplomatic contest that centred on the person of Cyril Loukárís has been described as a repercussion of the contemporary struggle between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism in the West.<sup>9</sup> The Dutch, English, Swedish, and Venetian ambassadors were in league, at the time when Loukárís ascended the Oecumenical Throne, against their Hapsburg and French confrères,<sup>10</sup> and Loukárís' intimacy with the Protestant diplomatic circles in his see brought him not only local Western political patronage but widespread Western cultural contacts—as is testified by his correspondence with the Dutch theologian Uytenbogaert and the Dutch statesman David le Leu de Wilhem.

<sup>1</sup> See Pichler, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

<sup>2</sup> See Pichler, *op. cit.*, pp. 45 and 49.

<sup>3</sup> See Pichler, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

<sup>4</sup> Korydhalléfs was anathematized by the Constantinopolitan Orthodox Church for objecting to the use of the Greek word *μερουργία* as a translation of the Latin word *transubstantiatio* (Pichler, *op. cit.*, p. 221).

<sup>5</sup> The monument of Alexander Mavrogordáto's studies at Padua was a Herveian treatise in Latin on the circulation of the blood: *Pneumaticum Instrumentum Circulandi Sanguinis, sive de Motu et Usu Pulmonum Dissertatio Philosophico-medica, Autore Alexandro Mavrogordato Constantinopolitano, Philosophiae et Medicinae Doctore* (Bologna 1664, Typographia Ferroniana). Another edition was published at Frankfurt in A.D. 1665 by T. M. Goetz (See Legrand, E.: *Bibliographie Hellénique, ou Description Raisonnée des Ouvrages Publiés par des Grecs au Dix-Septième Siècle*, vol. ii (Paris 1894, Picard), pp. 189-193).

<sup>6</sup> See Rheniérís, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

<sup>7</sup> See Pichler, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

<sup>8</sup> See Pichler, *op. cit.*, p. 208.

<sup>9</sup> See Pichler, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

<sup>10</sup> See Pichler, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

Thereafter, when the rally of the Ottoman Power under the leadership of the House of Köprülü was followed by a final lapse into dissolution, the classic Ottoman political principle of non-territorial autonomy for all communities in the Empire, not excluding resident aliens,<sup>1</sup> enabled the embassies of Western Powers in Constantinople to erect themselves into miniature *imperia in imperio* reigning, not only over their own nationals in Ottoman territory, but also over Ottoman subjects who were their official protégés. The germs of these Western protectorates can be detected in some of the provisions of the capitulations granted to England by the Porte in September 1675,<sup>2</sup> and in the Hapsburg-Ottoman capitulatory treaty of the 27th July, 1718.<sup>3</sup> In the capitulations granted to France in May 1740 these germs blossomed into a provision authorizing the French Ambassador to maintain fifteen Ottoman subjects as his servants free from taxation.<sup>4</sup> After the Great Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1768-74, which was a milestone in the course of the Ottoman Empire's decline, this privilege of exercising a protectorate over Ottoman subjects was extended to other capitulatory Powers, and the Porte presented each embassy with a certain number of blank 'certificates of denaturalization' (as the Ottoman term *berā'at* might be interpreted in this context), which the ambassadors were then free to bestow upon Ottoman subjects of their own choice.<sup>5</sup>

The Western embassies were more successful in abusing this privilege<sup>6</sup> than the Porte was in its belated attempts to restrict its scope.<sup>7</sup> The consequence was that an appreciable number of Greek Orthodox Christian and other Ottoman subjects came to participate in the fiscal privileges that gave the nationals of capitulatory Powers a decisive advantage over non-privileged Ottoman subjects in the now increasingly important trade between the Ottoman Empire and the West;<sup>8</sup> and this made Ottoman subjects engaged in foreign trade so eager to obtain the official protection of foreign governments that, shortly before the year 1824,<sup>9</sup> the Ottoman Government sought to reduce this incentive by granting 'most favoured foreign nation treatment' to Ottoman subjects trading with foreign countries who were not the official protégés of foreign embassies.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This principle and the institutions in which it was embodied are examined on pp. 184-6, below.

<sup>2</sup> Arts. 28, 45, and 59.

<sup>3</sup> Art. 5.

<sup>4</sup> Art. 47. In the same instrument the incipient rights of protectorate already secured by England and the Hapsburg Monarchy were conferred on France likewise in Arts. 13, 43, 45, 46, and 50.

<sup>5</sup> See Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. vi, p. 107.

<sup>6</sup> See d'Ohsson, I. M.: *Tableau Général de l'Empire Ottoman* (Paris 1788-1824, Didot, 7 vols.), vol. vii, pp. 506-8.

<sup>7</sup> Such attempts were made in the Anglo-Turkish peace treaty of the 6th January, 1809, Art. 9, and in the American-Turkish commercial treaty of the 7th May, 1830, Art. 5.

<sup>8</sup> See d'Ohsson, *op. cit.*, vol. vii, pp. 235 and 239.

<sup>9</sup> i.e., shortly before the publication of the last volume of d'Ohsson's work in that year.

<sup>10</sup> See d'Ohsson, *op. cit.*, vol. vii, p. 509. The two principal benefits thereby extended to non-protected Ottoman subjects were the issue of certificates of privilege and the limitation of the rate of customs duties payable by them to the 3 per cent. *ad valorem* which was at that time the maximum rate payable by the nationals and the Ottoman protégés of the capitulatory Powers. The first instrument in which a definite rate of customs duty *ad valorem* was fixed by mutual agreement would appear to have been the

This was a striking inversion of a stipulation in the Franco-Turkish capitulatory treaty of February, 1535,<sup>1</sup> that French merchants were to pay no higher duties than Ottoman subjects. That treaty was the archetype of all instruments, bilateral or unilateral, conferring capitulatory privileges in the Ottoman Empire on Modern Western Powers and their nationals; and Ottoman subjects had indeed profited at the expense of Westerners, in the competition for the profits of the maritime trade in the Mediterranean, as a result of the political union of the main body of Orthodox Christendom with the greater part of the Arabic World under Ottoman rule at the beginning of the Modern Age of Western history.

The first commercial effect of this political revolution in the Levant had been to strike a deadly blow at the commerce of Venice,<sup>2</sup> Genoa, and the other North Italian communities that had been progressively wresting the maritime commerce of the Mediterranean out of Greek hands since the eleventh century of the Christian Era; and, though the Greeks too had been hard hit, economically as well as politically, by the Ottoman conquest,<sup>3</sup> while all participants in the Mediterranean maritime trade had suffered alike from a conquest of the Ocean by West European peoples who had thereby turned the Mediterranean into a backwater,<sup>4</sup> the Greek subjects of the Porte found themselves, as a result of the Ottoman conquest, in a stronger position for competing with the Franks in the Mediterranean trade, even before they came to benefit from the commercial privileges which the Modern Western Great Powers were granted by the Porte from A.D. 1673 onwards.<sup>5</sup> The maritime trade via the Mediterranean, on which the 'Osmanlis' Greek subjects thus secured and maintained a hold, was another channel through which Western cultural influences seeped into the main body of Orthodox Christendom,<sup>6</sup> and the cultural intercourse became more active as the Mediterranean came back to commercial life at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.<sup>7</sup> Colonies of Ottoman Greek merchants were to be found in

capitulations granted to France on the 5th June, 1673. In this instrument, Additional Article 5, it is laid down that import and export duties payable by French merchants are to be reduced from 5 per cent., at which they had previously stood, to 3 per cent.

<sup>1</sup> Article 3.

<sup>2</sup> In the eighteenth century the Greek subjects of Venice in the Ionian Islands preferred to trade under the Ottoman flag (Sakellarios, *op. cit.*, p. 128).

<sup>3</sup> The greatest single economic blow that was dealt to the Greeks by their Ottoman conquerors was the settlement of Sephardi Jewish refugees from the Iberian Peninsula in the chief commercial centres of the Ottoman Empire—e.g. Salonica, Adrianople, Constantinople—to fill an economic vacuum created by the expulsion of the major part of the former Greek population of these cities (see II. ii. 245-6).

<sup>4</sup> Chios, for example, was hit by this diversion of the main channel of world trade (Argenti, P. P.: *Chios Vineta* (Cambridge, 1941, University Press), pp. xli-xlii). From the sixteenth century to circa A.D. 1791 the Chioti's main economic activities were agriculture and manufactures, not commerce (David, C. E., French Vice-Consul at Chios: Dispatch dated 14th June, 1824 = Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris, Correspondance Consulaire de Scio, 1812-25 D., No. 39bis enclosing 'Mémoire sur Scio'; printed in Argenti, P. P.: *The Massacre of Chios described in Contemporary Diplomatic Documents* (London 1932, Lane), pp. 52-95, especially p. 67).

<sup>5</sup> For this date, see p. 172, n. 10, above.

<sup>6</sup> The Chioti, for example, went to the West first in order to do business, but afterwards also in order to obtain a Western education (David, *op. cit.*, p. 78).

<sup>7</sup> The Mediterranean did not, of course, recover the position that it had held before the Oceanic Age; the Ocean continued to be the principal medium of communication for a World that had been united by the Oceanic enterprise of West European peoples;



the Mediterranean ports of Western Christendom as early as the sixteenth century;<sup>1</sup> and the notable increase in the trade between the Ottoman Empire and a geographically expanding Western World which declared itself towards the end of the eighteenth century was marked by the establishment of Greek commercial colonies in London, Liverpool, Manchester, and New York as well as in Venice, Leghorn, Marseilles, and Trieste.<sup>2</sup> These Greek settlements *in partibus Occidentalium* came to act like lenses which focused the cultural influence of the West and transmitted it to the Levant in concentrated rays of a high degree of potency.

The economic and consequent cultural opportunities opened up to Greek Ottoman subjects by this revival of maritime trade between the Levant and the West via the Mediterranean were made the most of by a few maritime Ottoman communities that enjoyed some measure of local autonomy, whether by charter or by custom or merely by oversight.<sup>3</sup> The outstanding chartered communities were the mastic-growing island of Chios, the olive-growing peninsula of Ayvalıq (Kydhoniés),<sup>4</sup> and the two continental Greek portlets of Ghalaxidhi<sup>5</sup> on the Gulf of Corinth and Trikeri<sup>6</sup> commanding the entrance to the Gulf of Volo. Among the communities that benefited by custom or oversight were the previously derelict Aegean islands Hydhra<sup>7</sup> and Pétses,<sup>8</sup> off the coast of the Argolid, which were colonized in the eighteenth century by Orthodox Christian

but in the course of the eighteenth century the Mediterranean did begin to change from being a mere backwater in an Oceanic system of waterways into becoming a through-route between the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean which had the advantage of being a short cut. This rehabilitation of the Mediterranean was consummated by the opening of the Suez Canal in A.D. 1869 (see IV. iv. 23), but the process had begun at least a hundred years before that. One cause of it was the progressive establishment of British rule in India, beginning with Bengal, which led the British to search for a shorter and quicker route between England and India than the Oceanic route via the Cape of Good Hope (see Hoskins, H. L.: *British Routes to India* (London 1928, Longmans Green)). A second cause was the opening up of a new continental hinterland to the Mediterranean through the replacement of Nomadism by the sedentary civilization of Russian Orthodox Christendom in the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe along the north coast of the Black Sea as a consequence of the Russian victory in the Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1768-74 (see III. iii. 428). A third cause was the Westernization of Egypt, which was initiated by the French military invasion in A.D. 1798.

<sup>1</sup> See Finlay, op. cit., vol. v, p. 156.

<sup>2</sup> The Chioti, for example, who appear to have had no permanent commercial establishments abroad before A.D. 1780, began to settle in Western and Russian maritime and commercial entrepôts from about that date onwards. Two members of the Ralli family can be traced as far back as A.D. 1780 in Leghorn; and there was an Avierino at Taganrog by A.D. 1795; a Zarakhani and a Zizinia at the same Russian port in A.D. 1805; a Kapparis at Theodosia and a Rhodhokanakis at Genoa by the same year; an Argenti, a Psykhas, and a Ralli at Amsterdam by A.D. 1810; a Galatti and a Psykhas at Isma'il by the same year; and an Argenti at Marseilles by A.D. 1818 (Argenti, *The Massacres of Chios*, p. xxiv, n. 1). After the catastrophe of A.D. 1822, Chiot refugees founded further colonies in Constantinople, Egypt, the new dominions of Russia along the north coast of the Black Sea, Leghorn, Trieste, Vienna, Marseilles, Paris, London, Liverpool, Manchester, and the United States of America (ibid., pp. xxiii-xxiv; cp. *Chius Vincita*, p. cxviii). Chiot emigrants seem to have been quicker than other Greek emigrants to adapt themselves to the Western way of life (*Chius Vincita*, p. cxxi). Committees for raising funds for education in Chios were organized by the Chiot diaspora in Trieste, Leghorn, Marseilles, Paris, London, Liverpool, and Manchester (ibid., p. ccxvi).

<sup>3</sup> See II. ii. 262.

<sup>4</sup> For Ayvalıq, see II. ii. 40, n. 1.

<sup>5</sup> See Finlay, op. cit., vol. v, p. 281, and vol. vi, p. 167.

<sup>6</sup> See Finlay, op. cit., vol. vi, p. 167.

<sup>7</sup> See Finlay, op. cit., vol. v, p. 283, and vol. vi, pp. 30-33 and 168.

<sup>8</sup> See Finlay, op. cit., vol. v, p. 283, and vol. vi, p. 33.



Albanians from the Morea, and Kásos<sup>1</sup> and Psarà,<sup>2</sup> in the Sporades, which were colonized in the same age by Orthodox Christian Greeks.<sup>3</sup>

The attraction of these barren islands, and of the stony peninsula of Ayvalyq, was a hope of escaping the increasing fiscal oppression under which the Orthodox Christian settlers on these uninviting spots had been suffering in their previous homes in an age when a declining Ottoman Power was no longer able to protect its subjects against its agents. The colonist-islanders—who had to fling themselves on the sea as their only alternative to starvation—found favour with an Ottoman Government that in this age was eager to foster a native maritime population both as a counter-move in the commercial field to Western encroachments on Ottoman commerce and as a reservoir in the military field for the man-power of an Ottoman Navy on the Modern Western model.

The Qapudân Pasha Hüseyn Jezayrli, who as Grand Admiral was *ex officio* governor of the Archipelago and the Mani,<sup>4</sup> had no fewer than

<sup>1</sup> See Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. vi, p. 166.

<sup>2</sup> See Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 281, and vol. vi, p. 167.

<sup>3</sup> The autonomy enjoyed by these maritime Ottoman Greek communities that turned it to commercial account was shared by a number of highland communities, most of which also adjoined the sea. We may notice the Mání in the Morea; Sphakia in Crete; and Khimarrha, the Armatoli of Pindus and the Agrapha, the Elefterokhória, Mount Athos, the Pelion Zagorá and the Dhervenkhoría in Rumili. Of these all but the Mání, Sphakia, and Khimarrha were officially recognized by the Porte.

The Mání was independent *de facto* till A.D. 1670, the year after the Ottoman conquest of Candia (Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. 116-17); in that year it was compelled to receive Ottoman garrisons and to pay kharāj; in A.D. 1685 it made a pact with Venice through which it secured autonomy under Venetian rule (Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 205). After the Ottoman reconquest of the Morea in A.D. 1715, the Maniots retained their autonomy but were compelled to resume payment of kharāj. They joined the Russians when these invaded the Morea in A.D. 1770 (Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. 252-3), and reacknowledged the sovereignty of the Porte in A.D. 1777. In A.D. 1803-4 they were again brought to heel by the Ottoman authorities after they had flirted with the French (Sakellarios, *op. cit.*, pp. 236-7). In A.D. 1821 their chieftain Petrobey gave the signal for the Greek national uprising by attacking the Ottoman garrison of Mistrá.

Sphakia was compelled to pay kharāj in A.D. 1770 (Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. xii and 263). Its autonomy was respected in practice by the Porte thereafter (Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. vi, p. 4).

The Khimarrhiots made the living that they could not wring out of the rocks of Acroceraunus by serving as mercenaries in the armies of Venice and Naples (see Mozart's *Così fan Tutti*, *lurum* A.D. 1790).

The Armatoli have been noticed already in another context in V. v. 297-8.

The Elefterokhória were three confederations of villages on the Peninsula of Khalkidhiki which governed themselves and collected their own taxes under the superintendence of an Ottoman resident backed by a token military force (Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. vi, p. 202).

Mount Athos ('the Holy Mountain') was an autonomous federal republic of Orthodox Christian monasteries, including representatives of most of the Orthodox Christian nationalities, though the Greeks had a great preponderance. Here too the Porte was represented merely by a resident (Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. vi, pp. 203-4).

The Zagorá (*Slavice* 'Among the Mountains') was a cluster of densely populated Greek Orthodox Christian villages running up the western flank of Mount Pelion overlooking the Plain of Thessaly. Its autonomy was recognized by the Porte and administered by elective magistrates (Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. vi, pp. 200-1).

The Dhervenkhoría were five Albanian Orthodox Christian villages, mustering two thousand fighting men, who were commissioned by the Porte to police the overland route between Rumili and the Morea over Mount Cithæron and Mount Geraneia (Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. vi, p. 30).

<sup>4</sup> The Qapudân Pasha administered this governorship through the agency of his Phanariot Greek Orthodox Christian secretary the Dragoman of the Fleet (see d'Ohsson, I. M.: *Tableau Général de l'Empire Ottoman* (Paris 1788-1824, 7 vols.), vol. vii (Paris 1824, Didot), p. 431, and Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 242). The Mani had been separated administratively from the Morea, and been added to the Qapudân Pasha's domain, after

two hundred Hydhrriot sailors serving on board his flagship in A.D. 1797, and this service won for Hýdhra valuable privileges. In A.D. 1802 the Qapudân Pasha appointed a native Hydhrriot Christian governor, and the taxes payable by the island to the Porte were commuted for a contingent of 250 men to the fleet and a gratuity to the Qapudân Pasha and his staff.<sup>1</sup> The same boons of local self-government and light taxation were granted to Pétses, Kásos, and Psarà on the same considerations. Under these exceptionally favourable conditions the four islands and the two continental portlets developed a merchant marine which earned high, though short-lived, profits during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (*gerebantur* A.D. 1792-1815), when the Ottoman flag was the only neutral flag left in the Mediterranean; and the lion's share of the trade carried on under this flag was secured by this handful of Ottoman Orthodox Christian maritime communities.<sup>2</sup> This windfall from a storm in the neighbouring Western World ceased to drop into these Ottoman Greek mariners' hands as soon as the Western peoples emerged from their Napoleonic bout of fratricidal warfare;<sup>3</sup> and the unemployment, distress, and discontent arising from the rapid decline in the volume of their commercial business after A.D. 1815 made these communities ready,

A.D. 1777, when it had reacknowledged the sovereignty of the Porte, which had been in abeyance there since the Russian descent on the Morea in A.D. 1770 (Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. 265-6).

<sup>1</sup> See Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 283, and vol. vi, pp. 32-33.

<sup>2</sup> See Sakellarios, *op. cit.*, pp. 212-15. In this lucrative but ephemeral Ottoman Greek trade the Chiots found a leading role to play. About the year A.D. 1780 their manufactures—of which the most valuable was a silk industry inherited from the period of Genoese rule—had succumbed to Western industrial competition; but, after the outbreak of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in the West, Chiot capitalists financed the Hydhrriot, Petsiot, and Psariot merchant marine that was earning profits by carrying grain, oil, and other produce of the Ottoman Empire from Anatolia, Salonica, and Egypt to the ports of the Napoleonic French Empire. The Chiots then established business houses at Marseilles, Trieste, and Leghorn (see p. 179, n. 2, above) to correspond with their houses at Constantinople, Salonica, and above all at Smyrna, where Chiot enterprise had made an entrepôt for the exchange of Western manufactures with the products of the interior of Anatolia. After the annexation of Croatia to the French Empire in A.D. 1809, the Chiots took part, from their commercial bases in Salonica and Smyrna, in an overland trade which the French proceeded to open up via Bosnia with the Ottoman World. From Constantinople, Chiot merchants exported cloth to Austria. Chios made her fortune in twenty years (David, *op. cit.*, pp. 67-70).

Even the hitherto almost exclusively agrarian Ottoman Greek community in the Morea shared in this temporary commercial prosperity. When the liquidation of the Venetian dominion over the Morea in A.D. 1715 had been followed by the collapse of the local Venetian commercial supremacy, the Venetian commercial heritage in the Morea had been captured, not by the Moreot Greeks, but by the French (see Sakellarios, *op. cit.*, pp. 126-8). The cereals exported from the Morea had all been shipped to Marseilles, while the current crop had been shipped to Great Britain and Holland (*ibid.*, pp. 128 and 210). There is no record of Greek merchants participating in the trade of the Morea before the foundation of a commercial company by Benáki of Kalamáta in A.D. 1761 (*ibid.*, pp. 128-9). The French traders in the Morea were, however, ruined by the abortive Greek Christian insurrection and retaliatory Albanian Muslim barbarian conquest in A.D. 1770-9 (*ibid.*, p. 216); what remained of the eighteenth-century trade through a French channel was paralysed by the outbreak of the French Revolution (*ibid.*, p. 212); and, when the Napoleonic Wars offered their golden opportunity to neutral Ottoman carriers, Moreot landowners, Turkish as well as Greek, stepped into the ruined French merchants' shoes (*ibid.*, pp. 211, 218, and 244).

<sup>3</sup> This commercial stagnation after A.D. 1815 made itself felt in Chios as well as in the seafaring Greek islands (David, *op. cit.*, p. 71). Yet the trade between Chios and the West nevertheless remained so important that the catastrophe of A.D. 1822 was reported by the Hapsburg Internuncio at Constantinople to have been severely felt in many towns in Germany, France, Italy, and England (Argenti, P. P.: *The Massacres of Chios*, pp. xv-xvi and 127).

in A.D. 1821, to join in a Greek national insurrection—inspired by Western political ideas—which held out hopes for them of replacing the dwindling profits of trade by the spoils of buccaneering.<sup>1</sup>

In the Westernization of the main body of Orthodox Christendom through the maritime channel, a particularly important part was played by the Greek island of Chios, which had been under Western rule for just about two and a half centuries by the date of its annexation to the Ottoman Empire in A.D. 1566,<sup>2</sup> and which retained both its Western political constitution<sup>3</sup> and its Western cultural complexion<sup>4</sup> under

<sup>1</sup> Statistics of the number of families, and the number of ships of a tonnage of over a hundred tons, to be found at Hydhra, Pétses, Kásoi, Psará, Ghalaxidhi, and Trikeri in A.D. 1821, on the eve of the Greek uprising of that year, are given in Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. vi, p. 167.

<sup>2</sup> Chios fell into the hands of a piratical Genoese family, the Zaccaria, in the reign of the East Roman Emperor Andronicus II Palaiológos (*imperabat* A.D. 1282–1328). During the last 220 years before the Ottoman conquest the Western masters of Chios were a Genoese chartered company, the Maona, which had obtained possession of the island in A.D. 1346 after its liberation from the Zaccaria in A.D. 1329.

<sup>3</sup> The Chiois twice secured the restoration of their traditional institutions of self-government after an Ottoman military occupation, because the 'Osmanlis had the wit to realize that the economic prosperity of the island, which was so profitable for the Ottoman treasury, might evaporate if the islanders were no longer to be allowed to manage their own affairs in their own way.

After the original annexation in A.D. 1566, a Chiot deputation, led by the 'Latin' (i.e. Roman Catholic) bishop, and including one representative each of the Greek Church, the Greek merchants, the Latin merchants, and the Greek nobility, obtained from the Porte in A.D. 1567, through the good offices of the Qapudân Pasha Piale, who had been the Porte's instrument in annexing Chios to the Ottoman Empire in the preceding year, a charter reconferring self-government on the islanders and exempting them from the *devrîshmé* (the recurrent levy of children for the Pâdishâh's Slave-Household) and from other ills to which the unprivileged *ra'iyeh* were subject (Argenti: *Chios Vineta*, pp. cxxxvii–clix). This charter of A.D. 1567 was followed in A.D. 1578 by another which was still more favourable, particularly in the matter of taxation (*ibid.*, p. clix). More than a hundred years later, in A.D. 1696, after the Ottoman reconquest of Chios on the 21st February, 1695, from the Venetians, who had occupied the island on the 12th September, 1694, the Sultan expressly reconfirmed the island's constitutional privileges at the intercession of Alexander Mavrogordato (*ibid.*, pp. clxxiv–v).

Chios appears to have enjoyed greater security under Ottoman than under Genoese rule, and to have found it less difficult to obtain redress for its grievances from the suzerain Power (Argenti: *Chios Vineta*, p. cxxiii).

One effect of the restoration of the island's local autonomy under Ottoman auspices was to transfer political power in the island from a 'Latin' Roman Catholic minority of Genoese origin to a Greek Orthodox Christian majority—or at any rate to an aristocratic minority of this majority. By the terms of their capitulation to the Genoese conqueror Simone Vignoso on the 12th September, 1346, the Greek inhabitants of Chios had transferred their allegiance from the Imperial Government at Constantinople to the Republic of Genoa on the conditions (among others) that they should be allowed to retain their ancestral religion and customs, including the right to elect their own Metropolitan, and the existing privileges of their nobility (Argenti: *Chios Vineta*, p. xlii, n. 2); but all political power had passed into the hands of the Genoese Government and the chartered company (*maona*, Arabic *ma'awnah*) which had financed the conquest. After the extinction of this Genoese régime by the 'Osmanlis in A.D. 1566, the Greek Orthodox Christian Chiois were admitted to office in the government of the island (Argenti: *Chios Vineta*, p. cxxii), and they eventually gained a preponderant voice in it. By A.D. 1760, Chios was being governed by an Orthodox Christian oligarchy. On the board of *dhimoyérones*, two places out of five were reserved for the Greek nobility, one place for the Greek plebeians, and two places for the Latins (*ibid.*, pp. clxxx–clxxxi).

The 'Latin' minority in Chios lost ground politically, not only in consequence of the Ottoman annexation in A.D. 1566, which deprived it of a political ascendancy that it had been enjoying for more than two hundred years by that date, but also in consequence of the Florentine expedition against Chios in A.D. 1599 and the Venetian occupation of the island in A.D. 1694–5 (see Argenti, P. P.: *The Expedition of the Florentines to Chios*, [Cont. on next page.

<sup>4</sup> See Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. 79–80.

Ottoman sovereignty. An experience and ability in business, and a familiarity with the West which was both a cause and a consequence of this economic success, qualified the Chiots for serving the Porte in its dealings with Western neighbours with whom it no longer found itself able to settle its accounts by sheer force of arms; and it was no accident that the first two incumbents of the office of Dragoman of the Porte, Panayiotákis Nikoússios (*fungebatur* A.D. 1669-73)<sup>1</sup> and Alexander Mavrogordáto (*fungebatur* A.D. 1673-99)<sup>2</sup> were both connected with Chios.<sup>3</sup> Alexander Mavrogordáto's father was a Chiot silk-merchant, and his maternal grandfather had made a fortune as a wholesale purveyor of beef to the Palace and the public markets at Constantinople.

Thereafter, Chios produced the scholar-publicist Adhamándios Korais<sup>4</sup> (*vivebat* A.D. 1748-1833), who, in a Greek Orthodox Christian Westernizing movement that sprang from below upwards, is the symbolic figure corresponding to the autocrat-technician Peter the Great in a Russian Orthodox Christian Westernizing movement that was imposed from above downwards.

Korais' father was a Chiot who had settled at Smyrna, a continental Anatolian port, commanding a magnificent hinterland, where Western merchants had been the commercial pioneers and Western influences counted for more than they did at Constantinople at the time. In the new Greek community, of divers local origins, that had been called into existence at Smyrna by the economic opportunities created there by Western enterprise, Korais' father rose to be a churchwarden, an alderman (*δημόγερος*), and Prime Warden of the Smyrniot Guild of Chiot Merchants (*Πρωτομαγίστωρ τῆς τῶν Χίων Ἐμπορίας Συντεχνίας*); and, though he was himself a business man of no education, his wife was

1599 (London 1934, Lane); eundem: *The Occupation of Chios by the Venetians, 1694* (London 1935, Lane), which brought upon the Chiot 'Latin' community an odium and a mistrust, in their Ottoman suzerains' feelings towards them, from which their Greek Orthodox Christian fellow islanders remained exempt. After the Ottoman reoccupation in A.D. 1695 the 'Latin' Chiots were condemned to the galleys and their property was distributed by the Ottoman authorities among the Orthodox Chiots, who had been plundered by the Venetians. At the same time the Sultan ordered all Orthodox Chiots who had been forcibly converted to Roman Catholicism by the Venetians to return to Orthodoxy. The French Ambassador at Constantinople secured from the Porte a revocation of the sentence on the 'Latins' to serve in the galleys, on condition that they publicly renounced Roman Catholicism and embraced Orthodoxy (Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios by the Venetians*, pp. xcii-xciii); but from A.D. 1695 to A.D. 1720 the Latin community in Chios was excluded, by fiat of the Porte, from participation in the local administration (Argenti: *Chios Vincita*, p. cci). Their subsequent recovery of their political rights seems to have been due to a further intervention on the part of the French Ambassador at Constantinople (see Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 238).

The mastic-growing villages in the south of the island were placed by the Porte under a special régime. They were exempt from *kharāj* but had to deliver 25,000 oqas of mastic gum to the Porte annually free of charge, and to sell the rest of the crop to the Porte at the price of 2½ kurush for the oqa (Argenti: *Chios Vincita*, pp. cclxxi-ii).

<sup>1</sup> See Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. xi; Jorga, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 281; Zolotàs, G. I.: *Ἱστορία τῆς Χίου*, vol. iii, Part I (Athens 1926, Sakellarios), pp. 441-2.

<sup>2</sup> See Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 242; Jorga, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 283; Zolotàs, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, Part I, pp. 424-39; Part II (Athens 1928, Sakellarios), pp. 730-44.

<sup>3</sup> Panayiotákis was educated at Chios, but appears to have been of Rumeliot, not of Chiot, origin.

<sup>4</sup> This surname is presumably a Greek version of an Arabic *qarrā'*, signifying 'an accomplished reader [of the Scriptures]'. The corresponding Hebrew word *qarrā'im* (plural) had been adopted as a name by a sect of anti-Talmudist Jews who prided themselves on being 'readers [of the Law and the Prophets as opposed to the commentators upon them]' (see II. ii. 411).

a schoolmaster's daughter, and he had an ancestor, Andónios Korais, who had been a doctor of medicine, had travelled to Paris, and had published literary works in Western Europe in the last quarter of the seventeenth century.<sup>1</sup>

The money made by Adhamándios Korais' father in business at Smyrna enabled Adhamándios to emulate their Chiot ancestor's career. In A.D. 1782 he went to the University of Montpellier<sup>2</sup> to study medicine there; in A.D. 1788 he went on to Paris; and, after imbibing there the Modern Western enthusiasm for the Ancient Greek classical literature, and witnessing the irruption of Democracy into Modern Western life through the French Revolution, he settled in Paris for good and devoted the forty-five years of his sojourn there (A.D. 1788-1833) to the service of his countrymen in the Levant both as a scholar and as a publicist. As a scholar he laboured to make the Ancient Greek classics accessible to his Modern Greek contemporaries by editing them with introductions and notes in a version of the Modern Greek language which he sought to fashion into a vehicle for conveying the Modern Western culture.<sup>3</sup> As a publicist he laboured to guide his compatriots in their endeavours to translate into political terms a latter-day aspiration to adopt the Modern Western way of life.<sup>4</sup>

Korais was alive to the importance of the part in the Modern Greek Westernizing movement that the Chiots had it in them to play, as he showed in a letter written by him from Paris on the 4th July, 1823, to Prince Alexander Mavrogordáto, a contemporary Greek statesman who, like Korais, was of Chiot origin, in virtue of being a descendant of the celebrated seventeenth-century Dragoman of the Porte. This Phanariot contemporary of Korais had thrown in his lot with the Greek insurgents against Ottoman rule who had been fighting since A.D. 1821 to carve a Greek national state, on a post-Revolutionary Modern Western pattern, out of Ottoman territory in the Morea and Rumelia; and in this enterprise he was given the following advice by his Parisian mentor:

'It is essential that in your arduous task you should obtain the support of worthy collaborators, and it will be difficult for you to find them except among the Chiots—not that they are intellectually superior to other

<sup>1</sup> In seeking their education in the West, Andónios Korais and Alexander Mavrogordáto (see p. 171, above) had been following an unbroken Chiot tradition dating from the Genoese age of Chian history. At Rome a scholarship for Chiot students had been founded by Allatius at the College of Saint Athanasius (a Roman Catholic College for Greeks). Emmanuel Timoni, the Chiot discoverer of vaccination, had studied at Padua shortly before A.D. 1691. In A.D. 1773 the Peter Schilizzi hospital in Chios was founded by a Chiot who had studied medicine in Florence and who modelled his foundation in his native Greek island on a hospital in his Italian *alma mater*. The practice of going to Italy for their education remained common among Chiots until the catastrophe of A.D. 1822. This was one of the reasons why the Chiots were distinguished from other Ottoman Greeks by their greater familiarity with the West (Argenti, *Chios Vincita*, p. cxx), and why in the eighteenth century Chios was the educational centre for the Greeks of Constantinople, Smyrna, and Egypt (Argenti, *The Massacres of Chios*, p. xxiv).

<sup>2</sup> Montpellier was the university that served the hinterland of the port of Marseilles, to which it stood more or less in the relation of Padua to Venice.

<sup>3</sup> The Modern Greek language problem has been touched upon in V. vi, 68-70.

<sup>4</sup> For Adhamándios Korais' antecedents and career, see Thierriand, D.: *Adhamándios Korais* (Trieste 1889-90, Austrian Lloyd Press, 3 vols.), vol. i, pp. 89-90; Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. 285-6.



Greeks,<sup>1</sup> but because they have proved, by their achievements in administering their township under the yoke of slavery, how fit they are to contribute to the common work for Hellas when they are free. They have achieved concord and they possess what Aristotle calls "the eye that comes from experience". They are the right people to inspire their brother Hellenes with their own concord and to share with them the fruits of their own experience.<sup>2</sup>

Besides the Chiots and other maritime Greeks under Ottoman and Venetian rule and the *ra'îyek* under the protection of Western embassies at Constantinople, there were Greek and Vlach communities under Ottoman rule in Rumelia that served as carriers of the Modern Western culture into the main body of Orthodox Christendom by taking advantage of commercial opportunities opened up by Hapsburg military successes at the Ottoman Empire's expense. Though the Hapsburg armies' momentary incursion into Serbia in A.D. 1689 was followed by longer-lasting occupations of the Lower Morava Basin in A.D. 1718-39 and in A.D. 1788-92, no Serb Orthodox Christian territory south of the Save and Danube was permanently incorporated into the Hapsburg Monarchy. At the same time, these ephemeral military and political *actes de présence* of the Hapsburg Power in Serbia, and, still more, its permanent establishment in the ex-Ottoman portion of Hungary, just across the river from Belgrade, had the economic effect of stimulating an overland trade between Central Europe and the Levant; and, though, in the nineteenth-century chapter of this story, the linking of Vienna and Budapest with Constantinople and Salonica was a work of Austrian enterprise,<sup>3</sup> the initiative in opening this overland trade-route up had been taken in the eighteenth century by Rumeliot Orthodox Christian subjects of the Porte who transported their merchandise on the backs of pack-animals.<sup>4</sup>

These eighteenth-century Rumeliot trading ventures along the overland route were family businesses in which the heads of a business at its Rumelian headquarters were in partnership with kinsmen stationed at Budapest, Vienna, and Leipzig as the family firm's representatives at the trade's Western terminals. This business organization based on kinship was a key to commercial success which was at the same time a potent conductor of Modern Western culture into Rumeliot Orthodox Christian homes. The Rumelian terminals and headquarters of the trade were apt to be fastnesses that were less handicapped than favoured

<sup>1</sup> Cyril Loukaris, in his day, had been disgusted at the ignorance of Koréssi and other Chiots (Metretal, op. cit., p. 96).—A.J.T.

<sup>2</sup> Korais, A.: *Απάνθισμα Ἐπιστολῶν* (Athens 1839, Rallis), pp. 258-9. A much larger collection of Korais' letters has been published by N. M. Dhamalás (Athens 1885-6, Perris, 3 vols.).

<sup>3</sup> The linking up of Constantinople with Austria-Hungary by a continuous permanent way was accomplished between the years A.D. 1872 and A.D. 1888. Salonica, and eventually Athens, were linked up with the Belgrade-Constantinople line by a branch which diverged from it at Nish.

<sup>4</sup> At Shátishta, in South-Western Macedonia, on the 5th-6th September, 1921, the writer of this Study met an old man who, as a boy, had accompanied his father on one of the last of the overland caravan-expeditions between Shátishta and Central Europe before the pack-animal trade was killed by the building of the Oriental Railway. From start to finish, this overland voyage on foot had kept the merchant-adventurers on the road for many months at a stretch (see II. ii. 262).



by their physical inaccessibility in an age when, for the subjects of a disintegrating Ottoman Empire, the condition *sine qua non*, if they were to have any chance of economic prosperity, was the enjoyment of some exceptional relief from the prevalent pressure of Ottoman misgovernment.<sup>1</sup> The Westernization of a Rumeliot fastness is vividly portrayed in an account of a visit paid on the 23rd-24th December, 1801, by a British traveller to the industrial village of Ambelákia, which had struck him as being

'one of the most extraordinary places in all Turkey, because, being situate in the most secluded spot of the whole empire, and where no one would look for the haunts of active industry, it carries on an extensive commerce, the effects of which were once severely felt by our own manufacturers in Britain. . . .

'The town consists of four hundred houses, as it were hanging upon this side of Mount Ossa, above the Pass of Tempe;<sup>2</sup> it contains no Turkish inhabitants, and enjoys a state of freedom forcibly contrasted with the condition of other places in the same neighbourhood, although not exempted from imposts.

'We might almost have imagined ourselves to be in Germany. The inhabitants are many of them from that country; and they are a thriving healthy-looking people. They wear the eastern dress, but they have introduced many foreign manners and customs among those of Greece. Some German merchants, upon our arrival, sent to us the last *Frankfort Gazettes*; and soon afterwards they paid us a visit. As we intended to pass the night here, we accompanied them to see their staple manufactory for dying cotton thread of a red colour, which not only supports and enriches the inhabitants, but has given rise to a commerce so considerable that whole caravans are laden with this cotton for the markets of Pest, Vienna, Leipsic, Dresden, etc.; and hardly a day passes without some exports being made, which are carried even to Hamburgh. . . .

'About this time the merchants of Ampelákia began to feel the effect of the preference given to English cotton thread in the German markets; and it was a subject of their complaint. "They foresaw," they said, "that the superior skill of the English manufacturers, and their being enabled to undersell every other competitor upon the Continent, would ultimately prove the ruin of their establishment." This, no doubt, is owing to the improvement adopted in Great Britain of spinning cotton thread in mills, by means of engines that are worked by steam, which has caused such a considerable reduction in its price—all the thread made at Ampelákia being spun by manual labour. The beautiful red tincture of the Turkish cotton will, however, long maintain its pristine celebrity. It has never been perfectly imitated in England. The English cotton thread is much finer, but it has not the tenacity of that which is manufactured in Turkey; neither is its colour so durable.

'The whole population of Ampelákia, amounting to four thousand souls, including even the children, is occupied in the preparation of this single article of commerce; the males in dyeing the wool, and the females in spinning the thread. . . . Although but a village, Ampelákia contains

<sup>1</sup> See the passage quoted from Rycart's book in II. ii. 265, n. 2.

<sup>2</sup> On the 2nd September, 1921, the writer of this Study managed to catch one glimpse of Ambelákia from the window of a railway carriage as he was travelling by train through the Vale of Tempe on a section of the line between Athens and Salonica that had been built after the annexation of Southern Macedonia to the Kingdom of Greece as a result of the Balkan Wars of A.D. 1912-13.—A.J.T.

twenty-four fabrics for dyeing only. Two thousand five hundred bales of cotton (each bale weighing two hundred and fifty pounds) are annually dyed here, the principal produce of the manufacture being sent to Vienna.<sup>1</sup>

*The Reception of a Modern Western Culture by the Ottoman Orthodox Christians and its Political Consequences*

The Modern Western influence that radiated into the main body of Orthodox Christendom through these overland and maritime channels was playing upon a society which was living at the time under a universal state imposed by an alien Power, and in these circumstances the course of the Orthodox Christian Westernizing movement, evoked by this radiation of the Western culture in its modern form, was different from that of the contemporary process in a Russian Orthodox Christendom that was overtaken by the impact of the Modern West in a universal state which had been made by, and remained in, native Russian hands. In the main body of Orthodox Christendom, unlike Russia, the attempt to adopt a Modern Western way of life was made on the educational plane first and on the political plane afterwards, instead of *vice versa*. The academic work of an Adhamándios Korais in his sanctum at Paris, and of a Vuk Karadžić in his sanctum at Vienna, preceded the insurrections of a Qāra George and a Miloš Obrenović in the Shumadiya and a Petrobey in the Mani against Ottoman rule, whereas, in a Russia ruled by a Russian autocrat, Peter the Great was not the disciple but the forerunner of a Westernizing school of Modern Russian men of letters.

The measure of the extent of the seventeenth-century revolution in the Greek attitude towards the culture of the West is given by the contrast between the disdain for Latin barbarism that had been felt or affected by Byzantine intellectuals of the school of Photius, Psellus, and Anna Comnena and the cult of 'Enlightened Europe'<sup>2</sup> that was practised and preached by Korais.

<sup>1</sup> Clarke, E. D.: *Travels in Various Countries of Europe, Asia and Africa*, Part II, Section iii (London 1816, Cadell and Davies), pp. 281 and 285-8, cited in II. ii. 26, n. 4. See also Beaujour, F.: *Tableau du Commerce de la Grèce* (Paris 1800, Renouard, 2 vols.), vol. i, pp. 272-5.

<sup>2</sup> Ambélakia par son activité ressemble plutôt à un bourg de Hollande qu'à un village de Turquie. Ce village répand par son industrie le mouvement et la vie dans tout le pays d'alentour, et il donne naissance à un commerce immense qui lie l'Allemagne à la Grèce par mille fils. Sa population, qui a triplé depuis quinze ans, est aujourd'hui de quatre mille âmes; et toute cette population vit dans les teintureries, comme un essaim d'abeilles vit dans une ruche. On ne connaît point dans ce village les vices ni les soucis qu'engendre l'oisiveté. Les cœurs des Ambélakiotes sont purs et leurs visages contents. La servitude qui flétrit à leurs pieds les campagnes qu'arrose le Pénée n'est point montée sur leurs coteaux: aucun Turk ne peut habiter ni séjourner parmi eux, et ils se gouvernent comme leurs ancêtres par leurs *protoyeros* et par leurs propres magistrats. Deux fois les farouches Musulmans de Larisse, jaloux de leur aisance et de leur bonheur, ont tenté d'escalader leurs montagnes et de piller leurs maisons; et deux fois ils ont été repoussés par des mains qui ont soudain quitté la navette pour s'armer du mouquet.

Tous les bras, même ceux des enfants, sont employés dans les teintureries d'Ambélakia; et, tandis que les hommes teignent le coton, les femmes le filent et le préparent...

Il y a à Ambélakia vingt-quatre fabriques, où l'on teint chaque année deux mille cinq cents balles de coton, de cent okes la balle. Ces deux mille cinq cents balles passent toutes en Allemagne, et sont distribuées à Pest, Vienne, Leipsik, Dresde, Anspach et Bareuth. Les marchands ambélakiotes ont des comptoirs dans toutes ces villes, et ils y débitent le coton aux manufacturiers allemands.

<sup>2</sup> 'Enlightened Europe'—*Φωτισμένη Εὐρώπη*—is one of Korais' key phrases. See, for example, his use of it in a letter of the 8th November, 1810, to the Chiot community at

'Europe,' wrote Korais from Paris on the 8th November, 1810, to his compatriots the Chiot settlers at Smyrna, 'used to despise us as an uneducated nation, unworthy of our splendid forefathers. . . . But now, since you true sons of Hellas have thought of adorning Chios with scientific learning, and the people of Kydhonies [Ayvalyq] have done the same in their town, and the people of Constantinople have been moved to acquire knowledge, the Westerners have begun to take an interest in us and to study our movements—our enemies in order to denounce these as the lifeless convulsions of corpses, our friends in order to encourage them as the struggles against Death of a people raised from the dead . . .

'What we have learnt hitherto is good, and we ought to be grateful to those who taught it, since they taught everything they knew. But the present state of Hellas demands something better, more systematic, more profound, more useful; and this, without doubt, is to be found in the learning of Europe, which many of our intellectual heroes have acquired not long since [a list of names follows], and which many priests and deacons as well as many laymen are seeking to acquire to-day for the profit and glory of Hellas by travelling in Europe.'<sup>2</sup>

In his unwearingly enthusiastic advocacy of education on Modern Western lines, Korais—more fortunate than Voulgcharis in his generation—was preaching to the just converted;<sup>3</sup> and, among Greek and Serb

Smyrna (Korais, A.: *Ἀπάνθισμα Ἐπιστολῶν* (Athens 1839, Rallis), p. 30), and in another of the 17th June, 1824, addressed to the Rumeliot Greek brigand-patriot Odhyssefs (ibid., p. 15). In Korais' parlance, 'Enlightened Europe' means the secularized society of the contemporary Western World.

<sup>1</sup> It is noteworthy that Korais uses the word 'Europe' in the cultural sense as a synonym for 'the West', to the exclusion of the geographically European portion of the domain of Orthodox Christendom.

<sup>2</sup> *Ἀπάνθισμα*, pp. 33 and 39.

<sup>3</sup> Many schools and colleges were founded on Ottoman territory by the private enterprise of Greek Orthodox Christian *ra'iyeh*—both individuals and communities—between the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of the Christian Era and the Greek uprising of A.D. 1821. Schools had been founded before the close of the eighteenth century at Aretsi in Bithynia and at Mesolonghi—a Rumelian Venice inhabited by Greek fishermen who gained their livelihood from lagoons at the mouth of the Aspropotamo (Achelous) which also screened them from undue interference on the part of their Ottoman masters (Sathas, K.: *Τουρκοκρατουμένη Ἑλλάς* (Athens 1869, Koromilas), pp. 459–60). In the Morea, schools were founded at Vytina and other places between A.D. 1800 and A.D. 1821 (Khrysanthopoulos, Ph.: *Ἀπομνημονεύματα* (Athens 1899, Sakellarios, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. 5)—perhaps partly under the inspiration of the college at Tripolitsa, and the schools elsewhere, that had been maintained by the Venetians during their occupation of the Morea at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (see p. 169, above). A fuller account of the new schools founded in the Morea from A.D. 1781 onwards will be found in Sakellarios, op. cit., pp. 252–3. The most distinguished of the Moreot schools, in this scholar's judgement, was the school at Dhimitsina (ibid., p. 147). The Morea, however, was not in the van of the contemporary Greek educational movement (ibid., pp. 146 and 253); and the foundation and support of the schools in the Morea was largely the work of Moreot business men living abroad (ibid., p. 147). Benefactions to Greek schools at Yánnina evoked from Korais in Paris a letter of the 20th March, 1803, in which he congratulated the donor Kaplánías and, in doing so, urged him to 'set apart an annual sum . . . for buying the most important new books published in [Western] Europe', and to 'leave no stone unturned to provide two teachers, one of French and one of Latin, or at least one teacher of Latin, which is almost as essential as Greek' (*Ἀπάνθισμα*, p. 213). A college for the teaching of a Western curriculum was founded at Chios in A.D. 1809, under a headmaster who had been in France (David, op. cit., p. 77). The founding of a school at Smyrna by the Chiot community there, on the model of schools already established at Chios and Kydhonies, was likewise the occasion of Korais' letter of the 8th November, 1810, cited on p. 182, n. 2, above. At Kydhonies a college was founded in 1813 (Finlay, op. cit., vol. vi, p. 179), while at Athens in 1812 a 'Philomuse Society' was organized for the purpose of financing the education of Greeks in the West (Finlay, op. cit., vol. vi, p. 98). On the 21st November, 1816, Korais wrote from Paris to the trustees of the Greek secondary school at Chios: 'Set up a printing press. In France and Germany I know of humble villages which have been transformed

Orthodox Christian *ra'îyeh* alike, the newly acquired taste for a secular Modern Western culture excited an ambition to shake off an Ottoman yoke with a view to enjoying political freedom in accordance with some Modern Western ideal. In the political circumstances in which they found themselves, this was a formidable undertaking; for the Ottoman millet-system, under which they had been living since the reign of Sultan Mehmed II Fâthî (*imperabat* A.D. 1451-81), was at the opposite pole of the institutional gamut from the constitution of a secular Modern Western state, either in its pre-Revolutionary pattern of Enlightened Monarchy or in its post-Revolutionary pattern of Parliamentary Democracy.

### *The Ottoman Millet-System of Communal Autonomy*

Though the constitution of the Sultan's Slave-Household was 'totalitarian' to the last degree,<sup>1</sup> the very efficiency that this total suppression of the individual *qul*'s personal liberty had instilled, in the institution's heyday, into a tiny Ottoman governing minority had made it possible for this handful of rulers to allow the great majority of their subjects to enjoy a far-reaching communal autonomy. While monopolizing the control of armed forces, police, criminal justice, and finance, the Porte was eager to save itself trouble by leaving other public business in the hands of autonomous communities whose heads were appointed by the Pādishāh and were personally responsible to him for the good behaviour of their flocks.<sup>2</sup>

This Ottoman communal autonomy had to be on a non-territorial basis—not so much for the sake of safeguarding the political security of an Ottoman Power which felt itself, in its prime, to be impregnable, as because, in consequence of a series of social catastrophes,<sup>3</sup> the divers communities under Ottoman rule had come to be geographically intermingled with one another and at the same time economically differenti-

into splendid cities as soon as they had received the divine gift of printing' (*Apánthisma*, pp. 214-15). In a letter written on the 12th October, 1822, to the Chiois, to encourage them in their task of reconstruction after the catastrophe of A.D. 1822, he told them that 'the true ornaments of churches are ecclesiastics adorned with education and nobility of life . . . and for such ornaments you must look, not to expensive edifices and marbles, golden manuals, and other works of men's hands, in which God does not make his dwelling-place, but to secondary schools, libraries, printing, and all the other instruments of enlightenment and education' (*Apánthisma*, p. 46). After the establishment of the nucleus of an independent Greek national state, we find Korais, true to his principles, writing from Paris on the 5th January, 1828, to President Kapodistrias about books for the nation, partly the gift of the brothers Zosimádhēs, which had been purchased in Western Europe and dispatched to Návplos by Korais (*Apánthisma*, pp. 265-8. See further pp. 269-70 for a letter of the 1st March, 1829, to the same correspondent on the same subject).

<sup>2</sup> See the sketch of it in III. iii. 22-50.

<sup>3</sup> This responsibility was brought home to the millet-bāshy of the Millet-i-Rûm by Sultan Murād IV when he put the Oecumenical Patriarch Cyril Loukari to death on the 26th June, 1638, for having failed to prevent the Don Cossacks from seizing Azov (see pp. 156, above), and again by Sultan Mahmūd II when he put to death the Oecumenical Patriarch Gregory on Easter Day the 22nd April, 1821, for having failed to prevent the Moreots from rebelling against the Porte. From the Ottoman constitutional standpoint the execution of Gregory was a warrantable exercise of severity, since the Moreots, unlike the Don Cossacks, were Ottoman subjects for whom the Oecumenical Patriarch was responsible politically as well as ecclesiastically.

<sup>4</sup> Chief among them being the disintegration of the main body of Orthodox Christendom and the recurrent irruptions of Eurasian Nomads into both South-Eastern Europe and Asia Minor.

ated, till it had become hard to say whether they were nationalities, occupational groups, or social classes. Though the Jews and the Roman Catholics of the Latin Rite were perhaps the only communities of Ottoman subjects that were entirely divorced from the cultivation of the soil, the other communities likewise tended to become adepts in some particular profession or craft<sup>1</sup>—which any of their adherents might practise anywhere within the Ottoman frontiers—besides constituting one element in the local peasantry of some particular region. The Greeks, Vlachs, and Armenians, for example, like the Jews and the Latins, were ubiquitous as men of business; the Greeks were also ubiquitous as sailors and the Albanians as masons and latterly also as mercenary soldiers, while the Vlachs had a wide range as shepherds, and the Bulgars as military grooms and market gardeners.<sup>2</sup> The Ottoman system of communal autonomy was admirably framed to meet this 'geosocial' situation;<sup>3</sup> for the division of powers between the autonomous communities and the Imperial Government was not territorial but functional. On the one hand the communities did not share with the Porte any of the four above-mentioned prerogatives of sovereignty, even in districts in which their adherents happened to constitute a majority of the local population; on the other hand the measure of self-government delegated to them by the Porte was exercised by their communal authorities throughout the Empire—with whose dominions the domain of each autonomous community was thus in fact coterminous.

This network of autonomies—all coterminous with Ottoman sovereignty and with one another—embraced all the Empire's inhabitants; for, though the term 'millet' technically applied to non-Muslim *ra'iyeh* only, a similar autonomy was enjoyed by the community of free Muslim Ottoman subjects and also by the communities of resident aliens together with their Ottoman protégés. The responsible headship of an autonomous community was conferred—or imposed—by the Porte *ex officio* on some appropriate ecclesiastical dignitary, if such was to be found. The head of the free Ottoman Muslim community, for example, was the Sheykh-el-Islām ('Grand Mufti') of Constantinople; the head of the Ottoman Orthodox Christian community (Greek, Bulgar, Serb, Ruman, Albanian, Georgian, Qāramānlī, and Arab, without distinction) was the Oecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople; the head of the Ottoman Gregorian (Armenian Monophysite) Christian community was the Gregorian Patriarch of Constantinople; and so on. These Muslim, Christian, and Jewish prelates (for the Jews, too, were organized in an ecclesiastical corporation) were compelled by the Porte to accept political responsibility for co-religionists who were Ottoman subjects, even when these were not members of their own ecclesiastical flock. The Oecumenical Patriarch, for instance, as millet-bāshī of the Millet-i-

<sup>1</sup> Professional specialization is apt to be a retort to social penalization (see II. ii. 208–12).

<sup>2</sup> See II. ii. 223.

<sup>3</sup> The situation was, of course, one of the familiar features of universal states, and the Ottoman millet-system was built on foundations that had been laid successively by the Achaemenian and Sasanian Empires and the Arab Caliphate in their efforts to cope with previous presentations of the same political problem. The wealth of the historical experience which the Ottoman millet-system thus incorporated was, no doubt, one of the secrets of its long-continuing success.



Rûm, was responsible politically to the Porte for Ottoman subjects who were the spiritual subjects of the Oecumenical Patriarch's ecclesiastical peers the Patriarchs of Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem, the Archbishop of Ochrida, and the President of the Autocephalous Church of Cyprus, as well as for Ottoman subjects who were the spiritual subjects of the Oecumenical Patriarchate itself; and, when the Gregorian Bishop of Brusa was raised to the rank of Patriarch by Sultan Mehmed II Fâtiḥ in A.D. 1461, he had to pay for this ecclesiastical aggrandisement by submitting to be saddled with political responsibility for Christian *ra'îyeh* who were not only outside his ecclesiastical jurisdiction but were not even of the same communion.<sup>1</sup> The role played by these ecclesiastical millet-bâshys of autonomous communities of Ottoman subjects was played by the ambassadors of foreign Powers in the government of their own nationals and protégés resident in the Ottoman Empire, and by the Pādishāh himself in the government of a Slave-Household that was his corporate instrument for exercising his sovereign powers.<sup>2</sup>

It will be seen that the Ottoman Millet-i-Rûm, just because its constitution was so well adapted to the social circumstances of the main body of Orthodox Christendom in the Ottoman Age, was utterly unlike any secular Modern Western political institution; and, as soon as the Westernization of the 'Osmanlis' Orthodox Christian *ra'îyeh* reached a point at which it awakened political ambitions in their hearts, they were faced with the question how they were to pass from this utterly un-Western régime to some form of Modern Western political life.

<sup>1</sup> See Steen de Jehay, F. van den: *De la Situation Légale des Sujets Ottomans Non-Musulmans* (Brussels 1906, Schepens), p. 62. In A.D. 1461 the newly created Gregorian Patriarch was, in fact, made millet-bâshy of all non-Orthodox Christian *ra'îyeh* in the Ottoman Empire. Thereafter, in course of time, his political responsibility gradually came to be restricted to Gregorian Christian Ottoman subjects by the Porte's progressive recognition *de facto*, though not in every case *de jure*, of the communal autonomy of the Jacobite Monophysites, the Nestorians, the Roman Catholics of divers rites (Latins and Uniate ex-Monothelite Maronites, ex-Nestorian Chaldeans, ex-Jacobites, and ex-Gregorians), and eventually also the Protestants. The patriarchal vicars of the Latin rite, who administered the Latin Roman Catholic Ottoman community from A.D. 1599 onwards (Steen de Jehay, *op. cit.*, p. 308), were exceptional among the Ottoman millet-bâshys in being non-Ottoman subjects appointed by an ecclesiastical authority, the Pope, who was not an Ottoman subject either and whose see lay outside the Ottoman Empire's frontiers. The Gregorian, like the Roman Catholic, subjects of the Porte were spiritual subjects of an ecclesiastical authority who was not an Ottoman subject—in this case the Gregorian Catholicos of Echmiāzin, whose see was under Safawī Shī'ī Muslim sovereignty from A.D. 1501-2 onwards (see I. i. 371) and was ceded by Persia to Russia in A.D. 1828. The Catholicos, however, was impotent to give to the Gregorian Patriarch of Constantinople the support and protection which the Constantinopolitan Patriarchal Vicar of the Latin rite could be sure of receiving from the Vatican.

<sup>2</sup> Though the *ci-devant* Christians from whom the Pādishāh's Slave-Household was recruited invariably became converts to Islam before being commissioned (see III. iii. 37, n. 1), the act of religious conversion did not depress these individually disciplined and dedicated, and therefore politically all-powerful, Ottoman Muslim public slaves to a political parity with their politically powerless free Muslim co-religionists. The Pādishāh's Household in its heyday was virtually an autonomous community in itself, and Sultan Bayezid II (*imperabat* A.D. 1481-1512) gave them the privilege of being exempted from the jurisdiction of the *sharī* courts and being judged exclusively by their own officers (Lybyer, A. H.: *The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Magnificent* (Cambridge, Mass. 1913, Harvard University Press), p. 116). The Seyyids (i.e. recognized claimants to descent from the Prophet Muhammad) likewise virtually constituted a separate autonomous community of their own under the headship of the Nakīb el-Eshrāf (Lybyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 206-7; Rycart, Sir Paul: *The Present State of the Ottoman Empire* (London 1668, Starkey and Brome), pp. 110-11). See further, X. ix. 37.



*The Fiasco of the Phanariots' 'Great Idea'*

In the course of the century ending in A.D. 1821 the Phanariot Greek entourage of the Oecumenical Patriarchate came to transmute their old dream of resuscitating the East Roman ghost of the Roman Empire<sup>1</sup> into a new dream of solving 'the Western Question' on the political plane by converting the Ottoman Empire, as Peter the Great had converted the Russian Empire, into a replica of such contemporary Western multinational 'enlightened monarchies' as the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy and the Kingdom of Sardinia; and this ambitious Phanariot Greek political aspiration was fostered by an encouraging series of progressive political successes.

In making the Oecumenical Patriarch *ex officio* millet-bāshī of all the Orthodox Christian *ra'iyyeh* of an expanding Ottoman Empire, Sultan Mehmed II Fātih and Sultan Selim I Yawūz had given this Constantinopolitan prelate political authority over Orthodox Christian peoples that had never been under the rule of any Constantinopolitan emperor since the Arab conquest of Syria and Egypt in the seventh century of the Christian Era;<sup>2</sup> and in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the political power of the Phanar had been farther extended by the action of their free Muslim fellow subjects. During the hundred years following the death, in A.D. 1566, of Suleymān the Magnificent the free Muslims had compelled the Pādishāh's Slave-Household to take them into partnership in the government of the Ottoman Empire, and they had followed up this political victory over the *ci-devant* Christian *qullar* by taking the Greek *ra'iyyeh*, in their turn, into partnership with themselves.

The creation of the offices of Dragoman of the Porte and Dragoman of the Fleet, in order to employ Ottoman Greek ability in the Ottoman service for redressing an adverse balance in the struggle between the Ottoman Empire and the Western Powers, had been followed in the eighteenth century by measures in favour of the Greeks at the expense of non-Greek Orthodox Christian *ra'iyyeh* who had openly taken sides with the 'Osmanlis' Hapsburg and Russian adversaries. During the 110 years between the Ruman Prince Demetrius Cantemir's desertion to the Russian camp in A.D. 1711 and the Greek Prince Hyspilandi's crossing of the Pruth in A.D. 1821, the Porte consistently appointed Phanariot Greek instead of Ruman princes to the thronelets of Wallachia and Moldavia.<sup>3</sup> In A.D. 1737, after the Serb Patriarch Arsenije IV had followed the precedent, set in A.D. 1690 by his predecessor Arsenije III,<sup>4</sup> of inciting his flock to take up arms against the Porte in the Hapsburg cause and subsequently seeking asylum in Hapsburg territory, the Porte appointed a Greek to the vacant patriarchal throne of Peć;<sup>5</sup> and in A.D. 1766 the Porte suppressed both the Serb Patriarchate of Peć and the West Bulgarian Archbishopric of Ochrida<sup>6</sup> and placed the non-Greek flocks of both these hitherto ecclesiastically autonomous Orthodox Christian churches under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of a Greek

<sup>1</sup> See VI. vii. 29-31.

<sup>2</sup> See II. ii. 225, n. 1.

<sup>3</sup> See Hadrovica, L.: *L'Église Serbe sous la Domination Turque* (Paris 1947, Presse Universitaires de France), p. 153.

<sup>4</sup> On this point, see IV. iv. 622.

<sup>5</sup> See pp. 166-8, above.

<sup>6</sup> See IV. iv. 622, n. 6.

Oecumenical Patriarch who, as millet-bāshy of the Millet-i-Rūm, was already politically responsible for them. The dependence on the Phanariots into which the Porte had fallen by the close of the eighteenth century for the conduct of ever more important diplomatic dealings with ever more potent Western Powers is illustrated by the fact that, when in A.D. 1793 the Porte established permanent diplomatic missions in Paris, Vienna, London, and Berlin, it could find no Muslim 'Osmanlis competent to serve as ambassadors, and was compelled to appoint Greek Christian *chargés d'affaires*.<sup>1</sup>

Between A.D. 1766 and A.D. 1821 the Phanariot Greeks might have fancied that they had within their reach an ascendancy in the Ottoman Empire of the kind that the contemporary King-Emperor Joseph II had been working to secure for the Germans in the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy. By this time, however, the Phanariots' apparently promising political position had actually been undermined by repercussions of revolutionary Western political events. In the first place, Enlightened Monarchy—the one Modern Western political institution to which it was practically possible for the Phanariots to accommodate themselves—had been abruptly supplanted by Nationalism as the dominant political ideal in the West itself,<sup>2</sup> and in the second place the non-Greek Orthodox Christian *ra'īyeh* of the Ottoman Empire foresaw no satisfaction for their own awakening national aspirations in the exchange of a Turkish Muslim for a Phanariot Greek ascendancy—as the Rumanian population of the Danubian Principalities showed when, after 110 years' local experience of Phanariot Greek rule, they made a fiasco of Hypsilandi's raid by turning a deaf ear to the Greek invader's summons to them to rally to him as fellow members of an Ottoman Orthodox

<sup>1</sup> See d'Ohsson, I. M.: *Tableau Général de l'Empire Ottoman* (Paris 1788-1824, 7 vols.), vol. vii (Didot), p. 573.

<sup>2</sup> The victory of the ideal of Nationalism over the ideal of Enlightened Monarchy in Ottoman Orthodox Christian souls is reflected in the writings of Korais, who was as ardently nationalist as he was anti-Phanariot and anti-Byzantine.

In a letter addressed to a Greek National Delegation in London, he cites the authority of Franklin, Washington, Jefferson, and Bentham, and quotes one of Franklin's sayings (*Apánthisma*, pp. 20-25). In a letter of the 4th July, 1823, addressed to Alexander Mavrogordáto, on the new constitution of the infant Greek national state, he writes: 'Persuade our countrymen to adopt the institutions of the Anglo-Americans [i.e. the people of the United States] (*ibid.*, p. 255), and in the same letter he conveys his hostility to the Phanariots, though this without discourtesy to his correspondent, through a topical application of the text 'Can any good thing come out of Nazareth?' (*ibid.*, p. 254).

Korais' political convictions worked together with his linguistic and literary ideals to make him execrate the East Roman Empire.

'The yoke of the Romans, the Graeco-Roman Emperors and the Turks weighed each more heavily than the last upon the Hellenes', he wrote in a letter of the 10th January, 1822, addressed to the leaders of the Greek national uprising (*Apánthisma*, p. 4), and in his letter of the 12th October, 1822, to the Chioti he declared that, 'if the Graeco-Roman Emperors had given to the education of the race a small part of the attention that they gave to multiplying churches and monasteries, they would not have betrayed the race to other rulers far worse deluded than they were. For all the evils that we have suffered from the maniac Muslims we are indebted to those material-minded and fleshly Christian Emperors. Now that our turn has come, let us show ourselves wiser and truer Christians than they did, and learn by the misfortunes which they suffered in their generation and bequeathed to us.' (*Apánthisma*, pp. 46-47).

'That macarone Phrantzís! Reading three or four pages of him was enough to make my gout worse! C'est une horreur! And then we are surprised that the Graeco-Roman Empire fell!' (*Apánthisma*, p. 233).

Christian community that was to liberate itself from the Ottoman yoke by taking up arms under Phanariot Greek leadership.<sup>1</sup>

*The Disruption of an Ottoman Orthodox Christendom by a Modern Western Nationalism*

This frustration of the Phanariots' 'Great Idea' was an intimation that a multi-national Orthodox Christian Millet-i-Rûm which had set its heart on adopting a Modern Western way of life on the political as well as on the educational plane would now have to sort itself out into a patchwork of parochial Greek, Ruman, Serb, Bulgar, Albanian, and Georgian national states—on the pattern of France, Spain, Portugal, Holland, and Great Britain—in each of which a particular language, instead of a particular religion, would be the shibboleth uniting 'fellow countrymen' and distinguishing them from 'foreigners', even though these 'foreigners' might be Christians of the same Orthodox Faith who, under the Ottoman dispensation, had been fellow members, *ex officio religionis*, of the same empire-wide Millet-i-Rûm.

At the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the makings of this exotic Modern Western pattern in the linguistic and political map of the Ottoman Empire were exiguous. Within the Ottoman frontiers at that date there were few districts whose population was even approximately homogeneous in linguistic nationality, and few which possessed even the rudiments of local statehood. Ottoman Orthodox Christian autonomous territories could almost be counted on the fingers of one hand: the two Rumanian principalities Wallachia and Moldavia<sup>2</sup> and the four Georgian principalities Gurjel, Mingrelia, Imeretia, and Abkhazia would exhaust the list. The only other materials for building Orthodox Christian national states out of the ruins of a disintegrating Ottoman Empire were single communities—like the Greek and Moreot Albanian islands and portlets noticed above<sup>3</sup>—which enjoyed some measure of autonomy by charter, custom, or inadvertence, and barbarian fastnesses—like the Mani, the Agrapha,<sup>4</sup> the Shumadiya, and Montenegro—which had either never effectively been brought under Ottoman rule or had effectively succeeded in casting it off.<sup>5</sup> The enduring political effects of ephemeral eighteenth-century occupations of the Lower Morava Basin by the Hapsburgs and of the Morea by the Venetians declared themselves in the nineteenth century when these areas became the nuclei of a Serb and a Greek national state.<sup>6</sup>

Bulgarian and Albanian national states<sup>7</sup> were slower in making their

<sup>1</sup> This Rumanian reaction to Hypsilandi's adventure, and its decisive effect on the Greek adventurer's fortunes, have been noticed in II. ii. 227.

<sup>2</sup> The adjoining principality of Transylvania had likewise been under Ottoman suzerainty in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the Ottoman Power had been at its apogee; but the Rumanian Orthodox Christian and Uniate element in the population of Transylvania was not one of the politically enfranchised Transylvanian 'nations', though in numbers it may already have been equal to the Magyars, Szekels, and Saxons put together.

<sup>3</sup> On pp. 174-5.

<sup>4</sup> See p. 175, n. 3, above.  
<sup>5</sup> The nuclei of the Greek successor-state of the Ottoman Empire have been enumerated, by anticipation, in II. ii. 261-2.

<sup>6</sup> See V. v. 637-8.

<sup>7</sup> In Albania, by the time when she recovered her independence, the Orthodox Christian element in the population had dwindled to a minority confined to the South.

appearance, and, when they did appear, they owed their foundation to the action of foreign Powers. The Bulgarian successor-state of the Ottoman Empire was brought to birth in A.D. 1877 by Russia and the Albanian in A.D. 1913 by the Hapsburg Monarchy and Italy. Moreover, all these ex-Ottoman Orthodox Christian national states came into existence piecemeal, and the labour of winning a fragmentary autonomy or independence had to be followed up by the further labour of bringing the fragments together.<sup>1</sup> Moldavia had to be united with Wallachia, Montenegro with Serbia, Eastern Rumelia with Bulgaria, an autonomous Samos and an autonomous Crete with a nuclear Kingdom of Greece; and the process of redistributing Ottoman territory into national domains had to be completed by a dismemberment of Macedonia—the most recalcitrant of all Ottoman territories to this painfully protracted process of partition, just because Macedonia had been the quintessence of the Ottoman Empire on the Rumelian side of the Straits.

This radical reconstruction of the political map of Ottoman Orthodox Christendom, in order to make it conform to a revolutionary Modern Western pattern, spelled misery for millions of human beings over a period of four or five generations beginning at the outbreak of the Great Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1768–74 and ending only in the breathing-space between the First and the Second World War; and the suffering inflicted became more widespread and concurrently more intense as the procrustean operation was successively performed upon territories and populations that were less and less amenable to being reorganized politically on a basis of nationality in the Modern Western understanding of the idea.<sup>2</sup> Even the Morea, as it was in A.D. 1821, could not be made as Greek as a contemporary France was French without exterminating a previously dominant Ottoman Muslim minority, amounting to about 10 per cent. of the total population of the *eyâlet*,<sup>3</sup> by a barbarous combination of eviction and massacre.

*κλαίνε μανούλαις γιὰ παιδιά, γυναῖκες γιὰ τοὺς ἄνδρες,  
κλαίει καὶ μιὰ χανούμισσα γιὰ τὸ μοναχογιό της.*<sup>4</sup>

This exultantly savage Orthodox Christian Greek Moreot paean on the destruction of the tyrannical Muslim Albanian Moreot township of Lála in June 1821<sup>5</sup> is characteristic of the inhuman spirit that inspired the partition of the Ottoman Empire during the next hundred years. In a world in which the existing communities were geographically intermingled and economically interdependent, an indigenous millet system of communal organization, which had faithfully reflected this Ottoman

The Centre had become predominantly Muslim (see pp. 164–5, above), while the North had remained predominantly Roman Catholic.

<sup>1</sup> The apprenticeship which many of these fragments had to serve under Ottoman suzerainty, as the price of being stamped with the seal of legitimacy by the Porte, has been noticed in VI. vii. 16–17.

<sup>2</sup> See II. ii. 227–8.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 681–3, below.

<sup>4</sup> *Οἱ Λαλιώτισσες*, in Poltits, N. G.: 'Εκλογαὶ ἀπὸ τὰ Τραγούδια τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Λαοῦ (Athens 1914, Estia), p. 18: 'Mothers weep for children, wives for their husbands, and a lady [khanum] weeps for her only son.'

<sup>5</sup> On the 31st May, 1912, the ruins of Lála were still lying desolate when the writer of this Study walked past them that morning en route from Olympia to Dhírvri.

society's structure, could not be rejected in favour of an exotic ideology of Nationalism, which reflected the quite alien structure of a Late Modern Western Society, without precipitating an Ishmaelitish struggle for existence.<sup>1</sup> In preaching to the hitherto widely dispersed speakers of each of the interwoven languages of the Ottoman Empire that they had a hitherto unheard-of sacred right to possess a sovereign independent linguistically homogeneous national state of their own on the pattern of a France or a Spain, the Ottoman Orthodox Christian apostles of a novel Western political creed were, in effect, inciting their brethren to make a virtue of evicting or massacring their neighbours for the crime of having inherited a different mother tongue; and, in the name of an alien ideal which had thus been imported in an evil hour, the shot-silk fabric of a seamless Ottoman robe was remorselessly plucked to pieces by cruel hands, and the broken threads of each diverse national hue were then roughly rewoven into so many separate rags to make a patchwork coat of many colours in which the only note of uniformity was a monotonously pervasive stain of blood.<sup>2</sup> A crescendo of atrocities and tragedies came to its climax in the wholesale deportation of an Armenian minority in the eastern vilayets in A.D. 1915 by order of a 'New 'Osmanli' government of the day, and the wholesale flight of a Greek Orthodox Christian

<sup>1</sup> Gen. xvi. 12.

<sup>2</sup> This morally devastating effect of the impact of a Modern Western Nationalism upon an Ottoman Orthodox Christendom during this dark century of ex-Ottoman Orthodox Christian history was aggravated by the vein of Archaism with which the intrusive Western ideology had been charged, before export, by a Western Romantic Movement. A partition of Macedonia between Bulgarian, Turkish, Greek, Albanian, and Serbian national successor-states of the Ottoman Empire would have been difficult enough to achieve without fearful injustices and atrocities, even if each of the interested nationalities had scrupulously limited its claims to territories in which a majority of the living generation of the inhabitants genuinely wished to be included in the claimant nationality's inchoate national state. The conflict between rival national claims, and the malice, hatred, and all uncharitableness envenoming the feelings of the ex-Ottoman Orthodox Christian peoples towards one another, were, however, further accentuated by an Archaism which, instead of being content to take the living map as the basis for its territorial claims, insisted upon basing these on some perhaps quite ephemeral past state of the map in which the political domination, as distinct from the national domain, of this or that people had been at its maximum extent. The Serbs, for example, would claim the frontiers of the fourteenth-century empire of Stephen Dushan; the Bulgars would claim the frontiers of the tenth-century empires of Samuel and Symeon; the Greeks would claim the frontiers of the eleventh-century empire of Basil the Bulgarslayer (*Βουλγαροκτόνος*)—and this not as a multi-national empire in which the Greeks were merely to exercise an ascendancy, but as a Greek national state that was to be as Greek as France was French.

The Ottoman Turks themselves, when the Turkish diaspora in Macedonia caught the infection of an archaistic Western Nationalism from their insurgent Orthodox Christian *ra'îyeh*, toyed with the conceit of seeking an ultra-archaistic compensation for a Rumili which could never be saved for a Turkish national state, though it had been the heart of an Ottoman Empire. Academic-minded Turkish archaist-nationalists cast back to a pre-Islamic and pre-sedentary chapter in the history of a Eurasian Nomad minority of their forebears (see p. 262, n. 1, below). They consoled themselves for the loss of Rumili by conjuring up the vision of Qyzyl Elmā: a legendary Garden of Eden, in which a primeval Turkish people had eaten of the magic fruit of the Red Apple tree long before Ertoghul's fugitive war-band had been blown out of the Steppe by a Mongol explosion. Were not at least two-thirds of the Turkish-speaking portion of Mankind still to be found in Eurasia outside an Ottoman Turkey's frontiers? One of the most signal evidences of Ghāzi Mustafā Kemāl Atatürk's political genius was his clear recognition that a visionary pursuit of this mirage of a Yeni Tûrān beyond the eastern limits of an Ottoman Turkish national home in Anatolia was bound to bring Turkey into a disastrous headlong collision with a Russia who had not indicated any relaxation of her hold upon the Crimea, the Volga Basin, the Caucasus, and Central Asia in styling herself 'the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' instead of 'the Russian Empire'.



minority from Western Anatolia in A.D. 1922 after the débâcle of invading Greek armies that had avenged Mehmed Fâtiḥ's conquest of Constantinople by overrunning the cradle of the Ottoman Power. It was only after these supreme catastrophes that the sufferings of 'displaced persons' were mitigated by the beneficent intervention of the League of Nations, and the national feud between Greeks and Turks was brought to an end by the statesmanship of Elefthérios Venizélos and Mustafâ Kemâl Atatürk.<sup>1</sup>

Orthodox Christian national states that had come into existence in these untoward circumstances and on this petty scale could not, of course, indulge, like a Westernizing Russian Empire, in the ambition of playing, *vis-à-vis* the Modern West, the role of the East Roman Empire *vis-à-vis* a Medieval Western Christendom. Their feeble energies were absorbed in local disputes over small parcels of territory, and, though the territorial aspirations of the Serb and Rumanian national successor-states of the Ottoman Empire were partly responsible for the break-up of one great Modern Western state, the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy,<sup>2</sup> the bitterest animosities of these politically reanimated Orthodox Christian peoples were those which they harboured against one another. Even if the emergence of this cluster of Orthodox Christian national states in South-Eastern Europe had been forestalled by a successful realization of the Phanariots' 'Great Idea', a reconstituted East Roman Empire could never have challenged the West on its own account, supposing that its makers had conceived the ambition; for it could never even have come into existence, or kept itself in existence after being set up, unless it had been established by Russian force of arms and been maintained as Russia's satellite. This did not come to pass, though the Empress Catherine II of Russia played with the idea<sup>3</sup> after her great victory over the Ottoman Empire in the Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1768-74. In the event the petty national states into which the Ottoman Millet-i-Rûm eventually sorted itself out in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries found themselves in an international situation not unlike that of their predecessors during the centuries immediately preceding the establishment of a *Pax Ottomanica* in the main body of Orthodox Christendom. In that age the Greeks, Serbs, Bulgars, and Rumans had been confronted with a choice between domination by their Medieval Western fellow Christians and domination by the 'Osmanlis. In a post-Ottoman Age the alternatives that confronted them were incorporation into a secular Modern Western body social and subjection, first to a Petrine, and thereafter to a Communist, Russia.

*Russia's Competition with the West for the Ex-Ottoman Orthodox Christians' Allegiance*

In A.D. 1952 a majority of these non-Russian Orthodox Christian peoples were actually under Russia's military and political control. Georgia was one of the constituent republics of the Soviet Union; Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania were satellites of the Soviet Union. The

<sup>1</sup> See VI. vii 30-31.

<sup>2</sup> See II. ii. 177-88.

<sup>3</sup> See II. ii. 225, n. 2.



only two non-Russian Orthodox Christian countries which at this date were not in Russia's clutches were Greece—where the Russians had eventually been worsted in an undeclared war-after-the-war between the Soviet Union and the United States in which the combatants on the two sides had been Greek proxies of the foreign belligerents—and Yugoslavia, which had thrown off a post-war Russian hegemony without having been overtly molested up to date; and even Yugoslavia, whose rulers had not repudiated Communism in repudiating their allegiance to Moscow, had found herself, like Greece, unable to keep Russia at bay out of her own resources, without drawing upon American aid. At the same time it was significant that, save for the single case of Georgia,<sup>1</sup> this Russian domination over non-Russian Orthodox Christian countries had been established only since the end of the General War of A.D. 1939-45; that even an indirect exercise of Russian power was everywhere odious to all but a small minority of Communists who were governing these countries with Russian backing as the Soviet Government's agents; that the Yugoslav Communists had already rebelled against the hegemony of their Russian comrades; and that this recalcitrance against a Russian ascendancy was an old story which could be illustrated from the history of Russia's relations with Rumania, Bulgaria, and Serbia in the nineteenth century, at dates long previous to the metamorphosis of the Russian Empire into the Soviet Union.

On the morrow of the Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1877-8, for example, Russia had looked forward, with a not unreasonable confidence, to exercising a paramount political influence over a Serbia whom she had just rescued from a single-handed struggle with Turkey, over a Rumania to whom she had just presented the Dobruja, and, above all, over a Bulgaria whom she had just brought into existence *ex nihilo* through the sheer force of Russian arms. Yet, in the sequel, Bulgaria shook off Russia's tutelage at the first opportunity, Serbia veered back for a generation (A.D. 1881-1903) into the political orbit of the Hapsburg Monarchy, and Rumania—forgetting the acquisition of the Dobruja and only remembering that, in exchange for this piece of Ottoman territory, Russia had forced her to retrocede the fraction of Bessarabia that had been

<sup>1</sup> The United Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti, which was the largest and most important of the Georgian states, placed itself under Russian suzerainty in A.D. 1783; was annexed by Russia at the turn of the years A.D. 1800 and A.D. 1801 (the exact date is variously given as either the 18th December, 1800, or the 18th January, 1801); and was finally subdued, after a last rebellion, in A.D. 1812. The Principality of Mingrelia was annexed by Russia in A.D. 1803 and the Principality of Imeretia in A.D. 1804-10. Persia renounced in Russia's favour all claims over Kartli-Kakheti, Mingrelia, Imeretia, and Abkhazia in the Russo-Persian peace treaty concluded at Gulistan in A.D. 1813. Turkey recognized Russian sovereignty over Kartli-Kakheti, Mingrelia, and Imeretia, and also over Gurriel, in the Russo-Turkish peace treaty concluded at Adrianople on the 14th September, 1829, Art. 4. In the same article Turkey ceded to Russia the town of Akhaltsik and the fort of Akhalkalak. Details will be found in W. E. D. Allen: 'The Caucasus', in *The Baltic and Caucasian States* (London 1923, Hodder and Stoughton), pp. 195-9, and in the same author's *A History of the Georgian People* (London 1932, Regan Paul), pp. 210-18.

The Russian annexation of Georgia at the beginning of the nineteenth century, like the French conquest of Corsica in A.D. 1768, had the unforeseen effect of providing a political genius born in the annexed territory with a field for his abilities and ambitions which would have been closed to him if his obscure and secluded homeland had not been swallowed up by an acquisitive Great Power. No more would have been heard of Stalin as a Georgian priest than of Napoleon as a Corsican patriot.

presented to Rumania by the victors in the Crimean war<sup>1</sup>—came to look upon Russia, instead of Turkey, as her national bugbear.<sup>2</sup>

This anti-Russian feeling in non-Russian Orthodox Christian countries might seem at first sight surprising at a time when Orthodox Christianity was still the established religion of a Russian state that claimed to be the heir of the East Roman Empire. In the ninth-century Macedonian Slav dialect known as 'Old Slavonic' the Russian, Rumanian,<sup>3</sup> Bulgarian, and Serbian Orthodox churches had a common liturgical language, while the Russian, Bulgar, and Serb peoples were also more intimately linked by the kinship between their living Slav vernaculars. Why did 'Pan-Slavism' and 'Pan-Orthodoxy' prove of so little avail to Russia in her dealings with the Slavonic-speaking and other

<sup>1</sup> Bessarabia—the slice of territory between the Rivers Dniestr and Pruth—had been divided under the Ottoman régime into two parts: the Bujăq, on the Black Sea Coast, which was under Nomad occupation and Ottoman administration, and an inland part which was cultivated by a Rumanian and Ukrainian peasantry and was an integral portion of the autonomous principality of Moldavia. In A.D. 1812, Russia had compelled the Porte to cede both parts of Bessarabia to her as the price of peace at the end of the Russo-Turkish War of 1807–12 (Russo-Turkish peace treaty concluded at Bucarest on the 28th May, 1812, Art. 4).

<sup>2</sup> This substitution of Russia for Turkey as the principal foreign object of the Rumanian people's dislike and apprehension was a natural consequence of this particular Orthodox Christian nation's situation and history. Situated, as they were, in the fairway of Russia's overland avenue for the invasion of Rumelia, the Rumans had been the first Ottoman Orthodox Christian people to have a first-hand experience of a Russian 'liberating' army; and they had also been the only Ottoman Orthodox Christian people that had escaped the experience of being subject to a local Muslim 'ascendancy'. The treaties under which the two Ruman principalities Wallachia and Moldavia had originally submitted to Ottoman suzerainty had provided that they should be exempt from colonization by Muslims and should continue to be governed by Christian princes; and consequently the misgovernment and oppression from which they had suffered under an Ottoman dispensation had been inflicted on them first by Ruman Orthodox Christian and later by Greek Orthodox Christian, but never directly by Turkish Muslim, hands. In these circumstances it is not surprising that in A.D. 1711, when a Russian army made its appearance in the Lower Danube Basin for the first time since Svyatoslav's retreat in A.D. 971 or 972 (see p. 127, n. 2, above), the Rumans should have shown reserve, whereas the Montenegrins and Herzegovinians rose in arms at the arrival, not of a Russian army, but of a mere inflammatory scrap of Russian paper in the shape of a proclamation. It is true that in A.D. 1711 the Hospodar of Moldavia, Demetrius Cantemir, did throw in his lot with the Russians (see p. 162, above), and that there was a party in favour of the same policy in the more distant, as well as more important, principality of Wallachia; but the Hospodar of Wallachia, Constantine Brăncoveanu, refused to commit himself and eventually came down on the side of his Ottoman suzerain, and in this policy he seems to have had behind him a majority of the Wallachian boyars. 'As one of them said: "It is dangerous to declare for Russia until the Tsar's army crosses the Danube. Who knows, moreover, whether Wallachia in the power of the Russians will be happier than under the dominion of the Turks?"' After the battle on the Pruth, one of Brăncoveanu's (Brăncoveanu's) close adherents wrote in praise of his wisdom in 'awaiting the decision of a battle in which it has finally been seen that, beneath German clothes, the Muscovites are still Muscovites'. Here in two nutshell is summed up the reason for Peter's failure to win Wallachia' (Sumner, B. H.: *Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire* (Oxford 1949, Blackwell), p. 44, where the reader will find the references to the sources of the two dicta quoted above).

<sup>3</sup> In the Rumanian principalities, 'Old Slavonic' continued to be the sole current liturgical language of the Orthodox Christian Church down to A.D. 1679, when the Metropolitan of Moldavia, Dositheos, published at Jassy a translation of the Liturgy into Rumanian. The Bible likewise was translated into Rumanian in A.D. 1688. The introduction of the Rumanian version of the Liturgy encountered opposition, and in the reign of Prince Constantine Brăncoveanu of Wallachia (*Junegatur* A.D. 1688–1714) there was a reaction in favour of the 'Old Slavonic' classical language. Thereafter, Greek ousted 'Old Slavonic' as the language of higher secular education in the principalities, while 'Rumanian remained the language of the Liturgy' (Jorga, N.: *Geschichte der Rumänen und ihrer Kultur* (Herrmannstadt [Sibiu] 1929, Krafft und Drotleff), pp. 233–4 and 239–40).

Orthodox Christian peoples to whom she repeatedly gave such effective help in their struggles to extricate themselves from Ottoman toils?

The answer appears to be that the Ottoman Orthodox Christians had already fallen under the spell of the Modern Western Civilization before Russia had offered herself to be their champion and redeemer, and that Russia was attractive to them—in so far as she did attract them at all—neither because she was Slav nor because she was Orthodox but because she was a pioneer in a cultural enterprise of 'winning the West' which was the goal of their own ambitions. The closer their acquaintance with Russia, the more alive the non-Russian Orthodox Christian peoples became to the superficiality of a Petrine Russia's Western veneer. 'Scratch a Russian and you will find a Tatar!'<sup>1</sup> However much these former *ra'iyyeh* might be indebted to Russia for their liberation from an Ottoman yoke, it was natural that they should take advantage of their newly gained liberty by going straight to the Western fountain-head instead of being content to receive the living waters of the West through a mud-choked Russian channel. This is perhaps the explanation of the apparent paradox that the prestige of Russia in Greek, Ruman, Serb, and Bulgar eyes diminished in proportion as Russia became a more familiar figure and a more potent presence in these South-East European Orthodox Christian peoples' lives.

Russian influence over them was, in fact, at its apogee in the generation immediately following the Great Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1768-74. The decisive victory over a once irresistible Ottoman Power that had been won in this war by Russia thanks to her adoption of a Modern Western military technique was as thrilling for the 'Osmanlis' *ra'iyyeh* as it was disconcerting to the 'Osmanlis' themselves; and, though the Russian naval expeditionary force in the Mediterranean had done the Moreot Greeks a poor service by irresponsibly inciting them to revolt without being able to give them effective aid against the avalanche of Albanian Muslim barbarians whom the 'Osmanlis' let loose upon them in retaliation,<sup>2</sup> the moral effect of this unfortunate Greek experience of Russian intervention was more than offset by the Russians' naval and military successes in the war and by the vigour of their political exploitation of the terms of peace.

The peace treaty concluded at Küçük Qaynarja on the 21st July, 1774, stipulated (Art. 11) that Russia was to have the same treatment, rights, and status in the Ottoman dominions as were enjoyed at the time by France and Great Britain, just as if the terms of the French and British capitulations then in force had been incorporated in the treaty *verbatim*, and it was provided in the same article that Russian consulates, on the same footing as the French and British consulates, might be established at any place in Ottoman territory. In the subsequent Russo-Turkish commercial treaty of the 21st June, 1783, it was expressly agreed<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 'It will take the Russians a long time to shake off from themselves the habits and way of thought inherited from a barbarous ancestry. *Gratter le Russe et vous trouverez le Tartare, ça c'est une insulte aux Tartares.* This is a hackneyed expression; however, it is a true one' (Burnaby, F.: *A Ride to Khiva* [in A.D. 1875] (London 1877, Cassell), p. 82).

<sup>2</sup> See V. v. 294. Details will be found in Sakellarios, *op. cit.* pp. 162-204.

<sup>3</sup> In Arts. 50, 51, and 54.

that Russian consuls should have the right, already enjoyed by the representatives of other capitulatory Powers,<sup>1</sup> of maintaining tax-free and otherwise privileged Ottoman servants. Russia made it her policy to exploit these treaty rights by using Greek Ottoman subjects as her instruments. Ottoman Greeks, selected by Russian consuls in the Ottoman Empire, were sent to Russia to be educated at the Russian Government's expense,<sup>2</sup> and from A.D. 1818 onwards Greeks were appointed to Russian consulships.<sup>3</sup> Ships belonging to Orthodox Christian Ottoman subjects were licensed by the Russian authorities to trade under the Russian flag<sup>4</sup>—a favour which gave the first impetus to the boom in Greek shipping that reached its peak during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.<sup>5</sup>

In the generation immediately preceding the Greek national uprising of A.D. 1821 the new maritime cities founded by the Russian Government on the north coast of the Black Sea,<sup>6</sup> after the acquisition of this seaboard by Russia in the Russo-Turkish wars of A.D. 1768–74 and A.D. 1787–92, played an important role in the emancipation of the Greeks as clinics in which Greek *ra'īyeh* were inoculated with a revolutionary Western political ferment. The trade through these newly founded ports which sprang up between their Russian continental hinterland and the Ottoman shores of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean not only brought Ottoman Greek shipping into their harbours but attracted permanent Greek residents; and the Greek commercial colony at Odessa gave birth in A.D. 1814 to 'the Society of Friends' (*Φιλική Εταιρεία*), a Greek nationalist secret society which set itself to conduct an underground propaganda in Greek-inhabited Ottoman territories. The Greeks serving as Russian consuls in the Ottoman Empire

'were all initiated into the *Etaireia ton Philikon* and acted as missionaries themselves, and their propaganda found acceptance among the rest of the Greeks and won their confidence, because everybody believed that Russia was inextricably involved in these activities and that she would take part in the Greek conflict.'<sup>7</sup>

These words were written in retrospect by Photákos Khrysanthópoulos, who played his part in the subsequent Greek War of Independence as aide-de-camp to Kolokotrónis; and the story of Photákos's early life is a personal illustration of the stimulus imparted to Ottoman Greeks by contact with Russia in this generation.

Photákos, as he records in his memoirs,<sup>8</sup> was the son, born in A.D. 1798, of a Moreot Greek Orthodox Christian priest. His native village was Maghoulaná in the interior of the peninsula, and he received a Greek primary education there before going on to the recently founded Greek higher school at Vytína. By this date the Moreot Greeks were becoming political-minded.

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 172–3, above.

<sup>2</sup> See Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 267.

<sup>3</sup> See Khrysanthópoulos, Ph.: *Ἀπομνημονεύματα* (Athens 1899, Sakellarios, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. 16.

<sup>4</sup> See Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. 280–1.

<sup>5</sup> See pp. 175–7, above.

<sup>6</sup> Kherson was founded in A.D. 1778, Nikolayev in A.D. 1789, Odessa in A.D. 1792.

<sup>7</sup> Khrysanthópoulos, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 16.

<sup>8</sup> Khrysanthópoulos, *op. cit.*, Introduction, vol. i, pp. ix–xiii.

'It was customary for all the inhabitants of a village or a small country-town to meet after the end of divine service. They came out of church, stopped in the churchyard, and talked together there; and, if the more intelligent among them happened to have heard any foreign news—perhaps about a war between the Westerners (*Φράγκοι*) and the Turks—they used to tell it, and everybody was pleased, above all when it was Russia that had won a battle. When that happened, they used to join with the priest in a prayer to God to give our co-religionists strength to overthrow our enemies the Turks.'<sup>1</sup>

At Vytína in this atmosphere the young Photákos imbibed political ideas which made his father anxious to get the boy out of the country for fear that he might fall foul of the Turks; and so, in A.D. 1813, Photákos was taken, with other young Moreot Greeks, to Russia by a Moreot business man, established there, who had been back in the Morea on a visit. In Russia Photákos went into business in the inland Bessarabian town of Kishinyóv, but, hearing of the existence of the Philikí Etairía, he migrated to Odessa and was initiated. In A.D. 1820 he was sent by the society as their emissary to the Morea to pass the word that the 25th March, 1821, was to be 'the day'. His expenses were paid by a rich Odessan Greek business man, and he sailed from Odessa to Hýdhra on board an Hydriot ship.

Photákos' account of the effect of life in Russia on himself and his compatriots is as convincing as it is vivid:

'The Greeks . . . always longed to go to Russia. There we could work and earn our bread and after a time forget our fear and cease to be *ra 'tyeh* of the Turks. We could cleanse ourselves inside and outside, realise that we were human beings, walk with a confident step, and catch the new atmosphere from one another. We could hear the bells of the churches ringing freely; we could go to their churches and give thanks in the liturgy of our religion with a devotion that came from the heart. And, when we had taken our fill of all these blessings, we could begin to consider how to liberate our parents, brothers, and relatives and our beloved country, so that she too might recover her splendour, like Russia.

'This terrible mental cancer prayed upon our lives, and we could never conclude our reflections without our eyes being clouded with tears. Why should we be slaves of the Turks, the most barbarous nation in the World? This weeping and lamentation of ours, and all our other miseries, filled every place where Greeks were gathered together. Equality, fraternity, loyalty, and mutual affection were general among us, and after the day's work we were continually meeting in our leisure hours and discussing the liberation of our country. Everyone sent his savings to his birthplace, to his parents and other relatives; and he sent his native commune and the village church a few books, a little lamp, or a little bell. And so we continued for the present. There in Russia our national consciousness grew, and our hearts burnt unquenchably within us. Had Russia not been there, or had she been another nation with another religion, it is questionable whether we should have secured our liberation or preserved our nationality. Where else, indeed, should we have brought our embryonic liberty to birth?'<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Khrysanthópoulos, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 35; cp. p. 15.

<sup>2</sup> Khrysanthópoulos, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 16-18.



In Russia, on this new ground so lately won from Nomadism for the agriculture, commerce, and industry of a sedentary civilization, Ottoman Greek immigrants at the opening of the nineteenth century experienced the exhilaration of breathing fresh air; but, if Phôtakos is a faithful interpreter of their state of mind, they were still unaware of the source of the life-giving breeze. Though they were inhaling it within the expanding borders of a Russian Orthodox Christendom, its provenance was not Russia and its ozone was not Orthodoxy. The mighty rushing wind that was sweeping out of the Russian forests across the Ukrainian steppes and over the sea to Greece had not been raised by any local atmospheric conditions; it had come from afar, and a scientific inquirer bent on tracing it back to its origin would have had to make a pilgrimage from Odessa northwards overland to Riga, and from Riga westwards overseas, to find the distant source of this spiritual elixir in Holland and Britain and America. The atmosphere in early nineteenth-century Russia that inspired the Ottoman Greeks was a Western atmosphere to which Russia was merely giving passage; and in succumbing to this atmosphere they were opting, even if unconsciously, not for Russia, but for the West.

### 3. *The Modern West and the Hindu World*<sup>1</sup>

#### *Likenesses and Differences in the Situations of a Hindu Society under British Rule and an Ottoman Orthodox Christendom*

The circumstances in which the Hindu World encountered the Modern West were in some points remarkably similar to those in which the main body of Orthodox Christendom underwent the same experience. The Hindu World, too, had entered into its universal state by the time when the impact of the Modern Western Civilization upon it began to make itself felt there;<sup>2</sup> in India, as in the non-Russian part of Orthodox Christendom, this universal state had been imposed by alien empire-builders who were children of the Iranic Muslim Civilization; and in

<sup>1</sup> See xi, maps 52A and 53.

<sup>2</sup> If we are right in our view that a universal state was imposed on the Hindu World by alien hands in the form of the Timurid Mughal Empire, and also right in equating the effective establishment of the Mughal Rāj with Akbar's conquest of Gujerāt in A.D. 1572, this event in Hindu history did not occur till seventy-four years after the first landfall of Western ocean-faring mariners on the west coast of the sub-continent; but da Gama's arrival at Calicut in A.D. 1498 did not produce the sensation in India that it produced in Venice and in Egypt, where it was immediately realized that the rounding of the Cape of Good Hope by Portuguese ships was a threat to all parties commercially interested in the traditional short route between India and Western Europe via the Indian Ocean and the Levant. The continental-minded Central Asian Muslim conquerors of the interior of the Indian sub-continent were as insensitive to landfalls on the coast as they were sensitive to passages of the Hindu Kush; and, though their latest representative, the Timurid Mughal empire-builder Bābur, crossed the Hindu Kush only six years, and descended from Kābul upon the Panjab only twenty-one years, after da Gama had arrived in India by sea, there is no mention of the Portuguese explorer's feat in the memoirs of the Central Asian soldier. Even in the eyes of Bābur's grandson Akbar, the founder of the Mughal Rāj, the handful of Westerners squatting on sufferance in one or two ports on the fringes of his enormous realm were still little more than objects of curiosity as the pedlars of ingenious toys and the missionaries of an interesting religion. Indeed, the impact of the West on Mughal India hardly began to make itself felt seriously before the Mughal power had begun to go into decline after the death of Awrangzib in A.D. 1707.



Mughal India, as in Ottoman Orthodox Christendom, the subjects of these Muslim rulers were feeling the attraction of their masters' alien culture at the time when the Modern West appeared above their horizon, but subsequently transferred their cultural allegiance to this later-risen star as the West manifestly increased and the Islamic Society manifestly decreased in potency. These striking points of similarity between the two situations throw into relief, however, certain not less striking points of difference.

For example, when the Ottoman Orthodox Christians made the cultural change of front in which they turned away from the Ottoman toward the Modern Western way of life, they had to overcome a traditional antipathy to the West which had become ingrained in the hearts of their ancestors as a result of an unfortunate experience of the West in a previous encounter with it in its medieval phase. By contrast, the Hindus, in their corresponding cultural reorientation, had no such unhappy memories to live down; for the encounter between the Hindu World and the West that began on the day when da Gama made his landfall at Calicut was virtually the first contact that had ever occurred between these two societies.

Moreover, this difference in the antecedents is overshadowed by a still more important difference in the sequel. In the history of a non-Russian Orthodox Christendom the alien universal state which this society brought upon itself<sup>1</sup> remained in the hands of its original Iranic Muslim founders until it went into dissolution after reaching its natural term. An Ottoman Empire which fell on evil days before the close of the sixteenth century, when its classical régime of government through the Pādishāh's Slave-Household broke down after the death of Suleymān the Magnificent, was restored in the course of the seventeenth century when, under the leadership of the House of Köprülü, the free Muslim community in the Empire took over the reins of government<sup>2</sup> and secured effective assistance in its formidable task by taking the Phanariot leaders of a subject Orthodox Christian community into a junior partnership with itself.<sup>3</sup> The Mughal Empire achieved no corresponding recovery from the similar anarchy into which it fell after the death of Awrangzib, and, while the Hindu, like the Orthodox Christian, universal state lived out its life to the term of its natural expectation and likewise remained to the end in alien hands, there was in this case a transfer of control from one pair of alien hands to another.

The empire which the Timurid war-lords' feeble successors failed to hold together was reconstituted by British business men who stepped into Akbar's shoes when they became aware that the framework of law and order in India, without which no Westerners could carry on their trade there, was going to be restored by the French if the British did not

<sup>1</sup> The subjugation of the main body of Orthodox Christendom by the 'Osmanlis is accounted for by the contemporary native historians Dhoúkas and Phrantzls as being God's judgement on His Orthodox Christian people for their sins; and this verdict may be accepted by an historian who does not believe that the Orthodox Christians were in any special sense God's Chosen People if the particular sins for which the Orthodox Christians had to pay this price may be identified with the two political vices of autocracy and factiousness.

<sup>2</sup> See V. vi. 208-9.

<sup>3</sup> See II. ii. 222-8; III. iii. 47-48; V. v. 154-5; and pp. 162-3, above.

forestall these rivals by doing the work themselves. Thus the Westernization of the Hindu World entered on its critical stage in a period in which India was under Western rule, and in consequence the reception of the Modern Western culture was initiated in India, as in Russia, from above downwards, and not from below upwards, as in an Ottoman Orthodox Christendom.

*The Reception of a Modern Western Culture and its Political Consequences*

In this situation the Brahman and Banya castes of the Hindu Society, between them, succeeded in playing the part in Hindu history for which, in non-Russian Orthodox Christian history, the Phanariot Greeks made an unsuccessful bid. Under all political régimes in India, one of the prerogatives of the Brahmans had been to serve as ministers of state. They had played this part in the Indic World before playing it in an affiliated Hindu Society; and, after the breakdown of the Hindu Civilization in the twelfth century of the Christian Era<sup>1</sup> and the subsequent progressive intrusion of Iranic Muslim invaders into a disintegrating Hindu Society's domain,<sup>2</sup> these alien intruders found it convenient, if not indispensable, to follow in this point the practice of the Hindu states which they were supplanting. Brahman ministers and minor officials in the service of Muslim rulers made this alien rule less odious than it would otherwise have been to the Hindu majority of these Indian Muslim princes' subjects, because these Brahman intermediaries understood how to handle their fellow Hindus and at the same time enjoyed a prestige in their eyes which reconciled the rank-and-file to following the dominant caste's lead in accommodating themselves to an irksome alien political yoke. In making this use of the Brahmans the Mughal Rāj followed the precedent of the parochial Indian Muslim states whose former dominions it had united under its own rule, and the British Rāj, in its turn, followed the precedent of the Mughal Rāj,<sup>3</sup> while British economic enterprise in India, both public and private, opened up corresponding opportunities for the Banyas.

As a consequence of the transfer of the government of India to British hands, the policy of the British régime in making English, instead of Persian, the official language of the Indian imperial administration, and giving Western literature a preference over Persian and Sanskrit literature as a medium of Indian higher education,<sup>4</sup> had as great an effect on Hindu cultural history as was made upon Russian cultural history by the Westernizing policy of Peter the Great. In the Hindu, as in the Russian, Society, Western letters, and, with them, a venter of Western life, came into vogue among the dominant classes through the fiat of an autocratic oecumenical government and not through the personal initiative of private individuals, which was the agency through which the *ra'îyeh* of the Ottoman Porte had made themselves acquainted with the Modern

<sup>1</sup> See IV. iv. 99-100.

<sup>2</sup> See xi, maps 44 and 45.

<sup>3</sup> In enlisting the services of Hindus in the administration of British India, the British authorities did not deliberately give the Brahmans any special preference, but the Brahmans' hereditary ascendancy in the Hindu Society enabled them once again to secure the lion's share of the opportunity for themselves.

<sup>4</sup> For these measures, see V. v. 516, n. 1 and VI. vii. 243.

Western culture. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the Porte appointed Phanariot Greeks to posts of high responsibility and influence in the Ottoman public service because these Phanariots were already familiar with a Western World with which the Porte now found itself constrained to transact business. In the nineteenth century, high-caste Hindus went in for a Western education because a British régime in India had ruled that a familiarity with the English language and literature should be the key to entry into the British Indian public service.

While the Westernization of India thus proceeded from above downwards on lines originally laid down by a British Rāj primarily for its own administrative purposes, the process did not remain confined within limits that would have sufficed for the supply of minor civil servants to 'the Serkār' and subordinate clerks to private British business houses. The governmental and commercial life of India could not be put upon a Western basis without introducing a Western leaven into Indian life over a wider range. The Westernization of Indian business and government called into existence in India two Western liberal professions, the University Faculty and the Bar; and in a Westernized Indian business activity based on private enterprise the most profitable openings could not be made a monopoly for European British subjects, as the highest positions in the Indian Civil Service were reserved for them in effect down to A.D. 1917. In these circumstances the Hindu community showed its ability by successfully turning its administrative, legal, and commercial talents to account under the exotic conditions set by a Western commercial and political ascendancy; and, long before the transfer of the government of India from English to Indian hands in the course of the thirty years A.D. 1917-47, there had grown up in India a new class of Westernized Hindu lawyers, business men, and industrialists as well as Westernized Indian members of the Imperial public service.

It was inevitable that this new element in the Hindu Society, whose distinctive characteristic was its Western education, should aspire, as in Ottoman Orthodox Christendom the Phanariot Greeks had aspired in their day, to take over the oecumenical empire under which they were living from the alien hands by which it had been built, and to turn it into one of the parochial states of a Westernizing World on the constitutional pattern prevalent at the time at which this political ambition took conscious shape. At the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the Phanariots had dreamed an already anachronistic dream of turning the Ottoman Empire into an eighteenth-century Western enlightened monarchy.<sup>1</sup> At the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the Westernizing political leaders of the Hindu World paid homage to a change in Western political ideals by setting themselves the far more difficult task of turning the British Indian Empire into a democratic Western national state.

At a date less than five years after the completion of the transfer of the Government of India from English to Indian hands on the 15th August, 1947, it was still far too early to attempt to forecast the outcome of this momentous political enterprise; but it was already possible to say that

<sup>1</sup> See VI. vii. 29-31, and pp. 187-9, above.

Hindu statesmanship had been more successful than foreign well-wishers could have dared to hope in its efforts to salvage as much as possible of the political unity that had been perhaps the most precious British gift to an Indian sub-continent.

As the transfer of political power had become imminent, this political unity had come into danger of being disrupted by two fissures in Indian political life which had been politically more or less innocuous so long as the Rāj had been held in British hands. One of these fissures was the geographical division of India between territories of two political categories: the British Indian provinces and the autonomous Indian principalities that were in treaty relations with the British Government. The other was the non-territorial division of India between two geographically intermingled communities, the Hindus and the Indian Muslims, and the further subdivision of the Hindu community, likewise on non-territorial lines, into a number of castes, ranging from Brahmans to 'Untouchables'. These two lines of division cut across one another, and they were also of different age and unequal gravity. The geographical division between provinces and principalities was an accidental legacy of the history of the British conquest of India in the course of a hundred years beginning with the British occupation of Bengal at as recent a date as A.D. 1757-60. On the other hand the communal division of the people of India into a Hindu and a Muslim millet was as old as the Iranic Muslim conquest of Hindustan towards the close of the twelfth century of the Christian Era,<sup>1</sup> while the communal sub-division of the Hindu millet into castes was a legacy from the history of the antecedent Indic Civilization. It was not surprising that the Government of the Indian Union that came into existence on the 15th August, 1947, should have dealt more successfully with the problem of the princes than with the problems of the Muslim millet and the Depressed Classes; it was, however, remarkable that the existence of these two communal problems should not have worked greater havoc than it did work at this critical moment in Indian history.

By the year A.D. 1952 the Central Government of the Indian Union had already imposed its authority, by a show of force, on the Deccani state of Hyderabad, which was by far the largest, most populous, and most powerful of all the autonomous principalities inherited by the Indian Union from the British Rāj within the frontiers with which the Union had emerged as a fully self-governing state member of the British Commonwealth of Nations; and it was actively engaged in carrying out a *Gleichschaltung* of the rest. This merger of the existing principalities in the new Union was not inequitable—whatever the princes' legal rights might be—since Indians who were subjects of ex-client princes of a former British Rāj had as strong a moral claim as Indians who had been subjects of the British Rāj itself to share in the self-government which the former British rulers of India had conceded to the Indian people; and the change seemed unlikely to cause any serious regrets or to provoke any dangerous reactions, since there were few principalities, if any, in which a majority of the inhabitants might have been expected to opt

<sup>1</sup> See IV. iv. 99.

for a continuance of the *ancien régime*. On the other hand the Hindu leaders had been less successful in dealing with their Indian Muslim counterparts, since it had been beyond their power to coerce them, and had proved beyond their ability to persuade them, into renouncing their demand that a separate Muslim successor-state of the British Indian Empire should be constituted out of territories in which the Muslims were in a majority over the Hindus.

The Indian Muslims' motive in insisting upon the creation of Pakistan was a fear arising from a consciousness of weakness. They had not forgotten how, in the eighteenth century of the Christian Era, the Mughal Rāj had failed to maintain by the sword a dominion over India which the sword alone had won, and they were aware that, by the same arbitrament, the greater part of the Mughals' former domain would have become the prize of Marāthā and Sikh Hindu successor-states if British military intervention had not given the course of Indian political history a dramatically different turn by re-establishing an oecumenical government of India under British auspices. The Indian Muslims realized that, but for this, they would not only have lost their former dominion over the Hindus but would have paid for their harshness in the exercise of it by suffering a reversal of roles in which it would have been their turn to taste the tribulations of 'under dog'. They also knew that, although they had been fortunate enough to escape from a perilous pass with no worse a fate than to find themselves placed on a political parity with the Hindus under the rule of a third party, they had again allowed themselves to be outstripped by the Hindus in a phase of the perennial conflict between these two Indian communities in which a British arbiter had decreed that the pen should be substituted for the sword as the weapon to be employed in a trial of strength in which the destinies of the two parties were as seriously at stake as if this new-fangled academic competition had not replaced the old-fashioned ordeal by battle.

On the morrow of the British occupation of Bengal in A.D. 1757-60 the Bengali Hindus who had thereby come under British rule had promptly divined that a mastery of Modern Western arts would be the key to success in a world that was passing under Western control and was being remoulded to a Western pattern; and, by the date of the transfer of power in India in A.D. 1947, the Panjabi Hindus likewise had been profiting for all but a hundred years from the opportunities for Westernization that had been afforded to them by the British conquest of their country in the fifth decade of the nineteenth century. By comparison, the Indian Muslims—handicapped by an intellectual inertia that was the legacy of a former military and political ascendancy, and demoralized, instead of being stimulated, by the shock of their military and political débacle—had been slow in taking their cue in a race in which the victory would fall to the most successful Indian adepts in the alien technique of Modern Western life; and, though in the course of the nineteenth century the Indian Muslims did wake up and start to run, they were too late to have been able to make up for lost time by the date in the twentieth century when they were confronted with the prospect of having to compete with the Hindus once again, as in the eighteenth



century, without there being an all-powerful British arbiter to hold the ring and to guarantee the weaker party against the appalling risk of being made to pay the uttermost penalty for incompetence.

For these reasons the Indian Muslims insisted in A.D. 1947 on having a separate successor-state of their own, and the consequent partition of the former British Indian Empire between the two new Dominions of India and Pakistan threatened to reproduce, on a sub-continental scale, the tragic consequences that had followed from the partition of the Ottoman Empire during the century beginning with the Greek uprising in A.D. 1821. In a twentieth-century British India, as in a nineteenth-century Ottoman Orthodox Christendom, the attempt to sort out geographically intermingled millets into territorially separate and severally self-contained national states led to the drawing of frontiers that were execrable from the administrative and economic points of view; even at this price, huge minorities were left on the wrong sides of the new dividing lines; there was a panic flight of millions of refugees who abandoned their homes and property, were harried by embittered adversaries in the course of a terrible trek, and arrived destitute in the unfamiliar country in which they had to start life again among unknown co-religionists; and there was one section of the border between India and Pakistan where even this calamity was eclipsed by the still greater evil of an undeclared war for the possession of the autonomous principality of Kashmir, whose Muslim population was under the rule of a Hindu dynasty. By the year A.D. 1952, however, effective efforts had been made by Indian statesmen, both at Delhi and at Karachi, to save India from following this dreadful Ottoman course to the bitter end. The still un-uprooted minorities on both sides of the line had been sufficiently reassured to bring the flow of refugees to a halt; the dispute over Kashmir had been referred to the United Nations Organization for settlement by conciliation; and, while this task had proved to be a depressingly baffling one, it was, on the other hand, encouraging to observe that the political malady of Nationalism, which had split India into two, did not here show any signs of carrying its disintegrating effect farther, as it had carried it in the Ottoman Empire, by impelling the divers nationalities embraced within each of the two principal millets to demand separate territorial sovereignties in their turn.

In the Ottoman Empire, as we have seen, the several nationalities comprised in the Orthodox Christian Millet-i-Rûm had broken away simultaneously from their Muslim masters and from one another, and the Muslims themselves had eventually followed this unfortunate example by developing separate Turkish, Arab, Albanian, and Kurdish national consciousnesses. In a twentieth-century India the potentialities of disruption were at least as great within the bosom of the Hindu and the Muslim community alike. The Bengali Muslim differed from the Panjabi Muslim as greatly as the Bengali Hindu differed from the Panjabi Hindu or Sikh; and in the Hindu World there were linguistic barriers far sharper than those dividing the Northern Indian speakers of divers dialects of the same Aryan language. The Dravidian languages of the South were members of an entirely different family. Yet, notwith-



standing the existence of these latent incentives to disruption, a politically emancipated Hindu community was not showing violent fissiparous tendencies on lines of nationality any more than on lines of caste. Thus, at the time of writing, Indian prospects were, on the whole, encouraging from a short-term political point of view; and, if the impact of the Modern West did still threaten the Hindu World with serious perils, these were to be looked for not so much on the political surface of life as in its economic subsoil and its spiritual depths, and were perhaps likely there to take some time in coming to a head.

*The Gulf between a Hindu and a Post-Christian Western Weltanschauung*

The obvious special perils of Westernization which the Hindu World had to apprehend were two. In the first place the Hindu and the Western Civilization had hardly any common cultural background and were strikingly alien from one another in *ethos* in this age. In the second place the Hindus who had mastered the intellectual content of an exotic Modern Western culture with a virtuosity that rivalled the performance of the Phanariots were a tiny minority perched on the backs of a vast majority of ignorant and destitute peasants as precariously as, in the constitution of the Human Psyche, the Consciousness hovers over the abyss of the Subconscious. By the date of India's attainment of political independence as a state member of a comity of Western and Westernizing nations, the radiation of the Western culture into the Hindu World had affected only the top layer of the society. Yet there was no ground for expecting to see the process of Western cultural penetration come to a stop at that level, while there were strong grounds for forecasting that, when it began to leaven the peasant mass beneath, it would also begin there to produce novel and revolutionary effects.

The cultural gulf between the Hindu Society and the Modern Western Society at the time when the top layer of the Hindu Society had begun to be appreciably affected by Western influence had been wider than that between the Russian Orthodox Christian, Ottoman Orthodox Christian, Ottoman Muslim, and Modern Western societies whose encounters with one another we have surveyed in previous sections of this chapter.

Differentiated though these four societies had been by the diversity of their individual experiences and achievements, they had retained nevertheless an affinity with one another in virtue of a common cultural heritage derived from a single pair of antecedent civilizations, the Hellenic and the Syriac.<sup>1</sup> By contrast, the Hindu Society was not related either to the Western or to the Iranic Muslim Society by any comparable degree of kinship; for, though a tincture of both the Hellenic and the Syriac culture could be traced in the veins of the Hindu body social too, the dilution was in both cases weak.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, the difference

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 90-91, below.

<sup>2</sup> The western fringe of the domain of the Hindu Civilization's predecessor the Indic Society had been annexed by Cyrus II and by Darius I to an Achaemenian Empire which had served as the Syriac Society's universal state (see VI. vii. 63, 634, and 649), and the transmission of some measure of Syriac cultural influence from the Indic Society to the Hindu was attested by the Syriac provenance of the Kharoshthi Alphabet

in *êthos* between the Hindu *Weltanschauung* and the Western *Weltanschauung* in the Late Modern version in which this first began to make an impression on Hindu souls was no mere diversity; it was an outright antithesis; for by the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of the Christian Era the Modern West, as we have seen,<sup>1</sup> had fabricated a secular version of its cultural heritage from which Religion was eliminated in order to give primacy to Technology, whereas the Hindu Society, like its Indic predecessor, was and remained religious to the core—so much so, indeed, as to be open to the charge of 'religiosity' if, as that pejorative word implies, there can in truth be such a thing as an excessive concentration of psychic energy on a spiritual activity which is Man's most important pursuit.<sup>2</sup>

This antithesis between a passionately religious and a deliberately secular outlook on life cut deeper than any diversity of vein between one religion and another; and in this point the Hindu, the Islamic, and the Early Modern Western Christian cultures were more in sympathy with one another than any one of them was with the secular culture of the West in its late modern phase. Though the religion of the Hindu World was of Indic provenance, while the religions of the Islamic and Early Modern Western Christian worlds were derived from Judaism, this diversity of historical origins was of less moment than the consensus of all three societies in taking it for granted that Religion—whatever the orthodox presentation of it might be held to be—was the mainspring and meaning of Man's existence. On the strength of this common belief, it had been possible for Hindus to become converts to Islam and to Roman Catholic Christianity without subjecting themselves to an intolerable spiritual tension. The Muslims of Eastern Bengal and the Roman Catholics of Goa were living evidence of this; for both these communities were descended from Hindu converts with only a slight admixture of Central Asian blood in the one case and West European blood in the other.

This proven ability of Hindus to make their way on to alien cultural ground by a religious approach was significant, because, if religiosity was the Hindu Civilization's chief distinguishing mark, its next most conspicuous feature was aloofness. This characteristic aloofness was, no doubt, overcome in the intellectual compartment of their spiritual life by those Hindus who, from the latter part of the eighteenth century of the Christian Era onwards, acquired a secular Modern Western education and thereby qualified for playing a part in the reconstruction of the political and economic sides of Indian life on a Modern Western basis;

(see V. v. 500). The Hellenic culture had bitten deeper into Indic life; it shared the credit for the genesis of the Mahāyāna, as was attested by the Hellenic element in the style of Mahāyanian Buddhist art (see III. iii. 131 and 247, n. 2; V. v. 134, 196, and 481). This Hellenistic art, however, had become an heirloom, not of the Hindu World, but of the Far East, for the Indic Society had succeeded in expelling this intrusive Hellenic element from its own body social before going into dissolution, and the religion of Hinduism, which had been the symbol and the agent of this anti-Hellenic reaction in Indic souls, had also served as the chrysalis for incubating the Indic Society's Hindu successor.

<sup>1</sup> On p. 118, with n. 9, above.

<sup>2</sup> This vein of religiosity in the Indic and Hindu civilization has been noticed in III. iii. 384-5.

but the recruits of this unhappy intelligentsia performed a valuable social service as cultural intermediaries between the Hindu and the Modern Western World at the cost of a schism in their souls which did not afflict either the Bengali Muslim or the Goanese Roman Catholic descendants of apostates from the Hindu, but not from the religious, outlook on life. This Hindu intelligentsia bred by the British Rāj remained aloof in their hearts from the secular Modern Western way of life with which their minds had become familiar; and this discord produced a deep-seated spiritual malaise in Hindu souls<sup>1</sup> which could not be cured by the political panacea of obtaining full self-government for an Indian national state organized on a contemporary Western pattern. Indeed, the relaxation of a political tension might actually bring the spiritual tension to a head by leaving a Westernizing Hindu intellect *tête-à-tête* with an unconscionably religious Hindu soul, without any further possibility of avoiding a painful searching of heart through finding a scapegoat in an English interloper whose alien régime might plausibly be held responsible for all Indian ills, psychological as well as political.

*The Aloofness of a Reformed British Civil Service in India*

The unyielding spiritual aloofness of Western-educated Hindu minds would in any case have been a formidable problem both for the human beings whose Hindu souls were being racked by an unresolved discord and for the Hindu Society in which these inharmonious 'intellectuals' were called upon to take the lead in an age of Hindu history in which a collision between the Hindu and the secular Modern Western culture was the dominant event in social as well as personal life. The situation had been aggravated, however, by the mischance that this unmitigated spiritual aloofness on the Hindu side had been matched by an accentuated spiritual aloofness in the souls of the Western rulers with whom the Hindu intelligentsia had to do business under the régime of the British Rāj. Between the year A.D. 1786, in which Cornwallis assumed the

<sup>1</sup> The spiritual malaise which is the occupational disease of an intelligentsia has been noticed in V. v. 154-9, and is examined further on pp. 338-43, below. The sharpness of the psychological tension in twentieth-century Hindu souls that had been Westernized intellectually while remaining Hindu in feeling, intuition, and sensation (to use C. G. Jung's categories) may be gauged from the testimony of nineteenth-century Russian souls in which the gulf between a traditional way of life and an exotic Western *Weltanschauung* was much less wide, and the tension therefore proportionately less severe. Unhappy though they were in almost everything else, the nineteenth-century Russian intelligentsia were fortunate in being gifted with a power of artistic expression and in being moved to use this gift as a vent for relieving their spiritual malaise by discharging their feelings in works of literature. This literary secretion from a culturally sick body social was a pearl of great price for the historian as well as for the psychologist and the man of letters. Out of the vast wealth of evidence which it offered to the student of encounters between contemporaries of diverse culture, we may file here one passage culled from the memoirs of Alexander Herzen (*vivebat* A.D. 1812-70), the natural son of a Russian nobleman by a girl from Stuttgart:

'In Russia men exposed to the influence of this mighty Western movement became original, but not historical, figures. Foreigners at home, foreigners in other lands, idle spectators, spoilt for Russia by Western prejudices and for the West by Russian habits, they were a sort of intellectual superfluity and were lost in artificial life, in sensual pleasure, and in unbearable egoism' (Herzen, Alexander: *My Past and Thoughts*, translated from the Russian by Constance Garnett (London 1924, Chatto and Windus, 6 vols.), vol. i, p. 94).

governor-generalship of British India with a mandate to reform the administration,<sup>1</sup> and the year A.D. 1858, which saw the completion of the transfer of British political authority in India from the East India Company to the Crown, there was a profound, and on the whole untoward, change in the attitude of the European-born British ruling class in India towards their Indian-born fellow subjects.

In the eighteenth century the English in India, like their predecessors the Mughals and the Portuguese, had followed unselfconsciously the custom of the country, not excluding the custom of abusing power, but they had also likewise been on familiar terms of personal intercourse with the Indians whom they unscrupulously cheated and oppressed. In the course of the nineteenth century they achieved a notable moral rally. The intoxication with suddenly acquired power and the demoralization by suddenly opened facilities for illicit personal enrichment which had disgraced the first generation of English rulers in Bengal were successfully overcome by a new ideal of moral integrity, which required the English civil servant in India to look upon his power as a public responsibility and not as a personal opportunity. The stages in this moral redemption of the British Rāj in India by British consciences can be followed from the India Act of A.D. 1784 to the introduction, in A.D. 1855,<sup>2</sup> of a competitive examination as the gate of entry into the Indian Civil Service;<sup>3</sup> but *pari passu* we can also follow the waning of personal familiarity between English residents in India and their Indian neighbours, until the all too humanly Indianized English 'nabob' has changed, out of recognition, into the professionally irreproachable and personally unapproachable English civil servant who said goodbye in A.D. 1947 to an India to whom he had dedicated his working life without making her his home.

In the eighteenth century, after the decay of the Mughal Rāj had gone far enough to break down the containing walls of the factories in which Western merchants had hitherto been living in isolation<sup>4</sup> like their counterparts in the Sloboda at Moscow before the days of Peter the Great,<sup>5</sup> the English who went to India in divers capacities—in the service of the East India Company, in the service of Indian princes, or as free-lance military and political adventurers hoping to carve out successor-states of the Mughal Empire on their own account<sup>6</sup>—were all of

<sup>1</sup> A second date which was fateful for the future course of relations between Indians and English was the year A.D. 1799, which saw Wellesley initiate a systematic conquest of India by British arms. While the British occupation of Bengal in A.D. 1757–60 might perhaps not inaccurately be described as an act of empire-building by inadvertence, this description certainly would not apply to the British conquest of the rest of the sub-continent during the fifty years A.D. 1799–1849. This military programme was deliberately taken in hand in A.D. 1799 with an eye to forestalling a re-entry of the French into India, and it was deliberately carried forward after A.D. 1814 in order to round off a British Rāj with which the French were thereafter no longer in a position to interfere.

<sup>2</sup> See Blunt, Sir E.: *The Indian Civil Service* (London 1937, Faber), p. 46.

<sup>3</sup> The British Indian Civil Service has been noticed in this Study, in other contexts, in V. v. 47–48 and VI. vii. 364–5.

<sup>4</sup> See Spear, T. G. P.: *The Nabobs: A Study of the Social Life of the English in Eighteenth-Century India* (London 1932, Milford), p. 22.

<sup>5</sup> See p. 130, above.

<sup>6</sup> See Compton, H. E.: *A Particular Account of the European Military Adventurers of Hindustan, 1784–1803* (London 1892 (1st ed.) and 1896 (2nd ed.), Fisher Unwin); Grey, C., and Garrett, H. L. O.: *European Adventurers in Northern India, 1785–1849* (Lahore 1929, Punjab Government Press).

one mind in looking forward to making themselves at home in the country, as other foreign conquerors of India had done before them. In this Indianizing movement the free-lance adventurers went the fastest and the farthest.<sup>1</sup> For example, Claude Martin (*vivebat* A.D. 1735-1800), a French soldier of fortune who, after the fall of Pondicherry in A.D. 1761, had taken military service first with the British and then with the Nawāb of Oudh,<sup>2</sup> 'was nearly as Indianized as the Nawāb was Europeanized'.<sup>3</sup> At Lucknow, Martin had four concubines and a household of eunuchs and slaves; but he combined this Mughal pomp and luxury with a cosmopolitan culture, for he also had 4,000 Western books (Latin, French, Italian, and English), a collection of Persian and Sanskrit manuscripts, and a hundred oil paintings, including works by Zoffany and the two Daniells.<sup>4</sup> Among the English servants of the British East India Company in Martin's generation the ideal of emulating in India the career of the London city merchant who became an English country squire was replaced, after the Company's victory over a Mughal nawāb at the Battle of Plassey (*commisum* A.D. 1757), by the ideal of becoming a 'nabob'.<sup>5</sup>

Instead of continuing to marry Goan Portuguese Christian wives, the Company's English servants now took, like Martin, to keeping zenanas *alla Moresca*.<sup>6</sup> Till *circa* A.D. 1800 there was no prejudice, in this Anglo-Indian society, against 'natural children', and these would be sent to England for their education if not too dark 'to escape detection'.<sup>7</sup> The Indian mothers of these well-beloved children were sometimes married in lawful wedlock by the children's English fathers. The English servants of the East India Company who went the fastest and the farthest in this direction were the collectors—a new class of civil servants, stationed not in Calcutta but throughout the country-side, which had been called into existence in A.D. 1772<sup>8</sup> as a consequence of the Company's acquisition, in A.D. 1765, of the financial administration of Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, and the Northern Circars.<sup>9</sup> These widely scattered English representatives of the Company came under the social influence of the Bengali nawābs and zamīndārs among whom they were living, and they transmitted this current of Indian cultural radiation to other English people in India.<sup>10</sup> The English in India took to learning Persian;<sup>11</sup> and, through this sympathetic medium of intercourse, they made Indian friends. They found Muslim princes more congenial than Marāthās;<sup>12</sup> but, besides the Muslim country gentry, their friends included cultivated Indian official colleagues of theirs, some of whom were Hindus,<sup>13</sup> and Hastings'<sup>14</sup> own personal circle of Indian friends was knit by such genuine ties of feeling that, twenty years after he had left India, the survivors continued to make affectionate inquiries after him.<sup>15</sup>

This easy and intimate cosmopolitan eighteenth-century Anglo-

<sup>1</sup> See Spear, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 133.

<sup>3</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 36-37.

<sup>4</sup> See VI. vii. 365.

<sup>5</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 136.

<sup>6</sup> Governor of Bengal, A.D. 1772; Governor-General of British India, A.D. 1774-85.

<sup>7</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 135-6.

<sup>8</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 83-85.

<sup>9</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 32 and 37.

<sup>10</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 31.

<sup>11</sup> See Spear, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-32.

<sup>12</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 136.

<sup>13</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 136.

<sup>14</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 136.



Indian life startled a twentieth-century English student of History by its manifest freedom from subsequently erected barriers to social intercourse between English people and Indians when scenes from it were brought before his eye in contemporary pictures by John Zoffany (*vivebat* A.D. 1735–1810) and other English artists of the day.<sup>1</sup> This historical spectacle was startling because the genial 'cosmopolitanism' to which it bore witness had been swiftly superseded and permanently replaced by a bleaker social climate. This counter-movement, which first declared itself in symptoms that might have been discounted as trivial, eventually spread to the vital sphere of personal relations. The substitution of Western for Oriental military music in the Company's forces at Madras in A.D. 1767<sup>2</sup> was followed, after Hastings' recall in A.D. 1785, by the banning of Oriental music in the social life of the English community in India.<sup>3</sup> Arrack went the same way;<sup>4</sup> and the habit of nargilah-smoking, which had replaced pipe-smoking *circa* A.D. 1754–5, declined after A.D. 1773.<sup>5</sup> By A.D. 1827 it had come to be regarded as extremely bad taste for an English lady in India to wear Indian ornaments,<sup>6</sup> and, before the turn of the century, the contemporary Western styles of Hellenistic 'classical' architecture and gardening were already being applied in British India *tels quels*.<sup>7</sup> The exclusion of half-castes from the British Indian public service in A.D. 1792<sup>8</sup> by Cornwallis (*fungebatur* A.D. 1786–93) was a graver portent which foreshadowed Wellesley's deliberate creation of a social distance between English and Indians. Wellesley (*fungebatur* A.D. 1798–1805) adopted a hectoring tone in his dealings with Indians, and he stopped the practice of inviting Indians and half-castes to official parties.<sup>9</sup>

'Race prejudice at the beginning of the [eighteenth] century was instinctive, and disappeared with time and better acquaintance; at the end it was doctrinal, and precluded the acquaintance which might have removed it.'<sup>10</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See, for example, Zoffany's picture (in which Claude Martin figures) of Colonel Mordaunt's cock match at Lucknow, A.D. 1786, painted for Warren Hastings, and his portrait group of the Palmer family, probably also painted at the same place in the same year. 'Major William Palmer is looking at his wife, the Bibi Fā'iz Bakhsh, who is seated on his right with her three children. The Bibi's sister is on Palmer's left, and three women attendants complete the group' (*Catalogue of Exhibition of Art, chiefly from the Dominions of India and Pakistan* (London 1947–8, Royal Academy of Arts)). These two pictures bear witness to the familiarity of the relations between the late-eighteenth-century English in India and their Indian contemporaries in private life; and this unselfconscious practice of doing in India as India does was followed by them in affairs of state as well. Zoffany's picture of a durbār (Plate No. 4. in the *Journal of the Royal Society of Arts*, vol. xcvi, No. 4820, of the 5th May, 1950, illustrating Sir W. Foster's paper on 'British Artists in India' on pp. 518–25 of the same issue) portrays Warren Hastings and his English staff seated cross-legged on the ground, transacting business with a Mughal potentate bolstered on a carpet. While the other Englishmen betray some signs of physical discomfort, Hastings is manifestly at his ease.

<sup>2</sup> See Spear, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

<sup>3</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 33.

<sup>4</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 34.

<sup>5</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 36 and 98. On the other hand the cult of cleanliness, which the eighteenth-century Englishman in India had acquired from his Indian contemporaries, was transmitted by him to his twentieth-century compatriots in Great Britain (see *ibid.*, p. 146).

<sup>6</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 142.

<sup>7</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 63.

<sup>8</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 34 and 50–51.

<sup>9</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 138.

<sup>10</sup> Spear, *op. cit.*, p. 144. The spirit of the pre-Wellesley phase of Anglo-Indian relations died hardest at Bombay, where the commercial interests and activities of the English community continued to overshadow the field of government and administration (see *ibid.*, pp. 134–5). At Bombay (and likewise at Surat) the course of events was evolu-



Why was it that the former free-and-easy personal relations died away so unluckily in an age when the loss of their beneficent influence on Anglo-Indian relations could least well be afforded? No doubt the change was due to the combined operation of a number of different causes.

In the first place the latter-day English official in the Indian Civil Service might fairly plead that his unfortunate aloofness from the Indians whom he governed was the inevitable price of his precious moral integrity in the discharge of a public trusteeship. How could a man be expected to act professionally like a god without also retaining the airs of a god in private life? Another, and less estimable, cause of the change of attitude was perhaps the pride inspired by conquest; for by A.D. 1849, and indeed by A.D. 1803, the military and political power of the English in India had become sensationally stronger than it had been in A.D. 1786, not to speak of A.D. 1757.<sup>1</sup> The operation of these two causes had been analysed acutely by a twentieth-century English student of the history of Indo-British social and cultural relations.

'As the [eighteenth] century drew to its close, a change in the social atmosphere gradually came about. The frequency of . . . "reciprocal entertainments" decreased, the formation of intimate friendships with Indians ceased. . . . The higher posts of the Government were filled with appointments from England; its designs became more imperial and its attitude more haughty and aloof. The gulf which Mussulman nawābs and English *bons viveurs*, diplomatic pandits and English scholars had for a time bridged over began ominously to widen again. . . . A "superiority complex" was forming which regarded India not only as a country whose institutions were bad and people corrupted, but one which was by its nature incapable of ever becoming any better . . .

'It is one of the ironies of Indo-European relations in India that the purging of the administration coincided with the widening of the racial gulf.<sup>2</sup> . . . The days of corrupt Company officials, of illegotten fortunes, of oppression of ryots, of zenanas and of illicit sexual connexions, were also the days when Englishmen were interested in Indian culture, wrote Persian verses, and foregathered with pandits and maulvis and nawābs

tionary, not revolutionary (see *ibid.*, p. 75). English and Indian business men went on meeting on equal terms, and, between the English and the Parsees, social relations were intimate (see *ibid.*, pp. 72, 74-75, and 127). No doubt Bombay benefited from the stimulus of being India's maritime march in an Oceanic age of history (see II. ii. 133). All the same, on the 25th September, 1929, the writer of this Study was reproved at Bombay by his English hosts there for having made the *faux pas* of taking an omnibus. It was explained to him that, in Bombay, it was beneath an Englishman's dignity to ride in a public conveyance. He ought to have ridden solitary in a cab.

<sup>1</sup> Spear points out (in *op. cit.*, pp. 32-33 and 130) that 'the period of cosmopolitan intercourse' between English and Indians in India, which can be equated approximately with the term of Warren Hastings' governor-generalship (*fungebat* A.D. 1774-85), was also the period in which there was a balance of political power between the British East India Company and the Indian successor-states of the Mughal Rāj. Wellesley (*fungebat* A.D. 1798-1805), during whose governor-generalship first Tipu Sahib and then the Marāṭhs were overthrown, and who introduced a viceregal splendour into the governor-general's *mise-en-scène* (see Spear, *op. cit.*, p. 65), was also the moving spirit in the deliberate adoption of a pointed attitude of haughty aloofness towards the English conquerors' Indian subjects on the part of an alien English dominant minority.

<sup>2</sup> The earliest recorded complaints of British race-feeling in India come from James Skinner (*vivebat* A.D. 1778-1841), a military adventurer with Indian blood in his veins who went over from the Marāṭhā to the British service on the eve of the British assault on the Marāṭhās in A.D. 1803 (Spear, *op. cit.*, p. 13).

on terms of social equality and personal friendship. The tragedy of Cornwallis . . . was that in uprooting the acknowledged evils of corruption he upset the social balance without which mutual understanding was impossible. . . . Cornwallis . . . made a new governing class by his exclusion of all Indians from the higher governmental posts. Corruption was stamped out at the cost of equality and cooperation. In his own mind, as in the commonly accepted view, there was a necessary connexion between the two measures; "Every native of Hindustan", he said, "I verily believe, is corrupt". . . . He thought English corruption could be solved by reasonable salaries, and did not stop to consider that the advantage of Indian goodwill made it at least worth trying as a remedy for Indian corruption also. He never thought of creating an Indian imperial bureaucracy on the model of Akbar's mansabdars, which by special training, proper salaries and the encouragement of equal treatment, promotion and honours, might have been bound to the Company as the Moghul officials were bound to the Emperor.<sup>1</sup>

A third cause of estrangement was the speeding-up of communications between India and England as a consequence of certain early nineteenth-century achievements of Modern Western technology. The reopening and the subsequent improvement of the short route between Western Europe and India via Egypt—first by portage on camel-back between Alexandria and Suez from sailing-ship to sailing-ship, then by steam instead of sail and by railway instead of camel caravan, and finally by the opening of the Suez Canal in A.D. 1869<sup>2</sup>—made it feasible for English people to travel to and fro between England and India so quickly and frequently that an English civil servant or business man posted in India could now bring out an English wife to join him,<sup>3</sup> and could go on to bring up his children in England without completely breaking up his family life, especially after the linking up of India with England by telegraph in A.D. 1865. Thanks to the doubtful blessing of these technological miracles, the latter-day English employee in India contrived to do his work there as a pilgrim and a sojourner who remained psychologically domiciled in a home on English ground.<sup>4</sup>

The three so far enumerated causes of latter-day English aloofness from the Indians among whom the English in India worked were all of the Englishman's making; but there was perhaps a fourth cause, and one more potent than the rest, of which the Englishman in India was the victim and not the originator. An Indian who had experienced and

<sup>1</sup> Spear, T. G. P.: *The Nabobs: A Study of the Social Life of the English in Eighteenth-Century India* (London 1932, Milford), pp. 136, 137, 145, and 137.

<sup>2</sup> See Hoskins, H. L.: *British Routes to India* (London 1928, Longmans Green), p. 383.

<sup>3</sup> According to Spear, op. cit., pp. 140-2, the social self-insulation of the English in India was promoted by the increase in the number of English women in India—and also by the increase in the number of evangelical Protestant English missionaries, whose attitude towards 'the heathen' was bigoted.

<sup>4</sup> While the technological revolution in means of communication was the new factor that made this attitude of aloofness come to prevail among Englishmen serving in India in all capacities, the psychological change had been initiated, while the sailing ship was still in its heyday, by the soldiers of the Royal British Army as soon as units of this force had begun to be posted in India. The Royal troops 'inaugurated the conception of service in India as a temporary vocation undertaken with a view to retirement in England' (Spear, op. cit., p. 31), whereas the officers of the newly raised Company troops 'in civil life conformed to their Anglo-Indian environments' (ibid., p. 30).

resented the latter-day English resident's aloofness might feel more charitably towards this originally self-invited (and eventually also self-dismissed) intruder if he were to recollect that, for perhaps as long as three thousand years before the advent of the English in India, the sub-continent had been saddled with the institution of Caste; that the Hindu Society had accentuated a trait which it had inherited from its Indic predecessor; and that after the departure of the English, as before their arrival, the people of India were still afflicting themselves with a social evil of their own making. Looked at in the long perspective of Indian history, the aloofness which the English in India developed during the hundred and fifty years of their *rāj* could be diagnosed as being a mild attack of the chronic Indian psychological malady of caste-mindedness. It was perhaps not altogether surprising or altogether inexcusable that, in the course of their sojourn in India, the English should have been affected in their turn by an age-old sub-continental atmosphere.<sup>1</sup>

### *The Unsolved Problem of a Rising Pressure of Population*

While the aggravating effect of a latter-day English aloofness on the spiritual discord in intellectually Westernized Hindu souls might be

<sup>1</sup> This fourth possible explanation of the aloofness to which the English in India gradually succumbed might account for the striking difference, in their attitude towards 'natives', between the latter-day English in India and their Dutch contemporaries in Indonesia. In Insular India the personal relations between the Dutch and the Javanese were still, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, much what the relations between the English and the Hindus in Continental India had been in the eighteenth century. Down to the moment of the liquidation of the Dutch Empire in Indonesia by the Japanese conquest in A.D. 1942, the Dutch were still bringing up in Java children of undiluted Dutch blood, and at the same time intermarrying with the Javanese and reckoning the issue of mixed marriages as Europeans. Why, in Java, did no refrigeration of the psychological atmosphere occur, considering that the first three of the four possible causes of the change in British India were all operative in Netherlands India likewise? Might not the answer be that in Indonesia the fourth of the causes that we have enumerated was not at work, and that this difference in the situation made all the difference to the course of events? A difference in the cultural environment had not always existed, for, from the fifth to the fifteenth century of the Christian Era, Indonesia had been an overseas colonial extension of the Hindu World; but, between the decline and fall of the Hindu Indonesian Empire of Majapahit during the hundred years ending in A.D. 1518 and the arrival of the Dutch in A.D. 1595, Indonesia was captured from the Hindu Society by the Arabic Muslim Society, and in A.D. 1952 the only living monument of the Hindu Age in the Archipelago was the persisting Hinduism of the inhabitants of the little island of Bali. Thus, since before the beginning of the Dutch *Rāj* in Indonesia, the prevailing religion in the Archipelago had come to be Islam; and, of all the living higher religions, Islam—standing, as it did, for equality between all loyal Muslim subjects of a single sovereign Lord God—was the most inimical, in practice as well as in theory, to the institution of Caste. Perhaps, therefore, it was no accident that in an Indonesia where Islam held the field the Dutch should have remained immune from the caste spirit in an age when the English were succumbing to it in a Continental India where Islam had never succeeded in gaining the allegiance of a majority of the population and had recently also suffered a political eclipse.

In another context (in II. i. 211-27), we have observed that, in the matter of race feeling, Roman Catholic Western Christians had, on the whole, come nearer than Protestant Western Christians to approaching the Islamic standard, though in most other respects Protestantism had more affinity with Islam than Roman Catholicism had. An unfortunate inspiration from the Old Testament appears to account for the badness of the record of the Dutch settlers in South Africa and the English settlers in North America, by comparison with the French Canadians, in their behaviour towards the 'Canaanites' whom they found in the land. A common Protestantism, however, cannot explain either the diversity of Dutch Protestant behaviour in South Africa and in Indonesia or the diversity of English Protestant behaviour in India in the eighteenth and in the twentieth century.

relieved by the termination of the British Rāj, the ameliorative effect of British administration on the condition and expectations of the Indian peasantry was a British legacy which might prove to be a mill-stone round the necks of the British civil servants' Hindu successors in the government of India.

Under a *Pax Britannica* that had been maintained for more than a hundred years, the natural resources of the sub-continent had been eked out in divers ways: by the building of a net-work of railways which made it possible for surplus food-supplies in one area to be transported to another area where there was a shortage; by the irrigation of previously uncultivated areas in the Panjab; and, above all, by an able and conscientious administration. By the time of the departure of their English rulers in A.D. 1947, the Indian peasantry, uneducated though they still were in the academic sense, had perhaps become just sufficiently alive to the material achievements of a scientifically developed Modern Western technology and the political ideals of a Christian-hearted Modern Western democracy<sup>1</sup> to begin to question both the justice and the inevitability of their own ancestral indigence. They had begun to feel dimly that they too had a right to share in those amenities of Civilization which in the past had been the monopoly of a small minority in India as elsewhere, and at the same time to imagine vaguely that the magic cornucopia of Science could perform, 'in real life', the legendary miracle of the loaves and fishes, if only a ruling minority chose to use it for this beneficent purpose.

At the same time an Indian peasantry that was beginning to dream these dreams had been doing its worst to prevent their realization by continuing, as in the past, to breed heedlessly up to the limits of subsistence on a meagre customary standard of living, with the result that the addition to India's food supply which had been wrung out of a previously unutilized margin of resources by British administrative enterprise had mainly gone, not towards improving the Indian peasant's individual lot, but towards increasing the peasantry's numbers. Under British rule the population of India had risen from about 206,000,000 in A.D. 1872 to 338,119,154 in A.D. 1931 and 388,997,955 in A.D. 1941; at the time of the transfer of power from English to Indian hands, this human flood was still rising; and by the same date the possibilities of increasing India's capacity to contain a mounting volume of inhabitants had been to a large extent used up. How were the Hindu successors of the British to handle a political legacy which already allowed no margin at all for incompetence or folly in the administration of the stewardship which they had now taken over?

The traditional cure for 'over-population', not only in the Hindu World but in the economy of other civilizations too in a pre-democratic age, was to allow famine, pestilence, civil disorder, and war to reduce the population again to a figure at which the survivors would once more find themselves able to lead their traditional life on their customary low standard; and horrifying instances of drastic reductions of population

<sup>1</sup> See Bergson, H.: *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de La Religion* (Paris 1932, Alcan), pp. 304-5, quoted in this Study in I. i. 9 and IV. iv. 156.

by methods of barbarism were indeed on record. For example, the population of 'Irāq, after having been built up by perhaps more than three thousand years of careful husbandry, had been cut down again by the last two Romano-Persian wars and thereafter by the Mongol invasion;<sup>1</sup> North-West Africa, whose scientific cultivation the Carthaginians had begun, the Romans had completed, and the Primitive Muslim Arabs had spared, had eventually been devastated by the barbarian Arab Banu Hilāl and Banu Sulaym;<sup>2</sup> and the population of China had been reduced, if the official census figures were to be believed, from 9,069,154 to 2,900,000 families within the short term of ten years (A.D. 754-64) by the destructive effects of An Lu Shan's rebellion against the T'ang régime.<sup>3</sup> In the latest chapter of Indian history before the transfer of power, Mahatma Gandhi, in his single-minded quest of independence for an India struggling to be free, had willed for her the same Malthusian end, without willing the necessary barbaric means.

Gandhi had divined that the achievement of mere political liberation from British rule might be an illusory emancipation if India still remained entangled in the economic tendrils of a Westernized World; and he unerringly laid his axe to this economic banyan tree's technological root in launching his campaign for the abandonment of the use of machine-made cotton goods by the people of India in favour of home-spun; but his countrymen's unwillingness to follow his lead on this crucial point was a sign of the times,<sup>4</sup> for it brought into prominence the fact that by this date India was implicated economically in the life of the Western World no longer merely as a purchaser from abroad of the products of a Western mechanized industry, but now also by the far more compromising bond of having learnt to manufacture such products for herself with Indian hands that had mastered a Western technique. Moreover, even if Gandhi had succeeded in putting out of business the Hindu textile manufacturers of Ahmadabad and Bombay, the effect would have been to precipitate in India an economic, social, and political crisis which could never have been left for Nature to solve in her own brutal way by either a British civil service or by its Western-educated Hindu successors.

If and when this still undischarged but also still unexorcized storm-cloud on a politically free India's horizon did burst in a tornado-blast, the Hindu statesmen responsible for the government of India in that day would be constrained by the moral atmosphere of a Westernizing World to strive for some relatively humane and constructive solution. They would find themselves confronted with an Indian peasantry that had caught just enough of the Modern Western spirit to be unwilling this time to acquiesce tamely in a peasantry's traditional tribulations; they would have to reckon with an oecumenical public conscience<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See IV. iv. 42-43.      <sup>2</sup> See III. iii. 322-4, 445-6, and 473-4, and V. v. 247.

<sup>3</sup> See Fitzgerald, C. P.: *China, A Short Cultural History* (London 1935, Cresset Press), p. 308.

<sup>4</sup> See III. iii. 190-1 and 202-4.

<sup>5</sup> This conscience had proclaimed a conviction of responsibility for being the keeper of the vast peasant majority of Mankind when, at the close of the general war of A.D. 1939-45, the authorities of the victorious United Nations had taken account of the whole population of the World, including the rice-eating as well as the wheat-eating peoples, in administering the distribution of the then available food supplies.



which no parochial government could any longer afford to ignore; and, most compelling influence of all, the voice of this conscience would also be speaking to them from within their own partially Westernized souls.

For these reasons it could be prophesied with some confidence that the Western-minded statesmen of a Hindu Rāj would have to grapple one day with the problem of a depressed Indian peasantry. It could not, however, be taken for granted that they would find themselves able to solve this inexorable problem by Modern Western political methods; and, should a Western panacea prove to be of no avail in a crisis which, for India, would be one of life and death, a rival Russian panacea would inevitably force its way on to India's national agenda; for a Communist Russia, like a Westernizing India, had inherited the problem of a depressed peasantry from her native cultural past, and, unlike India, she had already responded to this challenge on lines that she had worked out for herself. These Communist lines might be too ruthless and too revolutionary for either the Indian peasantry or the Indian intelligentsia to be able to follow them with any zest; but, as an alternative to the still grimmer fate of decimation, a Communist solution of the peasantry problem might demand consideration, *faute de mieux*, and this might bring a politically emancipated India face to face with the ideology of a Soviet Union with whom India—unlike China and the Islamic World and Eastern Europe—was not, or at any rate not yet, in immediate geographical contact.<sup>1</sup>

#### 4. *The Modern West and the Islamic World*

##### *The Encirclement of the Islamic World by the West, Russia, and Tibet*

At the opening of the modern chapter of Western history, two sister Islamic societies, standing back to back, blocked all the overland lines of access from the contemporary domains of the Western and the Russian Society to other parts of the Old World.

Though the Arabic Muslim Civilization had not inherited the Atlantic seaboard of the Andalusian Umayyad Caliphate in the Iberian Peninsula, at the close of the fifteenth century it was still holding an Atlantic seaboard in Africa extending from the Straits of Gibraltar to the Senegal. Western Christendom thus still remained insulated from Tropical Africa overland, while waves of Arab influence were breaking upon the Dark Continent not only along its north coast in the Sudan out of the dry sea of the Sahara, but also along its east coast, the Sābil, out of the Indian Ocean.<sup>2</sup> That ocean had indeed become an Arab lake, to

<sup>1</sup> The bearing of Russia's Communist solution of the problem of a depressed peasantry on the destinies of all the non-Russian societies, including India, that were likewise saddled with this problem and had still to solve it, is discussed on pp. 684-9, below. The possibility that the Soviet Union and India might eventually become immediate neighbours as a consequence of the partition of British India between the Indian Union and Pakistan is discussed on pp. 690-1, below.

<sup>2</sup> One wave of Arab influence also broke—to the eventual undoing of the Arabs themselves—upon another then still-dark continent lying not to the south but to the north of the Arabic Muslim World. The lateen sail (see Perry, J. H.: *Europe and a Wider World* (London 1949, Hutchinson), pp. 22-24) and the art of navigating the high seas by taking astronomical bearings (see Prestage, E.: *The Portuguese Pioneers* (London 1938, Black), p. 315) were both conveyed by Arab hands from the Indian Ocean, where



which the Venetian trading partners of the Egyptian middlemen had no access, while Arab shipping was not only plying up and down the Indian Ocean's African shore from Suez to Sofala, but had also found its way across to Indonesia, captured the archipelago from Hinduism for Islam, and pushed on eastwards to plant an outpost in the Western Pacific by converting the pagan Malay inhabitants of the southernmost of the Philippines—whom the Spanish ocean-going mariners duly recognized as 'Moors' when they came upon them in the sixteenth century in a circumnavigation of the globe from east to west.

At the close of the fifteenth century the Iranic Muslim Civilization held what seemed to be an even stronger strategic position *vis-à-vis* both Western Christendom and Russia. The 'Osmanli empire-builders' programme of bringing the whole of the main body of Orthodox Christendom under Iranic Muslim rule had been duly completed by Sultan Mehmed II Fâtiḥ (*imperabat* A.D. 1451-81) through the conquest of Constantinople, the Morea, Qāramān, and Trebizond. The same reign had seen the Black Sea turned into an Ottoman Lake in A.D. 1475 through the seizure of the Genoese colonies Caffa and Tana in the Crimea<sup>1</sup> and the establishment of Ottoman suzerainty over a Crimean Tatar successor-state of Chingis Khan's son Jūji's Mongol horde, whose sedentary subjects in the peninsula and nomad subjects in the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe were the 'Osmanlis' fellow Muslims and fellow Turks. Adjoining the Khanate of the Crimea on the east, the sister Khanate of Āstrakhān commanded the mouth of the Volga, while the Khanate of Qāzān, whose likewise Turkish-speaking Muslim inhabitants had once been known as 'the White Bulgars', commanded the confluence of the Volga with the Kama and thereby blocked the way from Muscovy both down the Volga and across the southern Urals. Behind this front extending from the Qazanlys' western frontier on the Volga to the 'Osmanlis' western frontier on the Adriatic, the Iranic Muslim World extended south-eastwards over Bashkiristan and Qāzāqistan and the Tarim Basin to the north-western Chinese provinces of Kansu and Shensi, and over Iran and Hindustan to Bengal and the Deccan.

This massive Islamic road-block was a challenge which evoked a proportionately energetic response from pioneer communities in the two blockaded Christian societies.

In Western Christendom the peoples of the Atlantic seaboard invented in the fifteenth century a new type of ocean-going sailing-ship, three-masted and square-rigged, with a sprinkling first of lateen and later of fore-and-aft sails, which was capable of keeping the sea for months on end without putting into port and which earned, by its unprecedented performance, the distinction of being known as 'the ship' *par excellence* for the next three and a half centuries.<sup>2</sup> In such

they had been invented, to the maritime peoples on the Mediterranean and Atlantic seabords of Western Christendom.

<sup>1</sup> See II, ii, 445.

<sup>2</sup> This sudden swift advance in the arts of ship-building and navigation in Western Christendom in the fifteenth century, and the period of relative stagnation that followed until the nineteenth century brought another sudden swift advance, are reviewed in XI, ix, 364-74.

vessels, Portuguese mariners, who had made their trial runs in deep-sea navigation by discovering Madeira *circa* A.D. 1420 and the Azores in A.D. 1432, succeeded in outflanking the Arab seafront on the Atlantic by rounding Cape Verde in A.D. 1445, reaching the Equator in A.D. 1471, rounding the Cape of Good Hope in A.D. 1487-8, landing at Calicut, on the west coast of India, in A.D. 1498, seizing command of the Straits of Malacca in A.D. 1511, and pushing on into the Western Pacific to show their flag at Canton in A.D. 1516 and on the coast of Japan in A.D. 1542-3.<sup>1</sup> In a flash the Portuguese had snatched out of Arab hands the thalassocracy of the Indian Ocean; and, though the Portuguese afterwards lost all but a remnant of their naval and commercial empire in the East to Dutch, English, and French Western rivals of theirs, the Arabs were never able to win their lost thalassocracy back.<sup>2</sup> The blockade of Western Christendom by an Arabic World that had outflanked it overland in Africa had not only been broken; it had been inverted into a maritime blockade of the Arabic World by Western Christendom through the Westerners' newly acquired command of a ubiquitous Ocean.<sup>3</sup>

While these eastward-faring Portuguese pioneers in a sudden over-seas expansion of the Western World were thus outflanking an Arabic Muslim World on the south, eastward-faring Cossack river-boatmen were as suddenly and sweepingly extending the borders of the Russian World by outflanking an Iranic Muslim World on the north. The way was opened for them by the Muscovite Tsar Ivan IV when he conquered Qāzān in A.D. 1552; for Qāzān had been the Iranic World's north-eastern bastion, and after its fall there was no obstacle except forest and frost, which were the Nomad-fighting Cossacks' familiar allies, to prevent these pioneers of a Russian Orthodox Christendom from passing the Urals and rapidly working their way eastwards along the Siberian waterways until they were brought to a halt by stumbling in A.D. 1638<sup>4</sup> on the Pacific Ocean and then, on the 24th March, 1652, on the north-eastern marches of the Manchu Empire.<sup>5</sup> In reaching these new frontiers an expanding Russian World had outflanked not only the Iranic Muslim World but the whole of the Eurasian Steppe<sup>6</sup>—a waterless inland sea which Timur Lenk had neglected to turn into an Iranic 'lake' when the opportunity for extending his empire round all its coasts had presented itself to him in the fourteenth century.<sup>7</sup> The Iranic World now had to pay the penalty for Timur's lack of vision. Before Timur's day a nascent Iranic Muslim Civilization had succeeded in capturing the Turkish-speaking western half of a latter-day Eurasian Nomad World through

<sup>1</sup> See p. 313, n. 2, below.

<sup>2</sup> The one successful counter-stroke which the Arabs did achieve against the Portuguese in their decline was their ejection of this first wave of Western intruders not only from Maskat (*circa* A.D. 1648) and from the rest of 'Umān, but also from the east coast of Africa, as far south as Zanzibar inclusive, in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of the Christian Era; but this was only an ephemeral Arab recovery in the interval between two waves of Western expansion. In the nineteenth century the Westerners easily defeated the Arabs in the competition between them for the opening up of the interior of the African continent.

<sup>3</sup> See VII. vii. 435 and XII. ix. 469-70.

<sup>4</sup> See II. ii. 157 and V. v. 206-7.

<sup>5</sup> See Ravenstein, E. G.: *The Russians on the Amur* (London 1861, Trübner), p. 21.

<sup>6</sup> The Cossacks' emulation of the exploits of the Portuguese has been noticed in III. iii. 19; IV. iv. 497-8; and V. v. 315-16.

<sup>7</sup> See IV. iv. 491-501.

the conversion of the three western appanages of the Mongol Empire to the Sunni form of Islam;<sup>1</sup> and, on the eve of the Russian conquest of Western Siberia, this victory of the Iranic Civilization in this quarter had been rounded off by the conversion of the Khanate of Sibir; but the Iranic Civilization never went on to capture the Mongol-speaking eastern half of Eurasia on the farther side of the Zungarian Gap; and in A.D. 1576-7 the Mongols—followed by the Calmucks *circa* A.D. 1620—abandoned a primitive paganism, not, like their western cousins, for Islam, but for the Tantric Mahayanian form of Buddhism which had been preserved in a Tibetan fastness by a fossil of an extinct Indic Civilization.<sup>2</sup>

Thus, in the course of little more than a century reckoning from the date of the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror's death in A.D. 1481, an Islamic World into which the Iranic and Arabic societies had coalesced since the conquest of Syria and Egypt by Sultan Selim I in A.D. 1516-17<sup>3</sup> had been not only outflanked on two sides but completely encircled by the pioneering enterprise of Portuguese sailors, Cossack backwoodsmen, and Lama missionaries. By the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the noose was round the victim's neck; and, what was more, he had by then already been foiled in divers attempts to break out of the toils. This failure was a signal one in view of his possession of the interior lines (the one advantage that had not only been left to him, but had been weighted still more heavily in his favour by his opponents' far-flung encircling operations); and he was now inexorably condemned to die by strangulation whenever an alien executioner might choose to draw the fatal bow-string tight. Yet the suddenness with which the Islamic World had been caught in this potential stranglehold was not so extraordinary as the length of the time that was still to elapse before either the Muslims' adversaries or the Muslims themselves were to become sufficiently alive to the situation to be moved to take action—on the Western and the Russian side, action to pounce upon an apparently helpless prey, and, on the Muslim side, action to escape from apparently desperate straits.

### *The Postponement of the Crisis*

The Islamic World's Western and Russian adversaries were slow to close in upon their quarry, even when they seemed to have it at their mercy; and, when they did venture, their timidity and procrastination were justified in the event by a succession of discouraging military experiences. In the Ottoman recoil from the disastrous outcome of the second Ottoman siege of Vienna in A.D. 1682-3, which marked the visible turn of the tide in the warfare between the Islamic World and the West on a Danubian front, the Hapsburg counter-offensive was repelled in A.D. 1689 and again in A.D. 1738-9—this second time, definitively. When the Venetians took the opportunity of the Ottoman

<sup>1</sup> These were Jūi's portion on the steppe between the Altai and the Carpathians; Chaghatay's portion astride the Zungarian Gap; and Hūlāgū's portion in Iran and 'Irāq.

<sup>2</sup> See III. iii. 451; IV. iv. 497; V. v. 137 and 309-10.

<sup>3</sup> See I. i. 387-8, and xi, maps 50 and 51.

Power's momentary collapse to conquer the Morea in and after A.D. 1684, they were made to pay for their temerity by losing in A.D. 1715 not only this ephemeral acquisition but their ancient possession the Island of Tinos into the bargain. Peter the Great took the same opportunity to capture the fortress-port of Azov in A.D. 1696; but, when he was emboldened by this success to invade Moldavia in A.D. 1711, at a moment when he had relieved himself of pressure from Sweden by his sensational victory over Charles XII at Poltava in A.D. 1709, he had to surrender the precious maritime outlet that he had won for Russia in an inner recess of an inland sea that was still a Turkish lake, as the price of being allowed to escape annihilation in Moldavia at the hands of an Ottoman army that had caught the rash invader in its grip. The first Muslim populations of any appreciable size to pass under Western rule were those in Java, which the Dutch acquired in A.D. 1600-84,<sup>1</sup> and Bengal, which the British acquired in A.D. 1757-60; but these were two outlying enclaves on the Islamic World's extreme south-eastern edge; and, when the British, after having conquered all the rest of India east of the Indus Valley, proceeded in A.D. 1838 to trench on the core of Dār-al-Islām by invading Afghanistan, they suffered a disaster there which took the Western aggressors aback and changed the course of history.

In A.D. 1952 the greater part of this core, from Afghanistan to Egypt and from Turkey to the Yaman, was free from alien political rule or even control. By that date Egypt, Jordan, the Lebanon, Syria, and 'Irāq had all re-emerged from beneath the flood of British and French imperialism which had submerged them successively in A.D. 1882 and in the course of the General War of A.D. 1914-18, and the residual threat to the integrity and independence of the heart of the Arabic World was now coming, not from the Western Powers, but from the Zionists. The homeland of the Ottoman Turks in Anatolia had likewise emerged intact from an attempt to carve a Greek empire out of it in A.D. 1919-22. In A.D. 1952 the two principal exceptions to the freedom from alien rule which was being enjoyed for the most part by the core of Dār-al-Islām were the Far West of the Arabic Muslim World in North-West Africa, which had fallen into the hands of France, and the Far East of the Iranic Muslim World in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin, which had fallen into the hands of Russia. Elsewhere, Dār-al-Islām had merely been shorn of outlying fringes in India, Indonesia, and Rumelia and of imperfectly reclaimed hinterlands—such as the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe and its adjuncts the Crimea and the Caucasus, which Russia had acquired since A.D. 1774, and the interior of Tropical Africa, which the West European Powers had partitioned among themselves since A.D. 1880.<sup>2</sup> The slowness of the Modern Western World's advance at the Islamic World's expense can be measured by its history in the Maghrib.

In the past, this Mediterranean island, cut off, as it was, from both the

<sup>1</sup> By A.D. 1684 the Dutch had become masters of Western Java and paramount in the rest of the island; but it was not till A.D. 1830 that the whole of Java was brought under effective Dutch rule.

<sup>2</sup> A possible relation of cause and effect between the success of the Islamic World in preserving its independence in the nineteenth century of the Christian Era and the ill success of the contemporary Panislamic Movement is discussed on pp. 692-5, below.

Nile Valley and the Western Sudan by the dry sea of the Sahara, had been apt to experience the same fortunes as the Iberian Peninsula and Sicily, with which it was in closer touch across the waters of the Western Mediterranean; and, when, at the dawn of a Modern Age of Western history, the union of Aragon with Castile in A.D. 1479 was followed by the Spanish conquest of Granada in A.D. 1492 and by the rounding off of the Aragonese insular empire in Sardinia and Sicily through the Spanish conquest of Naples in A.D. 1503, it might have been expected that the North-West African countries opening on to the Mediterranean would now fall to Spain, and the Atlantic coast of Morocco to Portugal. The Portuguese had, indeed, begun to carve out a transmarine Algarve on the Moroccan side of the Straits of Gibraltar in A.D. 1415-71, and the Spaniards followed suit by holding Tripoli from A.D. 1510 to A.D. 1551 and imposing their suzerainty on the Hafsid princes of Tunisia from A.D. 1535 to A.D. 1574; but these prizes were snatched by the 'Osmanlis out of the Spaniards' hands after the Ottoman corsair Urūj Barbarossa of Lesbos<sup>1</sup> had audaciously driven a wedge between the Spaniards and the Portuguese by establishing himself in Algeria in A.D. 1516-18.<sup>2</sup> All that eventually remained of this abortive Spanish empire in the Maghrib was a tenuous chain of *presidios* clinging to peninsulas and islets along the rocky shore of the Moroccan Rif; and the incipient Portuguese empire along the Atlantic coast was excised by the Moroccans single-handed, without Ottoman aid. When King Sebastian of Portugal set out to complete the Portuguese conquest of Morocco in A.D. 1578, the royal invader and his army paid for their aggression with their lives, and Portugal with the loss of her independence for sixty years.<sup>3</sup>

Thereafter, until after the opening of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era, the Barbary Corsairs—unconquered by the Franks and unamenable to the Porte—preyed on the shipping of all Western Christian maritime Powers whose governments did not submit to paying them an annual tribute. It was not till A.D. 1803-5 that the Tripolitaniens were chastised by the United States, and not till A.D. 1816 that an international squadron commanded by Lord Exmouth made it clear to the rulers of all the Barbary States that their piracy would no longer be tolerated by Western Christian Powers who now at last had their hands free from the Napoleonic Wars. The definitive Western Christian conquest of the Far West of the Islamic World did not begin till the French landed at Algiers in A.D. 1830 to find there for France a substitute for the empire which she had not succeeded in imposing on Europe; and 104 years were to elapse between this first French landing on the North-West African coast and the submission to France of the last unsubdued tribes in the Atlas in A.D. 1934. A spectator of the Spanish landing at Goletta in A.D. 1535 who had supposed himself to be witnessing the political annexation of the Maghrib to Western Christendom would have been just four hundred years out of his reckoning.

<sup>1</sup> It is perhaps not fanciful to suggest that Barbarossa's prowess at sea was an inheritance from the age-old Greek inhabitants and medieval Italian masters of his native island.

<sup>2</sup> See I. i. 348; p. 104-5, above; X. ix. 37-38.

<sup>3</sup> Portugal was engulfed in the Spanish Monarchy from A.D. 1581 to A.D. 1640.



Why had both the West and Russia been so slow in taking the offensive against an hereditary enemy at their gates? And why, after they had at last tasted blood, had they not managed to devour more than the extremities of this Tityos's carcase? In a list of reasons for the Islamic World's rather surprising reprieve we may include the initial self-confidence with which the Muslims had been inspired by the memory of extraordinary previous achievements; the subsequent tactical victories that masked their strategical defeat in their attempts to break out of the toils of Western and Russian encirclement; the long-lasting effect of these impressive Muslim successes in inducing the Westerners to take the Muslims at their own valuation; the leading Modern Western peoples' loss of interest in the Mediterranean for some three hundred years after their conquest of the Ocean towards the close of the fifteenth century; and the mutual frustration of the rival competitors for the spoils of the Islamic World after the Western Powers and Russia had at last become aware that the once formidable titan now lay at their mercy.

The Muslims' initial self-confidence was indeed well-founded; for both the sister Islamic societies had done mighty deeds in their infancy. In the thirteenth century of the Christian Era the Arabic Muslim Society had performed in real life the infant Héraklès' legendary feat of strangling, each with a single hand, the two snakes sent by his persecutress Hera to devour the babe in his cradle. This Herculean prowess had been displayed by the Arabic Muslim Society in saving itself from the peril of being overwhelmed by a hostile combination between two formidable Christian aggressors when in A.D. 1260 the Far Eastern Christians, with the united forces of a Eurasian Nomadism at their back, had pushed across the Euphrates into Syria as far as Damascus, while the Western Christian Crusaders were still holding a bridgehead on the Syrian coast no farther away than Acre.<sup>1</sup> This thirteenth-century Arabic Muslim prodigy of self-preservation was matched in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries by the Iranic Muslim Society's not less remarkable aggressive feat of conquering the main body of Orthodox Christendom. With these achievements to their credit, the Muslims took it for granted that they were invincible; and their consequent *moral* and prestige long continued to compensate for their increasing technological inferiority to their Modern Western and Westernizing adversaries.

This prestige and *moral* were buoyed up by the Muslims' subsequent tactical victories in their strategically unsuccessful attempts to break out of a ring that had been run round them by their Christian neighbours;<sup>2</sup> for the superficial successes immediately made their mark, while the underlying failures long escaped notice.

In the Mediterranean, for example, the 'Osmanlis' sixteenth-century

<sup>1</sup> See II. ii. 238 and 451, and p. 355, below.

<sup>2</sup> The history of the Islamic World's long-drawn-out struggle with the Western Powers and Russia from the sixteenth century onwards had much in common with the history of Germany's struggle with the same adversaries in the first and second world wars; and indeed in the First World War Germany and Turkey were in the same camp. The Muslims, like the Germans, won battle after battle without being able to save themselves by these victories from eventually losing the war.



success in defeating Spain's attempt to gain possession of the Maghrib,<sup>1</sup> and the Barbary Corsairs' subsequent thalassocracy in the Mediterranean on sufferance from Western maritime Powers pre-occupied with Oceanic enterprises, obscured the 'Osmanlis' far more significant failure to break through to the coast of the Atlantic and compete with the Western Christian Powers for possession of the Americas.<sup>2</sup> The 'Osmanlis' capture of Rhodes from the Knights of Saint John in A.D. 1522 was likewise more sensational, though less significant, than their subsequent inability to expel the Knights from their new naval base on the Island of Malta.

The 'Osmanlis did break through to the Indian Ocean after their conquest of Egypt in A.D. 1517; and their subsequent defeats by the Portuguese off Diu in A.D. 1538<sup>3</sup> and in Abyssinia in A.D. 1542-3<sup>4</sup> were more momentous than either their victory in the same year A.D. 1538 off Preveza or their reverse in A.D. 1571 at Lepanto in an unprofitable struggle with the Mediterranean Western maritime Powers for the command of a land-locked sea whose narrow outlet into the Atlantic was out of the 'Osmanlis' reach. If, instead of having to submit to being bottled up in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf as tightly as in the Mediterranean, Ottoman sea-power had been able to retrieve the recent failure of Egyptian sea-power to sweep the Indian Ocean clear of the Portuguese intruders, the 'Osmanlis might have become the heirs of the Indian Muslim princes of Gujerāt and have anticipated the descendants of their ancient enemy Timur Lenk in becoming the Turkish Muslim founders of an Indian universal state. This historic Ottoman failure in the Indian Ocean attracted less attention, however, than either the subsequent feats of other Muslim Powers on the Indian mainland<sup>5</sup> or the 'Osmanlis' own antecedent feat of swallowing up an Egyptian Mamlūk Empire which had been the leading Power in the Arabic World for a quarter of a millennium.

This amalgamation of the Mamlūk with the Ottoman Empire was indeed a conspicuous alteration of the political map. Yet the 'Osmanlis' acquisition of the Egyptian portage between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, which gave them the strategic advantage of holding the interior lines in a contest in the Indian Ocean with the Portuguese circumnavigators of Africa, proved barren after all when the 'Osmanlis failed nevertheless to wrest the command of the Indian Ocean out of Portuguese hands. Nor did the concentration of Islamic forces through the union of Egypt and other Arabic countries with the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century make up for the fatal disruption of the Iranic World, at the beginning of the same century, through the sudden rise of a militantly anti-Ottoman Safawī Shī'ite Power in the Iranic World's heart.<sup>6</sup> In the ensuing struggle in the Indian Ocean between the

<sup>1</sup> See p. 221, above.

<sup>2</sup> See II. ii. 445.

<sup>3</sup> In A.D. 1565 the Muslim conquest of the Indian sub-continent was completed by the Deccanese Muslim Powers' feat of overthrowing and partitioning the Hindu Empire of Vijayanagar (see V. v. 515, with n. 1). In A.D. 1572 the Muslim power in India was concentrated into an omenical rāj through the Timurid Mughal prince Akbar's conquest of Gujerāt in that year.

<sup>4</sup> See II. ii. 444-5.

<sup>5</sup> See II. ii. 365-6 and 445.

<sup>6</sup> See I. i. 366-88.

'Osmanlis and the Portuguese, the Portuguese partly owed their victory to a schism in the Iranic Muslim camp which enabled the Portuguese to win the 'Osmanlis' Safawī enemies for their allies instead of finding themselves confronted with a united Iranic World.

On the Danubian front, likewise, the 'Osmanlis' strategic reverse in A.D. 1529, when they failed to capture Vienna and thereby failed to crack the still tender carapace of a new-born Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy,<sup>1</sup> was eclipsed in the eyes of contemporaries by the preceding overthrow of Hungary in A.D. 1526 in the last round of a Hungaro-Ottoman Hundred Years' War. Contemporary Western observers shuddered to see a Western Christian kingdom go the way of its Orthodox Christian neighbours. Yet the carving of a new pashalyq of Buda out of Western Christendom's south-eastern flank, which was all that the Ottoman Empire eventually gained from the Battle of Mohacz, was a trifling advantage by comparison with the adverse effect of the other consequences of this battle on Ottoman prospects of farther expansion in this quarter. The severity of the disaster that had overtaken Hungary stimulated the Western World to provide itself with a Danubian Hapsburg carapace which, in the next chapter of the story, proved strong enough, in the two ordeals of A.D. 1529 and A.D. 1682-3, to resist the heaviest blows that Ottoman armies could deliver at this distance from their base of operations.

Vienna, like Tabriz, was just too far beyond the 'Osmanlis' effective range to go the way of Buda and Erzinjan; and it was noteworthy how small a quota of the Western World's total energies had to be mobilized in order to hold the 'Osmanlis at bay in the Burgenland. The personal union, under the House of Hapsburg, of an unconquered remnant of the territories of the Hungarian Crown of Saint Stephen with the territories of the Bohemian Crown and with the Hapsburgs' own hereditary possessions in south-eastern Germany sufficed to bring the 'Osmanlis to a halt on the eastern glacis of Vienna;<sup>2</sup> and the West European countries proved able with impunity to ignore the Ottoman peril while they were harvesting the opportunities which their conquest of the Ocean had brought within their grasp, and were contending with one another for possession of these trans-oceanic spoils.

The political schism between the Hapsburg Power and France and religious schism between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism, which rent Western Christendom in the sixteenth century, were proportionately no less devastating than the contemporary breach in the Iranic Muslim World between a Sunnī Ottoman and a Shi'ite Safawī Power; and a sixteenth-century France might have been as valuable an ally for the Ottoman Empire in the Mediterranean as a sixteenth-century Safawī Empire was for Portugal in the Indian Ocean. The French Mediterranean naval port of Toulon did harbour an Ottoman fleet in the winter of A.D. 1543-4; yet Toulon never became an Ottoman counterpart of the Portuguese base at Ormuz; and in the Mediterranean, as on the Danube, the Hapsburg Power managed to keep the 'Osmanlis in check notwithstanding the diversions made by its Western Christian rivals in

<sup>1</sup> See II. ii. 179 and V. v. 325.

<sup>2</sup> See II. ii. 179.

its rear. This ability of the Modern Western World to fight off with one hand the Islamic World's efforts to break out, while the members of the Western body politic were warring all the time with one another, gives the true measure of the Western World's superiority over the Islamic World in strength even in an age in which the Ottoman Power stood at its zenith.

The least noticed, but not least signal, of all these sixteenth-century Ottoman strategic reverses was a failure to undo a master-move in a Russian encircling movement. The year A.D. 1569<sup>1</sup> witnessed the discomfiture of an Ottoman expeditionary force which had been sent via the Crimea to break a recently acquired Muscovite hold on the line of the Lower Volga<sup>2</sup> and to bring this vital waterway within the Ottoman Empire's reach by digging a canal from the nearest point on the Don to connect the Volga with the Black Sea. This abortive Ottoman thrust into the Eurasian Steppe was an attempt to reverse a previous change in the political map which had been to the 'Osmanlis' serious disadvantage. Since the opening of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era the 'Osmanlis had suddenly and unexpectedly been cut off from access overland, both south and north of the Caspian, to their Sunnī co-religionists in Central Asia and India. South of the Caspian, the road had been blocked by the establishment of a Safawī Empire extending from the Caspian to the Persian Gulf; north of the Caspian, it had been blocked by two successive Russian forward moves.<sup>3</sup> The year A.D. 1502 saw the eviction of the last of the epigoni of Chingis Khan's son Jūji from the sarāy (*Russicē* Tsaritzyn) on the bank of the Middle Volga.<sup>4</sup> Thereafter, in A.D. 1552-4, the Muscovites had conquered not only this Mongol horde's successor-state of Qāzān, commanding the confluence of the Volga with the Kama,<sup>5</sup> but also its successor-state of Āstrakhān, commanding the Volga's mouth. If the 'Osmanlis had succeeded in ejecting the Muscovites from the line of the Lower Volga in A.D. 1569, they would have cleared for themselves a path over the Eurasian Steppe north of the Caspian along which they could have joined hands with their Uzbeg Turkish co-religionists who had recently conquered the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin from the Timurids,<sup>6</sup> and with the Khans of Sibir,

<sup>1</sup> See Inalcik, H.: *The Origin of the Ottoman-Russian Rivalry and the Don-Volga Canal (1569)* (Ankara 1948, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi), and the present Study, I. i. 374, n. 2, and II. ii. 445.

<sup>2</sup> In the General War of A.D. 1939-45, the line of the Lower Volga was the scene of one of the decisive battles of history (*commissum* 22 Nov. 1942-2 Feb. 1943). The outcome of the military operations in the same theatre in A.D. 1569, which was perhaps of equal importance, was consummated without any direct clash of arms between the Russian forces and the alien invader. In A.D. 1569 the Grand Vizier Mehmed Sököllü's grand design of reopening the severed communications between the Ottoman Empire and the Sunnī Muslim Turkish states of Central Asia by opening up a Don-Volga inland waterway between the Black Sea and the Caspian was frustrated, without any need for military intervention on Muscovy's part, by the ill will and bad faith of the Khan of the Crimea and by the insubordination of the Janissaries, whose Rumelian souls revolted against a prospect of having to pass the winter in a clime that was far bleaker than an Azarbaijanian Qārabāgh (see I. i. 386).

<sup>3</sup> See I. i. 398.

<sup>4</sup> Sarāy stood on the left bank of the Volga, in the angle of its westward bend adjoining the eastward bend of the Don. On the opposite bank in A.D. 1556 the Russians built a fort called Tsaritzyn which became famous in A.D. 1942-3 under the name of Stalingrad.

<sup>5</sup> See p. 217, above.

<sup>6</sup> See I. i. 371-5. Requests received by the Porte from the Khans of Khīva (Khawā-rizm), Bukhārā, and Samarqand for Ottoman action to reopen the pilgrimage route, via

whose horde on the Great Northern Bay of the Eurasian Steppe, in the Tobol Basin east of the Ural Mountains, was converted to Sunnism<sup>1</sup> on the morrow of the 'Osmanlis' abortive expedition to the Volga and on the eve of the Cossacks' subsequent successful passage of the Urals.

If, in A.D. 1569, the 'Osmanlis had attained their military objective, three important political results would have followed. The Sunni Muslim World, which had been split asunder by the eruption of Imāmi Shi'ism in Iran, would have been reunited along a corridor to the north of the Caspian; the resurgent Shi'i Power would have been encircled and possibly crushed; and the threat to which the Islamic World's north-eastern flank had been exposed by the Russian conquest of Qāzān in A.D. 1552 would have been neutralized, since the Cossacks' passage of the Urals in A.D. 1586 would have been forestalled by the erection of an effective Islamic barrier across the next stage of their eastward path. The Cossacks' fire-arms would not have been able to make the short work that they did make of the Siberian Tatars' resistance if the Tatar archers had been reinforced by Ottoman matchlock-men who could have fought the Cossacks on equal terms.<sup>2</sup>

In the event, the reverse suffered by the 'Osmanlis on the Don-Volga Steppe in A.D. 1569 not only left the way open for the Cossacks to pour over the Urals into Siberia; it gave the signal for them to perform, before the close of the sixteenth century, the more audacious feat of sealing the severance of the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe from its heartland east of the Caspian by bounding forward from the line of the Dniepr to the lines of the Don, the Terek, and the Yaik.<sup>3</sup> This triple Cossack reinforcement of a Muscovite breakwater along the line of the Lower Volga that had held firm against the 'Osmanlis created a system of defence in depth that was too strong to be breached by the Nomads. The last of all the eruptions of Eurasian Nomadism did sweep across the Yaik and the Volga in A.D. 1616; but it was halted at the line of the Don and never reached the line of the Dniepr;<sup>4</sup> and the Nomads who rode out on this forlorn hope were not Turkish-speaking proselytes of an Iranic Muslim Civilization but Mongol-speaking Calmuck neophytes of a Tantric Mahayanian Church which had survived as a fossil in a Tibetan fastness.

It will be seen that the failure of the Ottoman attempt to break into the heart of the Eurasian Steppe in A.D. 1569 was fraught with the gravest consequences for the Islamic World; but the significance of this Ottoman reverse was obscured by the continuance, for at least 160 years there-

Ästrakhān, from Central Asia to Mecca, which the Russian occupation of Ästrakhān had closed, appear to have weighed with the Porte in the taking of its decision to launch the adventurous expedition of A.D. 1569 (see Inalcik, *op. cit.*, pp. 68 and 73). The Porte was sensitive to such appeals because its prestige in a Sunni Muslim World was bound up with its title to the guardianship of the Two Holy Cities of the Hijāz, which it had taken over from the Mamlūk Sultan of Egypt when it had extinguished the Mamlūk Power in A.D. 1517.

<sup>2</sup> A trial of strength in Western Siberia in the last quarter of the sixteenth century between 'Osmanlis and Muscovites, both equipped with fire-arms of Modern Western origin, would have been a counterpart of the similar contest that actually took place between Ottoman and Portuguese matchlock-men in Abyssinia in A.D. 1542-3 (see II. ii. 365-6 and 445).

<sup>3</sup> See II. ii. 157 and V. v. 314-15.

<sup>4</sup> See V. v. 315.

after, of Crimean Tatar slave-raids into Muscovite territory. In a book published in A.D. 1668 an English observer, Sir Paul Rycaut, estimated that, at the time when he was making his observations, the average annual import of slaves from Krim Tatar to Constantinople was at least twenty-thousand head.<sup>1</sup> Russia continued to suffer from this scourge throughout the reign of Peter the Great, and an effective Russian *lines* in the Ukraine was not constructed till A.D. 1730-4, in the reign of the Empress Anna.<sup>2</sup> Though these slave-raids were of no military importance,<sup>3</sup> they sustained the illusion that the Ottoman Empire was on the offensive, and Muscovy on the defensive, for more than a century and a half after the roles had been reversed in fact.

This mirage of an unimpaired Islamic military power long continued to bemuse, not only the Muslims themselves, but also their Western adversaries. The continuing prestige of the Islamic Civilization in Western eyes is attested by the continuance into the eighteenth century of conversions to Islam among Western Christians who were neither victims of the Barbary slave-raiders nor prisoners of war, but were voluntary entrants into the Ottoman service.<sup>4</sup> The non-converted Western Christian employee of the Porte was a rare figure before the nineteenth century and cut a poor figure during the first half of it;<sup>5</sup> and,

<sup>1</sup> Rycaut, Sir Paul: *The Present State of the Ottoman Empire* (London 1668, Starkey and Brome), p. 81, cited in III. iii. 35, n. 3.

<sup>2</sup> See Sumner, B. H.: *Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire* (Oxford 1949, Blackwell), p. 15, n. 3.

<sup>3</sup> For their social and religious importance see the passage quoted from Rycaut's book, loc. cit., in V. v. 110.

<sup>4</sup> In Egypt in A.D. 1801, one of the commanders of the Ottoman forces cooperating with the British expeditionary force against the French was a renegade whose original name had been Campbell (Walsh, T.: *Journal of the Late Campaign in Egypt* (London 1803, Cadell and Davies), p. 66). The sensational 'conversion' of the French general Menou to Islam during the French occupation of Egypt in A.D. 1798-1801 was almost certainly insincere.

<sup>5</sup> The outstanding eighteenth-century representative of his kind was the French military officer Baron de Tott, who was employed by the Porte, during the Great Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1768-74, to fortify the Dardanelles in the Western style of the day after a Russian fleet from the Baltic had confounded all Turkish notions of geography by appearing in the Mediterranean and destroying the Ottoman fleet in the Battle of Cheshme (*commisum* 7 July, A.D. 1770). The allegation that de Tott became a convert to Islam is denied by his English translator (*Memoirs of the Baron de Tott on the Turks and the Tartars*, translated from the French by an English gentleman at Paris under the immediate inspection of the Baron (London 1785, Jarvis, 2 vols.), vol. i, pp. xvii-xxiv):

'Mr. de Tott has stated to the translator the impracticability of the Turks receiving any essential permanent instructions from the Europeans, on this... principle, viz. that, the instant their instructor becomes a Mahometan, he is looked upon as a fellow subject and is reduced to a level with themselves, besides the contempt naturally attending a forced conversion; and, if he remains a Christian, he has insuperable obstacles to overcome, even with the unusual and improbable protection and firmness of a Sultan Mustapha. Amongst others, the famous Mr. de Bonneval, whose history made so much noise at the beginning of this century, may be rated as an example of the truth of this observation. No Christian can ever be more respectably situated than Mr. de Tott; yet even his regulations produced only a momentary effect, and are already fallen into decay' (*ibid.*, pp. xx-xxi).

The translator supports Baron de Tott's contention by going on to report two anecdotes related to him by the Baron himself. Incidentally the Baron testified 'that he had never received a farthing from the Porte, nor any other appointment than that of his own Court' (*ibid.*, p. xxi).

Sixty-five years or so later, the position of Frankish employees in the Ottoman service was still what it had been in de Tott's day, on the testimony of the famous Prussian soldier Helmuth von Moltke, who served an apprenticeship in the Ottoman Empire in the years A.D. 1835-1839 as a member of a Prussian military mission to the Porte. Von Moltke records that at this date the Ottoman high command could not venture to outrage



even after the renegade had ceased to be the typical Western employee in Dār-al-Islām, a Western homage to the attractiveness of the Islamic culture which had formerly taken the radical form of religious conversion to the Islamic Faith was still paid in the superficial, yet nevertheless psychologically significant, form of the wearing of Islamic dress by Western Christian travellers in the Islamic World, as well as by Western Christian residents there. While this change of costume had the effect of serving as a practical precaution against the danger of arousing a Muslim population's latent fanaticism by flaunting Frankish clothes which, in early nineteenth-century Muslim eyes, were still the badge of Unbelief,<sup>1</sup> the primary motive was never this utilitarian one, but was always a sense of admiration;<sup>2</sup> and this hard-dying homage of the Modern West to Islam did not cease till it extinguished itself by losing its sincerity and evaporating into an affectation<sup>3</sup> that is amusingly satirized in Kinglake's portrait<sup>4</sup> of the English aristocrat, Lady Hester Stanhope (*vivebat* A.D. 1776-1839), theatrically aping the part of a sultan's mother<sup>5</sup> in her dilapidated mansion in the Lebanon.

These psychological causes of the postponement, for some two hundred years, of a doom to which the Islamic World had been inexorably condemned before the sixteenth century was over, were reinforced by an economic cause and a political one.

The economic cause was the commercial stagnation of the Mediterranean Sea for some three hundred years after the conquest of the Ocean by the West European peoples at the close of the fifteenth century. In its

the Muslim feelings of even its Western-trained troops by ordering them to present arms to officers who were gyaours, even when these gyaour officers were, like von Moltke and his colleagues (and also like de Tott in his day), the servants of a foreign sovereign and not of the Pādishāh. 'We', von Moltke writes, 'were highly distinguished individual representatives of an abysmally low-rated category. . . . As for Franks who offer their services to the Turks for pay, these naturally find themselves in an immeasurably poorer position; and the natural result is that (with a few most honourable exceptions) the only Franks who contrive to endure it are of the kind that is prepared to submit to every sort of humiliation. People offer themselves as teachers in Turkey who have been bad pupils at home' (Moltke, H. von: *Briefe über Zustände und Begebenheiten der Türkei* (Berlin 1841, Mittler), p. 414).

<sup>1</sup> According to a report from Col. Campbell to Sir John Bowring, incorporated in the latter's *Report on Egypt and Candia* dated the 27th March, 1839 (London 1840, Clowes), p. 190, Frankish clothes were by that date commanding respect instead of exciting contempt in Egypt. In Damascus, on the other hand, Frankish clothes were still not to be seen (Bowring, J.: *Report on the Commercial Statistics of Syria*, dated the 17th July, 1839 (London 1840, Clowes), p. 92).

<sup>2</sup> Perhaps the most remarkable of all Modern Western sartorial tributes to the abiding prestige of a decadent Islamic Civilization was the nineteenth-century and twentieth-century French and British practice of dressing even European troops in uniforms of an Islamic style. The Maghribi fez, jacket, and baggy trousers of the French *zouave* (*suw-wār*) had their counterpart in the turban worn by the English officer in a British Indian cavalry regiment—a headgear which proclaimed the British Rāj to be the Mughal Rāj's heir.

<sup>3</sup> See Clot-Bey, A. B.: *Aperçu Général sur L'Égypte* (Paris 1840, Fortin et Masson, 2 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 150-1.

<sup>4</sup> Kinglake, A. W.: *Eothen* (1st ed., 1844), chap. 8.

<sup>5</sup> The wife of an Ottoman sultan came into power if and when her son succeeded her husband on the imperial throne; and an Herodotus would have noted with amusement that the accident of becoming a widow, for which a woman was penalized in the Hindu World by being sent to the funeral pyre to be burnt alive, and in the Western World by being sent to the dower house to die of *ennui* there, was rewarded in the Islamic World by the enjoyment, as a widowed mother, of a status and a licence never accorded to a wife during her husband's lifetime.



preoccupation with the task of opening up for itself this vaster and more lucrative field of enterprise,<sup>1</sup> the West was content to abandon the Levant to Ottoman Greek mariners<sup>2</sup> and the Western Mediterranean to Barbary pirates<sup>3</sup> till, as a result of its very success in acquiring an oecumenical empire by exploiting its command of oceanic routes, it had built up in India and the Far East such substantial interests that the re-opening of a direct route between India and Western Europe now became a matter of importance to West European governments and men of business.

The chief landmark in the history of this change in the Western attitude towards the Mediterranean was the British East India Company's acquisition of a virtual sovereignty over Bengal in A.D. 1757-60. Thenceforward the finding of a short cut between a rapidly expanding British Rāj in India and this renascent Indian Empire's new metropolis in the British Isles became a more and more earnestly pursued object of British policy,<sup>4</sup> and, in an age of Western ascendancy, this renewed Western interest in the Mediterranean<sup>5</sup> spelled Western military and political intervention in the life of the Islamic countries possessing Mediterranean seaboard or situated on the land-bridge between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. In the fifteenth century the Western peoples' main inducement to seek an oceanic route, however circuitous, from Western Europe to India had been the Western Powers' inability to control a short route via the Mediterranean and the Red Sea or the Persian Gulf, because this route was bestridden by Islamic Powers whom the West was not then strong enough to coerce. In the eighteenth century, Egypt and Syria were still in the hands of their former Mamlūk Muslim masters' Ottoman Muslim conquerors and successors, but by this date the 'Osmanlis were no longer capable of defending their empire against Western or Westernizing aggressors, and the Western Powers could therefore now have, for the taking, a Mediterranean route between India and Western Europe which would not only be shorter than the Cape route but would also be as fully at their command in the military and political circumstances of the day—always supposing that the alien competitors for the Islamic World's spoils could agree with one another over the division of them.

As it turned out, this essential condition of agreement was never attained, and the diplomatic and military energy expended in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by each of the Powers on thwarting its

<sup>1</sup> The West European peoples' preoccupation with the Ocean and indifference to the Mediterranean in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries is comparable to the American people's preoccupation with their own continent and indifference to Europe in the nineteenth century.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 173-7, above.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 221, above.

<sup>4</sup> See Hoskins, H. L.: *British Routes to India* (London 1928, Longmans Green).

<sup>5</sup> The British had shown an interest in the Western Mediterranean since the beginning of the eighteenth century. They had acquired Gibraltar in A.D. 1704, campaigned in Catalonia in A.D. 1704-12, and held Minorca from A.D. 1708 to A.D. 1782. The conflict between Great Britain and France which led to these results was, however, a war of the Spanish, not the Mughal or the Ottoman, succession; and, even after Malta had come into British hands in A.D. 1798 in the Napoleonic round of the Anglo-French duel, another generation was to pass before a through-route between England and India via the Mediterranean was to be established by the spanning of the gap between Malta and Suez in the direct British line of communications between England and India.

rivals' designs on the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire would probably have sufficed to prolong the Ottoman Empire's life for the hundred years and more by which it actually exceeded its natural expectation, even if the 'Osmanlis themselves had never made the attempt to save their house from destruction by reconstructing it in a Modern Western style under the spur of shocking military defeats.

Though the discomfiture by British arms of a moribund Mughal Empire's local viceroy in Bengal might do little to upset Islamic complacency, and might be regarded in the West mainly as an incident in a struggle over India between Great Britain and France, the defeat of the Ottoman Empire by Russia in the Great Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1768-74 was taken everywhere as a portent; and, when in A.D. 1798 the French descended upon the Ottoman dominion of Egypt, and overcame all resistance there with ease,<sup>1</sup> as a step towards reopening in India a contest with their British rivals which had been decided there against France in the Seven Years' War, even shrewd observers took it for granted that they would live to see the Ottoman Empire partitioned between France, Russia, Great Britain, and the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy. Yet this expectation, natural though it was at the time, was not fulfilled in the event; for the only parts of the Ottoman Empire, within its frontiers of A.D. 1768, which were in the possession of any of those foreign Powers in A.D. 1952 were the territories adjoining the north and east coasts of the Black Sea, from Bessarabia to Batum inclusive, which had fallen to Russia; Cyprus, which had fallen to Great Britain; and Tunisia and Algeria, which had fallen to France. As for the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy, which had held Bosnia-Herzegovina from A.D. 1878 to A.D. 1918 and the sanjāq of Novipazār from A.D. 1879 to A.D. 1908, she had voluntarily evacuated Novipazār and had lost Bosnia-Herzegovina in the act of losing her own existence.<sup>2</sup> The lion's share of the Ottoman Empire of A.D. 1768, from Bosnia to the Yaman and from Tripolitania<sup>3</sup> to Moldavia inclusive, had passed into the hands, not of alien Great Powers, but of Orthodox Christian and Muslim successor-states, of which the largest in area—apart from a mostly arid Sa'ūdī Arabia—was a Turkish Republic stretching from Adrianople to Mount Ararat.

This remarkable triumph of the nineteenth-century Western political ideal of Nationalism on alien ground could hardly, however, have been achieved by the feeble and discordant efforts of the surprisingly liberated local peoples if the surrounding Great Powers had not thrust this prize into their hands by frustrating one another and thereby creating a political vacuum which, when the maintenance of Ottoman sovereignty

<sup>1</sup> See IV. iv. 458-60.

<sup>2</sup> The occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in and after A.D. 1878, and annexation of this occupied Ottoman territory in A.D. 1908, had, indeed, been nails driven into the Hapsburg Monarchy's coffin by its own statesmen's hands, since these Hapsburg acts of aggression against a moribund Ottoman Empire had had the effect of bringing the Monarchy into a head-on collision with a youthful Serb nationalism.

<sup>3</sup> A 'Libya' consisting of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Fazzān, which had been conquered from the Ottoman Empire by Italy in A.D. 1911-12, and from Italy by Great Britain in the general war of A.D. 1939-45, had attained independence on the 24th December, 1951.

proved no longer possible, all the Powers alike preferred to see occupied by local successor-states rather than by any of the Great Powers' own number.

The suzerainty of the Porte over Egypt, for example, was prolonged, after all, from A.D. 1798 to A.D. 1924 thanks in the first place to the military intervention of Great Britain in A.D. 1801—when British and British Indian expeditionary forces cooperated with an Ottoman expeditionary force in compelling the French invaders to capitulate—and in the second place to the diplomatic intervention of all the Great Powers of the day except France in A.D. 1840-1, when they compelled the Ottoman viceroy of Egypt, Mehmed 'Alī, not only to evacuate all Asiatic territories of the Ottoman Empire but also to reacknowledge the suzerainty of the Porte over the African Ottoman territories that were being left in his hands, in consideration of his receiving from the Porte a grant of the governorship of Egypt for himself and his heirs, and a grant of the governorship of the Sudan for himself for life. In the next chapter of Egyptian history the occupation of Egypt by Great Britain in A.D. 1882 ended, not, as might have been expected, in the replacement of Ottoman suzerainty by British sovereignty, but, like the French occupation of A.D. 1798-1801, in an eventual evacuation—though in this chapter of the story the Western occupation lasted fifty-four years (A.D. 1882-1936) instead of three, and was followed, not by a reassertion of Ottoman suzerainty, but by a general recognition of Egyptian independence.

In a different quarter, all but an outermost fringe of the Ottoman dominions in Rumelia and Anatolia was saved from falling into Russia's hands by the diplomatic action of the other Powers in A.D. 1839 and A.D. 1878, and by the military intervention of three of them—France, Great Britain, and Sardinia—on the Ottoman Empire's behalf in the Crimean War (*gerebatur* A.D. 1853-5); and Russia took an appropriate diplomatic revenge when, in A.D. 1921, a nascent Soviet Union helped a nascent Turkish Republic to save itself from an Anglo-Greek attack which was already being hampered by the hostility of France and Italy to any further augmentation of their British ally's power at Turkey's expense. Thanks to the stalemate of power politics in this long-drawn-out game of chess, the Ottoman heritage in Anatolia and Rumelia was preserved for eventual distribution between a Turkish Republic and the Ottoman Empire's South-East European successor-states.

The independence of Afghanistan, likewise, was preserved, not only by the valour of the Afghans in the first and second Anglo-Afghan wars, but by a rivalry between Great Britain and Russia which moved the British to bolster up Afghanistan as a buffer-state between India and Russia rather than to risk driving the Afghans into Russia's arms by attempting the completion of a conquest which would have been not beyond Great Britain's power, in spite of all Afghan efforts to resist it, if the rival Russian Empire had not loomed up over the British Indian horizon.

As for Persia and the Asiatic Arab successor-states of the Ottoman Empire outside the Arabian Peninsula, their experience of Russian and Western imperialism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries had been,

down to the year A.D. 1952, much the same as Egypt's. They had managed, after all, to preserve their independence after having been perilously caught in the toils. In A.D. 1952 Persia was still independent, within frontiers that were approximately those with which she had emerged from the Russo-Persian peace-settlement of A.D. 1828, though in A.D. 1907 she had been subjected, without being consulted, to the beginnings of a partition by the terms of the Anglo-Russian agreement of that year. Her unity had been restored in A.D. 1917, when the Russian as well as the 'neutral' and the British zone of Persia had fallen into the British lion's maw as a result of Russia's collapse in the First World War;<sup>1</sup> and her independence had been restored in A.D. 1921 when the Soviet Union—seeking to protect her 'soft under-belly' by turning Persia, as well as Turkey, into a buffer against British attack—constrained Great Britain to withdraw her troops from Persian soil by a show of force on Persia's Caspian coast. As a result of the Ottoman Empire's dissolution in the First World War, 'Irāq, Transjordan, and Palestine had fallen into the hands of Great Britain, and Syria and the Lebanon into the hands of France; yet, in the sequel, none of these Arab countries had gone the way that India and the Maghrib had gone during the hundred years ending in A.D. 1914. All of them except Palestine had, after all, secured at least a temporary independence as Arab national states—the French mandated territories owing to the action of Great Britain on their behalf during the Second World War—and the Palestinian Arabs had lost their country neither to Great Britain nor to Russia but to the Zionists.

Thus the rivalries between Great Britain and France, between Great Britain and Russia, and between Russia and the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy had preserved the political independence of the core of the Islamic World within limits that have been indicated.<sup>2</sup> Each Power had taken its turn in preventing its rivals from appropriating the heritage of the Islamic Powers and their successor-states; but the Muslim peoples had not been entirely passive beneficiaries of this favourable equilibrium of alien political forces; for, though the military and political reverses which they had suffered in and after A.D. 1768 had not put an end to their political independence, the shock of successive disasters had nevertheless brought into play the compelling motive of self-preservation, and this spur had driven the Muslim peoples to enter reluctantly upon a course of Westernization in which it had proved impossible to call a halt when once the momentous initial step had been taken.

### *The Muslim Peoples' Military Approach to the Western Question*

The clues to an understanding of the Muslim peoples' approach to 'the Western Question' are to be found in three circumstances. At the time when the impact of the Modern West became the dominant problem in their lives, the Muslim peoples—like the Russians and unlike the Ottoman Orthodox Christians at the corresponding crises in their histories—were still politically their own masters; they were also the heirs of a great military tradition which was the warrant of the Islamic

<sup>1</sup> The short title by which the General War of A.D. 1914-18 was coming to be known by the time of writing.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 230, above.

Civilization's value in its children's own eyes; and the sudden demonstration of their latter-day military decadence by the unanswerable logic of defeat in ordeal by battle<sup>1</sup> was as surprising to them as it was humiliating.

The Muslims' complacency over their historic military prowess was so deeply ingrained in their souls that the lesson implicit in the turn of the military tide in their Western adversaries' favour in A.D. 1683 had not yet made any appreciable impression on them by the time when, little short of a hundred years later, this lesson was on the point of being more sharply driven home. When, after the outbreak of war between the Ottoman Empire and Russia in A.D. 1768, it was common knowledge in Western Europe that the Russians were intending to bring into action a navy in the Modern Western style of that day which they had built up in the Baltic, the Porte declined to believe in the physical possibility of navigating ships from the Baltic into the Mediterranean till a Russian squadron duly turned up in the Levant to the consternation of an adversary who was so obstinately unprepared to cope with it.<sup>2</sup> Even after this painfully revealing Ottoman experience in the Great Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1768-74, the Egyptian Mamlûks could not be persuaded that they stood in any danger from their 'Osmanli conquerors' latter-day Western pupils in the art of war. When the Mamlûk war-lord Murâd Bey was warned by the Venetian business man Rosetti, the *doyen* of the Frankish community in Egypt, that Napoleon's seizure of Malta might be the prelude to a descent on Egypt, Murâd Bey burst out laughing at the absurdity of such an idea;<sup>3</sup> and, on the very eve of the catastrophe, the governor of Alexandria was equally impervious to a still more urgent warning given him by a landing-party from Nelson's fleet.<sup>4</sup>

The shock of the denouement was proportionately severe;<sup>5</sup> yet the Mamlûks' humiliation in A.D. 1798 was not so painful as the 'Osmanlis' in A.D. 1774, for the Russians at whose hands the 'Osmanlis had suffered their defeat were not even Franks; they were creatures of the same clay as the 'Osmanlis' Orthodox Christian *ra'îyeh*,<sup>6</sup> and their country was known to the 'Osmanlis, not as a formidable military Power, but as the happy hunting-ground of the 'Osmanlis' slave-raiding Krim Tatar

<sup>1</sup> The dramatic exposure of the decadence of the Egyptian Mamlûks by a French infantry whose equipment and training were originally derived from those of the Ottoman Janissaries in their prime has been noticed in IV. iv. 454-61.

<sup>2</sup> 'Whilst the weakness of the government compelled it to shut its eyes to the excesses of a licentious soldiery, the ministers strove to conceal the naval war which threatened the Empire. No Russian vessel had ever made its appearance at Constantinople. The Russians, therefore, have no ships; or, if by chance they have any, what does that signify to the Turks, since there is no communication between the Baltic and the Archipelago? The Danes, the Swedes, whose flags are known to the Turks, could not overturn that argument in their minds; maps spread out before their eyes had no more effect; and the Divan was not yet persuaded of the possibility of the fact when they received intelligence of the siege of Coron, the invasion of the Morea, and of the appearance of twelve of the enemy's line-of-battle ships' (de Tott, Baron: *Memoirs on the Turks and the Tartars*, English translation (London 1785, Jarvis, 2 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 14-15).

<sup>3</sup> Clot-Bey, A. B.: *Aperçu Général sur l'Égypte* (Paris 1840, Fortin et Masson, 2 vols.), vol. ii, p. 163.

<sup>4</sup> See the passage quoted in IV. iv. 458-60 from Shaykh 'Abd-ar-Rahmân al-Jabartî: *Ajâ'ib-al-Athâr fî'l-Tarâjim wa'l-Akhbâr*.

<sup>5</sup> See Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 164.

<sup>6</sup> See III. iii. 48.



vassals. Yet Muscovy had now signally defeated the Ottoman Empire in the field by means of a borrowed Frankish military technique. In fact, this Russian victory over Ottoman arms was a Frankish victory at second-hand; and, to produce such an effective result through such an incompetent agency, Frankish military methods must be potent indeed. By starting this train of thought in dismayed Ottoman minds, the victorious Empress Catherine II prepared the ground in Turkey for the military reforms of Sultan Selim III, while in Egypt a victorious Napoleon was in the same sense the forerunner of Mehmed 'Ali.<sup>1</sup>

In the Ottoman World at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as in the Russian World at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the aftermath of defeat by a Modern Western war-machine was a Westernizing movement from above downwards, beginning with a remodelling of the armed forces.

'Ce ne sont jamais les peuples qui font les civilisations, ce sont de grandes individualités qui les imposent presque toujours par la lutte et par la violence',

wrote Clot Bey,<sup>2</sup> the French physician whom Mehmed 'Ali took into his service in A.D. 1825 with a mandate to make provision on Western lines for the health of the Pasha of Egypt's new Westernized army;<sup>3</sup> and, though a generalization from Mehmed 'Ali's career does not hold good for all the instances of Westernizing revolutions within an historian's purview, the French director of Mehmed 'Ali's military medical service was entirely correct in declaring in A.D. 1840:

'C'est l'armée et les nombreux appendices qui s'y rattachent qui ont donné à l'Égypte l'impulsion civilisatrice qui l'entraîne aujourd'hui . . .<sup>4</sup> Tout était à faire, et tout a commencé à être fait à la suite de l'organisation militaire.'<sup>5</sup>

In the Ottoman Empire, as in Russia, this Westernization from above and from a military point of departure cast military officers for the role of liberal revolutionaries. The successful revolt of the 'Young 'Osmanli' Committee of Union and Progress in A.D. 1908 against the autocracy of Sultan 'Abd-al-Hamīd II is the counterpart, in point of personnel, of the abortive revolt of the Decembrists against the autocracy of Tsar Nicholas I in A.D. 1825. The leaders of the Decembrists were mostly Guards officers,<sup>6</sup> recruited from the Russian nobility,<sup>7</sup> who had served

<sup>1</sup> See Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 165.

<sup>2</sup> Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 167.

<sup>3</sup> See Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 369-70.

<sup>4</sup> Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 167.

<sup>5</sup> Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 199; cp. p. 200. Sir John Bowring expresses an identical opinion in his *Report on Egypt and Candia* (London 1840, Clowes), p. 49.

<sup>6</sup> In thus once again attempting to play a dominant and decisive role in Petrine Russia's political life, the officers of the Imperial Guard were not, in A.D. 1825, taking a new departure. 'For exactly a hundred years from Peter's death' in A.D. 1725, the Guards had 'decided either the accession or the maintenance on the throne of every empress or emperor' (Sumner, B. H.: *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia* (London

[Cont. on facing page.

<sup>7</sup> See *Le Monde Slave*, Nouvelle Série, 2me Année, No. 12, Décembre, 1925 (Paris 1925, Alcan): 'Centenaire des Décabristes', p. 334. Paul Pestel, the leader of the moderate Southern Group, was a free-thinking Protestant of German origin, whose mother had lived at the Saxon Court at Dresden (*ibid.*, pp. 360, 369, and 370).



in the Russian army of occupation in France after the overthrow of Napoleon<sup>1</sup> and were impressed, not so much by the legend of the French Revolution, as by the constitutional monarchy which had been inaugurated under their eyes in a post-Napoleonic France.<sup>2</sup> The ring-leaders in the 'Young 'Osmanli' revolution of A.D. 1908 were likewise mostly military officers<sup>3</sup> who—in a generation which 'Abd-al-Hamid's censorship had done its worst to starve of Western intellectual food for fear of this infecting them with 'dangerous thought'—had enjoyed almost a monopoly of licensed access to contemporary Western sources of knowledge and inspiration, because even an 'Abd-al-Hamid had perceived that without Western-educated officers he could not have a Westernized army, and that without a Westernized army he would soon find himself an autocrat without an empire.

No doubt the tyrant's intention was that the Western studies of his military cadets should be strictly confined to technical military manuals, but it proved beyond the wit of a secret police to ensure that intelligent and idealistic-minded young men should pick nothing but this stony fruit from the tree of Modern Western knowledge when a wicket-gate into a Western intellectual paradise had once been opened to them.<sup>4</sup> A twentieth-century Ottoman, like a nineteenth-century Russian, autocracy was indeed in a dilemma from which it could not escape. If it was to insure itself against a danger of being conquered by militarily efficient neighbours, it must win military efficiency for itself by providing itself

1950, English Universities Press), p. 137; cp. eundem: *Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire* (Oxford 1949, Blackwell), p. 9). The two new phenomena in A.D. 1825, were, first, that on this occasion the Russian Imperial Guard—duly keeping abreast of the movement of Western political ideas—were taking action on behalf, no longer of enlightened autocracy, but of parliamentary constitutional monarchy (see p. 551, n. 3, below), and, second, that this time—for the first time in a hundred years—their intervention in politics was unsuccessful. From first to last, Peter's new-model Imperial Guard had been the spear-head of the Westernization movement in Russia which Peter had inaugurated.

'The Guards were drawn from the landowning families, but they served for life and had been brought up in the full spate of Peter's reforms. They had grown to manhood unhabituated to the traditional Muscovite ways, and were, for the most part, ardent supporters and admirers of their creator . . . Peter used the Guards more and more frequently on all manner of extraordinary, non-military missions, notably to bring to book those in high authority. . . . In the latter part of the reign . . . [they] became something like *missi dominici*. . . . Their official appellation, "compellers", speaks volumes. In earlier years Peter used them in the Army to compel other troops to discipline; now in his closing years he used them in government to compel authorities, high and low alike, to behave themselves and carry out the law. They were, as it were, a personal extension of Peter's own thunderclap will' (Sumner, *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia*, pp. 36-71).

<sup>1</sup> See Masaryk, T. G.: *The Spirit of Russia*, English translation (London 1919, Allen and Unwin, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. 97. The political education of at least two officers of the younger generation who played leading parts in the Turkish Revolution of A.D. 1908—Enver Bey and Fethi Bey Okyar—was likewise completed by a period of service in the Western World; but in both these Turkish military careers the sojourn in the West came after, not before, the revolution at home. Enver served as Turkish military attaché in Berlin between the revolution of A.D. 1908 and the suppression of the counter-revolution of A.D. 1909; Fethi served in A.D. 1909 as Turkish military attaché in Paris.

<sup>2</sup> See *Le Monde Slave*, loc. cit., pp. 378-9.

<sup>3</sup> Among these, Enver and Cemal won immediate celebrity, but Mustafā Kemal and Fethi lived to earn a deservedly greater reputation as leaders of the far more fruitful Turkish national movement of A.D. 1919, while the brain of the conspiracy that came to a head in A.D. 1908 was not a soldier at all but was the Salonican telegraph clerk Tal'at.

<sup>4</sup> Muslim 'Osmanlis had begun to read Western newspapers since the morrow of the Great Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1768-74 (Jorga, N.: *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches* (Gotha 1908-13, Perthes, 5 vols.), vol. v, p. 44).

with fighting forces on the Modern Western pattern; but it could not do this without exposing itself to the alternative danger of being destroyed, not by foreign conquest, but by domestic revolution, through the reception of subversive Western political ideas by the professionally Western-trained military officers on whose technical proficiency the military quality of the autocracy's fighting forces depended. This dilemma explains the emergence, in both Russian and Ottoman history, of a characteristic figure—the liberal revolutionary military officer—which was a natural phenomenon in a social no-man's-land between two conflicting cultures, however paradoxical it might appear to be in Western eyes accustomed to a middle-class social order in which 'Liberalism' and 'Militarism' were mutually exclusive conceptions.

Up to this point we have been noticing similarities in the courses taken by the Westernizing movement on Islamic and on Russian ground; but there was at least one point of capital importance in which the two movements differed sharply. Peter the Great divined, with the insight of genius, that a policy of Westernization must be 'all or nothing'. He saw that, in order to make a success of it, he must press on without a pause when once he had embarked on it, and must apply it to all departments of life, whatever his particular starting-point might have been. Accordingly Peter—setting out, like his Ottoman counterparts, from a military point of departure, and being prompted in the first instance, as they were prompted, by the motive of self-preservation—never thought of coming to a halt at the limits of the military sphere (if any such limits could be drawn in the internal economy of a society which, in seeking to Westernize its fighting forces, was seeking by definition to equip them with technical resources of civilian provenance). Peter forged straight ahead from his narrower towards his wider objective;<sup>1</sup> and, though, as we have seen,<sup>2</sup> the Petrine régime in Russia never succeeded in Westernizing more than the urban superstructure of life and ultimately paid the penalty for its failure to leaven the rural mass<sup>3</sup> by forfeiting its mandate to Communism, this arrest of its cultural offensive short of its comprehensive goal was due perhaps not so much to failure of vision or to inadequacy of agenda as to lack of sufficient driving-power. In Turkey, on the other hand, for a century and a half, from the outbreak of the Great Russo-Turkish War in A.D. 1768 till after the close of the First World War in A.D. 1918, the converts *à contre cœur* to a policy of Westernizing the Ottoman fighting forces continued, in despite of successive painful exposures of their fallacy, to hug the illusion that, in

<sup>1</sup> See p. 138, above.

<sup>2</sup> On p. 140, above.

<sup>3</sup> Peter's 'efforts to improve agriculture were intermittent, sporadic and ineffectual' (Sumner, *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia*, p. 161), though agriculture was the almost exclusive source of Petrine Russia's wealth, on which such heavy new calls were being made by the high-speed Westernization of the fighting forces, administration, and industry. Moreover, 'so far from attempting to alter serfdom as the basis of the state, Peter clamped it down more firmly on the peasantry' (ibid., p. 151; cp. pp. 157-8). In consequence, the Russian peasantry never came to feel that the Russian State was their affair (see Weidlé, W.: *La Russie Absente et Présente* (Paris 1949, Gallimard), pp. 163-4); and, though, in the last days of the Petrine régime, the peasantry was courted belatedly by the governing class and its agents as well as by the Intelligentsia—Rasputin, as well as Tolstoy, went into peasant dress—the peasantry rejected impartially both the Petrine governing class and an Intelligentsia which had been moved to secede from it by a sentimental cult of 'the People' (see ibid., pp. 110-12 and 183-4).

adopting elements from an alien culture, it was possible to pick and choose—as though a culture were not an organic way of life which must be taken or left as a whole.<sup>1</sup>

During that century and a half the prevalent ideal in Ottoman hearts was to adopt the alien culture of the Modern Western World to the minimum extent required for immediate self-preservation, and it took Ottoman minds five generations to learn that the practicable minimum was nothing less than the ideal maximum. The judgement on all the successive doses of Westernization that the 'Osmanlis administered to themselves, with wry faces, in the course of that age of their history is the damning verdict: 'Each time too little and too late';<sup>2</sup> and this verdict is said to have been pronounced by the post-Mahmudian 'Osmanli reformer-statesman Mustafâ Mehmed Reshîd Pasha (*vivebat* A.D. 1802(?)–58), at the beginning of his career, in the following words:

'Le malheur, c'est qu'il faut nous hâter, et qui ne connaît l'indolence du Musulman et ses insurmontables préjugés! Indolence et préjugés, voilà nos plus grands ennemis. Ce sont eux qui arrêtent notre marche, et nous devrions courir.'<sup>3</sup>

It was not till A.D. 1919, when this persistent impolicy threatened to deprive the Ottoman Turks of their Turkish homeland, after having already lost them their non-Turkish subject territories, that Mustafâ Kemâl and his companions committed themselves and their countrymen unreservedly to the policy of whole-hearted Westernization on which Peter the Great had launched out unhesitatingly as soon as he had become master of Russia's destinies.

This long-pursued Ottoman practice of 'staggering' the process of Westernization, which cost the 'Osmanlis so dear before they eventually threw it over, was the reflexion of a negative inertia and repugnance rather than the expression of any positive policy. At the same time the tragedy of the Ottoman Sultan Selîm III and the tragi-comedy of the Afghan King Amānallāh suggest that the Islamic Westernizers might have run the risk of bringing on themselves other serious setbacks if they had been quicker to abandon the tactics of 'hastening slowly' along a treacherous westward road. While a Mustafâ Kemâl Atatürk found himself strong enough, in the fifth generation of an Ottoman Westernizing movement, to venture deliberately to flout Islamic custom by tearing the veils off Muslim women's faces and compelling the men to wear hats with brims in which it was impossible for them to perform their prayer-drill,<sup>4</sup> his Ottoman predecessor and his Afghan contemporary both came to grief through attempting, in the first generation, to emulate the calculated provocativeness of Peter the Great. When Peter inaugurated his Westernization campaign by shaving Muscovite beards, this psychological *Blitzkrieg* justified its audacity by breaking the spirit of the conservative opposition without giving them time to go into action

<sup>1</sup> On this question see pp. 542–64, below.

<sup>2</sup> See II. ii. 186–7 and III. iii. 47.

<sup>3</sup> Reshîd Pasha, as quoted by Engelhardt, E.: *La Turquie et le Tanzîmât* (Paris 1882–4, Cotillon [et Pichon, successeur], 2 vols.), vol. ii, p. 325.

<sup>4</sup> See V. vi. 102–3.

against the impious futurist innovator. But, when Selim III put his new model army into uniforms in the Western style, and when Amānallāh brought back from London 1,001 ready-made suits of Western civilian clothes and clad in these the 1,001 members of a Great National Assembly (*Loe Jirga*) of conservative-minded Afghan tribal notables in October 1928,<sup>1</sup> the Afghan imitator of Peter paid for his audacity with his throne,<sup>2</sup> and the 'Osmanli with his life.

In the Ottoman World down to the time of writing, a still unconcluded drama of Westernization had so far run through four acts. The first act was the abortive attempt to Westernize the Ottoman fighting forces that was made by Sultan Selim III (*imperabat* A.D. 1789-1807). The second act was an abortive attempt to instil a tincture of Western Civilization into Ottoman civil life as a corollary of the successful Westernization of the fighting forces in Turkey by Sultan Mahmūd II (*imperabat* A.D. 1808-39) and in Egypt by Mehmed 'Alī (*proconsulari munere fungebatur* A.D. 1805-49). Both these two great Ottoman Turkish Westernizers performed wonders, yet the impetus that they gave to an Ottoman Westernizing movement did not outlive its authors for longer than a single generation, and the subsequent collapse of their work was due, not solely to the incapacity of their epigoni, but also to an inherent weakness in the work itself; for, though Mahmūd, as well as Mehmed 'Alī, had perceived that it was impossible to Westernize his fighting forces effectively without setting them in a Westernized framework of civilian life, not even Mehmed 'Alī had carried this ancillary process of Westernization in the civilian sphere deep enough, or far enough afield, to provide sufficiently solid civilian foundations for an ambitious military superstructure, and the eventual result of this discrepancy was a financial, military, and political collapse which overtook Turkey and Egypt simultaneously at the turn of the eighth and ninth decades of the nineteenth century. In Turkey this unhappy ending of the second act was followed by the opening of a third act in A.D. 1908, when the Committee of Union and Progress was brought into power by a military revolution which compelled Sultan 'Abd-al-Hamīd II to reinstate the constitution which he had accepted on the 23rd December, 1876, and suspended on the 14th February, 1878. This third act, in its turn, ended disastrously for Turkey in seven years of war (A.D. 1911-18) which left her not only militarily prostrate but actually in danger of political annihilation. Yet a situation which might have been the end of the play was followed, after all, by a fourth act, opening in A.D. 1919, in which the Ottoman Turkish people, under the leadership of Ghāzi Mustafā Kemāl, abandoned the now hopeless task of saving the Ottoman Empire in order to concentrate their efforts on the new objective of salvaging out of the wreckage a Turkish nation-state whose survival was to be ensured by a radical reconstruction on a Western basis. At the time of writing, this notable enterprise had been carried successfully through its first stage.

<sup>1</sup> See Toynbee, A. J., and Boulter, V. M.: *Survey of International Affairs*, 1928 (London 1929, Milford), p. 205.

<sup>2</sup> For Amānallāh's career, see V. v. 333 and V. vi. 234.

*The Salvaging of an Ottoman Society by Selīm III, Mehmed 'Alī, and Mahmūd II*

Selīm III's pioneer adventure in the Westernization of Turkey had an ominous overture in Krim Tatar during the brief interval of nine years between the renunciation of Ottoman suzerainty over the Khanate in the Russo-Turkish Peace Treaty of Küçük Qaynarja (*pactum* A.D. 1774)<sup>1</sup> and the annexation of the Khanate by Russia in A.D. 1783. Khan Shāhin Girāy (*regebat* A.D. 1777-83), finding himself left at the mercy of a victorious Russian Empire that was his immediate neighbour, was quicker than his ex-suzerain the Porte to discern, and act upon, the signs of the times. He set himself forthwith to Westernize his army; but, before this pathetic attempt to retrieve a desperate situation was crushed by Russia's heavy hand, it had evoked a reactionary domestic insurrection and had burdened the Khanate with a crushing load of national debt—two portents of troubles that were to overtake Turkey likewise in her subsequent pilgrimage towards the same Western goal.<sup>2</sup>

In Turkey, Western military experts were employed by the Porte in the war with the Hapsburg Monarchy and Russia that broke out in A.D. 1788;<sup>3</sup> but the first comprehensive attempt to remodel the Ottoman army and navy was not made till after the accession of Selīm III in A.D. 1789 and the restoration of peace in A.D. 1792. The Ottoman Navy was reorganized by French hands; Selim's new-model army, the Nizām-i-Jedīd, was inaugurated in 1793.<sup>4</sup> The tragic end of this enlightened experiment demonstrated that, in the political strategy of military Westernization in the Ottoman World, an indispensable opening move was to get rid of the classical regular army represented in Turkey by the Pādishāh's Slave-Household and in Egypt by the Mamlūks; for, while, by Selīm III's day, more than a century had passed since a Janissary Corps which had once been the best infantry in the World had ceased to be of any avail in war against the Ottoman Empire's foreign enemies, the reformer-sultan's fate showed that the Janissaries still held their own sovereign's life in their hands and that the living generation had no more scruple than their seventeenth-century predecessors had had against murdering a Pādishāh when his policy seemed to them to threaten their vested interests.

In the next act of the Ottoman drama, this lesson was taken to heart by Selīm III's cousin and all but immediate successor, Mahmūd II, and in Egypt by Mehmed 'Alī. Mahmūd managed to extirpate the Janissaries in A.D. 1826, eighteen years after he had been placed on his perilous throne,<sup>5</sup> and Mehmed 'Alī the Egyptian Mamlūks in A.D. 1811, six years after he had contrived to be appointed Pasha of Egypt,<sup>6</sup> as Peter had

<sup>1</sup> The eventual frustration of a sly Ottoman attempt to reacquire this suzerainty by reserving the Sultan's jurisdiction over the Crimea in his capacity as Caliph has been noticed in VI. vii. 23, with n. 4.

<sup>2</sup> See Jorga, N.: *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches* (Gotha 1908-13, Perthes, 5 vols.), vol. v, pp. 13 and 22.

<sup>3</sup> See Jorga, op. cit., vol. v, p. 54.

<sup>4</sup> See Jorga, op. cit., vol. v, p. 117.

<sup>5</sup> See III. iii. 49-50.

<sup>6</sup> See III. iii. 31 and 50.



extirpated the Streltsy<sup>1</sup> in A.D. 1698-9,<sup>2</sup> ten years after his own advent to effective power; and, while Mehmed 'Alī did not have to exercise such patience as Mahmūd in waiting for his opportunity to put his drones to death, he did show extreme caution and tact in taking the steps by which he gradually built up a counterpart in Egypt of Selīm III's abortive Nizām-i-Jedid.

By the time of his elevation to the viceroyalty of Egypt in A.D. 1805, Mehmed 'Alī was in a position to profit by Egyptian experience during the four years that had passed since his second appearance on the scene in A.D. 1801 as an officer in the Ottoman expeditionary force which had arrived in Egypt in that year.<sup>3</sup> The French Army that had conquered Egypt in A.D. 1798 and occupied it thereafter during the years A.D. 1798-1801 had made a still deeper impression on the Muslim soldiers who had encountered them than had been made on the Porte by the Western-trained Russian army and navy that had defeated the Ottoman fighting forces in A.D. 1768-74. Even the Mamlūks, in their lair in Upper Egypt, had attempted to drill their troops French-fashion;<sup>4</sup> the Mamlūk warlord Husayn Bey al-Afranji went so far as to raise a troop of Egyptian Christian soldiers, with French drums to keep them in step;<sup>5</sup> and Muhammad al-Alfī likewise had a unit of French-drilled troops, whose evolutions Mehmed 'Alī used, in A.D. 1806, to watch through field glasses.<sup>6</sup> The classically educated and conservative-minded *qul* Khosrev

<sup>1</sup> 'The Streltsy, part palace guard, part standing army and police force, organised in twenty-two regiments, each about a thousand strong, and stationed mainly in Moscow, were more addicted to armed outbursts than fitted for serious military operations. ... They were a hereditary, privileged force, recruited for the most part from the townsfolk, partly engaged in trade and handicrafts, living apart in their own quarters, an incalculable hotbed of superstition, pride, reaction, and religious dissent' (Sumner: *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia*, p. 13).

<sup>2</sup> See III. iii. 282, n. 1. While Peter had been absent from Russia on his Western tour of A.D. 1697-8, the Streltsy had tried to play the same trick as the Janissaries succeeded in playing on Selīm III. Deserters from the Streltsy regiments stationed in the provinces had marched on Moscow with the programme of wiping out Peter's German partisans and dethroning the Tsar in favour of his elder sister Sophia, who had been in power as regent between the anti-Petrine revolution of May 1682 (when Peter's adherents had once already been massacred) and the pro-Petrine revolution of A.D. 1689. This *Putsch* was crushed by Peter's Scottish right-hand-man Gordon before Peter had had time to return to Moscow from Vienna, where the news of the revolt had found him. On his return he took savage punitive measures against the rebels; the Streltsy Corps itself was disbanded; and the survivors were forbidden to bear arms (see Brückner, A.: *Peter der Grosse* (Berlin 1879, Grote), pp. 257-66). While Peter was justified, from his own standpoint, in destroying a long since useless corps which had tried to deprive him of his throne and would not have hesitated to take his life, the Streltsy, on their side, had had grounds for mistrusting Peter's intentions towards them. Between his effective advent to power in A.D. 1689 and his two campaigns against the Ottoman fortress of Azov, he had advertised their incompetence by pitting them against his new Western-trained regiments in manoeuvres (Brückner, *op. cit.*, p. 110); he was suspect of having used the two Azov campaigns of A.D. 1695 and A.D. 1696 as opportunities for decimating them (Brückner, *op. cit.*, p. 252), as the Ottoman statesmen of the House of Köprülü had been suspected of prolonging the War of Candia in order to reduce the numbers of the Janissaries (see III. iii. 49, n. 4); and, on the eve of his departure from Russia in A.D. 1697, he had banished them from Moscow (Brückner, *op. cit.*, p. 249).

<sup>3</sup> Mehmed 'Alī had volunteered for service in Egypt in A.D. 1798, and had duly served in the first Turkish expeditionary force that had suffered disaster at Aboukir on the 25th July, 1799.

<sup>4</sup> See Jabarti, Shaykh 'Abd-ar-Rahmān al-: *'Ajā'ib al-Athār fi'l-Tarājim wa'l-Akhbār*, French translation: *Merveilles Biographiques et Historiques* (Cairo 1888-96, Imprimerie Nationale; Paris 1888-96, Leroux, 9 vols.), vol. vii, p. 128. Cp. vol. viii, p. 46.

<sup>5</sup> See Jabarti, *op. cit.*, vol. vii, p. 253.

<sup>6</sup> See Jabarti, *op. cit.*, vol. viii, p. 46.



Pasha, who was the first viceroy of Egypt under the restored Ottoman régime after the capitulation of the French in A.D. 1801, set to work next year to provide himself with the rudiments of a Nizām-i-Jedid by recruiting Sudanese pilgrims *en route* through Egypt; dressing these in uniforms of a French cut; requisitioning black slaves from private owners; giving these, too, a military training; and also requisitioning white slaves, whom he equipped like Mamlūks but placed under the command of French officers with a stiffening in the ranks of as many French deserters as he could enlist.<sup>1</sup> This experiment had as unhappy an ending as Khosrev's master Sultan Selīm III's; for, when Khosrev led his new-model army against the unpaid and consequently mutinous Albanian mercenary troops of the Ottoman army of reoccupation, he not only failed to dislodge the mutineers from the citadel of Cairo, but was driven by them out of the capital and barely succeeded in escaping from Egypt alive.<sup>2</sup>

These turbulent Albanian barbarians, who had arrived in Egypt in the Ottoman expeditionary force of A.D. 1801 with Mehmed 'Alī as their second in command,<sup>3</sup> required more delicate handling than the degenerate Egyptian Mamlūks and Janissaries.<sup>4</sup> In A.D. 1806 Mehmed 'Alī had to quell a mutiny of Albanian troops to whom he owed arrears of pay.<sup>5</sup> In A.D. 1813 he ventured with impunity to impose a fatigue of Western drill, twice a week, on the expeditionary force that was at that time in training for an assault upon the Wahhābīs in the Hijāz;<sup>6</sup> but a more systematic attempt that he made in A.D. 1815 to impose not only Western drill but also Western uniforms on his Albanian and Turkish troops provoked a mutiny at Cairo<sup>7</sup> in the spirit of the *émeutes* against Khan Shāhin Girāy and Sultan Selīm; Mehmed 'Alī could count himself fortunate in managing to bribe the mutineers into a return to discipline<sup>8</sup> before he had suffered Selīm's fate; and this lesson taught the canny Rumeliot to outmanœuvre his wild men instead of hazarding a second frontal attack on their susceptibilities.

<sup>1</sup> See Jabarti, *op. cit.*, vol. vii, p. 112.

<sup>2</sup> See Jabarti, *op. cit.*, vol. vii, pp. 163 and 167. The Albanian mutineers pillaged Khosrev Pasha's house in Cairo, but the Pasha's harem was defended by eighteen French soldiers in his service, who kept the mutineers out till all the women had been evacuated (*ibid.*, p. 166).

<sup>3</sup> Their commander, Tāhir, was not only an Albanian himself but had little or no command of any language except his Albanian mother tongue. He frequented the [Bektashi] dervishes in Cairo and attended their religious exercises (Jabarti, *op. cit.*, vol. vii, p. 181). A few weeks after he had driven Khosrev Pasha out of Cairo and out of Egypt, Tāhir met his death in a clash between his Albanians and the Egyptian Janissaries, and this left the way clear for his second-in-command, Mehmed 'Alī, to make himself absolute master of Egypt in the course of the twenty years A.D. 1803-23 by successively playing off the Mamlūks against the Janissaries, the 'Ulamā against the Delīs, and finally Joseph Sève's French-trained Sudanese regular troops against the Albanians.

<sup>4</sup> The Egyptian Janissaries were so degenerate by this date that Mehmed 'Alī did not find it necessary to pay them the left-handed compliment of massacring them. Their spirit had already been broken by the humiliation of falling under the ascendancy of the Mamlūks whom it was their hereditary duty to hold in check (see IV. iv. 453-4).

<sup>5</sup> See Jabarti, *op. cit.*, vol. viii, pp. 17-18.

<sup>6</sup> See Jabarti, *op. cit.*, vol. ix, p. 11. The local representatives of the Western Powers were invited to watch these manœuvres (*ibid.*, p. 29).

<sup>7</sup> See Jabarti, *op. cit.*, vol. ix, pp. 122-31; Clot-Bey, A. B.: *Aperçu Général sur l'Égypte* (Paris 1840, Fortin et Masson, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. lxvii.

<sup>8</sup> See Jabarti, *op. cit.*, vol. ix, p. 131. Mehmed 'Alī did succeed in the same year in persuading the commander and the rank-and-file of one regiment of Delīs to wear the new Western uniforms (Jabarti, *op. cit.*, vol. cit., p. 132).

In A.D. 1819 Mehmed 'Ali hired an unemployed Napoleonic French soldier, Joseph Sève; posted him at Aswān, at the southern extremity of Upper Egypt, out of the Albanians' sight and mind;<sup>1</sup> set him to work there on giving one thousand recruits a three years' training;<sup>2</sup> persuaded him to become a nominal convert to Islam under the name of Suleymān;<sup>3</sup> took a leaf out of his own unfortunate predecessor Khosrev Pasha's book by going on, between January, 1823, and June, 1824, to furnish Sève with thirty thousand Sudanese negro slave-recruits who had been captured in the campaigns of conquest in the Upper Basin of the Nile that had been started in A.D. 1820;<sup>4</sup> and then gradually replaced these black troops by still more docile and far less expensive Egyptian peasant conscripts.<sup>5</sup> *Pari passu* with the formation of this new-model army in the Western style, Mehmed 'Ali disbanded his dangerous Albanian and Turkish irregular troops by such gradual stages that their sting was drawn before their eyes were opened to the ruse that the Pasha had been playing on them.<sup>6</sup>

Correspondingly acute difficulties were encountered and overcome by Sultan Mahmūd II in building up his new-model army in Turkey—an

<sup>1</sup> See Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. i, p. lxxviii.

<sup>2</sup> See Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 202. The core of this new-model army was a body of three or four hundred young Mamlūks who had saved their lives by capitulating and becoming Mehmed 'Ali's property (Vingtrinier, A.: *Soliman-Pasha* (Paris 1886, Firmin-Didot), p. 101). Sève succeeded in disciplining these turbulent and murderous troops by winning their devotion through showing himself completely fearless in face of an attempt to take his life on the parade-ground (ibid., pp. 102-4; Bowring, J.: *Report on Egypt and Candia* (London 1840, Clowes), p. 50). These reclaimed Mamlūks provided a corps of officers for the new-model army when the rank-and-file was expanded by drafts of Sudanese negro slave-recruits and Egyptian peasant conscripts (Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 203).

<sup>3</sup> See Vingtrinier, op. cit., p. 105. Clot-Bey distinguished himself by refusing to apostatize (ibid., p. 105).

<sup>4</sup> See Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 203; Vingtrinier, op. cit., pp. 114 and 117.

<sup>5</sup> See Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 204, and also Bowring, J.: *Report on Egypt and Candia* (London 1840, Clowes), p. 49, with the story, ibid., p. 50, of Colonel Sève's handling of his three hundred Mamlūks. Mehmed 'Ali's original plan had been to recruit Negro slaves in order to avoid the necessity of conscripting Egyptian peasants, but this servile military material proved too expensive (Bowring, op. cit., p. 16). These Sudanese slave-recruits 'were strong and docile enough, submitted patiently to military discipline, and learnt their drill; but they refused to be kept alive' (Dodwell, H.: *The Founder of Modern Egypt* (Cambridge 1931, University Press), p. 64). According to a dispatch of the 8th February, 1824 (F.O. 78/126) from the British Consul-General in Egypt, Henry Salt, cited by Dodwell, op. cit., p. 65, some 20,000 of them were thought to have been collected and sent up to Aswān by A.D. 1824, but in that year not 3,000 remained alive. It was on the advice of the French Consul-General Drovetti that Mehmed 'Ali had recourse to the conscription of Egyptian fallāhīn as an alternative source of military man-power (according to Jabarti, op. cit., vol. ix, p. 82, 7,000 had been conscripted in A.D. 1814 for the war against the Wahhābīs in the Hijāz). About 30,000 of these conscripts were sent to Sève at Aswān. 'Salt, who visited the training camp with Mehmed 'Ali in 1824, thought the Pasha had reason to be delighted with and proud of his new army' (Dodwell, op. cit., p. 65).

<sup>6</sup> See the report, dated the 3rd February, 1838, by an English mechanic employed in Egypt, in Bowring, op. cit., pp. 198-9. The Albanians did revolt again in Cairo in A.D. 1823, but on this occasion Khosrev Pasha's defeat by them twenty years earlier, in A.D. 1803, was avenged by a successor of Khosrev's who had been their second-in-command at that time. In A.D. 1823 six regiments of Mehmed 'Ali Pasha's French-trained Sudanese regular troops made short work of the Albanian mutineers. After Sève had marched his twenty-five thousand new-model troops from Aswān to within four leagues of Cairo, the Albanians submitted to the choice, offered them by Mehmed 'Ali, of either entering the new regular army or leaving Egypt. The revolt of the Albanians against the employment of French officers had been doubly dangerous because it had been accompanied by a revolt of the fallāhīn against conscription; but, after the Albanians' collapse, the fallāhīn, too, became submissive (Vingtrinier, op. cit., pp. 123 and 127).

enterprise on which he embarked on the 16th June, 1826, literally on the morrow of the destruction of the Janissaries.<sup>1</sup> The nucleus of his new force was provided by remnants of divers corps that had been created or reorganized on Western lines by Selim III; but the officers of these corps did not suffice for an expanded army in the Western style, even when they were reinforced by officers borrowed from Mehmed 'Ali and by a few Western renegade officers for the cavalry, artillery, and engineers.<sup>2</sup> As for the rank-and-file, it had to be recruited by force in the teeth of conservative resistance. In Bosnia, Mahmūd's local recruiting officer was mobbed, and the new Western-style uniforms were torn to pieces.<sup>3</sup> The pressed men had to be brought to barracks in chains and kept under guard after their arrival.<sup>4</sup> The least unsatisfactory recruits were boys from the poorer classes of the Muslim community whose families had no traditional associations with the Janissaries,<sup>5</sup> and many of these boy recruits were not more than thirteen years old.<sup>6</sup> The privates were quicker in mastering Western drill than the high command was in mastering the Western art of war.<sup>7</sup>

When Mehmed 'Ali won a free hand, he carried through to completion his policy of Westernizing his armed forces. Under the general superintendence of Colonel Sève as Chief of Staff,<sup>8</sup> a training school for infantry officers, directed by a Piedmontese *ci-devant* Napoleonic officer, Bolognini, was opened at Damietta,<sup>9</sup> and an artillery school at Turah under a Portuguese director, Segueria.<sup>10</sup> A regular cavalry force was not organized till after Mehmed 'Ali's son, Ibrāhīm Pasha, had seen the French cavalry in the Morea,<sup>11</sup> when they were replacing his own troops on the eve of his evacuation, under *force majeure*, after the destruction of the Egyptian and Turkish fleets at Navarino by a combined Anglo-Franco-Russian naval force. Thereafter a cavalry school was opened at Gizah, in a palace formerly belonging to the Mamlūk war-lord Murād Bey, under the direction of a French officer, Varin.<sup>12</sup> In the army as a whole, the contemporary French military organization was copied exactly (except that Turkish was retained as the language for the words of command).<sup>13</sup> The French system of discipline was introduced, and was

<sup>1</sup> See Bastelberger, J. M.: *Die militärischen Reformen unter Mahmūd II, dem Retter des Osmanischen Reiches* (Gotha 1874, Perthes), pp. 109 and 128.

<sup>2</sup> See Bastelberger, op. cit., pp. 127-9. In the artillery the renegades were the only scientifically trained officers (ibid., p. 142).

<sup>3</sup> See ibid., pp. 126-7.

<sup>4</sup> See ibid., pp. 126-7.

<sup>5</sup> See ibid., pp. 139-40. The new Turkish, like the new Egyptian, army was governed by the French *réglements* (ibid., p. 139).

<sup>6</sup> See Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 204.

<sup>7</sup> See Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 207.

<sup>8</sup> See Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. i, p. lxxxii, and vol. ii, p. 205. In the new-model Turkish army the cavalry proved more difficult to train *alla Franca* than the infantry. The Turks particularly disliked the Western style of horsemanship. A Westernized Turkish cavalry was produced in the end thanks to the work of their Western instructors and to the personal concern of Sultan Mahmūd, who was particularly interested in this arm (Bastelberger, op. cit., pp. 129-30 and 141-2).

<sup>9</sup> See Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 206; cp. Bowring, op. cit., pp. 52-53. In Ibrāhīm Pasha's army of occupation in Syria, the cavalry were not so well drilled as the infantry, according to the British Consul-General in Egypt, Colonel Patrick Campbell, in a report on Syria in A.D. 1837, printed in J. Bowring's *Report on the Commercial Statistics of Syria*, dated the 17th July, 1839 (London 1840, Clowes), p. 128.

<sup>10</sup> See Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 208.

<sup>11</sup> See ibid., p. 134.

<sup>12</sup> See ibid., pp. 127, 139, and 173.

<sup>13</sup> See Bowring, op. cit., p. 49.

administered according to the French military penal code<sup>1</sup> (except that the traditional Egyptian punishment of the bastinado was not abolished).<sup>2</sup>

The Egyptian new-model army was also made to march to French military music;<sup>3</sup> but in the psychologically significant and politically delicate matter of military dress Mehmed 'Ali—taught by his unfortunate experience in A.D. 1815<sup>4</sup>—showed more prudence than Sultan Mahmūd II in making a judicious compromise. Mahmūd put his new-model army into a completely Western military costume from the neck downwards, and thereby brought into odium his entire programme of reform by identifying it in Muslim minds with hateful Western clothes<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> A new-model navy was created for Mehmed 'Ali by French naval officers on parallel lines:

'The naval code adopted in Egypt is that of France, whose introduction must be traced to the number of French sea-officers who have entered the Egyptian Navy, and many of them obtained elevated command. Very essential services have indeed been rendered to the Egyptian Marine by French naval officers, especially by Cérisy Bey, who had for many years charge of the arsenal at Alexandria, and Besson Bey, who was second in command in the Fleet' (Bowring, J.: *Report on Egypt and Candia*, dated the 27th March, 1839 (London 1840, Clowes), p. 54).

Mehmed 'Ali's first-hand observation of the potency of sea-power in the campaigns in and around Egypt during the years A.D. 1799–1807 had made him alive to the value of a navy in the Modern Western style for a nineteenth-century ruler of Egypt, and he started work on building one up for himself in A.D. 1808, immediately after his repulse of the British invasion of Egypt in A.D. 1807 and seven years before his abortive first attempt in A.D. 1815–16 to create a new-model army. After buying Western warships at second hand, Mehmed 'Ali obtained in A.D. 1821 the French Government's permission to have two frigates and one brig built for him at Marseilles (Dodwell, *op. cit.*, pp. 66 and 223). 'A little later he made a dock at Alexandria and began to build on his own account, employing French shipwrights to control the work' (*ibid.*). His naval dockyard at Alexandria, on the other hand, was not started till A.D. 1828 (*ibid.*), when he was beginning to replace his original Western-model navy which he had lost at Navarino. A French expert from the naval dockyard at Toulon, Cérisy, was put in charge of the dockyard at Alexandria in A.D. 1829 (*ibid.*). A line-of-battle ship of one hundred guns was launched on the 3rd January, 1831 (Clot-Bey, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 222–5). By A.D. 1833 Mehmed 'Ali had 6 ships of the line, ranging in scale of armament from 84 to 110 guns, and 7 frigates, and by A.D. 1837, 8 ships of the line, with one more under construction. The number of hands employed in the arsenal at Alexandria rose to over 3,000 under the direction of 60 Westerners, and the naval school at Ras-al-Tin had a strength of 1,200 cadets (Dodwell, *op. cit.*, p. 223). In A.D. 1839 Mehmed 'Ali's navy was still being managed for him by Frenchmen, but Mehmed Bey, who was the controller of the dockyard at that time, had been educated in England (Bowring: *Report on Egypt and Candia*, pp. 33–34).

<sup>2</sup> See Clot-Bey, *op. cit.*, p. 212; *cp.* Bowring, *op. cit.*, pp. 52–3.

<sup>3</sup> See Clot-Bey, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 81.

<sup>4</sup> See p. 241, above. In Egypt the style and cut of Frankish military uniforms had offended the aesthetic susceptibilities, not only of the Rumeliot soldiery who had been ordered to assume this alien garb, but also of the native Egyptian civilian spectators. Jabarti, for example, comments (in *op. cit.*, vol. ix, p. 140) on the ugliness of the new uniforms, and laments, in this context, over the disappearance of a traditional decorum and good taste.

<sup>5</sup> In the uniform of Mahmūd's Westernized Turkish Army by A.D. 1839 the loose native shalwar had been replaced by tight Western pantaloons for all ranks, while the officers had also been put into Western military frock-coats (Bastelberger, *op. cit.*, pp. 202–3). These affectations drew criticism from Mehmed 'Ali's son and right-hand-man Ibrahim Pasha, who was the leading exponent of the rival Egyptian school of Ottoman Westernizers:

'The Porte have taken Civilisation by the wrong side. It is not by giving epaulettes and tight trousers to a nation that you begin the task of regeneration. Instead of beginning by their dress—and dress will never make a straight man of one who is lame—they should endeavour to enlighten the minds of their people. Look at us: we have schools of every description; we send our young men to be educated in Europe. We are also Turks, but we defer to the opinions of those who are capable of directing our own, whereas no regard is paid by the Porte to advice that is not their own. Their men would make very good soldiers, but their officers . . . ! The only man they had, capable of conducting their affairs, is the late Grand Vizier, Reshid Pasha. . . . You see the treatment

—though, in deference to the symbolic significance with which headgear, above all other articles of dress, was traditionally charged in the Islamic World, he did draw the line at forcing a Western form of military hat on to his soldiers' heads. In the army, as in the civil service, Mahmūd effaced former invidious distinctions by replacing the studied diversity of the traditional Islamic headgear by the egalitarian uniformity of the non-Western fez,<sup>1</sup> but a hundred more years were to pass before Mahmūd's successor, Mustafā Kemāl Atatürk, could venture in Turkey to impose upon all male Ottoman subjects the brimmed hat which, in Muslim eyes, was the Frankish gyaour's characteristic mark of the beast.<sup>2</sup> In the new-model Egyptian army, Mehmed 'Ali likewise abolished the turban,<sup>3</sup> and even went to the Petrine length of forbidding the wearing of beards;<sup>4</sup> but the uniform which he devised for his troops was modelled, not on Western military uniforms, but on the more congenial contemporary dress of Rumeliot Turkish Muslim civilians.<sup>5</sup> All the same, Mehmed 'Ali found it advisable to grant high rates of pay to senior officers, as an antidote to the repugnance which was aroused in Turkish souls by even the moderately Western style of the new-model army in Egypt.<sup>6</sup>

In Mahmūd's Turkish army the officers were paid less and the privates more.<sup>7</sup> In Egypt a Turkish officer enjoyed a rarity value, as the native Egyptians did not prove to make good officers,<sup>8</sup> while they did provide an abundant supply of conscript private soldiers. The Egyptian peasant conscript was perhaps better off in the Army than in his village.<sup>9</sup> The Egyptian troops were well fed<sup>10</sup> and were pronounced by a Western observer to fare no worse than their contemporary fellow soldiers in the

which he experienced at their hands' (Memorandum of M. Alexander Pisani's report of his interview with Ibrāhīm Pasha at Kyutahiyeh, dated the 10th March, 1833 [?], enclosed in F.O. 78/209, Canning to Palmerston, [H.] 12, 7th March, 1832, quoted in Bailey, F. E.: *British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement, A Study in Anglo-Turkish Relations, 1826-1853* (Cambridge, Mass. 1942, Harvard University Press), p. 172, n. 153).

<sup>1</sup> The non-Western origin of the fez, which was its merit in Muslim eyes, did not make it a specifically Islamic head-dress. It was an ancient Mediterranean article of apparel—identical with the Roman freedman's pileus—and it had been taken over by Arabic-speaking Mediterranean Muslims without ever having been abandoned by Greek-speaking Mediterranean Orthodox Christians.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 237, above, and V. vi, 102-3. Among Egyptian Muslims in Mehmed 'Ali's day the feeling against hats—and especially against hats with brims—was so strong that the expression 'I will take the hat' was used with the meaning 'I will stick at nothing' (Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. i, p. 362).

<sup>3</sup> The date of this negative revolution in Egyptian military headgear was about A.D. 1823 (Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. i, p. 362). A hundred and twenty-four years later, the turban was still part of the full-dress uniform of the last British officers to serve in Indian cavalry regiments (see p. 228, n. 2, above).

<sup>4</sup> See Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. i, p. 368. Beards were still highly prized by the Egyptian peasantry, and the story of a peasant conscript's grievance against a village headman (*shaykh-al-balad*) who had caused the conscript's beard to be shaved will be found *ibid.*, p. 369.

<sup>5</sup> See Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. i, p. 363. No doubt the moral of an unwillingly conscripted Egyptian fallāh-soldier was raised by the exhilarating experience of finding himself clad in the dress of the imperial people with whom, in civil life, he could never have ventured to equate himself.

<sup>6</sup> See Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 211.

<sup>7</sup> See Bowring, J.: *Report on the Commercial Statistics of Syria*, dated the 17th July, 1839 (London 1840, Clowes), p. 27.

<sup>8</sup> See Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 214.

<sup>9</sup> See Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. i, p. 248.

<sup>10</sup> See Clot-Bey, op. cit., p. 209.



West;<sup>1</sup> and their behaviour to their civilian fellow Egyptians (though not their behaviour to the foreign Arabic-speaking civilian population of Syria) was exemplary by contrast with the excesses of their predecessors the Mamlūks, Janissaries, Delis, and Albanian mercenaries.<sup>2</sup> Broken in to Western military discipline and led by Rumeliot Turkish and Albanian commanders, they developed a martial spirit,<sup>3</sup> of which they gave proof in the Morea in A.D. 1825, when they broke the resistance of insurgent Greek highlanders who were still formidable even after they had turned their arms against one another, and at Nisib on the 24th June, 1839, which was perhaps the first occasion since the Battle of Kadesh (*commisum circa* 1288 B.C.) in which the peasantry of the Lower Nile Valley had defeated in the field the peasantry of the Anatolian Plateau.<sup>4</sup> This military service in Mehmed 'Alī's army reawakened in Egyptian souls a national consciousness which had been stifled ever since the Primitive Arab Muslim conquerors of Egypt in the seventh century of the Christian Era had snatched out of Egyptian hands the political fruits of an eight-hundred-years-long Egyptian struggle against Hellenism.<sup>5</sup>

Though Mehmed 'Alī thus gave the first impulse to a latter-day Egyptian nationalist movement on a Modern Western pattern,<sup>6</sup> and, at the height of his power in the fourth decade of the nineteenth century, was in direct or indirect control of all the Arab countries east of Cyrenaica and west of 'Irāq and the Hadhramawt, over an area extending from the Libyan desert to the Persian Gulf, this Rumeliot Turk<sup>7</sup> was neither an

<sup>1</sup> See Bowring, J.: *Report on Egypt and Candia*, dated the 27th March, 1839 (London 1840, Clowes), p. 52.

<sup>2</sup> See Dodwell, *op. cit.*, pp. 228 and 256.

<sup>3</sup> See Clot-Bey, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 212.

<sup>4</sup> An afterwards eminent Prussian officer who was a spectator of the Battle of Nisib from the Turkish side formed a low opinion of both the belligerent armies. 'Hāfiz Pasha's army', writes Hellmuth von Moltke (*Briefe über Zustände und Begebenheiten in der Türkei* (Berlin 1841, Mittler), pp. 405-6), 'was undoubtedly the best trained, best disciplined and best practised army, and at the same time the army with the worst moral, that the Porte had ever put into the field.' In the campaign of A.D. 1839 the Qōniyeh and Qaysari corps remained passive and thereby allowed Ibrāhīm Pasha to withdraw his garrisons from Cilicia and concentrate them on the battlefield (*ibid.*, p. 384); and, immediately after the rout of the Turkish army at Nisib, the retreating Turkish regular troops were attacked by their Kurdish fellow soldiers (*ibid.*, p. 397), who had been kidnapped to make good the losses in the Turkish ranks and who had had to be treated like prisoners of war by their Turkish officers, with whom these non-Turkish-speaking recruits were unable to communicate (*ibid.*, pp. 382-3). While the new-model Western-trained Turkish regulars were melting away, the old-fashioned feudal cavalry (*sipdār*) held together (*ibid.*, p. 398). The moral of Ibrāhīm's Egyptian regulars was equally low (*ibid.*, p. 383). Two Egyptian battalions deserted to the Turks on the very day of the Turkish defeat (*ibid.*, p. 398). Nevertheless, Ibrāhīm won the day—though he could muster hardly more than half the Turkish army's strength—thanks to his superiority in artillery and in ability to manœuvre (*ibid.*, p. 382).

<sup>5</sup> The anti-Macedonian Egyptian nationalist movement of the second century B.C., like the anti-Turkish Egyptian nationalist movement of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era, was brought to life by the military prowess of a native Egyptian new-model army raised and trained by alien rulers (see V. v. 68).

<sup>6</sup> According to Clot-Bey, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 468-9, the Arabs already hated the Ottoman domination.

<sup>7</sup> Mehmed 'Alī was born in A.D. 1769 at Kavála (*Kaβάλα*, the phonetic equivalent of the Attic Greek word *κεφαλή*) in the Macedonian dialect of Ancient Greek), the port of the Eastern Macedonian tobacco-growing plains watered by the lower course of the River Struma (Strymon) and by its right-bank affluent the Anghista (Angitēs). In the fourteenth century of the Christian Era the city of Serres (Siris) in the Struma plain had become a stronghold, first of the Serb and then of the Osmanli conquerors of the



Egyptian nor a Pan-Arab nationalist;<sup>1</sup> he was an Ottoman patriot whose ambition was, not to destroy the Ottoman Empire by carving out of its Arab provinces a successor-state for himself and his heirs, but to rejuvenate the Ottoman Empire<sup>2</sup> by a process of Westernization which was to be achieved through a fruitful marriage of his own genius with the economic resources of Egypt. If his march on Constantinople had not been halted by the intervention of Russia in A.D. 1833 and of Russia, Great Britain, the Hapsburg Monarchy, and Prussia in A.D. 1839, he might have become the Shogun of a Westernizing Ottoman Empire in which an efficiently managed Egypt would have served, as it had once served in Augustus's Roman Empire, to provide an enlightened dictator with the material means for carrying out his policy.<sup>3</sup> In an Ottoman Empire under Mehmed 'Ali's administration, the rehabilitation of this derelict eldorado in the Nile Valley might have offset the loss, in A.D. 1774, of a still undeveloped eldorado in the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe, as Carthage had been compensated for the loss of her Sicilian dominion in the First Romano-Carthaginian War by Hamilcar Barca's acquisition for her of a greater empire in the Iberian Peninsula.

Unhappily, not only for Mehmed 'Ali's personal ambitions, but for the interests of the Islamic World, the Rumeliot viceroy of Egypt, like the Barcide viceroy of Spain, was thwarted by the jealousy of lesser men<sup>4</sup> in the capital of the tottering empire whose fortunes he was effectively retrieving by constructive labours far afield; and an alliance between Mehmed 'Ali's personal rivals at Constantinople and a concert of foreign Powers who had combined to frustrate the Levantine ambitions of his patroness France proved a more effective force, in the international crisis of A.D. 1839, than the public feeling in Turkey, and in the Islamic World at large, in Mehmed 'Ali's favour.<sup>5</sup>

derelict European provinces of an East Roman Empire that had been shattered by Western Christian military adventurers in A.D. 1204. The fertile districts of Serres and Drama had been planted thickly with 'Osmanli settlers by Sultan Murād I; and Mehmed 'Ali, with his blond hair and beard and light chestnut-coloured eyes (Clot-Bey, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. lxxv), might well have been a scion of this stock, though, according to one account of his ancestry, his family were recent arrivals in Macedonia from Anatolia and were of Albanian origin. Mehmed 'Ali himself had started life in the local tobacco trade (Clot-Bey, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. lix) before enlisting as a volunteer in the Ottoman expeditionary force that was sent to Egypt in A.D. 1799. Mehmed 'Ali's first wife, who, like her husband, was a Rumeliot, is said to have influenced him (Bowring, *op. cit.*, p. 148).

<sup>1</sup> According to Prokesch-Osten, Count A.: *Mehmed Ali, Vizekönig von Aegypten, aus meinen Tagebuche, 1826-1841* (Vienna 1877, Braumüller), pp. 62-63, Mehmed 'Ali did not want to found an Arab empire, though in such an enterprise he would have had the support of Arab public feeling (cp. Bowring, *Report on Egypt and Candia*, p. 7).

<sup>2</sup> This is the opinion of A. B. Clot, the French director of Mehmed 'Ali's army medical service (Clot-Bey, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 476), and also of a contemporary Austrian diplomatic observer, Count A. Prokesch-Osten (see *op. cit.*, pp. 15 and 120).

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 696-8, below.

<sup>4</sup> Mehmed 'Ali's arch-enemies at Constantinople in the crisis of A.D. 1839-41 were the conservative Grand Vizier Khosrev Pasha, who was not only opposed on principle to Mehmed 'Ali's policy of Westernization but bore him a personal grudge for his share in Khosrev's humiliating expulsion from Egypt in A.D. 1803, and a rival Westernizer in the person of the French-educated Reshid Pasha, who was transferred from the Ottoman Embassy in Paris to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Constantinople on the 24th January, 1838, by the Khosrev whom he afterwards supplanted (Prokesch-Osten, *op. cit.*, pp. 70 and 134).

<sup>5</sup> On this point, Prokesch-Osten's testimony deserves consideration, though it must be discounted to some extent in view of this witness's personal bias as an advocate (*op. cit.*, p. 105) of the policy of working for a reconciliation between Mehmed 'Ali and Sultan

By the fiat of the Powers, Mehmed 'Ali was confined, in the settlement of A.D. 1840-1, to the governorship of the Ottoman possessions in the Nile Valley;<sup>1</sup> yet, though the Ottoman World was thus disappointed of its hopes of political reunion under the auspices of a man of genius, it had at least escaped the complete dissolution that had threatened it in and after A.D. 1774;<sup>2</sup> and the imposition of peace in A.D. 1840-1 at the cost of a permanent political division between Turkey and Egypt did relieve the crushing pressure of an armed truce under which the two Ottoman Powers had been keeping costly Westernized armies mobilized on a remote frontier for six years (A.D. 1833-9) since the Turco-Egyptian War of A.D. 1831-3.<sup>3</sup> The security of Turkey was increased by the terms of a protocol of the 13th July, 1841, in which all the Great Powers of the day agreed with Turkey that the Straits between the Aegean and the Black Sea should be closed to non-Turkish warships of all flags in peacetime. Thereafter, in the Crimean War (*gerebatur* A.D. 1853-6), Turkey had France, Great Britain, and Sardinia for her allies, instead of having

Mahmūd II's successor Sultan 'Abd-al-Mejīd (*imperabat* A.D. 1839-61). According to Prokesch-Osten, Mehmed 'Ali was a convinced Muslim (p. 15); he reckoned, in the crisis of A.D. 1839, that Muslim opinion would rally to his support because he had shown greater independence than had been shown by the Porte in dealing with the Franks (p. 80); and the hopes of the Muslim World were in fact centred on him (p. 121). Whatever may have been the feelings of the Islamic World at large, those of some of his Turkish fellow countrymen were made manifest in the action of the Turkish fleet, which, on the outbreak of war, sailed from the Bosphorus to Alexandria and placed itself at Mehmed 'Ali's disposal. Prokesch-Osten reports that after the Turkish fleet's arrival at Alexandria on the 17th July, 1839, Mehmed 'Ali gave the officers an address in which his theme was the need for fraternal unity among Muslims and the consequent duty of loyalty to Sultan 'Abd-al-Mejīd (p. 102). On the same occasion he is said to have expressed a wish to come to Constantinople in order to reorganize the Ottoman Empire (p. 103). On the evidence of the same authority, Turkish public opinion in Constantinople in A.D. 1839 was overwhelmingly on the side of Mehmed 'Ali and against his adversary the Grand Vizier Khosrev; and the partisans of the Viceroy of Egypt included the Sultan's mother (pp. 111-12). When Khosrev appealed for a second time to the Powers, other Turkish grandees were moved to indignation (pp. 117 and 119).

<sup>1</sup> The Pādishāh's two firmans of the 13th February, 1841, conferred the Pashalyq of Egypt on Mehmed 'Ali and his heirs (on terms that were strictly defined), and the governorship of Mehmed 'Ali's own conquests in the Sudan on Mehmed 'Ali himself for life.

<sup>2</sup> It has already been noticed, on pp. 230-41, above, that the portions of Dār-al-Islām that had come under non-Muslim rule between A.D. 1774 and A.D. 1952 were a remarkably small fraction of the whole. The immediate threat to the Ottoman Empire's existence on the morrow of the signature of the Russo-Turkish peace treaty of Küçük Kaynarja came from the pullulation of incipient parochial successor-states; and, among these, the states set up by militant outlying barbarians, such as the Montenegrins, the Serbs of the Shumadiya, the Maniots, the Kurds, and the Wahhābīs, were less menacing than those set up in the metropolitan provinces by insubordinate Ottoman Muslim war-lords such as Paşvanoghlu of Viddin and 'Ali of Yannina in Rumelia, and the Qāra 'Osmānoghlu and a host of lesser dere beys in an Anatolia whose Muslim Turkish population had never quite forgotten the days before the Ottoman conquest of the non-Ottoman Turkish successor-states of the Saljūqs (see II. ii. 150-4). These Ottoman war-lords built up their power by hiring war-bands of Muslim barbarian mercenaries—Albanians, Bosniaks, and Maghribīs—and they were a greater menace than the recalcitrant tribesmen in Rumelia, Arabia, and Kurdistan because there were no national limits to the war-lords' capacity for territorial expansion at the expense of the authority of the Porte. By A.D. 1840-1 these internal dangers had been weathered by the Ottoman Empire at the cost of having been constrained to recognize the autonomy of Mehmed 'Ali in the Nile Valley and of a Serbian principality in the Lower Morava Valley and the independence of a Kingdom of Greece within modest frontiers. The Turkish new-model army, inefficient though it still was had succeeded in reimposing the Porte's authority on the Kurds, while the Wahhābīs had been temporarily crushed by Mehmed 'Ali on the Porte's behalf (see IV. iv. 76-78).

<sup>3</sup> This point is made by Moltke, *op. cit.*, pp. 381 and 401.

to fight Russia again single-handed, and in the ensuing peace-settlement of Paris she was formally admitted into the Western comity of nations.

*The Collapse in Turkey and Egypt at the Beginning of the Last Quarter of the Nineteenth Century*

Thus the dose of Westernization that had been administered by Ottoman statesmanship to Turkey and Egypt since A.D. 1774 had enabled both these Ottoman polities by the middle of the nineteenth century to surmount the crisis into which the Ottoman World had been plunged by the Russo-Turkish War that had broken out in A.D. 1768. Yet, towards the turn of the eighth and ninth decades of the nineteenth century, both Mahmūd II's Turkey and Mehmed 'Ali's Egypt collapsed. Why was it that, within twenty years of the signature of the Peace Treaty of Paris in A.D. 1856, both Turkey and Egypt had fallen into adversity again?

One cause of this simultaneous collapse of the two temporarily rejuvenated Ottoman Powers was the cumulative effect of a strain imposed by the maintenance of professional fighting forces on a Western pattern in a society whose life had not yet been Westernized through and through. The consequent increase in government expenditure was not balanced by any increase of a comparable order of magnitude in the national income through a Westernization of methods of economic production; so far from that, the productivity of the peasantry was reduced by the devastating effects on work, health, and morals of the introduction of the recently invented Modern Western institution of military conscription;<sup>1</sup> and in Egypt, where Mehmed 'Ali had embarked on an ambitious programme of industrial as well as agricultural development that had not been emulated in Turkey by Sultan Mahmūd, a chartered accountant's balance sheet would probably have shown that these enterprises were running at a loss.<sup>2</sup> A growing gap between public expenditure and

<sup>1</sup> See IV. iv. 150-2.

<sup>2</sup> Arguments on both sides of the question whether Mehmed 'Ali's attempt to industrialize Egypt was justified economically are set out by Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 278-9. The adverse judgements in Bowring's report should perhaps be taken with a grain of salt in view of Prokesch-Osten's insinuation (op. cit., pp. 82-83) that the British did not relish the competition of Egyptian manufactures with theirs in the markets of the Islamic World. Yet Bowring was probably correct in stating (op. cit., p. 15) that the population of Egypt was impoverished by the monopolies through which Mehmed 'Ali's Government attempted to make its economic enterprises pay their way. He also states (op. cit., p. 29) that the cotton textile and other Egyptian governmental industries were compelled to sell their product to the consumer at an unremunerative price in order to compete with imported Western goods which were free to enter Egypt subject to payment of duty at the rate of 3 per cent. *ad valorem* (the maximum chargeable under the current terms of the Ottoman Capitulations). Bowring declares that the effective maximum was still lower than this. If Bowring is correct on this point too, that would, of course, tell against Prokesch-Osten's view that Egyptian industries were regarded, in British eyes, as a serious menace to British exports. All the same, we know for a fact that the British Government had in mind Mehmed 'Ali's policy of state-promoted industrialization fortified by monopolies when it negotiated with the Porte the Anglo-Turkish commercial treaty of the 16th August, 1838, in which the maximum of 3 per cent. *ad valorem* for Ottoman import duties was confirmed. The terms of this treaty were, of course, applicable to all Ottoman territories, including Egypt; but the Egyptian, unlike the Turkish, Government managed to abandon its monopolies in form without ceasing to enjoy them in effect (see Moseley, P. E.: *Russian Diplomacy and the Opening of the Eastern Question in 1838 and 1839* (Cambridge, Mass., 1934, Harvard University Press), p. 101; Bailey, F. E.: *British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement, A Study in*

revenue was momentarily bridged by the Turkish and Egyptian Governments' fatal discovery of the nineteenth-century Western money market. Loans contracted, with the light-heartedness of ignorance, on exorbitant terms for non-reproductive purposes brought both governments to bankruptcy within two or three decades.

A second cause of collapse was the burden of holding down territories in which a majority of the population was disaffected. Turkey had inherited from her own past the problem of Rumelia; she had reimposed on herself the burden of Ottoman Kurdistan by re-establishing her authority there in A.D. 1835-50,<sup>1</sup> and the burden of the Asiatic Arab provinces by suppressing the 'Irāqī Mamlūks in A.D. 1831<sup>2</sup> and by availing herself of the support of four Great Powers to recover Syria from Mehmed 'Alī in A.D. 1840 and the Hijāz in A.D. 1845. As for Mehmed 'Alī, he had deliberately saddled Egypt with a new empire which was as intractable as it was unremunerative by overthrowing the Wahhābī Power in Arabia in A.D. 1810-18 and embarking on the conquest of the Sudan in A.D. 1820. Sultan Selīm I, the Ottoman conqueror of Syria and Egypt in the heyday of Ottoman power, had never attempted this foolhardy feat of launching out on to the Afrasian Steppe; and, though Egypt was relieved of her Arabian commitment by the revolt of the Najd *circa* A.D. 1830<sup>3</sup> and the subsequent re-establishment of Turkey's in place of Egypt's suzerainty over the Hijāz, Mehmed 'Alī's successors at Cairo continued to push their southern and south-western frontiers forward into the heart of Africa till the Egyptian Government's Silesian representative Emin Pasha had carried the Egyptian flag to Uganda in A.D. 1877, four years before the whole house of cards was brought tumbling down in A.D. 1881-5 by the insurrection of the Sudanese Mahdī Muhammad Ahmad.<sup>4</sup>

The most serious of all these Ottoman problems of disaffected populations was Turkey's problem in Rumelia, where she had to deal, not, like Egypt in the Sudan, with Nomads and primitive peoples in an outlying hinterland, but with a subject Orthodox Christian majority geographically intermingled with a dominant Turkish minority which had likewise been at home in Rumelia since the establishment of the Ottoman Empire in the fourteenth century of the Christian Era.

After the turn of the tide in A.D. 1683 in the perennial warfare between the 'Osmanlis and the Western Powers, the destinies of the Ottoman Empire depended above all on the ability of the Turkish 'ascendancy' in Rumelia to conciliate its Orthodox Christian fellow countrymen and fellow subjects of the Porte. The Orthodox Christian peoples' greater dislike for Frankish than for Ottoman rule had made the Ottoman Empire's fortune in the days of its rise,<sup>5</sup> and, now that it had passed its zenith, its decline might at least have been retarded if Ottoman Orthodox

*Anglo-Turkish Relations, 1826-1853* (Cambridge, Mass., 1942, Harvard University Press), p. 124, n. 109).

<sup>1</sup> See Longrigg, S. H.: *Four Centuries of Modern 'Iraq* (Oxford 1925, Clarendon Press), pp. 284-8.

<sup>2</sup> See Longrigg, *op. cit.*, pp. 250-76.

<sup>3</sup> See V. vi. 233, with n. 5.

<sup>4</sup> See V. v. 295, with n. 1.

<sup>5</sup> See pp. 151-2, above.

Christians could have been induced to join with Ottoman Muslims in a common anti-Frankish front.

On the morrow of the turn of the tide, the possibility of establishing some such common front was greater than at any later date, since at that time the Modern West was only just beginning to exert its attraction on Ottoman Orthodox Christian souls,<sup>1</sup> and the Grand Vizier Mustafâ Köprülü was not slow in seeing and seizing this opportunity. In A.D. 1691, only eight years after the Ottoman retreat from before the walls of Vienna and three years after the Hapsburg armies' incursion into Kosovo, he promulgated the first charter of constitutional rights for the non-Muslim subjects of the Porte. But the Nizâm-i Jedid of A.D. 1691 did not go far enough, even on paper, to rally the *ra'îyeh* with conviction to the support of their discomfited Ottoman masters, and, even as far as it went, it remained largely a dead letter owing to a decadent Imperial Government's loss of effective control over the provinces. By the time when that control had been recovered in the course of the reign of Sultan Mahmûd II (*imperabat* A.D. 1808-39), the price of the *ra'îyeh*'s loyalty to the Porte had risen sharply. By that time the *ra'îyeh* had become hardened cultural converts to the secular civilization of the Modern West; this civilization had given birth to the political ideals of the year 1789; and, in the Western World itself, the unifying ideal of Parliamentary Democracy had been pressed into the service of the disruptive ideal of Nationalism.<sup>2</sup>

Thus, in the nineteenth century of the Christian Era, the political atmosphere of a Modern Western World into which the 'Osmanlis as well as their *ra'îyeh* were now being irresistibly attracted was less auspicious than it had been in the seventeenth century for an Ottoman attempt to win the *ra'îyeh*'s loyalty. A sincere, enlightened, and energetic attempt to attain this difficult objective was made, nevertheless, by the Ottoman 'ascendancy' during its years of grace between the settlement of the Egyptian question in A.D. 1841 and the outbreak, in A.D. 1875,<sup>3</sup> of a local revolt of the *ra'îyeh* in Bosnia which precipitated the break-up of the Ottoman Empire in Rumelia within the next three years.

The monuments of constructive Ottoman statesmanship during this critical period are the Westernizing constitutional reforms—known collectively as the Tanzimât—which were inaugurated by Sultan 'Abd-al-Mejîd's promulgation of the Khatt-i-Sherif-i-Gülkhâne on the 3rd November, 1839,<sup>4</sup> and were crowned by Sultan 'Abd-al-Hamid II's promulgation of a short-lived constitution on the 23rd December, 1876.

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 161-5, above.

<sup>2</sup> See IV. iv. 156-85.

<sup>3</sup> The revolt in Bosnia in July 1875 had been preceded by two years (A.D. 1873-5) of famine and financial collapse, so that the spell of political fine weather which had begun in A.D. 1841 virtually came to an end at the death of Mehmed Emin 'Ali Pasha in A.D. 1871. See Davison, Roderic H.: *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876* (thesis submitted to Harvard University for the degree of Ph.D., 1st April, 1942), p. 298. [The author had kindly permitted the writer of this Study to read and cite a typescript copy of this work which was deposited in the library of Harvard University. In May 1952 Dr. Davison's book was in process of revision with a view to publication.]

<sup>4</sup> The Khatt of the 3rd November, 1839, was reaffirmed in another Khatt of the 18th February, 1856, which was incorporated in Article 9 of the Paris Peace Treaty of the 30th March, 1856. The points of likeness and difference between these two charters are pointed out by Davison, *op. cit.*, pp. 34-35.



Sultan Mahmūd II's life-work had been to rid the Ottoman Empire of the usurpers—Janissaries in the capital, dere beys in Anatolia and Rumelia, and tribal chiefs in Arabia, Kurdistan, and Albania—who had stridden into the political vacuum created by the decay of the Pādishāh's Slave-Household since the later decades of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era. The immediate effect of Mahmūd's successful execution of this task had been a concentration in the Sultan's hands of an autocratic power which he had used mainly for Westernizing the Army, on the lines indicated above, to the neglect of corresponding reforms in the civilian sphere. The common aim of the liberal Westernizing Ottoman Turkish Muslim statesmen of the post-Mahmudian Age was to carry out Mahmūd's still unaccomplished work by converting the Ottoman Empire into a *Rechtsstaat*<sup>1</sup> whose subjects of all religions and nationalities would be secured so full a measure of equality before the law, according to the standards attained in the enlightened Western states of the day, that the *ra'ÿeh* would lose their desire to secede for the purpose of founding or joining separate national states of their own.

This policy was progressively put into effect by four eminent statesmen in three successive stages. The author of the Khatt of A.D. 1839 was Mustafā Mehmed Reshīd Pasha<sup>2</sup> (*vivebat* A.D. 1802(?)–58), a critic of Sultan Mahmūd who had gained his own experience in diplomacy—in London and Paris as well as at Kyutahīyeh and Constantinople—during the years A.D. 1833–9.<sup>3</sup> After the Crimean War (*gerebatur* A.D. 1853–6), Reshīd's work was carried on by his two pupils and critics Mehmed Emīn 'Alī Pasha (*vivebat* A.D. 1815–71) and Mehmed Kecheji-zāde Fu'ād Pasha (*vivebat* A.D. 1815–69)—a pair of Ottoman statesmen who were honourably distinguished by their exemplary cooperation with one another in practising the art of hastening slowly. Under the auspices of 'Alī and Fu'ād, Midhat Pasha (*vivebat* A.D. 1822–84) performed marvellous pioneer work in applying the ideals of the Tanzimāt to the problems of Ottoman provincial administration; but, when, after the deaths of his pair of predecessors, Midhat took over their responsibilities at the centre of government, he failed to show their tact and judgement in grappling with a more formidable crisis in Ottoman affairs than they had ever been required to face.

Midhat<sup>4</sup> was the son of an Ottoman official of Pomak origin<sup>5</sup> and perhaps also of Bektāshī proclivities.<sup>6</sup> He was born at Ruschuk and grew up at Lofcha (Loveč), Viddin, and Constantinople.<sup>7</sup> He entered the Ottoman public service at the age of fourteen in A.D. 1836,<sup>8</sup> but found

<sup>1</sup> See Bailey, *op. cit.*, pp. 185–6.

<sup>2</sup> The Khatt of the 3rd November, 1839, was to a large extent a reproduction of a memorandum communicated by Reshīd to Palmerston on the 12th August, 1839 (Bailey, *op. cit.*, pp. 185–6 and 271–6).

<sup>3</sup> See Bailey, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

<sup>4</sup> For Midhat's career see Davison, *op. cit.*; Babinger, *Fr.*, s.v. 'Midhat Pasha', in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, vol. iii (Leyden 1936, Brill), pp. 481–2; [Antoine, Louis] 'Léouzon-le-Duc': *Midhat Pasha* (Paris 1877, Dentu); Midhat, 'Alī Haydar (Midhat Pasha's son): *The Life of Midhat Pasha* (London 1903, John Murray); eundem: *Midhat Pasha: Hayāt-i-Siyāsīyesi, Khidmāti, Menfā Hayātī* (Constantinople, A. H. 1325 = A.D. 1909, Hilāl Press, 2 vols.).

<sup>5</sup> See Davison, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

<sup>6</sup> See Davison, *op. cit.*, p. 197; Babinger, *op. cit.*, p. 481.

<sup>7</sup> See Babinger, *op. cit.*, loc. cit.

<sup>8</sup> See Babinger, *op. cit.*, loc. cit.



an opportunity later in his career, in A.D. 1858, of spending six months in the West and visiting Vienna, Paris, Brussels, and London.<sup>1</sup> Midhat made his mark in the field of provincial administration, where Sultan Mahmūd II had cleared the ground by sweeping away the host of local usurpers who had been on the verge of carving the Ottoman Empire into successor-states, but had left to his own heirs on the Ottoman imperial throne the task of building up a new system of local government, on Western lines, through which the Porte could exercise and maintain its recaptured authority over the Sultan's hereditary dominions. In successive tenures of provincial governorships in different quarters of the Ottoman Empire, including not only Rumelia but 'Irāq, Midhat worked out, and applied with conspicuous personal success, a dual policy which was taken by the Porte as the basis for a general reorganization of Ottoman provincial administration. With one hand he took action to make the Ottoman régime not only tolerable but attractive to Ottoman subjects of all communities by fostering mixed provincial councils,<sup>2</sup> mixed schools, technical education, and public works, especially for the improvement of communications. With the other hand he was equally vigorous in suppressing Pan Slavism and other forms of separatism and in maintaining law and order.<sup>3</sup>

Midhat came to the front in A.D. 1854, when he was entrusted with the task of restoring order in a Rumelia where repercussions of the Crimean War were making themselves felt among the Slav Orthodox Christian majority of the local population.<sup>4</sup> He distinguished himself there by his success in suppressing unrest and brigandage and in settling Circassian refugees from the Russian conquest of the North-Western Caucasus.<sup>5</sup> After returning to the Grand Council of the Empire at Constantinople, which he had already served as its Second Secretary, and winning the esteem of the representatives of Turkey's allies,<sup>6</sup> he was appointed in A.D. 1857 to be governor of Viddin and Silistria;<sup>7</sup> and thereafter, after visiting Western Europe<sup>8</sup> and serving the Grand Council as its First Secretary,<sup>9</sup> he served during the years A.D. 1861-3 as governor of a special province comprising the three Rumelian districts of Nish, Üsküb, and Prizren<sup>10</sup>—a delicate task, since the Orthodox Christians in the local population were Serb fellow tribesmen of the people of the adjoining autonomous principality of Serbia and independent statelet of Montenegro. In this special province Midhat worked for the establishment of genuinely representative institutions of local self-government, for a just redistribution of taxation, and for material improvements that would benefit the inhabitants without distinction of religion or nationality.<sup>11</sup> His success here led to his being commissioned to advise and assist

<sup>1</sup> See Babinger, *op. cit.*, loc. cit.; Davison, *op. cit.*, p. 197; Antoine, *op. cit.*, pp. 29 and 38.

<sup>2</sup> These had been envisaged in the Khatt of A.D. 1839 (Davison, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-28).

<sup>3</sup> See Davison, *op. cit.*, pp. 198-201.

<sup>4</sup> See Babinger, *op. cit.*, p. 481.

<sup>5</sup> See Antoine, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-21.

<sup>6</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 22.

<sup>7</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 26; Babinger, *op. cit.*, p. 481.

<sup>8</sup> See above.

<sup>9</sup> See Antoine, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

<sup>10</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 30; Davison, *op. cit.*, p. 189; Babinger, *op. cit.*, p. 481.

<sup>11</sup> See Antoine, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-34.

Fu'ad and 'Ali Pashas in the drafting of a standard law<sup>1</sup> to regulate the administration of provinces (*vilâyets*) on the lines of his own practice,<sup>2</sup> and then being appointed, in A.D. 1864, to apply this new law in another special province composed of the three Rumelian districts of Nish, Viddin, and Silistria.<sup>3</sup> In this province in three years (A.D. 1864-7) Midhat built 3,000 kilometres of roads, 1,400 bridges, and three polytechnics: one at Nish, one at Ruschuk, and one at Sofia.<sup>4</sup>

Since A.D. 1858, Midhat had had the advantage of knowing something of the West as well as Turkey at first hand,<sup>5</sup> and he was opposed to mechanical imitations not suited to local conditions.<sup>6</sup> Perhaps his chief strength was his courage in acting on his own initiative.<sup>7</sup> But his virtues, signal though they were, were pitted against formidable adverse forces. Though his policy of translating the classical Ottoman millet system into Modern Western terms was the most humane and enlightened programme that could have been devised for improving the lot of a mixed population of diverse creeds and nationalities, this aim did not appeal to the Rumeliot Orthodox Christians of his generation, whose hearts were already set on becoming citizens of national states of a type represented in embryo by the contemporary Kingdom of Greece and Principality of Serbia; and in these disruptive ambitions they were encouraged by Russia, who was eager to go on fishing in troubled Rumelian waters. Moreover, this attitude of the disaffected *ra'iyyeh* and their foreign instigators was largely justified by an unwillingness on the part of the Muslim 'ascendancy' in Rumelia to waive its historic privileges, and on the part of the conservatives at the Porte to commit themselves sincerely and wholeheartedly to a policy of transforming the Ottoman Empire into a commonwealth genuinely guaranteeing full equality before the law, in the Modern Western sense of that ideal, to all its subjects without religious discrimination.

The constitutional issue thus raised in nineteenth-century Turkey by the scandal of a traditional discrimination against a non-Muslim majority in the population of Rumelia gave rise to a corresponding issue within the bosom of the ruling community itself; for the Muslim, including the Turkish Muslim, subjects of the Porte, as well as the *ra'iyyeh*, were sufferers from a misgovernment that had its root in the Ottoman practice of Islamic political theory.<sup>8</sup> As the point was put by Midhat Pasha himself:

'In the past our ruling idea was to satisfy Europe in Turkey in order to keep Turkey in Europe. To-day our aspirations and our labours to achieve reform spring from an impulse within ourselves, from thoughts that are our own, and from an activity that is native to our country.'<sup>9</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This law of the Vilâyets was promulgated in November 1864, and was revised in A.D. 1867 and A.D. 1870. By A.D. 1868 the whole of the Ottoman Empire except 'Irâq and the Yaman had been reorganized into provinces on the new pattern (Davison, *op. cit.*, pp. 189-90, 203, and 206; Kramers, J. H., s.v. 'Tanzimât [-i-Khayriyyeh]', in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, vol. iv (Leyden 1934, Brill), p. 659).

<sup>2</sup> See Antoine, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

<sup>3</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 40.

<sup>4</sup> See Antoine, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

<sup>5</sup> This point is emphasized by Davison in *op. cit.*, p. v.

<sup>6</sup> Midhat Pasha, quoted by Antoine, *op. cit.*, pp. 57-58.

<sup>7</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 39.

<sup>8</sup> See p. 253, above.

<sup>9</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 44.

Accordingly, the outbreak in A.D. 1875 of an insurrection of the Serb Orthodox Christians in Herzegovina, where there was acute tension between the local *ra'îyeh* and a local Muslim 'ascendancy' consisting of ex-Bogomil native Slav landlords, raised the question of constitutional government for Turkish Muslim Ottoman subjects as well as the question of political independence for Rumeliot Orthodox Christians still under Ottoman rule, and, when, in this crisis, Midhat, instead of being sent to Herzegovina by the Porte, was appointed in August 1875 to be, for the second time, Minister of Justice, he resigned in November 1875 and went into opposition. He was marked out for becoming the leader of the 'New 'Osmanlis';<sup>1</sup> for in A.D. 1867 he had been recalled from his Danubian province to Constantinople<sup>2</sup> to be President of a new Imperial Council of State<sup>3</sup> (*fungebatur* A.D. 1868-9) and, since then, he had been governor of the provinces of Baghdad<sup>4</sup> (*fungebatur* A.D. 1869-72) and Salonica<sup>5</sup> (*fungebatur* October 1873-February 1874) and—for a spell of three months (1st August-19th October, 1872)—Grand Vizier.<sup>6</sup>

In the movement for constitutional government on Western lines that was now coming to a head within the bosom of the Ottoman Turkish community,<sup>7</sup> an agitation was started on the 7th May, 1876, by the Muslim theological students ('softas')<sup>8</sup> in Constantinople, and during

<sup>1</sup> The origins of the 'New 'Osmanlis' (*Turcîd* 'Yeni 'Osmanlılar', mistranslated into French as 'Jeunes Turcs', according to Davison, *op. cit.*, p. 277) are obscure (*ibid.*, p. 279). The fathers of the movement were men of letters not employed in the Ottoman government service (pp. 217-18)—İbrâhîm Şînâsî (pp. 230-5), Nâmyq Kemâl (pp. 235-41), Ziyâ (pp. 243-8), and the 'Zealot'-minded Central Asian Turk 'Âlî Su'âvî (pp. 250-2)—who were, all alike, independent publicists, language reformers, and patriots, but in other respects were very diverse (p. 253). Their first revolt was against the classical Ottoman Turkish literary style, which was remote from the living language of the day, but by A.D. 1865 they were already advocating constitutional government for Turkey in the Western style (p. 280), and in A.D. 1867 they joined with three pashas in publishing a criticism of the withdrawal of the Ottoman garrisons from Serbia and thereby incurred the displeasure of 'Âlî Pasha (pp. 215-16 and 238). There was, indeed, an abortive conspiracy in A.D. 1867 against 'Âlî and Fu'âd's régime (p. 282). In consequence, Nâmyq Kemâl, Ziyâ, and 'Âlî Su'âvî had to flee to Paris, whither Şînâsî had preceded them in A.D. 1864 on a second visit (Şînâsî had been sent there for the first time in A.D. 1843 at the age of seventeen by Sultan 'Abd-al-Mejîd and had taken part there in the revolution of A.D. 1848 before coming home in A.D. 1851). The four 'New 'Osmanli' leaders were unable to return to Turkey till after the death of 'Âlî Pasha in A.D. 1871. Nâmyq Kemâl was banished from Constantinople to Cyprus on account of the sensation created by the production, in A.D. 1873, of his patriotic play *Vdân, yahud Silistere* (pp. 392-6).

<sup>2</sup> See Antoine, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

<sup>3</sup> This Council of State, which was created by dividing the existing Grand Council of the Empire (alias 'Tanzîmât Council') into a Council of State and a High Court of Justice (see Kramers, J. H., s.v. 'Tanzîmât [-i-Khayriyyeh]', in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, vol. iv (Leyden 1934, Brill), p. 657), was duly organized on a model that was French except in one crucial point in which there was no analogy between the political circumstances in the France and in the Turkey of Midhat's day. In the Turkey of A.D. 1867 the seats on the Council had to be distributed between the different communities of which the population of the Ottoman Empire was composed, and the non-Muslim communities were flagrantly under-represented (according to Davison, *op. cit.*, pp. 303-4, they were given 13 seats out of 50; according to Antoine, *op. cit.*, p. 75, they were given 3 seats out of 16).

<sup>4</sup> See Antoine, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-81. In his governorship of Baghdad, Midhat achieved results second only to those achieved by him in the Danube Province in A.D. 1864-7.

<sup>5</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 88.

<sup>6</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 88.

<sup>7</sup> The Turkish community had been alienated from the existing régime by the famine of A.D. 1873-4, which had been worst in the Turkish-inhabited areas of the Empire, e.g. in Central Anatolia (Davison, *op. cit.*, pp. 401-2).

<sup>8</sup> See Davison, *op. cit.*, pp. 432-3; Midhat, 'Âlî Haydar [Midhat Pasha's son]: *The Life of Midhat Pasha* (London 1903, John Murray), p. 81. Since the extirpation of the

the night of the 29th–30th May the reigning sultan 'Abd-al-'Aziz was deposed on the strength of a *fatvā* (legal opinion)<sup>1</sup> rendered by the revolutionary clerics<sup>2</sup> leader Khayrallah, whose followers' demonstrations on the 10th and 11th May had prevailed upon the intimidated Sultan to appoint him Sheykh-el-Islām (chief of the Islamic religious jurisconsults in the Ottoman Empire). From that date Midhat was virtually in power—though it was not till the 18th December, 1876, that he became Grand Vizier for the second time—and a constitution was duly promulgated by Sultan 'Abd-al-'Aziz's second successor<sup>3</sup> Sultan 'Abd-al-Hamid on the 23rd December of the same year; but this gleam of light had no sooner shone out than it was eclipsed by a deluge of disasters.

The Herzegovinian insurgents had been neither pacified nor suppressed; Montenegro and Serbia had gone to war with Turkey on their behalf; a conference of representatives of the Powers which had assembled in Constantinople to try to restore peace ignored the new Ottoman Constitution and failed to fulfil its own mission; the victory of Russia in a new Russo-Turkish war (*gerebatur* A.D. 1877–8) cut down the Ottoman dominions in Rumelia to a remnant that was no longer permanently tenable, even after the Great Bulgaria of the original Russo-Turkish peace treaty of San Stefano (*pactum* 3rd March, 1878) had been pared down and split in two by the terms of the revisionary peace treaty of Berlin (*pactum* 13th July, 1878); the administration of six sources of public revenue from indirect taxation was handed over by the Ottoman Government to an international council of foreign bondholders on the 20th December, 1881; and, meanwhile, Sultan 'Abd-al-Hamid had established his autocratic control over what remained of the Ottoman Empire's territory and sovereignty by dismissing the undiplomatic constitutionalist Midhat Pasha from office on the 5th February, 1877, and suspending the constitution itself on the 14th February, 1878. After a cat-and-mouse persecution, the Ottoman protagonist of a Modern Western constitutionalism was tried and convicted in May

Janissaries in A.D. 1826 the softas had taken over the Janissaries' traditional role of serving as the principal political 'pressure group' in the capital of the Empire. (In a sense, the 'Ulema were the Janissaries' heirs by right of conquest; for their secession from the camp of reaction to the camp of reform had been the decisive change in the Ottoman domestic political situation which had made it possible for Sultan Mahmūd II to succeed in an enterprise which had proved too difficult for his predecessor Sultan Selim III). In A.D. 1853 the softas had agitated for war against Russia, and in A.D. 1876 it was again their anti-Russian feeling that moved them to support the constitutionalists (Davison, *op. cit.*, pp. 430–1). They were brought into the constitutionalist camp by a leading 'ālim, Khayrallah Efendi (*ibid.*, p. 426).

<sup>1</sup> See Davison, *op. cit.*, p. 436; Midhat, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

<sup>2</sup> To minds attuned to Modern Western social and constitutional history, the spectacle of clerics taking the lead in a movement for political reform on liberal lines would perhaps be still more surprising than to see military officers playing this part. The liberalism of these nineteenth-century Ottoman 'khojas' had the same origin as the liberalism of their contemporaries in the Ottoman Army. Their profession required that they should be educated; and an education in the traditional Islamic theology and literature enlarged the mind, even though it did not lead so directly to Western 'dangerous thoughts' as the technical education of the new-model Ottoman military officers.

<sup>3</sup> On the authority of another *fatvā* from the Sheykh-el-Islām, Khayrallah, 'Abd-al-'Aziz's successor Murād V had been replaced in his turn, on the 31st August, 1876, on the ground that he was mentally deranged, by his astutely perverse-minded brother 'Abd-al-Hamid II.

1881 on a preposterous charge of having murdered the deposed Sultan 'Abd-al-'Aziz' and was banished to Tā'if in the Hijāz to be murdered there by 'Abd-al-Hamid's orders.<sup>2</sup>

Simultaneously, Egypt was overwhelmed by a comparable concatenation of catastrophes. In A.D. 1876 she paid the penalty for her rulers' financial improvidence by forfeiting her financial autonomy to an international *Caisse de la Dette*, and in A.D. 1882 an Egyptian nationalist movement, whose programme was to rescue Egypt from the financial control of foreign creditors by bringing the incompetent Turkish autocracy of the Khedive under the constitutional control of the Egyptian people, was crushed by the armed intervention of a single foreign Power. The leader of the Egyptian nationalists, Ahmad 'Arābī Pasha, suffered Midhat Pasha's political fate of being dismissed from office, tried, convicted, and sent into exile,<sup>3</sup> and the British expeditionary force remained in occupation in Egypt. Its presence there enabled the British Government to bring the finances—and, with them, the administration—of Egypt under its own paramount control, but did not avail to save the Sudan, south of Wādī Halfah, from being lost to Egypt through the insurrection of the Mahdī Muhammad Ahmad in A.D. 1881-5.

It will be seen that the ingredients of the cup of wrath were the same for both Egypt and Turkey, but they were mixed in different brews which had diverse effects on the patients in the next chapters of their histories.

In Turkey's catastrophe the insurrection of a disaffected Rumeliot subject population was the occasion of the other tribulations, whereas in Egypt's catastrophe the insurrection in the Sudan was their consequence. In Egypt the troubles began with the imposition of foreign financial control, whereas in Turkey a partial loss of financial sovereignty was the aftermath of insurrection and war. As for the Egyptian nationalist movement of which 'Arābī Pasha was at least the nominal leader, it was comparable to the contemporary nationalist movements among the Rumeliot Orthodox Christians inasmuch as, like these, it was a revolt of a non-Turkish subject population against a local Turkish 'ascendancy'. The revolt in Egypt was initiated by Arab officers of an Egyptian Army which was still officered predominantly by Turks and Albanians. At the same time, this movement headed by 'Arābī at Cairo in A.D. 1882 resembled the movement led by Midhat at Constantinople in A.D. 1876 in expressing, not a will to secede, but a demand, emanating from the Muslim people of the country, for the replacement of an inefficient autocracy by a parliamentary constitutional régime of the contemporary Western pattern.

### *The Failure of the Arabs to Respond to a Continuing Challenge of Western Aggression*

Both constitutional movements were suppressed; but their suppression was accomplished by different means in the two cases, and this

<sup>1</sup> See Babinger, *op. cit.*, p. 482.

<sup>2</sup> Babinger, *loc. cit.*, gives the date of the crime as the 30th April, 1883; other authorities give divers dates (e.g. the 8th May and the 8th July) in A.D. 1884.

<sup>3</sup> 'Arābī was banished for life to Ceylon, but was allowed to return to Egypt in A.D. 1901.



difference drove the two countries along divergent political courses. In Turkey the 'New 'Osmanlis' were suppressed by Sultan 'Abd-al-Hamid without recourse to foreign aid, with the result that, for the next thirty-one years (A.D. 1877-1908), Turkey was under the yoke of a native autocrat. In Egypt, 'Arābi and his partisans were crushed by the armed intervention of a Western Power, with the result that for the next fifty-four years (A.D. 1882-1936) Egypt was under foreign military occupation. In other words, in this next chapter of Ottoman history Turkey went through China's experience while Egypt went through India's. Turkey, like China, preserved for herself the blessing of freedom to make her own mistakes at the price of having to endure the unmitigated consequences of them, whereas Egypt was afflicted with the blight of being managed, rehabilitated, and shielded by alien hands at the cost of being debarred, so long as this benevolently stifling unsought tutelage lasted, from learning through the suffering that had been found to be Man's one effective school of practical wisdom.

Thus Egypt had escaped from an uncongenial Turkish domination only to become a pawn on the chessboard of Western power politics. This nineteenth-century Egyptian experience was shared by other Arab countries outside the bounds of the desert and highland fastnesses of the Arabian Peninsula itself; and a retrospect of this chapter of these Arab countries' history would lend colour to the view that their weakness had been ruthlessly exploited by Modern Western politicians to solve Western problems at the Arabs' expense.

France, for example,<sup>1</sup> had embarked in A.D. 1830 on the conquest of Algeria in compensation for the collapse of a Napoleonic Empire in Europe; in A.D. 1881 she had imposed a French protectorate on Tunisia, with Bismarck's blessing, in compensation for her defeat in the Franco-German War of A.D. 1870-1; in A.D. 1907-12 she had proceeded, with Great Britain's blessing, to impose a French protectorate on Morocco in compensation for her blunder, in A.D. 1882, in missing her opportunity to go into partnership with Great Britain in the occupation and control of Egypt; and in A.D. 1920 she had attacked and conquered Syria, with a mandate from the League of Nations, in compensation for having been attacked and all but conquered, herself, by Germany in the General War of A.D. 1914-18. Italy's attack on the Ottoman Arab provinces in Libya in A.D. 1911, with the connivance of the other Great Powers, had likewise been delivered in compensation for the shortness of the measure which Italy had received in the partition of Tropical Africa between European Powers during the last two decades of the nineteenth century.

On the same cynical principle of making the defenceless pay, the Zionists on the 14th May, 1948, had set up a state of Israel in Palestine by force of arms in a war that had resulted in more than half a million Palestinian Arabs losing their homes, in compensation for atrocities committed against Jews in A.D. 1933-45, not in the Levant, but in Europe, and not by Arabs, but by Germans.<sup>2</sup> The French in A.D. 1920 could defend their act of aggression with a show of legality by exhibiting

<sup>1</sup> See X. ix. 11.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 288-92, below—especially p. 290, nn. 1 and 3.



a licence from the League of Nations to violate the rights of the Arab people of Syria because other members of the League were feeling sympathy with France over her sufferings at Germany's hands in the First World War, and because Great Britain, in particular, was grateful to France for having taken the brunt of the German attack on the Western allies, was uneasy in her conscience over having exercised her option to leave unratified a treaty, guaranteeing France in Europe, which she had signed on the 28th June, 1919, and was anxious to obtain the acquiescence of France in British ambitions at the expense of the Arab peoples of Palestine and 'Irāq. By a similar operation of psychological forces the Zionists obtained a retrospective condonation from the United Nations Organization for their violation of the rights of the Arab people of Palestine<sup>1</sup> because the Western World as a whole was feeling sympathy with the Jews over their sufferings at Germany's hands during the Second World War and the six years preceding its outbreak, and because Westerners were ashamed that such atrocities should have been committed by a Western nation. The United States and the Soviet Union in A.D. 1948, like Great Britain in 1920, had an additional motive for condoning an act of injustice against an Arab people. In A.D. 1948 the United States and the Soviet Union were competing for Jewish goodwill in a 'cold war' which by that time they were waging with one another, as the Allied and Associated Powers had been competing with Germany for Jewish goodwill in the First World War at the time when the British Government had issued the Balfour Declaration and the American, French, and Italian Governments had adhered to it.

An impartial non-Western observer's verdict would assuredly have been that, however grievously the Western peoples might have sinned against one another and against the Jewish stranger in their midst, and however desirable it might be that they should make atonement at their own expense, there was neither merit nor justice in their compensating their victims at the expense of innocent third parties. As against Zionist and Western aggressors, the Arabs had an unanswerable moral case; but, with the exception of the ex-Ottoman Maghribis,<sup>2</sup> they could be criticized for their improvidence in having severed their political connexion with their Turkish fellow subjects of an Ottoman Pādishāh when they were as impotent to defend themselves unaided against aggression as they had been proved to be by the uniform sequel in the histories of Egypt, Palestine, the Lebanon, Syria, and 'Irāq; and they could be blamed much more severely for their moral failure in not having taken any serious steps to put their own house in order when, in the next chapter of the story, they had become masters of their own house at last.

<sup>1</sup> This was the moral implication of the admission of the State of Israel to membership in the United Nations on the 11th May, 1949, three days before the first anniversary of the Zionists' original act of aggression.

<sup>2</sup> The Moroccans had always consistently played a lone hand, but the Algerines, Tunisians, and Tripolitarians, whose local 'Osmanli rulers had virtually ignored the suzerainty of the Porte in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, had followed their rulers from A.D. 1830 onwards in seeking to strengthen their links with the Ottoman Empire as a safeguard against the danger of Western imperialism which had been suddenly and startlingly brought to their attention by the French occupation of Algiers (see p. 230, above).

This stricture applied in particular to Egypt after the British recognition of her independence, subject only to four reservations, on the 28th February, 1922;<sup>1</sup> to 'Irāq after the coming into force of the Anglo-'Irāqī treaty of the 30th June, 1930, through the admission of 'Irāq to membership in the League of Nations on the 3rd October, 1932; and to Syria and the Lebanon after the rendition by the French of their Levantine mandates on the 3rd January, 1944. From those dates onwards, the ruling class in the principal Arab countries had been substantially free to grapple with domestic problems—economic, social, and political—and its failure to address itself to this urgent task was a more grievous sin against the Arabic Society, and a more dangerous threat to its survival, than the blackest deeds of alien aggressors. This internal weakness was the cause of the Arab League's egregious failure in A.D. 1948-9 to hold its own on the battlefield, and even to maintain a united political front, against an infant Israeli state which, on paper, was outmatched in strength singly by each of the Arab states nominally banded together against it. The 'displacement' of the Arab population of the greater part of Palestine was an Arab calamity that was the consequence of a Jewish offence; the other Arab peoples' impotence to save their Palestinian brethren from this fate was an Arab humiliation that the Arabs had brought upon themselves.

The military and political weakness exhibited by the Arab states under this test was a reflection of their social rottenness; this underlying evil was the responsibility of the ruling class; and this class could not plausibly plead, as an excuse for their sin of omission, that the task of social salvage was beyond their strength, considering the results achieved by the efforts of their counterparts in Turkey in the same generation. In Turkey and the ex-Ottoman Arab countries the twentieth-century ruling class was the heir of one and the same social heritage; and the social transformation that had been accomplished in Turkey in the quarter of a century opening in A.D. 1923 set a standard for these Arab countries which was as peremptory as it was reasonable. What Turkey had managed to achieve in her poverty was not too much to expect of Egypt, with her wealth in cotton, or of 'Irāq, with her wealth in oil; and the presence here of these material resources offering ways and means, which a Turkish statesmanship might have envied, for carrying out a programme of social reform made the perpetuation in these Arab countries of gross economic inequalities between an affluent minority and an indigent mass far more invidious and explosive than it would have been if their latent riches had not been discovered and tapped. The one plea open to the ex-Ottoman Arab ruling class was that its *moral* had been atrophied by a long bout of Western tutelage; but, except perhaps in the case of Egypt, which had been under British occupation for fifty-four years, this plea was conclusively rebutted by chronology, since

<sup>1</sup> In A.D. 1952—between the date in A.D. 1949 when this passage had been written and the date at which it was being revised in galley proof—a *coup d'état* had been made in Egypt by a group of military officers, headed by General Najib (*Gallo-Aegyptiac* Néguib). In the autumn of A.D. 1952 it was not yet possible to forecast the prospects of the radical and comprehensive programme for national regeneration which had been launched in Egypt by this revolutionary new régime.

all the states members of the Arab League that disputed the establishment of the state of Israel in A.D. 1948 were *ex hypothesi* then already independent, and none of these except Egypt had come under Western control before the final dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War (*gerebatur* A.D. 1914-18), so that none of them except Egypt had been under Western tutelage for a longer spell than a quarter of a century.

*The Failure of a Turkish Committee of Union and Progress to Maintain the Ottoman Empire*

In Turkey, as we have noted, the drama of Westernization ran into a third and a fourth act which had no parallel in contemporary Arab history.

The third act opened in Turkey on the 22nd-24th July, 1908, when on three consecutive days a hitherto subterranean Committee of Union and Progress raised the standard of revolt against 'Abd-al-Hamīd's autocracy in the Macedonian garrison town of Resna, proclaimed at Salonica the re-establishment of the constitution of A.D. 1876, and compelled Sultan 'Abd-al-Hamīd at Constantinople to ratify their revolutionary act. This attempt on the part of a second generation of 'New 'Osmanlis' to save the Ottoman Empire's existence by transforming it into a parliamentary constitutional state on a Western pattern was no more successful than the first; and this time it became manifest that the failure was due to an intrinsic flaw in the policy, for this time, when 'Abd-al-Hamīd tried to repeat the counter-revolution which he had accomplished in A.D. 1877, he did not recover his autocratic power but forfeited his throne. From the deposition of 'Abd-al-Hamīd in A.D. 1909 to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in A.D. 1918, the responsibility for Turkey's fortunes was on the heads of the Unionists.

The fatal weakness of the 'New 'Osmanlis' programme was that, in a multi-national empire whose peoples had been captivated by the Western political ideal of Nationalism, 'union' and 'progress' were incompatible objectives; and, when the pressure of events forced the party into making a choice, they sacrificed an attainable progress to the forlorn hope of still saving an untenable union. A twentieth-century Ottoman Empire stood no better a chance than a twentieth-century Hapsburg Monarchy of being converted into a Switzerland writ large; and the fraternization between members of long discordant millets in the first moment of excitement and relief at a sudden unexpected release from the common yoke of 'Abd-al-Hamīd's tyranny was proved by its brevity to be a political mirage. On second thoughts the members of the non-Muslim communities reverted to a disbelief, born of melancholy experience, in the possibility of their ever being admitted to any genuine equality under the Ottoman flag with their Turkish masters; and, even if they had been convinced that this miracle would come to pass, it may be doubted whether, when it came to the point, they would have been willing to sacrifice to an ideal of Ottoman fraternity their hopes of being eventually re-united with their already independent brethren in separate national states of their own. By A.D. 1908 these feelings had come to be shared

with the non-Muslim Greek, Serb, Bulgar, and Armenian subjects of the Ottoman Empire by the non-Turkish Muslim Arabs, Albanians, and Kurds. In these circumstances the Empire could be held together only by *force majeure*, and, to hold it by force, an Hamidian tyranny would have to be reimposed by the Turks alone on all their non-Turkish fellow Ottomans, Muslims as well as Christians.

Desperate though it was, this *tour de force* was nevertheless attempted by the Committee of Union and Progress, and a folly which cannot be condoned can at least be explained.

In the first place the Ottoman Empire was still in being, and few imperial peoples had ever had the strength of mind, which the British were to show in A.D. 1947, to give up an untenable empire voluntarily without waiting for it to be wrested from them. The Committee of Union and Progress spent seven of their ten years of grace in waging ruinous wars against irresistible aggressors: a war with Italy (*gerebatur* A.D. 1911-13) which failed to save Tripolitania and Cyrenaica; a war with the Balkan States (*gerebatur* A.D. 1912-13) which failed to save anything in Rumelia beyond the western suburbs of Adrianople; and a war with the Powers of the Entente (*gerebatur* A.D. 1914-18) which dealt the Ottoman Empire its *coup de grâce* after having been wantonly undertaken in the ill-conceived hope that, with Germany's aid, this military adventure might compensate Turkey for her losses in Rumelia by enabling her to recover Egypt and other ex-Ottoman Arab territories in Africa and to win territories inhabited by non-Ottoman Turkish peoples in the Russian Empire which had never been under Ottoman rule.<sup>1</sup>

A second reason why the Committee of Union and Progress sacrificed the national interests of the Turkish people in a losing battle to maintain the Ottoman Empire was that the strength of the party was drawn from the Macedonian remnant of the Rumeliot Turkish 'ascendancy'. The party headquarters were at Salonica;<sup>2</sup> the backing in the Army, which made the revolution of A.D. 1908 practicable, came from officers of the Macedonian garrison; and an anxiety for the preservation of Ottoman sovereignty over Macedonia determined the date of the *pronunciamento*—for Tal'at's and Enver's revolution in A.D. 1908 was precipitated, like the abortive revolutions of Midhat Pasha at Constantinople in A.D. 1876

<sup>1</sup> The Pan-Turanian idea (see p. 191, n. 2, above), which was taken up by 'the Young Turks' (as 'the New Osmanlis' may be styled without inaccuracy in this context) during the Russo-Turkish war of A.D. 1914-18, and for which Enver Pasha eventually gave his life on a battlefield in Soviet Russian Central Asia, had originated as a *jeu d'esprit* in the mind of an imaginative French Consul-General at Salonica, who had coined a 'Pan-Turanianism' on the analogy of an already current 'Pan-Germanism' and 'Pan-Slavism' (see Cahun, Léon: *Introduction à l'Histoire de l'Asie* (Paris 1896, Colin)).

<sup>2</sup> Salonica was well qualified for serving as a centre for a Westernizing Turkish political movement at this stage of Ottoman history. It was free from the incubus of the classical Ottoman régime which was still weighing heavily on Constantinople. It was the regional capital of the remnant of Rumelia, whose Turkish inhabitants were the most energetic and progressive element in the Turkish population of the Ottoman Empire. The Salonican Turks were linked, through the Dönme, with their Sephardi Jewish fellow townsmen, who had been kept in touch with the Modern Western World by their Spanish origin and their commercial interests (see II. ii. 246-7). And, finally, Salonica, like Constantinople, had been linked up with Continental Western Europe by rail. The writer remembers the impression made on him, on his first visit to Salonica in June 1912, as his ship approached the quay, by the sight of Hungarian, Austrian, and German railway wagons standing there.

and 'Arābi Pasha at Cairo in A.D. 1882, by a fear that the overthrow of a native autocracy might be anticipated by a foreign intervention to which Macedonia seemed to be more imminently exposed in A.D. 1908 than any other outlying part of the Ottoman Empire of that date.

*The Success of Mustafā Kemāl Atatürk in Creating a Turkish National State*

On the 23rd July, 1919, when Mustafā Kemāl repeated at Erzerum the *pronunciamiento* made by Enver and Niazi at Resna on the 22nd July, 1908, the prospects for Turkey appeared, on a superficial view, to have changed radically to her disadvantage. The Pādishāh whom a mutinous officer was defying in A.D. 1919 was not, like 'Abd-al-Hamid, an autocrat fighting for his own hand; he was a puppet in the hands of a victorious coalition of foreign Powers which had just overthrown not only Turkey but her mighty ally Germany; and the spur which had goaded Mustafā Kemāl into hoisting his revolutionary colours was not the menace of foreign aggression against an outlying territory where the Turkish element in the population was in a minority; it was the accomplished fact of a Greek invasion—sponsored by Great Britain, France, and the United States—of a predominantly Turkish Anatolia. As it turned out, however, these grim circumstances were so many blessings in disguise, since they inspired the Rumeliot leaders of a new Turkish Westernizing movement with the strength of mind at last to have the full courage of their convictions, and moved the mass of the Turkish people in Anatolia for the first time readily to follow a revolutionary westward lead as the only remaining chance of saving themselves from a now imminent threat of annihilation. This intellectual and emotional revolution fired a new-born Turkish nation to a high pitch of heroism and a degree of psychic and social malleability that proved more than a match for the adversities by which this spirit had been evoked. The heroism displayed itself in a decisive victory in a battle for national survival against apparently hopeless odds in the years A.D. 1919-22; the malleability in a still more hardly won success in a long-drawn-out struggle for national regeneration.

The new ideas and aims of Mustafā Kemāl and his companions were proclaimed in a 'National Pact' that was adopted on the 28th January, 1920, by the Ottoman Parliament at Constantinople. The key-note—and the strength—of the new policy was a resolve to abandon wild-goose chases and to concentrate on the whole-hearted pursuit of practicable objectives; and the ability to take this resolve was a priceless gain which the Turkish Nationalists owed to their 'New 'Osmanli' predecessors' staggering losses. To renounce the ambition of recovering sovereignty over ex-Ottoman territories inhabited by a majority of Arabs or a majority of Orthodox Christians that had already been lost by A.D. 1920 was less difficult than it had been to abandon the will to retain sovereignty over those territories while they were still, however precariously, in Turkey's possession. To dismiss the Pan-Turanian dream of a compensatory empire to be carved out of Turkish territories in the Caucasus and Central Asia at Russia's expense was likewise less difficult



now that Turkey and Russia were no longer at war with one another but were companions in defeat, with the consequence in Russia that the fallen Tsardom had been replaced by a Communist régime which, like the Turkish National Movement in A.D. 1920, was a target of Western hostility and was accordingly disposed to make common cause with the Turkish Nationalists in their parallel struggle for existence. In this new situation the Turkish Nationalists resolutely turned away from a visionary Pan-Turanian future as well as from an irretrievable Ottoman past, and addressed themselves to the task of carving a Turkish national successor-state of the Ottoman Empire out of Ottoman territories with a Turkish majority in their population, with a view to building up the life of this new Turkish nation on completely Western foundations.

It will be seen that this programme was a Turkish counterpart of programmes that the ex-Ottoman Orthodox Christian peoples had been carrying out by degrees for more than a hundred years past; and this likeness was not accidental; it was due to a deliberate adoption, by the leaders of the new Turkish National Movement, of a policy which, within their own lifetimes, had served their Orthodox Christian neighbours well at Turkey's expense. This spectacle had made a vivid impression on the imagination of the Turkish Nationalist leaders because they had seen it at close quarters; for the moving spirits in the Nationalist Movement were ex-Unionists who, like the moving spirits on the Committee of Union and Progress during the years A.D. 1908-18, were Macedonian Turks. Mustafâ Kemâl—whose beard, if he had worn one, would have been as blond as Mehmed 'Ali's—came from Salonica; Fethî came from Üsküb; but, in and after A.D. 1919, these Rumeliot Turkish nationalists showed their mettle by refusing to allow their policy to be governed by a nostalgia for a Macedonian fatherland that Tal'at and Enver had failed to save. They eschewed the perversity of the Macedonian Turkish Unionists who had sacrificed Turkey in a vain attempt to save Macedonia, and the even greater perversity of the Macedonian Bulgar nationalist refugees who had sacrificed Bulgaria in a vain attempt to reconquer Macedonia from a Bulgarian base of operations. Mustafâ Kemâl and his Macedonian Turkish nationalist companions stoically turned their backs on a beloved Rumelian homeland, which had once been the heart of the Ottoman Empire, in order to bring to life a new Turkish nation in an outlandish Anatolia<sup>1</sup> whose

<sup>1</sup> The strength and persistence of these Rumeliot Turkish exiles' homesickness was borne in upon the writer of this Study on the 11th November, 1948, when, on the west bank of the River Jeyhân, in the lowlands of Cilicia, in the south-eastern corner of Anatolia, he was spending a day with the ex-Rumeliot Turkish owner and operator of an orange plantation. This alert, progressive, and sanguine-minded Cilician planter was justifiably proud of the wealth that his brother and he had conjured, within the past twenty-five years, out of ground that had been out of cultivation when it had been assigned to his family in compensation for the estates that they had forfeited in their native Thessaly as a result of the exchange of populations that had followed the Graeco-Turkish War of A.D. 1919-22. His heart was in the future of a new Westernizing Turkey-in-Asia, and he was particularly enthusiastic about the economic potentialities that he was doing so much personally to develop in his own new home in Cilicia. Yet, when the writer happened to mention that he had once visited Yenishehr (*Graecè* Larissa), his Cilician Turkish host's family's Thessalian native town, the forward-looking pioneer enthusiast for a new Turkey's Cilician California was suddenly transformed into a backward-looking scion of a Rumeliot Ottoman Turkish Muslim 'ascendancy'. He

people—Turks and Muslims though they were—had been, not the Ottoman Turks' fellow conquerors, but the fellow victims of a Rumeliot Ottoman Turkish 'ascendancy's' conquered Orthodox Christian subjects in Europe.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, in setting out to create a new Turkish national state in Anatolia, Mustafâ Kemâl and his companions were faithfully following the example of their Greek and Serb fellow Rumeliot who had founded a new Greek and new Serb national state in two outlying tracts of the Balkan Peninsula a hundred years earlier; and, in the same vein, they were using the Modern Western magic formula of Nationalism to conjure back into political consciousness a people that had been lying dormant for centuries under an Ottoman domination. In Anatolia the ground had been prepared for this by the imposition of military conscription on all male Muslim Ottoman subjects since the reign of Sultan Mahmûd II (*imperabat* A.D. 1808–39); but of course Mahmûd had had no more intention of fostering a Turkish nationalism than Mehmed 'Alî had had of fostering an Egyptian nationalism when he had introduced this Modern Western military institution into his dominions.

In the fourth act of the drama in Turkey—an act which was not staged till a hundred and thirty years after the play had been opened there by the accession of Sultan Selim III—the Islamic World was the scene of an adventure in Westernization which, in the crucial points of audacity, speed, comprehensiveness, and wholeheartedness, could challenge comparison with Peter the Great's work in Russia and with the Meiji Revolution in Japan. Mustafâ Kemâl Atatürk saw that his first objective—which was to defeat the Greeks' attempt to conquer by force of arms a vital part of the Turkish national patrimony in Anatolia—was no more

began eagerly to inquire what the English traveller had thought of the landmarks of the Thessalian exile's childhood in Yenisehr—first and foremost, the local mosques.

<sup>1</sup> The 'Osmanlis, starting from the north-west corner of the Anatolian Plateau, had built up their power by north-westward conquests at the expense of Orthodox Christian principalities in the Balkan Peninsula before turning their arms south-eastward against Turkish principalities in Anatolia (see II. ii. 150–4); and they had met with the more stubborn resistance from Turks who chafed under a yoke imposed by kinsmen and coreligionists still more restlessly than the Orthodox Christians repined at a, for them, alien Ottoman rule. After defeating at Nicopolis in A.D. 1396 the Western Christian Crusaders who had come to his European Orthodox Christian victims' aid, the Ottoman Sultan Bâyezîd I had been defeated at Ankara in A.D. 1402 by his Anatolian Muslim Turkish victims' Transoxanian Turkish Muslim champion Timûr. The dethroned Anatolian Turkish princes' appeal to Timûr had been made by them, and entertained by him, in the name of a Pan-Turkish and Pan-Islamic solidarity against an Ottoman Turkish conqueror who had impiously ignored the bond of a common religion and nationality; and, though the Ottoman Empire managed to recover from an all but mortal blow struck by Central Asian Turkish hands, and succeeded in reimposing its yoke on Anatolian Turkish necks, the Ottoman Pâdishâh's Anatolian Turkish Muslim, like his Rumeliot Orthodox Christian, subjects remained disaffected at heart—as they showed on the religious plane by their readiness to fall away from the Sunni orthodoxy of their 'Osmanli masters to the heresies of Sheykh Bedr-ed-Dîn and Shah Ismâ'îl and Hajji Bektash (see I. i. 365 and 382–3; IV. iv. 68–69; V. v. 111 and 295; and V. v. 662–5) and on the political plane by the re-emergence of the long-suppressed Anatolian Turkish principalities in the form of embryonic successor-states of the Ottoman Empire on the morrow of the Great Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1768–74. On the eve of the repression of Bektashism by Sultan Mahmûd II in A.D. 1826 (see p. 267, n. 3, below), there are estimated to have been seven million Bektashis in the Ottoman Empire, mostly in Anatolia (Birge, J. K.: *The Bektashi Order of Dervishes* (London 1937, Luzac), p. 15). The 'Alevi peasantry of Anatolia had a consciousness of affinity with the Christians (ibid., p. 210).

than a necessary military preliminary to a social and cultural enterprise, and that, if he were to allow an exhausted Turkish people to take a victory in the field as an excuse for resting on their oars, the extinction of Turkey would have been postponed without having been permanently averted. He therefore did not wait for a military decision in the Graeco-Turkish War of A.D. 1919-22 in choosing his moment for launching his Westernization programme. He launched it while the Turks were still fighting with their backs to the wall, and he followed up the return of peace without a pause by bending all the strength of his demonic will-power to the waging of a 'total war' of social and cultural transformation. A Turk of that generation might have found it hard to say whether the military war-years A.D. 1911-22 or the cultural war-years A.D. 1922-8 were the more severe of these two ordeals.

The range and speed of the campaign of Westernization in Turkey during the seven years opening with the year A.D. 1922 can be indicated by mentioning four revolutionary changes that were carried through within that brief span of time. Those seven years in Turkey saw the disestablishment of Islam and secularization of the national life;<sup>1</sup> the social emancipation of women;<sup>2</sup> the transfer of Turkey's intellectual affiliations from the Islamic to the Western cultural tradition through the substitution of the Latin for the Arabic Alphabet as the medium for conveying the Ottoman Turkish language;<sup>3</sup> and the apprenticing of Turkish hands to the mysteries of a Modern Western technology, industry, and commerce. In this Study it would be out of proportion to embark on any detailed account of these changes in Turkey, or to attempt to give even a catalogue of the corresponding contemporary changes in other Islamic countries. We must content ourselves with taking a glance at the revolutions in the two fields of Religion and Economics.

In Turkey and other Islamic countries in the second quarter of the twentieth century of the Christian Era, the psychological effects of the process of secularization were more disturbing than they had been in the Western World 250 years earlier, and this for two reasons. In the first place, in the Islamic World the change did not arise spontaneously from within but was forced upon the Islamic Society, with a vehemence proportionate to the obstinacy and pertinacity of the resistance to it, by the cumulative effects of an encounter with an alien civilization. In the second place, the change was not foreshadowed and facilitated in the Islamic World, as it had been in Western Christendom, by a traditional distinction between the institutions of Church and State and between a religious and a secular side of life. The texture of Islamic life was a seamless web in which it was hard to distinguish threads that could be labelled specifically 'religious' and still harder to pluck such threads out without tearing the whole fabric to pieces.

For these two reasons the *bouleversement* caused by secularization in

<sup>1</sup> See Toynbee, A. J.: *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, vol. i (London 1927, Milford), pp. 1-81; Toynbee, A. J., and Boulter, V. M.: *Survey of International Affairs*, 1928 (London 1929, Milford), pp. 206-13.

<sup>2</sup> See Toynbee and Boulter, *Survey*, 1928, pp. 200-2.

<sup>3</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 216-34, and the present Study, V. vi. 67-68.

Islamic countries was extreme, and its most shattering effects were in the sphere of private life. The extrication of the Turkish state from the toils of Islam—revolutionary though this process of disestablishment was<sup>1</sup>—did not create acute personal problems of the kind that were presented to the intelligentsia by the elimination of Islam from education, and to the peasantry by the suppression of Islamic religious orders in Turkey through three administrative decrees of the 2nd September, 1925. The religious and cultural life of the Turkish peasantry in Anatolia had drawn its nourishment from the affiliation of villages to dervish religious houses;<sup>2</sup> and the sudden spiritual vacuum which the suppression of the religious orders produced throughout the Anatolian country-side<sup>3</sup> was not adequately filled by the gradual spread of primary education through the arduous process of building village schools and training village schoolmasters.

As for the economic revolution, the Turkish Nationalists were confronted here with the double task of industrializing an agricultural country and employing as their instrument for accomplishing this revolutionary change a community that had previously lived aloof from precisely those activities that were the distinctive features of the Modern Western way of life. Under a millet system<sup>4</sup> that had articulated the population of the Ottoman Empire into geographically intermingled communities which, in Western terms, were a cross between nationalities and occupational groups, the members of the Muslim millet had been peasants, soldiers, clerics, and civil servants, but had left it to the members of the Orthodox Christian, the Gregorian Monophysite Christian, and the Jewish millet to supply the requisite complement of shopkeepers, merchants, and artisans; and the lines of this established division of labour had still been followed in the earlier stages of the process of Westernization. The pursuit of an exotic Frankish technology had been left to the *ra'iyyeh*, while a Muslim intelligentsia had concentrated its efforts on mastering the Modern Western arts of war, medicine, law, and administration. Hence in A.D. 1922, when all but a fraction of the Greek and Armenian minority in Turkey fled the country and was eventually replaced by Turks expatriated from ex-Ottoman territories in Rumelia, Turkey found herself suddenly deprived, by her own volition, of the inadequate force of native Western-trained technicians that she had hitherto possessed<sup>5</sup>—and this at a moment when her nationalist

<sup>1</sup> The successive abolitions of the Sultanate and the Caliphate in Turkey have been noticed in this Study in VI. vii. 24–25. Some account of subsequent measures by which the process was carried to completion in Turkey between the years A.D. 1924 and A.D. 1928 will be found in Toynbee and Boulter, *Survey of International Affairs, 1928*, pp. 206–8.

<sup>2</sup> For the importance of this network of relations, see Birge, J. K.: *The Bektashi Order of Dervishes* (London 1937, Luzac), esp. pp. 57–58, p. 64, n. 4, and pp. 211–12.

<sup>3</sup> The first blow at the religious orders had been struck by Sultan Mahmūd II. After his destruction of the Janissaries in A.D. 1826, he started a general inquisition into, and proscription of, the Bektashi Order, with which the Janissary Corps, as well as the Anatolian peasantry, had been affiliated (Birge, op. cit., p. 77). Bektashism survived underground; began to publish literature openly in A.D. 1869, in the liberal atmosphere created by the 'New 'Osmanli' movement; went underground again under the autocratic régime of 'Abd-al-Hamid (A.D. 1877–1908); and came out into the open again between A.D. 1908 and A.D. 1925 (Birge, op. cit., pp. 78–81).

<sup>4</sup> See pp. 184–6, above.

<sup>5</sup> In Smyrna in April 1923, on the morrow of the catastrophe which had precipitated

leaders were giving the word for a forced march towards the ambitious goal of a thorough-going Westernization of Turkish economic life.

Mustafâ Kemâl met this crisis by the 'kill-or-cure' expedient of teaching the child to swim by throwing it into water where it was out of its depth, and there was perhaps no department of his all-embracing programme of Westernization in which the value and efficacy of the Rumeliot dictator's personal driving-force were more signally vindicated by the experience of the next quarter of a century. In the autumn of A.D. 1948, when the Republic of Turkey was celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary of its establishment on the 29th October, 1923, the Turkish people's success in acquiring the technical keys to Modern Western Man's material power could be measured most pertinently by the extent to which the simplest forms of characteristically Modern Western skill had become familiar to the masses. Statistics of mechanics and foremen were more significant in this context than statistics of engineers and managers; and, on this test, the Turks in A.D. 1952 had no reason to be dissatisfied with their achievement so long as they were comparing it with their own past deficiency in this field and not with the target set them, for their future exertions, by the contemporary achievements of the Soviet Union and the Western World.<sup>1</sup>

*Russia's Competition with the West for an Ascendancy over the Islamic World*

The whole-heartedness and effectiveness of the Westernizing movement in Turkey in its fourth bout might, in itself, have been taken as presumptive evidence that, by the middle of the twentieth century of the Christian Era, the Western way of life had made permanent converts, not only of the Ottoman Turks, but of all other Muslim peoples, apart from a minority—amounting perhaps to 25 million out of a total of probably more than 250 million Muslims alive at this time<sup>2</sup>—who, willy nilly, were then following the Communist way of life as citizens

a wholesale exodus from Turkey of the Greek and Armenian *ra'f'eh*, the writer of this Study had successive interviews with the managers of the two railways of which Smyrna was the terminus, and was informed by each of his interlocutors that, at the moment of the catastrophe, he had lost overnight 90 per cent. of his personnel and had had to keep his trains running, as best he could, with an intake, all in one moment, of that overwhelmingly high percentage of unskilled labour. The explanation was that these two railways in Turkey had been built, owned, and managed by a French and a British private company, and had each recruited almost the whole of its staff, apart from a tiny Frankish contingent, from non-Turkish natives of the country. The sudden exodus of the *ra'f'eh* thus put these two railways in a quandary from which they might have failed to extricate themselves if they had not been assisted by the military engineers of the Turkish Army—whose technical training was the outstanding exception to the rule, still prevailing at the time, that to be a Turk and a Muslim was synonymous with being innocent of all acquaintance with Modern Western technique.

<sup>1</sup> The writer and his wife spent the month of November 1948 in Turkey as guests of the Turkish Government, and during a week out of this month they were travelling by road from Ankara to Adana via Yozgat, Chorum, Merzifun, Amasyeh, Toqat, Sivas, Qaysari, and Niğdeh. They were impressed by the number and resourcefulness of the lorry-drivers whom they passed on the road, and by the keenness of both the instructors and the pupils at the provincial polytechnic at Niğdeh. If Midhat Pasha could have returned to life to see that sight, he would assuredly have felt that his own life-work had not been in vain.

<sup>2</sup> The total Muslim population of the World was estimated to have been 242 millions in A.D. 1929 according to Massignon, L.: *Annuaire du Monde Musulman*, 3rd ed. (Paris 1930, Leroux), pp. 479–80.



of the Soviet Union. Though the Ottoman Turks were now truculently reckoning themselves as Europeans and dissociating their country from the Middle East, their fellow Muslims were testifying, by their flattering imitations of Atatürk's radical Westernizing policy, that Turkey's prestige had never stood higher in their eyes.<sup>1</sup> In short, in the Islamic World it had come to seem likely that the people's vote would now be cast for Westernization in so far as the question of cultural allegiance remained a matter of free choice; but it was clear that the issue would depend, not entirely on the will of the people directly concerned, but partly also on a trial of strength between a Western and a Russian World which encircled the Islamic World between them.

The tension of this Russo-Occidental tug-of-war for ascendancy over the Islamic World had been heightened since A.D. 1774 by a progressive enhancement of the Islamic World's importance in two respects—as a source of key commodities and as a channel of key communications.

The Islamic World embraced the homelands of three out of the four primary civilizations of the Old World; and the agricultural wealth which those now extinct societies had once wrested from the previously intractable valleys of the Lower Nile, the Tigris-Euphrates, and the Indus had been increased in Egypt and the Panjab, and been partially restored in 'Irāq, by the application of Modern Western methods of water-control. The principal addition, however, to the Islamic World's economic resources had been made by the discovery and economic utilization of subterranean deposits of mineral oil in regions which had never been of any outstanding agricultural value. The natural 'gushers', which, in a pre-Islamic Age, had been turned to religious account by Zoroastrian piety to keep alight a perpetual flame in honour of the holiness of Fire, had been noted in A.D. 1723 by the prospector's eye of Peter the Great as a potential economic asset;<sup>2</sup> and, though some 150 years had still to pass before an intuition of genius was confirmed by a commercial exploitation of the Baku oil field, the fresh discoveries, which followed in rapid succession during the next hundred years after that, showed that Baku was only one link in a golden chain stretching north-westwards to Grozhny and south-eastwards through 'Irāqī Kurdistan and Persian Bakhtiariistan and the Bahrayn Islands into once reputedly valueless peninsular Arabian territories which uninformed early-twentieth-century Western diplomats had carved up on the map as light-heartedly as uninformed nineteenth-century American politicians had paid off the remnants of American Indian peoples deported from Georgia with apportionments of then reputedly valueless land well

<sup>1</sup> The shock given to Indian Muslim susceptibilities, in particular, by the Turkish Republic's abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate on the 3rd March, 1924, had not permanently alienated the non-Turkish Muslims from Turkey. Its effects had been quickly obliterated by the *déclat* of a success that had justified Atatürk's impious audacity in the event; and the very disdain with which the Turks, in this chapter of their history, were inclined to treat their fellow Muslims perhaps increased these poor relations' respect for their now pointedly distant Turkish kinsfolk. The Arabs of Syria and 'Irāq, who were the Turks' nearest Muslim neighbours, could not forget that they had been under Turkish rule for four hundred years before the Ottoman Empire had gone into dissolution in A.D. 1918, and that, in the next chapter of Islamic history, the defeated Turks had maintained their independence while the 'liberated' Arabs had merely exchanged one alien master for another.

<sup>2</sup> See II. ii. 278-9.

beyond the Mississippi.<sup>1</sup> By the middle of the twentieth century the oil fields of Kuwayt and Sa'ūdi Arabia had begun to take the shine out of the cotton fields of Egypt as it had been taken out of the cotton fields of Georgia by the oil fields of Oklahoma; and Russia, Great Britain, France, and—last but not least—the United States had already appropriated all but the North Persian slice of a fabulously rich Middle Eastern oil-cake.

The geographical results of this scramble for oil had produced a tense political situation, since Russia's slice of the cake in the Caucasus and the Western Powers' slices in Persia and the Arab countries were within point-blank range of one another, while the British and French slices had come to be only less important in the economy of Western Europe than the Russian slice was in the economy of the Soviet Union.<sup>2</sup>

This tension was increased by the revival of the Islamic World's importance as a node of oecumenical communications. The shortest routes between Russia and a circum-Atlantic Western World on the one side and India, South-East Asia, Indonesia, China, and Japan on the other side all traversed Islamic ground, waters, or air; and on the route-map, as on the oil-map, the Soviet Union and the Western Powers were at dangerously close quarters. In A.D. 1952, American, British, French, and Dutch routes from the Atlantic via the Red Sea or the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean and the Pacific were flanked on the north-east by Russian outposts in Bulgaria, Transcaucasia, and Transcaspiia, while 'the soft under-belly' of the Soviet Union in the Ukraine and the Caucasus could be commanded, at still closer range, from the south by enemy outposts in a Turkey and a Greece over which the President of the United States had declared a virtual protectorate on the 12th March, 1947, and in a Persia whose name had been added to those of Greece and Turkey in this context by the American Secretary of State on the 17th March, 1949. A Baku oil field which supplied the needs of the greater part of the Volga Basin via the Caspian Sea lay within a few miles of the Russo-Persian frontier.

The military and political awkwardness of this geographical situation had been accentuated by a shift in Russia's centre of gravity since the end of the Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1768–74 which had been comparable in magnitude to the shift in the United States' centre of gravity

<sup>1</sup> This incident in the history of the United States has been noticed above on p. 36, n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> In A.D. 1951—between the date in A.D. 1949 when this passage had been written and the date in A.D. 1952 when it was being revised for the press—the mounting pressure of Persian national feeling had achieved the expulsion of the Anglo-Iranian Petroleum Company from the oil-field in Bakhtiariistan and from the refineries and wharves at 'Abbādān. This outcome of a local collision between the Westernizing political ideology of an Islamic people and the economic enterprise of a Western people in this province of Dār-al-Islām had thrown into Russia's lap two fine gift-parcels of unearned politico-military increment. In depriving Great Britain of the oil from the South Persia field it had diminished, to that extent, the Atlantic Community's economic, financial, and military power; and, in depriving Persia of the royalties on an alien Western commercial company's profits, it had dried up the previously richest source of Persian public revenue and national income and had thereby aggravated the economic and social ills from which Persia was already suffering. Considering the invidious width of the gulf, in Persia, between the respective standards of living of a tiny dominant minority and a miserable agricultural proletariat, this fresh turn of an economic screw in Persia could hardly fail to bring grief to the political mill of Communism.

since her declaration of her independence in A.D. 1776. Within that period of a century and three-quarters, the replacement of hunters by farmers and industrial workers between the Appalachian Mountains and the Pacific coast of North America had been emulated in the Old World in the replacement of Nomads and wild highlanders by farmers and industrial workers in the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe and in the Caucasus; and this *ci-devant* north-western fringe of the Islamic World, which had been economically all but virgin soil before its annexation by Russia between the years A.D. 1774 and A.D. 1864, had since become the Soviet Union's economic heart. This rapid conjuring into existence of a new world opening on to the northern and eastern shores of the Black Sea, with the whole of the Soviet Union for its hinterland, had created—or, in more accurate terms, re-created—a question concerning the control of the Straits leading out of the Black Sea into the Aegean which had been dormant so long as the Black Sea had been an 'Ottoman lake'; and the coincidence in date between Russia's acquisition of a coastline on the Black Sea and the Western Powers' re-opening of the short route between the Western World and India had started a political game of naughts and crosses<sup>1</sup> in which Russia found herself perpetually being thwarted by a Western player who in one round might call herself the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy, in another round Great Britain, in another Germany, and in another the United States, but who betrayed a consistently Western identity by persisting, through all these metamorphoses, in making moves that kept Russia in check.

On the 12th March, 1947, when President Truman gave Russia notice that the United States had taken over the Western player's role, the game had become an exasperating one from a Russian standpoint, since Russia's objective remained unattained while her stake in the game had been steadily increasing in value. In A.D. 1774 the Empress Catherine had reasonably expected to live to take the short and logical steps from Azov to Constantinople and Gallipoli; yet in A.D. 1947 these keys to Russia's Pontic front-door were still in non-Russian hands; and, though since A.D. 1944 the Russian Army had been astride the Balkan Range, on Constantinople's Bulgarian threshold,<sup>2</sup> Soviet statesmen could hardly forget that other Russian armies had pushed their way still closer to Constantinople in A.D. 1829 and A.D. 1878 without having managed on either occasion to seize a prize that had then lain so nearly within their grasp. Meanwhile, the vulnerability of Russia's new vital organs in the Ukraine and the Caucasus to attack by Western Sea Powers enjoying a right of way into the Black Sea had been demonstrated on three occasions: in the Crimean War (*gerebatur* A.D. 1853-6); in A.D. 1878, when the exposure of a victorious Russian army's Pontic flank to the

<sup>1</sup> Compare the power game known as 'Lengthways and crossways' (*tsung-heng*) which was played between the contending parochial states of a Sinic World in the last phase of their fratricidal warfare with one another (see Franke, O.: *Geschichte des Chinesischen Reiches*, vol. i (Berlin 1930, de Gruyter), p. 193).

<sup>2</sup> The Soviet Union had compelled Bulgaria to transfer her allegiance to her from Germany on the 9th September, 1944, when Russian troops had entered Bulgaria from the Dobruja.

possibility of an attack by the British Navy had enabled the Western Powers to convert the Treaty of San Stefano into the Treaty of Berlin; and in A.D. 1918-20, when the Western Powers had prolonged the resistance in Russia to the establishment of the Bolshevik régime by conveying munitions, via the Straits, to the 'White' Russian armies of Generals Denikin and Wrangel. On each of these occasions, British sea power had been able to attack or threaten Russia at a vital point thanks to a command of the passage through the Straits; and, when President Truman enunciated his doctrine in A.D. 1947, the Soviet Government must have had these precedents in mind—even though they might hope that, if occasion arose, the passage of the Straits could now be denied to the American Navy by a Soviet Air Force operating from Bulgarian bases.

In these circumstances the future of the Islamic World, as well as that of a non-Russian Orthodox Christendom, remained unpredictable at the time of writing.

### 5. *The Modern West and the Jews*

#### *The Peculiarities of the Western Province of a Jewish Diaspora's Domain*

Whatever might be the ultimate general verdict of Mankind on the Western Civilization in the modern chapter of its history, it was already manifest mid-way through the twentieth century of the Christian Era, some 450 years after the beginning of this epoch, that Modern Western Man had branded himself with two particular marks of lasting infamy by the commission of two crimes that were indelibly inscribed on his record. One of these crimes was the shipping of Negro slaves from Africa to labour on plantations in the New World;<sup>1</sup> the other was the

<sup>1</sup> The encounter between the white-skinned founders of the Western Society and the dark-skinned members of primitive societies whom these Whites had conscripted by force into the Western Society's ranks during the modern chapter of Western history had a generic affinity with the encounters between the representatives of different civilizations that are the subject of the present Part of this Study, and not least with the encounter between Western Christendom and Jewry.

Like the feelings of Gentile Westerners about the Jews in their midst, the feelings of White Westerners about the Negroes in their midst were associated with an awareness of certain differences in physique between a dominant majority and a penalized minority, but there was conclusive evidence that these feelings of antipathy were not in either case an automatic psychic reaction to a visual perception of distinctive physical traits. The feelings aroused in a Western Gentile psyche by the sight of an Armenoid nose on the face of a Jew were not aroused by the sight of a nose of the same configuration on the face of a Turk (and this physiognomy was common among the Turks as well as among the Jews, since it had been communicated to the population of Palestine by Indo-European-speaking Hittite immigrants from Anatolia and not by Semitic-speaking Israelite immigrants from Arabia). This showed that the Western Gentile's antipathy towards the Jew was excited, not by a physical difference, but by social and cultural differences which had come to be symbolized by a physical difference when the Western Gentile encountered the Armenoid physiognomy in a Jew, though the same physiognomy could be encountered by the same Westerner without producing on him the same psychological effect when he met it in a Turkish representative of an Iranic Muslim Society towards which the Western World's attitude was different from its attitude towards Jewry. The evidence likewise showed that the White Westerner's antipathy towards the Negro was not an automatic effect of a physical difference in pigmentation and in odour. A White inhabitant of the Southern States of the United States who would have objected to the propinquity of one of his Negro fellow citizens as a fellow passenger in a pullman car felt no repugnance at being waited upon by a Negro attendant in the same car at equally close quarters; the Negro physique

extermination of a Jewish diaspora in the European homeland of Western Christendom; and these two atrocities had one horrifying common feature. In both of them a primaevial wickedness and cruelty that were innate in Human Nature had been mated with a capacity for planning and execution that could have been exhibited only by a technologically mature civilization; and this shocking combination of technological maturity with moral depravity distinguished these cold-blooded Modern Western crimes from the outrages committed by Primitive Man, which, humanly sinful though they too were, still had in them something of the innocence of a predatory Pre-Human Nature as exhibited in the tiger or the shark.<sup>1</sup>

It was, of course, true that the responsibility for these two revolting Modern Western crimes was not shared in equal proportions by all members of the Modern Western Society. The Judas share of the crime against the African Negroes lay on the heads of the English and their colonists on the eastern seaboard of North America; the Judas share of the crime against the Jews lay on the heads of the Spaniards, Portuguese, and Germans. Yet these direst criminals had, after all, been eminent exponents of the Western Civilization of their day; and their overwhelming guilt was a salutarily terrifying reminder of the truth that Civilization was no permanent transfiguration of the essence of Human Nature, but was merely a brittle 'cake of custom'<sup>2</sup> precariously plastered over the crater of a live spiritual volcano, where it was at the mercy of perennial eruptions of Original Sin. In the casting up of the Western Society's final account, it was conceivable, no doubt, that these particular English, American, Spanish, Portuguese, and German entries on the debit side might be more than balanced by other entries to Western Man's credit; but it could already be forecast that the eventual summing-up would give no warrant for the pharisaical complacency to which Modern Western Man had been prone—especially during the quarter of a millennium between the end of the Modern Western Wars of Religion and the outbreak of the First World War.

The tragic outcome of the encounter between the Western World and Jewry—a tragedy which eventually numbered the Palestinian Arabs

was not offensive to a White Southerner in a Negro whose profession stamped him as a menial; and there were Whites who would have been shocked to see lawful wedlock made legal between persons of different colour without being shocked at seeing White men cohabiting with coloured concubines.

This evidence shows that in the relation between White Westerners and Negroes, as in the relation between Gentile Westerners and Jews, the stumbling-block was a difference, not of race, but of social standing and of culture. All the same, the encounter between the Modern West and the Negroes falls outside the scope of the present Part of this Study, since, at the time when the Negroes were smitten by the Western World's impact, they were not the representatives of a civilization (in the sense in which the term is used in this work), but were still in the primitive state of culture; and even this primitive social heritage was lost by those Negroes who were shipped to the New World as slaves. The history of the relations between Negroes and White Westerners is thus part of the domestic history of the Western World. It has been touched upon in II. ii. 218-20 and in V. v. 153 and 168.

<sup>1</sup> 'Funded civilisation' makes 'the savage of Civilisation more terrible than the savage of Barbarism' (Meadows, T. T.: *The Chinese and their Rebellions* . . . , to which is added *An Essay on Civilisation and its Present State in the East and West* (London 1856, Smith Elder), p. 518).

<sup>2</sup> Bagehot, W.: *Physics and Politics*, 10th ed. (London 1894, Kegan Paul), pp. 27 and 35, quoted in II. i. 192.



among its innocent victims—was the consequence of an interplay between Original Sin and a particular conjunction of social circumstances, and the first step towards an understanding of the tragedy was to inquire how far these circumstances accounted for it.

Jewry, in the form in which it collided with Western Christendom, was certainly an exceptional social phenomenon, but it was also certainly not unique. Jewry was exceptional in being a fossilized relic of a civilization that was extinct in every other shape.<sup>1</sup> The Syriac parochial state of Judah, from which Jewry was derived, had been one of a number of Hebrew, Phoenician, Aramaean, and Philistine communities into which a Syriac Society had articulated itself in its growth stage; but, whereas Judah's sister communities, including her next-of-kin, Israel, had lost their identity, as well as their statehood, as a result of fatal injuries which the Syriac Society had sustained from successive collisions with its Babylonian and Hellenic neighbours, the same challenges had stimulated the Jews to create for themselves a new mode of corporate existence in which they managed to survive the loss of their state and their country by preserving their identity as a diaspora among an alien majority and under alien rule. This exceptionally successful Jewish reaction to a challenge to which most Syriac communities had succumbed was not, however, unique; for the Jewish diaspora in the Islamic and the Christian World had an historical counterpart in the Parsee diaspora in India, which was another fossilized relic of the same extinct Syriac Society.

The Parsees were survivors of Iranian converts to the Syriac Civilization who had given the Syriac Society a universal state in the shape of the Achaemenian Empire; the Parsee, like the Jewish, community was the monument of a victorious will to outlive the loss of state and country; and the Parsees, too, had suffered this loss as a result of successive collisions between the Syriac World and neighbouring societies. Like the Jews during the three centuries ending in A.D. 135, the Parsees' Zoroastrian Iranian forefathers had sacrificed themselves in an unsuccessful attempt to eject an intrusive Hellenism by force from a conquered Syriac World; and the penalty for failure, which had been inflicted on the Jews in the first and second centuries of the Christian Era by the Hellenic Civilization's Roman champions, had been inflicted on the Zoroastrian Iranians in the seventh century by Primitive Muslim Arab barbarian invaders of the Roman and Sasanian empires who were completing the Zoroastrian Iranians' uncompleted task by liberating the Syriac World west of the Euphrates from an Hellenic ascendancy that by this date had persisted there for nearly a thousand years. In these similar crises in their history the Jews and the Parsees had preserved their identity by the same creative feat of improvising new institutions and specializing in new activities. They had found in the elaboration of their heritage of religious law a new social cement to replace a political bond that had perished with their state, and they had survived the disastrous economic consequences of being uprooted from the land of their fathers by developing, in the land of their exile, a special skill in

<sup>1</sup> For this phenomenon of 'fossilization', see I. i. 35, 51, and 90-92.

commerce and other urban business in lieu of a husbandry which these landless refugees were no longer able to pursue.<sup>1</sup>

Nor were these Jewish and Parsee diasporas the only fossils that an extinct Syriac Society had left behind it; for, before the Primitive Muslim Arabs succeeded in carrying out the task of ejecting Hellenism in which the Jews and the Zoroastrians had failed, a second series of abortive attempts to attain the same objective had been made by champions of a submerged Syriac Society within the bosom of the Christian Church; this second unsuccessful Syriac counter-offensive in its turn had precipitated a number of 'fossils in diaspora' in the shape of the Nestorian and Monophysite Christian Churches; and these scattered Christian communities, like their Jewish and Parsee forerunners, had preserved their identity through a devotion to distinctive religious rites and a proficiency in commerce and finance. Nor, again, was the Syriac Society the only civilization in which communities that had lost their statehood and had been uprooted from the soil had succeeded in surviving through a combination of ecclesiastical discipline with business enterprise. In the main body of Orthodox Christendom under an alien Ottoman régime, a subjugated Greek Orthodox Christian community had been partially uprooted from the soil, and these Greek Orthodox Christian *déracinés* had responded to this ordeal by accommodating themselves to changes in their economic activities and their social organization on lines which carried them far along the road towards becoming a diaspora of the same type as the Gregorian Armenian, Jacobite Syrian, and Coptic Egyptian Monophysites and the pre-Christian stratum of Syriac 'fossils' represented by the Jews and the Parsees.

Indeed, the millet system of the Ottoman Empire<sup>2</sup> was merely a systematically organized version of a communal structure of society which had grown up spontaneously in the Syriac World after the Syriac peoples had been inextricably intermingled with one another by the malice of an Assyrian militarism that had not been content to pulverize its victims but had scattered the survivors abroad in order to make sure that they should never find a chance of retrieving their political fortunes. The consequent rearticulation of Society into a network of geographically intermingled oecumenical communities in place of a patchwork of geographically segregated parochial states had been inherited from the Syriac Society by its Iranic and Arabic Muslim successors and had subsequently been imposed by 'Osmanli Iranic Muslim empire-builders on a prostrate Orthodox Christendom which they had subjugated by the employment of Assyrian methods of barbarism.

In this historical perspective it is manifest that the Jewish diaspora encountered by a Western Christendom, so far from being a unique social phenomenon, was one among a number of surviving representatives of a long established and widely distributed species of community. This species had come to be the standard type in the Syriac World after the culminating paroxysm of Assyrian militarism; it had always been the

<sup>1</sup> For examples of the stimulus of penalizations on the economic and other planes, see II. ii. 208-59.

<sup>2</sup> For an account of this system of communal organization, see pp. 184-6, above.

standard type in the two Islamic societies that were the Syriac Society's offspring, and it had also been the standard type in the main body of Orthodox Christendom during the period of the Ottoman régime. The area over which the Jewish diaspora had spread itself included, of course, the domains of the Islamic societies as well as those of the Christendoms, and, if we think of this area as being the oecumenical domain of the Jewish 'millet' and look at it, through Jewish eyes, as a unity, we shall perceive that—at least in the Early Modern Age, before the Ottoman Orthodox Christians had transferred their cultural allegiance from their 'Osmanli masters to their Western neighbours—the millet system which was exemplified in the social organization of the Jewish diaspora was the standard type of social structure in three out of the five provinces of Jewry's empire. Of the remaining two provinces we can leave the Russian Orthodox Christian province out of the reckoning; for there were hardly any Jews in Russian Orthodox Christendom outside 'the Jewish Pale' of the Russian Empire, and, while it was true that a majority of the Jewish population of the World was concentrated in 'the Pale' before its devastation in the first and second world wars, the Pale had to be reckoned as falling within the Western and not the Russian Christian province of a Jewish *Oikoumenê*, since the Jewish diaspora in the Pale had originated in Western Christendom and had drifted into this originally Russian territory<sup>1</sup> in the wake of medieval Polish and Lithuanian Western Christian conquerors.<sup>2</sup> In effect, therefore, the millet system of social organization was the rule in three out of four effectively occupied provinces of Jewry's oecumenical empire, and was exceptional in the Western Christian province alone.

This conclusion raises the question whether the peculiar social setting of the tragic encounter between Jewry and Western Christendom may not be found to consist in peculiarities on the Western at least as much as on the Jewish side; and, when we put this question, we can see that the course of Western history was indeed peculiar in at least three respects that are all relevant to the history of Jewish-Occidental relations. In the first place the Western Society articulated itself into a patchwork of geographically segregated communities each occupying exclusively a separate local territory of its own, instead of articulating itself into a network of geographically intermingled communities on the pattern prevailing in the other provinces of the Jewish World. In the second place the Western Society transformed itself in the course of its history from an ultra-rural society of peasants and landlords<sup>3</sup> into an ultra-urban society

<sup>1</sup> The history of this western fringe of Russian Orthodox Christendom, which had been overrun by Western Christian conquerors in the fourteenth century and had been reannexed to the unconquered core of Russia between A.D. 1772 and A.D. 1945, has been touched upon on pp. 126-9, above, and is dealt with again on pp. 398-400, below.

<sup>2</sup> See II. ii. 241-2. Dr. James Parkes here makes the comment that the Jewish community in the Pale was not wholly of West European provenance. There were elements in it that had come from the opposite side of the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe; and these elements included Qara'im as well as orthodox Talmudists from the Crimes who were believed to be of Khazar origin (see II. ii. 410-1).

<sup>3</sup> Christopher Dawson points out, in *Religion and the Rise of Western Culture* (London 1950, Sheed and Ward), pp. 56-57, that the Western Christian peasant's life and work were restored to honour in this age by a rustic Benedictine monasticism. See also the present Study, III. iii. 266.

of artisans and bourgeois. In the third place this nationalist-minded and middle-class-minded latter-day Western Society emerged surprisingly and suddenly, at the close of the fifteenth century of the Christian Era, from the relative obscurity of the medieval chapter of its history and came rapidly to overshadow all the rest of the traversable and habitable surface of the planet. Each of these three peculiar features of Western life and history made its effect on the fortunes of that unlucky fraction of a Jewish diaspora that happened to have wandered into this Western *Ultima Thule* of a pre-da Gaman World whose centre-point was, not Portugal, but Farghānah.

*The Persecution of the Peninsular Jews under a Visigothic Catholic Christian Régime*

The inner connexion between Antisemitism and the Western Christian ideal of a homogeneous community embracing all the inhabitants of a particular territory reveals itself clearly in the history of the Jewish diaspora in the Iberian Peninsula.

Though the ideal of homogeneity was inherited by Western Christendom from a converted Hellenic World whose inhabitants had latterly come to be uniformly Roman in their political status and uniformly Christian in their religion, apart from the Jews,<sup>1</sup> the conquest of the lion's share of a dissolving Catholic Christian Roman Empire's western provinces by Arian Christian Teutonic barbarian war-bands reopened the question of a nascent Western Society's future social structure by introducing the germs of a millet system into it. The conquerors cherished their Teutonic communal law and their Arian communal religion as distinctive badges which served to mark them off from their Catholic Roman subjects,<sup>2</sup> and another social effect of the conquest was a hardening of the distinction between freemen and slaves, which had been softened by a vein of humanity in the Roman Law of the Imperial Age. In the Roman Empire's Teutonic barbarian successor-states the servile element in the population came to be marked off from the free element more sharply than before, through changes for the worse in both their treatment and their status.<sup>3</sup> Here were the rudiments of a society articulated along horizontal instead of vertical lines into geographically intermingled but socially segregated communities on the millet pattern. In a society of this structure a Jewish diaspora would not strike a jarring note; and in fact there is no evidence of any serious collision between the Jewish diaspora in the Iberian Peninsula and the successor-state of the Roman Empire that had been established there by the Visigoths so long as the Western Christian body social in the Visigothic dominions

<sup>1</sup> A toleration of the Jewish diaspora which went against the grain of Judaic intolerance in the ethos of Christianity was part of the Christian Roman Empire's political heritage from an antecedent pagan régime. The pagan Roman authorities' forbearance towards Judaism had been a surprising exception to their general rule of repressing Greek and Oriental missionary religions. Judaism had aggravated the Dionysiac and Christian offence of making proselytes by lending itself to a political militancy of which both Bacchus-worship and Christianity were innocent. Yet a pagan Roman Government had accorded to the Jews a religious toleration which it had denied to the Bacchantes (see II. ii. 216) and to the Christians.

<sup>2</sup> See V. v. 227-9 and VI. vii. 286-8.

<sup>3</sup> For one local manifestation of this general tendency, see Ziegler, A. K.: *Church and State in Visigothic Spain* (Washington, D.C. 1930, Catholic University of America), pp. 170-6.

continued to be internally articulated on horizontal lines into a Gothic Arian millet and a Roman Catholic millet that was sharply divided in its turn into a free and a servile social stratum.

In the course of the sixth and seventh centuries, however, the gulf between the slave and the free community in Visigothia was diminished, and the gulf between the Roman and the Gothic community was completely bridged, by the cumulative results of a series of local measures<sup>1</sup> which reflected an oecumenical tendency in the Western Christendom of that age to revert from an embryonic millet system to the Hellenic tradition of social homogeneity;<sup>2</sup> and, *pari passu* with this *Gleichschaltung* of the Christian communities, a tension arose in Visigothia between a more and more thoroughly unified Christian people and a consequently more and more conspicuously peculiar Jewish millet. The accentuation of this tension is registered in a series of anti-Jewish enactments of a Judaically fanatical ferocity<sup>3</sup> that presents a painful contrast to the simultaneously increasing humanity of the contemporary legislation for protecting slaves

<sup>1</sup> The first notable breach in the barrier between Roman and Visigoth was the abrogation in the reign of King Leovigild (*regnabat* A.D. 568-86) of a law, forbidding inter-marriage between Romans and barbarians under pain of death, which had been enacted originally from the Roman side in A.D. 375 in a constitution of the Emperors Valentinian and Valens and had been incorporated in A.D. 506 into the Visigothic King Alaric II's *Lex Romana Visigothorum*, alias *Breviarium Alarici* (Ziegler, *op. cit.*, p. 23). The crucial step was the conversion of King Recared (*regnabat* A.D. 586-601) from Arianism to Catholicism in A.D. 587. The Visigothic community followed their king's lead, and the consequent union of Goths and Romans took institutional shape in a series of eighteen national councils, held at Toledo between the years A.D. 589 and 701 inclusive (*ibid.*, p. 35), in which a minority of laymen co-operated with a majority of bishops and other clerics in enacting canons that did not deal exclusively with ecclesiastical affairs. The final step was taken by King Recceswinth (*regnabat* A.D. 649-72) when in A.D. 654 he abrogated simultaneously the barbarian law under which his Gothic subjects had been living and the Roman Law under which his Roman subjects had been living, and gave exclusive legal currency in his dominions to a new *Liber Iudiciorum* (alias *Forum Iudicum*), in which Roman and barbarian elements were blended (*ibid.*, pp. 62-64, and the present Study, VI. vii. 288). In this new law of the land, which was binding on all the King's subjects, the Roman element was predominant (Ziegler, *op. cit.*, p. 75).

<sup>2</sup> The decisive steps in this direction were taken by statesmen who were not Visigoths. The first step, which was the most decisive of all, was the Salian Frank war-lord Clovis's conversion from paganism to Catholic Christianity in A.D. 496; the next was the destruction of the Arian barbarian successor-states of the Roman Empire in Africa and Italy by the Emperor Justinian in A.D. 533-52; the third was the conversion of the English from paganism to Catholic Christianity by Gregory the Great's missionaries in and after A.D. 597. If the Gothic, Burgundian, and Vandal instead of the Frankish and English Teutonic barbarian successor-states of the Roman Empire had set the pattern for the subsequent development of the structure of the Western Society, Western Christendom might have become, like the Islamic Society, a hierarchy of millets or, like the Hindu Society, a hierarchy of castes in which the Arian war-bands would have been the *Kshatriyas* and a Catholic clergy the *Brahmans*.

<sup>3</sup> Before the beginning of the progressive amalgamation of the Christian communities in the Visigothic Kingdom, the life of the Jewish diaspora there had been governed by the terms of Alaric II's *Lex Romana Visigothorum*. Under this code, Jews were forbidden to attempt to convert Christians to Judaism, to marry Christians, and to buy Christian slaves; they were excluded from military and civil office without being exempted from onerous public duties (*munera*); and they were forbidden to build new synagogues. They were permitted, however, to keep existing synagogues in repair and to practise their religion; they were exempted from the transaction of fiscal or other public business on the sabbath day; and they were allowed a considerable measure of communal autonomy. 'The authority of Jewish superiors was acknowledged not only in what concerned their own religion but also in civil matters. Jews might, if they wished, have recourse to their own elders for arbitration' (Ziegler, *op. cit.*, p. 187, following *L.R.V.* ii. 1, 10). Thereafter, the position of the Jews in Visigothia deteriorated (though an ever more savage anti-Jewish legislation seems largely to have remained a dead letter owing to the venality of the public authorities, including the Crown and the Episcopate, and the



against their masters' and *pauperes* against *potentiores*.<sup>2</sup> 'The maltreatment of the Jews in the Visigothic Kingdom was the unfortunate result of the union between Church and State.'<sup>3</sup>

Though the wealth of the Peninsular Jews and the venality of their Christian oppressors made the anti-Jewish policy of the Visigothic Kingdom 'ridiculously ineffective',<sup>4</sup> it is not surprising that the Visigothic Crown's Jewish subjects should have retorted to Egica's

Jews' command of the resources for paying the necessary bribes). In A.D. 589 the First Council of Toledo, at King Recared's request, reaffirmed anti-Jewish provisions of the *Lex Romana Visigothorum* that had fallen into disuse (Ziegler, op. cit., p. 189). King Sisebut (*regnabat* A.D. 612-21) gave the Jews a choice between conversion to Christianity and banishment from the kingdom (Ziegler, op. cit., p. 190, following Isidore of Seville, *Historia Gothorum*, 60, and *Continuatio Isidori*, 15), but in this he was acting independently of the Church, and the Fourth Council of Toledo (*sedebat* A.D. 633) forbade further compulsory conversions, though it did not allow Jews already compulsorily converted to relapse (*ibid.*, pp. 190 and 191). The Sixth Council (*sedebat* A.D. 638) commended King Chintila (*regnabat* A.D. 636-40) for having forbidden unconverted Jews to remain in the kingdom and took steps of its own to ensure the effective execution of the King's ruling (*ibid.*, p. 192). King Receswinth (*regnabat* A.D. 649-72) attacked the Jews in his royal message (*tomus*) to the Eighth Council (*sedebat* A.D. 653); and, when the Eighth Council declined to go beyond the limits of the Fourth Council's anti-Jewish measures, Receswinth widened the breach between Christendom and Jewry in his kingdom by promulgating intolerable anti-Jewish legislation of his own in the very year A.D. 654 in which he completed the closing of the breach between his Roman and his Gothic Catholic Christian subjects by bringing them under a common law. Receswinth prohibited the practice of the Jewish religion under pain of death (Ziegler, op. cit., p. 193, following *Leges Visigothorum*, xii. 2. 12, 16, 17). King Erwig (*regnabat* A.D. 680-7) promulgated twenty-eight laws against the Jews (*L.V.* xii. 3. 1-28), which were endorsed by the Twelfth Council (*sedebat* A.D. 681); and the third of these laid it down that they must abjure Judaism within a year under pain—not, now, of death, but of exile and forfeiture of property (Ziegler, op. cit., pp. 194-5). King Egica (*regnabat* A.D. 687-702) tried to cut the root of the economic power which had enabled the Jews largely to elude the previous legislation against them by playing upon the Christian authorities' venality. He increased the special taxes payable by the Jews and at the same time forbade unconverted Jews to transact commercial business with Christians or to engage in foreign trade, and required them to sell to the fiscus any real property that they had acquired from Christians (Ziegler op. cit., p. 195, following *L.V.* xii. 2. 18). The Sixteenth Council (*sedebat* A.D. 693) approved Egica's legislation (Ziegler, op. cit., p. 195).

In this sordid Visigothic tale there is a hidden vein of tragic irony; for, though the vice of fanaticism acquired the new name of 'bigotry' from the conspicuousness of the Visigoths' practice of it, these Teutonic barbarians were not in fact the first 'bigots' known to history. The abuse of political power for the inhuman purpose of imposing on a subject minority a choice between the abandonment of its ancestral religion and the extreme penalty of banishment or even death had been practised by the Jews against their Gentile neighbours in Syria seven hundred years before they themselves had been confronted with the same choice by the Visigoths in the Iberian Peninsula. The earliest known instance of 'bigotry' is the compulsory conversion of the conquered Gentiles of Galilee to Judaism by their Maccabean Jewish conqueror Alexander Jannaeus in the first quarter of the last century B.C. (see II. ii. 73, and V. vi. 478 and 499, n. 1); and the Maccabean temper was inherited by Christendom from a Jewry that came to be the principal victim of this Jewish vein in the Christian religion. Jewish 'Maccabeanism' was not, of course, the sole source of Christian 'Antisemitism', for 'Antisemitism' had been rife in a pre-Christian Hellenic World, at Alexandria and elsewhere, from the second century B.C. onwards (see Marcus, R.: *Antisemitism in the Hellenistic World* (New York 1946, Conference on Jewish Relations)); but the combination of a fanatical religious intolerance with an antipathy arising from social and economic grievances was an aggravation of pre-Christian 'Antisemitism' into which Christianity was betrayed by the Judaic, not the Hellenic, element in its ethos.

<sup>2</sup> See Ziegler, op. cit., pp. 176-9.

<sup>3</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 169.

<sup>4</sup> Ziegler, op. cit., p. 197. The honesty of this verdict delivered by a Modern Western scholar who was also a priest of the Roman Catholic Church was as impressive as it was creditable to the author; and Father Ziegler's honesty is equalled by his acumen. He points out that the Catholic Visigothia of A.D. 587-711 was not, as has sometimes been supposed, a hierarchy, but was an Erastian state, and that a partnership which was a boon to the commonwealth was a doubtful blessing for the Church (*ibid.*, pp. 126-33).

<sup>5</sup> Ziegler, op. cit., p. 198.

legislation by conspiring with their co-religionists in North-West Africa to procure the intervention of the Arabs. The detection of the conspiracy by the Visigothic government in A.D. 694<sup>1</sup> and the consequent reprisals<sup>2</sup> neither gave the Peninsular Jews the *coup de grâce* nor saved the Visigothic Kingdom from destruction after the Arabs' hands had been freed for a farther westward advance by their definitive conquest of Carthage from her Roman defenders in A.D. 698; and the Peninsular Jews survived to see their intuition justified by five hundred years' experience of a Muslim régime (*vigebat* A.D. 711-1212) under which an autonomous diaspora was not a peculiar people.

*The Respite for the Peninsular Jews under Andalusian and Ottoman Muslim Régimes*

The social effect of the Arab conquest of the Iberian Peninsula was indeed to make the Jewish community at home there again by re-establishing the horizontally articulated structure of society that had prevailed there before the conversion of the Visigoths from Arian to Catholic Christianity. The metropolitan territory of the Umayyad Arab Caliphate was Syria, where the millet system of communal organization had been endemic since the Achaemenian Age; and, before the Primitive Muslim Arabs had broken through the Roman *limes*, this indigenous way of life had already reasserted itself in both Syria and Egypt. The fifth century of the Christian Era, which had seen the unity of the Christian society fractured in the western provinces of the Roman Empire by the imposition of an Arian barbarian 'ascendancy' on a Catholic Roman subject population, had seen it fractured simultaneously in the eastern provinces by the secession of a Monophysite Syriac submerged population from a Catholic Roman 'ascendancy'; and, when in the seventh century this 'Melchite' régime, as it was nicknamed by the Imperialists' disaffected Monophysite Christian subjects, was replaced by a Muslim barbarian 'ascendancy', the Umayyad Arab Muslim successor-state of the Roman Empire reproduced, point for point, the social structure of the Empire's 'Teutonic Arian successor-states in the West before their annihilation or conversion.<sup>3</sup> The Arab conquest

<sup>1</sup> See Ziegler, *op. cit.*, pp. 121 and 195-6.

<sup>2</sup> The Seventeenth Council of Toledo (*sedebat* A.D. 694) was specially convened by King Egica to deal with this emergency, and it rose to the occasion. By the eighth canon of this council, 'all the Jews were declared enslaved to Christian masters, who were to see to it that no Jewish rites were practised. Their goods were confiscated to the fiscus, and their children after attaining the age of seven were to be taken from them and reared as Christians'. The Jews of Septimania were exempted from this sentence at Egica's request (*ibid.*, p. 196).

<sup>3</sup> There was perhaps a possibility that the Arab Muslim conquerors of Syria and Egypt might have followed the path of the Visigothic Arian Christian conquerors of the Iberian Peninsula to the length of eventually adopting the Christianity of their subjects in place of their own distinctive religion. Islam (as would have become evident in that event) had originated in an Arab barbarian prophet's attempt to provide his own people with a counterpart of the Christianity of their neighbours, and Muhammadanism might have shared the fate of Arius's Christian heresy. The Umayyad beneficiaries of Muhammad's political genius were (save for 'Umar II) as luke-warm in their allegiance to their official faith as they were susceptible to the culture of the Monophysite Arab ex-wardens of the Roman Empire's Syrian *limes*, whose fraternization with the Umayyads had helped to make the usurping dynasty's fortunes. If some Umayyad caliph had abandoned Islam for Monophysite Christianity, the last chapter of Syriac history might have taken the same turn as the first chapter of Western history in the Iberian Peninsula.

of the Iberian Peninsula brought the conquerors' institutions in its train; and thus, after the Visigoths' downfall in A.D. 711, the social organization of the Iberian Peninsula reverted to what it had been before the Visigoths' conversion to Catholicism in A.D. 587. A Catholic Christian population again found itself subject to a barbarian 'ascendancy' with a distinctive communal religion and law of its own; and the substitution of Muslim Arabs for Arian Christian Goths in the top layer of a now again horizontally articulated society was wholly to the Peninsular Jews' advantage, since the Jewish survivors and the Arab liberators of a Syriac Society whose civilization was their common heritage were drawn towards one another by a cultural affinity of which there was no more than a trace in the relations between the Jews and the Arian Christians.

The well-being enjoyed by the Jewish diaspora in the Peninsula under a Muslim régime did not outlive the Peninsular Muslim Power's collapse; for the Medieval Catholic Christian barbarian conquerors of the Andalusian Umayyad Caliphate's domain were dedicated to that ideal of a homogeneous Catholic Christian commonwealth that had governed the policy of the Visigothic barbarian successor-state of the Roman Empire during the years A.D. 587-711, and, unlike seventh-century Visigothia, fifteenth-century Spain and Portugal conscientiously carried this fanatical policy of *Gleichschaltung* into effect. Between A.D. 1391 and A.D. 1497 the Jewish diaspora in the Peninsula was compelled either to go into exile or to profess conversion to Catholic Christianity.<sup>1</sup>

In the extremity to which they were thus reduced by the abrogation of the millet system in a province of Dār-al-Islām that had been annexed to a Medieval Western Christendom, some of the Peninsular Jews were saved by being given asylum in an Orthodox Christian World where the millet system had recently been introduced by Ottoman Muslim conquerors.<sup>2</sup> In the commercial centres of an oecumenical empire in which the rest of Society was organized on the same communal lines, a refugee Peninsular Jewish diaspora enjoyed a further spell of well-being<sup>3</sup> until, some four centuries after their transplantation, Rumelia, where the social climate had been genial for the Jews in the heyday of the Ottoman régime, was overtaken by the inclement social conditions that had already frozen the Jews out of the Iberian Peninsula. The Salonican Sephardim were threatened with catastrophe when the non-Jewish millets of the Ottoman Empire, including eventually the *ci-devant* Muslim 'ascendancy' itself, became converts to the political ideology of the Western World in the virulently extreme form of Modern Western Nationalism.<sup>4</sup>

### *The Causes of the Western Christians' Ill-treatment of the Jews*

The amenity of being a normal, not a peculiar, social phenomenon was not the only benefit accruing to an autonomous Jewish diaspora under

<sup>1</sup> See II. ii. 244.

<sup>2</sup> Others found asylum in Holland and at Leghorn (see II. ii. 244, and p. 286, below), and others again in North-West Africa.

<sup>3</sup> See II. ii. 244-7.

<sup>4</sup> The conversion of the ex-Ottoman Orthodox Christian and Muslim peoples to Modern Western Nationalism has been dealt with on pp. 189-92 and 263-8, above.

Muslim rule. In Dār-al-Islām the Jews' liberty to live their communal life in their own way was not precariously dependent on a fortunate absence of friction thanks to the congruity of this way of life with the Islamic social environment; it was positively guaranteed by stipulations of the Islamic Law. The Prophet Muhammad himself had expressly laid it down in the Qur'ān that Jews and Christians were to be allowed to go on practising their own religions under the protection of the Islamic state if they submitted to Muslim rule and agreed to pay a differential tax;<sup>1</sup> and, on the morrow of the Peninsular Jews' settlement in the Ottoman Empire, these texts of Islamic holy writ had duly saved the lives of the Ottoman Pādishāh's Christian subjects when their citation by the Oecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, at the suggestion of the Sheykh-el-Islām, had deterred Sultan Selim I the Grim from taking a leaf out of their Spanish Catholic Majesties' book by unlawfully confronting his non-Jewish *ra'īyeh* with the inhuman choice between conversion to Islam and death.<sup>2</sup>

This toleration of 'the People of the Book', which was secured *de jure* for Jews and Christians in Dār-al-Islām, was, of course, accorded *de facto* to Jews in Christendom as a rule;<sup>3</sup> and indeed it would have been almost prohibitively illogical and invidious for the adherents of a younger religion to proscribe the practice of an older religion which, according to the innovators' own doctrine, had likewise been revealed to Mankind by the One True God to prepare the way for the definitive revelation which the younger religion claimed to embody.<sup>4</sup> By a fortunate chance<sup>5</sup> the toleration of 'the People of the Book' had been expressly enjoined in the scriptures of an Islam whose adherents might otherwise perhaps have been tempted into intolerance by their religion's militant and domineering ethos. Conversely it might perhaps have been expected *a priori* that the absence of any corresponding injunction in the New Testament would have been more than made good by the gentle and unaggressive ethos of Christianity. The New Testament had nothing to say about matters of public policy because the Primitive Christians, unlike the Primitive Muslims, were the submissive subjects and not the

<sup>1</sup> See II. ii. 245; IV. iv. 225-6 and 630; and V. v. 674, n. 2.

<sup>2</sup> See V. v. 706, n. 1, and V. vi. 204-5.

<sup>3</sup> The *de facto* toleration accorded to the Jews in Christendom was accorded in Dār-al-Islām to the Zoroastrians and the Hindus through a tacit conferment on them of the status expressly guaranteed to the Jews and the Christians by the Qur'ān.

<sup>4</sup> This chronological consideration explains why it was that the Christians tolerated Judaism but not Islam, whereas the Muslims tolerated both Judaism and Christianity. Dr. James Parkes here notes that the Christian, as well as the Islamic, Church found a juridical basis for the toleration that it practised. While the Christian Church held that the divine authority previously attaching to Judaism had been entirely abrogated by the Incarnation, it nevertheless discovered two grounds for conceding that the Jews in Christendom's midst had a right to a continuing survival. In their latter-day distressed condition they were serving as witnesses to the heinousness of the crime of deicide, and their survival was guaranteed by St. Paul's assurance that Jewry would be converted in the fullness of time (see, for example, Rom. x. and xi). In making these findings, Theology was playing the beau rôle of serving as the handmaid of Mercy and Loving-kindness.

<sup>5</sup> The inclusion of any particular ruling in the Medinese sūrahs of the Qur'ān must be held to be a matter of chance, since these sūrahs were a collection of *ad hoc* rulings elicited by the day-to-day business that came on to Muhammad's agenda in his political role of *podestà* (to give him the title that this imported dictator would have borne if Medina had been a Medieval Italian city-state).

masterful rulers of a state.<sup>1</sup> Why was it that the Christians, when they eventually came into political power, distinguished themselves so disadvantageously from their Muslim contemporaries by abusing this power in their behaviour towards the Jews?

One reason was that in the New Testament the Gospel of Love was accompanied by a polemical attack on the Pharisees and was consummated by the story of the Passion of Christ; for these two particular ingredients in Christianity's holy writ could be taken by a latter-day Christian, who had the perverse will so to believe, as evidence that he was warranted by the New Testament itself in refusing to give the Jews the benefit of a Christian's general obligation to love and cherish his fellow human beings. In persuading the Roman authorities to put the founder of the Christian Church to death, the Jews in Christian eyes had committed a capital offence which was also an unspeakable impiety on the assumption that the Jews were grievously mistaken in rejecting the Christians' claim that the crucified Jesus was an incarnation of the God-head. Thus, by a tragically ironical *peripeteia*, a Passion which, according to the Christian Church's theology, was a supreme act of self-sacrifice, willed, out of love for Mankind, by a God incarnate in a man who was a Jew, could be taken by professing Christians as a justification for persecuting latter-day kinsmen of Jesus' murderers who were consequently kinsmen of Jesus himself; and the animus shown by the Evangelists in recording a controversy between Jesus and the Pharisees which was a family quarrel within the bosom of Jewry, and indeed within the bosom of Pharisaism itself, could incite Jesus' latter-day Gentile adherents to condemn their professed Master's own religion and community, root and branch.

An historian, observing this deadly recoil on Jewish heads of the shedding of Jesus' blood, might come to the cynical conclusion that, in gently submitting to be put to death, at his Jewish fellow countrymen's instigation, by the Roman authorities, Jesus had involuntarily done his own people immeasurably greater harm than they had subsequently suffered at Muhammad's Gentile hands when this militant prophet had provided for his landless Meccan followers at Medina by instigating the massacre and spoliation of the Jewish husbandmen in the Medinese oasis. To appear as the embarrassing victims of the Founder of Islam was a much less damaging entry in the record of a Jewish diaspora at the mercy of a Muslim or a Christian majority than to appear as the execrable murderers of the Founder of Christianity. And, after all, had not Muhammad made some considerable amends to the rest of Jewry for a crime committed by him against the single Jewish community of the Banu Qurayzah in the single oasis of Yathrib (*trucidati* A.D. 627) when, on the occasion of his subsequent conquest of the North Arabian Jewish oasis of Khaybar (*captum* A.D. 629), he had given Judaism an abiding legal guarantee of toleration under Muslim rule by a less maleficent exercise of the same political power that he had misused in dooming the Medinese Jews to destruction?

However that might be, it was attested by History that the *êthos* of

<sup>1</sup> On this point, see III. iii. 466-72.



Christianity had not availed to avert from the heads of the Jewish diaspora in Western Christendom the catastrophic effects of a provincial Western Christian political outlook in which a millet looked like an offensive anomaly. This peculiar inhospitality of Western Christendom to the Jewish strangers in its midst was aggravated by the peculiar course of Western Christendom's economic and social development.

The birthplace of the western Society was an outlying tract of the Hellenic World where the Hellenic Civilization had broken down at the turn of the fourth and fifth centuries of the Christian Era because, on this recently and superficially Hellenized ground, the urban culture of Hellenism had failed to strike root. The superstructure of urban life that had been erected in the western provinces of the Roman Empire on primitive agricultural foundations had proved to be an incubus instead of a stimulus;<sup>1</sup> and, after this exotic Roman-built superstructure had collapsed under its own weight, the West sank back to the same low economic level at which it had lain before Hellenism had attempted to seed itself beyond the Appennines or across the Tyrrhene Sea. This peculiar economic handicap with which the Western Society started life had two consequences which, between them, were bound to make trouble. In the first place a nascent Western Christendom was invaded by a Jewish diaspora from an urban Syriac World which found an opening for making a livelihood in the West by providing a rustic society with that minimum of commercial experience, skill, and organization without which even Ruritania could not live, but which Ruritania at that early stage of her development was incompetent to provide out of her own resources.<sup>2</sup> In the second place the Western Christian Gentiles' very ineptitude in business affairs inspired them with a compelling and abiding ambition to become their own Jews by mastering Jewry's arts—for their encounter with the Jewish diaspora, and the spectacle of the wealth and power that these aliens gained through the performance of an indispensable social service, was one of the experiences that made the Western Christians of the Dark Age aware of their economic backwardness and eager to overcome it.

In the course of ages a more and more demonic concentration of Western Gentile will-power on this Jewish economic objective came to reap a sensational reward. By the twentieth century of the Christian Era even the East European rear-guard of the Western peoples' column of route in their long march towards the goal of economic efficiency was going through a metamorphosis that had been achieved a thousand years earlier by the North Italian and Flemish pioneers in a Western economic and social movement that might be called with equal appropriateness either 'Judaization' or 'modernization'. In Western history the sign of the attainment of this social modernity was the emergence of a Gentile bourgeoisie whose field of economic enterprise was the same as the Jewish diaspora's; and the advent in the West of this modern Gentile bourgeoisie made for a quarrel there between Gentile and Jew by making the Jew seem superfluous to the Gentile and the Gentile seem insatiable to the Jew. As soon as the Gentile felt that he was competent to do the

<sup>1</sup> See III. iii. 99-100.

<sup>2</sup> See II. ii. 241.

Jew's work, he coveted the Jew's place for himself in addition to his own; and the Jew, on his side, was resentful at the prospect of being frozen out of his original niche in an expanding Western economic edifice. At a stage at which agriculture had been the staple industry of an infant Western Society, the Western Gentiles had taken advantage of a majority's brute power of numbers to monopolize the ownership and occupation of the land and had profited doubly by that economic injustice to the Jews when this penalized minority—duly responding to the challenge of penalization<sup>1</sup>—had made good the Western Society's most serious economic deficiency by making something of such modest opportunities for commerce as were to be found in a backward agrarian economy. And now the Western Gentiles were bent on driving out of the commercial as well as the agricultural field a Jewish diaspora which had done the Western World the twofold service of building the West's once exiguous commerce up into a lucrative business and thereby teaching their Gentile neighbours the tricks of a valuable trade.

*The Plot of the Jewish Tragedy in a Western Christendom*

This economic quarrel between Jews and Western Gentiles ran through three acts. In the first act—classically performed in seventh-century Visigothia—the Jews were as unpopular as they were indispensable, but the ill-treatment which they incurred through their unpopularity was usually kept within bounds by the incapacity of their Gentile persecutors to fill their places. At this stage the worst that happened to the Jews as a rule was to be compelled to hand over to the Gentiles—by way of bribes, surtaxes, fines, and other euphemisms for robbery—a substantial portion of the wealth that was perpetually accumulating in the Jews' hands owing to the pre-eminence of their ability in the pursuits of trade and finance on which a Gentile majority had constrained them to concentrate their energies. The second act opened, in one Western country after another, as soon as a nascent Gentile bourgeoisie had acquired sufficient experience, skill, and capital of its own to feel itself capable of usurping the local Jews' place; for at that stage—as was demonstrated not only in thirteenth-century England and in fifteenth-century Spain but in twentieth-century Poland and Hungary—the Gentile bourgeois might be tempted to use the power conferred by numbers in order to rid themselves by force of long-established Jewish predecessors whom they might not have found it so easy to defeat in peaceful and honest economic competition. This second act—which was as discreditable to the Gentiles as it was tragic for the Jews—was followed by a third act in Western countries where the local representatives of a now well-established Gentile bourgeoisie had become such past masters in Jewish economic arts that their traditional fear of succumbing to Jewish competition no longer constrained them to forgo the economic advantage of re-enlisting Jewish ability in the service of their national economy.

Modern Western countries in which the Gentile bourgeoisie had arrived at this degree of professional self-confidence found it to their

<sup>1</sup> See II. ii. 209.

interest to give political asylum and economic opportunity to Jewish outcasts from economically more backward Western countries that were still in the violently anti-Jewish second stage of Western relations with Jewry. In this spirit the Tuscan Government allowed crypto-Jewish refugees from Spain and Portugal to settle at Leghorn in and after A.D. 1593;<sup>1</sup> Holland had already opened her doors to Portuguese crypto-Jewish refugees since A.D. 1579;<sup>2</sup> and England, which in the seventeenth century was following hard on Holland's heels in a race for primacy in the West's now world-wide trade, ventured from A.D. 1655 onwards to readmit a Jewish diaspora which she had expelled in A.D. 1290 when a nascent Gentile English bourgeoisie had been ruthlessly elbowing its way into Jewry's ancient preserves.

### *A Mirage of Emancipation*

The economic enfranchisement of the Jews which followed the Modern Western Gentile bourgeoisie's attainment of its own economic maturity was accompanied by a social and political enfranchisement which was a consequence of the contemporary religious and ideological revolutions in Western Christendom. The outbreak of the Protestant Reformation early in the sixteenth century broke the united Christian front with which the Jewish diaspora in the West had been faced since the conversion to Catholicism of the last surviving local Arian 'ascendancy' towards the end of the seventh century;<sup>3</sup> and, though the modern fracture in the Western body ecclesiastic conformed to the peculiar structure of the Western Society in breaking on vertical and not on horizontal lines, it nevertheless brought the Jewish diaspora substantial relief. In seventeenth-century Holland and England, for example, the Jews were given a welcome not only because they had become useful partners instead of formidable competitors in a competent local Gentile bourgeoisie's eyes but also because they were the victims of these Protestant Christians' Catholic Christian enemies. And, when, towards the close of the seventeenth century, the Catholic and Protestant peoples of a Gentile Western World tacitly agreed to drop the religious bone of contention which had been at least the ostensible object of their Wars of Religion, the re-establishment of peace between previously contending Christian sects this time brought the Jews a further measure of relief from Christian pressure instead of the turn of the screw which the Jews had experienced in Visigothia after the ending of the feud there between Arian and Catholic Christians in A.D. 587.

<sup>1</sup> See II. ii. 244. In planting Peninsular Jewish refugees in Leghorn the Florentines were moved by the same combination of economic with political considerations that had already led the 'Osmanlis to plant them in Constantinople and Salonica. The 'Osmanlis wanted these Jewish immigrants to take the bread out of the mouths of their Greek *ra'iyeh*; the Florentines wanted the Jewish settlers at Leghorn to take it out of the mouths of the Pisans, whom the Florentines had finally conquered and crushed in A.D. 1509. The Florentine conquerors of Pisa, like the Ottoman conquerors of Rumelia, were concerned not merely to promote the economic welfare of their recently acquired empire but to find some way of doing this without thereby creating an opportunity for their conquered rivals to recapture a commercial prosperity which had been the source of their former political and military power.

<sup>2</sup> The Lombards were not converted to a fully orthodox form of Catholicism till A.D. 698 (see Lot, F: *Les Invasions Germaniques* (Paris 1935, Payot), p. 283).

<sup>3</sup> See *ibid.*

The reason for this difference in the consequences for the Jews lay, of course, in the difference in the spirit in which the Christians patched up their quarrels on these two historic occasions. In sixth-century Visigothia the peace of the Church had been restored through a conversion of the Arians to Catholicism which had left the Jews in the invidious position of being the only surviving dissenters; in a seventeenth-century Western World ecclesiastical peace was restored by a tacit agreement to continue to differ without continuing to take this religious difference to heart; and a growing indifference to religious issues, which was both the cause and the consequence of the damping of a Judaic flame of religious fanaticism in the relations between Christian and Christian, inevitably had its effect on the traditional attitude of the Christian towards the Jew. The diversion of Gentile hearts and minds from applied theology to applied science towards the close of the seventeenth century was duly followed at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by the official emancipation of the Jews on the social and the political as well as the economic plane. On the European Continent this beneficent practical application of the Ideas of 1775 and 1789 was propagated from Revolutionary France into Germany and Italy by the Napoleonic Empire; in the New World it was propagated by the revolutions in which the American colonies of Great Britain, Spain, and Portugal successively achieved their independence. By A.D. 1914 the official emancipation of the Jews on all planes of human activity was a long since accomplished fact in all provinces of the Modern Western World outside the former territories of the extinct United Kingdom of Poland-Lithuania—which, except for Poznan, West Prussia, and Galicia, had been included since A.D. 1815 in 'the Jewish Pale' of the Russian Empire.

Thus, on the eve of the First World War, 'the Jewish problem' in the Western World might have been thought to have found a solution in a fusion of the Jewish and Christian communities with one another through a union that had been a voluntary act on both sides instead of having been imposed forcibly on the weaker by the stronger party. In a bourgeois and secular Modern Western Society in which the now all-important field of business activity had been reopened to the Jews on equal terms with the Gentiles, while Religion had sunk into being a matter of secondary importance or no importance at all, why should not the individual Jew become socially uniform with the individual Gentile by evolving into a Western bourgeois of the Jewish religious denomination or of no religious belief or allegiance of any kind? In the Western World in the course of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era the process of assimilation on this basis did in fact go very far, and it was conceivable that it might have ended in a complete obliteration of the historic communal distinction between Jews and Western Christians if the process had not been cut short through the sudden and unexpected seizure of the Western World by a fresh paroxysm of trouble as severe as the previous bout from which it had emerged towards the close of the seventeenth century.<sup>1</sup> Nineteenth-century Western hopes of solving

<sup>1</sup> See V. vi. 315-16.

the Jewish problem, like nineteenth-century Western hopes of abolishing the institution of War, proved in retrospect<sup>1</sup> to have been a delusion; and a tragedy which had momentarily looked as if it were a play in three acts then entered on a fourth act which was more horrifying than any of its three predecessors and which afforded no glimpse of any prospect of finality.

*The Fate of the European Jews and the Palestinian Arabs, A.D. 1933-48*

The peculiar horror of this fourth act lay in the unprecedented wickedness of the malefactors and unprecedented sufferings of both innocent Jewish victims and an innocent Arab third party.

On the Gentile actors' side the German persecution of the Jews in Continental Europe in the years A.D. 1933-45 was far more shocking than the Spanish and Portuguese persecution of the Jews in the Iberian Peninsula in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. While both persecutions had been prompted by economic motives that had been given a less disreputable and less self-interested appearance by being cloaked under a show of idealism, the medieval Peninsular Christians' profession of zeal for their religion was not so insincere as the modern German Neo-Pagans' profession of zeal for the idolatrous worship of their tribe—as was shown by the fact that the Spaniards and Portuguese did genuinely enfranchise any Jews who conformed to the practice of Western Christianity, whereas the German National Socialists' racial tribalism left a Jew no avenue of escape from being the 'non-Aryan' that Nature was alleged to have made him. The medieval Iberian Christians, again, were naively practising their traditional religion according to their benighted understanding of its precepts, whereas the modern German Nazis had deliberately repudiated the humanitarianism that had been the cardinal virtue in the moral code of a post-Christian Modern Western Enlightenment.

The full measure of the Nazis' depravity is not given in the bare statistical statement—appalling though these figures are—that, within a period of no more than twelve years, they reduced the Jewish population of Continental Europe, west of the Soviet Union, from about 6½ million to about 1½ million<sup>2</sup> by a process of mass-extermiation which

<sup>1</sup> See IV. iv. 141-55.

<sup>2</sup> In A.D. 1952 it was not possible to give exact figures based on accurate statistics, and it seemed improbable that the necessary information would ever be obtainable. According to *The Jewish Year Book, 1947* (London 1948, Jewish Chronicle), pp. 298-9, the Jewish population of Germany and the Continental European countries occupied by Germany in the Second World War—not including the occupied parts of the Soviet Union—was 1,181,600 in April 1946. *The American Jewish Year Book, 1945-6* (Philadelphia 1945, Jewish Publication Society of America) does not attempt to estimate the post-war figures; but vol. xli of the same series, covering the year 1939-40 and published in 1939, gives, on p. 585, figures amounting to a total of 6,484,499 for the Jewish population of the same area. On this showing, the Jews in the area appear to have been 5,302,899 fewer in 1946 than they had been in 1939; and this figure comes close to the estimate of a drop from 6½ millions to 1½ millions in the same area between the same dates, which is given by the Board of Deputies of British Jews in *The Jews in Europe, their Martyrdom and their Future* (London 1945, Woburn House), p. 38.

In these calculations there were several possible sources of error. The areas in question for A.D. 1939-40 and for A.D. 1946 might not be exactly coterminous; and, in order



was so unprecedentedly systematic and cold-blooded that the new word 'genocide' had to be coined to describe what was in effect a new crime. In the operation of the destructor-plants in which the Nazis' victims were asphyxiated, the maniacal sadism of the men and women in command was less appalling than the criminal docility of the hundreds and thousands of subordinates who duly carried out their monstrous instructions, and the moral cowardice of the German public, who took good care to avoid acquainting themselves with the atrocities that their husbands, sons, and brothers, and even their sisters, wives, and daughters, were committing in their name. The moral nadir to which German souls sank under the Nazi dispensation is revealed, not only in these murders and physical tortures that were perpetrated by German hands, but also in the odious precept and example through which pastors and masters who were shamefully betraying their trust taught Gentile German school-children to make life unbearable for their Jewish schoolfellows by the industrious infliction of studied unkindness.

This moral downfall of one of the leading nations of a Modern Western World in the second quarter of the twentieth century of the Christian Era shook the foundations of the régime of secular enlightenment on which the West had been subsisting for a quarter of a millennium. It showed that the gain won by discarding a Judaic Christian fanaticism in the reaction against the savagery of the Early Modern Western Wars of Religion had been outweighed by the loss suffered through the simultaneous smothering of a likewise Judaic Christian love. After this modern German exhibition of the volcanic potentialities of an undomesticated Original Sin, it was impossible to retain Modern Western Man's latter-day dogmatic belief in the inevitable progress of a secularized Western Civilization and in the self-perfectibility of a graceless Human Nature. But the Nazi Gentiles' fall was less tragic than the Zionist Jews'. On the morrow of a persecution in Europe in which they had been the victims of the worst atrocities ever known to have been suffered by Jews or indeed by any other human beings, the Jews' immediate reaction to their own experience was to become persecutors in their turn for the first time since A.D. 135—and this at the first opportunity that had since arisen for them to inflict on other human beings who had done the Jews no injury, but who happened to be weaker than they were, some of the wrongs and sufferings that had been inflicted on the Jews by their many successive Western Gentile persecutors during the intervening seventeen centuries. In A.D. 1948 some 684,000 out of some 859,000 Arab inhabitants of the territory in Palestine which the Zionist Jews

to estimate from the figure for the drop in the Jewish population the figure for the number of Jews who had been done to death, a statistician would have on the one hand to add an unknown number for the losses of the Jewish population in the German-occupied territories of the Soviet Union, and on the other hand to allow for a number of survivors who, by April 1946, had already migrated from Germany and the ex-German-occupied countries since VE-Day. Allowing for these unknown quantities, it might be estimated that at least five million Continental European Jews had been done to death by the Nazis from first to last. In Dr. James Parkes' opinion—communicated to the writer on the 28th February, 1951, in a comment on this footnote—an estimate of six million, in round numbers, would be nearer the mark for the figure by which the Jewish population of Continental Europe, including the Soviet Union, had been reduced since the outbreak of the War of A.D. 1939-45.

conquered by force of arms in that year lost their homes and property<sup>1</sup> and became destitute 'displaced persons'.<sup>2</sup>

If the heinousness of sin is to be measured by the degree to which the sinner is sinning against the light that God has vouchsafed to him, the Jews had even less excuse in A.D. 1948 for evicting Palestinian Arabs from their homes than Nebuchadnezzar and Titus and Hadrian and the Spanish and Portuguese Inquisition had had for uprooting, persecuting, and exterminating Jews in Palestine and elsewhere at divers times in the past. In A.D. 1948 the Jews knew, from personal experience, what they were doing; and it was their supreme tragedy that the lesson learnt by them from their encounter with the Nazi German Gentiles should have been not to eschew but to imitate some of the evil deeds that the Nazis had committed against the Jews.<sup>3</sup> On the Day of Judgement the gravest

<sup>1</sup> The figure 859,000 is the estimate of the total non-Jewish population, on the 31st December, 1946, of the territory subsequently occupied by Israel within the boundaries of the 1st May, 1949, which is given in the *Final Report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East*, Part I, *The Final Report and Appendices* (Lake Success, N.Y. 1949, United Nations), p. 22, col. 2. In the same place the total number of refugees from Israeli-held territory at the date of the Report is estimated at 726,000, on the reckoning that the non-Jewish population then still in Israel amounted to 133,000. The figure of 684,000 refugees, given on page 289, above, is based on a reckoning by Dr. James Parkes that, by January 1951, the number of the non-Jewish population in Israel had risen to about 175,000—presumably in consequence of a repatriation of some 42,000 of the Palestinian Arab 'displaced persons'.

<sup>2</sup> While the direct responsibility for this calamity that overtook the Palestinian Arabs in A.D. 1948 was on the heads of the Zionist Jews who seized a *Lebensraum* for themselves in Palestine by force of arms in that year, a heavy load of indirect, yet irrefutable, responsibility was on the heads of the people of the United Kingdom; for the Jews would not have had in A.D. 1948 the opportunity to conquer an Arab country in which they had amounted to no more than an inconsiderable minority in A.D. 1918 if, during the intervening thirty years, the power of the United Kingdom had not been exerted continuously to make possible the entry of Jewish immigrants into Palestine contrary to the will, in despite of the protests, and without regard to the forebodings of Arab inhabitants of the country who in A.D. 1948 were duly to become the victims of this long pursued British policy. See further pp. 303-6, below.

<sup>3</sup> The cold-blooded systematic 'genocide' of several millions of human beings in extermination camps, which had been the worst of the Nazis' crimes against the Jews, had no parallel at all in the Jews' ill-treatment of the Palestinian Arabs. The evil deeds committed by the Zionist Jews against the Palestinian Arabs that were comparable to crimes committed against the Jews by the Nazis were the massacre of men, women, and children at Dayr Yāsīn on the 9th April, 1948, which precipitated a flight of the Arab population, in large numbers, from districts within range of the Jewish armed forces, and the subsequent deliberate expulsion of the Arab population from districts conquered by the Jewish armed forces between the 15th May, 1948, and the end of that year—e.g. from 'Akkā in May, from Lydda and Ramla in July, and from Beersheba and Western Galilee in October. When Nazareth was captured in July, most of the population seems to have been allowed to stay. On the other hand, the Arabs who were expelled from 'Akkā in May included refugees from Haifa, and those who were expelled from Lydda and Ramla in July included refugees from Jaffa, in addition to the local Arab population. The massacre and the expulsions, between them, were responsible for the exile of all those Palestinian Arab 'displaced persons' (to use the current euphemism), from the territory conquered by the Israelis, who fled from or were driven from this territory after the 9th April, 1948. The expulsions seem to have accounted for about 284,000 out of the total of about 684,000 Palestinian Arabs who became 'displaced persons' from first to last, including those who had already been evacuated by the British mandatory authorities or had already fled on their own initiative or had already lost their homes as a result of military operations between the outbreak of hostilities in Palestine in December 1947 and the massacre of the 9th April, 1948.

The Arab blood shed on the 9th April, 1948, at Dayr Yāsīn was on the heads of Irgun; the expulsions after the 15th May, 1948, were on the heads of all Israel.

If, on behalf of Israel, it were to be pleaded that these Jewish outrages in A.D. 1948, even reckoned *pro rata*, were dwarfed in quantity, as well as in heinousness, by the Nazi atrocities in A.D. 1933-45, it would have to be taken into account, on the other side,

crime standing to the German National Socialists' account might be, not that they had exterminated a majority of the Western Jews, but that they had caused the surviving remnant of Jewry to stumble. The Jews in Europe in A.D. 1933-45 had been the vicarious victims of the Germans' resentment over their military defeat at the hands of their Western fellow Gentiles in the war of A.D. 1914-18; the Arabs in Palestine in A.D. 1948 became in their turn the vicarious victims of the European Jews' indignation over the 'genocide' committed upon them by their Gentile fellow Westerners in A.D. 1933-45. This impulse to become a party to the guilt of a stronger neighbour by inflicting on an innocent weaker neighbour the very sufferings that the original victim had experienced at his stronger neighbour's hands was perhaps the most perverse of all the base propensities of Human Nature;<sup>1</sup> for it was a wanton endeavour to keep in perpetual motion the sorrowful wheel of *Karma*<sup>2</sup> to which Adam-Ixion was bound and from which only Love and Mercy could ever release him.

The tidal wave that overwhelmed the Palestinian Arabs in A.D. 1948 was a backwash from an upheaval in the relations between Gentiles and Jews in Western longitudes beyond the Palestinian Arabs' horizon;<sup>3</sup> and its catastrophic effect on these innocent strangers' fortunes was a consequence of the third of the three peculiarities that have been attributed in an earlier passage of this chapter to the Modern Western Civilization.<sup>4</sup> In a Modern Western Society that had come to overshadow all the rest of Mankind, even an imperfectly and precariously emancipated Jewish diaspora in the West had become a power in the World through becoming an effective force in the political life of potent Western countries; and, in consequence, the West's unsolved domestic Jewish problem had become fraught with perils for non-Western and non-Jewish peoples who had nothing to do with this Western problem except for being in the Westerners' power. The contemporary unsolved domestic Jewish problem of the Islamic World in the Yaman and the Maghrib was without effect on the fortunes of any third party because in the twentieth century the Islamic Society was impotent to discharge its own debts at any third party's expense; but in that age there was no power on Earth strong enough to say nay to the Western Society when the Western

that the Jews had had much more experience than the Germans had had of the sufferings that they were inflicting. If the Nazis were debarred from filing the plea that they knew not what they did, the Israelis were debarred *a fortiori*.

<sup>1</sup> This was, of course, a propensity of Human Nature under all veneers, and not just of Human Nature under the veneer of Judaism or Germanism. Historic examples of it in which the perpetrators had been non-German Gentiles were the French acts of aggression against the Italians in A.D. 1494 and against the Syrians in A.D. 1920. In inflicting a sixty-five years' war (*gerebatur* A.D. 1494-1559) on Italy the French were taking their revenge for a hundred years' war (*gerebatur* A.D. 1337-1451) that had previously been inflicted on France not by the Italians but by the English. In invading and occupying Syria in A.D. 1920 the French were taking their revenge for an occupation of French soil in A.D. 1914 in which the invaders had been not the Syrians but the Germans.

<sup>2</sup> See V. v. 427-9 and 432-3.

<sup>3</sup> In A.D. 1948 the Palestinian Arabs might aptly have applied to the calamity that overtook them in that year the words that had fallen so quaintly from Neville Chamberlain's lips on the 27th September, 1938. 'How horrible, fantastic, incredible' it must have seemed to them that they should have lost their homes 'because of a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom' they knew 'nothing'.

<sup>4</sup> See p. 277, above.

victors in the War of A.D. 1939-45 chose to compensate the Western Jews for the crimes committed against them by a defeated Western belligerent at the expense, not of the guilty West, but of an innocent non-Western people. In its impotence to resist this injustice the rest of Mankind could only marvel at Western Man's attempt to obtain absolution for a Western sin by imposing a proportionate penance on strangers who were not implicated in the guilt.

*Causes of the Failure of Enfranchisement*

This fourth act of the drama in which the Modern West and Jewry were the dramatis personae was indeed in all respects so disconcertingly tragic that the historian cannot refrain from seeking to discover the points at which an apparently promising third act had gone wrong.

One vulnerable point was, of course, the survival of a psychological barrier between Western Gentiles and Jews after the juridical barrier between them had been officially removed. In a nineteenth-century *soi-disant* Liberal Western World there was still an invisible ghetto within which the Western Gentile continued to confine the Jew, and the Jew, on his side, continued to segregate himself from the Western Gentile. The nominally emancipated Jew found himself still being excluded—unavowedly yet effectually—from social opportunities and amenities by his Gentile professed fellow members in an officially united society, while the Gentile found himself still faced by a free-masonry—likewise as effectual as it was unavowed—among Jews who were eager to claim, without being willing to accord, the benefits that ought to have accrued equally to all members of both these two *ci-devant* millets as a result of their official *Gleichschaltung*. In fact, either party continued to observe a double standard of behaviour—a higher standard for dealing with members of its own crypto-community and a lower standard for dealing with nominal fellow citizens on the other side of a supposedly no longer existent social pale—and this new coat of hypocrisy embalming the old vice of inequity made either party more contemptible, as well as less formidable, in the other's eyes and thereby made the situation more exasperating, as well as less onerous, for both parties.

This immediate aftermath of Jewish emancipation in the West was ironically disappointing; and, though a substantial improvement in relations had in fact nevertheless been secured, the precariousness of this was revealed by the recrudescence of Antisemitism in a nineteenth-century and a twentieth-century Western World wherever there was any appreciably rapid increase in the numerical ratio of the Jewish to the Gentile ingredient in the local population. This tendency was discernible by the year A.D. 1914 in London and in New York as a result of Jewish immigration since A.D. 1881 from the former dominions of the extinct United Kingdom of Poland-Lithuania under pressure of Russian-instigated persecution;<sup>1</sup> and after A.D. 1918 it became virulent in

<sup>1</sup> 'In a couple of decades the Jewish population of the United States rose from less than a quarter of a million to more than a million; that of England from less than a hundred thousand to nearly a quarter of a million; while France, Holland, and Germany each received between twenty and twenty-five thousand of these refugees. The new-

German Austria and the German Reich as a result of further Jewish immigration from Galicia, 'Congress Poland', and the more easterly provinces of 'the Pale' during the First World War.<sup>1</sup>

These symptoms revealed a state of affairs that was not only disappointing but dangerous, yet a warrantable disappointment and apprehension gave no reasonable grounds for despondency; for it was one of the well-recognized limitations of Human Nature that human souls should take time in adjusting themselves emotionally to innovations which the Reason had endorsed by a stroke of the legislator's pen; and, if the Jewish problem in the Western World could have been insulated from its contemporary Western ideological setting, Time would have been on the side of an eventual solution of the problem *de facto* when once it had been solved *de jure*—as was shown by the progressive increase in the frequency of intermarriage between Western Gentiles and Jews, which was an approximate current index of the progress towards a *de facto* solution that was being achieved. Unhappily this beneficent process of assimilation between individual Western Gentiles and Jews, which offered the best hope of a solution of the Jewish problem in the peculiar ideological environment of the Western social tradition, was overtaken and upset by the eruption of a Modern Western Nationalism and by the social devastation which this ideological catastrophe brought in its train.

Modern Western Nationalism attacked the Jewish diaspora in the Western World on two flanks simultaneously. It led the Western Jews by its attractiveness and at the same time drove them by its pressure to invent a Jewish nationalism *alla Franca*<sup>2</sup> which might be described as a collective form of Westernization in contrast to the individual form associated with a pre-nationalistic Liberal Western dispensation.<sup>3</sup> Like the Westernizing ideal of turning the individual Jew into a Western bourgeois of Jewish religion, the alternative Westernizing ideal of turn-comers were unlike any Jews whom the West had seen for centuries . . . and their great numbers, coupled with the suspicion of their neighbours, intensified their clannishness and the difficulty of the simplest political, social, and economic assimilation' (Parkes, J.: *The Jewish Problem in the Modern World*, 1st American ed. (New York 1946, Oxford University Press), pp. 67–68).

<sup>1</sup> The Antisemitism displayed by Gentiles in Poland, Hungary, and Rumania after A.D. 1918 was not, of course, due to a change in numerical ratios, for in these countries migration had relieved the pressure of Jewish numbers on Gentile susceptibilities in proportion to the increase of the same pressure in Austria, Germany, Great Britain, and the United States. The explanation of the inter-war phenomena in Eastern Europe was not statistical but historical. In A.D. 1918 the Western countries west of 'the Pale' were all in Stage Three, at which a now well-established Western Gentile bourgeoisie had felt themselves able to grant the Jews a *de jure* (albeit precarious) emancipation. By contrast, the Western Gentile bourgeoisie in Poland and Hungary at that date were still in the militant Stage Two, in which they were aspiring to become their own Jews and were seeking to clear an economic *Lebensraum* for themselves by elbowing the Jews out of their way, while the Westernizing Gentile population of Rumania (at least in the Regat, as distinct from Transylvania) was still in Stage One, at which the Jewish practitioners of the higher arts of economic life were as obnoxious to the Gentiles as they were indispensable to them. In German Austria and Germany a fear of falling back out of Stage Three into Stage One, as a result of the economic catastrophe precipitated there by the First World War, no doubt partly accounted for the virulence of the recrudescence of Antisemitism in those two economically advanced Western countries by comparison with the relative mildness of the contemporary symptoms in the United Kingdom and the United States.

<sup>2</sup> This convenient Italian phrase signified 'in the Western style' in Ottoman parlance.

<sup>3</sup> See II. ii. 212–14.



ing the oecumenical Jewish millet into a parochial nation (concentrated, Western-fashion, within the frontiers of a national territory with an exclusively and homogeneously Jewish population) was evidence that the emancipation of a Western Jewry in the nineteenth century of the Christian Era had been genuine enough to expose the Western Jews, for the first time in the history of their relations with their Gentile neighbours, to the influence of current Western ideas and ideals. At the same time, Zionism, on the testimony of Theodor Herzl himself, was also evidence of an anxiety, in nineteenth-century Western Jewish souls, lest the avenue of individual assimilation, which had previously been opened up to Western Jews by the advent of a Modern Western Gentile Liberalism, might be closed to them again by the onset of a Modern Gentile Nationalism that was treading hard on Liberalism's heels.<sup>1</sup>

The last quarter of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era witnessed a recrudescence of Antisemitism in the Western World that was as ominous as it was unexpected. In point of numbers the greatest blow dealt to a Western Jewry in this generation was the instigation of pogroms in 'the Pale' by a Russian Tsardom *in extremis* which resorted to this base expedient in and after A.D. 1881<sup>2</sup> in the futile hope of diverting the hostility of its Gentile subjects from its own head on to the heads of their Jewish neighbours.<sup>3</sup> Yet this fresh outbreak of persecution in the backward eastern fringes of the Western World on the initiative of a non-Western régime was not so alarming a portent as the contemporary symptoms in Germany and France. The first explosion of Antisemitism in a latter-day Germany (*saeviebat* A.D. 1873-96) was a flash in the pan.<sup>4</sup> The Dreyfus Affair (*saeviebat* A.D. 1894-1906), to which a Liberal France succumbed in the hour of her demoralization after her defeat by Germany in A.D. 1870-1, was more deeply disturbing.<sup>5</sup> The spectacle of anti-Jewish demonstrations in Paris at the time when the battle over the Dreyfus case was being fought out in France was the experience that converted the Austrian Jewish journalist Theodor Herzl from being an ardent assimilationist into becoming the Apostle of Zionism.<sup>6</sup>

It is perhaps no accident that a nineteenth-century Jewish Zionism and a twentieth-century German Neo-Antisemitism should have arisen successively in the same geographical zone of the Western World, and that this locus should have been the German-speaking territories of the Austrian Empire just west of the domains of the Hungarian Crown of St. Stephen and the former United Kingdom of Poland-Lithuania. This Austrian zone lay sufficiently far to the west for its Jewish inhabitants to be subject to infection by current Western ideologies—including Nationalism as well as Liberalism—in a Modern Western Liberal Age, and sufficiently far to the east for its Gentile inhabitants to be no less subject

<sup>1</sup> See IV. iv. 163.

<sup>2</sup> See Parkes, *op. cit.*, chap. 4, especially pp. 62-66.

<sup>3</sup> See Parkes, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-44.

<sup>4</sup> See Parkes, *op. cit.*, p. 89. In a comment on the first draft of the present chapter of this Study, the same Western Christian Gentile student of Jewish history put in the following words the dilemma with which the Jewish diaspora in the West found itself confronted in Herzl's generation: 'Western nationalism fundamentally made Jewish assimilation impossible. The tragedy was implicit in the Jews' position, not in the Jews' choice of Nationalism. Whichever line they adopted offered them a tragic solution.'

<sup>5</sup> See p. 292, above.

<sup>6</sup> See Parkes, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-39.

to infection by pre-Liberal Western ideologies still persisting among the backward Gentile populations of the adjoining 'Pale' after the dawn of Liberalism farther west; and the notion that the Western Jews might win for themselves, by adopting Western Nationalism, an asylum which they might prove not to have secured through a conversion to Western Liberalism would naturally present itself to the minds of Austrian Jews whose nineteenth-century status of individual emancipation was threatened by the simultaneous onsets of a Modern Gentile Nationalism from Western Europe and a Medieval Gentile Antisemitism from 'the Pale'.<sup>1</sup>

*Inherent Consequences of the Captivation of the Jews by a Modern Western Gentile Nationalism*

A Modern Western Gentile Nationalism, with its medieval objective of self-imposed ghettos for all peoples, was an exaggeration, amounting to a caricature, of the traditional Western ideal of the homogeneous single-community parochial state; but, in this archaistic Modern Western ideology's North American and West European birthplaces, its devastating effects were mitigated by the circumstance that in these countries Nationalism was virtually a consecration of the existing state of the map. In France and other Western countries on both shores of the Atlantic towards the close of the eighteenth century, the populations actually were distributed in locally homogeneous blocks approximately corresponding to the territories of existing sovereign states; and, though, as the mania of Nationalism progressively travelled eastwards—infecting first the eastern parts of the Western World and thereafter the domains of divers living non-Western societies—it was successively attacking countries where the contemporary cartographical facts were more and more sharply at variance with the nationalistic ideal, it was not till it attacked the Western Jewish diaspora that it came to affect a community whose contemporary geographical distribution and political allegiance afforded Nationalism no vestige whatsoever of a basis in the realm of existing facts.

The alien converts to this Modern Western Nationalism whose predicament came nearest to being like that of the Jews were the Armenians; yet even the Armenians differed from the Jews in having continuously preserved, into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a remnant of an ancestral territory in which they were still the local cultivators of the soil. While the latter-day Jewish and Armenian diasporas were remarkably similar to one another in geographical distribution, economic occupation, communal organization, and psychological attitude, there was no element in a latter-day Jewry corresponding to the autochthonous Armenian peasantry of Van, Erivan, and the Qārabagh; and, in the light of the consequences of the impact of Nationalism on the Armenians, this difference in the situation of the Armenian and the Jewish people in the twentieth century had a bearing on Jewry's prospects. In the fortunes

<sup>1</sup> The Antisemitic Christian-Social leader Karl Lueger was elected Burgomaster of Vienna in October 1895, and was allowed by the Emperor Francis Joseph to assume office in March 1897 after he had been re-elected no less than four times against the Emperor's veto.—Parkes, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

of the Armenian diaspora the impact of Nationalism had spelled tragedy; for the adoption of the Western ideal of Nationalism by an Armenian diaspora that was everywhere in a minority had threatened the non-Armenian majority among whom they were dispersed with the alternative calamities of subjugation or eviction, and this menaced majority had safeguarded its own future by the barbarous method of wiping the Armenian diaspora off the map in the successive massacres and deportations of which the Armenians were the victims in the Ottoman Empire between A.D. 1896 and A.D. 1922. In this catastrophe which their conversion to Nationalism had brought upon them, the Armenian people were saved from complete extinction thanks to their having preserved a parcel of territory in which they had never ceased to constitute a majority of the local population; and the generation that saw the destruction of the Armenian diaspora in Turkey also saw the establishment of a miniature Armenian national state in the shape of the Republic of Erivan within the framework of the Soviet Union.

This Armenian experience illustrated a simple law of Nationalism which was manifest to historians though it had been ignored by nationalists. The destructiveness of Nationalism was proportionate to the degree of the discrepancy between the ideal of Nationalism and the local state of existing geographical and political facts. Even in the *ci-devant* British colonies in North America, where the discrepancy was at a minimum at the date of the Revolutionary War, it was nevertheless sufficiently serious to make itself grievously felt in the expulsion of the United Empire Loyalists.<sup>1</sup> The enormously greater devastation caused by the impact of Nationalism on the Armenians was proportionate to the enormously greater degree of the discrepancy in that case. What was to be the outcome of the impact of Nationalism on the Jews, in whose case the discrepancy was at its maximum? By the time when Zionism was inaugurated in the nineteenth century of the Christian Era, more than seventeen hundred years had passed since the last date at which there had been any territory continuously inhabited by a compact Jewish agricultural population corresponding to the Armenian peasantry in the neighbourhood of Erivan. The Jews had had no living homeland of the kind since A.D. 135, when the last roots of Jewry in Judaea had been pulled out of the soil by the Romans.<sup>2</sup> What practical applications of the Modern Western ideal of Nationalism were open to a people in this historical plight?

In theory, Jewish nationalists *alla Franca* had a choice between two alternatives. Their objective of providing Jewry with a country which would be 'as Jewish as England' was 'English'<sup>3</sup> could be attained either by colonizing some no-man's-land in 'the great open spaces', which had

<sup>1</sup> See IV. iv. 165-7.

<sup>2</sup> Dr. James Parkes comments:

'When the last roots of Jewry were pulled up in the hills of Judaea, substantial communities remained across the Jordan, around the fringes and in the plains, and a relatively compact and by that time more numerous Jewish community in Galilee was almost untouched. The Galilean patriarchate exercised certain political and religious powers over Jews elsewhere right up to A.D. 435. This is the date of the disappearance of anything which could be called a Jewish government [in Palestine].'

<sup>3</sup> A phrase quoted by Sir W. Churchill in his memorandum of the 3rd June, 1922.

been opened up through Western pioneering enterprise, or alternatively by supplanting the Gentile inhabitants of such parts of Palestine as had been inhabited by Jews before A.D. 135. The second of these two alternative possible programmes was beset with difficulties, moral as well as material. It required the eviction of an existing population which, by the year A.D. 1897, when Theodor Herzl inaugurated the Zionist Movement, must be reckoned to have been at home in Palestine for more than seventeen and a half centuries, since the most recent drastic change in the composition of the population of Palestine had taken place as far back as the morrow of the suppression, in A.D. 135,<sup>1</sup> of the last Jewish insurrection against the Roman Imperial Government, when there had been a systematic colonization of the previously Jewish-inhabited districts of Palestine by Gentile settlers from other parts of the Roman Empire.<sup>2</sup>

Even if it were to be assumed—though this assumption would be unwarrantable—that the subsequent population included no elements that had been there before the second century of the Christian Era, this latter-day population's tenancy of its Palestinian home would still have been longer, by at least a hundred years, than the previous tenancy of the same parts of Palestine by the Children of Israel and Judah—on the assumption that these too had not incorporated any elements from an earlier population—even at the longest reckoning of the interval between the entry of the Israelites in the course of a post-Minoan *Völkerwanderung* in the days of the New Empire of Egypt and the eviction of the Jews by the Romans in A.D. 70 and A.D. 135.<sup>3</sup> A similar

<sup>1</sup> The subsequent change that had followed the Primitive Muslim Arab conquest of Palestine in A.D. 636–7 had been not only much less abrupt but also probably smaller even in the aggregate. The Arabs who had seeped into Palestine gradually in the course of the next 1,260 years had made Palestine a wholly Arabic-speaking country by converting much more than by supplanting the pre-existing population.

<sup>2</sup> See Spruner, K., and Menke, Th.: *Atlas Antiquus*, 3rd ed. (Gotha 1862, Perthes), Plate No. xxvi, the central map: 'Syria Phoenice, Syria Palaestina Provinciae ab Aerae Christianae Anno 70 usque ad Diocletiani Tempus.'

<sup>3</sup> Dr. James Parkes comments:

'I do not believe that the argument about changes of tenancy is valid. There is no moment in Palestinian history when, over the whole or a large part of the country, there was a sudden change of population. Many who think of themselves as Arabs to-day had ancestors who had been at one time heathen or "Canaanites", and later Jews, and then, probably, Christians (after Justinian). There is an unchanging core of indefinable size, and there are accretions of every century. Certainly there were far more Jews in the country for at least a century after the Arab conquest than there were "Arabs" or "Muslims"; and, when the majority became Muslim and Arabic-speaking, it is probable that more were ex-Jews and ex-Christians than newly-arrived "Arabs", though there must have been a considerable number of the latter, especially after good government passed and allowed increasing badawi encroachment.'

This comment, with which the writer of this Study entirely agreed (see p. 207, n. 1, above), moved him to add a comment of his own. In his personal opinion the title of the population of Palestine or any other country to be left in the undisturbed possession of their homes rested on the human rights of the living generation, and its validity did not depend on the production of evidence proving that the living generation's ancestors had been *in situ* for this or that number of centuries. If, however, the question of the legitimacy of the title of the non-Jewish population inhabiting Palestine during the half century A.D. 1897–1948 were to be argued on the (in the writer's opinion) more academic ground of length of ancestral tenure, then evidently the historical facts cited by Dr. Parkes in his comment and agreed with him by the present writer would make the pre-Zionist population's title overwhelmingly strong; for, on this showing, the living generation of this population were the descendants, heirs, and representatives not merely of the Arabs who had seeped in since the conquest of Palestine by the Primitive Muslim

eviction of the population by which Palestine was inhabited at the close of the nineteenth century, and by which it continued to be inhabited down to the year A.D. 1948, could be achieved only by an act of military aggression, at the existing population's expense, such as had been committed by the wild tribesmen of Israel and Judah when they had originally broken into Palestine from the Arabian Desert, and by the Minoan Philistines and Western Christian Crusaders when they had broken in from the Mediterranean seaboard. Such aggression would be militarily and politically difficult to commit so long as Palestine remained within the Ottoman Empire and until Zionism obtained the backing of a preponderant group of Western Powers; and, under all military and political conditions, it would be morally difficult to defend in a world in which the progress of technology was making the scourge of war so prohibitively severe that aggression was coming to be recognized for the crime that it always had been. It would likewise be morally difficult for Zionists to justify in the eyes, not only of the Gentiles, but also of the traditionally orthodox Jews of the quietist school known as *Agudath Israel*.<sup>1</sup>

*Inherent Consequences of Zionism's Departure from a Traditional Jewish Practice of Political Quietism*

While a confident expectation of the eventual return of a surviving diaspora of Jewry and a vanished diaspora of Israel to their previous homes in Palestine was a fundamental tenet of orthodox Judaism which had inspired the Jewish diaspora to preserve its communal identity over a period of 1,762 years, reckoning back from the inauguration of the Zionist Movement in A.D. 1897 to the suppression of Bar Kōkabā's messianic insurrection in A.D. 135, the sixty generations of Jews in diaspora that had come and gone in the course of that flow of Time had persisted in leaving it to Almighty God to carry out on His, and not on His Chosen's People's, initiative a restoration that all schools of orthodox Judaism alike held to be an act that was God's prerogative. This persistent practice of all post-Hadrianic Jews—orthodox, heretical, agnostic, and anti-religious—had been consecrated by *Agudath Israel* in their belief that any fresh recourse to a human initiative for the purpose of bringing the restoration to pass would be an impious usurpation of God's prerogative by human hands.

In taking this view the *Agudath* appear to have been a minority among the orthodox, and the *Mizrachi* who embraced Zionism without admitting that this was incompatible with orthodoxy could argue that a post-Hadrianic practice of refraining from taking political action for bringing about the return had been merely prompted by manifest ex-

Arabs in A.D. 636-7, and not merely of the Hellenic or Hellenizing Gentile colonists who had been planted in Palestine in the second century of the Christian Era, but of the Jews and the Israelites themselves and of the Israelites' incorporated Canaanite predecessors right back to the Mesolithic Natufian fathers of agriculture and the Middle Palaeolithic Carmelite cross-breeds between *Homo Sapiens* and *Homo Neandertalensis* (see Albright, W. F.: *The Archaeology of Palestine* (London 1949, Penguin), pp. 59 and 55).

<sup>1</sup> The attitude of *Agudath Israel* and the difference between its negative-minded non-violence and the positive-minded non-violence of Rabbi Johanan ben Zakkai's response to the challenge of the fall of Jerusalem in A.D. 70, have been noticed in V. v. 76, 588-9, and 617, n. 2, and V. vi. 128.



pediency without being enjoined by any generally accepted article of Jewish belief. Against the practice of the 1,762 years running back from A.D. 1897 to A.D. 135 they could adduce the contrary practice of the 674 years running back from A.D. 135 to 539 B.C., during which the Jews, after having first hailed as their messiah their Gentile liberator Cyrus the Achaemenid, had risen again and again, at the call of successive native Theudas and Judases, on the then forlorn hope of restoring an extinguished kingdom of David by force of Jewish arms. The orthodox Jewish converts to a Herzlian Zionism could also argue that, while a policy of quietism might, in adverse circumstances, be expedient, a policy of activism could never be impious, since another fundamental tenet of Judaism was a belief that God works within History and not outside it, and gives effect to His will in human affairs by acting through divinely inspired human agents. Yet, however cogent the *Mizrachi's* reply to the *Agudath* might be, there were difficulties in their position likewise.

These difficulties did not arise in regard to those Gentile militarists and empire-builders who, in Jewish belief, had been historic agents of the Almighty God of Israel; for, if these Gentiles had indeed played this role, they had been signally unaware of the mission which they were carrying out. The Assyrian, Neo-Babylonian, Seleucid, and Roman warlords, whose crushing military superiority might appear, to an unenlightened eye, to be the natural explanation of Israel's and Judah's calamities, remained naïvely ignorant of the bizarre fact that, in the sight of Jewish seers, they had been the unintentional and unconscious agents of a One True God<sup>1</sup> who had been employing them, without deigning to make them privy to His counsels, to punish His Chosen People for their sins with an eye to forgiving and restoring this Chosen People when a sufficient experience of suffering should have brought forth fruits meet for repentance<sup>2</sup> in Jewish hearts. There was no moral ambiguity or ambivalence in the role of an unintentional and unconscious agent of God's act of forgiveness and restoration, for which a Gentile Cyrus had been cast by a Jewish prophet;<sup>3</sup> but what about the subsequent Jewish *soi-disant* messiahs who had claimed the allegiance of their fellow Jews on the pretension that they were the Lord's Anointed? How were their fellow Jews to discern whether these professed executors of God's will were truly inspired? And, even if they were not cynically fraudulent impostors, could they be acquitted of being presumptuously arrogant visionaries? Could they be held innocent of having taken the divine law into their own human hands? And was not this an act of presumption which was also an act of impiety? Was not the Lord's repudiation of their claim and disapproval of their action patently signified in the heaviness of the disasters which He had invariably allowed them to bring upon themselves and upon their deluded followers? And, if this had been God's judgement on the Theudas and Judases, who had never dreamed of disbelieving in God, and who had been prompted by a sincere though misguided desire to put God's will

<sup>1</sup> See V. vi. 123-6.

<sup>2</sup> Deutero-Isaiah xlv. 28 and xlv. 1-4.

<sup>3</sup> Matt. iii. 8; cp. Luke iii. 8.

into effect by hastening the advent of a messianic kingdom which God had promised to Judah through His prophets, how was a God-fearing Jewry to reconcile itself with a secular Zionist movement that numbered agnostics among its leaders, and whose programme had been inspired, not by the messianic visions of post-Exilic Jewish prophets, but by the blue-prints of a Western Gentile Nationalism whose prophets had been a King Louis XI of France, a King Henry VII of England, and the Florentine publicist Niccolò Machiavelli?<sup>1</sup>

These theological and moral difficulties in the ideology of Zionism were matched by its political awkwardness; for, in deliberately departing from the political quietism that had been Jewry's consistent practice for some sixty generations ending in A.D. 1897, it had abandoned a traditional Jewish attitude that had made Jewry's survival in diaspora possible by inspiring the Jews with an unquenchable hope without confronting the Jews' Gentile successors in Palestine with a standing menace. So long as the Jewish diaspora was content bona fide to leave the future of Palestine in the hands of God, the existing Christian and Muslim inhabitants of the Promised Land could afford to do likewise; and, when the orthodox Jewish doctrine of an eventual repatriation of Jewry to Palestine through an act of God was thus accompanied by a traditional Jewish practice of political quietism, the doctrine—like a derivative Christian doctrine of the Second Coming of Christ—could be interpreted in crude Machiavellian or Marxian terms as a psychological device, not for bringing to pass a 'far-off divine event to which the whole creation moves',<sup>2</sup> but for maintaining, *en attendant ad infinitum*, the social cohesion of a mundane community in diaspora.<sup>3</sup> A worldly-minded member of the relatively prosperous latter-day Jewish diaspora in the Western World west of 'the Pale' might accordingly endorse, on grounds of present communal self-interest, a traditional belief which an unworldly-minded member of a still unemancipated Jewry in 'the Pale' would cherish as a corollary of his trust in God and his intuition that the true end of Man is to glorify and enjoy God for ever.

It will be seen that *Agudath Israel's* religious scruples and the Palestinian Arabs' political anxieties alike could have been reconciled with a latter-day Jewish nationalism *alla Franca* if the Zionists had decided to seek a site for the Jewish national state of their dreams, not in Palestine, but in some no-man's-land. In the first chapter of the history of Zionism this issue was an open question which was hotly contested. It was not till an offer of a site in East Africa had been made by the British Government on the 14th August, 1903, and been declined by the Seventh Zionist Congress in A.D. 1905<sup>4</sup> that the die was irrevocably cast in favour of identifying the goal of latter-day Jewish nationalist en-

<sup>1</sup> See II. ii. 252-4 and V. vi. 216.

<sup>2</sup> Tennyson: *In Memoriam*, Conclusion, Stanza xxxvi.

<sup>3</sup> A deeper and more convincing psychological interpretation of the Jewish and the Christian hope might be that both doctrines were myths, formulated in collective terms, of a spiritual pilgrim's progress through which it was open to the souls of individual human beings to return, with God's help, from an exile in the wilderness of Original Sin to a lost paradise of voluntary concordance with the will of their Creator.

<sup>4</sup> See Sokolow, N.: *History of Zionism, 1600-1918* (London 1919, Longmans Green, 2 vols.), vol. i, pp. 296-7; Stein, L.: *Zionism* (London 1925, Benn), pp. 94-95.

deavours with the Palestinian *qiblah* of the traditional Jewish religious hope. This fateful decision was not dictated *a priori* by the orthodox Jewish tradition. In the hyper-orthodox eyes of *Agudath Israel*, a Political Zionism that had selected the historical Zion as its objective had indeed, as we have seen, thereby rendered itself guilty of impiety. The preference for Palestine over East Africa was prompted by the spirit of the exotic Gentile ideology to which the Zionist Jews had succumbed; for the *éthos* of this Modern Western Nationalism was inveterately archaistic,<sup>1</sup> and, in opting for Palestine in A.D. 1903-5, the Zionists were acting under the inspiration of a Western Gentile Romantic Movement which had previously captivated the Gentile peoples round about them.<sup>2</sup>

Archaism, as we have seen in another context,<sup>3</sup> is always a perilous pursuit, but it is most perilous of all when it is taken up by members of a community that is a fossil relic of a dead civilization, since the Past to which the archaists have it in their power to cast back in such a case may be more sharply at variance with present realities than even the remotest past state of a society belonging to the living generation of the species. A Western-inspired archaism carried the twentieth-century Zionist faction of a Jewish diaspora back to the aims and *éthos* of the generation of Joshua; and the consequent replacement of the traditional Jewish hope of an eventual restoration of Israel to Palestine on God's initiative, through the agency of a divinely inspired Messiah, by a Zionist Movement, working to establish a Jewish national state in Palestine on Jewry's initiative by mundane political and military means, had the same explosive effect as the contemporary replacement of the traditional Christian hope of an eventual millennium to be inaugurated at the Second Coming of Christ by a Communist Movement working to establish a mundane new dispensation by means of a world revolution.

'When ye shall see the abomination of desolation, spoken of by Daniel the Prophet, standing where it ought not (let him that readeth understand), then let them that be in Judaea flee to the mountains. . . . For in those days shall be affliction, such as was not from the beginning of the creation which God created unto this time.'<sup>4</sup>

### *The Effects of the First World War on the Destiny of Palestine*

The calamities which inexorably overtook the Jews in Continental Europe and the Arabs in Palestine in the twentieth century of the Christian Era were indeed implicit in the decision taken in the nineteenth century by a section of the Jewish diaspora in the West when they adopted a programme of collective Westernization on the lines of the archaistically oriented Modern Western ideal of Nationalism. Yet the rise of a Zionist Movement whose objective was a Jewish national state in Palestine would not in itself have been capable of producing

<sup>1</sup> The influence of this vein of Archaism in aggravating a Modern Western Nationalism's devastating effect on the lives of its Ottoman Orthodox Christian converts has been noticed on p. 191, n. 2, above.

<sup>2</sup> 'Zionism, in defiance of common-sense but in obedience to a deep-seated instinct, declared itself once and for all a movement concerned wholly and solely with Palestine' (Stein, *op. cit.*, p. 95).

<sup>3</sup> In V. vi. 49-97.

<sup>4</sup> Mark xiii. 14 and 19; Matt. xxiv. 15 and 21; Dan. xi. 31 and xii. 11.

these tragic effects if a Gentile Western Society had not fallen into a succession of world wars, precipitated by the indigenous nationalism of the Gentile Western peoples, for which neither Arabs nor Jews were responsible. The outbreak of the First World War struck the fatal spark that ignited a fortuitously laid train of gunpowder.

The first link in a concatenation of inauspicious events was the break-up of the Ottoman Empire in Asia as a consequence of its intervention in the war of A.D. 1914-18 on what proved to be the losing side. Under the Ottoman dispensation the Arab population of Palestine had been insured against becoming the victims of Zionist ambitions to their detriment thanks to the fact that the Muslim majority of the Palestinian Arabs was part of the dominant Muslim community in an empire whose integrity in Asia had hitherto been preserved substantially intact by an interplay between the Ottoman Muslims' collective strength and an international balance of power.<sup>1</sup> Ever since the political control of Palestine had passed out of Christian into Muslim hands as a result of the Primitive Muslim Arab conquest in the seventh century of the Christian Era, Jews had been free to resort to, and reside in, Palestine for the purpose of religious exercises and studies; and since A.D. 1882 the Ottoman Government had allowed the Zionists to found agricultural settlements in the Palestinian country-side on a scale that was modest enough to avoid the provocation of any alarm or resentment among the Arab inhabitants of the country.<sup>2</sup> This Ottoman safeguard to the rights and interests of the Palestinian Arabs was removed by the overthrow of the Ottoman imperial régime.

The antecedent overthrow of the Romanov imperial régime in Russia—likewise in consequence of defeat in the war of A.D. 1914-18—had already removed another of the Palestinian Arabs' safeguards; for, down to A.D. 1914, the Russian people had continued to follow in large numbers the traditional Christian practice—long since almost obsolete in the West—of going on pilgrimage to the Holy Land, and the Russian Imperial Government—which had identified itself with the Antisemitism of the Western or semi-Westernized Christian majority in the population of the former United Kingdom of Poland-Lithuania since the lion's share of this vast area had become 'the Jewish Pale' of the Russian Empire—had been intransigent in vetoing any inclination on the part of its Western allies to grant satisfaction to Zionist aspirations in Palestine,

<sup>1</sup> This Ottoman insurance policy had cost the Muslim majority of the Palestinian Arabs an expensive premium in the shape of military conscription into an Ottoman Army in which the rate of mortality—from disease even more than from hostilities—had been cruelly high. The Palestinian Arabs' subsequent fate suggested that it had been worth their while to pay even this price for the preservation of their existence.

<sup>2</sup> The flow of Jewish emigration from 'the Pale' into Palestine between A.D. 1882 and A.D. 1914 was a mere trickle compared to 'the immense stream which flowed into the expanding centres of the World's industry [in the Western countries]' (Parkes, J.: *The Jewish Problem in the Modern World*, 1st American ed. (New York 1946, Oxford University Press), p. 66). By the time of the outbreak of war in A.D. 1914, there were fifty-nine Jewish agricultural settlements in Palestine with an aggregate population of twelve or thirteen thousand. (See the list in Nawratzki, K.: *Die Jüdische Kolonisation Palästinas* (Munich 1914, Reinhardt), Anlage 18. The figures of inhabitants given in this table add up to only 10,105, but the figures for seven settlements are missing.) The total Jewish population of Palestine at the same date numbered about 80,000, out of about 750,000 Palestinians of all faiths.

on the ground that the transformation of Palestine into a Jewish national state would desecrate a Holy Land which still meant to Russians all that it had once meant to other Christians likewise. The Tsardom fell on the 12th March, 1917; the Balfour Declaration was issued on the 2nd November of the same year.

Another political factor which the First World War brought into play was a competition between the belligerents in courting the sympathy of Jewry. To win Jewish support—and, still more, to avert Jewish hostility—was an object of great moment to both sides; for, imperfect though the psychological emancipation of the Jewish diaspora in the West may still have been at this date, their economic and political emancipation had already gone far enough to give Jewry's suffrages a substantial and perhaps decisive weight in a trembling Western balance of international power. The Jews were now an appreciable force in the domestic political life of the Central and the Western European Powers alike, and of the United States to a still greater degree; and the feelings of the American Jewish community loomed large in the calculations of European belligerents who had come to realize that the United States would have the last word to speak in a European conflict and that this American last word might be influenced appreciably by the views of Jewish American citizens.

In the course of the thirty-six years ending in A.D. 1917 the Jews throughout the World had come, with good reason, to look upon Russia as being Jewry's 'Enemy Number One', and, in the First World War, Germany, as the protagonist on the anti-Russian side whose victorious arms had liberated a large part of 'the Pale' from an Antisemitic Russian rule, stood to gain those world-wide Jewish sympathies which the West European Powers stood to lose as Russia's allies. After the German Army had pushed the Russian Army back in A.D. 1915 to a line approximating to the Russo-Polish political frontier of A.D. 1793, the German General Staff gave American Jewish journalists opportunities of seeing with their own eyes how the Russians had found vent for their rage at their shattering defeat at German hands by discharging it on an innocent and defenceless Jewish population in the territory that they had been forced to evacuate. For the West European Powers—and for the United States likewise, as soon as she became their co-belligerent—it was a matter of urgency to outmatch this card which Germany had acquired through conquering 'the Pale', and a trump card had been placed in their hands by a British conquest of Palestine which put it in their power to offer satisfaction to Zionist aspirations. The Western Powers were tantalizingly inhibited from playing this Palestinian card so long as they had any hope of keeping their Antisemitic Russian partner in the firing-line; and it is no wonder that the Balfour Declaration was published as soon as the last Western hopes of further Russian military collaboration had expired.

#### *Great Britain's Responsibility for the Catastrophe in Palestine*

In taking a measure so well calculated to help them to win a war in which they were fighting for their lives, it is comprehensible that the



Western Powers should not have looked ahead beyond the hoped-for achievement of victory. They were less blameworthy for making dubious commitments concerning Palestine to Jews and Arabs while the First World War was still being fought than they were for shirking their consequent duty, in the subsequent interval of peace, to face the equivocal situation which they had created in Palestine under the stress of a world war and to liquidate it at the earliest possible date with the least possible injury and injustice to the parties to whom their war-time commitments had been made. The Western Power that bore the lion's share of the responsibility for the inter-war failure to retrieve the position in Palestine was Great Britain, who, first as Occupying Power and then as Mandatory, was conducting the administration of Palestine from A.D. 1917 to A.D. 1948.

Throughout those crucial thirty years the British attitude—common to all parties and adopted by successive ministries—was one of culpably wilful blindness.<sup>1</sup> The Palestine which the British had conquered from the 'Osmanlis in A.D. 1917-18 was a province of an Ottoman World in which mixed populations had been exploding, with a fearful cost in human suffering, ever since the extermination of the Muslim diaspora in the Morea by Greek Orthodox Christian insurgents in A.D. 1821.<sup>2</sup> Even British statesmen who were ignorant of nineteenth-century Ottoman history could not be unaware of the fate that had overtaken the Armenian diaspora in Anatolia in A.D. 1915; and, after that portent in this adjacent Ottoman territory had failed to deter the British from embarking in Palestine on the deliberate creation of a new explosive mixture of mutually incompatible national ingredients, the fate that overtook the Greek diaspora in Anatolia in A.D. 1922 might still have counselled them to reconsider the Balfour Declaration before it was too late. A third warning was given them by the explosion that inevitably followed in Palestine itself in A.D. 1929. Yet, in spite of these awful object lessons, British statesmanship doggedly kept Palestine headed for manifest disaster while the local situation went from bad to worse until it got completely out of hand as a result of the advent of the Nazis to power in Germany, their unprecedentedly inhuman persecution of the Jews in the Reich, and the extension of this campaign of 'genocide' to the rest of Continental Europe after the outbreak of a Second World War in A.D. 1939.

From first to last, there was never a practicable plan in British minds for peacefully stabilizing the explosively unstable situation in Palestine which Britain had deliberately created. The British Government did not attempt to stabilize even the respective numbers of the Arab and Jewish elements in the population until the Jewish minority had been allowed to become so large—'approaching a third of the entire population of the country'<sup>3</sup>—that there was no longer any chance of its being willing to remain a minority in a bi-national state and no longer any possibility of such a state, if ever constituted on paper, finding it possible to govern itself through the Western institution of majority rule.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See p. 290, n. 2, above.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 190-2, above.

<sup>3</sup> United Kingdom Parliamentary Paper Cmd. 6019 of the 17th May, 1939, para. 6.

<sup>4</sup> See p. 305, n. 4, below.

Though the Mandatory Power's official apologists might offer juridical proofs that British promises to Jews and Arabs in respect of Palestine were not formally incompatible, it would have been difficult to argue that the undeniably incompatible expectations which had been engendered by these British promises in Jewish and in Arab minds were not legitimate inferences, on their part, from the British declarations.<sup>1</sup> Whatever an official British spokesman might say, or the Jewish Agency profess, during the earlier phases of the mandatory régime, it was psychologically impossible to promise the establishment in Palestine of 'a national home' for the Jewish people—specifically including the facilitation of Jewish immigration and the encouragement of close settlement by Jews on the land—without encouraging Zionists to look forward to the establishment there of a Jewish national state, notwithstanding the stipulation in the Balfour Declaration and in the Mandate that the rights and position of other sections of the population should not be prejudiced, and likewise impossible to promise 'the development of self-governing institutions'<sup>2</sup> to a country in which the Arab element in the population was in an overwhelming majority, at the time when the mandate was conferred and the terms of the mandate were worked out,<sup>3</sup> without encouraging Palestinian Arabs to look forward to the establishment in Palestine of an Arab national state, notwithstanding the stipulation in the Mandate, as well as in the Balfour Declaration, requiring the establishment in Palestine of a Jewish 'national home'.

The object lesson of Turco-Greek and Turco-Armenian relations during a century culminating in the two catastrophes of A.D. 1915 and A.D. 1922 confuted in advance the Mandatory Power's official pious belief that the mandatory régime would somehow miraculously save Great Britain's honour by engendering one day a self-governing bi-national Arab-Jewish Palestinian state.<sup>4</sup> In a memorandum of the 3rd

<sup>1</sup> In the United Kingdom Parliamentary Paper Cmd. 6019 of the 17th May, 1939, para. 3, the Mandatory Power confessed that 'the Royal Commission [of A.D. 1936-7] and previous commissions of enquiry' had 'drawn attention to the ambiguity of certain expressions in the Mandate, such as the expression "a national home for the Jewish people", and' that they had 'found in this ambiguity and in the resulting uncertainty as to the objectives of policy a fundamental cause of unrest and hostility between Arabs and Jews.'

<sup>2</sup> Mandate for Palestine, Article 2.

<sup>3</sup> The mandate for Palestine was conferred on Great Britain on the 25th April, 1920, by the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers during the Conference of San Remo; the final text of the instrument in which the mandate was embodied was dated the 24th July, 1922; the mandate officially came into force on the 29th September, 1923. According to a census taken by the Mandatory Power on the 23rd October, 1922, there were in Palestine on that date 671,098 Arabs (including Marāwīlāh, Druses, and Christians, as well as Sunnis), 83,794 Jews, and 2,290 others (Samaritans, Bahā'īs, Hindus, Sikhs) in a total population of 757,182 (Palestine Government: *Report and General Abstracts of the Census of 1922*, p. 58). On this showing, the Arab majority in the population of Palestine amounted to nearly 90 per cent. of the whole at the date when the second article of the Mandate for Palestine was drafted.

<sup>4</sup> At as late a date as the 17th May, 1939, when the hands of the clock of History were indicating the approach of the eleventh hour, the United Kingdom Government were still declaring that, apart from their specific obligation under the Mandate 'to secure the development of self-governing institutions in Palestine', 'they would regard it as contrary to the whole spirit of the mandate system that the population of Palestine should remain for ever under mandatory tutelage'. Yet, in the same paragraph of the same state paper (Cmd. 6019 of 1939, para. 8), they found themselves constrained to confess that, while they desired 'to see established ultimately an independent Palestine state . . . in which the two peoples in Palestine, Arabs and Jews', could 'share authority in government in such a way that the essential interests of each' would be 'secured', they

June, 1922, Sir Winston Churchill, as British Secretary of State for the Colonies, had the hardihood to commit himself to the opinion that the Balfour Declaration did 'not contain or imply anything which need cause either alarm to the Arab population of Palestine or disappointment to the Jews'. The harsh truth was that, in issuing the Balfour Declaration and subsequently undertaking a mandate for Palestine in which its terms were embodied, Great Britain was condemning one or other of the two communities concerned to suffer a fearful catastrophe in the same breath in which she was undertaking to make herself responsible 'for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion'.

In the light of sensational events in adjacent Ottoman territories it could be predicted with assurance after A.D. 1915, and with double assurance after A.D. 1922, that the mandatory régime in Palestine would end in the death or eviction or subjugation of hundreds of thousands of human beings. The only open question was whether these non-divinely predestined victims were to be Arab or Jewish men, women, and children; and the denouement in A.D. 1948-9 bore out the contentions made in the Arab reply to the Churchill memorandum of A.D. 1922. It was incontestable that, during the thirty years ending in the terminal date of the British mandatory régime in A.D. 1948, the three hundred thousand Jewish immigrants introduced into Palestine in the course of that period entered the country 'by the might of England against the will of the people, who' were 'convinced that these' had 'come to strangle them';<sup>1</sup> and the event proved that this British action did in truth mean the Palestinian Arabs' 'extinction sooner or later', in spite of the clear undertaking in the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate that nothing should be done that might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.

#### *Germany's and the United States' Responsibility for the Catastrophe in Palestine*

The perversely predestined catastrophe in Palestine in A.D. 1948 was precipitated by three events. The first of these was the rise of the Jewish

were 'unable at present to foresee the exact constitutional forms which government in Palestine' would 'eventually take' and (para. 10(v)) were making 'no proposals at this stage regarding the establishment of an elective legislature'.

<sup>1</sup> According to the United Kingdom Parliamentary Paper Cmd. 6019 of the 17th May, 1939, para. 6, more than 300,000 Jews had immigrated into Palestine by that date since the publication of the Churchill memorandum of the 3rd June, 1922, and the population of the Jewish national home had risen to some 450,000 (nearly a third of the total population of the country). According to the Government of Palestine, *Statistical Abstract, 1943* (Jerusalem 1944, Government Printing Press), p. 3, the period 1922 to 1942 saw a total increase of 400,618 in the Jewish population of Palestine, from 83,790 to 484,408 (29.9 per cent. of the total population of the country), and, of these 400,618 additional Jewish souls, no less than 305,803 were immigrants and no more than 94,815 were the fruit of natural increase. The total increase in the number of the Palestinian Muslims during the same period was 406,115; of these, no less than 386,100 were the fruit of natural increase (thanks to the cessation of Ottoman military conscription and the improvement in public health under a British mandatory régime); and, of the 20,015 souls, out of these 406,115, that were added to the Muslim population of Palestine during these years from sources other than natural increase, no more than 10,315 were immigrants; for 9,700 of them were inhabitants of districts transferred to Palestine from the Lebanon and Syria in A.D. 1923.

community in the United States, subsequently to the Jewish influx from the Russian Pale in and after A.D. 1881,<sup>1</sup> to a degree of economic and political power in American life at which the Jewish vote had become a force in the arena of American domestic politics for whose support the two party machines must eagerly compete, and which therefore neither of them could afford to alienate. The second decisive event was the 'genocide' of the Jewish diaspora in Continental Europe at German Gentile hands in A.D. 1933-45; the third was the outbreak of 'a cold war' between the Soviet Union and the United States after the overthrow of Fascism by the united efforts of Western Parliamentary Democracy and Communism in the Second World War. None of these events had any intrinsic connexion with the issue between Jews and Arabs in Palestine,<sup>2</sup> yet, between them, they had an effect that was as decisive as it was untoward and inequitable on the course of this act in the tragedy.

There was neither justice nor expediency in the exaction from Palestinian Arabs of compensation due to European Jews for crimes committed against them by Western Gentiles. Justice required that the debt to Continental European Jewry which the Western World had incurred through the criminality of a Western nation should be assumed by a defeated Germany's victorious Western adversaries; and expediency pointed in the same direction as justice; for the victorious Western countries between them did possess the capacity—for which Palestine's resources were quite inadequate—of absorbing the European Jewish survivors of the *Furor Teutonicus* without seriously deranging their own domestic social equilibrium. On the 15th December, 1946, the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization duly urged each of its members to receive its fair share of non-repatriable persons for permanent resettlement in its territory at the earliest possible time,<sup>3</sup> but this resolution was not welcomed either by the Jewish diaspora in the United States or by the Zionists. The American Jews may have been moved partly by the self-regarding consideration that even a moderate further increase in their own numbers might prejudice their already delicate relations with their Gentile fellow citizens, and the makers of Zionist policy partly by a callous determination to turn the personal tribulations of European Jewry to account for the promotion of Zionist political aims in Palestine. Whatever the mixture of Jewish motives may have been, Jewry made it clear that it had set its heart on a Jewish national state in Palestine as an asylum for the remnant of the European diaspora; and thereupon the Democratic and Republican parties in the United States, and the United States and the Soviet Union in the United Nations Organization, vied with one another in contending for Jewish support by displaying a competitive zeal for furthering the fulfilment of

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 292 and 294, above.

<sup>2</sup> The rise and character of the National Socialist Movement in Germany and the inauguration and terms of the Mandate in Palestine were, of course, indirectly connected with one another in the sense that both the Mandate and National Socialism were outcomes of the defeat of the Quadruple Alliance in the First World War; but this rather tenuous ultimate common origin was the only relation between them.

<sup>3</sup> United Nations: *Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, 23rd October-15th December, 1946* (Lake Success 1947, U.N.O.), Resolution No. 62(1), para. (e), on p. 98.

Jewish aspirations, as Great Britain and Germany had contended for Jewish support in the likewise critical years A.D. 1915-17.

*Realpolitik*—in the twofold form of a competition for the winning of Jewish support both in the international struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union and in the domestic struggle between the Democratic and Republican parties in the United States—was not, of course, the only motive that moved America to relieve Great Britain unceremoniously of as much of the blood-guiltiness for the tragedy in Palestine as she could manage at this late hour to transfer from the ex-Mandatory Power's head on to her own.<sup>1</sup> The American approach to the Palestinian problem was, on the whole, less Machiavellian than it was Quixotic.<sup>2</sup> While the Arab victims of the Palestinian tragedy were invisible to most American eyes, the Jewish victims of the European tragedy were brought alive to Gentile American imaginations by the prominence in the United States of a Jewish diaspora which had no Arab counterpart there; and this vivid realization of the European Jews' sufferings smote Gentile American consciences—mainly, no doubt, because those sufferings had been inflicted by the American Gentiles' German *soi-disant* fellow Christians, and partly perhaps also because the American Gentiles were uneasily aware of a repressed yet unconscionable vein of Antisemitism in their own hearts.

President Truman's personal susceptibility to this popular American confusion of mind and mixture of motives might go far to explain presidential interventions in the Palestinian imbroglio which would have been utterly cynical if they had not been partially innocent-minded. The Missourian politician-philanthropist's eagerness to combine expediency with charity by assisting the wronged and suffering Jews would appear to have been untempered by any sensitive awareness that he was thereby abetting the infliction of wrongs and sufferings on the Arabs; and his excursions into the stricken field in Palestine reminded a reader of the *Fioretti di San Francesco* of the tragi-comic exploit there attributed to the impetuously tender-hearted Brother Juniper, who, according to the revealing tale, was so effectively moved by a report of the alimentary needs of an invalid that he rushed, knife in hand, into a wood full of unoffending pigs, and straightway cut off a live pig's trotter to provide his ailing fellow human being with the dish that his soul desired, without noticing that he was leaving the mutilated animal writhing in agony and without pausing to reflect that his innocent victim was not either the invalid's property or his own.<sup>3</sup> It must be added that the American repetition of this story included a sequel that was not to be found in the Italian original. In the *Fioretti* there is no indication that the sufferings of the victim of a holy man's impulsive charity excited any human pity—

<sup>1</sup> For a British observer, this spectacle had the grim humour of the denouement of R. L. Stevenson's fantasia *The Bottle Imp*, in which the vial of wrath is eventually carried off unconcernedly by the mate of an American ship.

<sup>2</sup> This characteristically 'Anglo-Saxon' attitude of combining an unavowed yet patent Machiavellianism with a suspect yet sincere Quixotry was displayed as grotesquely by the British in and after the First World War as by the Americans after the Second World War in the Palestinian policy of these two great English-speaking peoples.

<sup>3</sup> *Fioretti di San Francesco d'Assisi*: 'Vita di Frate Ginepro', cap. 1: 'Come Frate Ginepro tagliò il Piede ad uno Porco solo per darlo a uno Infermo'.



for, when the owner of the unfortunate animal did eventually slaughter it, he was concerned, not to put a suffering creature out of its misery, but to atone, by making a feast for Brother Juniper and his brethren, for his own ungodly indignation at the damage done to his property—whereas, in the annals of the United Nations Organization, it is recorded that the United States Government took the initiative in relieving the plight of some 684,000 Palestinian Arab 'displaced persons' by providing half the total sum that was estimated to be necessary for purposes of first aid to these human victims of 'Anglo-Saxon attitudes'.

### *The Retrospect and the Outlook*

The consequent situation in Palestine was fraught with geographical, historical, and psychological paradoxes. The one substantial piece of Palestinian territory west of Jordan which the Zionist State of Israel had not engulfed by the time in A.D. 1949 when Jewish-Arab hostilities in Palestine were suspended was the Hill Country of Ephraim, which had been the historic Israel's first Palestinian foothold and their Samaritan legatees' last Palestinian stronghold. The core of the Zionist State's territory was the *ci-devant* land of the Philistines in the Shephelah, which had never before been colonized by an Israelite or Jewish population and which, during the thirteen centuries for which Philistines and Israelites had lived in Palestine side by side,<sup>1</sup> had not even been united politically with Ephraim or Judah save for a few brief periods, at long intervals, of Philistine rule over Israel or Jewish rule over Philistia. On its two flanks the Zionist Philistia Rediviva was reaching inland with its left arm into 'Galilee of the Gentiles', which had been forcibly converted to Judaism less than a century before the beginning of the Christian Era, and with its right arm into the Negeb in the track of the Philistines' Cherethite fellow invaders who had anticipated the Zionists in heading for 'Aqabah'.<sup>2</sup> In A.D. 1949, as in A.D. 135 and A.D. 70 and 586 B.C. and 721 B.C. and 732 B.C., a Palestinian community, uprooted from its native soil by a military and political tornado, was facing the challenge of being scattered abroad among the nations in order to show whether it would have the spirit to preserve its identity in diaspora like Judah or would vanish like Israel; but these twentieth-century Palestinian *déracinés* were Gentiles, not Jews, while the invaders who had uprooted them were Jews, not Gentiles. These geographical and historical paradoxes were the effects of a psychological paradox that far surpassed them.

The paradox of Zionism was that, in its demonic effort to build a community that was to be utterly Jewish, it was working as effectively for the assimilation of Jewry to a Western Gentile World as the individual Jew who opted for becoming a Western bourgeois 'of Jewish religion' or a Western bourgeois agnostic. The historic Jewry was the diaspora, and the distinctively Jewish *éthos* and institutions—a meticulous devotion to the Mosaic Law and a consummate virtuosity in commerce and finance—were those which the diaspora, in the course of ages, had

<sup>1</sup> i.e. from an early date in the twelfth century B.C. to A.D. 135.

<sup>2</sup> See VI. vii. 102, n. 1, and p. 358, n. 1, below.

wrought into social talismans endowing this geographically scattered community with a magic capacity for survival. For good or for evil, by the common consent of all first-hand witnesses, including Gentiles who were fascinated by it and Jews who were repelled by it, this masterly adaptation to a diasporan environment was the essence of 'Jewishness' in the universally accepted historical meaning of the term. Latter-day Jewish Westernizers of the Liberal and the Zionist school alike were breaking with this historic Jewish past; and Zionism's significant difference from Liberalism lay in making the breach more drastic.

In deserting the diaspora individually in order to lose himself in the ranks of a Modern Western Gentile urban bourgeoisie, the Liberal Jew was assimilating himself to a Gentile social milieu that had previously gone far, on its side, to assimilate itself socially and psychologically to the Jewish diaspora; in deserting the diaspora collectively in order to build up a new nation, closely settled on the land, on the trail of the Modern Western Protestant Christian pioneers who had created the United States, Canada, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand, the Zionists were assimilating themselves to a Gentile social milieu which had no counterpart in the life of a post-Exilic Jewry, and whose own inspiration from the Old Testament was derived, not from Isaiah any more than it was from Deutero-Isaiah, but from the Books of Joshua and Exodus.<sup>1</sup>

The Zionists' audacious aim was to invert, in a new life of their own making, all the distinctively Jewish characteristics enshrined in the diaspora's traditional life. They set out defiantly and enthusiastically to turn themselves into manual labourers instead of brain workers, country-folk instead of city-dwellers, producers instead of middlemen, agriculturists instead of financiers, warriors instead of shopkeepers, terrorists instead of martyrs, aggressively spirited Semites instead of peaceably abject non-Aryans; and this Nietzschean revaluation of all traditional Jewish values, for destruction as well as for construction, for evil as well as for good, was directed towards the horizon-filling narrow-hearted aim of making themselves sons of a latter-day Eretz Israel in Palestine that was to be 'as Jewish as' England 'was English',<sup>2</sup> instead of remaining the

<sup>1</sup> The sanction derived by Bible-Christian supplanters of American Indians, African Bantu, and Australian Blackfellows from the Israelites' biblically recorded conviction that God had instigated them to exterminate the Canaanites has been noticed in II. i. 211-27. We may now go on to observe that the divers Neo-Canaanites victimized by the divers Neo-Israelites were not all equally tractable. Fortune perhaps rather than foresight had provided the British Israelite invaders of North America and Australia with local Canaanites who were sufficiently feeble and few to allow of their being rapidly reduced to a residue which could be parked in reservations. The South African Dutch Israelites' Bantu Canaanites, the British Israelites' 'Wild Irish' Canaanites, and the Prussian Israelites' Polish Canaanites could not be disposed of either so expeditiously or so conveniently as the North American Indians and the Australian Blackfellows. The Bantu's primitive feebleness in culture was made up for by their strength in numbers, and the numerical weakness of the Poles and the Irish by their inheritance of a high culture. The Zionist Israelites' Arab Canaanites combined the cultural strength of the Irish and the Poles with the numerical strength of the Bantu. The Palestinian Arabs were heirs of the Arabic Civilization and members of an Arabic-speaking society whose geographical domain stretched away beyond the bounds of Palestine as far as Mosul, Morocco, Zanzibar, and Java. The Arabs would, in fact, be almost as difficult to wipe off the map as the Chinese or the Hindus.

<sup>2</sup> A phrase quoted by Sir Winston Churchill in his memorandum of the 3rd June, 1922 (see p. 296, n. 3, above).

step-sons of a New York, London, Manchester, and Frankfort that were not more Jewish than Bombay was Parsee or Ispahan Armenian.

Within the thirty years A.D. 1918-48 the Zionist pioneers in Palestine duly achieved this almost incredible *tour de force* of minting a fresh type of Jew in whom the child of the diasporà was no longer recognizable. The image and superscription on this new human coinage was not Hillel's but Caesar's. The Janus-figure—part American farmer-technician, part Nazi *sicarius*—was of a characteristically Western stamp. Yet, while a collective Westernization in a Modern Western nationalist mould was the Zionists' triumphantly achieved objective, the lode-stone that had drawn them so forcefully to the Westernizing goal that they had reached through a feat of left-handed self-transfiguration was 'the real presence' of the Holy Land. To judge by the unquestionable potency of this psychological factor in enabling the Zionist pioneers to accomplish what they did accomplish in Palestine in this generation, we may surmise that the annals of Zionism would have been less dynamic, and the entries against its name in the Book of Judgement less deeply scored on both sides of the account, if the scene of Zionist exploits had been an East African Arcadia and not a Palestinian Phlegra. Yet this mystical feeling for an historical Eretz Israel, which inspired the Zionist pioneers with the spiritual power to move mountains, was entirely derived from a diasporan orthodox theology that convicted the Zionists of an importunity which verged upon impiety in their attempt to take out of God's hands the fulfilment of God's promise to restore Israel to Palestine on God's own initiative.

What judgement on the secular Zionist substitute for the diasporà's religious hope would be delivered by the mind of an orthodox Jewish devotee while he was wailing at the retaining-wall of an annihilated Temple as a testimony of Israel's contrition and as an appeal to God to hasten the promised time when He would show a penitent Israel his mercy by restoring Israel to Palestine in God's own way? And what action would a Zionist Israeli Ministry of the Interior instruct its police to take against a Jew who persisted in wailing after Israel had been restored by force of Zionist human arms? Would this traditional Jewish religious rite be proscribed by Zionist political authorities as a provocative act of high treason—constructively a pro-Arab demonstration—against the accomplished fact of a profanely man-made Palestinian Zionist State?<sup>1</sup>

The practical achievement of the Zionist Movement's political aims had in fact brought a new Jewish problem on to the stage of history. The familiar issue between Jew and Gentile would be duplicated henceforth by an at first sight novel issue between an old-fashioned Syriac-minded Jewish diasporà in the United States and a new-fangled Western-minded Jewish nation in Palestine. The metamorphosis which Zionism had induced in its adherents clinched the demonstration—already implicit in the un-Jewishness of the *éthos* of the surviving 'Jews in Fastnesses'<sup>2</sup>—that Jewishness, in the accepted historical meaning of the

<sup>1</sup> A prudent Jewish wailer would stay on the Jordanian side of the line by which Jerusalem was now partitioned.

<sup>2</sup> See II. ii. 402-12.

term, was not the indelible brand of a particular physico-psychic race but was the plastic impress of a particular psychological response to a particular social challenge. Within the span of a single generation the different response to a different challenge that had been made by the Zionist pioneers in Palestine had produced a striking differentiation of *ethos* and type;<sup>1</sup> and this was not, after all, a unique occurrence. In a neighbouring province of the Ottoman World in the course of the century that had elapsed between the establishment of a Greek national state in A.D. 1821-29 and the extermination of the Ottoman Greek diaspora in A.D. 1922, the 'Yunāni' citizens of a new Westernizing Kingdom of Greece had likewise become noticeably differentiated from their former fellow members of a Millet-i-Rūm who had continued to be *ra'iyyeh* of the Porte. In the measure in which the citizens of a Zionist Israeli state succeeded in assimilating themselves collectively to contemporary American and German Gentiles, they would become progressively alienated from the members of a Western Jewish diaspora from which the Zionist Israel had sprung. The issue arising from this estrangement between a traditional Jewry and its changeling offspring might prove to be a difficult one, since, even after its extermination in Continental Europe, the diaspora remained several times more numerous, and many times more wealthy, than a Palestinian Israeli nation could ever hope to become. Indeed, for as far as could be seen ahead, the financial and political sympathy and support of the Jewish diaspora in the United States would continue to be a Palestinian Israel's life-line; and it remained to be seen for how long a time these generous foreign subscribers to Israel, who, besides being Jews, were also American citizens, would remain content to submit to 'taxation without representation'.

In its diminutiveness, its fanaticism, and its Ishmaelitic enmity with its neighbours the new Zionist Israel in Palestine was a reproduction of the Modern Western national state that, in its faithfulness, verged on being a parody; and it was a misfortune, for both Jewry and the World, that this statelet—begotten of so much idealism, self-sacrifice, crime, injustice, and suffering—should have seen the light at a moment when it might be hoped that the species of community of which this was the youngest member was at last approaching its eclipse. This hope could be cherished mid-way through the twentieth century of the Christian Era because a Modern Western Nationalism was an archaistic throw-back to a rustic parochial past state of the Western Society which was being stamped as an untenable anachronism, at the very time when it was being revived, by the simultaneous flowering of a Modern Western technology which was expanding the range of Western life in all its aspects from a parochial to an oecumenical scale.<sup>2</sup>

On the morrow of a Second World War the existing national states, from the smallest to the largest, were striving—with a futile obstinacy which they might have spared themselves if they had taken to heart the object lesson once contrived by King Canute—to keep at bay the ocean

<sup>1</sup> See Simon, E.: 'What Price Israel's "Normalcy"?' in *Commentary*, April 1949 (New York 1949, American Jewish Committee).

<sup>2</sup> See IV. iv. 169 and 179-80.

of oecumenicalism that the roaring gale of technological progress was driving against their frail and tortuous dykes. They were piling exchange-controls on customs-barriers, immigration-restrictions on exchange-controls, and police-cordons on immigration-restrictions, without a prospect of being able to do more than vexatiously delay the irresistible progress of a tide that was carrying human affairs towards world unity. The antiquated patch-work of ghetto-like nation-states, which the airman still saw flickering below him on the face of a rapidly coalescing World, was assuredly destined to be submerged under a flood whose surface would show the shot-silk sheen of communities—scattered Jewish-fashion—that had come to be geographically intermingled without losing their distinctive identities. In a World that had been unified by Western technology in spite of itself, the institutional future seemed likely to lie far less with the Western institution of the national state than with the Syriac institution of the millet; and, while the architects of a constitution for the World might find useful ideas for the construction of their basement in the work of the fathers of the Constitution of the United States, the classic organization of the millet system in the Ottoman Empire by the genius of Mehmed the Conqueror might prove to be a more fruitful source of inspiration for the design of the living-rooms in this promised house of many mansions.<sup>1</sup>

#### 6. *The Modern West and the Far Eastern and Indigenous American Civilizations*

##### *The Perils of Ignorance*

The living civilizations whose encounters with the Modern West we have been surveying up to this point have all been societies that were within close range of the Western Society's radiation; and all of them had already had experience of the Western Society before they began to be affected by the impact of the Western culture in its modern phase. The Jewish diaspora had been geographically intermingled with the Western body social since Western Christendom's first emergence out of a post-Hellenic social interregnum, and even the Hindu World had been brought into touch with the West through Muslim intermediaries before the Modern Western pioneers of oceanic navigation established a direct contact with the Hindus by outflanking the Islamic World on the south through their circumnavigation of Africa. By contrast, the existence of the West was still quite unknown to the Transatlantic civilizations in the New World, and all but unknown to the Far Eastern civilizations in China and Japan, down to the moment when the Modern Western pioneer navigators impinged on these more remote societies likewise in the course of an oceanic exploration of the surface of the planet which took barely half a century (*circa* A.D. 1492–1542)<sup>2</sup> to range almost as widely as the ubiquitous Ocean itself.

<sup>1</sup> A comment by Dr. James Parkes on this judgement of the present writer's will be found on pp. 706–7, below.

<sup>2</sup> Japan, which was the last new world to be discovered by the Western oceanic pioneers during their half-century of world-wide exploration, was reached by the Portuguese in A.D. 1542–3. The *Teppo-ki*, a chronicle written in Satsuma between the years A.D. 1596 and A.D. 1614, gives the 23rd September, 1543, as the date of the first



This ignorance explains the reason for the apparently paradoxical fact that the remoter civilizations showed, at the first encounter, a greater readiness to open their arms to the Modern West than was shown at the time by the Modern West's better informed next-door neighbours. For the Far East and for the New World the Modern West had the attractiveness of novelty; and the curiosity which the advent of the Western 'Martians' aroused there was not tempered by any pre-existing hostility or even suspicion. On the other hand in Jewish, Eastern Orthodox Christian, and Muslim hearts and minds the dominant reaction to the impact of the Modern West was not an innocently unsuspecting curiosity but a sceptically watchful aversion implanted by lively and painful memories of a previous encounter with the same Western Christendom in the medieval phase of its history.<sup>1</sup> These neighbours of the West remembered her, since the time of the Crusades, as a militantly aggressive society whose aggressiveness had been aggravated by a fanatical zeal to impose on all Mankind her local Western version of Christianity. Accordingly, all these neighbours of the West continued to keep her at arm's length so long as the fire of fanaticism was still showing its baleful red light over the Western horizon.

The first effect of the internal explosion which fractured the medieval unity of the Western Christian Church in the second generation of the modern phase of Western history was to raise still higher the already high temperature of the Western religious furnace; and, while Catholic and Protestant Modern Western Christians were directing part of their fire against one another in the Early Modern Western Wars of Religion, this fratricidal strife still left an ample margin of Western bigotry to spare for indulging a still unabated intolerance towards non-Western religious faiths. The neighbouring societies accordingly bided their time till the inconclusive destructiveness of the Western Wars of Religion had reduced the temperature of Western fanaticism by evoking a revulsion against Religion itself in Western hearts and minds; and, as we have seen, the reception of the Modern Western culture by Jews, Orthodox Christians, and Muslims did not begin until this alien Western way of life was able to offer itself to them in a secularized form—with Technology enthroned in Religion's former place at the apex of the Western pyramid of values—as the result of a momentous spiritual revolution within the bosom of the Western Society itself during the later decades of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era. Less prudence in dealing with the importunate Western stranger at the gate was shown by the Far Eastern and indigenous American civilizations. So far from waiting for the abatement of a Western religious fanaticism of which they had not been forewarned by any past experience of it, they laid themselves open to the impact of the West in its Early Modern phase, when its traditional religious aggressiveness was still in the ascendant.

In the first half of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era, when the ocean-faring Westerners first appeared above their horizon, these four

Portuguese landfall in Japan (Boxer, C. R.: *The Christian Century in Japan, 1549-1650* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1951, University of California Press), pp. 23 and 26).

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 277-80, above, and 346-403, below.

relatively remote societies were all in a more or less unhealthy social condition. All, so far as the latter-day historian can judge, were by then already in decline, and some of them had already travelled far along the road towards disintegration. The Japanese and Central American societies were both at the climax of the second paroxysm of a Time of Troubles which portended the imminence of a universal state; the Andean and Chinese civilizations were both already in the universal state phase. The Incaic Empire, when Pizarro smote it, was in what might be described in Hellenic terminology as a 'post-Trajanic' condition of lassitude due to a bout of over-exertion. In annexing the domain of the Karas in Ecuador to the Empire of the Incas in Peru, the Emperor Tupac Yupanqui (*imperabat circa* A.D. 1448-82) had taxed the Andean Society's resources and had bequeathed to his successor Huayna Capac an intractable legacy of political unrest which eventually played into the hands of the Spanish aggressors from the other side of the planet.<sup>1</sup> As for the Chinese Society of that date, it was still farther gone than the Andean in the stage of its social decay. An alien universal state imposed by the Mongols had been overthrown by a 'Zealot'-minded indigenous reaction, and the resulting Ming régime in its turn had already passed its zenith by the time when the Modern Western ocean-farers made their first landfall on China's southern coast.

Thus the Far Eastern and the American pair of civilizations were both in poor condition for coping with the West in its still bigoted Early Modern phase; yet, in the event, the two stories took sharply different turns. The American civilizations were as unsuccessful as the Far Eastern civilizations were successful in mastering a formidably difficult situation.

### *The Fate and Future of the Indigenous American Civilizations*

The Spanish conquerors of the Central American and Andean worlds immediately overwhelmed their ill-equipped and unsuspecting victims by force of arms, as the contemporary Dutch and English pioneers of Arctic exploration were able to club to death whole droves of puffins and penguins which were incapable of resisting their human assailants and yet made no move to escape them because this was their first encounter with Mankind and they had therefore still to learn by cruel experience that Man was the most murderous wild beast on the face of the planet. At this first impact the indigenous American societies were submerged. The alien invaders virtually exterminated those elements in the population that were the depositories of the indigenous cultures; they substituted for them an alien dominant minority by sowing the conquered territories thick with urban colonies of Spanish settlers;<sup>2</sup> and they reduced the rural population to the status of an internal proletariat of the victorious Western Christian Society by putting their labour at the disposal of Spanish economico-religious *entrepreneurs* on the understanding that these planter-missionaries would make it part of their business to convert their human flocks to the Roman Catholic form of

<sup>1</sup> See V. vi. 193.

<sup>2</sup> See VI. vii. 135.

Christianity.<sup>1</sup> The Spaniards' suppression of the indigenous civilizations of the Americas was in fact a barbaric counterpart of the Macedonians' suppression of the indigenous civilizations of Egypt and South-Western Asia after the domain of the Achaemenian Empire had been conquered for Hellenism by Alexander the Great.

In either case it looked, during the first chapter of the story, as if the culture of the subjugated society had been, not just temporarily overlaid, but permanently obliterated. In the Hellenic instance, however, the later chapters of the story show the submerged Oriental cultures surprisingly reasserting themselves after the lapse of many centuries and eventually expelling the intrusive Hellenic Civilization by force of arms in a *Blitzkrieg* in which the feats of Alexander's Macedonians were emulated, after the passage of a millennium, by the Primitive Muslim Arabs. In another cycle of history an Arabic Muslim Society that had been overwhelmed by the Ottoman arms of Sultan Selim the Grim, in the same generation that had seen the Spanish conquest of the Americas, subsequently succeeded in shaking off the ascendancy of an Iranic Muslim culture, which the Ottoman conquest had carried with it, after a bondage that had lasted for the shorter yet still impressive term of four hundred years.<sup>2</sup> These other instances, in which the whole story was known to a twentieth-century Western historian, would counsel him to beware of jumping to the conclusion that the apparent annihilation of the Central American and Andean civilizations by the Modern West at its first impact was the whole story of these two encounters.

Even if the fully unfolded tales of the encounter between the Arabic and the Iranic Civilization and the encounter between the Hellenic Civilization and its Oriental contemporaries had not stood on record in the twentieth-century Western historian's archives, the history of Mexico since A.D. 1910 might have suggested to him that the indigenous civilizations of the Americas might reassert themselves, not, perhaps, as separate cultures, yet at least as distinctive variations on a Modern Western cultural theme.<sup>3</sup> In the present writer's generation this possibility was already discernible; but it was then still so embryonic that, even if it could be surmised that a second chapter in the history of the encounters between the Modern West and the indigenous civilizations of the Americas would eventually unfold itself, the twentieth-century historian must resign himself to leaving the writing of this story to Posterity while he turned his own attention away from speculations about the ultimate fate of the submerged Central American and Andean worlds to the more profitable study of an already current second chapter in the history of the encounters between the Modern West and the two Far Eastern civilizations.

#### *Chinese and Japanese Reactions to the Impact of an Early Modern West*

Unlike the Central American and Andean societies, the Chinese and Japanese societies succeeded in holding their own against the West in its Early Modern Phase. Instead of being overwhelmed, they survived the

<sup>1</sup> The institution of the *encomienda* has been touched upon in VI. vii. 145.

<sup>2</sup> See IV. iv. 113-14.

<sup>3</sup> See IV. iv. 79-81.

deadly peril, to which they were exposed by their initial ignorance, of surrendering to the attractiveness of a strange presence of which they knew no evil. They managed with impunity to weigh the Western Civilization in the balance, find it wanting, make up their minds to cast it out, and muster the necessary force for putting into effect a considered policy of virtual non-intercourse. The sequel, however, had revealed, by the time of writing mid-way through the twentieth century, that this mastery which the Far East had displayed at its first encounter with the West was not the whole story but was merely the first chapter of it.

In breaking off relations with the West in the form in which the West had presented itself to them in its Early Modern phase, the Chinese and Japanese had not disposed of 'the Western Question' once for all; for the West did not remain rooted to the spot on which it had been standing at the moment when the Far East had dismissed it. The West proceeded thereafter to put itself through the spiritual revolution that opened a new chapter in Modern Western history at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; and, in now substituting Technology for Religion as the highest value, in Western estimation, in the Western cultural scale, it reopened 'the Western Question' for Far Eastern hermit kingdoms with an importunity to which they could not be for long impervious. In abandoning its traditional insistence that aliens must become converts to some Western form of religion as a condition *sine qua non* for being given the freedom of the Western Society, the West was jettisoning the bigotry that had previously made it appear repulsively menacing in Far Eastern eyes, while, conversely, in placing its treasure henceforward in Technology and diverting its psychic energy to this field from its repellent traditional aim of converting Mankind to Western Christianity by force, the West was launching itself on a course of technological progress that was rapidly to eclipse its own or any other society's previous achievements in this line; and a Western technological superiority which, at the earlier encounter, had struck Far Eastern observers of it as being formidably attractive was now raised to successive higher degrees of potency until the Far Eastern peoples, like their Hindu, Muslim, and Orthodox Christian contemporaries, found themselves confronted with a choice between mastering this superlative Western technology or succumbing to it.

From this point onwards the experience of the Far Eastern societies in their dealings with the West was the same as that of the other living non-Western civilizations; the distinctive feature in the Far Eastern case was that this encounter with the Modern West in its latter-day secularized form was the Far East's second meeting with the Modern West, and not its first; and, for a student of encounters between civilizations, it is interesting to study the points of likeness and difference between these two successive collisions of the same pair of Far Eastern civilizations with a Western Society which, in the interval between the two acts, had deliberately withdrawn its treasure from Religion and re-invested it in mundane values.

In this Far Eastern drama the Chinese and Japanese dramatis personae behaved alike in some ways and in other ways diversely. A striking point

of likeness was that in the second act the reception of a secularized Modern Western culture was initiated in both China and Japan from below upwards, in spite of the fact that in the middle of the nineteenth century, which was the time when this movement started in both societies, either of them was embodied politically in an indigenous universal state—China in the Manchu Empire and Japan in the Tokugawa Shogunate. The failure of both the Ch'ing régime in China and the Tokugawa régime in Japan to take the lead in initiating the process of Westernization at this stage stands out in contrast to the course of events in the corresponding chapters of Russian and Ottoman history, in which the reception of a secularized version of the culture of the Modern West was imposed on the people from above downwards by their rulers, instead of being forced upon the rulers by the peoples from below upwards. Thus at the opening of this chapter the histories of China and Japan followed an identical distinctive course. On the other hand the nineteenth-century Japanese Westernizing movement quickly parted company with the contemporary movement in China by changing over into the Petrine Russian rhythm; and the sixteenth-century Westernizing movements in the two Far Eastern societies had taken different courses from the outset. In their tentatively accorded and subsequently revoked reception of a still unsecularized Modern Western culture, the initiative had come from above downwards in a Chinese Society that was then already embodied in a universal state and from below upwards in a Japanese Society that was then still being racked by the last and worst paroxysm of a Time of Troubles.

The charts of the two Far Eastern societies' respective reactions to the Modern West will also be found to differ in their general conformation when we plot them out over a span of four centuries extending from the date of initial contact in the first half of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era down to the time of writing mid-way through the twentieth century. The Chinese curve comes out relatively smooth and the Japanese curve relatively jagged. By comparison with the corresponding Chinese reactions, the two successive receptions of the Modern Western culture in Japan, and the intervening rejection there of the earlier of the two versions in which this culture successively presented itself, all went to extremes, and the two successive reversals of policy—from reception to rejection in the seventeenth century and from rejection to reception in the nineteenth century—were relatively abrupt. The Chinese never went so far as the Japanese in surrendering themselves to the Modern Western culture on either occasion<sup>1</sup> or in insulating themselves from contact with the West in the intervening stage of anti-Western xeno-

<sup>1</sup> In the earlier of the two encounters the Japanese were far more receptive of an Early Modern Western culture than the Chinese were, whereas the Westerners in that age were far more receptive of the Chinese culture than they were of the Japanese (Boxer, C. R.: *The Christian Century in Japan, 1549-1650* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1951, University of California Press), pp. 208-9). In A.D. 1547 ordinary Japanese householders in the principality of Satsuma on the Island of Kyushu were literally opening their doors to the Portuguese by inviting them into their homes as guests (*ibid.*, p. 209). On the other hand in A.D. 1613 a Portuguese Jesuit belonging to the China mission, in a letter to General Aquaviva, gave it as his opinion that the Japanese members of the Society of Jesus, though virtuous, were not so *Aportuguesados* as the Chinese members (*ibid.*, p. 219).



phobia; and the reversals of policy that were decreed in Japan by the fiat of a dictator or by the verdict of a revolution were allowed in China to work themselves out more gradually and more spontaneously.

Though in both Far Eastern societies the Early Modern Western Christian missionaries made converts who eventually proved their sincerity in the hour of trial by sacrificing their lives rather than obey an omnipotent government's command to renounce their exotic adopted new faith, the dominant motives in both societies for tentatively embracing the Early Modern Western Christian culture were not religious but secular. In the sixteenth century both the Chinese Imperial Court at Peking and the Japanese parochial princelings on the Island of Kyushu put up with a religious propaganda which they found boringly unconvincing and distastefully bigoted<sup>1</sup> for the sake of material benefits which the Roman Catholic Christian missionaries had it in their power to bestow either directly, through their own personal attainments in the field of profane knowledge, or indirectly through their influence over their lay fellow Westerners.

In this chapter of the story the Chinese Imperial Court's cultivation of the Jesuits was less utilitarian or more frivolous—in whichever of the two lights we may prefer to regard it—than the contemporary cultivation of them in Japan. In Chinese minds the dominant incentive was curiosity; and, though, in their curiosity about sixteenth-century Western fire-arms, the Chinese as well as the Japanese had practical considerations in view, the Ming régime's desire to fortify its tottering authority by equipping itself with these new-fangled weapons was far less intense than the eagerness of contemporary Japanese war-lords to master a new military technique which might play a decisive part in the desperate final round of the struggle between them for the prize of becoming the founder of a Japanese universal state.<sup>2</sup>

Nor did the Ming or Manchu Imperial Government see in the development of trade through Western middlemen<sup>3</sup> those dazzling prospects of

<sup>1</sup> The Western Roman Catholic Christian missionaries alienated the Japanese by their intolerance (Murdoch, J.: *History of Japan*, vol. ii (Kobe 1903, Japan Chronicle), p. 65), and the political awkwardness of this Early Modern Western religious ethos is conjectured, by one Late Modern Western historian, to have been Hideyoshi's main motive in proscribing them (*ibid.*, p. 378). In Hideyoshi's decree of the 25th July, 1587, banishing the Jesuits from Japan, the continued sojourn of non-missionary Western visitors was expressly authorized (Boxer, C. R.: *The Christian Century in Japan, 1549-1650* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1951, University of California Press), pp. 147-8).

<sup>2</sup> The first service sought by the Japanese from the castaways of A.D. 1542-3 (Sansom, G. B.: *Japan, A Short Cultural History* (London 1932, Cresset Press), p. 406), who were their first Portuguese visitors, was to teach the Japanese armourers how to make arquebuses (Murdoch, J.: *History of Japan*, vol. ii (Kobe 1903, Japan Chronicle), pp. 33-34). By the beginning of the last quarter of the sixteenth century, Prince Otomo of the principality of Bungo in Kyushu, who became a convert to Christianity in A.D. 1578 (*ibid.*, pp. 77 and 102), was in possession of fire-arms, including artillery (*ibid.*, p. 98). The manufacture, as well as the use, of small arms established itself in Japan very rapidly, but artillery did not come to play as important a part in Japanese as in Western warfare, and the art of cannon-founding did not make much headway in Japan (Boxer, *op. cit.*, pp. 97 and 206-7).

<sup>3</sup> The business that the Portuguese new-comers found for themselves in the Far East was an exchange, not of Western commodities for Far Eastern, but of Chinese for Japanese. The Portuguese trade with Japan was based on the Portuguese settlements in Fukien and Kwangtung, where the Portuguese merchants purchased silk goods for export to Japan with Japanese silver (Boxer, *op. cit.*, pp. 92 and 109-10). The English and the Spaniards failed to elbow their way into the Japan trade because they failed to

commercial profits that excited Japanese cupidity.<sup>1</sup> Towards the close of the sixteenth century it looked as if the adoption by the Japanese of the contemporary Western art of war and their engagement in commerce with Western traders might draw Japan at this stage out of the ambit of the Far Eastern Society into the ambit of a Western Society which had made itself ubiquitous by conquering the Ocean. Before the advent of the Western ocean-farers in the Far East, the Japanese had already taken to the sea in a counter-stroke to the abortive attempts of the Mongols to invade Japan in A.D. 1274 and in A.D. 1281.<sup>2</sup> The Japanese had been making piratical descents on the coasts of China since A.D. 1369,<sup>3</sup> and, when, after

win a footing in China (*ibid.*, pp. 300-1). After the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Portuguese shippers began to feel the competition of the Japanese and Chinese, who by this time had taken to shipping Chinese silk to Japan in Japanese and Chinese bottoms. Japanese ocean-faring ships are known to have been licensed for overseas trade by Hideyoshi as early as A.D. 1592 (*ibid.*, pp. 261-2), and, during the forty years or so during which such licences continued to be issued, 182 voyages were made—mostly to Indo-China, though there were also many sailings to Manila (30 between A.D. 1604 and A.D. 1616) (*ibid.*, pp. 263-4). These Japanese 'red-seal' ships were originally required by Japanese law to carry Portuguese pilots, but they soon learnt to navigate for themselves as far as Malacca (*ibid.*, p. 265). In the art of ship-building, however, the Japanese remained inferior to the Portuguese, Chinese, and Koreans (*ibid.*, pp. 266-7). In A.D. 1612 the Japanese imported 5,000 quintals of Chinese silk from China and Manila in Japanese bottoms, while in the same year only 1,300 quintals were imported into Japan in the Portuguese Great Ship (*ibid.*, p. 296). By this time the Portuguese—and likewise the interloping Dutch—were also feeling the effects of an increasing Chinese competition in the silk trade between China and Japan (*ibid.*, pp. 299-300). After the suppression, in A.D. 1633-6, of Japan's overseas trade in Japanese bottoms by the Tokugawa régime, and the permanent interdiction of Portuguese trade with Japan by the decree of the 5th July, 1639, Japan's trade with China was carried on by the Chinese and the Dutch till it was eventually killed by the establishment of a native silk industry in Japan (*ibid.*, pp. 288-9).

<sup>1</sup> In the principality of Hirado in Kyushu Christianity was favoured on commercial considerations (Murdoch, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 54), and, in general, the reception with which the Christian missionaries met at Japanese hands varied in accordance with Japanese estimates of the prestige of the missionaries in the eyes of the Portuguese merchants (*ibid.*, p. 60; Boxer, *op. cit.*, p. 104). The parochial princelings competed with one another in trying to attract missionaries with a view to attracting trade (Murdoch, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 82-83). This was also one potent motive for conversions, and apostasy followed when trade did not (*ibid.*, p. 87). The daimyo of Hirado subsequently welcomed the Protestant Dutch and English traders who arrived in the wake of the Portuguese, because he preferred Western trade unencumbered with Western religion (*ibid.*, pp. 470-1). Fear of losing Portuguese trade deterred Hideyoshi from pressing the execution of his edict of the 25th July, 1587, ordering Christian missionaries to leave Japan but allowing Portuguese business men to stay (*ibid.*, pp. 243 and 252). Hideyoshi's successor, Tokugawa Ieyasu, appointed Hideyoshi's Jesuit interpreter Father João Rodriguez as his own commercial agent at Nagasaki for trading there on his account with the annual Portuguese ship (Boxer, *op. cit.*, p. 182).

In A.D. 1599 Ieyasu tried to attract Spanish trade to Japan en route from the Philippines to Mexico, and to obtain the services of Spanish shipwrights and miners (Murdoch, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 458-9), but the Spaniards did not care to take up the commercial openings offered to them in the Kwanto (*ibid.*, p. 463). In a treaty concluded on the 4th July, 1610, with an ex-governor-general of the Philippines who had been shipwrecked on the coast of Japan in the preceding year, Ieyasu conceded far-reaching Spanish demands as his *quid pro quo* for obtaining the services of Spanish technicians. His aims were to develop Japan's foreign trade, build up a Japanese merchant marine, and exploit Japan's mineral resources (*ibid.*, pp. 478-80). The offensive in breaking off commercial relations between Japan and the West was taken on the Western and not on the Japanese side. Circa A.D. 1614 the Japanese, together with all other foreigners, were forbidden to trade with the Spanish Viceroyalty of New Spain (*ibid.*, p. 603), and Japanese efforts to obtain a relaxation of this veto were unsuccessful (*ibid.*, p. 606). This previous rebuff of the Japanese by the Spaniards may go far to explain the anti-Spanish measures taken by the Bakufu in A.D. 1624 (see p. 323, n. 3, below).

<sup>2</sup> See IV. iv. 93.

<sup>3</sup> See Soothill, W. E.: *China and the West* (Oxford 1925, University Press), pp. 75-76. This scourge of Japanese piracy at China's expense continued to grow worse as, in Japan, the Time of Troubles approached its climax. The worst years of all were A.D.

the suppression of Japanese piracy by Hideyoshi,<sup>1</sup> Japanese seamen followed the example of the Western new-comers by taking to trade,<sup>2</sup> they rapidly extended the range of their maritime activities over the Pacific as far afield as the Straits of Malacca in one direction<sup>3</sup> and the Spanish Viceroyalty of Mexico in another.<sup>4</sup>

The converse side of the picture was that, by the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a Japan whose political unification by indigenous military force was then still incomplete and insecure had come to be perilously exposed to the danger of having political unity imposed on her from abroad at the eleventh hour, as it had been imposed on the Central American World, at the ruthless hands of alien *conquistadores*. The Spanish conquest of the Philippines in A.D. 1565-71, the union of the Portuguese with the Spanish Crown in A.D. 1581, and the Dutch conquest of Formosa in A.D. 1624 were object lessons of the fate which might befall another group of West Pacific islands with which the Portuguese had been in contact since the fifteen-forties.<sup>5</sup> By contrast,

1552-6. The business became international; for the Japanese pirates enlisted Chinese, Korean, Annamite, Malay, and Portuguese recruits. A key role was played by Chinese collaborationists (Boxer, *op. cit.*, pp. 254-5).

<sup>1</sup> The last raid by Japanese pirates on China was made in A.D. 1588 (Boxer, *op. cit.*, p. 256). Thereafter, unemployed Japanese adventurers offered the Spanish authorities at Manila Japanese aid for an invasion of China, and the Spaniards did take Japanese mercenaries with them when they invaded Cambodia in A.D. 1595 (*ibid.*, pp. 259-61).

<sup>2</sup> While Japanese pirates had been raiding China, other Japanese had been flouting the Ming Imperial Government's will in another way by trading with the Chinese. This trade had been started in the fifteenth century of the Christian Era by Japanese Zen Buddhist monasteries, and had afterwards been taken up by lay daimyo (Boxer, *op. cit.*, pp. 249-50 and 253).

<sup>3</sup> A Japanese colony established itself at Manila between A.D. 1593 and A.D. 1614 (Boxer, *op. cit.*, p. 302), and during the first quarter of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era similar colonies of Japanese traders and mercenaries made their appearance at divers points in South-West Asia (*ibid.*, pp. 296-7).

<sup>4</sup> There were Japanese traders in Mexico in A.D. 1597 (Murdoch, J.: *History of Japan*, vol. II (Kobe 1903, Japan Chronicle), p. 292). Japanese traders were doing business all over the Pacific by the time when they were suddenly prohibited from engaging in foreign trade by the non-intercourse ordinance of the 23rd June, 1636 (*ibid.*, p. 691).

<sup>5</sup> As early as A.D. 1596 the Japanese had been put on their guard against Spanish imperialism by some unwary remarks from the lips of the pilot-major of a wrecked Spanish ship, the *San Felipe*. In explanation of the enormous extent of the Spanish Crown's possessions—as displayed on a map of the World which he had shown to his Japanese interlocutors with an eye to overawing them—the imprudent Spaniard had declared that Spain's first move towards getting possession of any non-Western country on which she had political designs was to send missionaries to promote the formation of a native Christian party there which would serve, when the time came, as a spear-head for Spanish aggression (Boxer, *op. cit.*, pp. 165-6)—and this fate might indeed have overtaken Japan (Murdoch, J.: *History of Japan*, vol. II (Kobe 1903, Japan Chronicle), p. 437) if the political unification of Japan under an indigenous dictatorship in A.D. 1590 had not been confirmed by the results of the Battle of Sekigehara on the 21st October, 1600, and the Battle of Osaka on the 3rd June, 1615; for, after the personal union of the Portuguese with the Spanish Crown in A.D. 1581, the Spanish Franciscan friars in the Philippines had taken the offensive against the Portuguese Crown's ecclesiastical *padroado* in Asia (Boxer, *op. cit.*, pp. 155-6), and had entered the Japan mission field in rivalry with the Portuguese Jesuits with Hideyoshi's good will (*ibid.*, pp. 160-2), though in A.D. 1583 the Italian provincial of the Portuguese Jesuit mission in Japan, Valignano, had pleaded for the exclusion of other Catholic Christian religious orders from Japan and had had his request granted both by King Philip and by the Vatican (in a bull of the 21st January, 1585) (*ibid.*, pp. 156-60).

Hideyoshi's motives in welcoming the Franciscans had been to introduce a counterpoise to the influence of the Jesuits and to bring down the price of Chinese goods in Japan by stimulating a Spanish competition with the Portuguese middlemen in the trade between Japan and China; but the Japanese dictator had not reckoned with the Spanish Franciscans' fanatical temper. To the Jesuits' dismay—though not to their

the vast sub-continent of China had nothing more to fear from the advent of Western pirates in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries than she had found to fear from the activities of Japanese pirates in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.<sup>1</sup> For China, such still unmechanized Early Modern Western sea-raiders, however annoying they might be, were not potential conquerors; the dangers that gave serious cause for anxiety to a Chinese Imperial Government in this age were the possibilities of domestic revolt and of overland invasion from the Eurasian Steppe beyond the Great Wall or from the Manchurian forests beyond the Willow Palisade; and, after an enfeebled indigenous Ming Dynasty had been duly supplanted by a vigorous semi-barbarian Manchu Dynasty in the course of the seventeenth century, a recurrence of the conjuncture of invasion and revolt which had brought the Manchus into the saddle did not present itself on the Chinese political horizon within the next two hundred years.<sup>2</sup>

surprise, for Valignano had predicted this in A.D. 1583 (*ibid.*, p. 158)—the Spanish friars recklessly applied in Japan the drastic methods of propaganda which they had used with success in missions to primitive peoples (*ibid.*, p. 162). They ministered to the poor (*ibid.*, p. 233), whom the Jesuits in Japan had neglected (*ibid.*, p. 228), and they avowedly aimed at nothing less than a mass conversion of the Japanese people to Christianity (*ibid.*, p. 231). In short, the Spanish friars' tactlessness opened the new Japanese central government's eyes to the reality of the Spanish peril to Japan's independence, and Ieyasu put the Spanish lay residents in Japan and their associates the Franciscan missionaries under surveillance on the receipt of information that a Spanish expedition was on its way from Mexico for the conquest of the Moluccas (Murdoch, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 463). In A.D. 1612 the Spaniards started making a survey of the Japanese coasts, and Ieyasu's English mentor Will Adams did not miss his opportunity of improving the occasion by enlarging on the implications for Japanese security that were to be seen in this Spanish move (*ibid.*, p. 489). The moral was pointed by the detection of an intrigue between officials of Ieyasu's administration and Spanish agents in A.D. 1612-13 (*ibid.*, p. 492).

A domestic *Pax Tokugawica* in Japan had indeed been so hardly won that the Bakufu was naturally on the alert to foresee and parry all possible threats to its preservation. On the eve of the promulgation of the decree of the 27th January, 1614 (see p. 323, n. 3, below), the Jesuit Father Carvalho gave it as his opinion that the Bakufu was afraid of some Christian daimyo's attempting to wrest the supreme power in Japan out of Tokugawa hands with Spanish support (Boxer, *op. cit.*, p. 311). The Japanese political authorities' chief misgiving about Christianity—and this misgiving was felt by the daimyo as well as by the Bakufu—was that its claim on the allegiance of its Japanese converts might be a challenge to the claims of feudal loyalty—though in the event, when the converts' steadfastness was put to the test by persecution, the percentage of samurai converts who remained faithful was much lower than the percentage of non-samurai converts, who had no feudal ties to make competing claims upon them (*ibid.*, pp. 338-9 and 362). Japanese converts to Christianity were not the only potentially subversive elements in a hardly pacified Japan at which the Bakufu looked askance. It was also afraid of the lordless (i.e. unemployed) samurai, the so-called *ronin*; and this fear seems to have been the motive for the ban in A.D. 1621 upon foreign enlistment (*ibid.*, p. 269), and for the ban in A.D. 1633-6 upon overseas trade in Japanese bottoms (*ibid.*, p. 372).

<sup>1</sup> The behaviour of the Portuguese was on a par with that of the Japanese pirates in Chinese estimation (Fitzgerald, C. P.: *China, a Short Cultural History* (London 1935, Cresset Press), p. 471). On this account the Portuguese were corralled in a walled-off settlement at Macao in A.D. 1557 (*ibid.*, p. 474), and the only Chinese port opened to Western traders was Canton—by contrast with the Chinese treatment of the earlier Arab, Persian, and Malay commercial travellers from overseas who, unlike the Western barbarians, had been considered sufficiently civilized to be allowed to circulate throughout China without restrictions (*ibid.*, p. 470). It is significant that Matteo Ricci, who was a missionary and not a trader and who had taken the trouble to make himself an adept in the Sinitic literary culture, was allowed by the Emperor to reside in Peking in spite of opposition from the Board of Rites (*ibid.*, pp. 475-6).

<sup>2</sup> In the great war between the Manchu Far Eastern universal state and the steppe empire of the Zungars in the sixth decade of the eighteenth century of the Christian Era, the political stake was the fate of Zungaria only, and not the fate of China (see III. iii. 19).

This difference in the geographico-political situations of China and Japan in the Early Modern Age of Western oceanic expansion goes far towards explaining why it was that in China the repression of Roman Catholic Christianity was postponed till the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of the Christian Era and was the outcome, not of any apprehensive calculations in the field of power politics, but of an academic controversy over a point of theological terminology<sup>1</sup>—in contrast to the comparative promptness and ruthlessness of the suppression of Roman Catholic Christianity in Japan, and the final cutting of all but one solitary Dutch thread in the nexus between Japan and the Western World of the day. The succession of blows delivered by a newly established Japanese Central Government began with Hideyoshi's ordinance of the 25th July, 1587, decreeing the banishment from Japan of Western Christian missionaries,<sup>2</sup> and culminated in the ordinances of A.D. 1636 and 1639,<sup>3</sup> forbidding Japanese subjects to

<sup>1</sup> See V. v. 365-7 and 539, and V. vi. 23-24.

<sup>2</sup> See Murdoch, J.: *History of Japan*, vol. ii (Kobe 1903, Japan Chronicle), p. 243; Boxer, op. cit., pp. 147-8. It is significant that Hideyoshi should have fired this first shot in his anti-Western campaign as early as A.D. 1587; for, though his subjugation, in that year, of the principality of Satsuma on the island of Kyushu had brought him within sight of his goal of imposing a *pax oecumenica* on the Japanese World, his establishment of a Japanese universal state was not actually completed before his conquest of the Kwantô in A.D. 1590 (see Murdoch, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 222-234 and 258; Sansom, G. B.: *Japan, A Short Cultural History* (London 1932, Cresset Press), pp. 402-3).

<sup>3</sup> See Murdoch, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 636 and 664; Boxer, op. cit., pp. 372 and 384. The first martyrdoms were inflicted on the 5th February, 1597, when, as a retort to the threat implied in the pilot-major of the *San Felipe's* indiscreet avowal, twenty-six Christians (consisting of six Western-born Franciscans and twenty Japanese converts) were put to death (Murdoch, op. cit., vol. cit., pp. 280 and 295; Sansom, G. B.: *Japan, A Short Cultural History* (London 1932, Cresset Press), p. 413; Boxer, op. cit., p. 166). The extirpation of Christianity in Japan began in A.D. 1612 (Murdoch, op. cit., vol. cit., p. 487; Sansom, op. cit., pp. 416-17). After Hideyoshi's successor Tokugawa Ieyasu had received an unfavourable report on Christianity from an investigator whom he had commissioned to inquire into it (Murdoch, op. cit., vol. cit., p. 499), an edict ordering the suppression of Christianity in Japan was issued by him on the 27th January, 1614 (ibid., p. 503; Boxer, op. cit., pp. 317-19). This decree required all Japanese subjects to enrol themselves in one or other of the Japanese Mahayanian Buddhist churches, and the Buddhist priests were made responsible for keeping watch over their parishioners' orthodoxy (Boxer, op. cit., pp. 318-19). The prospect of persecution evoked an outburst of religious fervour in the Christian community at Nagasaki in May, 1614 (ibid., pp. 323-4). Yet, though 47 Western fathers (27 of them Jesuits) and more than 100 Japanese Jesuit lay brothers (dojoku) disobeyed the order for their banishment in the decree of A.D. 1614 by staying on in Japan *sub rosa* (ibid., p. 327), no single foreigner was put to death in Japan on account of his religion so long as Ieyasu (*obit* A.D. 1616) remained alive (ibid., p. 331). In A.D. 1617 one Western Dominican and one Western Augustinian in Japan courted martyrdom, for the sake of sharing the Japanese Christian martyrs' fate (ibid., pp. 332-3). Some Western priests remained in hiding in Japan for twenty years (ibid., p. 336). From A.D. 1613 to A.D. 1618 the Japanese authorities turned a blind eye to violations of the ban on Christianity (ibid., pp. 331-2), and, in particular, Hasegawa Gonroku, who from A.D. 1615 to A.D. 1626 was governor of Nagasaki, the centre of the Christian community in Japan, did his utmost to avoid having to make martyrs (ibid., pp. 345-6). When martyrdoms were inflicted, the authorities did not prevent the Christians from making mass-demonstrations of their feelings (ibid., pp. 342-3). According to Murdoch (op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 618-23), there was a crescendo of martyrdoms during the years A.D. 1617-22. The return, probably in A.D. 1622, of an emissary, Ibi Masayoshi, who had been sent by the Bakufu to inspect the Westerners' European homeland (ibid., p. 624), was followed in A.D. 1624-5 by edicts expelling all Spaniards from Japan and forbidding Japanese subjects to trade with any foreign country, particularly with Spain, Mexico, and the Philippines (ibid., p. 626; Boxer, op. cit., p. 439, n. 1). The systematic enforcement of the decree of A.D. 1614 by methods of 'frightfulness' did not begin till after the accession of Iemitsu to the Shogunate in A.D. 1623 (Boxer, op. cit., p. 362). The years A.D. 1626-36 witnessed the apostasy of the great



continue to travel abroad and Portuguese subjects to continue to reside in Japan.<sup>1</sup>

*Chinese and Japanese Reactions to the Impact of a Late Modern West*

In Japan, as in China, the eventual abandonment of a self-imposed insulation from contact with the West was initiated from below upwards, and was inspired by a hunger to taste the forbidden fruits of Modern Western scientific knowledge before this disinterested intellectual quest was conscripted into the service of a political movement for mastering the practical applications of the knowledge through which the Westerners had latterly been acquiring an unprecedented economic and military power. Like the early seventeenth-century Japanese de-

majority of the Western Catholic missionaries' Japanese converts (*ibid.*, p. 360), who in A.D. 1614 had numbered some 300,000 out of a total population of some 20,000,000 (*ibid.*, pp. 230 and 320-1).

The ordinance of the 23rd June, 1636, reaffirmed and made absolute, under pain of death, ordinances of A.D. 1633-4 forbidding even licensed Japanese ships to continue to engage in foreign trade without special permits, and debarring Japanese residents abroad from returning home; and the new decree also forbade Portuguese residents and their issue to continue to reside in Japan or to return thither (Murdoch, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 636). The Bakufu set itself to make the veto on foreign trade effective by prescribing a maximum tonnage for Japanese merchant ships and laying down specifications for their construction (*ibid.*, p. 695). On the 22nd October, 1636, Portuguese residents and their property were duly deported, and thenceforth Portuguese trade with Japan had to be conducted under close restrictions (*ibid.*, p. 637). The final step was precipitated by an insurrection—provoked by the tyranny of a local daimyo—which broke out on the 17th December, 1637, on the Shimebara Peninsula in Kyushu and which was not suppressed till the insurgents' stronghold, Hara Castle, was stormed by the Bakufu's forces on the 12th April, 1638. Thirty-seven thousand Japanese Christians are said to have re-emerged, joined the insurgents, and lost their lives in this affair (Sansom, *op. cit.*, p. 432; Boxer, *op. cit.*, p. 361). The decree of the 5th July, 1639, forbidding all intercourse with the Portuguese, was promulgated in consequence (Boxer, *op. cit.*, p. 384; Murdoch, *op. cit.*, vol. cit., p. 664). Portuguese ships arriving in Japan in A.D. 1639 were refused admittance (*ibid.*, p. 664). On the 6th July, 1640, a Portuguese expostulatory embassy arrived at Nagasaki (*ibid.*, p. 665). On the 3rd August, 1640, the four Portuguese ambassadors and fifty-seven of their companions were put to death, while thirteen survivors were sent back to Macao to convey to the Portuguese authorities a message from the Japanese Government: 'Let them think no more of us, as if we were no longer in the World' (*ibid.*, p. 667).

It did not prove so easy to extirpate the remnant of the native Catholic Christian community in Japan. One effect of the persecution was to disperse the community from North-Western Kyushu, where it had originally been concentrated (Boxer, *op. cit.*, p. 322), to north-eastern districts of the Main Island to which the Western missionaries had never penetrated (*ibid.*, pp. 335 and 358). The last martyrdoms were inflicted in A.D. 1856, and the last punishments, short of death, in A.D. 1867. Even after the Westernizing revolution of A.D. 1868, the new régime posted notices declaring: 'The evil sect of Christians is forbidden as heretofore'. The ordinance of A.D. 1614 was never formally rescinded, but after A.D. 1873 the notices were withdrawn, and the Japanese Christians then in prison on account of their religion were released and indemnified, because the new régime had come to realize that this was a condition *sine qua non* for obtaining the Western Powers' consent to a modification of the capitulatory treaties (Sansom, G. B.: *The Western World and Japan* (London 1950, Cresset Press), pp. 408-10). By this time the remnant of a Japanese Catholic Christendom had been holding out under severe persecution for longer than a quarter of a millennium.

<sup>1</sup> For the expulsion from Japan of all Westerners except the Dutch between A.D. 1614 and A.D. 1638, see II. ii. 366, n. 2. For the humiliations inflicted on the Dutch ghetto-dwellers on the islet of Deshima from A.D. 1641 to A.D. 1858, see II. ii. 232-3. The methods of 'frightfulness' by which the Japanese eliminated the Western residents and the Japanese converts to Western Christianity in their midst, and deterred the West, for more than two centuries to come, from making any further attempts to break down Japan's self-imposed isolation, had their counterpart in the contemporary conduct of Westerners in at least one recently Western-occupied adjacent Far Eastern country. In A.D. 1602, and again in A.D. 1639, the Spaniards provided for the security of their dominion over Manila by massing the Chinese residents there (Soothill, W. E.: *China and the West* (Oxford, 1925, University Press), p. 84).

votes to a Roman Catholic Western Christianity, the early nineteenth-century Japanese devotees to a Modern Western secular science demonstrated their sincerity by exposing themselves to the risk of meeting the tragic ends that eventually overtook them, at a moment of darkness before dawn, in the proscriptions of A.D. 1840 and A.D. 1850.<sup>1</sup>

The Tokugawa régime signaled the last years of its existence by banning all Dutch studies outside the field of medicine;<sup>2</sup> and, from the Bakufu's standpoint, the only thing wrong about this repressive policy was its impracticability. Yet this welling up of a disinterested intellectual curiosity concerning the achievements of a Modern Western science was an indirect outcome of the Bakufu's own cultural policy. In their anxiety to conserve their arduously attained achievement of freezing Japanese life into immobility on the once feverishly agitated military and political planes, the Tokugawa had wisely looked for alternative vents for unabated Japanese energies, and they had encouraged the pursuit of learning as one innocuous outlet. The mental discipline that they had favoured had been the cultivation of a Neoconfucianism which was the legacy of the intellectual renaissance of the Sung Age in China;<sup>3</sup> but it proved impossible for a reactionary régime in Japan at the

<sup>1</sup> See Murdoch, J.: *History of Japan*, vol. iii (London 1926, Kegan Paul), p. 563. During the hundred years preceding the crisis of A.D. 1853-68, both private and official circles in Japan were torn in two between feelings of curiosity and feelings of xenophobia as a result of their gradually increasing awareness of a renewal of pressure on Japan from the Western World (including Russia under her Petrine régime); and the conflict between these incompatible Japanese psychological reactions expressed itself in an inconsequent jumble of 'Zealot' and 'Herodian' gestures.

The Japanese physicians who had mastered the secrets of Dutch medical science incurred the jealousy of their Chinese-trained colleagues (*ibid.*, p. 559), whose feelings towards them were much like those of the Egyptian physicians at the court of the Achaemenian Emperor Darius I when they were put out of countenance by the superiority of their interloping Hellenic confrère Dêmocédês (Herodotus, Book III, chaps. 129-32). In A.D. 1784 a Japanese named Tanuma was assassinated on account of his proclivity to intercourse with Westerners (Murdoch, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 505); and, perhaps in reaction to a series of descents on the Japanese coasts by Russian and British ships in the course of the years A.D. 1804-11 (*ibid.*, pp. 511-22), a number of precautionary measures were taken by the Bakufu. During the years A.D. 1809-17 the Dutch ghetto on Deshima was marooned (*ibid.*, p. 523). In A.D. 1824 the standing orders for the expulsion of foreigners landing in Japan were renewed (*ibid.*, p. 528). In A.D. 1829 von Siebold (see p. 326, n. 1, below) was banished from Japan on a charge of having obtained possession of Japanese maps and other documents (*ibid.*, p. 558). An embassy from the Dutch Crown was rebuffed in A.D. 1844 (*ibid.*, p. 530).

On the other hand in A.D. 1786 the Bakufu began to explore the island of Yezo (Hokkaido) with a view to forestalling an apprehended Russian encroachment there (*ibid.*, p. 513). In A.D. 1809 they ordered the Japanese interpreters in Nagasaki to add to their repertory of foreign languages, hitherto confined to Dutch, by learning English and Russian (*ibid.*, p. 548). Between A.D. 1809 and A.D. 1817 the Dutch agent on Deshima compiled a Dutch-Japanese lexicon at the Bakufu's request (*ibid.*, p. 550). The apprehensions aroused in Japan by the spectacle of China's helplessness in the Sino-British war of A.D. 1839-42 moved the Bakufu to tolerate the activities of Takashima and his disciple Sakuma, who devoted their lives to mastering the contemporary Western technology of gunnery with an eye to the defence of Japan's coasts against Western naval attack. Yet the 'Zealots' managed to have Takashima imprisoned and prevented from continuing his work until after Commodore Perry's first visitation in A.D. 1853 (Sansom, G. B.: *The Western World and Japan* (London 1950, Cresset Press), pp. 262-72). During the years A.D. 1851-8 the Bakufu winked at commercial intercourse between the Japanese fief of Satsuma and France via the Luchu Islands, which were a dependency of Satsuma *de facto* (Murdoch, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 534).

<sup>2</sup> See Murdoch, *op. cit.*, vol. cit., pp. 564-5.

<sup>3</sup> See Murdoch, *op. cit.*, vol. cit., pp. 97-100; Sansom, G.: *Japan, A Short Cultural History* (London 1932, Cresset Press), pp. 470 and 492-3; eundem: *The Western World and Japan* (London 1950, Cresset Press), pp. 195-8 and 218-20.

turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to permit its subjects to supplement their authorized cultivation of a conservative vein of indigenous thought by making a strictly utilitarian study of Modern Western medicine without thereby opening a passage for the mighty flood of Modern Western knowledge in its entirety,<sup>1</sup> as it was to prove impossible for the Ottoman autocrat 'Abd-al-Hamid II at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to allow his military cadets to make a strictly utilitarian study of the Modern Western art of war without exposing the old order to the risk of being swept away by an influx of the political Ideas of 1789.<sup>2</sup>

While the inspiration of the nineteenth-century Japanese Westernization movement from below upwards thus came from Modern Western secular scientific thought, the inspiration of the corresponding and contemporary movement in China came from Modern Western Protestant Christianity, whose missionaries accompanied the British and American salesmen of the wares of an industrialized West,<sup>3</sup> as in the sixteenth century the missionaries of a Tridentine Roman Catholic Christianity had accompanied the Portuguese pioneers of Early Modern

<sup>1</sup> An embargo on the translation of Western books into Japanese had been lifted in A.D. 1720 (Sansom, *The Western World and Japan*, p. 214; Murdoch, J.: *History of Japan*, vol. iii (London 1926, Kegan Paul), p. 498); and, in this matter of cultural policy, some latitude was allowed by the Bakufu to its feudatories. While a reactionary Shintōism was being inculcated in Mito, Dutch learning was being cultivated in Sakura (ibid., pp. 457-8).

In the fief of Yonezawa, Western medicine was introduced by the Daimyo Uyesugi half a century before the advent of Commodore Perry (ibid., p. 391). In A.D. 1771 Sugita Gempaku, a Japanese physician in a daimyo's service, was excited by coming across some Dutch works on anatomy (ibid., p. 543). Sugita and two other Japanese physicians thereupon agreed with one another to learn Dutch; and they puzzled out the meaning of a Dutch anatomy book by using the diagrams as clues (ibid., p. 544; Sansom, op. cit., p. 217) with the patience and ingenuity which nineteenth-century Western scholars were to employ, two or three generations later, in deciphering cuneiform. Thereafter, several Japanese doctors obtained instruction, circa A.D. 1775, from a Swedish resident on Deshima named Thunberg (Murdoch, op. cit., vol. iii, pp. 540 and 545) and then from Isaac Titsingh, who was in charge of the Dutch factory on Deshima at divers times ranging from A.D. 1779 to A.D. 1785 (Sansom, op. cit., p. 218). A German scientist, P. J. von Siebold, who was in Japan during the years A.D. 1823-9, was visited at Nagasaki by students from all over the country who, after returning to their homes, used to submit to their Western instructor medical dissertations written in Japanese (ibid., pp. 262 and 274; Murdoch, op. cit., vol. iii, p. 552).

Meanwhile, Japanese curiosity concerning Western thought had not remained confined to the field of medical studies. An interest in mathematics, astronomy, and cartography, which had begun to show itself in Japan as early as A.D. 1684, had led to a study there of learned works by Jesuit fathers in Chinese (ibid., pp. 553-4); and this wider range of interest was stimulated by Titsingh, who studied Japanese literature, established personal relations with members of the Japanese governing class, and kept up a correspondence with them (ibid., pp. 502-4 and 507)—an intimacy which would hardly have been possible in the years A.D. 1690-2, when the German traveller Engelbrecht Kaempfer found that it was the policy of the Bakufu to prevent the Dutch from learning Japanese, though they failed to prevent Kaempfer from transmitting an intellectual current in the opposite direction by giving his Japanese attendant instruction in the Dutch language and in contemporary Western medicine (ibid., pp. 539 and 542). At Yedo, 'down-town' and 'up-town' clubs for the study of Western learning had sprung up during the first half of the nineteenth century, and by A.D. 1850 fifty-two Dutch works had been translated into Japanese by Takano Nagohide, *alias* Choei (ibid., pp. 559-60). Both Takano and his friend and confederate Watanabe Noboru, *alias* Kwazan, were eventually harried by persecution into committing suicide (Sansom, op. cit., pp. 273-80).

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 234-6, above.

<sup>3</sup> Morrison, the first Protestant missionary to work in China, landed at Canton in A.D. 1802 (Soothill, W. E.: *China and the West* (Oxford 1925, University Press), p. 98).

Western commercial enterprise in the Far East. In another context<sup>1</sup> we have noticed that the T'ai-p'ing politico-religious insurrectionary movement, which came near to overthrowing the Manchu régime in the sixth and seventh decades of the nineteenth century,<sup>2</sup> was not merely a 'Zealot' indigenous revolt against the tincture of an exotic Far Western Christian culture in the tradition of a semi-barbarian Manchu 'ascendancy', but was also, in another aspect, a translation of Protestant Western Christianity into indigenous Far Eastern terms.<sup>3</sup> Thereafter, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the Chinese initiators of a movement for secular political reform were likewise influenced by Protestant Western missionaries;<sup>4</sup> Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the Kuomintang, was the son of a Protestant Christian father;<sup>5</sup> and another Protestant Christian Chinese family played a paramount part in the Kuomintang's subsequent history in the persons of Madame Sun Yat-sen, her sister Madame Chiang Kai-shek, and their brother T. V. Soong.

Thus, from the outset, the nineteenth-century Chinese Westernizing movement differed from its Japanese counterpart in having a Protestant Christian instead of a secular scientific Western inspiration; and the two movements also rapidly diverged on the political plane. Both movements were confronted with the formidable task of having to liquidate and replace a well-established indigenous oecumenical régime which had demonstrated its unfitness to survive by showing itself insensitive to the imperative need for coping with the impact of an irresistibly powerful secularized Modern Western Civilization; but in this political emergency the Japanese Westernizers were more alert, more prompt, and more efficient than the Chinese. Within fifteen years of the first appearance of Commodore Perry's squadron in Japanese territorial waters in A.D. 1853, the Japanese Westernizers had not only overthrown a Tokugawa régime that had failed to rise to the urgent occasion; they

<sup>1</sup> See V. v. 107, 111, and 117.

<sup>2</sup> At their flood tide the T'ai-p'ing managed to push an advance-guard of seven thousand men to within twenty miles of Tientsin (Fitzgerald, C. P.: *China, A Short Cultural History* (London 1935, Cresset Press), p. 569).

<sup>3</sup> 'The T'ai P'ing movement... was primarily a religious revival and only secondarily a revolt against the Manchus' (Fitzgerald, C. P.: *China, A Short Cultural History* (London 1935, Cresset Press), p. 566). The T'ai-p'ing were friendly to the West, and it was their policy to throw the whole of China open to the Westerners instead of keeping them confined to the Treaty Ports (ibid., pp. 570-1); yet the French and British had no sooner imposed their own terms on the Manchu Imperial Government at Peking in the wars of A.D. 1857-60 than they perversely supplied the conservative Manchus with the military means of suppressing a spontaneous Chinese Westernizing movement which the Imperial Government had proved unable to crush out of its own resources (ibid., pp. 571-2). It will be seen that this decisive Franco-British intervention in China in favour of the Imperial Government and against the T'ai-p'ing in the seventh decade of the nineteenth century was in this respect analogous to the similarly decisive intervention of Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, and the Hapsburg Monarchy in the Ottoman Empire in favour of Sultan Mahmūd II and against Mehmed 'Ali in A.D. 1839-41. The frustration of the T'ai-p'ing movement was a tragic episode in the history of the encounter between China and the Modern West; for the author of the movement, the Hakka Hung Hsiu-ch'uan, was making a second attempt at the enterprise—previously attempted by the Jesuits without ultimate success—of initiating China into the Modern Western culture in its Christian entirety and not just in a technological abstract. In itself, Hung's attempt was the more promising of the two, since it emanated, not from alien missionaries, but from a Chinese prophet, and proceeded, not from above downwards, but from below upwards.

<sup>4</sup> For the influence of the missionaries Allen and Richard in that generation, see Soothill, op. cit., p. 173.

<sup>5</sup> See Soothill, op. cit., p. 175.

had achieved the far more difficult feat of installing in its place a new régime capable of putting into operation a comprehensive Westernizing movement from above downwards. The Chinese took 118 years to accomplish even the negative political result that the Japanese achieved in fifteen. The arrival of Lord Macartney's Embassy at Peking in A.D. 1793 was no less illuminating a demonstration of the formidably enhanced potency of the Western Civilization than the arrival of Commodore Perry's squadron in Yedo Bay sixty years later; yet in China the overthrow of the *ancien régime* did not follow till A.D. 1911, and the discarded universal state was then replaced, not by any effective new Westernizing political order, but by a familiar anarchy which the Kuomintang lamentably failed to overcome during the quarter of a century (A.D. 1923-48) which this twentieth-century Chinese Westernizing movement had at its disposal for showing whether it was capable of living up to its professed ideals and carrying out its declared programme.<sup>1</sup>

Since the nineteenth-century shock that jolted both Far Eastern peoples out of their ruts was the impact of new high-powered Western armaments carried by British warships in the war of A.D. 1839-42 and by American warships in the visitations of A.D. 1853-4, a nineteenth-century Japan's flying start over a nineteenth-century China in a race towards the goal of political and economic Westernization can be measured by the degree of Japan's military superiority over China during the fifty years running from the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war of A.D. 1894-5. During that half-century China was militarily at Japan's mercy; and, though, in the last round of this struggle, an effective conquest of the whole of China proved to be beyond Japan's resources, it was equally evident that, if the Japanese war-machine had not been shattered in the Second World War by the United States, the Chinese

<sup>1</sup> A comparison, which is as illuminating as it is objective, between the Chinese and the Japanese response to the identical challenge presented to both branches of the Far Eastern Society by the impact of a Late Modern Western Civilization is made by Hu Shih in *The Chinese Renaissance: The Haskell Lectures, 1933* (Chicago 1934, University Press), chap. 1. The Chinese philosopher's conclusion is that 'there are various types of cultural response, of which the Japanese type may be called one of "centralized control", and the Chinese type one of "diffused penetration and permeation"' (ibid., p. 27). In seeking to account for Japan's relative success, by comparison with the relative failure of China's corresponding contemporary efforts, in responding to the challenge from the West in the first chapter of an episode that was common to the history of both countries, Hu Shih puts his finger (ibid., p. 5) on three assets that Japan possessed, and China lacked, at the time. The first of these was an old, experienced, and powerful aristocratic ruling class; the second was a military tradition, kept alive in that class, which gave Japan the spirit to hold her own in the arena of a militaristic Western World (in contrast to the prevailing tradition in China, where the military virtues had remained under a cloud ever since they had been discredited by the paroxysm of militarism by which an antecedent Sinic Civilization had been convulsed during a Time of Troubles ending in the establishment of a Sinic universal state by Ts'ing She Hwang-ti). The third Japanese asset to which Hu Shih draws attention is the fact that, by the time of the cultural revolution in Japan in and after the seventh decade of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era, the Imperial Dynasty had already been reigning without governing for at least a thousand years, and had thereby automatically acquired a cumulative aura of venerability which was not tarnished by any of the odium that is inevitably incurred by political authorities who wield effective power. Hence, when, in A.D. 1868, the Japanese Imperial House was brought out of cold storage, it was admirably 'suited to be made into a constitutional monarchy after the European pattern' (ibid., p. 19). Hu Shih gives interesting illustrations of the disadvantage at which China found herself in this age, by comparison with Japan, for want of these three political instruments for dealing with the impact of the West (ibid., pp. 5-23).



would never have been able, unaided, to wrest back out of the Japanese invaders' hands the captured ports, industrial areas, and railroads that were the keys to the Westernization of China and that were vital to China's economy in the ratio of their rarity in China at this date.

Moreover, Japan's facile, albeit inconclusive, victories over China were the cheapest of the trophies with which a latter-day Japanese militarism adorned a triumphal progress that carried it, within a span of fifty years, to its ironical goal of an utter military and political disaster without precedent in Japanese history. Between A.D. 1894 and A.D. 1945 Japan extracted military dividends from a process of technological Westernization with a virtuosity that eclipsed the achievements of Petrine Russia between her victory in the Great Northern War of A.D. 1701-21 and her defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of A.D. 1904-5. In this trial of strength at the opening of the twentieth century of the Christian Era between one non-Western people that, by that date, had been in process of Westernization for more than two hundred years and another non-Western people that had been treading the same road for less than half a century, a victorious Japan won recognition as a Great Power in the Western comity of states, as a victorious Russia had won the same recognition, some two hundred years earlier, in her trial of strength with the Sweden of King Charles XII. Thereafter, Japan achieved the *tour de force* of making herself one of the three leading naval Powers in a twentieth-century world in which naval strength was a function of industrial potency in terms of a Western industrial technique; and her final fling was to smite the United States Navy in Pearl Harbour and overrun all the colonial possessions of the Western Powers in South-East Asia, from the Philippines to Malaya and Sumatra inclusive, in the course of a suicidal leap into the jaws of disaster.

These jaws were the common destination at which a Japanese hare and a Chinese tortoise had arrived simultaneously by the beginning of the second half of the twentieth century. At that date Japan was still lying passive under a foreign military occupation to which she had submitted by an act of unconditional surrender, while China, after she had robbed herself of the benefits of her liberation from the scourge of Japanese militarism by subjecting her tormented body social to the self-inflicted flagellation of a fresh civil war, had promptly proceeded to rob herself of the benefits of domestic pacification under the iron hand of a victorious Communist régime<sup>1</sup> by embroiling herself in a new foreign war in which she was not the victim but the aggressor, and in which she was fighting, not Japan, but those Western Powers that had so recently extricated her from Japan's clutches. Japan's plight was without precedent in the annals of an archipelago which had never before been invaded with success since the arrival of the Japanese people's own ancestors from overseas before the dawn of recorded Japanese history. China's plight might look at first sight more familiar, considering how many times in the course of her long history a bout of anarchy had ended

<sup>1</sup> The Chinese Communists won their decisive military victories over the Kuomintang in the autumn and early winter of A.D. 1948. The Communist People's Republic of China was inaugurated on the 30th September, 1949.

at last in a dictatorial reimposition of domestic peace through the triumph of a revolutionary régime. Even the alien origin of her new Communist rulers' ideology had its precedents in the tincture of Protestant Western Christianity in the T'ai'ping and the coating of post-Christian Western Liberalism on the Kuomintang. Yet China's plight likewise was novel at least in the points that, in embarking on a foreign war in Korea against the Western Community of Nations after having fought a culminating Chinese civil war in which the belligerents had been the Communists and the Kuomintang, China had become successively a battlefield and a belligerent in a world-wide conflict between two contending ideologies which were both of non-Chinese provenance.

*The Unsolved Problem of a Rising Pressure of Population*

What was the explanation of this uniformly disastrous ending of the first phase of the second encounter between these two Far Eastern societies and the Modern West? In both China and Japan the disaster had its root in a common Asiatic and East European unsolved problem which has come to our attention already in our survey of the encounter between the Modern West and the Hindu World.<sup>1</sup> What was to be the effect of the Western Civilization's impact on economically still primitive peasant populations which had been accustomed for ages to breed up to the limits of bare subsistence at a level only just above the starvation line, and which were now being inoculated with a novel discontent through a dawning awareness of the possibilities opened up by the progress of Western technology for an improvement in the conditions of human life—but this without having yet begun to face the hard fact that these possibilities could become practical opportunities for them only at the price of an economic, a social, and, above all, a psychological revolution? In order to tap the bounty of Amalthea's horn, these hide-bound peasants would have to revolutionize their traditional methods of land-utilization and systems of land-tenure and to regulate the number of their births. Here were conflicting ideals whose conflict was bound to breed disasters so long as it remained unresolved; and a disaster which, mid-way through the twentieth century, was still in the offing for India, had by then already overtaken the two contemporary societies in the Far East.

The operation of this factor in the history of Japan since the Meiji Revolution of A.D. 1868 was particularly conspicuous. The complete military and political stabilization and partial economic stabilization of Japanese life under the Tokugawa dispensation had been possible because there was a basis of demographic stability underpinning them. During the Tokugawa period the population of Japan had been kept stationary artificially by divers means.<sup>2</sup> When the Tokugawa régime was liquidated, an unnaturally frozen Japanese body social thawed out;

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 213-16, above, and pp. 684-9, below.

<sup>2</sup> From circa A.D. 1725 to circa A.D. 1850 the figure was always something between twenty-eight and thirty millions according to Sansom, G. B.: *Japan, A Short Cultural History* (London 1932, Cresset Press), p. 458. By the middle of the eighteenth century, infanticide and abortion had become regular practices among the Japanese peasantry, and they do not appear to have been eradicated by being officially prohibited, as they were in A.D. 1767 (*ibid.*, p. 508).

there was a general release of pent-up social forces, in the field of family life as well as in the fields of economics, politics, and war; and the silent lapse of the previous restrictions on the increase of population proved in the event to be a more revolutionary change than the political and economic revolutions which caught the World's attention at the time.

Unlike the contemporary changes on the political and economic planes, the resumption in Japan of unrestricted breeding was not an effect of any Western influence but was a reversion to the traditional *mores* of a primitive peasant society which had been put under restraint, by a psychological *tour de force*, in the glacial atmosphere of the Tokugawa Age. The contemporary technological Westernization of Japan did, however, accentuate the practical effect of this relapse into a primitive habit by lowering a death-rate whose height, in societies not equipped with Modern Western preventive medicine and public hygiene, had normally moderated the effects of a high birth-rate on the movement of population. The consequent net increase of the population in Japan after the Meiji Revolution was comparable to its net increase in India after the establishment there of the British Rāj; and in Japan the resulting pressure of population on the means of subsistence made itself felt still more quickly and more acutely owing to the complete absence there of any reserves of cultivable land, the dearth of raw materials for industry (a dearth which was specially stringent in respect of coal and iron-ore), and the people's traditionally higher average standard of living and consequently higher expectations in an era of Westernization.<sup>1</sup>

A Westernizing Japan might not have been so hard beset by these economic embarrassments if she had not drawn back at the last moment from taking the plunge at the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries of the Christian Era. If Japan had made her entry into the comity of Western nations at that date, she would doubtless have acquired a substantial share of the then still virgin lands in the South Seas and along the western coasts of the Americas that were subsequently occupied by settlers from Spain and from the British Isles during the lost two centuries and a quarter of Japan's self-imposed insulation. The once untenanted terrestrial paradises that had meanwhile become California and New South Wales would have been ideal colonizing grounds for a Japanese people that was so 'allergic' to alien climates that it found Hokkaido forbiddingly arctic and Formosa forbiddingly tropical. By the third quarter of the nineteenth century, when the ocean-faring Western peoples had had nearly four hundred years' grace for exploring and occupying the face of the planet without serious competition from any other society, these options were no longer open to a tardily awakened Japanese Sleeping Beauty. For a Japan who, in abandoning the Tokugawan limitation of births, had condemned herself to a choice between expanding in some form or exploding, the only two alternative forms of expansion that were practical politics in the Meiji Era were either to persuade the rest of the World to trade with her or to conquer additional territory, resources, and markets by force of arms

<sup>1</sup> For the increase of the economic pressure on the life of the Japanese peasantry after A.D. 1868, see Sansom, *op. cit.*, pp. 506 *seqq.*

from existing owners who were militarily too weak to defend their property against a militarily Westernized Japan's aggression.

Between A.D. 1868 and A.D. 1931 Japanese foreign policy oscillated uneasily between these two cardinal points of her political compass. The Japanese Liberals counted on the maintenance and expansion of a market for the relatively cheap products of efficiently managed Japanese textile and other light industries among vast peasant populations in Asia and Africa who were acquiring an appetite for the facilities and amenities of the Modern Western way of life but who could not afford the price of West European and North American manufactures. The Japanese militarists pointed to the remorselessly accelerating rise of a ubiquitous tide of Economic Nationalism,<sup>1</sup> and pressed upon their countrymen the alternative policy of military conquest with the arguments that the only markets that Japan could be sure of retaining in an ever more nationalist-minded world were markets under her own political control, and that even controlled markets would not solve Japan's economic problem unless they were supplemented by controlled sources of food-supply and raw materials. The gradual effect of a world-wide accentuation of Nationalism in converting the Japanese people to the Japanese militarists' doctrine was clinched by the terrible experience of the devastating economic blizzard which descended on Wall Street in the autumn of A.D. 1929 and then swept on over the rest of the World.

When the Japanese militarists launched their campaign of aggression at Mukden on the night of the 18th-19th September, 1931, they were condemning Mankind to the torment of a Second World War within eight years of this date, and condemning their own country, in particular, to the additional disaster of seeing that torment culminate within fourteen years in the national calamity of an utter military defeat. In the Second World War Japan was not only justly defeated in her desperate attempt to solve her latter-day economic problem by an unbridled career of military conquest; she was also justly deprived of all the conquests at the expense of weaker peoples that she had made through an unscrupulous militarism since A.D. 1894. Yet this just and auspicious frustration of Japan's unprincipled policy of trying to solve her economic problem by means of military aggression was a negative achievement which had prevented the consummation of a crime without alleviating the pressure that had moved the criminal to commit his wicked acts; and, at a date some six or seven years after 'V-J. Day', a positive solution of Japan's economic problem seemed to be as far off as ever—though a Japanese student of history might perhaps find some hope and consolation in the strange new fact that, as an ironical consequence of the United States' crushing victory, the responsibility for solving this insistent Japanese problem by some means or other had been transferred from Japanese to American shoulders.

In Chinese history the latest illustration of a primitive peasantry's

<sup>1</sup> The turn of the tide during the decade A.D. 1861-71—the very time when Japan was making her belated entry into a Westernizing World—has been noticed in IV. iv. 174. The chief threat to Japan's exports came, not from the Western industrial countries, but from the progressive industrialization of non-Western countries that, like India, were beginning to follow Japan's example.

habitual tendency to breed up to the limits of subsistence had been manifested during the *floruit* of the Manchu régime from the closing decades of the seventeenth century to the opening decades of the nineteenth. In the subsequent period of attempted Westernization the Chinese had never approached a level of military efficiency on Western lines at which they would have had it in their power to emulate Japan's abortive attempt to carve out an empire for herself with the sword at the expense of her neighbours. The worst that, down to A.D. 1950, the Chinese had been able to achieve through an imperfect mastery of Western military apparatus had been to employ it for enhancing the lethal effect of civil war, which in China was the traditional remedy for an excessive increase in population; and, although the Chinese Communist armies that had been launched in A.D. 1950 against the Americans and their allies in a Korean arena had fought with an efficiency and a resoluteness which the West had never encountered before in Chinese troops, they had failed, notwithstanding their superiority in numbers and their supplies of Russian equipment, to drive their Western opponents out of South Korea. In A.D. 1952 it did not look as if China, even under a Communist régime, had much prospect of being more successful than Japan had been if she were to set out, as Japan had done, to conquer a *Lebensraum* for herself by force of arms. It was all the more fortunate for China that she had inherited from her latest semi-barbarian conquerors, the Manchus, the last substantial unoccupied reserve of land in the temperate zone of the Northern Hemisphere.

Since the removal in A.D. 1878<sup>1</sup> of the last restrictions on Chinese immigration into the great open spaces of Manchuria beyond the Willow Palisade, with their vast resources in arable land, minerals, and timber, the Chinese population of 'the Three Eastern Provinces' had risen to the figure of approximately forty million within three generations; and this mass migration—which had changed the demographic map of the World as markedly as the Russian colonization of the Black Sea Steppes and Siberia or the West European colonization of the Americas and the South Seas—had been stimulated by the scourges of civil war, pestilence, and famine in the densely populated adjoining intramural Chinese provinces of Chihli, Shantung, and Hopei. In the alternating current of Chinese history, adversity had indeed been as potent a force as prosperity for promoting the constant expansion of the

<sup>1</sup> The establishment of the Manchu Empire in the seventeenth century of the Christian Era had brought the thinly populated steppes and forest-clad highlands of Manchuria under the same sovereignty as the densely Chinese-inhabited agricultural regions in the small area outside the Great Wall but inside the Willow Palisade and in the vast area inside the Great Wall, and under this dispensation there had been an unrestricted flow of Chinese immigration into the Manchurian country beyond the Willow Palisade. This immigration had been prohibited in A.D. 1776 by a decree of the Emperor Ch'ien Lung with an eye to conserving the Manchurian reservoir of barbarian man-power which was the source of the Manchus' military and political ascendancy in the Far Eastern World. This prohibition had proved ineffective, and, early in the reign of Tao Kuang (*imperabat* A.D. 1821–51), the Manchu Imperial Government had reversed Ch'ien Lung's policy in Southern Manchuria by legalizing the sale of land in that area to Chinese purchasers. Heilungkiang, the northernmost and most extensive of the Manchurian provinces of the Manchu Empire, was officially opened to Chinese immigration in A.D. 1878, and Kirin a few years earlier (Young, C. W.: *Chinese Colonisation and the Development of Manchuria* (Honolulu 1929, Institute of Pacific Relations), pp. 8–10).



Chinese people over an ever widening area; and this Chinese expansion, unlike its puny Japanese counterpart, was not restricted by any climatic limitations. While the Northern Chinese peasants had been schooled by the hard winters of their native provinces to lead a farmer's life on the land in the rigorous climate of Manchuria, the Southern Chinese had been acclimatized by a fifteen-hundred-years-long sojourn in the sultry Yangtse Basin and on the sub-tropical shores of the China Sea for leading a business man's life in the cities of Indo-China, Siam, Burma, Indonesia, and Malaya, where in the twentieth century of the Christian Era at least one new South-East Asian Chinese province could be seen taking shape through a traditional process of peaceful penetration.

Yet, in spite of their opportunity and capacity for relieving the pressure of population in China by both the constructive expedient of urban and rural colonization in diverse physical climates, ranging from the tropical to the arctic, and the destructive expedient of chronic civil war, the Chinese mid-way through the twentieth century of the Christian Era were being defeated almost as signally as the Japanese by the problem of coping with the fertility of a primitive peasantry in the social and psychological climate of a Westernizing World; and in China, unlike either Japan or India at this date, a problem which had so far found no solution on the lines of a Western-inspired Democracy was being forcibly taken in hand by a Russian-inspired Communism. In A.D. 1948-9 a Kuomintang movement which had been discredited by the rapidity of its change of front from a revolutionary championship of reform to a reactionary defence of vested interests had been swept away by a Communism propagated by native Chinese Communist force of arms; and three years later, at the moment when this volume was being sent to the press, the Communist régime in China appeared to be securely in the saddle.

#### *A Communist Russia's Chinese Fifth Column*

It remained to be seen whether a Chinese peasantry whose disillusionment with the Kuomintang had been a decisive though imponderable factor in turning the scales would find an effective remedy for its ills in the Communist prescription or would relish the prescribed regimen even if it were to prove capable of producing its promised effect; but it was already clear that the military and ideological conquest of China by Communism in A.D. 1949 was the latest move in a Russian assault on the main body of the Far Eastern Society which by that date had been in progress for some three hundred years—though this was the first operation in which the Russian strategists had commanded the services of a Chinese 'fifth column'.

In the second quarter of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era, when the Japanese were breaking off their tentative relations with an Early Modern Western Christendom and when Manchu empire-builders who had already passed the Willow Palisade were preparing to make their passage through the Great Wall, the Manchus were taken in the rear by Cossack pioneers of an expanding Russian Orthodox Christendom who had burst into the Upper Basin of the Amur River after

successively outflanking Dār-al-Islām and the Eurasian Steppe. As soon as the Manchus had broken at least the overt resistance of Southern China, where their usurpation had been stubbornly contested, they turned upon these audacious Cossack trespassers on the Manchurian pasture-lands that were the reservoir of Manchu barbarian man-power, and drove the intruders back to a line which the Imperial Russian Government found itself compelled to accept *de jure* as the frontier between the two Powers and to respect *de facto* for a hundred and sixty-eight years following the conclusion, at Nerchinsk, of the Russo-Manchu peace treaty of A.D. 1689.

This treaty provided for the maintenance of an authorized channel for overland trade between the two empires, and of a Russian embassy and church at Peking; but, throughout the next two centuries, the impact of Russia on China overland was felt only faintly by comparison with the maritime impact of the Portuguese and their more aggressive British and French successors. The concessions exacted from China by the maritime Western Powers as the victors' spoils in the wars of A.D. 1839-42 and A.D. 1857-60 cut Chinese sensibilities to the quick; but, when, in A.D. 1857, Russia righted the balance of competitive aggression at China's expense by compelling the Manchu Imperial Government to cede to Russia their title to all the territory that the peace settlement of A.D. 1689 had assigned to the Manchu Empire on the left bank of the Amur and the right bank of the Ussuri, neither the Chinese people nor even their Manchu masters were sensibly affected by the loss of these then still empty border territories; and they seem hardly to have noticed the construction of the new Russian port of Vladivostok in an all but ice-free natural harbour at the south-western extremity of these ceded Manchu territories, within a stone's throw of the north-east corner of Korea. The Chinese did not become apprehensively aware of Russia's advancing shadow till A.D. 1897, when the Russian Navy occupied Port Arthur as Russia's prize in a scramble between the Powers of the Western World for the seizure of naval bases on China's coasts, and A.D. 1900, when, taking advantage of the imbroglio with the maritime Western Powers in which China had been involved by a 'Zealot' movement culminating in the xenophobe Boxer Rebellion, the Russian Army swooped upon Manchuria and planted itself—in the footprints of the Manchus on the eve of the Manchu conquest of Intramural China 250 years back—at the threshold of Shanhaikwan, the vital passage between the mountains and the sea which was Intramural China's Thermopylae.

The sequel to this Russian seizure of Manchuria in A.D. 1897-1900, like the sequel to the preceding Japanese victory over China in A.D. 1894-5, was to demonstrate the vanity of Militarism. It was in vain that the Russians sought to consolidate their territorial gains in the Far East, and to prepare the way for extending them farther, by pressing a new-fangled Western mechanical invention into the service of the archaic crime of military aggression. The Russian-built railway linking Vladivostok and Port Arthur with St. Petersburg notably surpassed the North American transcontinental railways in its length, and

challenged comparison with them in the rapidity of its construction;<sup>1</sup> yet, in performing this feat, the Russian railway engineers were working unwittingly for the Japanese. The South Manchurian section of the Russian-built railway-system was transferred to Japanese hands in the peace-settlement following the defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of A.D. 1904-5; and, a generation later, Russia was compelled to advertise her then still unretrieved military inferiority to Japan in the Far Eastern zone of contact between the two Powers by agreeing to the forced sale to Japan, at a derisory price, of the trunk line of the Russian transcontinental railway within the frontiers of the newly conquered Japanese puppet state of 'Manchukuo'.<sup>2</sup> When Japanese militarism, in its turn, met with its nemesis at American hands, Russia was enabled—as an incidental consequence of American prowess in naval warfare and in atomic physics—to take her revenge for forty-three years of humiliation<sup>3</sup> by rounding up the once redoubtable Japanese Kwantung Army in a lightning campaign of twenty-five days.<sup>4</sup> But there was no evidence that in A.D. 1945 Russia could have defeated Japan in Manchuria if she had had to depend solely on her own military strength; and, in the sequel, the sensational resumption of a Russian advance beyond the limits of Manchuria which had been checked in A.D. 1904-5 by Japanese arms was accomplished, without any direct Russian military action at all, through the operation of Russian ideas and ideals on Chinese minds and hearts.

In spite of the establishment of a Russian Orthodox Christian mission at Peking since A.D. 1689, Russian Orthodox Christianity had never gained in China any influence comparable to that of a Modern Western Roman Catholicism and Protestantism. So long as the competition between the West and Russia for the spiritual conquest of Chinese souls was conducted on a common Christian basis, the preponderance of the Western spiritual influence was overwhelming. But the balance of impinging alien spiritual forces in the Chinese arena changed when the substitution of Liberalism for Christianity as the gospel of the West was followed by the substitution of Communism for Christianity as the gospel of Russia. Communism could plausibly claim to offer a more practically relevant remedy than Liberalism for the ills of a society that

<sup>1</sup> Except for the loop round the southern end of Lake Baikal, which was not built till A.D. 1905, the through-connexion linking Vladivostok and Port Arthur via Manchuria with the previous rail-head of the Russian railway-system at Chelyabinsk in Western Siberia was achieved within the decennium A.D. 1892-1902.

<sup>2</sup> The sale was finally transacted on the 23rd March, 1935, after negotiations that it had taken the best part of a year to carry through to completion.

<sup>3</sup> The writer of this Study realized how extreme this Russian humiliation was when, on the 24th November, 1929, in the course of a visit to Port Arthur under Japanese rule, he was taken by his Japanese cicerone to see the Japanese officers' club there. This had been the Russian officers' club before the fall of Port Arthur on the 2nd January, 1905, and, as a memorial of their victory, the Japanese inheritors of the establishment had kept all the Russian appointments exactly as they had found them. One feature that vividly impressed itself on the writer's memory was a room decorated with a series of coloured prints depicting Russian victories in the Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1877-8. In A.D. 1929 the Japanese occupants of the building manifestly relished the irony of this display, and, no doubt, in A.D. 1945 the Russians equally savoured the pleasure of taking their club over again from interloping tenants who had not dreamed that their conscientious care-taking was to be, after all, for the benefit of the original owners.

<sup>4</sup> 9th August to 2nd September, 1945.

was being worsted by the problem of a peasantry whose expectations had been heightened while its habits remained unchanged; and by A.D. 1952 the programme of the Chinese Communist leaders had not yet been discredited by a discrepancy between profession and practice which had already destroyed the credit of the Kuomintang.

Thus in China, as in other living non-Western societies, the middle years of the twentieth century of the Christian Era witnessed the delivery of a Russian challenge to the influence of a Modern Western Civilization which had appeared to have the whole World at its feet before the outbreak of the First World War in A.D. 1914.

#### *7. Characteristics of the Encounters between the Modern West and its Contemporaries up to date*

We have now surveyed at least the principal examples of encounters with the Modern Western Civilization up to the points at which these still continuing dramas had arrived by the time of writing, and, in the process, we have also taken note of a number of encounters, since the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of the Christian Era, between living non-Western civilizations. Neither of these fields has been covered in our survey completely. There are encounters which involved the Modern West, and contemporary encounters to which the Modern West was not a party, that have not been included in our review.<sup>1</sup> Yet

<sup>1</sup> In the field of encounters to which the Modern West was a party, we have cited the Zoroastrian diaspora in India as an historical counterpart of the Jewish diaspora in the West without entering into the history of the relations between the Parsees and the Modern Western World since the establishment of direct intercourse between the West and India in A.D. 1498; and we have not taken any account of the Modern Western World's relations with the surviving Nestorian, Monophysite, and ex-Monothelite Christian fossils of an extinct Syriac Society, which, like the Zoroastrian and Jewish fossils deposited in a previous chapter of history, were products of a long-continuing collision and conflict between the Syriac Civilization and Hellenism. By the middle of the twentieth century the Nestorian Assyrians of 'Iraq, the Zagros, and Malabar, the Monophysite Gregorian Armenians, Jacobite Syrians, and Coptic Egyptians and Abyssinians, and the ex-Monothelite Maronites of the Lebanon, had all yielded to the impact of the Modern Western Civilization in some degree. Every one of these fossil Oriental churches had lost converts to Tridentine Roman Catholic and to Protestant Western Christianity (though the seventeenth-century Malabari Nestorian converts to Roman Catholicism had transferred their allegiance, in the third quarter of the seventeenth century, to the Monophysite Patriarch of Antioch); and in all of them likewise the unconverted majorities had come under the influence of a secularized Modern Western culture. The same secular Modern Western influence had also made itself felt on the Hinayanian Buddhist relics of an extinct Indic culture in Ceylon, Burma, Siam, and Cambodia, and in Ceylon there had been conversions from Hinayanian Buddhism to both Roman Catholic and Protestant Western Christianity.

In the economic unification of the World on a Modern Western basis by Modern Western enterprise the economic resources of insular and continental South-East Asia—beginning with spices and passing on to rice, rubber, tin, teak, coffee, and quinine—had come to play an outstandingly important part, and the opportunities thus opened up under Western auspices had drawn into South-East Asia an inflow of Chinese and Hindu and Hadhramawti Arab business men and industrial workers. By the time of writing, the Hinayanian Buddhist populations of the South-East Asian mainland and the Sunni Muslim and Protestant and Roman Catholic Christian populations of the Malayan Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, Celebes, and the Philippines were feeling this convergent pressure from the giant societies on either side of them, and an historian could foresee a resolution of this multiple interplay of cultural forces into the simpler but more formidable issue of the locus of the future line of demarcation between a Chinese and a Hindu Society in a South-East Asia where the indigenous populations would have been submerged after the elimination of their ephemeral Western masters or protectors.

There had been other encounters since the close of the fifteenth century between

the evidence that we have examined in the preceding chapters is perhaps sufficient to allow us to draw some general conclusions from it.

The most significant of the conclusions that suggest themselves is that the word 'modern' in the term 'Modern Western Civilization' can, without inaccuracy, be given a more precise and concrete connotation by being translated 'middle-class'. Western communities became 'modern', in the accepted Modern Western meaning of the word, just as soon as they had succeeded in producing a bourgeoisie that was both numerous enough and competent enough to become the predominant element in Society.<sup>1</sup> We think of the new chapter of Western history that opened at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries as being 'modern' *par excellence* because, for the next four centuries and more, until the opening of a 'post-Modern Age' at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the middle class was in the saddle in the larger and more prominent part of the Western World as a whole. Yet, throughout this so-called 'Modern Age', there were fringes of the Western World—in Eastern Europe, Southern Italy, the Iberian Peninsula, and Latin America—that had never completely ceased to be 'medieval' in terms of this qualitative and not merely chronological test, while conversely, by the same test, the abortive city-state cosmos in Central and Northern Italy, Western Germany, the Low Countries, and the Hansa Towns was already 'modern' in the Later Middle Ages.

This definition of the Modern Western culture as being a phase of Western cultural development that is distinguished by the ascendancy of the middle class throws light on the conditions under which, before the advent in the West of a post-Modern Age marked by the rise of an industrial urban working class, any alien recipients of this Modern Western culture would be likely to be successful in making it their own. During the currency of the Modern Age of Western history the ability of aliens to become Westerners would be proportionate to their capacity for entering into the middle-class Western way of life.

This tentative conclusion is manifestly borne out by the facts when we test it by reference to cases of Westernization from below upwards. In the indigenous social structure of Greek Orthodox Christian, Chinese, and Japanese life, for example, there were elements that had some affinity with the middle-class element in the impinging Western Society; and the Westernization of the Greeks and the Chinese was undoubtedly facilitated, governed, and limited by the pace and extent of their progress

living non-Western civilizations to which the Modern West had not been a party even temporarily or indirectly. While the impact of the Modern West had affected the relations of the ex-Monothelite, Monophysite, and Nestorian Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire with their Muslim neighbours, and the relations of the Parsees and 'Saint Thomas's Christians' in India with their Hindu neighbours, there had been no Western intervention in the sixteenth-century competition between Sunni Islam and the Tantric Mahayanian Buddhism of Tibet for the conversion of still pagan Nomads on the Eurasian Steppe, none in the eighteenth-century collision between the Lamas' Calmuck converts and the Chinese main body of the Far Eastern Society, and none in the nineteenth-century collision between this indigenous Far Eastern culture and the Far Eastern outposts of the Islamic World in the Tarim Basin, the North-Western Chinese provinces of Kansu and Shensi, and the South-Western Chinese province of Yunnan.

<sup>1</sup> i.e. to become the *πολίτευμα*, as this predominant element was conveniently designated in the technical terminology of Hellenic political science (see VI. vii. 373, n. 1).



in developing these existing rudiments into a full-blown middle class in the Modern Western sense.<sup>1</sup> In these two Westernizing movements from below upwards the progress was gradual and was frequently checked by set-backs, but, as far as it went, it did result in the formation of a genuine middle class in these originally non-Western social milieux. On the other hand in cases in which the process of Westernization proceeded from above downwards—and Japan, as we have seen,<sup>2</sup> changed over to this alternative approach after the Meiji Revolution—the autocrats who set themselves to Westernize their subjects by fiat did not think of waiting for an unforced process of social evolution to provide them with authentic middle-class agents of indigenous origin for the execution of their Westernizing policy; and, since it was manifestly impracticable even for the most energetic autocrat to carry out a Westernizing policy single-handed, and even for autocrats who were Western conquerors of a non-Western society to propagate their alien way of life solely through the agency of Western-born administrators and missionaries without enlisting the aid of native converts, the high-handed apostles of Westernization from above downwards were constrained in every case to provide themselves with an artificial substitute for a home-grown middle class by manufacturing an intelligentsia.

The intelligentsias<sup>3</sup> thus called into existence in Russia, the Islamic and Hindu worlds, and Japan in response to the ubiquitous challenge of the impact of the Modern West were, of course, successfully imbued by their makers with a genuine tincture of middle-class qualities—as was demonstrated by their partial success in inducting into a middle-class Modern Western way of life the non-Western societies from which they had been recruited. The Russian case suggests, however, that even this partial success might be only provisional and ephemeral. In Russia, as we have seen,<sup>4</sup> Peter the Great's policy of adopting the Modern Western way of life in its orthodox middle-class form had been violently repudiated 228 years after Peter's effective advent to power in A.D. 1689. It had been supplanted in A.D. 1917 by the alternative policy of pressing forward with the acquisition and application of a Modern Western technology as an instrument for combating the orthodox middle-class Western ideology of Liberalism in the name of the heretical anti-bourgeois Western ideology of Marxism. This Marxian heresy had become the creed of a Russian intelligentsia which had originally been called into existence by the Petrine Tsardom to carry out the mission of bringing Russia into the middle-class Western fold; and, for at least three generations before the explosion on the political surface of life in the second Russian revolution of A.D. 1917, an anti-bourgeois animus in the hearts of a nineteenth-century Russian intelligentsia had been finding a literary vent in the works of Russian writers.<sup>5</sup> The wider significance of this chapter of Russian history lay in the fact that the

<sup>1</sup> In Japan, however, the commercial and industrial leaders of the Meiji Era were recruited, not from the commercial class of the Tokugawa Era, but from the Samurai, according to Sanson, G. B.: *Japan, A Short Cultural History* (London 1932, Cresset Press), p. 501.

<sup>2</sup> On pp. 327–8, above.

<sup>4</sup> On pp. 133–6, above.

<sup>3</sup> See V. v. 154–9.

<sup>5</sup> See, for example, pp. 699–701, below.

movement for Westernization from above downwards had been started in Russia a hundred years earlier than in the Islamic, Hindu, and Japanese worlds; for this chronological datum suggested that the latest turn of events in Russia might be an augury of one of the possibilities that were lying in wait for those other non-Western worlds in chapters of their histories that were still in the future at a date mid-way through the twentieth century. The possibility that these other histories in their turn might eventually take a Russian course was, indeed, something more than a mere theoretical induction from the Russian historical precedent. It was also implicit in an affinity between the Far Eastern, Hindu, and Islamic intelligentsias and the Russian intelligentsia that was already a matter of observable fact.

In the light of this anti-bourgeois turn which the Russian intelligentsia had already taken and towards which the other intelligentsias might be tending, it is perhaps worth pausing to look into the likenesses and the differences between the non-Western intelligentsias and the Western middle class whose role they had been commissioned to play in a non-Western social environment.

One important common characteristic of the Western middle class and the latter-day non-Western intelligentsias was their common provenance from beyond the original pale of the societies in which they had succeeded eventually in establishing themselves. In studying the encounter between the Western Society and the Jewish diaspora in its midst,<sup>1</sup> we have observed that the Western Society when it first emerged in the Dark Ages, like the surviving non-Western societies when they first collided with the West in its modern phase, was an agrarian society in whose life the urban pursuits of industry, commerce, and finance were exotic and were originally practised—in so far as they were practised at all—by an alien Jewish diaspora, until a Gentile Western middle class was called into being by the Western Gentiles' aspiration to be their own Jews. The abiding affinity of the Western middle class with a diaspora of the type represented by Western Jewry—a community uprooted from the soil and addicted to peculiarly urban occupations—was demonstrated, long after the Gentile Western middle class had captured from the country-folk the key position of being the dominant element in Society, by the alacrity and ease with which the Armenian Gregorian and Greek Orthodox Christian diasporas in the Ottoman World, and the Parsee diaspora in India, acclimatized themselves to the way of life of a Modern Western middle-class society. Conversely the Parsee or Armenian or Greek Westernized business man who came to work in New York or London and to sleep in Connecticut or Sussex appeared hardly more alien in the local farmer's eyes than the 'Anglo-Saxon' business man who shuttled to and fro in the same suburban trains between the same dormitories and offices. In a twentieth-century American or English farmer's sight, all his urban middle-class contemporaries—the Westernized and the native Western alike—were still as exotic as a Cordovan or Tarragonese Jew had once been in the eyes of a sixth-century peasant in Visigothia.

This quaintly invidious appearance of being 'pariahs in power' in the

<sup>1</sup> On pp. 276 and 284-6, above.

eyes of unuprooted cultivators of the soil was not the only point of likeness between the Modern Western middle class and the contemporary intelligentsias. Another point in common between them was that both had won their eventual dominance by revolting against their original employers. In Holland, Great Britain, the United States, France, and other Western countries the middle class had successively come into power by stepping into the shoes of enlightened monarchies whose patronage had inadvertently made the middle class's fortune. In non-Western polities in the Late Modern Age of Western history the intelligentsia had likewise come into power by successfully revolting against Westernizing autocrats who had been, not the inadvertent makers of their fortunes, but the deliberate authors of their existence.<sup>1</sup>

These points of likeness between intelligentsias called into existence in non-Western societies by Westernizing autocrats and a Western middle class whose role these intelligentsias were called upon to play are offset by at least one signal difference. The middle class that made itself paramount in the Western World in the Modern Age of Western history was an indigenous element in the society that it eventually came to dominate, in spite of its having had no place in that society's original social order. The history of the gradual and arduous ascent of this Western middle class from the lowly outskirts of the Western social hierarchy to its centre and summit was the history of the Western

<sup>1</sup> If we take a synoptic view of this common episode in the histories of Petrine Russia, a latter-day Ottoman Empire, and the British Rāj in India, we shall see that the revolt of the intelligentsia not only occurred in all three cases but came to a head in each case after the lapse of approximately the same span of time, reckoning from the initial dates of the respective Westernizing movements. In Russia the abortive Decembrist Revolution of A.D. 1825, which was the Russian intelligentsia's declaration of war on the Petrine Tsardom, broke out 136 years after Peter's effective advent to power in A.D. 1689. In India political 'unrest' began to reveal itself in Bengal towards the close of the nineteenth century, rather less than 140 years after the British occupation of Bengal in A.D. 1757-60. In the Ottoman Empire the Committee of Union and Progress overthrew Sultan 'Abd-al-Hamid II in A.D. 1908, 134 years after the Porte had first been impelled, by the shock of defeat in the Great Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1768-74, to begin training its Muslim subjects in appreciable numbers in a Modern Western art of war which had so signally demonstrated its efficacy at the Turks' expense when it had been employed against them even by Russian novices in the use of Western technology.

At this point we need not take up the question, raised in XI. ix. 187, below, whether the remarkable uniformity in the length of the time that it took for the revolt of the intelligentsia to come to a head in these three cases was a fortuitous coincidence or was the uniform effect of the operation of some constant psychological 'law'. We will merely note, in passing, that the argument in favour of the second of these two alternative possible explanations is supported by the reappearance of the same Time-span in a fourth case which, if not exactly parallel, is at least analogous. There was an interval of 138 years between the 'Osmanlis' defeat before the Walls of Vienna in A.D. 1683, which moved them to continue and extend the experiment of employing Phanariot Greek Orthodox Christian subjects of the Porte in responsible positions in the Ottoman public service, and the Greek uprising of A.D. 1821, which took place partly under Phanariot leadership. The parallel is not exact, because the Phanariots were not an intelligentsia which the Porte had called into existence; they were an embryonic Greek counterpart of the contemporary Western middle class who had made their fortunes by their own private enterprise and, in the process, had already acquired a familiarity with the West and its ways which opened a door for their entry into the Ottoman public service as soon as the Porte found itself obliged to negotiate with Western Powers to whom it was no longer strong enough to dictate. In these circumstances, Phanariots had already been appointed to key posts in the Ottoman service in the generation preceding the Ottoman catastrophe of A.D. 1683. The 138 years running from A.D. 1683 to 1821 were, however, those during which the Porte was so dependent on its Phanariot servants' knowledge of the Western World that the period may be described as a distinctively Phanariot Age of Ottoman administrative history.

Society's own spontaneous self-development. By contrast, the artificially manufactured intelligentsias suffered from the double handicap of being both *novi homines* and exotics. They would never even have come into existence, and would certainly never have come into power, if the non-Western societies on to whose stems they were grafted had not collided with a Modern Western World that was so far superior to these other societies in potency that they found themselves confronted with a choice between Westernizing and going under. The non-Western intelligentsias, unlike the Western middle class, were products and symptoms of their societies' discomfiture in encounters with a Western World which had been raised, by the rise of an indigenous middle class, to a height of prosperity and power at which it was more than a match for all its contemporaries. In short, the Western middle class stood for strength, whereas the Westernizing intelligentsias spelled weakness.

The intelligentsias, for their part, were sensitively aware of this invidious difference between themselves and the Western middle class; for the task of coping with this aggressive adversary was the intelligentsias' *raison d'être*, and they were condemned to spend themselves in this distressingly unequal contest on behalf of members of their own household from whom they had inevitably been alienated in the act of being trained to perform a social service that was as exotic from the standpoint of their native cultural tradition as it was vital in a world over which the West had cast its shadow. Their intuition of the thanklessness of their task conspired with an unavowed but inexorable nervous strain arising from the inherent contradictions in their social situation to breed in the intelligentsias a smouldering hatred of a Western middle class which was both their sire and their bane, their cynosure and their bugbear; and their excruciatingly ambivalent attitude towards this pirate sun, whose captivated planets they were, is poignantly conveyed in Catullus's elegiac couplet:

Odi et amo: quare id faciam, fortasse requiris.  
nescio, sed fieri sentio et excrucior.<sup>1</sup>

These two lines of Latin poetry enunciated the inexhaustible theme of a nineteenth-century Westernizing Russian literature whose masterpieces ran to many volumes; and this testament of a Russian intelligentsia that had been able to relieve its own malaise by the masterly exercise of a singular gift for self-expression faithfully mirrored the experience of other intelligentsias, sentenced to the same Psyche's task, whose unuttered woes might have been ignored if they had not found Russian spokesmen.

The intensity of an alien intelligentsia's hatred of the Western middle class gave the measure of that intelligentsia's foreboding of its own inability to emulate Western middle-class achievements. The classic instance, up to date, in which this embittering prescience had been justified by the event was the Russian intelligentsia's catastrophic failure, after the first of the two Russian revolutions in A.D. 1917, to carry out its fantastic mandate to transform the wreck of the Petrine Tsardom into a

<sup>1</sup> Catullus, Q.V.: *Carmina*, No. lxxxv.

parliamentary constitutional state in the nineteenth-century Western style. The Kerensky régime was a fiasco because it was saddled with the impracticable task of making bricks without straw. The Modern Western political system of responsible parliamentary government had been the creation of a middle class which had been sufficiently competent, experienced, prosperous, and numerous to come into political power when the time was ripe for it. In the social structure of the Russia of A.D. 1917 there was no corresponding element, and the Petrine Russian intelligentsia's inability to take a robust Western middle class's massive responsibilities on its own lean shoulders was demonstrated by its speedy collapse under the crushing weight of this unnatural burden. In this classic Russian instance, however, in which the action had been carried farther, midway through the twentieth century of the Christian Era, than in the history of any other encounter with the Modern West, the sequel had been no less quick in showing that an intelligentsia's failure to emulate the peculiar political achievement of the Western middle class was no evidence of inability to build any political structure of any kind. In Russia the same year A.D. 1917 that witnessed Kerensky's swift failure also witnessed Lenin's enduring success.

In Russia, before the year A.D. 1917 ran out, Lenin founded a polity of an original type which, in contrast to Kerensky's abortive essay in a conventional Western parliamentary régime, was constructed, not in obedience to *a priori* theory, but with a practical eye for dealing with an actual situation. As we have noticed in another context,<sup>1</sup> Lenin's objective was to repeat, and thereby salvage, Peter the Great's achievement of saving Russia from succumbing to the aggression of a technologically superior Western World by driving the Russian people to catch up with the vanguard of contemporary Western technological progress. Lenin faced the hard fact that this painful forced march could be exacted from an already exhausted people only by the discipline of the drill-sergeant's rod; and the particular form of dictatorial régime that he devised for his particular purpose took account of the momentary social exigencies of a Modern Western technology in its twentieth-century phase, besides conforming to a more general and enduring historical 'law' which decreed that the material gains of a revolutionary advance must always be paid for by losses of corresponding magnitude in the currency of liberty.

Lenin's political device for engineering a revolutionary Russian advance on a twentieth-century Western technological front was a personal dictatorship underpinned by the unanimous support of a unique political party that was to merit and retain its monopoly of power by the discrimination with which it selected its recruits, the fanaticism with which it indoctrinated its novices, and the discipline which it imposed on its full-fledged members. In its embodiment of this idea and these ideals, Lenin's All-Union Communist Party was not, of course, entirely without precedent. In Iranic Muslim history it had been anticipated in the Slave-Household of the Ottoman Pādīshāh,<sup>2</sup> in the Qzyylbash fraternity of devotees of the Safawīs,<sup>3</sup> and in a Sikh Khālsā that had been

<sup>1</sup> On pp. 139-41, above.

<sup>2</sup> See III. iii. 31-47.

<sup>3</sup> See I. i. 366-8 and V. v. 661-5.



called into being in a subjugated Hindu World by a decision to fight a Mughal ascendancy with its own weapons.<sup>1</sup> In these older Hindu and Islamic fraternities the *ethos* of the Russian heresiarch's Communist Party is already unmistakably discernible. Lenin's claim to originality rests on his independence in reinventing this formidable political instrument for himself and on his priority in applying it to the special purpose of enabling a non-Western society to hold its own against the Modern West by mastering the latest devices of a Modern Western technology without embracing the ideology that was the current Modern Western norm of orthodoxy.

The effectiveness with which this purpose was served by the Leninian single-party type of dictatorial régime was indicated by the frequency with which it was consciously imitated or inadvertently reproduced in the contemporary political history of other non-Western societies that were traditionally hostile to Russia but found themselves in the same predicament in a world in which 'the Western Question' had come to be ubiquitous.

In the Kuomintang régime established at Canton by Sun Yat-sen in A.D. 1921 a tincture of Russian Communism was deliberately introduced by the Chinese philosopher-statesman in A.D. 1923;<sup>2</sup> and, in the subsequent history of the Kuomintang National Government of China, the Leninian form of political constitution—a personal dictatorship supported by a unique party—significantly survived the breach which opened in A.D. 1927 between the Kuomintang and a Chinese Communist Party which had sought to take advantage of its affiliation to the Kuomintang in order to gain control of the National Government from within.<sup>3</sup> Though the Chinese Communists' rival pretensions were based on a claim to be genuine exponents of a Leninism which was admittedly diluted with Liberalism in the Kuomintang's ideology, the Kuomintang did not demonstrate the sincerity of its unfeigned eagerness to dissociate itself from Communism by repudiating the Leninian element in its own constitution and doctrine. The exigencies of a common predicament constrained a now bitterly anti-Russian Chinese ex-revolutionary party to continue to handle 'the Western Question' according to the inevitable Russian political prescription. From A.D. 1927 to A.D. 1949, when the Chinese Communists swept the Kuomintang off the Chinese political chess-board, the pious assurance in the Kuomintang's creed that 'the period of tutelage', which was the second of the three stages of revolution prescribed by Sun Yat-sen, was to be followed in due course by an unrestrictedly democratic dispensation was still just

<sup>1</sup> See V. v. 665-8.

<sup>2</sup> On returning to Canton in the summer of A.D. 1923 after a temporary loss of his foothold there in A.D. 1922, Sun Yat-sen brought with him as his political adviser a representative of the Soviet Government at Moscow, Michael Borodin (see *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, vol. II (London 1928, Milford), p. 311). The members of the Chinese Communist Party, which had been formed circa A.D. 1920 (see *Survey of International Affairs*, 1926 (London 1928, Milford), p. 240, n. 1), were admitted to membership in the Kuomintang at the beginning of A.D. 1924 (see *Survey of International Affairs*, 1927 (London 1929, Milford), p. 333).

<sup>3</sup> The Chinese Communist Party fell foul of the right wing of the Kuomintang at Nanchang in March 1927 and of the left wing of the Kuomintang at Hankow in June 1927 (see *Survey of International Affairs*, 1927 (London 1929, Milford), pp. 331-65).

as far from fulfilment' as the even more pious assurance in the Russian Marxist book of revelation that 'the dictatorship of the proletariat' was to fade out at long last through a withering away of the state itself.

The adoption of the Leninian type of polity in China was not so remarkable, however, as its adoption in Turkey; for, by the time when, on the morrow of the First World War, Mustafâ Kemal Atatürk established his revolutionary dictatorship *more Russico*, Russia had been Turkey's traditional 'Enemy Number One' for 150 years past, and a Russian provenance would have been enough in itself to discredit any idea or institution in Turkish eyes if this strong initial prejudice had not been overridden by some ineluctable necessity. The reason why patriotic-minded Turks were willing to take a lesson from Russia in this case was that their chastening experience of defeat in the First World War at the hands of technologically superior Western Powers had made the Turks, like the Russians, acutely aware that they must put themselves through a Westernizing technological revolution if they wished to survive; and the Turks, like the Russians, perceived that they could not carry out this revolutionary social manoeuvre unless they fell into the Leninian political formation of a *comitatus* at the heels of a dictator. Turkey's happy issue out of an urgently necessary revolution that had been accomplished at this temporary cost was declared when, on the 14th May, 1950, a party which by that date had been monopolizing political power in the country for twenty-seven years peacefully gave way to an opposition party by which it had been defeated in a genuinely free parliamentary general election.

Both the Turks and the Chinese could go to school in a Russian political academy without 'loss of face', since, like the Russians, they were heirs of non-Western cultures at bay against the Modern West, while, in their grim common race against Time to find a solution for an ubiquitous 'Western Question', it was manifest that the Russians were considerably ahead of all their fellow runners. A more impressive tribute (though it was a left-handed compliment) was paid to the Russian intelligentsia's political genius during the inter-war years in a mimesis of the Leninian polity in two great Western countries—Italy and Germany—where the local representatives of the Western middle class had failed to display the political ability of their brethren on the Atlantic seaboard without being their inferiors in an aptitude for technology that was the distinctive characteristic of Modern Western Man.

In Germany and Italy the Fascist and National Socialist imitations of the Communist Russian totalitarian state had run headlong into disaster within the lifetimes of their makers. In China a Kuomintang régime—in which a Leninian combine of dictator and *comitatus* had been incongruously overlaid with an appliqué-work of Western liberal political motifs—had been ousted in A.D. 1949 by a Communist régime which claimed to be a faithful Chinese copy of an original Russian new model. In Russia this original Leninian polity had survived the tremendous

<sup>1</sup> See, for example, the passage of the Government Organization Law, promulgated at Nanking on the 3rd October, 1928, which is quoted in *Survey of International Affairs*, 1928 (London 1929, Milford), p. 389.

ordeal of a Second World War to emerge as a rallying-point for all the forces still in the field against the ascendancy of the West over the World, and as the mighty antagonist of the United States if a devastating twentieth-century competition for world power were ever to be carried into a fatal final round. In Turkey, in contrast to Italy and Germany, a dictator who had introduced the Leninian polity there as a Russian means to a non-Communist end had died in his bed and had transmitted his dictatorship to a less demonic successor; and this successor and his partisans had afterwards demonstrated the sincerity of their conversion to the parliamentary democratic political ideals of the West by relinquishing office in obedience to the verdict of a parliamentary election in which they had not misused their power in order to 'rig' the results in their own favour, contrary to the will of the electorate.

This bewildering diversity of the mid-twentieth-century political landscape in non-Western or ex-Western provinces of a West-ridden World was one of many indications that the drama of the Modern West's encounter with the other living civilizations was then still in an early act even on the political plane of action, and *a fortiori* far from its denouement at deeper levels; and this conclusion would suggest that our survey of encounters with the Modern Western Civilization up to date had yielded all the illumination that it was capable of yielding at the time of writing. If a twentieth-century observer was to carry his study of encounters between civilizations farther, he must turn away from the spectacle of an uncompleted drama, in which the Modern Western Civilization was the protagonist, to consider the histories of other encounters in which the whole story lay within his ken because the play had here already been played out to a finish.

## (b) ENCOUNTERS WITH MEDIEVAL WESTERN CHRISTENDOM

### 1. *The Flow and Ebb of the Crusades*<sup>1</sup>

*Ex hypothesi* the whole story of the encounters between a Medieval Western Christendom and its neighbours was known to the writer of this Study and his contemporaries, since this story must have come to an end before the beginning of the subsequent story in which a Modern Western Society was the principal character. These two successive stories of encounters in which the Western Civilization was involved had at least one feature in common: in both episodes the Westerners had been the aggressors. In these two successive outbreaks, however, the Western aggressors had followed different paths with different consequences. In their modern outbreak, as we have seen, they had taken ship from the Atlantic seaboard of Western Europe and had found their way over the Ocean to all quarters of the globe; in their medieval outbreak—for which a convenient short title was 'the Crusades' in the broadest usage of the word<sup>2</sup>—they had taken ship from the Mediterranean seaboard of Western Europe for the Levant, or ridden out across the open eastern land-frontier of their Western Christian

<sup>1</sup> See xi, map. 41.

<sup>2</sup> See I. i. 38 and V. v. 242-4.

World into the adjoining domains of Orthodox Christendom in South-East Europe and in Russia. In conquering the World through mastering the Ocean, the Modern Westerners had been pioneers in an oecumenical adventure of which the issue was still hidden in the future mid-way through the twentieth century of the Christian Era. On the other hand in invading Dār-al-Islām and Orthodox Christendom the Medieval Western Christians had been treading in the Hellenic footprints of Alexander the Great and Titus Quinctius Flamininus on well-worn tracks that had led them to the source of their religion at Jerusalem and the source of their secular culture at Athens.<sup>1</sup>

The medieval outbreak of the Western Society in the eleventh century of the Christian Era was as surprisingly abrupt as its modern outbreak at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and the eventual collapse of the medieval Western adventure came as swiftly as its initial success. An intelligent observer from India, China, or Japan who had made his way to the other end of the Old World in the fifth or sixth decade of the thirteenth century of the Christian Era would have been as unlikely to foresee that the Western intruders were on the verge of being expelled from both 'Dār-al-Islām'<sup>2</sup> and 'Romania'<sup>3</sup> as he would have been—had he arrived on the scene three hundred years earlier—to foresee that these same two worlds were at that date on the verge of being attacked and overrun by the hitherto apparently backward and ineffective natives of the far western extremity of the cultivated visitor's *Oikoumenē*.

As soon as he had learnt to distinguish the two Hellenistic Christian societies from a Hellenising Syriac Society<sup>4</sup> which was in process of conversion from the Monophysite and Nestorian Christian heresies and Zoroastrianism to the all but Christian heresy of Islam,<sup>5</sup> our imaginary tenth-century Far Eastern observer would probably have come to the conclusion that, of these three local competitors for the command of the Mediterranean Sea and its hinterlands, Orthodox Christendom had the best prospects and Western Christendom the worst.

On the divers tests of the competing societies' comparative standing in wealth, education, administrative efficiency, and success in war, Orthodox Christendom would assuredly have come out at the top of our mid-tenth-century observer's list, and Western Christendom at the bottom. Western Christendom in that generation was an agrarian society in which urban life was exotic<sup>6</sup> and coin a rare currency, whereas in contemporary Orthodox Christendom there was a money economy based on an efficient and prosperous commerce and industry.<sup>7</sup> In Western Christendom the clergy alone was literate, whereas in Orthodox Christendom there was a lay governing class that was not merely literate but was educated in the high culture of an extinct Hellenic Society to which both the Christendoms were affiliated.<sup>8</sup> On the political plane,

<sup>1</sup> See I. i. 19 and X. ix. 100-1.

<sup>2</sup> The derelict domain of the Caliphate.

<sup>3</sup> The derelict domain of the East Roman Empire.

<sup>4</sup> See p. 408, with n. 5, below.

<sup>5</sup> For this Christian aspect of Islam, see the quotation from Nöldeke and Schwally in V. v. 230, n. 4. For the replacement of Monophysite and Nestorian Christianity by Islam in the Syriac World, see xi, maps 38 and 39.

<sup>6</sup> See pp. 276 and 284-6, above.

<sup>7</sup> See IV. iv. 344.

<sup>8</sup> See IV. iv. 345-6.

Western Christendom was living in a state of anarchy into which it had been plunged by the speedy failure of the semi-barbarian war-lord Charlemagne's over-ambitious attempt to erect a replica of the Roman Empire on this unpropitious *terrain*, whereas in Orthodox Christendom the revival of the Roman Empire by Leo Syrus, two generations before Charlemagne's day, had proved itself a success by a record—now more than two hundred years long—of survival, consolidation, and expansion.<sup>1</sup> During the second quarter of the tenth century this nascent East Roman Empire had begun reconquering from Dār-al-Islām territories south-east of the Taurus which a moribund Roman Empire had lost in the seventh century to Primitive Muslim Arab conquerors.<sup>2</sup> By the same test the fortunes of the Syriac World must be judged to be now on the wane; yet, even on this crude and imperfect criterion of ordeal by battle, the Syriac Society was not yet so far gone in its decline as to have lost the upper hand in its contest with the barbarous Christians of the West.

After the tide of Muslim conquest had begun to recede on land, it had continued for a time to advance at sea, and Orthodox Christendom as well as Western Christendom had been roughly handled in the ninth century by Maghribī Muslim buccaneers. They had wrested Crete out of the East Roman Empire's grasp in A.D. 823 and Sicily in A.D. 840–902; in A.D. 904, under the leadership of an East Roman renegade, Leo of Tripoli, they had swooped down upon Salonica, the metropolis of the East Roman Empire's surviving possessions in Continental European Greece; and in A.D. 949 they inflicted a disastrous defeat on an East Roman expeditionary force that had been commissioned to recapture a lost command of the Aegean Sea by driving the Maghribī Muslims out of their provocative Cretan outpost. The East Romans, however, did not acquiesce in this defeat, and they duly reconquered Crete in a second expedition in A.D. 961. No similar act of self-help is recorded to the credit of the Western Christians in the annals of their victimization by the Maghribī Muslims during the same period of Mediterranean naval history.

The eighth-century Carolingians' modest military achievements of expelling the Arab garrisons from Septimania<sup>3</sup> and establishing a Frankish march in the southern foothills of the Eastern Pyrenees<sup>4</sup> had been more than offset in the ninth century, after the Carolingian Empire's collapse, by the Maghribī buccaneers' audacious seizure of commanding points in ex-Carolingian territory. Andalusian Muslim raiders had appeared again in Septimania in A.D. 841.<sup>5</sup> Garde Freynet (Fraxinetum), overhanging the coast of Provence, had been occupied *circa* A.D. 891–4,<sup>6</sup> and an equally well placed stronghold at the mouth of the Garigliano *circa* A.D. 885; and the Muslim aggressors had not allowed themselves to be confined to their beach-heads; they had almost suc-

<sup>1</sup> See IV. iv. 340–4.

<sup>2</sup> See IV. iv. 399.

<sup>3</sup> The date of the Frankish conquest of Narbonne was A.D. 751, according to Lévy-Provençal, E.: *Histoire de l'Espagne Musulmane*, vol. i (Cairo 1941, Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale du Caire), p. 46.

<sup>4</sup> Gerona seceded to the Franks in A.D. 785 (*ibid.*, p. 91); Barcelona was conquered by them in A.D. 801 (*ibid.*, pp. 123 and 125–7).

<sup>5</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 148.

<sup>6</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 386.



ceeded in cutting Western Christendom in two by pushing inland from the Riviera and infesting the Alpine passes;<sup>1</sup> and between A.D. 840 and A.D. 876 they had come equally near to driving a wedge between Western and Orthodox Christendom by conquering the Lombard country in the lowlands of Apulia after they had gained a foothold in the intervening East Roman island of Sicily. The consummation of this Muslim conquest of Apulia had been averted only because its imminence had moved the East Roman Government to intervene there in A.D. 876;<sup>2</sup> but, for the local Western Christian population of Southern Italy, the consequence had been, not liberation, but merely the substitution of alien East Roman Orthodox Christian for alien Maghribi Muslim masters. Western Christendom's narrow escape from losing Provence and the Western Christian parts of Italy to the Maghribi Muslims<sup>3</sup> in the ninth and tenth centuries was due, not to Western Christian, but to East Roman, prowess.<sup>4</sup>

On this showing, a mid-tenth-century Far Eastern observer of Far Western affairs could hardly have failed to forecast that, in this outlandish group of barely distinguishable yet mutually antipathetic local societies, the future lay with Orthodox Christendom, and that, whatever might be the destiny of the Syriac World, Western Christendom at any rate had no prospect of emerging from an impotence and obscurity that were the inevitable penalties of a benighted inefficiency. There can be little doubt that our observer would have been astonished at the actual event if he could have lived on to witness it.

A more penetrating vision than could be expected of any contemporary observer, alien or local, might perhaps have caught glimpses of the realities underlying the deceptive appearances of the mid-tenth-century scene in the environs of the Mediterranean. The deadly hidden weaknesses of Orthodox Christendom, which were so soon to be brought to light and were to become so glaringly evident in retrospect, have been analysed in this Study already in another context.<sup>5</sup> As for the Syriac World, it had been enjoying a spell of delusive well-being in a belated 'Indian Summer' under a universal state which had been reconstituted

<sup>1</sup> The Muslims of Freynet had raided San Gall in A.D. 939 (*ibid.*, p. 387).

<sup>2</sup> See IV. iv. 343-4.

<sup>3</sup> During the years A.D. 880-915 the Maghribi Muslim raiders were ranging at will over Central Italy as far inland as the upper valley of the Tiber (Gay, J.: *L'Italie Méridionale et l'Empire Byzantin, 867-1071* (Paris 1904, Fontemoing), p. 159).

<sup>4</sup> The Maghribi Muslim stronghold at the mouth of the Garigliano was smoked out in A.D. 915 by a combined effort of all the Western Christian communities in Central and Southern Italy under East Roman leadership, and this signal public service confirmed the East Roman Empire's recently established hegemony over all Western Christian Italy south of the duchies of Rome and Spoleto (Gay, *op. cit.*, p. 162). In A.D. 931 and A.D. 942 the East Roman Navy made two unsuccessful attempts to help Hugh of Provence, who was connected by marriage with the East Roman imperial house of the day, to smoke the Muslims out of Garde Freynet (Schaube, A.: *Handelsgeschichte der Romanischen Völker des Mittelmeergebiets bis zum Ende der Kreuzzüge* (Munich and Berlin 1906, Oldenbourg), p. 98). Thereafter a Western Christendom that had rallied under the auspices of the Saxon wardens of its north-eastern marches (see II. ii. 167-8) did succeed in A.D. 973 in clearing the Maghribi Muslims out of both Garde Freynet and the Alpine passes by its own efforts (Schaube, *op. cit.*, pp. 98 and 69). Yet, even after that, the Muslims demonstrated that they still retained their naval command of the Western Mediterranean by sacking Barcelona on the 7th July, 985 (Schaube, *op. cit.*, p. 103; Lévy-Provençal, *op. cit.*, p. 435), as they had sacked Genoa in A.D. 935 (Schaube, *op. cit.*, p. 63).

<sup>5</sup> See IV. iv. 320-408.

in the shape of the Caliphate, after an Hellenic intrusion which had lasted for a thousand years, by latter-day Arab restorers of a prematurely overthrown Achaemenian Empire.<sup>1</sup> In the tenth century of the Christian Era the truth was that the Syriac Society was nearing the end of an abnormally prolonged old age, while a still adolescent Orthodox Christendom was in the more tragic plight of being already stricken with a mortal disease beneath the surface. Western Christendom had escaped this fate thanks to the failure of Charlemagne's attempt to emulate Leo Syrus's feat by saddling her with the incubus of a revival of the Roman Empire; and in the tenth century this apparently feeble and ineffective Western Society actually possessed hidden springs of vitality which were soon to well out in titanic activities on every plane of life.

A discerning observer's eye might have noticed that a Western Christian Society which had offered such slight resistance to its Muslim assailants from the Mediterranean had been valiantly and successfully fighting for its life against contemporary pagan Scandinavian assailants from the North Sea<sup>2</sup> and Magyar assailants from the Eurasian Steppe; and even against the Muslims the West had not been in retreat all along the line. The humiliating helplessness of Charlemagne's Frankish epigoni in Italy and Provence was balanced in the Iberian Peninsula by a gradual and inconspicuous but continuous and well-consolidated advance to the credit of the heirs of the Visigoths. By the second decade of the tenth century of the Christian Era, which saw the Muslim Power in the Peninsula raised by the Cordovan Umayyad Caliph 'Abd-ar-Rahmān III An-Nāsir (*imperabat* A.D. 912-61) to a zenith at which it continued to stand until its sudden collapse in A.D. 1009, the remnant of the Kingdom of Visigothia which had survived in the mountain-fastnesses of Cantabria and Asturia had reoccupied all but the headwaters of the basin of the Douro and, on the west coast, had pushed on beyond into the valley of the Mondego;<sup>3</sup> and, though 'Abd-ar-Rahmān and his

<sup>1</sup> This aspect of the Arab Caliphate as a resumption of the Achaemenian Empire has been noticed in I. i. 76-77.

<sup>2</sup> See II. ii. 194-202.

<sup>3</sup> The Arabs had relaxed their hold on the north-west corner of the Iberian Peninsula while they had been making the attempt to conquer Aquitaine from the Franks which had ended so disastrously in A.D. 732 (see Lévy-Provencal, *op. cit.*, p. 49), and the Berber colonists of this region had then been weakened first by a series of unsuccessful revolts against their Arab overlords and afterwards by a *re-exodus en masse* to North-West Africa during a five-years' famine circa A.D. 750-5 (*ibid.*, pp. 37 and 50). In consequence, King Alfonso I of Asturia (*regnabat* A.D. 739-57) was able to reoccupy the whole of the Douro (Duero) Basin from Osma downwards (*ibid.*, pp. 49-50). Oporto, at the mouth of the Douro, was conquered in A.D. 868 (*ibid.*, p. 223), and Coimbra, at the mouth of the Mondego, in A.D. 878 (*ibid.*, p. 224). King Alfonso II (*regnabat* A.D. 791-842) had actually occupied Lisbon from A.D. 799 to 808/9 (*ibid.*, p. 122). Garcia I (*regnabat* A.D. 910-14) transferred the capital of Asturia from Oviedo—the refugee Pelayo's fastness between the Asturian mountains and the north coast—to León at the mountains' southern foot (*ibid.*, p. 305), which the Muslims had retaken in A.D. 846 but had failed to hold (*ibid.*, p. 144); and in A.D. 913, three years before the opening of 'Abd-ar-Rahmān III's counter-offensive, Ordoño II had raided Evora (*ibid.*, p. 305) from his Galician appanage. Alfonso III (*regnabat* A.D. 866-910) had consolidated Asturia's gains by repopulating the devastated marches with Christian (*musta'rib*) refugees from territories under Muslim rule (*ibid.*, p. 228); but Asturia still remained open to invasion from Andalusia round the north-east corner of the Guadarrama mountain range so long as the headwaters of the Douro remained in Muslim hands—and, till after the collapse of the Muslim power in the Peninsula in A.D. 1009, San Esteban de Gormaz and Osma remained the farthest outposts of the Asturian Kingdom towards

no less puissant successor the dictator Abu 'Āmir Muhammad Al-Mansūr (*dominabatur* A.D. 981-1002) found themselves able to raid the Asturian kingdom and its diminutive independent Christian neighbours, Navarre and Aragon, at will and to compel them to acknowledge Andalusia's hegemony, neither of these great Andalusian Muslim soldiers and statesmen succeeded in permanently reoccupying, not to speak of recolonizing, any of the country that had been recovered by Visigothia's Asturian successor-state in the course of the century and a half preceding 'Abd-ar-Rahmān's accession.

This retransfer of a remote and uninviting corner of the Iberian Peninsula from Muslim to Western Christian hands, and its still more significant retention in Christian hands throughout the ordeal of A.D. 916-1009, passed almost unnoticed at the time, but, in retrospect, the failure of An-Nāsir and Al-Mansūr to complete a Muslim conquest of the Peninsula, which had been all but completed, some two hundred years before An-Nāsir resumed the task, by the first Arab *conquistador* Mūsā b. Nusayr, could be seen to have signified the turn of a tide which in the following century was to carry the Western Crusaders from the Douro to the Jordan and beyond; and the shrine of St. James at Compostela, in this out-of-the-way province which was the first fragment of Dār-al-Islām to fall into Western Christian hands, was already becoming second only to Jerusalem itself in attractiveness as a goal for Western Christian pilgrims.<sup>2</sup>

These entries on the credit side of a tenth-century Western Christendom's military account are not insignificant, but they are less significant than their accompaniments on the cultural plane. In France and England the Scandinavian invaders were not only brought to a halt, but those of them who were not ejected from the invaded territories were so wholeheartedly captivated by a Western Christian culture which they had failed to wipe out that they became its champions instead of its assailants.<sup>3</sup> In the same century this Western Christian Civilization showed itself worthy of its new proselytes' devotion by taking the first step towards putting its own house in order. The spiritual citadel of Early Medieval Western Christendom was monasticism, and the tenth-century Cluniac rejuvenation of the Benedictine way of monastic life was the archetype of all subsequent Western social reforms, religious and secular.

These unobtrusive signs of fresh life in a tenth-century Western Christendom are impressive when we bring them to light; yet, even when they have been given all their due, they seem hardly adequate to account for the amazing outburst of energy in an eleventh-century Western Christendom—an outburst in which the outbreak of aggression against the two neighbouring societies was one of the less creative and less estimable episodes. At the turn of the tenth and eleventh centuries

the South-East (*ibid.*, p. 228). Towards the North-East, Pampeluna, which had shaken off the Arab yoke in A.D. 798 (*ibid.*, p. 123), had become the principal city of the independent Basque Christian Kingdom of Navarre.

<sup>1</sup> This was the year in which 'Abd-ar-Rahmān opened his offensive against the Asturian Christians according to Lévy-Provençal, *op. cit.*, p. 306.

<sup>2</sup> Compostela had been a pilgrimage resort since the ninth century (*ibid.*, p. 441). When Al-Mansūr raided it in A.D. 997, he spared the tomb of the Apostle St. James (*ibid.*, pp. 440 and 442).

<sup>3</sup> See II. ii. 201-2.

the Western Christian Civilization followed up its feat of captivating the Scandinavian interlopers in Normandy and the Danelaw, and matched the Orthodox Christian Civilization's contemporary feat of converting the Scandinavian makers of Russia, by bringing within its fold the Scandinavian war-bands in their native lairs, as well as the continental barbarians of Hungary and Poland.<sup>1</sup> In the eleventh century the fundamental Cluniac reform of Western monastic life was followed up by the more ambitious Hildebrandine reform of the whole constitution and discipline of the Western Church, while the obscure conquest of the north-western corner of the Iberian Peninsula was followed up by a sensational forward movement along the entire length of the Mediterranean. In the Iberian Peninsula the eleventh-century Western Christian *conquistadores* established their ascendancy over the Cordovan Umayyad Caliphate's successor-states by conquering Toledo. In the Central Mediterranean they overran the East Roman Empire's dominions in Southern Italy and went on to conquer Sicily from Muslim intruders on Greek Orthodox Christian ground whom the East Roman Government had first failed to keep out and afterwards failed to eject. In the Levant, where they were operating at the opposite extremity of the Mediterranean Basin from their West European base, the Western Crusaders eclipsed in one expedition all the conquests, at the expense of the 'Abbasid Caliphate's successor-states, which it had taken the East Romans a century and a half (A.D. 927-1071) to win and one campaign to lose, by carving out, in and after 'the First Crusade' (*gerebatur* A.D. 1095-9), a chain of Western Christian principalities extending continuously from Antioch and Edessa through Tripoli to Jerusalem.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See II. ii. 168 and IV. iv. 378-9.

<sup>2</sup> In this eleventh-century forward movement the Normans and the North Italian maritime city-states Venice, Pisa, and Genoa were active on all three fronts; the Northern French, other than the Normans, made an appearance on the Iberian front (see V. v. 242, n. 4) and turned out in force to take part in the First Crusade; the Southern French likewise went into action on the Syrian front, but not (see Schaube, op. cit., p. 100) on either the Iberian or the Central Mediterranean front, though these two theatres of operations lay at their door.

On the Iberian front the Western Christians' eleventh-century successes were mostly achieved between A.D. 1009, when the Cordovan Muslim power collapsed, and A.D. 1086, when the Murābit Muslim Berber barbarians from Africa made their first passage of the Straits of Gibraltar in response to an appeal from some of the Cordovan Caliphate's successor-states for help against their Western Christian barbarian assailants from Europe. The most important permanent Western Christian advance in the Peninsula in this chapter of history was the conquest of Toledo in A.D. 1085 by King Alfonso VI of Castile; but, far beyond the limits of the conquered territories, the Western Christian frontier barbarians exerted their power over the Peninsular Muslim *mulūk-at-tawā'if* of the day by raiding their dominions, compelling them to purchase immunity from raids by paying tribute, and even establishing permanent cantonments of Western Christian war-bands in Muslim territory. Garcia Jimenes' cantonment at Alledo (A.D. 1085-92) may be compared with the fifth-century settlements of Visigoths and Burgundians in the Roman dominions in Gaul, and the Cid's and his heirs' 'protectorate' (*gerebatur* A.D. 1086-92 and 1094-1102) over the Muslim principality of Valencia with the fifth-century domination of Ricimer over the Roman Imperial Government at Ravenna.

On the Central Mediterranean front the Pisans and Genoese were the first to move. The sack of Genoa by the Maghribi Muslims in A.D. 935 was avenged when the Muslims were driven out of Sardinia in A.D. 1016 by the combined efforts of the Genoese and the Pisans and when the Pisans raided Bona in the Maghrib in A.D. 1034 (Schaube, op. cit., p. 50). From A.D. 1040 onwards the naval operations of the two North-West Italian maritime republics on this front were followed up by the conquests of the Normans on land—though a Pisan attack on Palermo in A.D. 1063 failed for lack of concerted action

The eventual collapse of the Medieval Western Christian ascendancy in the Mediterranean Basin that had thus been imposed at one amazing swoop would have been no less surprising to a Far Eastern observer re-surveying the scene 150 years after the First Crusade and 300 years after the time, half-way through the tenth century, when the fortunes of Western Christendom had been at their nadir.

In reckoning up the profits and losses of a century and a half of incessant strife, our imaginary mid-thirteenth-century observer would have noted that, in their distant and exposed outposts in Syria, the Western Christian aggressors had lost all their conquests except a few bridgeheads within three-quarters of a century. The territorial spoils of the First Crusade (*gerebatur* A.D. 1095-9) had neither been preserved by the Second Crusade (*gerebatur* A.D. 1146-9) nor recovered by the Third (*gerebatur* A.D. 1187<sup>1</sup>-92), which was the most fiercely contested of these three successive trials of strength between Western aggressors and an Islamic World at bay; and the virtuosity of Frederick II Hohenstaufen's accommodation with the Ayyūbid Kāmil in A.D. 1228-9<sup>2</sup> could

on the Normans' part, while, conversely, a single-handed Norman attack against Palermo and Girgenti in A.D. 1064 was likewise a failure, with the consequence that Palermo was able to hold out against the Normans till A.D. 1072 (Chalandon, *F. Histoire de la Domination Normande en Italie et en Sicile* (Paris 1907, Picard, 2 vols.), vol. I, pp. 203, 204, and 207-8; Schaube, *op. cit.*, p. 50). The Pisans and Genoese did not succeed in expelling the Muslims from Corsica till A.D. 1091 (see V. v. 244 and 622, n. 3).

Along the Mediterranean coast of the Iberian Peninsula the sack of Barcelona by the Muslims in A.D. 985 was avenged in the conquest of Almería by the Genoese in A.D. 1046 and in the joint Genoese-Catalan expedition against Tortosa in A.D. 1092-3 (Schaube, *op. cit.*, p. 64). The final demonstration that the 'thalassocracy' of the Western Mediterranean Basin had now passed from the Maghribi Muslims to the Western Christians was given by the sensational success of the Pisan naval expedition against Mahdiyyah in A.D. 1087. The principality of Mahdiyyah was compelled to acknowledge the suzerainty of the Pope and to open its doors to Pisan and Genoese traders. The local prince Tamim's son was carried away captive to Pisa, where he settled down to serve as town crier (Schaube, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-51)—as Perseus the last king of Macedon's son Alexander had settled down in his Roman captivity to serve as town clerk in the rural Latin colony Alba Fucensis.

<sup>1</sup> Reckoning the war as beginning with Saladin's assault on the Kingdom of Jerusalem in A.D. 1187, rather than with the Western Christian counter-attack in A.D. 1189.

<sup>2</sup> Frederick's first move was to make an alliance with Kāmil, whose dominions were at the moment confined to Egypt, against Kāmil's brother Mu'azzam, the prince of Damascus, whose Syrian dominions were the target of Frederick's prospective territorial claims. This astute step was unexpectedly countered by the unforeseen accident of Mu'azzam's death, which robbed Kāmil's alliance with Frederick of its original value in Kāmil's calculations and at the same time gave Kāmil a personal interest in the Syrian portion of the Ayyūbid dominions, which had now passed into his hands. Notwithstanding this unpropitious change in the situation, Frederick succeeded in persuading Kāmil to cede to him Jerusalem (minus the Haram-ash-Sharif), Bethlehem, and Nazareth, together with one corridor of territory connecting Bethlehem and Jerusalem, and another connecting Nazareth, with the surviving bridgeheads of the Kingdom of Jerusalem along the Syrian coast. This remarkable diplomatic achievement was mainly due to the moderation shown by both parties in contenting themselves with the satisfaction of their minimum desiderata. Kāmil was content to retain the principal Islamic holy place in Palestine, without seeking to drive the Franks into the sea, while Frederick was content to recover the principal Christian holy places in Palestine without seeking once again to insulate the Asiatic from the African domain of Dār-al-Islām. A contributory cause of the settlement of A.D. 1228-9 was Frederick's ability and readiness to come on to the other party's ground. Frederick personally conducted in Arabic his negotiations with Kāmil's envoy Fakhr-ad-Din, and he fraternized with the local Muslims throughout his stay in the Levant (see Kantorowicz, *E.: Frederick the Second, 1194-1250* (London 1931, Constable), pp. 176-99).

If the Western Christians had been sincere in their profession that the liberation of the Christian holy places in Palestine was the objective of their military expeditions to the Levant, they would have been constrained to admit that, after their decisive and



not conceal the hard fact that in Syria the invaders had failed—in spite of the opening offered to them by the decay of the 'Fātimid' Shī'ī Anticaliphate before the rise of the 'Abbasid Sunnī Caliphate's vigorous Ayyūbid successor-state—to achieve their strategic objective of insulating the Asiatic from the African and Iberian provinces of Dār-al-Islām. They had also failed to exploit an opportunity in Ifrikīyah of insulating the Muslim citadel in Egypt from Maghrib-al-Aqsā and Andalusia during the lull between the recession of the 'Fātimid' wave of Berber invaders from Eastern Kabylia and the onrush of a mightier wave of Muwahhid Berber invaders from the Atlas.<sup>1</sup> The bridgeheads that the Norman kingdom of Sicily had begun to establish along the coasts of Tunisia and Tripolitania in A.D. 1134 had all been swept away again by A.D. 1158.

In the Iberian Peninsula, on the other hand, all that was left of the former Islamic domain by the middle of the thirteenth century was an enclave round Granada; and this was not the only front on which Western Christendom had been recouping herself for her losses in Syria. The vigour of the resistance that the Third Crusade had encountered in colliding with the rejuvenated Sunnī Muslim Power which Saladin had taken over and built up had moved the Crusaders to seek alternative satisfaction for their cupidity at the expense of a less truculent victim. The lead which the Normans had given by conquering East Roman Italy (A.D. 1040–81) and going on to attack the broader East Roman dominions east of the Adriatic (A.D. 1081–5 and 1185–91) had been followed up by Richard Coeur-de-Lion when he had seized the East Roman island of Cyprus in A.D. 1191, and by the captains of the Fourth Crusade when they had allowed their course to be diverted from its original objective in Syria to Constantinople in A.D. 1203. Mid-way through the thirteenth century a French emperor was reigning at Constantinople, a French marquis at Bodonitsa, a French duke at Athens, and a French prince in the Morea, while there were few Greek islands in the Aegean that had not fallen into Italian hands. Yet these unseemly conquests at a sister Christian society's expense were not the chief ground for hope in the minds of Western Crusaders of the generation of St. Louis. They were less concerned to console themselves with Orthodox Christian spoils for reverses at Muslim hands than to retrieve these reverses with the aid of Nestorian Christian allies.

The forgotten Nestorian Christendom of the Far East had dramatically appeared above the Western Crusaders' eastern horizon in the

definitive military defeat by Saladin, their objective had been reattained for them by Frederick's diplomacy on terms which were guaranteed by the auspicious fact that on this occasion they had been voluntarily conceded by the local Muslim Power. Jerusalem was indeed soon wrested again out of Frankish hands by force of arms; but this time the assailants were not the Terre d'Outre Mer's Ayyūbid neighbours but the remote Khwarizmian wardens of Dār-al-Islām's north-eastern march, who were hurled into the Ayyūbid and Frankish dominions in Syria in A.D. 1243–4 by the irresistible impetus of their headlong flight before the face of the pursuing Mongols.

<sup>1</sup> This opportunity was particularly favourable for a Frankish barbarian invader, since, after the successful defection of the Sanhāja Berbers of Western Kabylia from the Fātimids in A.D. 1045, Ifrikīyah had been devastated by the barbarian Nomad Arab Banu Hilāl and Banu Sulaym, who had been unleashed against the Sanhāja by the Fātimids (see Gautier, E. F.: *Les Siècles Obscurs du Maghreb* (Paris 1927, Payot), pp. 368–9).

train of the Mongol Eurasian Nomad world-conquerors. There were Nestorian Uighur Turkish secretaries in the Mongols' service who had won their masters' gratitude and confidence by meeting a sudden need for clerks' work which had arisen from the Mongols' lightning-swift acquisition of an oecumenical empire,<sup>1</sup> while on the other hand the Muslims whom the Mongols had been subjugating in rapidly increasing numbers since their invasion of the Khwārizm Shah's dominions in A.D. 1220 had fallen foul of pagan rulers whose regulations were irreconcilable with the ritual prescriptions of the *Sharī'ah*.<sup>2</sup> Might not the Western Christians and the Far Eastern Christians manage, by a joint effort, to convert the Mongols to Christianity and then enlist their invincible converts in a common anti-Muslim crusade which would have the finality of a war of annihilation? The Mongols, as they had already demonstrated, had the will and the power to commit 'genocide'. How, then, could the Muslims escape extermination if they were encircled by ruthless Christian assailants attacking them simultaneously on a continental as well as a maritime front?

The seriousness with which these hopes were taken in a mid-thirteenth-century Western Christendom was indicated by the missions to the Mongol Khāqān's court at Qāraqorum on which Friar Giovanni di Piano Carpini was dispatched by Pope Innocent IV in A.D. 1246 and Friar William of Rubruck by Saint Louis in A.D. 1253.<sup>3</sup> Yet this Christian grand design for the extirpation of Islam proved to be a castle in the air. The critical years in which the opportunity came and went were A.D. 1258-62. In A.D. 1258 the Mongols dealt Islam a stunning blow by taking and sacking Baghdad and putting an end to the Baghdādī 'Abbasid Caliphate; in A.D. 1260 they crossed the Euphrates under a Nestorian Christian commander and occupied Damascus, within not much more than a hundred miles of the Western Crusaders' still-surviving bridgehead at Acre.<sup>4</sup> At that moment the converging Christian forces were within an ace of joining hands;<sup>5</sup> but the junction was never made, though Mongol armies crossed the Euphrates once again, in A.D. 1281,<sup>6</sup> before the Western bridgehead at Acre was pinched out by the Ayyūbids' Mamlūk successors in A.D. 1291.

Meanwhile, the liquidation of the French conquests in the former domain of the East Roman Empire, which had begun on the very morrow of the Franco-Venetian sack of Constantinople in A.D. 1204, had suddenly gathered momentum. In A.D. 1259 the Greek Orthodox Christian Emperor of Nicaea, Michael Palaiolōghos, had overthrown and captured Prince

<sup>1</sup> See II. ii. 238.

<sup>2</sup> See VI. vii. 257 and X. ix. 36.

<sup>3</sup> See II. ii. 451.

<sup>4</sup> This is the approximate distance by the shortest of the several alternative practicable routes, which runs (in the direction Acre-Damascus) via Rāmāh, Safad, and the Bridge of Jacob's Daughters spanning the Jordan between the Sea of Galilee and Lake Banyas, whence it travels on to Damascus through Qunaytirah. This shortest route is an arduous one, since it clammers over the southernmost spurs of both Lebanon and Antilebanon, but the easiest alternative route—running south-eastward from Acre through the Vale of Esdraelon, crossing the Jordan below the Sea of Galilee instead of above it, and then turning north-north-eastward—is about half as long again. A description of these and other alternative routes between Acre and Damascus is given by Sir George Adam Smith in *The Historical Geography of the Holy Land* (London 1904, Hodder and Stoughton), pp. 426-8.

<sup>5</sup> See II. ii. 238 and 451, and p. 222, above.

<sup>6</sup> See I. i. 350.

William II of the Morea at the Battle of Pelagonia; in A.D. 1261 he evicted the French from Constantinople; and in A.D. 1262 he extorted from his Moreot French captive the cession of three fortresses in the Morea<sup>1</sup> as the price of his release. In thus progressively driving the French out of the territories that they had stolen from the East Roman Empire in the Balkan Peninsula, the Nicaean Greek Orthodox Christians were working, not for themselves, but for their more effective Ottoman Turkish Muslim successors.<sup>2</sup> Michael Palaiolôghos, the Nicaean conqueror of Constantinople, was the forerunner of her subsequent Brusan conqueror Mehmed Fâtiḥ; and the Greek Orthodox Christian dynasty of which Michael was the founder spent a considerable part of its constantly dwindling resources for 170 years (A.D. 1262-1432) out of its 194 years-long tenure of power (A.D. 1259-1453) in doggedly reconquering the Morea, foot by foot, from its interloping Western Christian masters. The din of arms clashing in this parochial inter-Christian strife echoed so loudly from the flanks of Mount Erymanthus that both the bands of Moreot Christian combatants were deaf to the thunder of an Ottoman battle-axe staving in the gates of the Hexamfli. The reconquest of the Morea was completed by Constantine Dhrâghasis as Greek prince of the Morea in A.D. 1432, twenty-one years before he died in Constantinople at Saint Romanus's Gate as the last of the East Roman Emperors. As both prince and emperor, he had served in effect as the Pādishāh's bailiff, and the Ottoman conqueror duly followed up his occupation of Constantinople by taking over a reconquered Morea from a slaughtered Constantine's brothers Thomas and Demetrius in A.D. 1460.

Thus, of all the territorial gains at the expense of Dār-al-Islām and Romania that the Western Crusaders had made in the basin of the Mediterranean from the eleventh century to the thirteenth, the only substantial portions that remained in Western hands at the close of the fifteenth century were Sicily, Calabria, Apulia, and Andalusia. These exiguous fruits of such arduous labour were, however, supplemented by some eleventh-hour acquisitions on a Russian Orthodox Christian front. The crusading energies that had been diverted at the turn of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries from Syria to Romania, as an easier option than a front on which the adversary to be faced was now the redoubtable Ayyūbid Power, were soon re-diverted again from a Romania whose native Greek Orthodox Christians had been stung by the outrage of A.D. 1204 into a desperate resistance culminating in a spirited counter-attack. As the Crusaders' conquests in Romania melted away in their turn, the Western Christian military adventurers began to despair of an indomitable Mediterranean and to seek fairer fortunes in a more amenable Baltic.

The Teutonic Knights, who decamped at the turn of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries from Syria to the Vistula via Transylvania,<sup>3</sup> carved out a new Baltic domain for themselves at the expense of pagan Prussians, Letts, and Ests; but the main effect of their operations in this East European theatre was indirect. They made little headway against either their pagan Lithuanian or their Western Christian Polish neigh-

<sup>1</sup> Monemvasia, Maina (Mani), Mistrá.

<sup>2</sup> See III. iii. 27.

<sup>3</sup> See II. ii. 172.

bours, but the military prowess which they unintentionally inspired in these intended victims of theirs, by forcing them to fight for their lives, found an outlet in the fourteenth century in extensive Polish and Lithuanian conquests at the expense of a Russian Orthodox Christendom which had fallen into disunity in the twelfth century and had been ground to powder by the impact of the Mongols in the thirteenth.<sup>1</sup> This Western Christian encroachment on a Russian Orthodox Christendom's domain survived, as we have seen,<sup>2</sup> into the Modern Age of Western history after the liquidation of all the Medieval Western Christian conquests east of the Ionian Islands in a Greek Orthodox Christendom.

If we ask ourselves why it was that a Medieval Western Christendom's lasting gains of territory from the Crusades amounted only to such disproportionately small returns for so gigantic an expenditure of effort, we shall find more than one answer to our question.

One obvious explanation of the ultimate defeat of the Crusades lies in the excessive dispersion of the Western aggressors' energies. They attacked their neighbours on no less than five fronts—in the Iberian Peninsula, in South Italy, in the Balkan Peninsula, in Syria, and in the Continental European borderland between Western Christendom and Russia—and it is not surprising that they should have failed to obtain any decisive results from this improvident use of a limited fund of surplus Western energy which might have carried their offensive forward to some permanently tenable 'natural frontier' if it had been concentrated steadily on any single front out of the five.

If the French Crusaders, for example, had concentrated their efforts on reinforcing an Iberian front that lay at France's doors, Western Christendom might have reached the natural frontier of the Sahara, not in the twentieth century, but in the thirteenth, instead of halting for a quarter of a millennium—from the fifth decade of the thirteenth century to A.D. 1492—at the foothills of the Sierra Nevada and then for more than four centuries thereafter at the Straits of Gibraltar, which in all previous ages had been a bridge and not a barrier between the Iberian Peninsula and the Maghrib. The impetus of Western Christian aggression against the Maghribī province of Dār-al-Islām was weakened by the division of Western Christian forces between an Iberian and an Apulian front; yet, even so, if the Normans who headed for Apulia instead of León had concentrated thenceforward on this single new enterprise, they might perhaps still have reached a Saharan natural frontier on this Central Mediterranean front likewise, via Sicily and Tunisia. Instead, they dispersed their energies once again by invading the Transadriatic dominions of the East Roman Empire in A.D. 1081 before they had completed their conquest of Sicily, and then riding off on the First Crusade to carve out a Syrian principality for themselves round Antioch.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See II. ii. 172–3, and p. 399, below.

<sup>2</sup> On p. 126, above.

<sup>3</sup> The fantastically far-flung enterprise in Asia, in which Bohemond indulged in A.D. 1097, had been anticipated in A.D. 1073–4 by a compatriot of his surnamed Russell, who had attempted to take advantage of the crushing defeat of the East Romans by the Saljuqs at Melazkerd (Manzikert) in A.D. 1071 in order to carve out a Norman principality in the East Roman Empire's Armeniac army-corps district in North-Eastern Anatolia (see further, p. 389, n. 1, below).

Thereafter, when the Normans did tardily embark on the conquest of Ifrīqiyah in A.D. 1134, they allowed themselves to be diverted from carrying this African enterprise through to completion by being drawn into a great war with the East Roman Empire (*gerebatur* A.D. 1147-56) which was as exhausting as it was inconclusive.

The Levantine front that was opened up in the First Crusade had to compete with the demands of the already active fronts in the Central and the Western Mediterranean, yet the residue of Western Christian military effort that could be mobilized for action in Syria might still perhaps have sufficed to establish a tenable frontier in this distant theatre of operations if the Crusaders had been prudent enough to refrain from straying across the Euphrates and resolute enough to push forward to the fringe of the North Arabian Steppe all along the line from the right bank of the Euphrates to the head of the Gulf of 'Aqabah. They did succeed in reaching this natural frontier at its southern end, and thereby momentarily insulating Cairo from Damascus, and Mecca from both, by planting outposts of the Kingdom of Jerusalem at Aylah and Karak;<sup>1</sup> but these strategically momentous acquisitions remained as precarious as they were provocative so long as the left flank of the Western intruders' Transjordanian salient remained open to counter-attack from Dār-al-Islām's vast unconquered Asiatic interior. This deadly gap in the defences of the Terre d'Outre Mer could have been closed at the outset by the leaders of the First Crusade if, instead of crossing the Euphrates to seize an untenable Edessa, they had expended an equal amount of energy on occupying the key position of Aleppo between Antioch and the Syrian bank of the Euphrates and on securing all the crossings of the Euphrates between the southern spurs of the Antitaurus and the northern fringe of the North Arabian Steppe; for, had they thus sealed Syria off at the northern end, as they afterwards duly sealed it off at the southern end by occupying Karak and 'Aqabah, they could then have reduced Hamah, Homs, and Damascus at their leisure; and this strategy would have driven between a Sunni Muslim Caliphate in 'Irāq and a Shī'ī Muslim Anticaliphate in Egypt a wedge of Frankish territory that might have been proof against any Muslim blow that could have been struck at it from either side.

In the event, the Crusaders' neglect of the natural frontier offered by the elbow of the Euphrates<sup>2</sup> was to deliver them into the hands of a re-

<sup>1</sup> In pushing inland from the southern end of the Shephelah across the Negeb towards the Red Sea, the Crusaders were following in the tracks of the Cherethites and anticipating the strategy of the Zionists (see VI. vii. 102, n. 1, and p. 309, above). In building their Transjordanian castle at Karak, they were establishing themselves astride an historic 'King's Highway' which had latterly become the main pilgrimage-road to Mecca from the Asiatic provinces of Dār-al-Islām (see VI. vii. 101-2).

<sup>2</sup> The fecklessness of the Crusaders in neglecting this natural line of defence stands out in glaring contrast to the prudence shown by their Mamlūk successors and their Roman predecessors in profiting by it. Along the line of the Middle Euphrates the Mamlūks held at bay a Mongol Empire which extended across the Continent from the Euphrates to the Pacific at the time when the Mamlūks made the river into the moat of their 'Fortress Egypt'. In the long history of the eastern frontier of the Roman Empire, Pompey's prudence in 64 B.C. in making the Middle Euphrates the limit of his new Roman province of Syria was vindicated by the disaster that overtook Crassus at Carrhae in 54 B.C. and by the difficulties in which Trajan involved himself in A.D. 114-17 (see Lepper, F. A.: *Trajan's Parthian War* (London 1948, Cumberlege), pp. 95-96) when



juvenated Sunnī Muslim Power which the challenge of the Crusades called into existence. This new Power's first base of operations was 'Irāq, whose irrigation-system, which was the source of its agricultural productivity, had not yet been wrecked by Mongol barbarian invaders;<sup>1</sup> and the first in the series of warrior-statesmen who built this Power up was Zengī (*dominabatur* A.D. 1127-46), who was appointed in A.D. 1127 by the Saljūq Imperial Government to be atābeg (count) of the metropolitan province of a shrunken 'Abbasid Caliphate which the Saljūqs had liberated from the domination of the Shī'ī Buwayhids in A.D. 1055.<sup>2</sup> Within a year of his installation at Baghdad, Zengī won for himself a dominion of his own by annexing Mosul and the Jazīrah; and he immediately followed up these conquests on the east side of the Euphrates by crossing the river and releasing the stalwart outpost city of Aleppo from its encirclement by the Frankish principalities of Edessa and Antioch. Edessa, now encircled in its turn, fell to Zengī in A.D. 1144; Zengī's son and successor Nūr-ad-Dīn (*dominabatur* A.D. 1146-74) was able to hold his ground west of the Euphrates against the Second Crusade (*gerebatur* A.D. 1146-9), and Nūr-ad-Dīn's subsequent annexation of Damascus in A.D. 1154 provided his lieutenant Shīrkūh and Shīrkūh's nephew, colleague, and successor Saladin with a base of operations for breaking through the screen of Frankish outposts between Karak and 'Aqabah in order to compete with Amalric King of Jerusalem for the conquest of Egypt from a decrepit Fātimid Shī'ī régime.

Three successive pairs of rival expeditions (*gesta* A.D. 1163-4, 1167, 1168-9) ended in Egypt's remaining in Saladin's hands. The Western intruders' Terre d'Outre Mer then found itself enveloped by its Sunnī Muslim adversaries, and this encirclement spelled the doom of the Frankish Power in Syria; but Saladin was too good a strategist to strike before he had consolidated his now commanding position. In A.D. 1171 he extinguished the Fātimid Anticaliphate and restored *de jure* the sovereignty of an 'Abbasid Caliphate at Baghdad over an Egypt whose resources were at Saladin's own disposal *de facto*. Thereafter he rounded off his empire by first annexing Tripolitania, the Eastern Sudan, and the Yaman (A.D. 1172-4) and then, after the death of his overlord Nūr-ad-Dīn, making himself master of everything between the eastern borders of the Frankish principalities in Syria and the western foothills of the Zagros in Kurdistan (A.D. 1174-86).<sup>3</sup> When he struck at the Franks at last in A.D. 1187 the result was a foregone conclusion. The Third Crusade could not save the Terre d'Outre Mer from being reduced to a few bridgeheads along the Syrian coast.

he attempted to move the frontier forward perhaps as far as to the head of the Persian Gulf. No permanent annexation of Asiatic territory east of the Euphrates was made by the Roman Imperial Government till A.D. 194-9, when the Parthian Power was *in extremis*, and on this occasion the frontier was moved forward no farther than to the line of the Euphrates' eastern tributary the Khabūr.

<sup>1</sup> For the *coup de grâce* which the Mongols dealt to the Syriac Civilization by wrecking the irrigation-system of 'Irāq in the thirteenth century of the Christian Era, see IV, iv.

<sup>43</sup>.

<sup>2</sup> See I. i. 356.

<sup>3</sup> Saladin conquered Eastern Syria, south of Aleppo, in A.D. 1174; established his suzerainty over Aleppo in A.D. 1176; conquered the Jazīrah and annexed Aleppo in A.D. 1182-3; and established his suzerainty over Mosul in A.D. 1186.

The characteristically short-sighted counter-move of the leaders of the Fourth Crusade to Saladin's conclusive defeat of the Third Crusade in Syria was, as we have seen, to commit a now hard-pressed Western Christendom to yet a fourth Mediterranean front in the domain of the East Roman Empire; and here the disastrous effects of the Western aggressors' persistent dispersion of their energies made themselves felt more signally and more swiftly than in any other theatre. A Frankish host that was strong enough to deal the East Roman Empire an irretrievable blow by storming and sacking its sacrosanct and hitherto impregnable capital had not the strength to seize more than a handful of the fragments into which the shattered empire broke up, and even these meagre pickings slipped, one by one, out of the covetous Frankish hand that had clutched them. A Monferratine 'Kingdom of Salonica' lasted no longer than eighteen years (A.D. 1204-22), and a French 'empire' at Constantinople no longer than fifty-seven (A.D. 1204-61), while the French Principality of the Morea melted away less rapidly, but not less inexorably, from A.D. 1262 onwards.<sup>1</sup> The Italian city-states alone showed a capacity for retaining and increasing their share of the spoils that the Fourth Crusade had picked up from the wreckage of a wantonly shattered East Roman Empire.

A second explanation of the failure of the Crusades is to be found in the disappointment of the Crusaders' fond hope that a heaven-sent 'Prester John' would miraculously redress in Christendom's favour a balance which Saladin's genius had inclined so heavily to the advantage of the Crusaders' Muslim adversaries. In the event, the Mongol world-conquerors did not become converts to a Christianity of either the Roman or the Nestorian persuasion. The Roman Catholic archbishopric that was founded in A.D. 1294 by John of Montecorvino in the Mongol Khāqāns' southern capital at Khanbalyq (Peking),<sup>2</sup> on the inner side of the Great Wall, expired in the course of the fourteenth century<sup>3</sup> as obscurely as the Norse settlements in Greenland. The prize of converting the last still pagan Eurasian Nomads was eventually divided between Islam and the Tāntric Mahayanian Buddhism of Tibet,<sup>4</sup> and in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries Islam found other new worlds besides to conquer in Yunnan, the Deccan, Indonesia, the Sudan, Western Anatolia, and Rumelia.

The event thus exposed the vanity of a thirteenth-century Western Christian dream that Islam might be stamped out by an enveloping centripetal reflux of the western and eastern arcs of a Christian wave which had previously been receding centrifugally in all directions under the pressure of a following Islamic wave's advance.<sup>5</sup> The visionary

<sup>1</sup> See p. 356, above.

<sup>2</sup> See Moule, A. C.: *Christians in China before the Year 1550* (London 1930, S.P.C.K.), p. 172. For Qubilāy's transfer of the Mongol imperial capital to Peking from Qāraqorum, see II. ii. 121.

<sup>3</sup> See Moule, *op. cit.*, p. 197. The last archbishop of this see, which had been moved from Khanbalyq to Zaitun (Ch'uan-chou, near Amoy), was murdered somewhere in Central Asia in A.D. 1362.

<sup>4</sup> See pp. 218-19 and p. 337, n. 1, above.

<sup>5</sup> The succession of concentric waves in which Judaism, Christianity, and Islam spread over the face of the World, one after another, from an identical centre of dispersion in a 'Greater Syria' embracing Palestine and the Hijāz has been noticed in II. ii. 234-5 and 285-8, and is depicted in xi, map 6.

thirteenth-century Western observers who had dreamed this dream had not been mistaken in their intuition that, in the domain of Islam on which the Crusaders were trespassing, a mighty institution was passing away; their mistake had lain in identifying this moribund institution with the religion that had been revealed to Mankind through the Prophet Muhammad. The institution that was actually *in extremis* in the thirteenth century of the Christian Era was a Syriac Civilization whose disintegration had been retarded by an intrusion of Hellenism and whose universal state, originally embodied in the Achaemenian Empire, had been re-established by Muslim Arab empire-builders a thousand years after the destruction of the Achaemenian Empire by Alexander the Great.

Islam might indeed have died out if it had never outgrown its original function of providing a distinctive heretical religious badge for Arab war-bands that had accidentally reconstituted a Syriac universal state in the shape of the Caliphate as a by-product of the barbarian successor-state that they had been bent on carving out of the Roman Empire.<sup>1</sup> It would in fact have died out if the Umayyads, like their Visigothic contemporaries and victims,<sup>2</sup> had elected to abandon their distinctive barbarian heresy in favour of their Christian subjects' orthodoxy. In that event the *ci-devant* Muslim Umayyad Arab conquerors of Syria would have become converts to the Monophysite form of Christianity, like their predecessors the *ci-devant* pagan Ghassanid Arab wardens of the Roman Empire's Syrian desert marches.<sup>3</sup> This possibility had passed away when the replacement of the Umayyad dynasty by the 'Abbasids had transferred the ascendancy in the Caliphate from the Arabs to their Khurāsānī clients and had substituted the profession of Islam for the possession of an Arab pedigree as the qualification for membership in a dominant minority. From that time onwards the spiritual gifts and intellectual abilities of all peoples in a politically reunited Syriac World had contributed to build Islam up into an oecumenical higher religion which could compete with Christianity on the strength of the elements that it had borrowed from it; and, in the next and last chapter of Syriac history, this enriched Islam had begun to make mass-conversions among a now dissolving Caliphate's Christian and Zoroastrian subjects, not only by virtue of its intrinsic spiritual merits, but for the sake of the enduring social order which Islam promised to provide for a world that was appalled at the prospect of losing the oecumenical framework which had hitherto been provided for it by the political institution of the Caliphate.<sup>4</sup>

The future of Islam had thus been assured before an already tottering Baghdādī 'Abbasid Caliphate finally succumbed to a *coup de grâce* from the Mongols. So far from threatening Islam with destruction, the invasions of the Caliphate's derelict domain by the Crusaders from one side and by the Mongols from the other were the finishing touches in the making of Islam's fortune; for, when the Baghdādī 'Abbasid Caliphate foundered, and all that was left of the old fabric of the Syriac Society went down with it, Islam did not die, but lived on to offer refuge to the shipwrecked

<sup>1</sup> See V. v. 127-8, 230, and 673-8.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 280, n. 3, above.

<sup>3</sup> See *ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> See V. v. 678; VII. vii. 398-400; and xi, maps 38 and 39.

children of a lost civilization. Islam not only captivated the savage Mongol conquerors of the Caliphate; she served as a chrysalis for bringing to birth two new societies to take the place of a Syriac Society that had finally dissolved in the post-'Abbasid interregnum; and the emergence of the Iranic and Arabic Muslim civilizations set the seal on the discomfiture of the Western Christian Crusaders.

In the first place these nascent societies, in the vigour of their early youth, created war machines with which the Crusaders could not compete. In another context<sup>1</sup> we have taken note of the overthrow of Saint Louis' disorderly knights by a trained and disciplined Egyptian Mamlūk cavalry at Mansūrah in A.D. 1250.<sup>2</sup> The still better trained and disciplined Ottoman Janissary infantry, which overthrew the Mamlūks in A.D. 1516-17,<sup>3</sup> had the upper hand over their Western Christian adversaries from the fourteenth century to the seventeenth, when their military ascendancy was tardily wrested from them by Western troops who conquered them by at last successfully imitating them.<sup>4</sup> But sheer military superiority was not the whole explanation of the two new-born Islamic civilizations' triumph over the West; for the Iranic Muslim Civilization, at any rate, gained the day by its superior attractiveness as much as by its superior strength. When, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Greek Orthodox Christians who could no longer look forward to remaining their own masters found themselves still free to choose between a Frankish and an Ottoman domination, they opted for the 'Osmanlis';<sup>5</sup> and a minority among them that was willing to contract out of an onerous political servitude by abandoning a traditional religious allegiance showed less repugnance towards becoming converts to Islam than towards staying within the Christian fold at the price of becoming ecclesiastical subjects of the Pope. While the Greeks' historic choice was partly determined by the negative motive of resentment at the overbearing behaviour by which the Franks had made themselves odious in Greek eyes, some credit must also be given to the positive attraction exerted by the Ottoman way of life, in view of the significant fact that, in the golden age of Ottoman history, the Christian renegades who 'turned Turk' were not exclusively Orthodox Christians who had found themselves caught between an Ottoman and a Frankish mill-stone, but were also recruited from among Western Christians who were not under any corresponding pressure to change their religious allegiance against their inclinations.

In spite of the strength and attractiveness of the 'Osmanlis, the Franks might perhaps have retained permanent possession of at least a remnant of their acquisitions in the former domain of the East Roman Empire if the late Medieval Western cosmos of city-states, of which the North and Central Italian city-states were the foremost representatives, had succeeded in assimilating to itself the relatively backward feudal mass of a Medieval Western Christian body social. The Italians were condemned by an inexorable fiat of geography to live and move and have their being in the Mediterranean; they had invested heavily in commerce and

<sup>1</sup> See IV. iv. 431-65.

<sup>2</sup> See IV. iv. 450-2.

<sup>4</sup> See III. iii. 31-47.

<sup>5</sup> See IV. iv. 448-9.

<sup>5</sup> See pp. 151-2, above.

sovereignty in the Levant; and, though they were at least as unpopular as the French, Catalan, and Navarrese Franks among Orthodox Christians who could not avoid encountering them, they were at any rate more efficient than their Transalpine and Transmarine coreligionists—as was demonstrated by the accumulation in Venetian, Genoese, and Florentine hands of an ever increasing proportion of the constantly diminishing Frankish assets in the Levant in the course of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries.<sup>1</sup>

If the Italian city-states had been backed by a Western World in which their own order of society had prevailed, they might perhaps have proved strong enough, with this solid support in their rear, to save the situation for Western Christendom on its Mediterranean front; but, as we have noticed in another context,<sup>2</sup> the ninth decade of the fourteenth century saw the end of any prospect that the Western World as a whole might find its way to modernization through a mass-conversion to the city-state dispensation which had made the fortunes of the precociously modern Italians and Flemings. In the event, the feudal mass of a Medieval Western Christendom modernized itself, not by reminding its kingdoms into city-states, but by adapting to the kingdom-state scale of political operations<sup>3</sup> the efficient administrative apparatus which late medieval North Italian despots had imported from the East Roman Empire via its Sicilian successor-state;<sup>4</sup> and the Modern Western World that was actually called into existence crystalized, not round the Mediterranean city-states of Italy, but round the Atlantic kingdoms and commonwealths of Portugal, Spain, France, England, and Holland. A Venice, Genoa, and Florence that had thus lost their lead within their native Western Christendom had, *a fortiori*, lost their chance of heading a united Western resistance to the progress of the 'Osmanlis in the Levant, while the Atlantic countries that had won the lead and acquired the power were too eagerly preoccupied with the conquest of the Ocean to be willing to spend much energy on stemming the 'Osmanlis' advance in a Mediterranean that had dwindled into being a backwater.

These considerations, between them, perhaps go some way towards accounting for the Crusaders' eventual failure. Our findings may be summed up in the verdict that the Medieval Western Christian competitors for dominion over the Mediterranean Basin were neither strong enough to subdue their neighbours nor cultivated enough to captivate them. The second of these two judgements needs to be tested further by noticing what the Medieval Western Christians and their neighbours thought and felt about one another, and what, if any, cultural commerce was transacted between them.

## 2. *The Medieval West and the Syriac World*<sup>5</sup>

When the Medieval Western Christians launched their assault on the Syriac World in the eleventh century of the Christian Era, they found its inhabitants divided in their communal allegiance between Islam and

<sup>1</sup> See III. iii. 347, n. 1, and pp. 168–70 and 177–8, above. <sup>2</sup> See III. iii. 347–50.

<sup>3</sup> See III. iii. 300–1, 305, and 357–63; IV. iv. 198–200; and p. 395, below.

<sup>4</sup> See III. iii. 354–6; IV. iv. 198; VII. vii. 537–8; and p. 395, below.

<sup>5</sup> See xi, map 41.



the divers ecclesiastical communities that had occupied, between them, the stage of Syriac history before the Primitive Muslim Arabs had liquidated the Roman Empire south of the Taurus and had united politically under their own rule all Cis-Tauran Syriac territories, from the Pamirs to the Iberian Peninsula, that had been under Achaemenian and Carthaginian sovereignty at the turn of the sixth and fifth centuries B.C.<sup>1</sup> The relations established by the Western Christian Crusaders with surviving pre-Muslim Syriac communities with which they came into contact were more intimate than their relations with their Muslim contemporaries; and we may infer that the Crusades might have had longer abiding cultural effects of greater historical importance supposing that these Medieval Western wars of aggression had been waged in an earlier age in which the pre-Muslim communities had, all told, still embraced an overwhelming majority of the constituents of the Syriac Society.

In the seventh century of the Christian Era—at the moment when the Primitive Muslim Arab conquerors had burst out of the Arabian Peninsula—Syria, Egypt, and Armenia had been predominantly Monophysite, 'Irāq predominantly Nestorian, the Iranian Plateau predominantly Zoroastrian, the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin predominantly Mahayanian Buddhist, and North-West Africa and the Iberian Peninsula predominantly Western Catholic Christian, though some of these competing religious communities had been gaining ground at their neighbours' expense. The Monophysites, for example, had not only reduced the Catholic Christians in Egypt and Syria to a mere minority of 'Melchites' who owed their survival there to the official support of the Roman Imperial Government, but had also been encroaching on the Nestorians' domain east of the Khabūr and the Euphrates,<sup>2</sup> while the Nestorians,

<sup>1</sup> The reintegration of a pre-Alexandrine Achaemenian Empire in a post-Roman Arab Caliphate has been noticed in I. i. 76-77.

<sup>2</sup> Between A.D. 457 and A.D. 486 a Nestorian Christianity which had been declared heretical by the Catholic Church at the Council of Ephesus in A.D. 431 succeeded in capturing the Christian Church in the Sasanian Empire (see O'Leary, de L.: *How Greek Science Passed to the Arabs* (London 1948, Kegan Paul), pp. 58-59), thanks to its enjoyment of two advantages. Its official proscription in the Roman Empire certified its political innocuousness from the standpoint of the Sasanian Imperial Government, while the community of language between the Syriac-speaking Nestorian Christian refugees from the Roman dominions in Mesopotamia and Syria and the Syriac-speaking population of the Sasanian dominions in 'Irāq gave the Nestorians an easy entry into this important mission-field. The same two advantages were, however, enjoyed by the Syriac-speaking Monophysites, in their turn, after their doctrine had been declared heretical at the Council of Chalcedon in A.D. 451; and, in the sequel, they, too, succeeded in forcing an entry into the Sasanian Empire at the Nestorians' heels. Beth Arsham, on the threshold of the Nestorian Catholicos's see of Seleucia-on-Tigris, had a Monophysite bishop, She'mon, circa A.D. 503-48 (O'Leary, op. cit., p. 88). Adiabene was won for Monophysitism by Ahudemmeh, who was Bishop of Takrit, circa A.D. 559-75 (O'Leary, op. cit., pp. 90-91); and from A.D. 640 onwards the Monophysite Church in the ex-Sasanian dominions, then in process of being conquered by the Primitive Muslim Arabs, provided itself with a supreme pontiff entitled 'maphrian' (ibid., p. 91). On the other hand, when the Lakhmid Arab warden of the Sasanian Empire's anti-Roman marches, Nu'man V, was converted from paganism to Christianity towards the close of the sixth century of the Christian Era, he adopted, not Monophysitism, but the Nestorian faith of the Syriac-speaking sedentary population of his capital city, Hīrah (ibid., pp. 67-68 and 184-5). In making this choice, Nu'man may have been influenced by the consideration that the rival Ghassānid wardens of the Roman Empire's anti-Sasanian marches had opted for Monophysitism in A.D. 543, when the Ghassānid prince Harith b. Jabalah had obtained, through the offices of the Empress Theodora, the appointment of a Monophysite bishop to the see of Bostra (ibid., p. 86).

for their part, had been gaining ground at the Zoroastrians' expense on the Iranian Plateau, and the Zoroastrians at the Buddhists' expense in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin.

The sudden and rapid conquest of these vast territories by the Primitive Muslim Arabs had not at first made any appreciable difference to the religious and cultural complexion of the Syriac World. Islam had appeared on the scene as the distinctive religion of a handful of barbarian invaders;<sup>1</sup> and, even when an 'Abbasid had been substituted for an Umayyad régime as a result of the overthrow of the Umayyad Dynasty's Syrian Arab war-bands by Khurāsānī Iranian marchmen converts to Islam, the effect had been merely to replace one dominant minority by another.<sup>2</sup> A widespread conversion to Islam of the subject populations of the Caliphate, beyond the circle of the dominant minority's slaves, freedmen, and clients, apparently did not begin until after the 'Abbasid Caliphate had been smitten in the reign of Mu'tasim (*imperabat* A.D. 833-42) by the first of the successive strokes that punctuated its long-drawn-out death-agony, and this propagation of Islam did not gather momentum until, in the eleventh century of the Christian Era, the 'Abbasids' derelict dominions were invaded simultaneously by Saljūq Turkish Eurasian Nomad barbarians overland from the east and by Frankish barbarians overseas from Western Christendom.

During a social interregnum in which the Syriac Society was in dissolution while its daughter societies, the Arabic and Iranic Muslim civilizations, were still unborn, the non-Muslim populations that had been living since the seventh century of the Christian Era under an Islamic Caliphate's political aegis were being drawn towards a spontaneous conversion to Islam by a hope of finding in the solidarity of a common religious allegiance a social framework that would be more durable than the universal state whose once imposing structure was now falling about their ears, and at the same time they were being pushed forcibly along the same road by pressure—bursting out into increasingly frequent bouts of persecution—from a Muslim dominant minority that had been stung, by the humiliating and disquieting spectacle of barbarians overrunning Dār-al-Islām, into abandoning the toleration that it had been accustomed to extend, not only to the scripturally accredited 'People of the Book', but also by analogy to other cultivated non-Muslim communities such as the Zoroastrians, the Hindus, and even the Harrānī devotees of an elsewhere extinct Helleno-Babylonian paganism.<sup>3</sup> In a crisis in which a Frankish and a Eurasian Nomad barbarian aggressor eventually all but joined hands in Syria for the purpose of dealing

<sup>1</sup> See III. iii. 277; V. v. 230 and 676; and p. 10, n. 1, above.

<sup>2</sup> See VI. vii. 140-1 and 329.

<sup>3</sup> For the customary Islamic liberality in extending to the adherents of all higher religions the toleration accorded in the Qur'ān to 'the People of the Book', see IV. iv. 225-6 and V. v. 674, n. 2. For the fossil of the Babylonian Civilization that survived at Harrān down to the post-Syriac social interregnum, see IV. iv. 101, n. 1; V. v. 125, n. 1; and Seton Lloyd: 'Recent Survey of Remains at Harran', in *The Times*, 21st March, 1951, and 20th January, 1952. The part played by the Harrānīs in the self-Hellenization of the Syriac World in the 'Abbasid Age is noticed in the present Study on p. 408, n. 3, below.

Islam its death-blow,<sup>1</sup> Muslim public opinion became impatient of unconverted Unbelievers in the Muslim community's midst.

Owing to this conjunction of psychological and social circumstances, the Monophysite, Nestorian, and Zoroastrian communities in Dār-al-Islām suffered, in the course of some three centuries ending *circa* A.D. 1275, the fate which had overtaken the 'Melchite' Catholic community in the Roman dominions south of the Taurus in the course of the two centuries between the convocation of the Council of Chalcedon in A.D. 451 and the Arab conquest. In that earlier age of Syriac history a Catholic Christian community which had previously embraced almost the entire population of Syria and Egypt had dwindled into a minority as a result of a mass-secession to Monophysitism. Some four hundred years later the Monophysites and the other pre-Muslim ecclesiastical communities in the vast area that had been united politically in the meantime by the prowess of Muslim Arab conquerors were reduced in their turn, by mass-conversions to Islam, from being local majorities of the population of the now derelict domain of the Caliphate to being mere residual minorities like the 'Melchites'. As for Buddhism in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin and Western Catholic Christianity in the Maghrib, they both disappeared altogether from regions which had once played a leading part in the lives of the Mahāyāna and of the Western Christian Church, and it may be conjectured that Western Christianity would have had the same fate in Andalusia as in the Maghrib if its extinction there had not been forestalled by the Western Christian transfrontier barbarians' victory over the rival Muslim barbarians from the Sahara and the Atlas in their contest for possession of the spoils of the Andalusian Umayyad Caliphate; for, during the five centuries of Muslim ascendancy in the Peninsula, the backward native provincial Christians had shown themselves highly susceptible to the attractions of their Arab Muslim masters' superior Syriac culture.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 354-5, above.

<sup>2</sup> In the Islamic community in Andalusia the descendants of native Iberian converts (*muxalladūn*) probably far outnumbered the descendants of Berber, and *a fortiori* those of Arab, immigrants. There were mass-conversions on the morrow of the conquest, and the Muslims of Saragossa and Toledo, in particular, appear to have been mostly of native origin (Lévy-Provençal, E.: *Histoire de L'Espagne Musulmane*, vol. i (Cairo 1944, Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale du Caire), pp. 53 and 111). There were even converts to Islam who came not from the subject population but from the independent Iberian Christian principalities. The Banu Qasi of Tudela, whose representative Mūsā b. Mūsā seized Barcelona in A.D. 856 (*ibid.*, p. 220), were a converted Aragonese Gothic family (*ibid.*, pp. 109-10) who had Basque kinsmen and allies (*ibid.*, pp. 151-2), and the native origin of the family was proclaimed in the names of two of this Mūsā's four sons, Lope and Fortun, while the names of the other two, Mutarrif and Ismā'il, were tributes to the family's conversion (*ibid.*, p. 226). The rebel 'Abd-ar-Rahmān b. al-Jilliḡī ('the Galician's son'), who ruled an independent principality at Badajoz, in defiance of Cordova, *circa* A.D. 875-930 (*ibid.*, pp. 207-10 and 299), was manifestly likewise a Christian convert from beyond the border. The subject Christian origin of some of the leading Muslim families in Andalusia was similarly recorded in their family names: e.g. the Banu Angelino and Banu Sabarico of Seville, and the Banu'l-Longo, Banu Qabṭūrus, and Ibn-al-Qutīyah ('son of the Goth') (*ibid.*, p. 54). One of the rebels with whom 'Abd-ar-Rahmān had to contend, Muhammad b. Ardabulish (*ibid.*, p. 287), advertised in his father's Sarmatian Christian name 'Ardaburius' his family's descent from one of the pre-Visigothic Alan barbarian invaders of the Peninsula who must have stayed behind when the main body of his fellow tribesmen had crossed to Africa with their Vandal comrades. Though the Banu Hajjāj of Seville did not proclaim their Christian origin in their nomenclature, they are thought by Lévy-Provençal (*ibid.*, pp. 251-2)

Thus, at the very time when the Western Christian Crusaders were establishing their ephemeral foothold on the Mediterranean fringes of the African and Asiatic domains of a moribund Syriac Society, the non-Muslim communities in the Syriac World were being confronted with a choice between conversion to Islam and persistent loyalty to their traditional religious allegiances at the enhanced price of an isolation and a persecution which they had not previously been called upon to endure. In these untoward circumstances the majority embraced Islam, and the pre-Islamic ecclesiastical communities of the Syriac World became almost extinct save for a few 'fossils in fastnesses': the Zoroastrians in the oases of Yazd and Kirmān; the Nestorian Christians in the highlands of the Zagros; the Syriac-speaking 'Jacobite' Monophysite Christians in the highlands of the Tūr 'Abdīn; the Armenian 'Gregorian' Monophysite Christians in the highlands between the Cappadocian Plateau and the lowlands of Cilicia and Commagene;<sup>1</sup> the Maronite Monothelete Christians in the Lebanon; the Coptic Monophysite Christians in Upper Egypt, Nubia, and Abyssinia. Of these hardy survivors of a pre-Islamic age of Syriac history, only the Armenians and the Maronites came into direct contact with the Western Christian Crusaders, and both these communities were as strongly attracted by the Medieval Western Christian culture as the Medieval Western Christian subjects of a Muslim 'ascendancy' in Andalusia were attracted by the Syriac culture of their Arab conquerors.

to have been descended from Goths who had taken sides with Tāriq b. Ziyād in A.D. 711. Abu 'Amir Al-Mansūr's second successor in the Cordovan dictatorship, 'Abd-ar-Rahmān, was surnamed Sanchuelo (*ibid.*, p. 469).

The Iberian subjects of the Arab rulers of Cordova who did not adopt their masters' religion were nevertheless apt, like the converts, to take Arab names. The Christian count of the Christian community at Cordova, who was entrusted by the Umayyad amir Hakam I (*imperabat* A.D. 796-822) in A.D. 805 with the command of the slave corps and then in A.D. 818 with the collection of newly imposed taxes, was named Rabi' son of Teodulfo (*ibid.*, pp. 116-17). A Christian bishop, Rabi' b. Zayd, whose Christian name was Recemundo, was employed by 'Abd-ar-Rahmān III to obtain *objets d'art* for him from Syria or Constantinople (*ibid.*, p. 373) and was sent by him in A.D. 955 on an embassy to Otto I at Frankfurt, where he met Bishop Liutprand of Cremona and persuaded him to write his *Antapodosis* (*ibid.*, p. 388). This adoption of Arab names was a symptom of the proclivity towards the Arab culture which won for the Andalusian Arabs' Iberian Christian subjects the nickname *musta'ribūn* ('Arabizers'), as a synonym for *mu'āhidūn* or *mu'āhadūn* ('contractual clients').

The cultural bonds between Christian subjects and Muslim masters in Andalusia were linguistic. A vernacular Romance *koiné*, which was spoken by 'Abd-ar-Rahmān III (*ibid.*, p. 285), is thought by Lévy-Provençal (*ibid.*, p. 55) to have been the most widely current language among the Andalusian Muslims (compare the currency of the local Romaic Greek vernaculars among members of the Ottoman Muslim ascendancy in the Morea (see p. 683, below) and the Venetian ascendancy in the Ionian Islands (see p. 170, above) in the early years of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era). Conversely, the *musta'ribūn* took pride and pleasure in talking Arabic, composing Arabic poetry, and producing versions of Arabic literary forms in the medium of their native Romance.

The relation between the two communities was so intimate, and the atmosphere of toleration so strong, that there was at least one notorious case of counter-conversion to Christianity from Islam. The rebel 'Umar b. Hafsūn and his wife turned Christian in A.D. 899 (*ibid.*, p. 265), and their eldest son and their daughter Argentea followed their example, while the three other sons remained Muslims (*ibid.*, p. 293). After 'Umar's last son had been compelled by 'Abd-ar-Rahmān III to surrender the fortress of Bobastro on the 19th January, 928, Argentea went into a convent. She provoked martyrdom on the 13th May, 937 (*ibid.*, p. 296).

<sup>1</sup> Known, in the terminology of Assyrian political geography, as *Tabal*—'the Highlands' *par excellence*.

The Armenians who encountered the Crusaders after ensconcing themselves in the fastnesses of the Taurus and the Antitaurus in the eleventh century of the Christian Era were refugees from the North, like the Hittites who had found refuge in the same region in the twelfth century B.C. The invading 'Sea Peoples' and Phrygians, who in that age had overwhelmed a Hittite Power whose capital had crowned Boghazkal'eh in East Central Anatolia, had their counterparts in the eleventh century of the Christian Era in the East Roman Imperial Government and the Saljūq Turkish Eurasian Nomads. In its expansion at the expense of a disintegrating 'Abbasid Caliphate the East Roman Empire illiberally and unwisely extinguished the recently won independence of the Caliphate's Armenian successor-states in the highlands on the watershed between the basins of the Euphrates and the Aras, and thereby deprived itself of potential Armenian buffer-states against a Nomad invasion of Anatolia along the customary route up the Aras and down the Upper Euphrates' northern branch (*Turcicē* Frat Su, *alias* Qāra Su). Gaghiḱ II, the last king of Ani, the foremost of these Armenian principalities, was compelled by the East Roman Government to cede his dominions to them in A.D. 1045,<sup>1</sup> after Senekherim, the last king of Vaspurakan—the most easterly of the Armenian principalities and therefore the most dangerously exposed of them all—had voluntarily ceded his dominions to the East Roman Emperor Basil II in A.D. 1021 under the menace of the onset of the Saljūq wave.<sup>2</sup> The East Romans were so far from being able to defend their newly acquired Armenian marches against their Saljūq assailants that they lost not only these but the heart of their ancestral dominions in Anatolia as well. After a spell of less than twenty years under East Roman rule, Ani was sacked by the Saljūqs in A.D. 1064;<sup>3</sup> and the crushing defeat which the East Romans suffered at Saljūq hands at Melazkerd in A.D. 1071 opened the way for the Saljūqs' permanent conquest of Sivas, Qaysari, and Qōñiyeh and their temporary occupation of Nicaea almost within sight of the Sea of Marmara.

This collapse of the East Roman Empire in Anatolia gave the Armenians an opportunity to compensate themselves for their lost homelands by carving out a new realm in a different quarter. The East Roman Government had unintentionally prepared the ground for this by planting Armenian wardens of the marches at strategic points commanding the passes through the Taurus and the Amanus after the East Roman conquest of Cilicia and Antioch from the successors of the 'Abbasid Caliphate in and after A.D. 964,<sup>4</sup> and by assigning domains, inside the previous East Roman frontiers, to the Armenian kings whose dominions they had annexed in the eleventh century. Sivas had been assigned to Senekherim, the ex-king of Vaspurakan, in A.D. 1021,<sup>5</sup> and the army-corps district of Lykandos, in the mountains between Cappadocia, Commagene, and Cilicia, to Gaghiḱ, the ex-king of Ani, in A.D. 1045.<sup>6</sup> The Armenians' bitterness against an East Roman Empire that had deprived them of their political independence in their homelands

<sup>1</sup> See de Morgan, J.: *Histoire du Peuple Arménien* (Paris 1919, Berger-Levrault), pp. 151-2.

<sup>2</sup> See de Morgan, op. cit., p. 156.

<sup>3</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 149.

<sup>4</sup> See de Morgan, op. cit., p. 149.

<sup>5</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 162-3 and 165-6.

<sup>6</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 152.



was aggravated by the ill-treatment to which they were subsequently subjected in exile on East Roman soil; they seized their first chance of shaking off a hated yoke; and the East Roman military disaster of A.D. 1071 was followed in A.D. 1080 by the establishment of an independent Armenian principality in the mountains overhanging the Cilician Plain.<sup>1</sup> In A.D. 1097, in the reign of Prince Constantine I (*dominabatur* A.D. 1095-9), the son and successor of the founder, Rupen (*dominabatur* A.D. 1080-95), these recently liberated Armenians in the Taurus fraternized with the warriors of the First Crusade during their passage through Cilicia to lay siege to Antioch; and this fraternization made the new-born Armenian principality's fortune, besides being of substantial assistance to the Western Christian adventurers in the Levant.

Refugee Armenians and errant Crusaders were, indeed, drawn together by the powerful bond of a common enmity towards both the Orthodox Christians and the Muslims, between whom the Crusaders and the Armenians both found themselves caught in a vice, and it was a godsend for either party to be able to join hands with the other. With the Crusaders' help, Constantine's successor Thoros I (*dominabatur* A.D. 1099-1129) was able to descend from his mountains and to conquer the fertile Cilician plain, and this conquest not only increased the Armenian principality's strength but gave it a coastline which brought it into direct relations with a Western Christendom that had just wrested the 'thalassocracy' of the Mediterranean out of Maghribi Muslim and East Roman Orthodox Christian hands.<sup>2</sup> The Armenians were willing converts to the contemporary Western Christian culture. Constantine I married his daughter to Count Jocelyn of Edessa and his niece (the daughter of his brother and successor Thoros) to Baldwin the brother of Godfrey of Bouillon.<sup>3</sup> Prince Leo II (*dominabatur* A.D. 1187-96) decided that the Cilician Armenian principality could no longer afford to remain in the comparative isolation to which it was still condemned by its lack of any legitimate political status and by the ecclesiastical gulf which insulated the Gregorian Monophysite Church from both the Eastern Orthodox and the Western Catholic Christian communion. Prince Leo determined to purchase his recognition as a legitimate king from one or other of these two preponderant Christendoms by paying the price of ecclesiastical union; and, after a half-hearted attempt at union with his unloved Orthodox Christian neighbours, he eventually achieved union with the more distant and less odious Latins. The terms were agreed between Prince Leo and the Vatican in A.D. 1196, and at Tarsus in A.D. 1199 the Armenian prince was crowned king (*regnabat* A.D. 1199-1219 as King Leo I) by a Uniate Armenian catholicos in the presence of a representative of the Pope.<sup>4</sup>

This formal admission of a Cilician Armenia to membership in the body social and ecclesiastical of Western Christendom gave an impetus to the Westernization of King Leo's realm. The Armenian Kingdom accepted the institutions of Western feudalism in adopting the Assizes of Antioch, and an educated minority of laymen, as well as the Uniate

<sup>1</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 162 and 166.

<sup>2</sup> See de Morgan, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 352, above.

<sup>4</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 187-93.

clergy, became conversant with the Latin and French languages. In fact, the Cilician Kingdom of Armenia became an integral part of the Western Terre d'Outre Mer in the Levant,<sup>1</sup> and it was the last of the Continental Crusader principalities to succumb to an Islamic counter-attack. After the Egyptian Mamlûks had deprived the Crusaders of their last continental bridgehead south-east of the Amanus by capturing Acre in A.D. 1291, Cilician Armenia continued to hold out for the best part of a century before it, too, lost its political independence through the Mamlûks' capture of its capital city, Sis, in A.D. 1375 from its last king, Leo V de Lusignan (*regnabat* A.D. 1374-5).<sup>2</sup>

After the fall of the Cilician Armenian kingdom, the local Armenian communities themselves survived in their highland fastnesses for another five centuries and more, under successive Mamlûk, Dhu'lqadrî, and Ottoman régimes, till they were wiped out in the terrible deportations of A.D. 1915; but the loss of their political independence had cut them off from their access to the sea and, in consequence, also from their contact with Western Christendom. By contrast, the Maronites, whose Lebanese fastness had been embraced in the domain of the Syrian Crusader principalities and who, like the Cilician Armenians, had entered into an ecclesiastical union with the Western Church, were able, thanks to their proximity to one of the shores of the Mediterranean, to keep in touch with the Western World throughout the five centuries that intervened between the fall of Acre in A.D. 1291 and the revival of Western interest in the Levant towards the close of the eighteenth century of the Christian Era. The Maronites' earliest link with the Modern Western World was through France, who won over them in the nineteenth century a political influence which she forfeited in the twentieth century through an injudicious exercise of a mandatory authority over the Lebanon during the years A.D. 1920-44. The Maronites established a second link with the Modern West through the United States; and, at the time of writing, the French Catholic and American Protestant universities at Bayrût were living monuments of a

<sup>1</sup> This Francophilism of the Armenian 'displaced persons' who had carved out for themselves a successor-state of the East Roman Empire in Cilicia was shared by contemporary Armenian communities settled in territories then still under East Roman rule. In A.D. 1189, when Frederick Barbarossa was on the march, through East Roman territory, from the Danube to the Dardanelles, the Armenians at Philippopolis and Prousinos fraternized with his army—in contrast to their Orthodox Christian neighbours, who evacuated their homes on the Western Crusaders' approach (see Nikitas Khoniátis, *Khroniki Dhiliyis* (Bonn 1835, Weber), pp. 527 and 534); and, after the overthrow of the East Roman régime by the Western perpetrators of the so-called 'Fourth Crusade' in A.D. 1204, the Armenians of the Troad, like their Latin neighbours at Pighaf (Bigha), invited the newly elected Latin Emperor, Baldwin of Flanders, to come over into Opsikion to help them, and raised some troops of horse to serve with him when he arrived (*ibid.*, pp. 795-6 and 814; Villehardouin, Geoffroi de: *Conquête de Constantinople*, chap. 69, § 310, third edition of N. de Wailly's text and translation (Paris 1882, Didot), pp. 184 and 191). When the Crusaders found themselves compelled to evacuate their conquests on the Anatolian side of the Dardanelles, these Armenians emigrated with them *en masse* to the number of about twenty thousand, including the women and children, with their movable property loaded in wagons (Villehardouin, chap. 87, § 380, p. 226). They were all massacred by the local Greek population in Thrace (*ibid.*, chap. 87, § 385, p. 228).

Nikitas Khoniátis notes (p. 527) several points of Christian ecclesiastical practice in which the Armenians took the same line as the Western Christians in common disagreement with the Eastern Orthodox Church.

<sup>2</sup> See de Morgan, *op. cit.*, p. 235.

mutual attraction between the Maronites and the Western World which had persisted since the Age of the Crusades without a break.

The Crusaders' relations with the Maronites of the Lebanon and the Armenians of Cilicia were manifestly more intimate than their relations with the Muslims who, during the period of the Crusades, became the majority instead of a minority in the population of a disintegrating Syriac World; yet, considering that Muslims and Christians ranked officially as 'unbelievers' in one another's eyes, and that the champions of these two fanatically exclusive-minded Judaic religions were chronically at war, we may marvel at the degree of the mutual respect which their fighting-men came to feel for one another, and at the amount and the importance of the cultural nourishment which a Medieval Western Christendom imbibed through a Syriac channel in which the spirit and technique of an Arabic poetry were conveyed to them in a Romance language by Provençal troubadours, and the ideas of an Hellenic philosophy in the Arabic language by Muslim scholars.

In the realm of the sword the sympathy between the warriors in the two opposing camps arose from the surprising discovery of an unexpected affinity. On the battlefields of Andalusia the Andalusian Muslims and the transfrontier Christian barbarians who were their coinhabitants of the Iberian Peninsula sometimes felt a closer kinship with one another than the Iberian Christians could feel with their coreligionists from beyond the Pyrenees, or the Iberian Muslims with their coreligionists from the Sahara and the Atlas, when they were each enjoying the doubtful blessing of being reinforced by these officially laudable but practically awkward allies. On the battlefields of Syria the Turkish barbarians who had become converts to Islam in the act of overrunning the dominions of the Caliphate were not unsympathetic adversaries for Western Christian knights who, in degree of civilization, were still not far above the level of their own barbarian predecessors who had become converts to Christianity in the act of overrunning the Roman Empire some six centuries earlier. In the Turkish ghāzis the Crusaders were meeting their barbarian predecessors' counterparts—and the Normans their own counterparts, considering that these 'Hagarenes', who were the spearhead of the Frankish offensive in the Mediterranean in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, were as recent converts from Barbarism as the Saljūqs.

In the realm of the pen the Crusaders' temporary conquests in Syria, and still more their lasting conquests in Sicily and Andalusia, at the expense of Dār-al-Islām became so many transmitting stations through which the spiritual treasures in the storehouse of a moribund Syriac World were communicated to a Medieval Western Christendom.<sup>1</sup> The

<sup>1</sup> The successive stages in the process of transmission in Andalusia could be distinguished in the surviving historical record. The first stage was the marriage of Christian princesses from the independent barbarian Christian principalities in the North-West of the Iberian Peninsula by Umayyad amirs and caliphs and by 'Amirid dictators before the collapse of the Andalusian Muslim power in A.D. 1009. The second stage was the employment of transfrontier barbarian Christian mercenaries by Andalusian Muslim governments. The third stage—for which the second opened the way—was the conquest of Andalusia by the Peninsular barbarian Christian principalities. The fourth stage was the migration of musta'rib Christians from the still independent Andalusian Muslim principalities into the expanded Peninsular Christian Kingdoms. The fifth stage was the

genial atmosphere of religious tolerance and intellectual curiosity, which temporarily captivated the Western Christian conquerors of Palermo and Toledo in virtue of its shining contrast to their own traditional fanaticism, was native to an Early Islam;<sup>2</sup> but the cultural treasures

radiation of the musta'rib culture of the Andalusian Caliphate's Peninsular Christian successor-states into the Transpyrenean heart of Western Christendom.

The Cordovan Umayyad Caliph 'Abd-ar-Rahmān III (*natus* A.D. 891) had a Christian mother and grandmother (Lévy-Provençal, *op. cit.*, p. 284), and his predecessor 'Abdallah (*imperabat* A.D. 888-912) may have owed his blondness to Christian maternal ancestresses (*ibid.*, p. 231), though 'Abd-ar-Rahmān I, the founder of the Andalusian Umayyad line, must have owed his (*ibid.*, p. 98) to his Nafzah Berber mother (*ibid.*, p. 67). The dictator Al-Mansūr married Abarca, the daughter of Sancho Garcés II of Navarre (who paid a state visit to his son-in-law at Cordova in A.D. 992), and also a daughter of Bermudo II of León, who returned to León and took the veil after her Cordovan Muslim husband's death (*ibid.*, pp. 437-8). The Andalusian Muslim practice of employing transfrontier Christian mercenaries can be traced at least as far back as the reign of the Umayyad amir Hakam I (*imperabat* A.D. 796-822), whose favourite guards were a band of 150 Narbonne prisoners of war (*ibid.*, p. 133). Al-Mansūr (*dominabatur* A.D. 981-1002) substituted Christian and Maghribi Berber Muslim mercenaries for the six Andalusian Arab junds which had originated in *vexillationes* brought to Andalusia in A.D. 741 by Balj b. Bishr al-Qusayri (*ibid.*, pp. 427 and 32-33) from the Arab junds cantoned along the desert coast of Syria and in Palestine and Egypt (see VI. vii. 130-1). The conquest of Andalusia (all save one fastness round Granada) by the Peninsular barbarian Christian principalities between A.D. 1085 and A.D. 1248 exposed them to the radiation of the culture of their new Muslim subjects in the annexed territories, and the transplantation of musta'rib Christians into the interior of the Andalusian Caliphate's Christian successor-states carried the Andalusian culture, through the agency of these Arabizing Christian immigrants, into the North-West of the Peninsula, where the original Arab and Berber Muslim invaders had failed to maintain themselves. The Transpyrenean Frankish pilgrims to Compostela and volunteers in the armies of the Peninsular Christian conquerors of Andalusia played their part as carriers, in their turn, by importing a Peninsular musta'rib culture into regions of Western Christendom, north of the Loire, to which the eighth-century Arab raiders had never penetrated.

<sup>2</sup> As witness—to cite one document from the file of evidence—the following testimony from a party of eighth-century English pilgrims to the Christian Holy Land.

'At the time [of his arrival at Emesa *circa* A.D. 723], Willibald had with him seven of his fellow-countrymen, making a party of eight, including Willibald himself. They had no sooner arrived than the heathen Saracens, finding that a party of unknown foreigners had made their appearance in the city, arrested them and kept them under detention, as they did not know their nationality and did suspect them of being spies. They brought them, under detention, before an elderly man of substance to be inspected by him and to have their provenance identified. This elderly man interrogated them—asking them where they came from and what was their business. They replied by giving him a circumstantial account of the reason for their journey, going right back to the beginning; and to this the elder's reply was: "I have often seen people from those parts of the World—fellow-countrymen of these people—coming here; they intend no mischief; all that they want is to fulfil their law."

"Then they left the court and proceeded to Government House, to ask for a transit visa to Jerusalem, but they had no sooner presented themselves than the governor declared them to be spies and gave orders for them to be thrown into prison until he had had time to obtain instructions about their case from the King. After they had thus found themselves in prison, the marvellous dispensation of Almighty God—who, with His fatherly care, has everywhere deigned to cover his children with his shield and preserve them unharmed among missiles and engines of war, among savages and fighting-men, in prison and among hordes of miscreants—moved a man who was in business there to bestir himself, out of charity and for his soul's salvation, to ransom them and secure their release from prison, in order that they might be free to go wherever they might wish. In this he was unsuccessful, but on the other hand he had luncheon and dinner sent in for them every day; and on Wednesdays and Saturdays he used to send his son to the prison to escort them to the public baths and return them to prison again, while on Sundays he used to take them to church through the bazaars, to give them the opportunity of seeing anything that might take their fancy among the goods on sale there, and to give himself the opportunity of buying for them, out of his own pocket, whatever might suit their taste. The townspeople's curiosity was aroused by the party to such a degree that they soon fell into the habit of coming there regularly to look at them (they were young and handsome and well dressed).

'After that, while they were serving their time in prison, a man from Spain came and

which, in this propitious environment, Western minds consented to receive from Muslim and Jewish hands during the next two hundred years were of Hellenic as well as Syriac origin. The Syriac Society was not the creator, but was merely the carrier, of authentic and apocryphal works of the Hellenic philosopher Aristotle which were made accessible to twelfth-century Western schoolmen by being translated into Latin out of Arabic versions in which they had been preserved thanks to the labours of Syriac scholars who had been assiduously translating the corpus of Hellenic philosophy, mathematics, physical science, and medicine into Syriac from the original Greek since the fourth century of the Christian Era<sup>1</sup> and into Arabic, both from the earlier Syriac versions and also from the original Greek, since the ninth century.<sup>2</sup>

In mathematics, astronomy, and medicine, in contrast to philosophy and terrestrial physical science, the Syriac-speaking Nestorian Christian pupils of the Hellenes and the Arabic-speaking Muslim pupils of these Nestorian Christians had not only preserved and mastered the achievements of their Hellenic predecessors but had also taken lessons in an Indic school and had gone on to achieve original work of their own based on these Hellenic and Indic foundations. In these fields a Medieval Western Christendom took over from contemporary Muslim men of

talked to them in the prison. He made detailed inquiries as to who they were and what their native country was; and they gave him full and consecutive information about their journey. This Spaniard had a brother in the King's palace who was one of the King of the Saracens' chamberlains. So, when the governor who was consigning them to prison came to the palace, the Spaniard who had been talking to them in the prison, and the master-mariner in whose ship they had made their passage from Cyprus, presented themselves together before the King of the Saracens, whose title is *Amir al-Mu'minin*. After their case had come up for consideration, the Spaniard informed his brother of everything that the Englishmen had told him in the prison, and asked him to pass on the information to the King and to do what he could for them. Eventually all three of them together had an audience of the King and informed him *seriatim* of all the facts in the prisoners' case. The King asked them what country they came from, and they said: 'The West, where the Sun sets, is these people's home, and we do not know of any country farther west than that or of anything but open sea in that direction'. Addressing himself to the deputation, the King replied: 'Why do we have to punish them? They have committed no offence against us. Give them their visas and let them go.' Other people under detention in prison had to pay a fee, but in their case this was remitted' (*Hodoeporicon Sancti Willibaldi*, in Tobler, T., and Molinier, A. [edd.]: *Itinera Hierosolymitana et Descriptiones Terrae Sanctae Bellis Sacris Anteriora et Latina Lingua Exarata* (Geneva 1879-85, Fich, 2 vols.), vol. i, pp. 258-60).

The spirit of tolerance that is illustrated in this narrative was imported by the Primitive Muslim Arabs from Syria into Andalusia. In A.D. 785, when 'Abd-ar-Rahmān I wanted to enlarge the Mosque at Cordova, he did not confiscate, but bought, the half of the site that till then had been left to the Christians (Lévy-Provençal, *op. cit.*, p. 95). In the sixth decade of the ninth century of the Christian Era, when there was an outburst of fanatical fervour in the Christian community at Cordova, it proved as difficult to force the hand of the Umayyad authorities into bestowing the crown of martyrdom as it had been to force the Roman authorities' hand in similar circumstances seven or six centuries earlier (Lévy-Provençal, *op. cit.*, pp. 159-67). There was a statue of the Virgin Mary over the Bridge Gate of the Umayyad city of Cordova (Lévy-Provençal, *op. cit.*, p. 371), and a statue of a woman was even placed over the gate of 'Abd-ar-Rahmān III's summer palace at Madinat-az-Zahrah, on which work was started on the 19th November, 936. This second statue was removed in A.D. 1190—in an age of adversity in which a pristine tolerance was fighting a losing battle in Muslim hearts against rising feelings of resentment and apprehension (see pp. 365-6, above)—by order of the Muwshhid Berber 'liberator' of Andalusia, Ya'qūb Al-Mansūr (*ibid.*).

<sup>1</sup> See O'Leary, *op. cit.*, p. 51, and p. 408, n. 5, below.

<sup>2</sup> See Sweetman, J. W.: *Islam and Christian Theology*, Part I, vol. i (London 1945, Lutterworth Press), pp. 84-93; O'Leary, *op. cit.*, pp. 155-75; and the present Study, p. 408, n. 5. The renaissance of an Hellenic philosophy and science in a Medieval Western Christendom through an Arabic medium is examined further in X. ix. 45-47, below.



science the results of the Muslims' own researches as well as the classical Hellenic body of knowledge which the Syriac Society had preserved in an Arabic dress and the system of mathematical notation which it had acquired in India;<sup>1</sup> and, when we raise our eyes from the intellectual to the poetic plane, we shall see that, at this high level, the treasure that was acquired by a Medieval Western Christendom from the Andalusian Muslim representatives of a dying Syriac culture was a native Arab achievement which was to inspire all the subsequent achievements of a Western school of poetry down to the close of the Western Civilization's Modern Age—if it is true that the ideas and ideals, as well as the versification and rhyming, of this Western school's Provençal troubadour pioneers can be traced back to an Andalusian Muslim source.<sup>2</sup>

At the time of writing in the twentieth century of the Christian Era the body of mathematical, astronomical, and medical science which had proved so stimulating to Medieval Western minds when they had received it from the Muslim epigoni of the Nestorian pupils of the Greeks had long since been superseded in the Western World by a series of original Western discoveries which had transformed Man's vision of the Physical Universe, and a Western poetic tradition that had survived the transition from a Medieval to a Modern Age was being battered by the more violent break that the advent of a post-Modern Age had brought with it; yet, in the revolutionary dawn of this new chapter of Western history, the impact of a moribund Syriac Civilization on the youthfully impressionable imagination of a Medieval Western Christendom was still being proclaimed, with the silent eloquence of a visual testimony, in the realm of Architecture by 'Gothic' buildings which—in confutation of the misleading nickname that had been conferred on them by eighteenth-century Western antiquaries—bore on their face a patent certificate of the derivation of this Medieval Western style from models still extant in the ruins of Armenian churches at Ani and of Saljūq caravanserais on desert roads in Anatolia.

In the twentieth century the cities of Western Europe were still dominated by 'Gothic' cathedrals which had superseded their Romanesque predecessors as the result of a Medieval Western architectural revolution precipitated by the architectural impact of the Syriac World. But these medieval 'Gothic' ecclesiastical monuments of Syriac influence in the European homeland of an expanding Modern Western World's domain were not such impressive evidence—profoundly impressive though they were—as the modern Neo-Gothic 'sky-scrappers' which held their own on the sky-line of a twentieth-century New York against streamlined Towers of Babel, or as the Neo-Gothic halls and libraries and dormitories of contemporary American universities at Princeton, New Haven, and Chicago. An invading Syriac architecture's

<sup>1</sup> The names of the Transoxanian poet-philosopher-theologian-physician Abu 'Alī b. Sīnā (*vivebat* A.D. 980–1037) and the Andalusian philosopher Ibn Rushd (*vivebat* A.D. 1126–98) became household words in a Medieval Western Christendom in the outlandish distortions 'Avicenna' and 'Averroes'.

<sup>2</sup> The arguments for this derivation of the troubadours' art are set out by Christopher Dawson in an illuminating essay on 'The Origins of the Romantic Tradition' in his *Mediaeval Religion* (London 1934, Sheed and Ward), pp. 123–54.

achievement of supplanting the Romanesque style on its native Western ground in the medieval chapter of Western history was assuredly surpassed by the *tour de force* of its latter-day return to the charge in a Modern Western 'Gothic Revival' that was its successful revenge upon an ephemeral Modern Western Classical Renaissance.<sup>1</sup>

### 3. *The Medieval West and Greek Orthodox Christendom*<sup>2</sup>

While lesser Christian communities, such as the Lebanese Monothelites or the Cilician Armenian Monophysites, could reconcile themselves, albeit with a pang, to union with one of the two principal surviving Christian Churches as an alternative to the still bleaker doom of extinction, the adherents of the Eastern Orthodox and the Western Catholic Church found it more difficult to come to terms with one another than with their Muslim neighbours.

This discord between the Medieval Western Christians and their Eastern Orthodox Christian contemporaries was a consequence of the historical fact that the Hellenic Civilization had given birth to two daughter societies; for, on the morrow of their simultaneous emergence towards the close of the seventh century of the Christian Era, some five hundred years before the final breach between them in the tragic years A.D. 1182-1204,<sup>3</sup> these two Hellenistic Christian civilizations had already begun to be alienated from one another by a diversity in *êthos* and by a conflict of interests. In the course of the next five centuries the diversity in *êthos* was progressively accentuated by differences between the two sister societies' respective experiences in successive chapters of their separate histories, while the conflict of interests came to a head in a competition for political and cultural predominance in South-Eastern Europe and Southern Italy. This struggle for power was embittered by the two competing societies' rival claims each to be the sole legitimate heir of a Christian universal church, a Roman Empire, and an Hellenic Civilization which, in the last chapter of its history, had embodied itself in the Roman Empire as its universal state; for these competing ideological pretensions were ultimately irreconcilable.

The political conflict was apt to be masked under the form of ecclesiastical controversies in which questions of ritual practice and of ecclesiastical jurisdiction and discipline played a more prominent part than questions of theological doctrine.<sup>4</sup> For example, when in the eighth century the Roman See took sides, in a quarrel in Eastern Orthodox Christendom over image-worship, against the iconoclastic policy of the East Roman Imperial Government, it was declaring, on behalf of the people of the *Ducatus Romanus*, the Exarchate of Ravenna, and other

<sup>1</sup> For the archaistic revival of the 'Gothic' medieval style of architecture in the Modern West, see V. vi. 60. For the Modern Western Classical Renaissance in the realm of Architecture, see X. ix. 83-86.

<sup>2</sup> See xi, maps 33, 34, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41.

<sup>3</sup> The three atrocious acts that made the breach flagrant and irreparable were the massacre of Frankish residents in the East Roman Empire in A.D. 1182, the sack of Salonica by an avenging Norman expeditionary force in A.D. 1185, and the sack of Constantinople by a Franco-Venetian expeditionary force in A.D. 1204 ('the Fourth Crusade').

<sup>4</sup> In Eastern Orthodox Christendom 'popular interest veered from theological to liturgical issues... as early as the sixth century' (Every, G.: *The Byzantine Patriarchate, 451-1204* (London 1947, S.P.C.K.), p. 27).

then still surviving fragments of the Roman Empire in Central Italy, a political decision to look beyond the Alps, to Austrasia, for a desperately needed military protection against their aggressive Lombard neighbours which they had failed to obtain from a Transadriatic Imperial Power at Constantinople.<sup>1</sup> When Pope Nicholas I refused in A.D. 862 to recognize Photius and went on in A.D. 863 to have him condemned by a Roman synod,<sup>2</sup> and when Photius retorted by having Nicholas condemned by a Constantinopolitan synod of A.D. 867,<sup>3</sup> the two prelates were playing ecclesiastical cards in a political game in which the stakes were the future allegiance of the hitherto pagan peoples of South-Eastern Europe between Adrianople and Vienna.<sup>4</sup> When, mid-way through the eleventh century, a movement for standardizing ritual usages in the domain of the Roman See, which had been initiated in A.D. 1045 by Pope Gregory VI's appointment of Hildebrand to be his *capellanus*,<sup>5</sup> collided with a corresponding movement inaugurated in the domain of the Oecumenical Patriarchate by Michael Cerularius after his accession to the throne of the Constantinopolitan See in A.D. 1043, a liturgical conflict which caused the schism of A.D. 1054 was at the same time a political contest for the allegiance of ecclesiastical subjects of the Papacy in Southern Italy who were political subjects of the East Roman Empire.<sup>6</sup>

Though, in each of these three successive collisions, the ecclesiastical controversy masked a clash of political interests and was loaded with psychological charges of ideological animus and cultural antipathy, no one on either side on any of the three occasions seems to have been deliberately working for a breach. On the two first occasions of the three, the Papacy was tempted to exploit an opportunity for advancing its own interests which had been thrown in its way through its having been invited by one of two factions in Eastern Orthodox Christendom to intervene in a domestic quarrel within the bosom of the Eastern Orthodox Church;<sup>7</sup> and on both occasions the ecclesiastical controversy

<sup>1</sup> See IV. iv. 337 and 594-5.

<sup>2</sup> See Dvornik, F.: *The Photian Schism* (Cambridge 1948, University Press), pp. 93-98.

<sup>3</sup> See IV. iv. 379-81 and 605-10.

<sup>4</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 120-1.

<sup>5</sup> See IV. iv. 529 and 536.

<sup>6</sup> See Runciman, S.: *A History of the Crusades*, vol. i (Cambridge 1951, University Press), p. 96, and the present Study, IV. iv. 612-14. As Runciman puts it, 'the dispute was over usages; and it therefore raised the problem of the ecclesiastical frontier in Italy, a problem made more acute by the invasion of the Normans, themselves members of the Latin Church'. This was, however, only an incidental result of a policy of *Gleichschaltung* which had been aimed by Cerularius, not at the Lombard Catholic Christians in Southern Italy, who had been allowed to continue to follow the Latin rite and to remain under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Roman See after they had come under the East Roman Empire's rule at the turn of the ninth and tenth centuries (see IV. iv. 343-4 and 610-11), but at the recently annexed Gregorian Monophysite Christians in Armenia. 'His original motive was to absorb more easily the churches of the newly occupied Armenian provinces . . . But his policy affected also the Latin churches in Byzantine Italy and those that existed in Constantinople itself for the benefit of merchants, pilgrims, and soldiers of the Varangian Guard' (Runciman, *op. cit.*, p. 96).

<sup>7</sup> One of the most illuminating of the new lights in Dvornik's *The Photian Schism* is his exposition of the importance of the part played in the collision of A.D. 862-80 between Photius and the Roman See by a struggle between two factions within the Constantinopolitan Church. It was only human that the Roman See should have attempted to profit by the situation, but this was always a dangerous game for the Vatican to play in a Constantinopolitan ecclesiastical arena; for, though in domestic ecclesiastical controversies in the East Roman Empire it was an obvious recourse for a faction to appeal

between East and West was eventually composed on the basis of a tacit compromise over the underlying political conflict. When the eighth-century controversy between the Constantinopolitan Patriarchate and the Roman See was settled by the Constantinopolitan Church's repudiations of Iconoclasm in A.D. 787 and A.D. 842, the East Roman Imperial Government was acquiescing in the loss of its political sovereignty over the Ducatus Romanus and the Exarchate of Ravenna, while the Roman See was acquiescing in the loss of its ecclesiastical sovereignty over the 'toe' and 'heel' of Italy, as well as over Sicily and the Praetorian Prefecture of Illyricum. When the ninth-century controversy was settled in A.D. 879-80, the Constantinopolitan Patriarchate was acquiescing in the loss of its mission-field in Moravia, and the Roman See in the defeat of its hopes of acquiring jurisdiction over Bulgaria.

The reconciliation between the Roman and the Constantinopolitan Church in A.D. 879-88 would become easier to understand if it should prove that, contrary to the traditional reading of the historical evidence, the Photian Synod of Constantinople in A.D. 867 did not, after all, either explicitly denounce the Western Church for having interpolated the *filioque* clause in the Creed<sup>1</sup> or explicitly deny the Roman See's primacy over other patriarchal churches.<sup>2</sup> However that may be, there appears to be no doubt that in A.D. 1054 the ecclesiastical combatants on both sides exercised some self-restraint in refraining from aggravating a new breach by making theological denunciations against one another. The bull excommunicating the Oecumenical Patriarch Michael Cerularius and his advisers, which the departing Papal legates left on the altar of St. Sophia at Constantinople in that unhappy year, expressly admitted the orthodoxy of the Byzantine Church,<sup>3</sup> and the Constantinopolitan synod convened by Cerularius condemned, in its counterblast, the bull, the interpolation of the *filioque* clause in the creed, and the persecution of married clergy without expressly attaching to the Roman Church the responsibility for these offences.<sup>4</sup> In whatever ratios the responsibility for the breach in A.D. 1054 is to be apportioned between the Oecumenical Patriarch and the three Papal legates, it is clear that it was deplored by a majority on both sides. Occurring, as it did, at a moment when the Vatican and the East Roman Government had a common political interest in checking the conquests of the Normans in Southern Italy at the

to the Vatican when their opponents had outmanoeuvred them on the home front by securing the support of the East Roman Imperial Government, the warring Byzantine ecclesiastical factions were apt to close their ranks when their dissension manifestly threatened to jeopardize some vital East Roman interest. Ignatius, for example, who owed his reinstatement on the Patriarchal throne at Constantinople to the Roman See's intervention on his behalf, proved as unwilling as his deposed rival Photius had been to resign Bulgaria to the Roman See's jurisdiction (Dvornik, *op. cit.*, pp. 151-8); and a reconciliation between Ignatians and Photians circa A.D. 876 (Dvornik, *op. cit.*, pp. 169-71) prepared the way for the reconciliation in A.D. 879-80 between the Roman See and a Constantinopolitan Church that was now reunited under the presidency of a Photius who had been reinstated on the Patriarchal throne. Such experiences taught Eastern Orthodox Christendom that its domestic dissensions were an aggressive-minded Roman See's temptations and opportunities; and the feud between Photians and Ignatians, as well as the subsequent feud between Nicolaitans and Euthymians (see IV. iv. 598-9), was solemnly consigned to oblivion at synods held in Constantinople in A.D. 920 and A.D. 991 (Dvornik, *op. cit.*, p. 434).

<sup>1</sup> See Dvornik, *op. cit.*, pp. 122-3.

<sup>2</sup> See Runciman, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

<sup>3</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 123-9.

<sup>4</sup> See *ibid.*

expense of both these Powers, the ecclesiastical breach was deprecated by both of them for political reasons; and on both sides, for the next 150 years, responsible churchmen did their best at least to prevent the breach from widening, in so far as they were unable to ignore its existence.

'The churches of Alexandria and Jerusalem had taken no part in the episode. The Patriarch of Antioch, Peter III, definitely thought that Cerularius had been unnecessarily difficult. His church had continued to commemorate the Pope's name in its diptychs, and he saw no reason why that practice should cease . . . He could not support the standardization of ritual and usage; for his diocese contained churches where a Syrian liturgy was in use, and many of them lay beyond the political frontiers of the Empire. He could not have enforced uniformity there, even had he desired it. He kept himself outside of the quarrel.'<sup>1</sup>

The nearest neighbour to Western Christendom among the Eastern Orthodox Churches that, in the eleventh century, were independent of the Patriarchate of Constantinople was the autonomous Archbishopric of Ochrida,<sup>2</sup> and at some date between A.D. 1090 and A.D. 1095, with an eye to the current negotiations on the eve of the First Crusade, the incumbent of this see, Archbishop Theophylact, published a treatise minimizing the seriousness of the differences in ritual and theology between the Eastern Orthodox Churches and the Roman Church.<sup>3</sup> At the turn of the years A.D. 1097-8, when the Crusaders were threatened with famine under the walls of Antioch, the reigning Patriarch of Jerusalem, Symeon II, who had published a temperately worded treatise against the Latin rite, provisioned the Crusading Army from Cyprus, where he was a refugee; and this practical demonstration of goodwill was reciprocated in the policy followed by Adhemar, Bishop of Le Puy, Pope Urban II's legate *auprès* the Crusaders.<sup>4</sup> After the capture of Antioch by the Crusaders on the 3rd June, 1098, 'the Patriarch John was released from his prison and replaced on the patriarchal throne. John was a Greek, who disliked the Latin rite; but he was the legitimate patriarch of a see still in full communion with Rome. Adhemar was certainly not going to offend against legitimacy and local sentiment by ignoring his rights.'<sup>5</sup> No doubt he would have gone on to reinstate Symeon on the patriarchal throne of Jerusalem if he and Symeon had lived to see the capture of Jerusalem in A.D. 1099.

The spirit shown by the Papal legate<sup>6</sup> and the Patriarchs of Jerusalem and Antioch during the First Crusade was not confined to ecclesiastics.

<sup>1</sup> Runciman, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

<sup>2</sup> See IV. iv. 394, n. 1.

<sup>3</sup> See Every, *op. cit.*, p. 177; Runciman, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

<sup>4</sup> See Runciman, S.: 'Adhemar of Le Puy and the Eastern Churches', in *Actes du VI<sup>e</sup> Congrès International d'Études Byzantines*, vol. i (Paris 1951).

<sup>5</sup> Runciman: *A History of the Crusades*, vol. i, p. 237.

<sup>6</sup> Adhemar's goodwill shines by contrast with the rancour shown, 130 years earlier, by Bishop Liutprand of Cremona, in his report to the West Roman Emperor Otto II on his diplomatic mission to Constantinople in A.D. 968-9. In discussing the meaning of a prophecy in the third-century Christian Father Hippolytus's *De Antichristo*, Liutprand rejects with vigour the Byzantine interpretation, current in his day, that Hippolytus was foreshadowing an *union sacrée* of Eastern Orthodox and Western Catholic Christendom against Islam in Africa, and offers, as his own, the alternative interpretation of a joint victory of Otto I and Otto II over Nikiphoros Phokas (Liutprand of Cremona: *Relatio de Legatione Constantinopolitana*, chaps. 40-41).



The reigning East Roman Emperor Alexius I Comnenus, on whom the passage of the First Crusade through his dominions inflicted extreme political anxiety and personal discomfort,<sup>1</sup> is credited by his daughter the historian Anna Comnena with a scrupulous reluctance, even under severe provocation, to authorize his troops to shed their Western fellow Christians' blood. The Emperor, as Anna presents him, is determined to avoid 'civil war' between the representatives of the two branches of the Christian community,<sup>2</sup> and, when the clash becomes unavoidable, he instructs his archers to aim at the Franks' horses in order to break their charge without taking Christian lives.<sup>3</sup> Later on, Alexius instructs the governor-general of Durazzo to cite the moral obligation deriving from a common Christianity as his ground for responding favourably to Bohemond's overtures for the restoration of a peace which Bohemond himself has treacherously broken.<sup>4</sup> Again, one of the motives attributed to Alexius by Anna for his policy of sending East Roman forces to convoy the Crusaders across Anatolia is a concern to save fellow Christians from being cut to pieces by the Turks.<sup>5</sup> Anna's husband Nikiphóros Vryénnios, whose *Histories* she continued after his death, records that his father-in-law, in his campaign, before his accession to the imperial throne, against the Norman military adventurer Russell, who was trying to carve a principality for himself out of the East Roman Empire's Armeniac army-corps district,<sup>6</sup> took pains to capture Russell's rebel Frankish troopers alive, because he had a scruple against killing enemies who were his fellow Christians.<sup>7</sup>

In the history of the Comnenian Dynasty's relations with the Frankish trespassers on Orthodox Christian ground, the wry-faced forbearance practised by the Emperor Alexius I (*imperabat* A.D. 1081-1118) was to be transformed, in the attitude of his grandson and second successor the Emperor Manuel I (*imperabat* A.D. 1143-80), into a positive passion for Frankish comrades and customs;<sup>8</sup> and in the twelfth century, as in the eleventh, there were clerics on both sides, as well as secular statesmen on the East Roman side, who were concerned to avert a breach between the two Christendoms. Though at Antioch, under the rule of the Norman Bohemond, who was an implacable enemy of the East Roman Empire, the invading Latin clergy began, on the morrow of Bishop Adhemar's death on the 1st August, 1098, to oust the Greek clergy from the diocese, and drove the reinstated Greek Patriarch John first into resigning and then into emigrating within two years of the Latin occupation,<sup>9</sup> the Latin successors of the Greek Patriarch of Jerusalem, Symeon II, justified their claim to be his legitimate heirs by their good treatment of Eastern Orthodox Christian residents and pilgrims in their patriarchate, and here, under this liberal dispensation, intercommunion between Latins and Eastern Orthodox seems to have been common in the twelfth

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 390-2, below.

<sup>2</sup> See Anna Comnena: *Alexiad*, edited by Reifferscheid, A. (Leipzig 1884, Teubner, 2 vols.), Book X, chap. 9.

<sup>3</sup> See *Alexiad*, Book XIII, chap. 9.

<sup>5</sup> See *Alexiad*, Book XIV, chap. 2.

<sup>6</sup> See p. 357, n. 3, above, and p. 389, n. 1, below.

<sup>7</sup> See Vryénnios, N.: *Histories*, ed. by Meineke, A. (Bonn 1836, Weber), p. 85.

<sup>8</sup> See pp. 392-3, below.

<sup>9</sup> See Every, *op. cit.*, pp. 162-3.

century.<sup>1</sup> Circa A.D. 1107-11, in a letter instructing the Benedictine community in Constantinople not to yield to the Oecumenical Patriarch's exhortations to them to conform to the Eastern Orthodox rite, the Abbot of Monte Cassino, Bruno of Asti, qualified his insistence on the distinction between the two rites by reminding his correspondents 'that, although the customs of the churches are distinct, nevertheless there is one faith, indissolubly united to the head, that is Christ, and that He Himself is one and remains the same in His body'.<sup>2</sup>

In A.D. 1190, after the massacre of the Franks in the East Roman Empire in A.D. 1182 and the Norman sack of Salonica in A.D. 1185, the Eastern Orthodox titular Patriarch of Antioch, Theodore Balsamon, ruled, in answer to an inquiry from the Eastern Orthodox Patriarch of Alexandria, whose church had been accustomed to give communion to Latin prisoners-of-war held by the Muslim rulers of Egypt, that 'no Latins should be communicated with unless they first declare that they will abstain from their doctrines and customs and be in subjection to the canons, and be made like unto the Orthodox'.<sup>3</sup> Yet, even after the sack of Constantinople in A.D. 1204 in 'the Fourth Crusade', the Metropolitan of Ochrida Dhimitrios Khomatinós (*fungebatur* A.D. 1207-22) noted<sup>4</sup> that Balsamon's opinion was criticized by many Eastern Orthodox authorities 'as showing too great harshness and bitterness, and an unjustifiable tone, in blaming the Latin forms and customs, "because all this", they said, "has never been decreed synodically, nor have they ever been rejected as heretics, but both eat with us and pray with us"'.<sup>5</sup>

According to Runciman,<sup>6</sup> while the schism dates from A.D. 1100 in the Church of Antioch, in the Church of Jerusalem it dates only from some time after (though not long after) A.D. 1187, and in the Church of Constantinople only from A.D. 1204, 'when the Frankish conquerors appointed a Latin patriarch, ignoring the legitimate patriarch, John Camaterus'.

Why was it, then, that a breach between the two Christendoms, which had been staved off for the best part of five hundred years by the efforts of clerics and laymen of good will on both sides, came to pass, after all, in the years A.D. 1182-1204, and thereafter widened until in the fifteenth century the Eastern Orthodox Christians eventually opted for submission to a Muslim Ottoman Pādishāh's political dominion in preference to accepting a Western Christian Pope's ecclesiastical supremacy?<sup>6</sup> In the last act of this tragedy the immediate stumbling-blocks were

<sup>1</sup> See Every, *op. cit.*, pp. 159-62. First-hand evidence of this is to be found in the Russian Abbot Daniel's description of the celebration of Easter at Jerusalem in A.D. 1107 (see the English translation of his narrative (London 1888, Palestine Pilgrims' Text Society), pp. 74-82). Daniel was allowed by King Baldwin ('he knew me and liked me, being a man of great kindness and humility') to place his lamp on the Holy Sepulchre, in the name of All Russia, to be kindled by the Holy Light. He was allowed to place it on the tomb itself, beside the lamp of the Greeks and the lamp of the Monastery of St. Sabbas, whereas the Franks' lamps were merely suspended above and did not take light on this occasion.

<sup>2</sup> Migne: *Patrologia Latina*, vol. clxvi, cols. 1085-90, cited by Every, *op. cit.*, pp. 167-8.

<sup>3</sup> Migne: *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. cxxxviii, col. 967, cited by Every, *op. cit.*, p. 165.

<sup>4</sup> See Migne: *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. cxix, cols. 956-60, cited *ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> 'Adhemar of Le Puy and the Eastern Churches', p. 331.

<sup>6</sup> See pp. 151-2, above.

manifestly Western Christendom's obstinate insistence on dictating terms of ecclesiastical union that stamped Eastern Orthodox Christendom as her inferior, and her no less persistent unwillingness to sweeten this bitter pill by guaranteeing to the East Roman Imperial Government, as a *quid pro quo*, that effective military aid would in fact be forthcoming from the West if the East Roman political authorities were unexpectedly to succeed in inducing their clergy and people to follow their own heroic example in resigning themselves to the acceptance of such humiliating ecclesiastical conditions. The ultimate cause of the catastrophe is, however, perhaps to be found in a progressive divergence between the two cultures, in points of *ethos* and way of life, which had begun to show itself seven hundred, or even a thousand, years earlier, and which is illustrated on the ecclesiastical plane by the differentiation between the Greek and Latin rites; for this diversity stimulated an antipathy that increased *pari passu* with it. An aggravating circumstance was the sudden, unexpected, and sensational reversal of the two sister Christian societies' relative strengths and prospects in the eleventh century.<sup>1</sup>

One of the consequences of this political and economic *peripeteia* was that, from that time onwards, either party presented an insufferable appearance in the other party's eyes. In the sight of the Eastern Orthodox Christians the Franks were now parvenus who were cynically exploiting a superiority in brute force which had been undeservedly conferred upon them by a preposterous latter-day freak of Fortune. In the sight of the Western Christians the Byzantines were now mandarins whose overweening pretensions were neither justified by merit nor backed by force. To the Franks it seemed as monstrous that the Byzantines should expect them to feel honoured at being given the opportunity of pulling Greek chestnuts out of a Turkish fire as it seemed monstrous to the Byzantines that the Franks should take advantage of the exhaustion of an East Roman Empire which had spent its strength in bearing the brunt of a battle in a common cause against a Muslim aggressor who was a menace to Eastern and Western Christendom alike.

From the Eastern Orthodox Christian standpoint the eleventh-century reversal of the relation between the two Christendoms was an inexcusable practical joke which a Byzantine pedant's literary conceit might debit euphemistically to Clio, the pagan Hellenic Muse of History, as an ingenious way out of the blasphemy of ascribing to the presumably Orthodox God of Constantine and Justinian and Basil the Bulgar-Slayer a *gaffe* which was not only supremely unjust but was also in excruciatingly bad taste. In the preceding age the spectacle of a Western Christendom wallowing in a poverty and an impotence which were the wages of a sinful inclination towards Barbarism had been not unpleasing for a Byzantine statesman or scholar to contemplate. The contrast between his Latin poor relation's misery and his own comparative state of blessedness in This Life had given him the same sense of satisfaction and self-assurance that either breed of Christian would have felt in that epoch when he imagined himself in the Life to Come leaning over the

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 351-2, above.

balustrade of Heaven and feasting his eyes on the tortures of damned personal acquaintances in Hell.

As an early-eleventh-century Byzantine student of history might have seen it, his Latin contemporaries were then justly still being punished for the sins of forefathers who, in the fifth century of the Christian Era, had committed the moral and aesthetic solecism of parting company with their fellow Orthodox Christians and fellow Roman citizens in the Greek-speaking core of an Hellenic World embodied in the Roman Empire, in order to fraternize with North European barbarians by whom the Latin-speaking western fringes of the Roman Empire were being overrun. From the Byzantine point of view the fifth-century breakdown in those Latin-speaking provinces had revealed culpable incompetence in so far as it had been involuntary, as well as culpable disloyalty in so far as it had been the expression of a preference for chastisement by barbarian warlords' whips to chastisement by imperial tax-collectors' scorpions. Yet, in the sequel, the tribulation which the Latin secessionists from Civilization had brought upon themselves—and had duly continued to bring upon themselves in the ludicrously disastrous aftermath of Charlemagne's naively presumptuous usurpation of the Roman Imperial Crown—was a punishment that had gratifyingly fitted their crime, while on the other hand their secession, offensive though it might be, had not inflicted any appreciable material damage upon the intact Greek core of Romania and Christendom. Indeed, if the implicit offence to Byzantium's *amour propre* and the impalpable damage to her prestige could legitimately be discounted, she might consider that she was positively the gainer in being relieved of responsibility for a backward Latin fringe that had never been more than an excrescence on the body social of the Hellenic Society and had latterly become not merely an excrescence but an incubus.

This imaginary early-eleventh-century Byzantine appreciation of the relations between Eastern Orthodox Christendom and the West up to date would have required a painfully drastic revision before the century was over. A comfortable attitude of meritorious and unchallengeable superiority could now no longer plausibly be maintained towards once poor relations who, overnight, had become *nouveaux riches*; and the worst of it was that, all along, these Latin barbarians beyond the Byzantine earthly paradise's pale had been in possession of one ecclesiastical and cultural asset whose supreme value the East Romans could not dispute without impugning the title on which they based their own claim to be the exclusive Heirs of the Promise of Hellenism and Christianity.

The Old Rome on the banks of the Tiber might be held to have forfeited her political primacy to a New Rome, set on the shores of a mightier stream, whose geographically manifest destiny to become the capital of the World had been fulfilled by the historic act, and consecrated by the immense authority, of the first Christian Roman Emperor. Yet neither Constantine's august genius nor Poseidon's masterly creation of the Bosphorus by a god's mighty trident-stroke<sup>1</sup> could undo the historic fact that the site of the Old Rome, however woefully devastated

<sup>1</sup> See II. i. 325-6.

it might be in terms of human power and pride,<sup>1</sup> was eternally hallowed by the presence of the mortal remains of the two arch-apostles, Peter and Paul, who had come to Rome to be martyred there owing to the accident that this demi-Hellenic Central Italian town happened to be the political capital of the World in the Apostles day.<sup>2</sup> The numinous mana of a Rome that was the sepulchre of Peter and Paul had retained all the potency bequeathed by this second pair of discordant founders when the volatile political power of the pagan Rome of Romulus and Remus had ebbed away to Nicomedia and Constantinople and Milan and Ravenna and Trier and Aachen. On the political plane a medieval Rome had been degraded from being *caput mundi* to becoming a derelict frontier-post on the borderline between two rival Christendoms; but in the course of the eighth century of the Christian Era this ruin that had become a political liability had passed out of East Roman into Frankish hands, and in consequence the earthly representative of the Prince of the Apostles had become the President of a Western Christian commonwealth instead of remaining an East Roman subject. The Eastern Patriarchates might wince at being required to recognize the Papacy's supremacy, but it was difficult for them to deny that the Pope was at any rate *primus inter pares* in the light of the Papacy's indisputably decisive role in determining the acts of oecumenical councils, culminating in the Council of Chalcedon, whose findings were the foundations of Eastern Orthodox, as well as Western Catholic, theology.

Nor was the Papacy's eminence merely an echo of ancient history; it was also a portentous living fact, as the East Roman Imperial Government had discovered through a costly experiment on the occasion of the controversy over images in the eighth century. The Vatican had then proved no longer amenable to the harsh political discipline which the Emperor Justinian I had applied to Popes Silverius and Vigilius and the Emperor Constans II to Pope Martin I,<sup>3</sup> and thereafter the East Roman Imperial Government showed its flair for political realities by steadily insisting, sometimes in the teeth of opposition on the part of at least one faction in the Eastern Orthodox Church, upon treating the Papacy with the tactful consideration which it was only politic to show to a Great Power.<sup>4</sup> The East Roman Government constantly pursued this conciliatory policy towards the Vatican from the time of the conflict between Pope Nicholas I and the Oecumenical Patriarch Photius (*flagrabat* A.D. 862<sup>5</sup>-80<sup>6</sup>) down to the capture of Constantinople by the 'Osmanlis in A.D. 1453;<sup>7</sup> but, though the policy was never abandoned, the fateful

<sup>1</sup> See the passage quoted from a sermon of Gregory the Great's in IV. iv. 60-61 and VII. vii. 553.

<sup>2</sup> 'Non est a Graecis Romanus vilis tenendus locus quia recessit inde imperator Constantinus, verum eo magis colendus, venerandus, adorandus quia venerunt illuc Apostoli, doctores sancti, Petrus et Paulus' (Liutprand of Cremona: *Relatio de Legatione Constantinopolitana*, chap. lxii).

<sup>3</sup> See IV. iv. 337. The East Roman Government ought to have taken warning from the failure of its attempt in A.D. 693 to deal with Pope Sergius I as it had dealt with Pope Martin I in A.D. 653.

<sup>4</sup> See IV. iv. 604-16.

<sup>5</sup> See Dvornik, F.: *The Photian Schism* (Cambridge 1948, University Press), pp. 94-95.

<sup>6</sup> See *ibid.*, chap. 6, pp. 159-201.

<sup>7</sup> No particularly remarkable statesmanship was required to inspire the eleventh-hour attempts of the later Palaiologhi to come to terms with the Vatican at the price of



breach between the Oecumenical Patriarch and the Vatican in A.D. 1054 marked the beginning of the end of its effectiveness. Down to that date the East Roman Imperial Government had usually proved strong enough to impose its philopapal will on an antipapal faction in the Eastern Orthodox Church; from Cerularius's day onwards this faction in the Eastern Orthodox Church usually proved strong enough, when it chose, to repudiate and thereby nullify successive ententes between the East Roman Imperial Government and the Papacy.<sup>1</sup>

The more and more fanatically intransigent opposition to an ecclesiastical reunion with Rome which was displayed by the clergy and people of Eastern Orthodox Christendom after the final breach in A.D. 1182-1204 was the effect, not only of a reversal of fortune, but also of an increasing cultural antipathy which was reciprocated by a contemporaneous increase in the corresponding hostile feelings on the Western Christian side. In Byzantine eyes the Franks were impertinent, unmannerly, and truculent; in Frankish eyes the Byzantines were pretentious, pedantic, and perfidious. Out of the copious medieval Greek and Latin literature illustrating the Franks' and Byzantines' unedifying mutual dislike and hostility, we must be content in this place to cite a few illuminating passages from one representative spokesman on either side. As evidence of the Franks' prejudice against the Byzantines we may quote a report<sup>2</sup> by the Lombard bishop Liutprand of Cremona (*vivebat circa* A.D. 920-72) on a diplomatic mission to the East Roman Imperial Court at Constantinople which he had carried out on behalf of his Saxon master the West Roman Emperor Otto II in A.D. 968-9, when the East Roman Empire was at its zenith.<sup>3</sup> As evidence of the Byzantine

acknowledging the ecclesiastical supremacy of the Papacy over the Eastern Orthodox Churches. The breach of all diplomatic precedent that was committed by the Emperor John Palaiologhōs I in A.D. 1369, when he paid a personal visit to Pope Urban V at Rome as a suppliant, was prompted by the no less unprecedented change for the worse in the military and political situation of a precariously restored East Roman Empire since the reduction of Constantinople to an enclave, entirely surrounded by Ottoman territory, as a result of Sultan Murād I's conquest of Adrianople in A.D. 1361. The Emperor Manuel Palaiologhōs's visit to the Courts of France and England in A.D. 1400-2 was similarly prompted by the permanent blockade to which Constantinople had been subjected by Sultan Bāyezid I since A.D. 1391, and the Emperor John Palaiologhōs II's visit to Italy in A.D. 1437-9, which bore fruit in the negotiation of the ecclesiastical Union of Florence, by a lively fear of a repetition of the abortive siege of Constantinople by Sultan Murād II in A.D. 1422. On the other hand, when the founder of the dynasty, the Emperor Michael Palaiologhōs, had negotiated the first of the series of ecclesiastical unions in A.D. 1274 (see IV. iv. 615-16), the antecedent event that had prompted him had not been a disaster, but had been the brilliant success of his capture of Constantinople from the last of the usurping Latin emperors in A.D. 1261. Michael's concern was, not to retrieve a misfortune, but to forestall a *revanche*; and, in taking so momentous a step before being forced to take it by accomplished facts, he was showing vision as well as courage of the highest order.

<sup>1</sup> For the change in the Balance of Power between the East Roman Imperial Government and the Orthodox Church, to the Church's advantage, in and after the eleventh century of the Christian Era, see IV. iv. 612-23.

<sup>2</sup> *Liutprandi Relatio de Legatione Constantinopolitana*.

<sup>3</sup> This was not Liutprand's only excursion on to Orthodox Christian ground. One of his earliest undertakings as a young man had been a mission to Constantinople in A.D. 949 (*imperante Constantino VII Porphyrogenito*) on behalf of the North Italian prince Berengar of Ivrea (*Liutprandi Opera*, edited by Becker, J.: 3rd ed. (Hanover and Leipzig 1915, Hahn), p. viii), and he may also have been a member of the mission sent to Constantinople by Otto II in A.D. 971 (*ibid.*, p. xii). A brief and, on the whole, courteous account of the mission of A.D. 949 is given by Liutprand in his history of his own times (*Antapodosis*, Book VI, chaps. 3-10).

prejudice against the Franks, we may quote the Greek princess-historian Anna Comnena's history of the reign of her father the East Roman Emperor Alexius I (*imperabat* A.D. 1081-1118), who became disagreeably well acquainted with the Franks through having to cope first with the Normans' attempt to conquer the East Roman Empire in the war of A.D. 1081-5 and then with the Crusaders' transit across his dominions in A.D. 1096-7—a visitation which caused the Emperor more anxiety than the Normans' previous undisguised aggression, since the foiled but impenitent Norman aggressors were now claiming readmittance, in the company of a host of adventurers recruited from other Western Christian barbarian tribes, in the novel and unconvincing guise of the East Romans' allies and champions.

Bishop Liutprand's official anxieties and adversities in the difficult diplomatic task with which he had been entrusted were aggravated by his personal disgust with all the incidental details of daily life in the Orthodox Christendom of his day. The palace assigned to him was so inconsiderately exposed to the elements that it was always either too hot or too cold.<sup>1</sup> What hateful quarters!<sup>2</sup> And they were so far from the Emperor's palace—to which he was made to walk, and was not allowed to ride—that he always arrived out of breath.<sup>3</sup> In these odious apartments the Ambassador and his suite were kept insulated by security police.<sup>4</sup> Even his Greek-speaking dragoman was not allowed out to buy provisions, and he had to send to market a cook who knew no Greek and who was shamelessly cheated over the purchases which he was forced to make by dumb-show.<sup>5</sup> The pitch and gypsum with which the Greek wine provided for him was doctored made it undrinkable,<sup>6</sup> and drinking-water could not be had except for cash.<sup>7</sup> As for the food, it was as horrid as the wine and as scarce and expensive<sup>8</sup> as the water. The Lombard bishop could not stomach the highly seasoned fare that was served to him at the East Roman imperial table;<sup>9</sup> but he also disdained the plain Greek biscuit (*paxinádhi*) which was all that the poverty-stricken eunuch-bishop of Lefkádha had to offer him<sup>10</sup> ('in the whole of Greece', Liutprand declares, 'I have not found one single hospitable bishop').<sup>11</sup> In the hateful quarters in the capital the officer responsible for providing Liutprand and his party with their daily subsistence allowance was a devil.<sup>12</sup> The beds, too, were stone-hard, without mattress or pillow.<sup>13</sup> The Emperor's procession to celebrate the opening of a new regnal year was tawdry.<sup>14</sup> In short, every one of the Ambassador's 120 days<sup>15</sup> in the New Rome was a torment,<sup>16</sup> and, after taking a school-boy's revenge on his hosts by scrawling a screed of abusive Latin hexameters on the walls and table,<sup>17</sup> he rejoiced to see the last of 'that once opulent and flourishing but now famine-stricken, perjured, lying, deceitful, rapacious, covetous, miserly, empty-headed city'<sup>18</sup>—only to suffer a further martyrdom on a

<sup>1</sup> *Legatio*, chap. 1.<sup>2</sup> Chaps. 1, 26, and 29.<sup>3</sup> Chap. 1.<sup>4</sup> Chap. 63.<sup>5</sup> Chaps. 9-10.<sup>6</sup> Chaps. 1 and 46.<sup>7</sup> Chap. 58.<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, chaps. 13, 19, and 24.<sup>9</sup> Chap. 46.<sup>10</sup> Chaps. 34 and 44.<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*<sup>12</sup> Chap. 1.<sup>13</sup> 4th June to 2nd October, A.D. 968.<sup>14</sup> Chap. 57.<sup>15</sup> Chap. 1.<sup>16</sup> Chaps. 1 and 13.<sup>17</sup> Chaps. 20 and 32.<sup>18</sup> Chap. 13.

seven-weeks' journey' overland from Constantinople to Lepanto<sup>2</sup> in which he had to pay an exorbitant price to his courier (*dhiasóstis*) for the hire of pack-horses which the Imperial Government had omitted to provide.<sup>3</sup>

Equally exasperating—and this to both parties—were the chronic disputes over childish points of protocol which exacerbated Byzantino-Frankish relations for centuries. Liutprand was indignant with the Emperor Nikiphóros's brother, the Kouropalátis and Grand Logothete Leo, for referring to Liutprand's own master, Otto, not as 'emperor' (*Βασιλεὺς*) but as 'king' (*ῥήξ*),<sup>4</sup> while Nikiphóros spoke with displeasure of Otto's 'intolerable, unmentionable' presumption in styling himself 'emperor'.<sup>5</sup> The East Roman Imperial Court was still more incensed when a mission arrived from the Pope of the day<sup>6</sup> bearing a letter addressed to 'the Emperor of the Greeks'.<sup>7</sup> Questions of precedence proved as painful as questions of style and title. After having been seated fifteen places away from the Emperor at one banquet,<sup>8</sup> Liutprand left the room when, at another banquet, he found himself placed below a Bulgar envoy 'with his head cropped like a Hungarian and a brass chain doing duty for a belt'. Kouropalátis Leo and First Secretary Simeon ran after the retreating Ambassador shouting at him that the Bulgarian envoy enjoyed precedence over all other foreign ambassadors by treaty right, and that the present envoy, in spite of his cropped head, unwashed body, and brass chain, was nevertheless a patrician and must therefore take precedence over a bishop—particularly over a bishop who was also a Frank. They would not allow Liutprand to come back, but dismissed him to take his dinner in the servants' hall;<sup>9</sup> and another time, on a hunting party, they dismissed him from the imperial park for his breach of etiquette in wearing a cap instead of a hat in the Emperor's presence.<sup>10</sup> Before the ambassador's departure from Constantinople, the imperial authorities gave him a further lesson in the low esteem in which they held the Franks by compulsorily repurchasing from him five purple robes of state which Liutprand had bought during his stay in Constantinople but which the authorities now declared to be of the category scheduled as 'too good for export' (*κωλυόμενα*).<sup>11</sup>

Liutprand's conversations with the Emperor Nikiphóros and his ministers were enlivened on both sides by sallies that were occasionally pointed but more often merely vituperative.<sup>12</sup> Liutprand's own most telling shot was that 'it was the Greeks who bred heresies, and the Westerners who killed them';<sup>13</sup> and at a state banquet on the 7th June, 968, the inflammatory word 'Romans' kindled into flame the perpetually

<sup>2</sup> 1 and October to 20th November, A.D. 968.

<sup>3</sup> Chap. 57.

<sup>4</sup> Chap. 2.

<sup>5</sup> Chap. 25.

<sup>2</sup> Chap. 58.

<sup>6</sup> Chaps. 47 and 50.

<sup>7</sup> Chap. 47. When the East Roman officials took Liutprand to task over this, he gave them, according to his own account, the following malicious explanation: 'The Pope, in his noble simplicity, was intending to pay the Emperor a compliment, and not to insult him, by giving him this title. We are well aware that Constantine the Emperor of the Romans came here with the Roman Army and founded this city that is named after him; but, since you have changed your language, your manners and customs, and your dress, His Holiness inferred that you disliked being called Romans as much as you disliked wearing Roman clothes' (chap. 51).

<sup>8</sup> Chap. 11.

<sup>9</sup> Chap. 19.

<sup>10</sup> Chap. 37.

<sup>11</sup> Chaps. 53–55.

<sup>12</sup> See, for example, chaps. 37, 45, and 53.

<sup>13</sup> Chap. 22.

smouldering resentment between the representatives of the two Christendoms.

'Nikiphóros refused to give me a chance of replying to him, and added insultingly: "You are not Romans; you are Lombards!" He wanted to go on, and motioned to me to be silent, but I lost my temper and took the floor. "It is a notorious historical fact," I declared, "that Romulus, after whom the Romans are called, was a fratricide and a son of a whore—born, I mean, out of lawful wedlock—and that he set up an Alsatia for defaulting debtors, fugitive slaves, murderers, and perpetrators of other capital offences. He harboured these criminals, collected a crowd of them, and called them "Romans". This is the fine aristocracy from which your emperors, or κοσμοκράτορες as you call them, are descended. But we—and by "us" I mean us Lombards, Saxons, Frenchmen, Lorrainers, Bavarians, Swabians, Burgundians—we despise the Romans so utterly that, when we lose our tempers with our enemies, the one word "Roman!" is all that we have to utter, because, in our parlance, this single bad name embraces the whole gamut of meanness, cowardice, avarice, decadence, untruthfulness and all the other vices.'

Out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh,<sup>2</sup> and, in provoking Liutprand into losing his temper, Nikiphóros had stung his Latin guest into proclaiming his sense of solidarity with his Teutonic-speaking fellow Westerners in a common antipathy against all 'Romans'. In a later and more genial conversation at the imperial dinner table, Nikiphóros used the word 'Franks' to include Latins as well as Teutons;<sup>3</sup> and this usage had been justified in advance by Liutprand's revealing outburst. Though Liutprand was a Latin of the Latins in his intellectual culture—being as well versed as any Western scholar of his day in the Latin version of the classical Hellenic literature—a common Hellenic cultural background had not bred in Liutprand's heart any feeling of affinity with the contemporary Greek heirs of the same Hellenic heritage. Between this tenth-century Italian and these tenth-century Greeks a great emotional gulf was already fixed, whereas there was no gulf of the kind between Liutprand and his Saxon employers—whose kinsman he instinctively felt himself to be, in virtue of his own Lombard descent and Teutonic name, though his intrusive barbarian ancestors had not taken long to make themselves at home in Italy by forgetting how to speak their original Teutonic mother tongue. From the Byzantine standpoint this incurably barbarian-hearted Latin was a renegade from the Hellenic culture into which he had been initiated (even though only at second hand); and, at the first audience given to Liutprand by Niki-

<sup>1</sup> Chap. 12. The contempt which Liutprand professed to feel for 'Romans' was felt by the East Roman Court for the City of Rome, in contrast to Constantinople. "Look here", they said: "This fatuous, vulgar Pope of yours is ignorant of the historic fact that His Sacred Majesty Constantine transferred the imperial sceptre from Rome to this city—and, with it, all the Senate and the whole of the Roman Army—and left at Rome nothing but vile bodies: creatures such as fishermen, pimps, fowlers, bastards, proletarians and slaves!" (ibid., chap. 51). Presumably they forgot, in making this *extempore* exposition of the Byzantine case, that one of the fishermen whom Constantine had left behind in the Old Rome had been no less a person than the Prince of the Apostles. Presumably, too, this crushing retort did not occur to Liutprand either; for, if he had thought of it, he would certainly have put it on record.

<sup>2</sup> Matt. xii. 34.

<sup>3</sup> See *Legatio*, chap. 33.

phóros, the Emperor did not hesitate to accuse the Ambassador of having been sent by his Saxon employer Otto as a spy.<sup>1</sup>

Liutprand took his revenge by painting a verbal portrait of the Emperor—in a document that would never reach Nikiphóros's eyes and in a language that he did not understand—which was as unflattering as malice could make it.

"The man is a freak, a dwarf, with a great fat head and little mole's eyes. He is disfigured by a stubby, broad, thick, piebald beard sprouting from a neck as thin as my finger. He has a porcine mop of bristly hair, and he is as black as a nigger—"the sort of fellow you would not care to meet after dark".<sup>2</sup> He is pot-bellied, lean in the backside, too long in the thigh for so short a man, but also too spindly in the shanks. His heels stick out as far as his toes. He wears an old shabby linen uniform, dirty and faded with age, and women's shoes (*sicyoniis calceamentis*). He has a wagging tongue, a foxy character, and the unscrupulous untruthfulness of a Ulysses."<sup>3</sup>

This portrait is a recognizable caricature of authentic descriptions and pictures of Nikiphóros;<sup>4</sup> and it is also true that the Emperor's own countrymen, as well as the Lombard stranger, were apt to fall foul of him.<sup>5</sup> His tragic death, in the year following Liutprand's encounter with him, through a conspiracy between his wife and a paramour who had been her husband's trusted comrade-in-arms, was a reflection upon the character of the victim as well as upon that of his murderers. Yet the Western bishop's utter failure to detect the magnificent soldier and the blue-blooded aristocrat beneath this East Roman Emperor's plain and unattractive exterior gives the measure of the blinding animus against all things Byzantine by which Liutprand was obsessed, while the measure of the Byzantine Society's superiority over the contemporary Franks in cultivation is given by the contrast between Liutprand's crudely virulent caricature of Nikiphóros and the objective and discriminating verbal portrait, from the hand of the East Roman historian-princess Anna Comnena,<sup>6</sup> of the Norman adventurer Bohemond, a blond beast whose pugnacity, treacherousness, and ambition had given far more trouble to Anna's father and hero the East Roman Emperor Alexius I than the East Roman Emperor Nikiphóros II's brusqueness had ever given to Liutprand's master the West Roman Emperor Otto. A minute description of the physique of this corporeally magnificent specimen of Nordic Man—"whose build reproduced the proportions of the canon of Polycleitus"—is prefaced by Anna with a generous encomium.

<sup>1</sup> Chap. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Chap. 3: cp. chaps. 10, 23, 28, and 40.

<sup>3</sup> See Hahn, ad loc., n. 5 on p. 177 of his edition of Liutprand's works.

<sup>4</sup> The difference in character between the aggressive soldier Nikiphóros and the gentle scholar Constantine Porphyrogenitus was pointed out to Liutprand by the imperial officials when he complained that the permission to export robes of state of the first quality, which was now being refused to him when he was a bishop and an ambassador representing an emperor, had been granted to him on his previous mission to Constantinople in Constantine Porphyrogenitus's reign, when Liutprand had been merely a deacon and an envoy representing a prince (chap. 55).

<sup>6</sup> In her *Alexiad*, ed. by Reifferscheid, A. (Leipzig 1884, Teubner, 2 vols.), Book XIII, chap. 10.

<sup>2</sup> Juvenal: *Satire V*, ll. 53–54.



'The like of him was not to be seen in all Romania. There was not a barbarian or a Hellene there who could measure up to him. He was not only a marvel to behold; he was a legendary figure whose mere description took your breath away.'

The sting in the Byzantine authoress' picture of this Frankish human tiger lies in the tail.

'Nature had given an outlet through his heroic nostrils for the mighty spirit boiling up from his heart—for it must be confessed that there was something attractive about the man's countenance, though the effect of this was marred by the intimidating impression which the whole ensemble conspired to convey. The mercilessness of a beast of prey was writ large over the whole man in every limb of his body; it was betrayed by something about his look, in combination with the mightiness of his frame, and also by his laugh, which smote other people's ears like a lion's roar. His spiritual and physical complexion was such that ferocity and lust were always rampant in him, and both these passions were perpetually seeking vent in war. His intelligence was versatile, unscrupulous, and slippery; and in verbal encounters he was completely master of his words and never gave his adversary a handle in shaping his answers.'<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The aversion with which Bohemond's character inspired Anna, in despite of her admiration for the magnificence of his physique, was the usual feeling evoked by the Normans in the hearts of their East Roman victims. The hatred which they aroused was indeed, in general, so bitter that the Byzantine historians delighted to confound them with the Muslims under the generic opprobrious nickname 'children of Hagar'. Yet there was at least one Norman adventurer who, unlike Bohemond, succeeded in winning the affection, as well as the admiration, of the East Romans on whom he imposed himself.

Russell was a Norman soldier of fortune who had served with the Emperor Romanos Diogenēs in A.D. 1071 in the campaign against the Saljuqs that had ended at Melazkerd (Attaleiātis; *Historia*, ed. by Bekker, I. (Bonn 1853, Weber), p. 148). The collapse of the East Roman army and administration in Anatolia tempted the Norman adventurer to play for his own hand. He collected a band of Frankish men-at-arms; ensconced himself in the Armeniac army corps district in North-Eastern Anatolia; was taken prisoner by the Turks and was ransomed by his wife (Attaleiātis, op. cit., p. 193); but was eventually taken prisoner by them for the second time through the treachery of a Turkish warlord named Tutākh, who, after having given Russell a safe-conduct, secretly sold him to Alexius Comnenus, who had been sent by the Emperor Michael VII Dhōukas (*imperator* A.D. 1071-8) to capture Russell by fair means or foul (Attaleiātis, op. cit., pp. 199-200 and 206; Vryēnnios, *Historia*, pp. 85-87). Tutākh duly seized Russell and handed him over to Alexius in exchange for hostages whom Tutākh was to hold pending the payment of his stipulated price (Vryēnnios, op. cit., p. 87). But neither Alexius nor the Emperor Michael—who had preferred, as Attaleiātis puts it (op. cit., p. 199), to see the East Roman Empire in the hands of the Turks rather than to see one piece of East Roman territory defended against the Turks by this Latin soldier—had reckoned with the local popularity that Russell had acquired. When Alexius called a meeting of the local notables at Amasia to ask them to advance him the money to pay Tutākh's price for Russell, against a promise of a refund from the Imperial Treasury, there was an uproar. 'They shouted that Russell had never done them any harm, and they tried to snatch him from the house where he was under arrest, and to set him at liberty' (Vryēnnios, op. cit., p. 89). Alexius extricated himself from these straits by 'a trick that was as humane as it was clever'. He induced Russell to go into collusion with him in making a show of putting out Russell's eyes. The executioner went through the motions; Russell acted his part by duly bellowing and groaning; and, when he was displayed to the people of Amasia next morning as a blind man with a bandage over his eyes, 'this comedy effectively quelled the disturbance' (ibid., pp. 90-91). However, on the road to Constantinople with his prisoner, Alexius got into trouble with his cousin Theodore Dhōkeianós, at whose country house the party stopped to break their journey, 'for having blinded such a fine fellow, and one who might have done so much to retrieve East Roman fortunes'. Alexius amused himself by keeping his cousin mystified till after luncheon, when he made him take the bandage off from Russell's eyes. Theodore was overjoyed to find that, after all, Russell's eyesight was undamaged, and he congratulated Alexius on the adroitness of his play-acting (ibid., pp. 92-93).

It is manifest that Russell had won the sympathies, not only of a provincial Greek

This fascinating delineation of one of the arch-Franks of Anna's day<sup>1</sup> is almost equalled in vividness by a panorama of Frankdom in the mass which she introduces as an overture to her account of the descent of the First Crusade upon Orthodox Christendom.

'Intelligence of the approach of innumerable Frankish armies gave the Emperor Alexius considerable anxiety. He was only too familiar with the Franks' uncontrollable<sup>2</sup> impetuosity,<sup>3</sup> fickleness of mind<sup>4</sup> and suggestibility, and with the other inveterate characteristics, primary and secondary, of the Western Barbarians (*Κελτοί*). He was likewise familiar with the insatiable covetousness that has made these barbarians a by-word for the light-heartedness with which they take any excuse for tearing up treaties. This was the Franks' standing reputation, and it was completely confirmed by their acts. . . . The event proved to be even more portentous and more fearful than the anticipations. It turned out that the entire West, including all the tribes of the barbarians living between the west coast of the Adriatic and the Straits of Gibraltar, had started a mass migration<sup>5</sup> and was on the march, bag and baggage, for Asia through the intervening parts of Europe.'<sup>6</sup>

The most sorely trying of the afflictions which the Emperor Alexius suffered from the passage of the First Crusade was the unlimited call which these unwelcome and obtusely inconsiderate visitors made upon the precious time of a hard-worked administrator.

'From crack of dawn, or at least from sunrise, Alexius made it his practice to sit on the imperial throne<sup>7</sup> and to let it be known that every Western Barbarian who desired an audience with him could have unrestricted access to his presence every day in the week. His motives were the immediate one of wishing to give them the opportunity of presenting their requests and the ulterior one of using the divers opportunities that con-

Orthodox population that was already alienated from the East Roman imperial régime, but of the two sophisticated Byzantine men of letters who recorded the story; and this episode in the history of Graeco-Frankish relations shows that it was not impossible for personal charm to outweigh cultural antipathy.

<sup>1</sup> The same capacity for seeing the light as well as the shadow in the figure presented by an alien enemy is shown by Anna in her tale of the Latin fighting priest. Though the combatancy of the Latin priests is shocking to her, she feels, and conveys, the pathos of this warrior-cleric's death in battle (*Alexiad*, Book X, chap. 8).

<sup>2</sup> Cp. *Alexiad*, Book X, chap. 5, *ad fin.*: 'The Western Barbarians make the impression of being always hot-headed and vehement and of becoming utterly irrepressible when once they have committed themselves to an adventure.'

<sup>3</sup> Cp. *ibid.*, Book X, chap. 6: 'When the impulse seizes them to embark on a raid, they throw reason to the winds and become quite unbridled.'

<sup>4</sup> Cp. *ibid.*, Book X, chap. 11: 'The Emperor was aware of the Latins' proneness to change their minds.'

<sup>5</sup> The innumerable Frankish host was appropriately preceded in its advance by a likewise innumerable swarm of locusts (*Alexiad*, Book X, chap. 5).

<sup>6</sup> *Alexiad*, Book X, chap. 5.

<sup>7</sup> At one of Alexius's conferences with the leaders of the Crusade 'a Frankish baron had the audacity to seat himself on the Emperor's camp stool. The Emperor put up with this without saying a word—being familiar, as he was, with the overbearingness of the Latin character—but Count Baldwin came up, seized the fellow by the hand, and pulled him off the chair—with the admonition that, as the Crusaders had now become the Emperor's liegemen, it was incumbent on them to observe the custom of the country, which debarred the Emperor's subjects from sitting down in the imperial presence, even when the Emperor himself was seated. 'The baron answered Baldwin never a word; but, transfixing the Emperor with a savage stare, he muttered to himself in his own vernacular: "That just shows what a boor the man is! Fancy his monopolising the right to a chair with so many famous captains on their feet all round him!"' (*Alexiad*, Book X, chap. 10).

versation with them would offer to him for influencing them in the direction of his own policy. These Western Barbarian barons have some awkward national characteristics—an impudence,<sup>1</sup> an impetuosity, a covetousness, a lack of self-control in indulging any lust that seizes them, and, last but not least, a garrulousness—for which they hold the World's record; and they showed a typical lack of discipline in their abuse of the Emperor's accessibility.

Each baron brought with him into the imperial presence as many retainers as he fancied, and one followed at another's heels, and a third at the second's heels, in a continuous queue. Worse still, when they held the floor they did not set themselves any time-limit for their talk, such as the Attic orators used to have to observe. Each Tom, Dick, and Harry took just as much time as he chose for his talk with the Emperor. Being what they were—with their inordinately wagging tongues and their entire lack of respect for the Emperor, lack of sense of time, and lack of sensitivity to the indignation of the officials in attendance—they none of them thought of leaving any time over for those behind them in the queue; they just went on talking and making demands interminably.

'The volubility and mercenariness and banality of the Western Barbarians' talk are, of course, notorious to all students of national characters; but first-hand experience has given a more thorough education in the Western Barbarians' character to those who have had the misfortune to be present on these occasions. When dusk descended on the proceedings, the unfortunate Emperor—who had laboured through the live-long day without a chance of breaking his fast—would rise from his throne and make a motion in the direction of his private apartments; but even this broad hint did not avail to extricate him from being pestered by the Barbarians. They would go on jockeying for priority with one another—and this game was played not only by those who were still left in the queue; those who had already had their audience during the day would now keep on coming back and bringing up one pretext after another for speaking to the Emperor again, while the poor man was being kept on his feet and was having to put up with this babel of chatter from the swarm of barbarians thronging round him. The affability with which this one devoted victim kept on responding to the interpellations of the multitude was a sight to see, and the unseasonable chatter had no end to it; for, whenever one of the chamberlains tried to shut the barbarians up, he would find himself shut up, instead, by the Emperor, who was aware of the Franks' proneness to lose their tempers<sup>2</sup> and was afraid of some trifling provocation producing an explosion that might inflict the gravest injury on the Roman Empire.

'The scene was really most extraordinary. The Emperor would stand as stalwartly as if he were a wrought-metal statue made of, say, bronze or wrought iron, and he would maintain this posture till any hour in the night—sometimes from dusk till midnight, sometimes till the third cock-crow, sometimes almost till the Sun's beams became distinctly visible again. The courtiers could none of them stay the course; they used to withdraw for a rest and then return to the presence thoroughly out of temper. None of the Emperor's lords in waiting could compete with him in standing for that length of time without a change of position. All of

<sup>1</sup> If an equivalent of the American word 'brash' had existed in Anna's Romaic Greek mother tongue, she would have been sorely tempted to blot her Classical Neo-Attic copy-book by breaking out, at this point, into the living language of her day.

<sup>2</sup> 'Experience proved them to be chronically stiff-necked and sour-tempered' (*Alexiad*, Book XIV, chap. 2).

them would keep on shifting their weight from one leg to the other, while one would sink into a sitting posture, another would droop his head on one side and rest it on his shoulder, and a third would lean against the wall. The Emperor alone made no concessions whatever to this extremity of physical fatigue. It is really impossible to do justice in words to his endurance. In these conversazioni of his with the million, each of his interlocutors chattered to excess. It was like the endless jackdaw monologue of the Homeric Thersites.<sup>1</sup> And when one interlocutor withdrew he would yield the floor to another, and the second to a third, and so on and so on. These interlocutors of the Emperor's had only to stand at intervals, whereas the Emperor had to stay on his feet interminably—till the first cockcrow, or even the second. And then, after the briefest interlude of repose, at the return of sunrise he would be on his throne again, with another day of hard labour and ordeals—perhaps twice as severe as the last—following at the heels of the labours of the preceding night.<sup>2</sup>

The gout to which Alexius was a martyr is ascribed by his daughter to the effects of these stances with the importunate Western Barbarians rather than to an injury to his knee-cap which the Emperor had sustained during a game of polo.<sup>3</sup>

A mutual antipathy of this intensity, which eventually exploded into hideous action in the atrocities of A.D. 1182 and 1185 and 1204, might have been expected to rule out any possibility of mutual cultural influence; yet the Crusades did bear fruit in Franco-Byzantine, as well as Franco-Armenian and Franco-Muslim, interchanges of cultural goods.

After acquiring from the Muslims in the twelfth century of the Christian Era the philosophical and scientific abstract from the corpus of Hellenic literature that had been translated by Oriental hands from the original Greek into Syriac and Arabic,<sup>4</sup> the Medieval Western Christians tardily completed their Hellenic literary repertory by acquiring the originals of all the surviving works of Hellenic literature in Ancient Greek from the Medieval Greek Orthodox Christian carriers of this precious cargo on the very eve of the extinction of the political independence of the last enclaves of the East Roman Empire in an Orthodox Christendom that was being united politically at last under a *Pax Ottomanica*. This literary debt of the West to Orthodox Christendom<sup>5</sup> is more notorious, but less remarkable, than the Medieval Greek Orthodox Christians' cultural debt to the, in their eyes, still 'barbarian' Medieval Western intruders.

It is one of the surprises of History that the romantic vein in the way of life of Frankish knights and barons whose prosaic barbarism had proved such a plague to the East Roman Emperor Alexius I Comnenus

<sup>1</sup> *Iliad*, Book II, l. 212.

<sup>2</sup> See *ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> *Alexiad*, Book XIV, chap. 4.

<sup>4</sup> See pp. 371-3, above.

<sup>5</sup> Whether the Western school of painting can be said to be indebted for its inspiration to Byzantine Art is a more debatable question. The response that a Byzantine challenge evoked from Giotto and his successors was, not to imitate the Byzantine hieratic style, but to break away from it into a naturalistic style that was its antithesis. If a Western debt was ever incurred in the artistic commerce between the West and Byzantium, the Byzantine painter to whose account this debt must be credited is the Cretan Dhomínikos Theotokópoulos 'El Greco' (see IV, iv. 360-1), whose shattering Byzantine impact on a, by his time, mature and already over-ripe naturalistic Modern Western style began to produce its effects some three hundred years and more after the Byzantine artist-revolutionary's death in A.D. 1614.

in A.D. 1096 should have come to exercise a powerful attraction on his grandson and second successor Manuel (*imperator* A.D. 1143–80);<sup>1</sup> and it is still more noteworthy that, when, after this Francophil East Roman Emperor's death, a Francophobe reaction among the Empire's Greek Orthodox Christian subjects precipitated the Empire's second and, this time, irretrievable, collapse, the thirteenth-century Frankish conquerors of Constantinople and the Morea should have done their Greek victims the same unintentional but signal literary service that the contemporary Mongol conquerors of China likewise inadvertently performed for the Chinese. In China the temporary dethronement of the Confucian litterati under a barbarian-administered régime<sup>2</sup> gave a belated opportunity for a submerged popular literature in the living vernacular language to rise to the surface of Chinese social life, where it had never been allowed to make this shocking display of its vitality under the culturally repressive rule of Confucian-minded Chinese civil servants who were incurably devoted slaves of the Sinic literary classics.<sup>3</sup> In a barbarian-ridden Orthodox Christendom the same cause produced the same effect on a minor scale; and the new genres of popular literature—the drama and the novel—that came to flower in China in the Yüan Age had their counterparts in Medieval Greece under Frankish rule in the flowering of a popular lyric and epic poetry that had already been foreshadowed in the epic of the ninth-century East Roman borderer-barbarians who had broken into the domain of a disintegrating 'Abbasid Caliphate,<sup>4</sup> and that was to be echoed in the ballads of the nineteenth-century Greek *ra'ïyeh* brigand-patriot insurgents against the domination of a disintegrating Ottoman Empire.<sup>5</sup>

Since the twelfth century of the Christian Era the Franks, in their homelands in Western Christendom, had been breaking out of the chrysalis of a traditional literary style, conveyed in the vehicle of the Latin language, which was the Western literary heritage from an antecedent Hellenic culture, and had been expressing themselves in new forms in the French, Provençal, Tuscan, Castilian, High German,

<sup>1</sup> Manuel, in his infatuation with Frankish chivalry, threw to the winds all the well-considered traditional East Roman scientific military doctrine of equipment and tactics—to which his admiring historian John Kinnamos pays lip-service (*Historiae*, edited by Meineke, A. (Bonn 1836, Weber), pp. 168–9). Though East Roman professional soldiers were critical of the Frankish knights' excessive weight of body armour, which reduced their chargers' speed, as well as of their lack of discipline (Kinnamos, *op. cit.*, p. 73), Manuel celebrated his accession to the imperial throne by converting the East Roman cavalry from Avar horse-archers with round targets into Frankish lancers with kite-shaped shields (*ibid.*, p. 125; cp. Khoniátis, Nikitas: *Khroniki Dhiyisis*, edited by Bekker, I. (Bonn 1835, Weber), p. 254), and he could seldom resist the temptation to exchange the role of an East Roman general for that of a Frankish champion charging recklessly into the blue. Kinnamos records (*op. cit.*, p. 192) that he had been incredulous of the reports of Manuel's personal deeds of prowess till he had witnessed some of them with his own eyes. One of the happiest events in Manuel's life must have been his participation, at Antioch in A.D. 1159, in a grand tournament, described by Nikitas (*op. cit.*, pp. 141–4), on the occasion of his state visit as the local Norman prince's feudal overlord.

<sup>2</sup> The Mongols' audacious attempt to administer the Middle Kingdom through the agency of barbarian officials imported from Dār-al-Islām and Western Christendom has been touched upon in V. v. 349–51.

<sup>3</sup> The Archaism that had already fastened upon the Sinic literature before the days of Confucius has been noticed in V. vi. 82–83.

<sup>4</sup> See V. v. 252–9.

<sup>5</sup> See V. v. 297–8.



and other living local Western vernaculars of the day; and the Romaic Greek language is indebted for its principal literary monument dating from the fourteenth century to an anonymous Moreot Frankish poet of the third or fourth generation after the Frankish conquest, who wrote *The Chronicle of the Morea* in the living Greek that was the author's mother tongue, as unselfconsciously as he would have written it in French if he had happened to have been born and brought up in the land of his forefathers in the domain of the Langue d'Oil instead of overseas in a Greek-speaking colonial annex of Medieval Western Christendom.

Had this Moreot-bred chronicler been a clerk of native Moreot and not of exotic Frankish lineage, it would have been far more difficult for him—paradoxical though this may sound—to use the same living Romaic Greek tongue as a vehicle for literary composition; for, in the Byzantine cultural environment, he would have been drilled so rigorously in the Attic masterpieces and Neo-Attic conceits of a classical Greek literature that he would have become morally incapable of using his living mother tongue for any purpose higher than the vulgar demands of practical daily life. The Moreot Frankish author of *The Chronicle of the Morea* was also a cultivated man in his own tradition, as the internal evidence of his poem reveals. The subject in which this Western clerk was learned was, however, not Ancient Greek literature but Medieval French feudal law,<sup>1</sup> while his classical Hellenic language was not Attic Greek but Latin; and the freedom, which was this Moreot Frank's birthright, from the Byzantine incubus of an Attic Greek literary education enabled an alien enemy to endow the Romaic Greek language with a chronicle in the native accentual verse which local Greek hands afterwards supplemented and revised.

The most momentous of all the gifts exchanged between a Medieval Western Christendom and a contemporary Eastern Orthodox Christendom was the political institution of the absolute authoritarian state, which in Orthodox Christendom had been successfully disinterred from the sepulchre of a dead Hellenic past by the genius of Leo Syrus some two generations before Charlemagne made his abortive attempt in the West to perform the same *tour de force* of political necromancy. This perversely effective Orthodox Christian revival of an institution that had been a disintegrating Hellenic Society's last desperate political resort had been communicated to the West as a going concern in the Western successor-state which eleventh-century Norman swords had carved out of the East Roman Empire's former dominions in Apulia and Sicily;<sup>2</sup> and a Byzantine ideal of autocracy, which had been no more than a curiosity of Medieval Western institutional history so long as it had been confined to one recently acquired and still outlandish frontier province of Western Christendom, became a cynosure of all Western eyes—whether they beheld it with admiration or with aversion—when

<sup>1</sup> See *The Chronicle of Morea*, ed. by Schmitt, J. (London 1904, Methuen), pp. xxxviii–xlvi.

<sup>2</sup> In Sicily the local Norman usurpers of the East Roman dominion over the island had been preceded by Maghribi Muslims who had brought with them an administrative technique that had been taken over from the Roman Empire by the Primitive Muslim Arab conquerors of Syria, Egypt, and North-West Africa.

it was embodied in the person of a Frederick II Hohenstaufen who, besides being a King of Sicily, was a West Roman Emperor and a man of genius. Before the close of the thirteenth century a Byzantine autocracy which the Sicilian *Stupor Mundi* had failed to acclimatize in the West on an oecumenical scale was being successfully practised in miniature by local despots of North and Central Italian city-states;<sup>1</sup> and before the close of the fifteenth century this balefully efficient exotic institution was being propagated from Italy into the Transalpine and Transmarine provinces of Western Christendom,<sup>2</sup> to compete for their allegiance with an indigenous medieval system of government under which a measure of political liberty had been secured for at least a privileged minority of the population through a division of political powers between feudal monarchies and representative parliaments.

In subsequent chapters of Western history a long-drawn-out struggle between two opposing political ideals, which appeared, in the eighteenth century, to be coming to a peaceful end in a rapprochement between an enlightened form of autocracy and an aristocratic form of parliamentarism, became acute again in the twentieth century, when a parliamentarism that had changed its aim to the new objective of becoming a vehicle for Democracy found itself challenged, in the heart of the Modern Western World, by an autocracy that had thrown to the winds both its eighteenth-century watchword of 'enlightenment' and its nineteenth-century watchword of 'legitimacy' in order to catch a semi-educated public in the snare of an unscrupulous propaganda and to turn this insidiously bridled and blinkered Leviathan into a pliant instrument for a cold-blooded policy of imperialism through military aggression. It was no accident that an inter-war Fascist régime in Italy and National-Socialist régime in Germany should have borrowed their political technique and organization from a recently established Communist régime in a Russia where 'the political concepts embodied in the ancient Muscovite state' had been 'of Byzantine provenance'.<sup>3</sup>

This surprisingly active and many-sided cultural commerce between a Medieval Western and a contemporary Eastern Orthodox Christendom proved impotent, however, in the end to overcome the antipathy between the rival sister societies; and, when a broken-down Orthodox Christian Civilization reached a point in its disintegration at which the only freedom of manœuvre left to its hard-pressed epigoni was a liberty still to choose between 'turning Frank' and 'turning Turk', the Orthodox Christian converts to the Iranic Muslim Civilization of the empire-building 'Osmanlis' were, as we have already observed,<sup>4</sup> both more

<sup>1</sup> The impulse given to the establishment of local despotisms in Northern and Central Italy by the Emperor Frederick II's prestige has been noticed, in another context, in VII. vii. 537-8. See further X. ix. 13.

<sup>2</sup> See III. iii. 300-1, 305, and 357-63; IV. iv. 198-200; and p. 363, above.

<sup>3</sup> Weidle, W.: *La Russie Absente et Présente* (Paris 1949, Gallimard), p. 73, quoted on p. 677, below.

<sup>4</sup> Some two hundred years before the emergence of the Ottoman Turkish polity, the Saljiq Turkish way of life had exercised an attraction on some of the Greek Orthodox Christian victims of these barbarian invaders of the heartland of the East Roman Empire in Central Anatolia. The military disaster at Melazkerd in A.D. 1071 proved irretrievable

[Note continued on next page.]

<sup>5</sup> See pp. 151-2, above.

numerous and more effective than the converts to the contemporary Western way of life—even in its attractively precocious North Italian version.

The eminent Greek Orthodox Christian renegade to Islam, Khass Murād Palaiológhos Pasha, son of Vitus, who, as Beglerbey of Rumili, was killed in the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II Fātih's service in the decisive battle fought by the 'Osmanlis at Beyburt in A.D. 1473 against the Āq Qōyūnlū Türkmens,' sacrificed his life to greater purpose than his elder kinsman the Uniate Constantine Palaiológhos Dhrágasis, who, as East Roman Emperor, was killed at Constantinople in A.D. 1453 in a hopeless attempt to save a dispossessed Imperial City from resuming the role for which Geography had designed her by becoming the capital of an Ottoman Empire whose broad dominions had encompassed this anomalously surviving metropolitan enclave of East Roman territory on every side since A.D. 1360-1. Köse Mikhāl 'Abdallah, the apostate ancestor of Khass Murād Palaiológhos Pasha's superior officer 'Ali Bey Mikhāloghlu, had likewise been wiser in his generation, when he abandoned Orthodox Christianity for Islam in order to become one of the hereditary grantees of a rising Ottoman polity,<sup>2</sup> than Khass Murād's

because the Turks who were overrunning Anatolia found collaborators among the East Roman provincial population (Michael Attaleiātis: *Historia*, ed. by Bekker, I. (Bonn 1853, Weber), pp. 306 and 307). In the second generation of the post-Melazkerd era, when the Emperor John Comnenus (*imperabat* A.D. 1118-43) was reconquering a corridor of territory in the southern highlands of Anatolia, where the *terrain* was less advantageous to the Saljūq light cavalry than it was on the central plateau, he found that the Christian islanders in Bey Shehir Lake were on such friendly terms with their Turkish overlords at Qōniyeh that they resisted by force of arms the Emperor's summons to them to evacuate the islands and migrate into Turkish territory. 'Their intercourse with the Turks of Qōniyeh had resulted not only in a firm mutual friendship, but in the adoption by the Christians of the Turkish way of life in many respects, and they were so friendly with their Turkish neighbours that they regarded the East Romans as their enemies. Habit, ingrained by passage of Time, is indeed stronger than race or religion' (Nikitas Khoniātis: *Khroniki Dhilyisi*, ed. by Bekker, I. (Bonn 1835, Weber), p. 50; cp. John Kinnamos: *Historiae*, ed. by Meineke, A. (Bonn 1836, Weber), p. 22). John's own nephew and namesake had deserted on the field of battle to the Danishmends and had subsequently become a convert to Islam and had married the daughter of the Sultan of Qōniyeh (Nikitas, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-49). Kinnamos (*op. cit.*, p. 56) reports the death in action, in the reign of the Emperor Manuel (*imperabat* A.D. 1143-80), of a Turkish commander of East Roman origin named Gavrás.

The Greek-speaking islanders whom the East Roman Emperor John Comnenus evicted from the islands in Bey Shehir Lake in the twelfth century of the Christian Era were not the last Christian inhabitants of these islands to fraternize with the Turks. When the writer and his wife visited Bey Shehir on the 15th November, 1948, they were told that the islands were then inhabited by the descendants of Cossack refugees to whom the Ottoman Government had given asylum there from the hostility of a Muscovite Imperial Government.

<sup>2</sup> Before the organization of the Pādishāh's slave-household in and after the reign of Sultan Murād I (*imperabat* A.D. 1360-89), the first two generations of Ottoman empire-builders had buttressed the rising dynasty's power by the creation of a small number of hereditary grantees, whose interests they sought to attach to those of the House of 'Osman by endowing these privileged families with large estates and with important public offices that were heritable *de facto* if not *de jure*. These primitive aristocratic foundations of a familiar conventional type were quickly overlaid by 'the peculiar institution' which was to make the Ottoman Empire's military and political fortunes; yet, although the *arcanum imperii* of the classic Ottoman servile state was its implacable proscription of the aristocratic principle of heredity, we know of five houses of grantees—representing the House of 'Osman's first essay in the construction of an Ottoman *πολιτεῖα*—which were already so strongly entrenched by Sultan Murād I's day that they managed to survive the adverse change of political and social climate from an aristocratic to a servile régime.

These five families were the Mikhāloghlu, whose hereditary estates were scattered

and 'Ali Bey's contemporary the Greek historian Dhoúkas, who had abandoned Orthodox Christianity for Roman Catholicism in order to take service with the Genoese despots of one of the Latin *regna peritura*<sup>1</sup> in the Levant—the petty principality, established in Mytilene by the Gattilusi in A.D. 1355, that was extinguished by the Ottoman Pādishāh Mehmed II Fātih in A.D. 1462.<sup>2</sup>

through Eastern Thrace and Bulgaria and whose hereditary public office was the commandership-in-chief of the pre-Janissary light infantry known as *Aqynjys* (see Babinger, Fr., s.v. 'Mikhāl-Oghlu', in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, vol. iii (Leyden 1936, Brill), pp. 493–5); the Evrenōsoghlu, who were entrusted with the Ottoman conquest of Western Thrace and Macedonia, remained prominent in Ottoman public life down to A.D. 1488, and retained their hereditary estates round Yenije Vardar down to the nineteenth century of the Christian Era (see Mordtmann, J. H., s.v. 'Evrenos', in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, vol. ii (Leyden 1927, Brill), pp. 34–35); the Malqochoghlu, *alias* Malqojooghlu (see Babinger, loc. cit., p. 494; Mordtmann, loc. cit., p. 34); the Turakhānoghlu, who were entrusted with the Ottoman conquest of the Frankish principalities in Continental European Greece and whose hereditary estates lay round Yenishahr (Larissa), the capital of Great Vlachia (see Babinger, Fr., s.v. 'Turakhān Beg', in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, vol. iv (Leyden 1934, Brill), pp. 876–8); and the Chenderililer, who held the key office of Grand Vizier for four successive generations between A.D. 1386 and A.D. 1499—notwithstanding the deadly offence given to Sultan Mehmed II Fātih which proved fatal to the third Chenderili Grand Vizier, Khalil (see Giese, F., s.v. 'Cenderil', in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, vol. i (Leyden 1913, Brill), pp. 833–4).

Of these five privileged houses of hereditary Ottoman grandees, no less than three appear to have been of Orthodox Christian origin. Köse Mikhāl 'Abdallah, the founder and eponym of the Mikhālooghlu, was said to have been the renegade local Greek Orthodox Christian lord of Chirmenkia (*Turcié Khirmenjik*) at the southern foot of the Mysian Olympus, near Edrenos (Babinger, loc. cit., p. 493). The town of Mikhālyi, situated at a strategic point between Brusa and the Dardanelles, perhaps derives its name from this family (Babinger, loc. cit., p. 495). Ghāzi Evrenōs Bey, the founder and eponym of the Evrenōsoghlu, was said to have been a *ci-devant* Orthodox Christian retainer of the Turkish Muslim Emir of Qarasy, who entered the service of the Ottoman Emir Orkhān's son Suleymān after Orkhān's conquest of Qarasy in A.D. 1336. As for the Malqochooghlu, they would appear to have been renegade Serb Orthodox Christians if 'Malqoch' is really a Turkish travesty of 'Marković'.

<sup>1</sup> Virgil: *Georgics*, Book II, l. 498.

<sup>2</sup> Greek Orthodox Christians who opted in the fourteenth or fifteenth century of the Christian Era for embracing Islam in preference to accepting union with the Western Christian Church on Western terms could justify their choice by pointing to their own and their ancestors' experience of the comparative humanity of the Muslims by comparison with the Franks. In the East Roman historian Nikitas Khoniātis' *Khronikē Dhilyiis* the appalling accounts of the sack of Salonica by the Sicilian Normans in A.D. 1185 (pp. 385–98 of the edition published at Bonn in 1835 by Weber) and of the sack of Constantinople by the so-called 'Crusaders' in A.D. 1203–4 (ibid., pp. 710–70) stand out in glaring contrast to the description (ibid., pp. 653–7) of the Saljuq prince Kay Khusrū's chivalrous treatment of the East Roman civilians whom he carried away captive in a raid on the West Anatolian dominions of the East Roman Empire during the reign of the Emperor Alexius III Angelus (*imperabat* A.D. 1195–1203). Kay Khusrū's kindness to his prisoners during the campaign, and the favourableness of the conditions on which he subsequently settled them in his own dominions in the neighbourhood of Aq Shehir (the *ci-devant* Philomelium), 'not only prevented the prisoners themselves from feeling any nostalgia for their native land but also attracted to Philomelium many East Roman settlers who had not been carried away captive by the Turks, on the strength of reports of the good treatment that their kinsmen and fellow countrymen had received at the Turks' hands. The truth was that in the [East] Roman World, by our day, the springs of Christian virtue had dried up, the truths [of Religion] had ceased to be taken seriously, and arbitrary injustice had run riot until the natural affections of the majority of the population had been chilled to a degree at which entire Hellenic [i.e. 'Greek', not 'pagan'] communities voluntarily opted for finding new homes among the barbarians and rejoiced to get away from their native land' (ibid., p. 657). In another passage (ibid., pp. 762–3) the same East Roman observer expressly draws the contrast between the conduct of the Western Crusaders when they captured Constantinople in A.D. 1203–4 and that of the Muslims when they had recaptured Jerusalem in A.D. 1187 from its Western Christian conquerors. 'The Children of Ishmael did not behave like that; indeed, far from it, they showed the most exemplary humanity and clemency to the

4. *The Medieval West and Kievan Russia*<sup>1</sup>

The animosity against Western Christendom, which moved Greek Orthodox Christians in the fifteenth century to opt for falling under an Ottoman in preference to a Frankish domination, was common to these fifteenth-century Greeks and their Russian contemporaries; and indeed, before the century was over, the Muscovites had become the protagonists in Eastern Orthodox Christendom's struggle to preserve its ecclesiastical independence against Western encroachments. One of the signatories, on the Orthodox side, of the Act of Union concluded at Florence in A.D. 1439 had been Isidore, the Greek Metropolitan of Moscow; but, in A.D. 1441, when, after his return to Moscow, Isidore attempted to honour his signature within his diocese, the Grand Duke Basil II expelled this Greek betrayer of Orthodoxy, as Isidore appeared to be in Muscovite eyes,<sup>2</sup> and seized the opportunity to secure in A.D. 1448<sup>3</sup> the election, by the Muscovite hierarchy, of an anti-unionist metropolitan of Russian nationality in Isidore's place. At the same time the Muscovite metropolitan see repudiated its allegiance to the Oecumenical Patriarchate;<sup>4</sup> and, when in A.D. 1453 Constantinople had been duly requited for her apostasy in A.D. 1439 by succumbing to the 'Osmanlis, Moscow 'the Third Rome' remained, as we have seen,<sup>5</sup> in Muscovite estimation, the sole surviving citadel of Orthodoxy that was both impeccable and independent.

Thus, within five hundred years of Russia's conversion, the Russian branch of Orthodox Christendom had come to be at least as zealous as the main body was by this date in its resistance to Western ecclesiastical aggression. But this identical position in which the Russians and the Greeks were both entrenched in the fifteenth century had been reached by them along separate roads at different dates. In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, when Graeco-Frankish relations were already becoming strained in spite of statesmanlike efforts on both sides to keep the peace,<sup>6</sup> Russo-Frankish relations were becoming closer and more friendly. The estrangement of the Russians from the West, which had gone to more than Greek lengths before the end of the fifteenth century, dated no farther back than the thirteenth century; and the reason why the break between Russia and the West was thus delayed is evident. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, when White Russia and the

[Western] kinsmen [of the sackers of Constantinople] after they [i.e. the Muslims] had taken Jerusalem by force of arms. They did not violate the Latins' womenfolk, they did not choke the Holy Sepulchre with corpses. . . . All that they did [to the Latins of Jerusalem] was to allow them to go their way in peace on payment of ransoms which they assessed at a few gold pieces per head—leaving all the rest of the Latins' property to its owners, even in cases where their wealth was as abundant as the sands of the sea. This was how the adversaries of Christ treated Latins who from their standpoint were infidels. They chivalrously forbore to put them to the sword or subject them to the divers torments of fire, famine, persecution, denudation, tribulation, oppression—or any of the other atrocities which those professedly Christian co-religionists of ours committed against us, as we have recorded in outline, without their having any provocation on our part to bring up against us.'

<sup>1</sup> See xi, maps 41, 42, and 43.

<sup>2</sup> See Platonov, S.: *Histoire de la Russie* (Paris 1929, Payot), pp. 166-7.

<sup>3</sup> See Halecki, O.: 'Les Trois Romes', in *Le Flambeau*, 31<sup>e</sup> année, No. 3 (Brussels 1948), p. 281.

<sup>4</sup> In VI. vii. 31-40.

<sup>5</sup> See Platonov, op. cit., loc. cit.

<sup>6</sup> See pp. 376-80, above.



Ukraine were being progressively subjugated by the Lithuanians and the Poles, Russian Orthodox Christendom was being hit, for the first time, by a wave of Western aggression<sup>1</sup> which had struck the main body of Orthodox Christendom some two or three hundred years earlier, when the Normans had invaded the East Roman Empire's dominions in Southern Italy. In the Russian case, as in the Greek, the estrangement from the West was the consequence of an unhappy first-hand experience of unpleasant Western behaviour.

Russia's earliest relations with Western Christendom had been, like Bulgaria's, a consequence of her reception of Christianity at the hands of the Oecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople; for, though, as we have seen,<sup>2</sup> Russia—insulated, as she was, from the East Roman Empire by the two-fold barrier of the Black Sea and the Steppe—could afford to take less seriously the political subordination to the East Roman Empire's sovereignty which was the juridical consequence of becoming an ecclesiastical subject of the Constantinopolitan Patriarchate, this political corollary of adhesion to the Constantinopolitan Church was sufficiently awkward, even for the comparatively distant Russians, to make them, too, like the Bulgarians, explore the alternative possibility of entering the fold of Western Christendom. Olga, the first Russian royal proselyte, sent a mission in A.D. 959 to Otto I to ask him for a bishop<sup>3</sup> after she had received baptism at Greek hands; and, though Otto's candidate Adalbert did not reach Kiev before Olga's deposition by her pagan son Svyatoslav,<sup>4</sup> her grandson Vladimir, when, at Kherson in A.D. 989, he was bringing Russia once for all into the Eastern Orthodox Christian communion, sought to reinsure himself by receiving a visit from a papal envoy.<sup>5</sup> Vladimir afterwards gave facilities to St. Bruno for a mission to the Pechenegs on the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe;<sup>6</sup> and five embassies from Rome to Russia, and two embassies to Rome from Kiev, in Vladimir's reign alone, are mentioned in the Russian chronicles.<sup>7</sup>

In the event, Russia not only adhered, as Bulgaria had finally adhered, to Eastern Orthodox Christendom; she also voluntarily accepted the ecclesiastical supremacy of the Oecumenical Patriarchate, to which Bulgaria submitted only under *force majeure*. The first Greek metropolitan of Kiev, Theóemptos, ascended his throne in A.D. 1039 as the Oecumenical Patriarch's subordinate,<sup>8</sup> and thereafter, till the Kievan period of Russian history was brought to an end, mid-way through the thirteenth century, by the Mongol conquest, all but two of the metropolitans of Kiev, and about half the bishops of the Russian dioceses, were of Greek nationality.<sup>9</sup> There were, it is true, some symptoms of Russian restiveness under this Greek ascendancy. Whatever may be the significance of the fifty years' interval between the conversion of Vladimir

<sup>1</sup> See II. ii. 172-3, and p. 357, above.

<sup>2</sup> On p. 152, n. 6, above. See, further, pp. 676-7, below.

<sup>3</sup> See Vernadsky, G.: *Kievan Russia* (New Haven 1948, Yale University Press), p. 41, and Dvornik, F.: *The Making of Central and Eastern Europe* (London 1949, Polish Research Centre), p. 68.

<sup>4</sup> See Dvornik, op. cit., pp. 69-70.

<sup>5</sup> See Vernadsky, op. cit., p. 65.

<sup>6</sup> See Dvornik, op. cit., pp. 201-2.

<sup>7</sup> Prince D. Obolensky, in a note to the writer.

<sup>8</sup> See Vernadsky, op. cit., p. 79.

<sup>9</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 152 and 350.

at Kherson in A.D. 989 and the arrival at Kiev of the first Greek metropolitan as a representative of the Oecumenical Patriarch,<sup>1</sup> the Romano-Russian war of A.D. 1043-6 is described by the Byzantine historian Psellus<sup>2</sup> as 'a revolt of the Russians' that was provoked by their 'hatred of the hegemony of the Romans'.<sup>3</sup> In A.D. 1051 and again in A.D. 1145-7 unsuccessful attempts were made in Russia to throw off the Constantinopolitan Patriarchate's ecclesiastical control.<sup>4</sup> Yet, though in the Kievan period Russia already 'formed a distinct socio-political body of her own',<sup>5</sup> it is nevertheless true that, 'culturally, Russia may be thought of in this period as the northern frontier of Byzantium'.<sup>6</sup> The conversion of Russia to the Byzantine culture is exemplified in her reception of East Roman law<sup>7</sup> and of Byzantine literature,<sup>8</sup> and its fruits are apparent in her precocity.<sup>9</sup> Like the contemporary Greek World, and unlike the contemporary Frankish World, Kievan Russia was an urban society with a money economy and with a lay, as well as a clerical, educated class.<sup>10</sup>

'There is a noticeably greater similarity between Kievan Russia and Byzantine and Classical Antiquity than between Russia and Feudal Europe. Only, in this connexion, one would think—in addition to the Byzantine Empire—not of the Roman Empire but of Republican Rome and the Greek democracies. . . . In this period there was a basic difference in economic and political development between Russia and [Western] Europe.'<sup>11</sup>

This difference, however, did not prevent a Byzantine Kievan Russia and an Early Medieval Western Christendom from entering into economic, political, and cultural relations with one another. The contemporaneous conversion of Russia to Orthodox Christianity and of Hungary, Poland, and the Scandinavian countries to Western Christianity at the turn of the tenth and eleventh centuries not only made the old waterway between the Russian and Swedish provinces of a former pagan Scandinavian World into a channel of communication between the two Christendoms; it also established a long land-frontier between them running from the northern slopes of the Carpathians to the southern edge of a persisting pocket of paganism in the hinterland of the south-

<sup>1</sup> Prince Obolensky notes: 'The Byzantine and the Russian sources are curiously silent on the status and organization of the Russian Church during the fifty years that followed Vladimir's conversion. This has led a number of historians to conclude that the Russian Church was not directly subordinated to the Patriarchate of Constantinople until A.D. 1037-9, and to suppose that, before that date, it was either subject to Ochrida or to Rome, or was autocephalous. My own view is that these different theories are not convincing, and that circumstantial evidence and the testimony of later sources strongly suggest that Vladimir's Church was from the beginning subject to the authority of Constantinople. But it seems quite probable that Vladimir used his considerable military resources and political power as bargaining counters in his unsuccessful attempt to manage his own ecclesiastical affairs.'

<sup>2</sup> See Psellus, Michael: *Chronographia*, chap. 91 (p. 129 in C. Sathas' edition (London 1899, Methuen)).

<sup>3</sup> *Τὸ βάρβαρον . . . τοῦτο φύλον ἐπὶ τὴν Ῥωμαίων ἡγεμονίαν τὸν πάντα χρόνον λυττᾷ τε καὶ μέμνη.*

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 12.

<sup>5</sup> See Vernadsky, op. cit., pp. 168, 171, and 292-4.

<sup>6</sup> See ibid., pp. 80 and 271-5, and the present Study, X, ix, 715-17.

<sup>7</sup> See Dvornik, op. cit., p. 236-40.

<sup>8</sup> See Vernadsky, op. cit., pp. 212 and 213.

<sup>9</sup> See Vernadsky, op. cit., p. 280.

<sup>10</sup> Vernadsky, op. cit., pp. 82 and 218-19.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 12.

east corner of the Baltic Sea; and the debatable territory between Russia and Poland round Przemyśl and Czervień, which Vladímir had conquered from the Poles in A.D. 981,<sup>1</sup> became one of the principal avenues for a two-way traffic.

On the economic plane a Russian overland trade with Western Christendom was stimulated by the progressive economic adversity which overtook the East Roman Empire from A.D. 1071 onwards. In the days of the Empire's prosperity the Russians had sent an annual flotilla to trade with Constantinople as the next best thing to a military conquest of her that they had failed to achieve; but, when, as a result of the Saljūq Turkish barbarian invaders' decisive victory at Melazkerd, the East Roman Empire lost command of the food-producing areas in the interior of Anatolia, and, when, as a result of the Romano-Venetian commercial treaty of A.D. 1082, the Venetians, emulated by their Italian competitors, wrested the maritime trade of the Levant out of Greek hands and diverted it to Western ports, the Russians found it more profitable to divert their own trading activities from an impoverished Constantinople to a prospering West.<sup>2</sup> A German record of customs receipts testifies that Russian traders were entering East Francia overland from the east as early as A.D. 903-6.<sup>3</sup> From the eleventh century to the thirteenth—when the overland trade route between the West and Russia was superseded by a water route via the Baltic, Riga, and Novgorod—Regensburg was the main Western terminal of a traffic whose main Russian terminal was Kiev via Smolensk (which, in this age, had a greater volume of trade with Germany than either Novgorod or Pskov).<sup>4</sup> The transfer of Russian trade from the East Roman Empire to Germany was still further stimulated by the disaster that overtook Constantinople in A.D. 1204.<sup>5</sup>

On the political plane the desire of Kievan Russia to entertain relations with Western Christendom may be gauged from the number of royal marriages contracted between members of the House of Rurik and members of the royal families of Western Christendom. Imperial marriages with East Roman princesses were, no doubt, more highly prized.<sup>6</sup> The Emperor Basil II's offer of his daughter Anna's hand in A.D. 988 was the bait which induced Vladímir I to send military help to Basil against the rebel Bárdas Phokás<sup>7</sup> and then to receive baptism; and the King Solomon of the Kievan state, Vladímir Monomákh (*principatum gerebat* A.D. 1113-25), derived his surname from his Greek mother, whose family had been made illustrious by the Emperor Constantine

<sup>1</sup> See Dvornik, *op. cit.*, p. 90, and Vernadsky, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

<sup>2</sup> See Vernadsky, *op. cit.*, p. 216.

<sup>3</sup> See Dvornik, F.: 'The Kiev State and its Relations with Western Europe', in *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 4th series, vol. xxix (London 1947, R. H. S.), pp. 27-46. The present reference is to p. 42.

<sup>4</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 42; eundem, *The Making of Central and Eastern Europe*, p. 248; Vernadsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 338-9.

<sup>5</sup> See Vernadsky, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

<sup>6</sup> It is noteworthy that there were no marriages between Rurikids and members of any Bulgarian imperial family, though, according to Prince D. Obolensky, in a note to the present writer, the Bulgarian clergy had contributed to the conversion of Russia, and though, thereafter, the Bulgarian played an important part as a cultural intermediary between Byzantium and Russia (Vernadsky, *op. cit.*, p. 324).

<sup>7</sup> See Vernadsky, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

Monomákhos (*imperabat* A.D. 1042-54). Yet, in default of Greek imperial marriages, Frankish royal marriages were sedulously sought after by Russian princes. Vladimir I obtained the hands of a Polish and a Swedish princess for his two sons, and married his three daughters to a king of Hungary and two kings of Poland. Yaroslav obtained the hands of a Polish and two German princesses for his sons, and married his daughters to kings of Norway, France, and Hungary. Vsevolod's daughter Eupraxia (*Franciscè* Praxedis) married first the Margrave of the East Frankish Nordmark, Henry of Stade, and then the Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV (an unhappy marriage, from which she retired to Kiev in A.D. 1095). Vladimir Monomákh married Gytha, the daughter of King Harold of England. Vladimir and Isyaslav, the sons of Yaroslav, married their daughters to kings of Poland and Hungary. Vladimir Monomákh obtained the hand of a Swedish princess for his son and married his daughters to a king of Hungary and two kings of Denmark.<sup>1</sup>

The footprints of peddlars, brides, and bridegrooms were followed by pilgrims and monks. In the early twelfth century the shrines of Kiev were visited by Western pilgrims, and before the close of the century a church and monastery had been built there by Irish monks from Regensburg.<sup>2</sup> These religious wayfarers brought with them cults of saints and translations of books, and, in this cultural commerce between a Kievan Russia and an Early Medieval Western Christendom, the principal intermediary was Bohemia,<sup>3</sup> where a Methodian Slavonic tradition that had been persecuted by the Franks and betrayed by the Vatican had managed to survive<sup>4</sup> till the close of the eleventh century.<sup>5</sup> Old Slavonic translations, made in Bohemia, of Latin lives of the Saints found their way into Russia along the overland commercial route, and popularity was achieved in Russia by a late-eleventh-century prayer, translated into Old Slavonic out of an original Latin text, invoking Saints Magnus, Cnut, Olaf, Alban, Botolph, Martin, Victor, Linus, Anacletus, Clement, Leo, Cyril and Methodius, Wenceslas and Adalbert.<sup>6</sup>

'Russia was never more conscious of her common interests with Western Europe' than in the period between the eleventh and thirteenth

<sup>1</sup> These marriages between Rurikids and Frankish royalties are noted by Dvornik in 'The Kiev State and its Relations with Western Europe', p. 41.

<sup>2</sup> See Dvornik, 'The Kiev State', p. 40.

<sup>3</sup> See Dvornik, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

<sup>4</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 36-37.

<sup>5</sup> The Slavonic-rite monastery of Sázava, near Prague, was not suppressed till A.D. 1066.

<sup>6</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 38.

<sup>7</sup> One historical fact that has been cited (e.g. by Prince D. Obolensky in 'Russia's Byzantine Heritage', *Oxford Slavonic Papers*, vol. 1 (Oxford 1950, Clarendon Press), pp. 53-54) as evidence of Russian sympathy for the West—and this apropos of a Western *miademeanour* at Greek Orthodox Christendom's expense—is the institution in Russian Orthodox Christendom, soon after A.D. 1091 (see Dvornik, 'The Kiev State', p. 40), of an annual feast in honour of 'the translation' of the relics of St. Nicholas (who eventually became the patron saint of Christmas Day in the Western World) from their original resting place at Myra, in Lycia, to Bari, in Apulia. In instituting this feast, the Russian Church was following in the footsteps of the Papacy, which had instituted a feast in A.D. 1089 to commemorate the same event in Western Christendom. No corresponding feast was instituted by any of the Greek Orthodox Churches—and, indeed, it would have been surprising if this 'translation' had found its way into a Greek liturgical calendar, considering that the Bariot mariners who had brought the relics home with them in A.D.

centuries.<sup>1</sup> It is the more remarkable, and the more tragic, that, between the thirteenth century and the fifteenth, a Western aggressiveness that had already alienated the main body of Orthodox Christendom should have contrived also to dissipate this accumulated fund of Russian goodwill.

(c) ENCOUNTERS BETWEEN CIVILIZATIONS OF THE FIRST  
TWO GENERATIONS

1. *Encounters with the Post-Alexandrine Hellenic Civilization*<sup>2</sup>

*Likenesses and Differences between the Post-Alexandrine Hellenic and the Modern Western Eruption*

In a post-Alexandrine Hellenic view of Hellenic history the generation of Alexander the Great marked a break with the past and the beginning of a new era as sharply as, in a Modern Western view of Western history, the transition to a 'modern' from a 'medieval' age was marked by a conjuncture of striking new departures on divers planes of activity at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of the Christian Era.<sup>3</sup>

In both these new chapters of history the most obvious ground for a hybistic depreciation of the achievements of the past by comparison with present experiences and expectations was the consciousness of a sudden immense increase in power, including both a power over other human beings, manifested in military conquests, and a power over Physical Nature, manifested in geographical explorations and scientific discoveries. The Macedonian *conquistadores*' feat of overthrowing the Achaemenidae was as exhilarating as the Spanish *conquistadores*' feat of overthrowing the Incas. If a handful of military adventurers could thus shatter, at one blow, a universal state that had come to seem part of the permanent order of Nature, the society out of whose bosom these adventurers had issued forth might account herself, in virtue of their demonstration of her prowess, to be the potential mistress of all the rest of Mankind. But this enhanced sense of military and political power was not the whole, and indeed not the essence, of a new experience which expressed itself in the feeling that a new era had begun. If either a Helene of the third century B.C. or a Westerner of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era had been asked to describe the sensations by which

1087 had 'succeeded in carrying them off by a mixture of cunning and violence' (Obolensky, loc. cit.).

The Russian liturgical office composed for the celebration of the new festival certainly takes the Western side, to judge by the following passages: 'The city of Bari rejoices, and with it the whole Universe exults. . . . Like a star thy relics have gone from the East to the West . . . and the city of Bari has received divine grace by thy presence . . . . If now the country of Myra is silent, the whole World, enlightened by the holy worker of miracles, invokes him with songs of praise.'

One explanation of this unequivocally pro-Bariot Russian line in a dispute in which the Bariots were flagrantly in the wrong is perhaps to be found in the fact that Bari was a familiar, and Myra an unfamiliar, place to Russians of that generation. Till the Norman conquest in A.D. 1071 Bari, as well as Myra, had been a city of the East Roman Empire, and a garrison of Russian troops had been posted at Bari in A.D. 1066 (see Dvornik, *ibid.*).

<sup>1</sup> Dvornik, 'The Kiev State', p. 45.

<sup>2</sup> See xi, maps 24, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32.

<sup>3</sup> These two unofficial new eras have been noticed in V. vi. 340-2 and VI. vii. 300.



his consciousness of a new era was sustained, he would probably have given less weight to his sense of an enhancement of his society's material power than to his sense of an expansion of its mental horizon. In the sensation produced by the discovery 'in real life' of a hitherto fabulous India to which the Macedonians made their way by opening up a continent, and the Portuguese by mastering the Ocean, the sense of power arising from the successful performance of a mighty feat of exploration was accompanied and qualified, on both occasions, by a sense of wonder at the revelation of a marvellous alien world endowed with a mysteriously inimitable skill and wisdom. In the sensation produced in the Hellenic World by the scientific discoveries of an Aristotle or a Theophrastus, and in the Western World by the 'renaissance' of the Hellenic culture, the sense of power arising from a notable addition to knowledge and understanding was likewise accompanied and qualified by a sense of impotence in face of the reminder of Man's relative ignorance which every addition to Man's understanding of the Universe is apt to bring with it.

This comparison of the Hellenic World's experience in and after the generation of Alexander the Great with the Western World's experience at the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries of the Christian Era might offend the *amour propre* of post-Modern Western readers who had not yet emancipated themselves from the Modern Western World's irrational belief in its own uniqueness. But, before deciding to dismiss the suggested parallel as an unwarranted impertinence, Western believers in the incomparability of their own society would be well advised to put themselves on the alert against the distorting effects of 'the egocentric illusion' on a historian's perspective,<sup>1</sup> and, in a chastened frame of mind, to give a dispassionate consideration to the facts.

Even on the crudely simple test of the comparative extent of the areas over which the Modern Western Civilization and the post-Alexandrine Hellenic Civilization respectively succeeded in radiating their influence, it might be observed that Hellenism had anticipated the West in pushing its way to the extremities of the Old World—as far as Ceylon and Japan and Britain—and that, if Alexander had lived to be so tormented by his thirst for finding new worlds to conquer as to have been stimulated into forestalling the fifteenth-century Portuguese invention of ocean-going sailing ships, he might have forestalled the Spanish discovery of the Americas only to find that no civilization had yet emerged there above the dead level of primitive social life. If future research into the chronology of the indigenous American civilizations were to confirm the probability that the genesis of the earliest of them was posterior to Alexander's day, then the post-Alexandrine Hellenic Society would prove to have anticipated the Modern Western Society in having achieved the feat of making an impact on all existing contemporary societies of its own species; and, when we call the roll of these two supremely aggressive civilizations' respective victims, we find that their numbers are approximately equal. The post-Alexandrine Hellenic Civilization was encountered by the Syriac, the Hittite, the Egyptian, the Babylonian, the

<sup>1</sup> See I. i. 157-64.

Indic, and the Sinic; the Modern Western Civilization by the Orthodox Christian, the Islamic, the Hindu, and the Far Eastern. Even if we multiply the number of the Modern West's victims by adding the Jews to the list and by distinguishing an Iranic from an Arabic Muslim society, and Russian and Japanese branches from the respective main bodies of the Orthodox Christian and Far Eastern societies, we shall only have brought the number of the Modern West's victims up to eight, as against the six victims of the Modern West's post-Alexandrine Hellenic rival.

On this showing, we may venture to conclude that our comparison is a legitimate one, but, in vindicating it, we must also take note of one important difference. In studying the impact of the Modern West on its contemporaries, we have found occasion to distinguish between an Early Modern Age, in which the West was radiating out its culture in its full-blooded entirety, including the religious element that was its essence, and a Late Modern Age, in which the West was radiating out a secular extract from its culture, from which the religious element had been eliminated.<sup>1</sup> There is no corresponding division of chapters in the post-Alexandrine history of the radiation of Hellenism; for, by comparison with the Western Civilization, Hellenism was precocious. The Western Civilization did not secularize its *Weltanschauung* till the close of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era, a thousand years after its entry on to the stage of History through its emergence from a post-Hellenic social interregnum. The corresponding *Aufklärung* in the Hellenic World took place towards the close of the fifth century B.C., not more than seven hundred years after a post-Minoan social interregnum had brought an Hellenic Civilization to birth. Thus, by Alexander's day, this Hellenic *Aufklärung* was already a hundred years old, and there was no first chapter of post-Alexandrine Hellenic history in which Hellenism was propagated in its original integrity. The Attic drama that was presented to Parthians and Spaniards was not the communal religious rite that was celebrated in the theatre of Dionysus at Athens at annual festivals that were red-letter days in the local Attic ecclesiastical calendar; it was a commercial performance staged by a vagrant international dramatic artists' guild trading under the name *Διονυσίου Τεχνίται*.<sup>2</sup>

One of the possible reasons for the Hellenic Civilization's comparative precocity in bursting out of the intellectual swaddling clothes of traditional religion is the apparent poverty of the Hellenic Society's religious heritage from the antecedent Minoan Society<sup>3</sup> by comparison with the richness of the Christian heritage bequeathed to the Western Society by a Hellenism which had been converted to Christianity on its death-bed.<sup>4</sup> In Hellenic history the comparative insignificance of a religious legacy, which, in Western history, was to act as both a powerful

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 118-19 and 316-24, above.

<sup>2</sup> See IV. iv. 243; V. v. 201, n. 1, and 481; and p. 518, below.

<sup>3</sup> The question whether Orphism is or is not to be regarded as a legacy to the Hellenic Society from the religious experience of a disintegrated Minoan Society has been discussed in I. i. 95-100 and in V. v. 84-7. See further X. ix. 738-40.

<sup>4</sup> In a previous context (VII. vii. 420-3) we have come to the conclusion that the heritage of a higher religion is a feature that distinguishes the civilizations of the third generation, as a sub-species, from those of the second generation and the first.

stimulus and a heavy incubus, can be seen to have had a twofold effect. On the one hand it allowed Rationalism to raise its head more easily, and therefore more early, than it was to prove possible for Rationalism to triumph in Western Christendom; but on the other hand an intellectually enlightened Hellenic World never showed itself so prone as a secularized Late Modern Western World to intellectual hybris.

The Western pioneer rationalists' successive experiences of being first embittered by the length and arduousness of their struggle with a formidably entrenched Western Christian Church, and then intoxicated by the apparent completeness of their eventual victory, bred in them a temper expressed in the Voltairian war-cry 'Écrasez l'Infâme'; and this unenlightened spirit of intolerance, which a Modern Western Enlightenment had caught from the Judaic religion against whose dominion it had revolted, made a self-emancipated West equally unwilling to give credence, credit, or quarter to 'the imposture' of Muhammad or to any other of the living higher religions with which it was being brought into contact by the world-wide activities of its mariners, traders, and empire-builders. In this temper the Late Modern Western rationalist intellect did not hesitate to banish Religion itself from its mental kingdom of spiritual forces and values as a superfluous, illusory, and morbid excrescence on the healthy tissue of the rational human animal's social and cultural life; but the earlier victory of the Hellenic Enlightenment over a less tenacious religious conservatism had a different sequel.

In this Hellenic spiritual passage of arms a disgust at the light-hearted immorality of the shameless barbarian pantheon of Olympus, and a revulsion from the spiritually deeper, but also darker, stratum of Hellenic religious life that was tapped by the 'chthonic' cults of blood and soil, were quickly overborne by an unsatisfied hunger for spiritual bread which had already begun to torment Hellenic souls before the fifth-century *Aufklärung* had deprived them of even the stony substitute which was all that had been doled out to them by the parsimony of History. When the triumphal progress of their military and intellectual conquests brought the post-Alexandrine Hellenes into contact with full-blooded non-Hellenic religions whose spiritual value and efficacy seemed to be guaranteed by their manifestly assured command of their votaries' voluntary allegiance, the emotion that this spectacle evoked in Hellenic hearts had more in it of a wistful envy for the privileged possessors of a spiritual pearl of great price<sup>1</sup> than of a contemptuous pity for the dupes of an unscrupulously fraudulent priestcraft. Even the syncretistic religious cults devised by coldly calculating post-Alexandrine Hellenic statesmen—such as Ptolemy Sôtér's attempt to bring his Egyptian and Hellenic subjects together on common religious ground through his manufacture of the hybrid divinity Sarapis,<sup>2</sup> or Augustus's institution of Caesar-worship to serve as the religious cement for a Roman-built Hellenic universal state<sup>3</sup>—were tributes to their Hellenic subjects' horror of a religious vacuum, besides being designs for taking advantage of their non-Hellenic subjects' religiosity.

This receptive attitude of the post-Alexandrine Hellenic conquerors

<sup>1</sup> See V. v. 545-9.

<sup>2</sup> See V. v. 689-91.

<sup>3</sup> See V. v. 648-50.

towards the religions of societies which Hellenism had taken captive on the intellectual as well as on the military plane was one cause of the momentous religious consequences of an aggressive Hellenic Civilization's impact on six societies of the same species. We must take the measure of a post-Alexandrine Hellenism's flow and ebb if we are to see its religious consequences in their historical setting.

*The Flow and Ebb of Post-Alexandrine Hellenism*

In a process of penetration that resulted in a temporary Hellenization of the World, the entering wedge thrust in by Alexander the Great and his Macedonian and Roman successors was the death-dealing point of the sarissa and the pilum, and the first objective of these Hellenic military aggressors was the economic exploitation of their victims. Yet their profession of the nobler aim of propagating the achievements and ideals of the Hellenic culture was something more than a specious camouflage for the pursuit of a sordid self-interest by methods of barbarism. This profession was also partially sincere, and the warrant of its sincerity was the extent of its translation from words into facts.

The Hellenic conquerors' master-instrument for the fulfilment of their promise to impart the spiritual wealth of the Hellenic culture in exchange for appropriating a share of the material wealth of the populations whom they had conquered was the institution, *in partibus Orientalium et Barbarorum*, of Hellenic city-states, created *ex nihilo* by a politically omnipotent Hellenic war-lord's fiat, out of which a nucleus of privileged Hellenic citizen-colonists was to radiate the light of Hellenism among the subject native peasantry of the surrounding country-side from whom the intrusive landlord-missionaries drew their rents. A policy that had been inaugurated on the grand scale by Alexander the Great himself was pursued thereafter, for some four and a half centuries, by Alexander's Macedonian and Roman successors down to the Emperor Hadrian.<sup>1</sup>

Even in Egypt, where the economic exploitation of the indigenous population was more efficient and more overt than in any other land on which Hellenism had imposed itself by conquest,<sup>2</sup> and where 'the natives', on their side, had been wont, since the Hyksos' conquest of Egypt not much less than fourteen hundred years before Alexander's day, to reject the culture of successive alien conquerors with a demonic animosity,<sup>3</sup> at least a veneer of the Hellenic city-state dispensation was laid over the granite rock-bottom of a petrified Egyptian body social before the end of the story of the encounter between these two dramatically diverse civilizations. In their anxiety not to diminish the Egyptian milch-cow's scientifically managed yield, Alexander's narrow-hearted Ptolemaic successors deliberately forbore, in Egypt, from further foundations of Hellenic city-states after they had added Ptolemais to Alexandria and to a pre-Alexandrine Naucratis; and the unimaginative Roman successors of the Ptolemies had no other aim in Egypt than to maintain the yield which the Ptolemies had taught them to extract; yet, in the third century of the Christian Era, in an age in which the spread

<sup>1</sup> See VI. vii. 111 and 132-5.    <sup>2</sup> See pp. 696-8, below.    <sup>3</sup> See VI. vii. 49-50.

of the Hellenic city-state dispensation was coming to a halt in other provinces of an Hellenic universal state, the immemorially ancient cantons ('nomes') of Egypt were being superficially converted into the simulacra of self-governing municipalities equipped with the amenities of Hellenic urban life.<sup>1</sup> Outside Egypt, in their Asiatic possessions, even the Ptolemies had vied with their Seleucid neighbours and rivals in showing themselves worthy heirs of their common master Alexander—as was witnessed by a chain of Hellenic city-states, strung along the Transjordanian stretch of 'the King's Highway'<sup>2</sup> from Gadara to a Rabbath Ammon masquerading as Philadelphia,<sup>3</sup> which were eventually taken over by the Seleucidae from their Ptolemaic founders, and by the Romans from the Seleucidae.

This more or less benevolently despotic propagation of the Hellenic culture by Hellenic conquerors is not, however, so remarkable as its spontaneous adoption by non-Hellenes who were under no external compulsion to open their hearts and minds to it. A Philadelphia and an Adrianople, whose names commemorate their foundation by some Macedonian or Roman potentate, are less eloquent monuments of the Hellenic culture's intrinsic attractiveness than a Nicomedia and a Nicaea, whose names commemorate their foundation by the Philhellene descendants of a barbarian prince of Bithynia who had thrown off the yoke of the Achaemenidae, had escaped being conquered by Alexander, and had successfully resisted the imperialism of the Seleucidae. In the Antonine Indian Summer of Hellenic history, these post-Alexandrine Hellenic city-states that owed their existence to the unconstrained Philhellenism of *ci-devant* barbarians could proudly point to the achievements of an Arrian of Nicomedia<sup>4</sup> and a Dio of Prusa as evidence that they were making as great a contribution to Hellenic life and letters in that generation as Antioch or Alexandria, not to speak of Chaeronea or Athens.

Thus, in the event, the post-Alexandrine Hellenic culture made peaceful conquests of ground which had not been won for it by Macedonian or Roman soldiers, while in other regions, over which the tide of Hellenic military conquest had once flowed victoriously, the ebb of Hellenism in this repellantly aggressive guise was followed by a politically liberated non-Hellenic population's voluntary reception, on their own initiative, of an Hellenic culture to whose aesthetic and intellectual attractions they had remained impervious so long as this alien *Weltanschauung* had been made odious to them by being associated with their forcible subjection to a distasteful alien rule. The cultivation of Hellenic art in the Kushan successor-state of a Bactrian Greek empire astride the Hindu Kush in the last century B.C. and the first century of the Christian Era, and the cultivation of Hellenic science and philosophy in the Sasanian and 'Abbasid successor-states of a Seleucid Greek Empire in Irāq and Iran,<sup>5</sup> had, like the cereal crops of Egypt, to wait for

<sup>1</sup> See VI. vii. 50, and pp. 443-4 and 586, below.

<sup>2</sup> See VI. vii. 100-2.

<sup>3</sup> After the liquidation of Hellenic rule south of the Taurus by the Primitive Muslim Arabs, a previously Ammonite 'Philadelphia' reverted to the name 'Ammān'.

<sup>4</sup> See V. v. 38.

<sup>5</sup> It is significant that, although the self-Hellenization of the Syriac World east of the Euphrates did not reach its zenith until after the beginning of the 'Abbasid Age, and



its harvest till the subsidence of a fructifying but overwhelming flood had allowed the fertilized fields to show their faces again to the Sun.

The extent to which the military conquests of Hellenic war-lords, imposing though these were, were outranged, in the Time-dimension as well as in the Space-dimension, by the pacific radiation of the Hellenic culture is revealed by a comparative survey of the expansion of Hellenism on these two different planes.

Though the energy, man-power, and technique which the Hellenic Society diverted to the military conquest of its neighbours was a mere residue left over from the military resources that it was generating and expending in the chronic pursuit of fratricidal civil wars,<sup>1</sup> the first im-

although the 'Abbasid Caliphate embraced Syria and Egypt as well as 'Irāq, Iran, and the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin, the sources from which the Syriac-speaking and Arabic-speaking Hellenists of the 'Abbasid Age drew their draughts of Hellenic culture were not Alexandria or Antioch or any other focus of Hellenism in Syriac territories west of the Euphrates which had been under Hellenic rule for nearly a thousand years, but were Jund-i-Shāpūr in Khuzistan, on the south-eastern fringe of the Tigris-Euphrates Basin, and the oasis of Merv on the south-western fringe of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin (see O'Leary, *de L.: How Greek Science Passed to the Arabs* (London 1948, Kegan Paul), pp. 93, 96, 117, and 153). A political explanation of this apparent cultural paradox may be found in the fact that in Margiana and Susiana Hellenic rule had lasted less than two hundred years, instead of more than nine hundred, and had long since ceased to be remembered, and by the same token ceased to be resented, by the sixth century of the Christian Era, when Khusrū Anushirwan (*imperator* A.D. 531-79) founded at Jund-i-Shāpūr a school of Hellenic medicine and philosophy on the pattern of the school of Alexandria.

Jund-i-Shāpūr was selected by Anushirwan for this purpose because it had been an Hellenic city and a home of Aristotelian studies; but its Greek population had been the monument of an Hellenic military defeat, not of an Hellenic victory. They had been prisoners-of-war and civilian deportees who had been planted there by the Sasanian Emperor Shāpūr I (*imperator* A.D. 241-72) after his capture of the Roman Emperor Valerian and conquest of the Syrian metropolis Antioch-on-Orontes in A.D. 260—in contrast to the former Greek population of the by then no doubt already extinct Hellenic city-state Seleucia-on-Eulaeus (see Tarn, W. W.: *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge 1938, University Press), p. 18), which, like all cities of that name, had been founded by the Seleucidae, and whose Greek citizens, in their day, had been, not 'displaced persons', but an 'ascendancy' dominating the native inhabitants of the *ci-devant* Achaemenian imperial city of Susa. The deportees who had brought the study of Aristotle to Jund-i-Shāpūr from Antioch-on-Orontes in the third century of the Christian Era had presumably been Greek-speaking, or at any rate bilingual; but, whatever the original standing of the Greek language at Jund-i-Shāpūr may have been, Syriac came to prevail there as the linguistic medium for Science as well as for the affairs of everyday life (see O'Leary, *op. cit.*, p. 71).

It is also significant that, in the self-Hellenization of the Syriac World in the 'Abbasid Age, an important part was played by the fossilized remnant of an elsewhere extinct Babylonian culture that survived at Harrān in North-Western Mesopotamia (see Sweetman, J. W.: *Islam and Christian Theology*, Part I, vol. 1 (London 1945, Lutterworth Press), pp. 84-85; O'Leary, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-5). One of the most eminent of the ninth-century translators of Greek works into Arabic was the Harrānī Thābit b. Qurrah, who was excommunicated and banished by the pagan high priest of Harrān but nevertheless remained faithful to his ancestral religion—though his loyalty to it cost him his post of physician to the Caliph Qāhir (*imperator* A.D. 932-4). The Harrānīs were particularly well qualified for serving as interpreters of Hellenism to the Syriac World because a very strong tincture of Hellenism had been infused into their own Babylonian culture (see Sweetman, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-85; O'Leary, *op. cit.*, p. 172). This syncretism was the fruit of an attitude of receptivity towards the Hellenic culture; and this receptivity, in its turn, was the fruit of an *entente cordiale* between the Babylonian subjects and the Macedonian destroyers of the Achaemenian Empire. The religious and intellectual leaders of the Babylonian Society had seen in Alexander the Great a liberator from an alien yoke which had become an agency for the encroachment of the Syriac language and culture upon the Babylonian Society's domain (see V. v. 94 and 123); and, under a subsequent easy-going Seleucid régime, the peasantry of Babylonia had not been alienated by being made the victims of a Ptolemaic exploitation.

<sup>1</sup> See III. iii. 138-40 and 149-50, and p. 437, below.

pact of the Alexandrine Hellenic war-machine was shattering, and in the sequel its final recoil was delayed no less than twice by a fresh career of conquest which disappointed the hopes of adversaries who had rashly ventured to try conclusions again with an aggressor whose martial energy had delusively appeared to be flagging.

The overwhelming psychological effect produced by Alexander's astonishing feat of overthrowing the Achaemenian Empire in five years<sup>1</sup> is attested by the passivity of the conquered populations during the fratricidal wars for the division of the spoils which Alexander's Macedonian successors continued to wage against one another for forty years (321-281 B.C.) after Alexander's death<sup>2</sup> with the same impunity as the Arab conquerors of the Roman and Sasanian empires a thousand years later, after the death of the Caliph 'Uthmān, and the Spanish conquerors of the Andean Empire of the Incas in the sixteenth century of the Christian Era.<sup>3</sup> This diversion of the conquerors' efforts to the task of self-destruction did, indeed, save the independence of the former provinces of the Achaemenian Empire, from Bithynia to Azerbaijan inclusive, which had happened to lie beyond striking distance of Alexander's left wing on his march from the Hellespont to the Caspian Gates; but, of all the territories that Alexander had overrun, the Indus Valley alone escaped from his successors' grasp; and this was an ex-Achaemenian territory which had thrown off the Achaemenian yoke long before Alexander's advent. No appreciable portion of Alexander's conquests that had been acquired by him direct from the Achaemenian Empire was lost by his successors till the Parnian Nomads from Transcaspia took possession of the Seleucids' province Parthia about half way through the third century B.C.;<sup>4</sup> and, after that, *circa* 183 B.C., the ruler of a Greek principality in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin, whose communications with the heart of the Hellenic World had been cut by the Parnians' intrusion, was nevertheless able to muster the military strength to cross the Hindu Kush and overrun the vast domain of a broken-down Mauryan Empire, from the Panjab to Sind and Bengal.

This stroke might have added the whole of India to the territories under Hellenic rule, if the new prize had not evoked a new round of fratricidal wars for the division of the spoils between Greek and Greek. Yet neither the conquest of the Bactrian Greek conqueror of India's base of operations north-west of the Hindu Kush in 168-7 B.C. by a rival Greek war-lord who was perhaps the leader of a Seleucid expeditionary force<sup>5</sup> nor the subsequent conquest of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin

<sup>1</sup> See II. ii. 139.

<sup>2</sup> See XI. ix. 260-71.

<sup>3</sup> The proneness of alien conquerors of universal states to turn their arms against one another has been noticed in IV. iv. 484-6.

<sup>4</sup> Perhaps the only exception was the fringe of ex-Achaemenian territory along the eastern edge of the Iranian Plateau which Seleucus I Nicator ceded, *circa* 303 B.C., together with his claims to the already lost Indus Basin, to the founder of the Mauryan Empire, Chandragupta, in exchange for five hundred war-elephants for use in Seleucus's wars against his Macedonian rivals (see Smith, V. A.: *The Early History of India*, 3rd ed. (Oxford 1914, Clarendon Press), p. 119; Tarn, W. W.: *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge 1938, University Press), p. 100).

<sup>5</sup> For this account of Eucratidas, see Tarn, W. W.: *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge 1938, University Press), pp. 186-216.

by the Yuechi Nomads between 141 and 128 B.C.<sup>1</sup> prevented the Greeks from clinging to part of Demetrius's Indian conquests. Greek rule lingered on south-east of the Hindu Kush till after 32 B.C.<sup>2</sup> and thus perhaps just overlapped in time with the establishment of an Hellenic universal state round the coasts of the Mediterranean in the shape of the Roman Empire. In conquering a Carthaginian Empire which had successfully foiled the efforts of all previous Hellenic aggressors to break into the Syriac Society's colonial domain in the western basin of the Mediterranean, the Romans had emulated in the west the eastward conquests of Alexander the Great and Demetrius; and, when the Romans subsequently marched eastward in turn in Alexander's footsteps, they brought the Orientals' first military counter-offensive to a halt in the last century B.C. and postponed the final liquidation of Hellenic rule south-east of Taurus for another seven hundred years.

Before the tide of war was thus turned again in the Hellenic Society's favour by Roman force of arms, the Oriental counter-offensive had gone far. A westward expansion of the Parthian Power from the Caspian Gates to the east bank of the Middle Euphrates, which was maintained against successive Seleucid attempts to push the Parthians back between 140 and 129 B.C., had ham-strung the Seleucid Power by depriving it of its granary in Babylonia. The surviving remnant of a Macedonian successor-state of the Achaemenian Empire whose rule had once extended from the Aegean to the Pamirs was snuffed out when the Seleucid capital, Antioch-on-Orontes, was occupied in 83 B.C. by Tigranes, the king of the Seleucid Power's parvenu Armenian successor-state. In 87-86 B.C. the soldiers of Mithradates Eupator, the king of the Achaemenian Empire's never conquered Pontic Cappadocian successor-state, had carried Oriental arms as far into Continental European Greece as the Achaemenid Emperor Xerxes had penetrated in 480-479 B.C.<sup>3</sup> And these territorial gains by independent Oriental Powers at the Hellenic Powers' expense, extensive though they had been, had not been so ominous as the internal revolts of previously passive subject Oriental populations. As early as the turn of the third and second centuries B.C. the Ptolemaic Power had been shaken in its Egyptian citadel by the mutinousness of Egyptian fallāhīn whom the Ptolemaic Government had rashly converted from peasants into soldiers at a crisis in one of the fratricidal wars between the Ptolemaic and Seleucid Greek empires; and thereafter, in 166 B.C., the hillmen of Judaea had successfully revolted against a Seleucid régime which had annexed the Ptolemies' Syrian possessions at the opening of the century without taking over the Ptolemies' prudent policy of cultural *laissez-faire*.<sup>4</sup>

This wave of Oriental militancy was broken by a counter-wave of Roman conquest and empire-building in the East. Between 74 and 62 B.C. successive Roman expeditionary forces led by Lucullus and Pompey subjugated successor-states of the Achaemenian Empire in Northern and North-Eastern Anatolia, from Bithynia to Pontus inclusive, which

<sup>1</sup> See Tarn, *op. cit.*, p. 277.

<sup>2</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 343.

<sup>3</sup> See I. i. 76, n. 1.

<sup>4</sup> This insurrection against Ptolemaic and Seleucid rule in Egypt and Judaea in the second century B.C. has been noticed in V. v. 68.

had never been conquered by Alexander or by any of his Macedonian successors; Antioch-on-Orontes, with the rest of the former metropolitan territory of the Seleucid Monarchy in Northern Syria, was wrested out of Tigranes' hands; and the line of the Middle Euphrates<sup>1</sup> was selected by Pompey to serve as the eastern military and political frontier of an Hellenic World which had now been taken under Rome's aegis. When the chill shadow of Roman military power thus descended on the ex-Achaemenian territories west of Euphrates, an Egyptian peasantry who had been taking advantage of the relaxation of the Ptolemies' grip were sufficiently sensitive to this fresh change in the local political climate to relapse into their customary sullen submissiveness for the next five centuries, till the Monophysite Movement gave them their opportunity, in the fifth and sixth centuries of the Christian Era, to resume their revolt against Hellenism by defying a Roman régime which was then at last beginning to go the way of its Ptolemaic predecessor. The Jews, who were perhaps more passionate, though not more fanatical or more stubborn, than their Egyptian fellow victims, wilfully blinded themselves to the signs of the times<sup>2</sup> and brought destruction upon their metropolitan community in Judaea by three times challenging the Romans to ordeal by battle between A.D. 66 and A.D. 135.<sup>3</sup>

Nor did the Roman counter-offensive against the independent Oriental Powers come to a permanent standstill at the Pompeian line along the Middle Euphrates, notwithstanding Crassus's disastrous failure in 53 B.C. to conquer the Parthian Empire of the Arsacidae, and Trajan's all but disastrous repetition of Crassus's ambitious enterprise in A.D. 114-17. Augustus's more modest forward move of asserting Rome's suzerainty over Armenia in 20 B.C. had more lasting effects, and the obstinate unwillingness of the Arsacidae and their Sasanid successors to reconcile themselves to this unpalatable *fait accompli* beyond their northern borders eventually provoked successive eastward advances of a Roman frontier which Trajan's successor Hadrian had withdrawn again to Pompey's Euphratean line from Trajan's outposts at the foot of the Zagros and the head of the Persian Gulf. The southern frontier of Rome's Armenian protectorate was progressively screened against attack or infiltration from a base of hostile operations in Babylonia by Marcus Aurelius's annexation of Osrhoene in A.D. 166 and Septimius Severus's annexation of the rest of Northern Mesopotamia, up to the line of the River Khabūr, in A.D. 194-9. Even after these cumulative failures to stand up to Rome had cost the Arsacids their throne in A.D. 224, and after the ensuing bout of anarchy by which the Roman Empire was convulsed between A.D. 235 and A.D. 284 had given the Arsacids' militant Sasanid successors a unique opportunity to show their mettle, the first trial of strength between an old Roman and a new Sasanian Power ended humiliatingly for the Sasanidae in a further eastward extension of the cordon of Roman territory along the southern frontier of Armenia through the annexation to the Roman Empire of five districts east of the Tigris in A.D. 296.

Indeed, during the four centuries of its existence, the Sasanian Power

<sup>1</sup> See p. 358, n. 2, above.

<sup>2</sup> See V. v. 390, n. 3.

<sup>3</sup> See V. v. 68.

showed itself impotent to fulfil its *raison d'être* by completing a liquidation of Hellenic rule in the former domain of the Achaemenian Empire which the Sasanids' Arsacid predecessors had so nearly accomplished in the second century B.C. The Sasanids' permanent achievements went no farther than the recovery of the five districts east of Tigris and the Mesopotamian frontier fortress of Nisibis in A.D. 363 and the acquisition of the lion's share of Armenia when, *circa* A.D. 387-90,<sup>1</sup> the Roman Imperial Government freed its hands for grappling with a threat to its existence on the Danube by consenting to the partition of this long-disputed buffer-state beyond the Euphrates. Even the last and most devastating of the Romano-Persian wars (*gerebatur* A.D. 603-28) ended in a peace of exhaustion on the basis of the *status quo ante bellum*; and, in bleeding his empire white for the sake of seeing his outposts temporarily occupy Calchedon and Tripolitania, Khusrū II Parwiz was merely opening the door and showing the way to Arab *tertiū gaudentes*.

These Primitive Muslim Arab conquerors performed the last act in the drama of the Syriac World's encounter with Hellenism on the military and political plane by finally liquidating Roman rule in Syria and Egypt and reconstituting in twelve campaigns (*gerebantur* A.D. 632-43) the Syriac universal state which it had taken Alexander five campaigns (*gerebantur* 334-330 B.C.) to destroy.<sup>2</sup> Thus the end of an Hellenic military ascendancy which had endured for 973 years in the ex-Achaemenian provinces west of the Euphrates was as swift and conclusive as its original imposition had been. But the spectacle on this military plane gives only a superficial and misleading impression of the true course of the encounter; for, as we have already observed, Alexander and his Macedonian and Roman successors, in compelling their Oriental victims to submit to the force of Hellenic arms, had provoked them into steeling their hearts and minds against the reception of the Hellenic culture; and, after these Hellenic men of war had done their obstructive work, an Hippocrates and an Aristotle had still to wait patiently for centuries on the threshold of a closed academic door which no military weapon could prise open to give them entry. The Syriac World did not begin to show a spontaneous interest in Hellenic science and philosophy till it had begun to shake itself loose from Hellenic domination by providing itself with a Christianity of its own in the shape of the Nestorian and Monophysite heresies and with a literary medium of its own in the shape of the Syriac language; and the door thus at last set ajar was not opened wide till after the Arabs had pushed the Romans back beyond the Taurus and had brought with them the Arabic language as an alternative medium to the Syriac. If any credit is to be given to any men-at-arms for the belated self-Hellenization of Syriac minds, we must conclude that the military pioneers who cleared the way for these minds' reception of

<sup>1</sup> According to Christensen, A.: *L'Iran sous les Sassanides* (Copenhagen 1936, Levin and Munksgaard), p. 248, the partition was carried out early in the reign of Vahram IV (*regnabat* either A.D. 388-99 or A.D. 386-97). According to J. B. Bury, in his *editio minor* of Edward Gibbon's *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, vol. iii (London 1901, Methuen), p. 504, the negotiator of the partition on the Roman side was Theodosius I (*imperabat* A.D. 379-95).

<sup>2</sup> See II. ii. 139 and IV. iv. 485, n. 3.



the Hellenic culture were not an Alexander or a Pompey but were a Khālid b. al-Walid and a S'ad b. abī Waqqās.

The success of the Nestorian and Monophysite movements in achieving by non-military means, before the advent of the Muslim Arab warriors, so much more for the liberation of the Syriac World than had ever been accomplished by the Maccabees or the Sasanidae, is an exemplification, in the experience of the Hellenic Society's victims, of a fundamental law governing the histories of encounters between societies which has been put in classical form, in terms of Hellenic experience, in Horace's celebrated epigram *Graecia capta ferum victorem cepit et artes intulit agresti Latio*.<sup>1</sup> Hellenes and Orientals alike achieved cultural conquests as a result of having fallen into military and political adversity; and the Hellenization of the Latin-speaking barbarians of Central Italy through the gentle influence of conquered Greek city-states in Campania and Magna Graecia was not the earliest instance of this phenomenon in Hellenic history. The Greek-speaking barbarians of Macedonia and Epirus were being Hellenized in the same age through the forcible incorporation of a Chalcidicē and an Ambracia into their Homerically adolescent bodies politic;<sup>2</sup> and, more than two hundred years earlier than that, the forcible incorporation of the Greek city-states along the western seaboard of Anatolia into the barbarian kingdom of Lydia had made a Philhellene out of a Croesus who had come to the throne at Sardis as the leader of an anti-Hellenic party.<sup>3</sup>

In the Hellenic Civilization's encounter with its Syriac sister society the fitful imposition of Carthaginian rule upon Greek city-states in Western Sicily over a period of a century and a half, beginning with the launching of the great Carthaginian offensive in 409 B.C. and ending in the outbreak of the First Romano-Punic War in 263 B.C., probably did more to Hellenize the Syriac Society's colonial domain in the western basin of the Mediterranean than the subsequent Hellenic conquest and colonization of the Carthaginian Empire by the Hellenic Civilization's Roman converts. In Anatolia in the last century B.C. a Mithradates Eupator, who emulated Xerxes in boasting of a Persian pedigree as well as in carrying his arms into European Greece, was at the same time proud to account himself a Philhellene; and the source of the Hellenism which had captivated this Oriental war-lord of a Pontic Cappadocia that had escaped Macedonian conquest was not an imperial Pella or Antioch; it was a subject Sinope which had been annexed by Eupator's grandfather Pharnaces *circa* 183 B.C. and had been chosen by Eupator himself to be the maritime Greek capital of his motley dominions<sup>4</sup> in place of a

<sup>1</sup> Horace: *Epistulae*, Book II, Ep. i, ll. 156-7.

<sup>2</sup> See III. iii. 477-89.

<sup>3</sup> See Herodotus, Book I, chap. 92.

<sup>4</sup> The Pontic Greek city-state that was thus forcibly honoured by Persian sovereigns of the Cappadocian hinterland, who belonged to the post-Alexandrine dynasty founded by the ex-satrap Ariarathes, had previously been paid the same two-edged compliment by Datames, the moving spirit in the revolt of the western satraps against the Achaemenian Imperial Government in 367 B.C. Before embarking on this abortive attempt to carve out a Cappadocian successor-state of the Achaemenian Empire for himself, the ambitious Carian empire-builder had occupied Sinope and made it the capital of his ephemeral principality (see Olmstead, A. T.: *History of the Persian Empire* (Chicago 1948, University of Chicago Press), p. 412).

landlocked native city of Amasia<sup>1</sup> that was hallowed by the rock-cut tombs of Eupator's Persian ancestors. Nor was the cultural radiation of this subjugated colonial Greek city-state Sinope confined within the frontiers of the Oriental kingdom which had incorporated Sinope in its body politic. Across the breadth of Pontic Cappadocia the hinterland of Sinope expanded inland into the adjoining sister Cappadocian successor-state of the Achaemenian Empire in the interior of Eastern Anatolia; and by the fourth century of the Christian Era the cumulative cultural effect of an Hellenic influence which since Augustus's day had been playing upon Cappadocia, not only from Sinope, but from a more powerful though still more distant transmitting station at Ephesus,<sup>2</sup> had inspired descendants of Persian feudal barons planted in Cappadocia in the Achaemenian Age<sup>3</sup> to become the Attic-educated Cappadocian Fathers of an Eastern Orthodox Christian Church.

These instances of cultural attraction exercised on barbarian, Syriac, and Hittite hinterlands by politically subjugated maritime Hellenic city-states give the same evidence as the role subsequently played by the Hellenic deportee-settlement at Jund-i-Shāpūr in the self-Hellenization of the Syriac World after the final liquidation of Hellenic rule on Syriac ground. They testify to the operation of a social 'law' to the effect that, in cultural encounters between contemporaries, the sensitiveness of the receptivity of the heirs of an assaulted culture to the influence of an impinging culture is apt to be in inverse ratio to the degree to which the representatives of the impinging culture yield to the temptation of trying to force an entry.

This law is likewise revealed in the history of the radiation of Hellenic art, which travelled farther afield than Hellenic science or philosophy, and much farther afield than Hellenic arms. An Hellenic Kingdom of Macedon whose soldiers once marched eastward as far as the Panjab never succeeded in permanently establishing its dominion over the headwaters of its domestic rivers Axios and Strymon; yet the image and superscription of coins minted in the Lower Strymon Basin by Philip the son of Amyntas in the fourth century B.C. had made their way before the beginning of the Christian Era not only across the watershed between Strymon and Danube but right across the Continent and over the Channel into Britain.<sup>4</sup> Some four hundred years after Philip's day, the peacefully triumphal north-westward progress of his coin-types was overtaken in Britain by the advance of the military frontier of a Roman-built Hellenic universal state; but in the opposite direction the radiation

<sup>1</sup> The writer of this Study spent the night of the 7th November, 1948, in Amasia and visited the royal tombs *en route* for the summit of the citadel.

<sup>2</sup> See the passage in Strabo's *Geographica*, Book XII, chap. ii, § 10 (c 540), quoted in IV, iv, 21, n. 2. The expanding commercial and cultural hinterlands of rival ports behave like the expanding basins of rival rivers. Like a river, a port will capture territory from a competitor by pushing back the commercial watershed and thereby diverting the flow of trade from its rival to itself; but, unlike a river basin, in which the flow of water is in one direction only—from the headwaters to the sea—the hinterland of a port is the field of a two-way commercial and cultural traffic with an upward flow from coast to watershed as well as a downward flow from watershed to coast.

<sup>3</sup> See VI, vii, 123-4.

<sup>4</sup> See V, v, 196-8 and 482. The Philippan prototype did, however, 'suffer a sea change' in the course of its journey to a British Ultima Thule.

of Hellenic art far outshot the farthest reconnaissance of Alexander's or even Demetrius's expeditionary force. After travelling eastward, in the wake of Hellenic arms, from the Aegean to Gandhara, on the watershed between the Oxus and the Indus, and establishing a new base of pacific operations here under the aegis of Kushan barbarian successors of Bactrian Greek war-lords, Hellenic art made a further and still longer journey eastward from this second starting-point into a Sinic World into which neither Greek nor Roman armies had ever penetrated, to become the inspiration of the new art of a nascent Far Eastern Civilization.<sup>1</sup>

### *The Epiphany of Higher Religions*

The peaceful penetration of the Hellenic culture into regions never trodden by Hellenic conquerors even at the high tide of Hellenic military expansion teaches the same lesson as Hellenism's posthumous artistic and intellectual triumphs after the ebb of its dominion from territories that Hellenic war-lords had once overrun and subjugated; and this Hellenic lesson is illuminating for the general study of encounters between civilizations that are one another's contemporaries. That light was visible to students of history in the generation of the writer of this Study owing to the accident of their happening in this Hellenic case to know the whole story—in contrast to the state of their knowledge of current encounters with the Modern Western Civilization, in which a flood of detailed information out of all proportion to the meagre surviving records of Hellenic history was abruptly cut short, in the middle of the story, by the iron curtain of Man's insuperable ignorance of a still uncreated future.

Whether the impotence of force in the cultural commerce between contemporaries was one day to be illustrated in Modern Western history as it had already been revealed in post-Alexandrine Hellenic history was a question that was still enigmatic in A.D. 1952; and this negative result of a study of the encounters between his own society and its contemporaries served to remind the Modern Western student of History that those historical events that for him were the least remote, the best documented, the most alive, and the most familiar were also therefore the least illuminating for the purpose of his ultimate inquiry into the general course and character of human affairs.<sup>2</sup> The more remote and less fully documented history of encounters with an Hellenic Society, which had become extinct not much less than thirteen hundred years before the mid-twentieth-century student's day, promised to teach him more about the comparative effects, in encounters between contemporaries, of the alternative tempers of violence and gentleness, and *a fortiori* more about the outcome of such encounters on the religious plane.

To a twentieth-century Western historian, looking back from his historical vantage-point upon the long since completed history of encounters with a post-Alexandrine Hellenism, it was evident that by his day the spontaneous reception of Hellenic art in a fifth-century Sinic

<sup>1</sup> See III. iii. 131 and 247, n. 2, and V. v. 134-5, 196, and 482-3.

<sup>2</sup> This point has already been noticed in I. i. 36-37, and on p. 346 above.

World and of Hellenic science and philosophy in a ninth-century Syriac World had gone the same way as the feats of Macedonian and Roman arms during the last four centuries B.C. The artistic and intellectual, like the military and political, transactions between a post-Alexandrine Hellenism and its contemporaries were by this time a closed account that was having no continuing effect on transactions in the twentieth-century observer's own age; but this was not to say that the life of Mankind in the twentieth century of the Christian Era was not being influenced at all by any effects of a post-Alexandrine Hellenism's impact on the world of its day. The continuing operation of this impact was proclaimed in a twentieth-century world by the allegiance of an overwhelming majority of the living generation of Mankind to one or other of four living religions—Christianity, Islam, the Mahāyāna, and Hinduism—whose historical epiphanies could be traced back to episodes in a now extinct Hellenism's encounters with now extinct Oriental civilizations; and, if the future course of human affairs were to vindicate an intuition<sup>1</sup> that the 'universal churches' embodying the 'higher religions' were not merely the latest type of human society that had made its appearance up to date but were also an apter vehicle than either civilizations or primitive societies for helping human beings to make their pilgrim's progress towards the goal of human endeavours, it would follow that the encounters with a post-Alexandrine Hellenism shed a light which the encounters with a Modern Western Civilization did not shed upon the main theme of any general study of History.

When we surveyed the religious effects of the literally world-wide impact of a Modern Western Civilization, we met with little evidence here of the genesis of new higher religions comparable to those engendered by the virtually world-wide impact of a post-Alexandrine Hellenism. In the history of encounters with the Modern Western Civilization up to date, new higher religions, if discernible at all, proved to be conspicuously rare and rudimentary;<sup>2</sup> and we did not find any warrant for allowing ourselves to guess that this apparent religious barrenness of a Modern Western internal proletariat might be an illusion, arising from the prematurity of our date of observation, which might be dispelled by contrary evidence in still unwritten chapters of the story.<sup>3</sup> On this showing, we must conclude that, if the encounters between our own Western Civilization and its contemporaries had been the only instances known to us of encounters between contemporaries, we should have remained ignorant of the most enduring and most significant of all the effects which such encounters had once produced; and we must also admit the possibility that the darkness of our understanding of History would not be appreciably lightened even if we could live to read the remaining chapters of the Modern Western story, and if the information at Posterity's disposal in these still outstanding chapters should prove to be as abundant as in the chapters already in print. By contrast, our fragmentary record of the story of encounters with a post-Alexandrine Hellenism initiates us into the epiphany of a band of higher religions<sup>4</sup>—

<sup>1</sup> See VII. vii. 420-3.

<sup>2</sup> See VII. vii. 414-19.

<sup>3</sup> See V. v. 174-6.

<sup>4</sup> See V. v. 81-82, and xi, map 29.

the worship of Isis, the worships of Cybele and Iuppiter Dolichenus, Mithraism and Christianity and Islam, the Mahāyāna and Hinduism—which incidentally bear witness to Hellenism's encounters with a petrified Egyptian, a fossilized Hittite, a Syriac, and an Indic Civilization, though the revelation that is these higher religions' message is concerned, not with the final cause of the species of human society called 'civilizations', but with the will of God and with the goal of human endeavours.

The ecclesiastical institutions in which these higher religions had come to be embodied had behaved like all human institutions in competing with one another; and, in this competition, all but the four last on our list had ostensibly succumbed; but in truth these apparently extinguished competitors were still living on in the life of victors who had triumphed over them by taking over from them their distinctive sparks of truth and life. For those who had eyes to see, a Mithraic vein was discernible in the catholic tradition of a triumphant Mahāyāna, and a Mithraic, Isiac, and Cybeline vein in the catholic tradition of a triumphant Christianity. Unlike the military, political, intellectual, and artistic offspring of a post-Alexandrine Hellenism's encounters with contemporary societies of its own species, the higher religions that had made their epiphany in the course of those encounters were thus all still alive and at work in a twentieth-century world that had been unified on the technological plane by the ubiquitous expansion of a secular Modern Western culture.

## 2. *Encounters with the Pre-Alexandrine Hellenic Civilization*<sup>1</sup>

### *The Hellenic Society's Offensive in the Mediterranean Basin*

The drama in which a pre-Alexandrine Hellenic Society was the protagonist was performed in the same Mediterranean theatre that, some eighteen hundred years later, was to be the scene of a play in which a Medieval Western Christendom was to take the principal part; and in both performances there were three actors on the stage. The two rivals of a pre-Alexandrine Hellenism were the sister Syriac Society and the fossilized remnant of a prematurely shattered Hittite Society which had preserved its existence in the fastnesses of the Taurus. In the competition between these three parties for the dominion of the Mediterranean Basin the Syriac Civilization was represented by the Phoenicians and the Hittite by seafarers who, in the overseas territories in which they won a footing, became known in Greek as Tyrrhenians and in Latin as Etruscans to their Hellenic adversaries.<sup>2</sup>

In this three-cornered contest, which opened in the eighth century B.C., the prizes were the shores of the Western Basin of the Mediterranean, whose culturally backward native inhabitants were no match for any of the three rival intruding societies; the shores of the Black Sea opening on to the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe, which gave access in turn to the arable belt of Black Earth along the Steppe's north-western fringe; and the long-since intensively cultivated land of

<sup>1</sup> See xi, maps 18, 19, 20, 21.

<sup>2</sup> See I. i. 114 and II. ii. 85-86.



Egypt, where a civilization that had suffered the doom of Tithonus<sup>1</sup> had reached by this time a stage of decrepitude in its state of living death at which it could no longer keep one aggressive alien neighbour at bay without enlisting the services of another to bolster up its own failing strength.

In the struggle for these prizes the pre-Alexandrine Hellenic Civilization enjoyed several notable advantages over both its competitors.

Its most manifest advantage was geographical. The Hellenic base of operations in the Aegean was closer to the Western Mediterranean, and much closer to the Black Sea, than the Etruscan and Phoenician bases at the eastern extremity of the Mediterranean were to either of these two undeveloped maritime outlets for the Levant. Indeed, the Aegean homeland of Hellenism lay right across the sea-route to the Black Sea from the coasts of Cilicia and Syria, and it also commanded and threatened the right flank of the Etruscan and Phoenician sea-route to the West, whereas the Hellenes themselves could row straight from the Aegean into the Dardanelles and could make an easy coasting voyage from Corinth to Syracuse round the head of the Ionian Sea across the Straits of Otranto, without in either venture running the risk of being intercepted and attacked by their rivals.

The pre-Alexandrine Hellenic Society's second advantage in this competition lay in the head of population which it had accumulated as the result of a victory of the Lowlands over the Highlands in the preceding chapter of Hellenic history;<sup>2</sup> for the consequent pressure of population on the means of subsistence in Hellas gave the Hellenes' expansion an explosive force and stimulated them to follow up the establishment of trading posts overseas by making this new world into a Magna Graecia through a rapid and intensive settlement of Hellenic agricultural colonists on the land. Our scanty evidence gives the impression that neither the Etruscans nor the Phoenicians had a comparable amount of man-power to dispose of in this age; and it is at any rate clear that neither of them in fact emulated the Hellenes' achievement of making a new world their own by colonizing it. The cautious Phoenicians kept within the narrow bounds of their coastal trading-posts till the Carthaginians belatedly broke with Phoenician tradition by imposing their rule on the native population of their North-West African hinterland about half-way through the fifth century B.C.<sup>3</sup> The rash Etruscan settlers on the west coast of Italy pushed on into the interior across the Apennines and into the Po Basin until lack of man-power brought their advance to a halt at the southern foot of the Alps and there drew down upon them the avalanche of a Celtic barbarian counter-attack.<sup>4</sup>

The third advantage enjoyed by the Hellenes was, like the first, a

<sup>1</sup> See VI. vii. 47-52.

<sup>2</sup> See I. i. 24-25 and III. iii. 120-1.

<sup>3</sup> See Meyer, E.: *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. iii, Part I (Stuttgart 1901, Cotta), pp. 681-2.

<sup>4</sup> See II. ii. 85 and II. ii. 276, 280, and 345. In terms of the overseas expansion of a Modern Western World, the Greek settlements in Magna Graecia and Sicily may be compared to the English settlements along the Atlantic seaboard of North America; the Phoenician posts at key points in the Western Mediterranean to the Portuguese posts at key points in the Indian Ocean; and the Etruscan conquests in Italy to the Spanish conquests in Central and South America.

corollary of their geographical situation. The opening of the competition between Etruscans, Phoenicians, and Hellenes in the Mediterranean in the eighth century B.C. happened to coincide in date with the inauguration by the Assyrian war-lord Tiglath-Pileser III (*regnabat* 746-727 B.C.) of the last and most devastating offensive in the third bout of Assyrian militarism in South-Western Asia;<sup>1</sup> and the homelands of the Phoenicians and Etruscans in Syria and South-Eastern Anatolia were immediately exposed to the full fury of an Assyrian tornado which left the homeland of the Hellenes in the Aegean unscathed. The surviving Hittite principalities astride the Taurus in South-Eastern Anatolia were annexed to the Assyrian dominions by Sargon (*regnabat* 722-705 B.C.); and, after the Aramaean principalities in the interior of Syria had been ground to powder, the maritime Phoenician city-states in their turn were scarified by the Assyrian harrow. Sidon was annexed to the Assyrian dominions in 677 B.C. and its former territory was converted into an Assyrian province.<sup>2</sup> The Isle of Tyre was besieged by the Assyrians in 674-668 B.C.,<sup>3</sup> and was probably annexed after the suppression of a rebellion in 639-7 B.C. in the former Tyrian territory on the mainland.<sup>4</sup> Of the four metropolitan Phoenician city-states, only Byblus and Aradus retained their independence;<sup>5</sup> and their two conquered sisters were not compensated economically for their political subjugation by finding themselves incorporated into a continental empire that extended eastwards from the coast of Syria into the interior of South-Western Asia over the crest of Zagros on to the western rim of the Iranian Plateau. Asshur's South-West Asia, like Napoleon's and like Hitler's Europe, was too severely damaged in the making, too short-lived, and too incessantly mobilized for war ever to harvest the potential economic fruits of a violently enforced political unification.

Considering these handicaps, it is remarkable that the Phoenicians and Etruscans should have done as well as they did in their maritime competition with the Hellenes. In the race for the Black Sea the geographical advantage was indeed so overwhelmingly on the Hellenes' side that here their competitors were decisively defeated. Traces of a Phoenician settlement on the island of Thasos off the north shore of the Aegean,<sup>6</sup> and traces of Tyrrhenian settlements on the island of Lemnos, off the Aegean entrance to the Dardanelles, and at two points, inside the Dardanelles, on the Asiatic coast of the Sea of Marmara,<sup>7</sup> are evidence of a struggle in this arena which ended in a decisive and definitive Hellenic victory. The Black Sea became an Hellenic lake; and, in

<sup>1</sup> See IV. iv. 475-6.

<sup>2</sup> See Forrer, E.: *Die Provinzeinteilung des Assyrischen Reiches* (Leipzig 1920, Hinrichs), p. 65.

<sup>3</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 66.

<sup>4</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 66-67.

<sup>5</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 67.

<sup>6</sup> Tales of ancient Phoenician settlements in the Hellenic Society's eventual domain were, of course, commonplaces of Hellenic legend, and, in so far as they were to be credited at all, they were perhaps in most cases to be interpreted as echoes, in a post-Minoan folk-memory, of Minoan enterprise in an age before the dawn of Hellenic history and long before the intrusion of any authentic Phoenicians into Hellenic waters. In Thasos, on the other hand, the genuineness of the tale of a Phoenician settlement seemed to be attested by the attachment of the Semitic name Cabeiri ('the Great [Gods]') to divinities worshipped in an historic Thasian cult.

<sup>7</sup> See I. i. 114, n. 3, and I. i. 411-15.

the period of quiescence on the Steppe after the eruption of the Cimmerian and Scythian Nomads at the turn of the eighth and seventh centuries B.C.,<sup>1</sup> the Hellenic masters of the Black Sea and the Scythian masters of the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe<sup>2</sup> entered into a profitable commercial partnership in which the cereal harvests raised by the Scythians' sedentary subjects on the Black Earth were exported overseas to feed Hellenic urban populations in the Aegean in exchange for luxury goods of Hellenic manufacture designed to suit the Royal Scythians' taste.<sup>3</sup>

In the Western Mediterranean, where the balance of geographical advantage was less heavily weighted in the Hellenes' favour, the struggle lasted longer and went through many more vicissitudes before it ended, here too, in an Hellenic victory.

In the first round in the eighth century B.C. both the Etruscans and the Phoenicians managed to forge ahead of the Hellenes, in spite of the greater distance of their Levantine bases from the western scene of operations and in defiance of the ever impending Hellenic threat to the right flank of their long-drawn-out line of maritime communications, where the route ran between Libya and Crete. The Etruscans must have slipped through the Straits of Messina to establish themselves along the west coast of Italy between the mouths of the Tiber and the Arno before the Hellenes had closed the Straits by planting the toe of Italy on one side and the western seaboard of Sicily on the other with a serried array of colonial Greek city-states. The Phoenicians succeeded in resisting all Hellenic attempts to wrest out of Phoenician hands a command of the wider maritime passage westward between Cape Bon and the western tip of Sicily, which Phoenician pioneers had brought under their control by planting a Sicilian outpost at Motye<sup>4</sup> over against North-West African outposts at Utica and Carthage. In the ensuing phases of the struggle the overseas Phoenicians and the overseas Tyrrhenians alike achieved a self-sufficiency that neutralized the advantage enjoyed by the Hellenes in holding the interior lines and discounted the loss that the Levantine seafarers suffered when the harrowing of their parent societies in South-West Asia by the Assyrians deprived them of all prospect of receiving any appreciable further reinforcements from home.

The balance of advantage continued nevertheless to incline so heavily in the Hellenes' favour that, throughout the seventh century B.C. and the first half of the sixth, they went from strength to strength. The

<sup>1</sup> See III. iii. 410 and VI. vii. 580-680.

<sup>2</sup> For the Scythian empire based on the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe, see III. iii. 25, n. 8, and 428-30.

<sup>3</sup> See III. iii. 429. In the long history of a Medieval Western Christendom's expansion over the Mediterranean Basin and its backwaters, the trade between the Greek settlements on the north shore of the Black Sea and the Royal Scythians had its counterpart in a trade between Venetian and Genoese settlements on the same coast and the Golden Horde. During the first phase of the Mamlūk régime in Egypt, when the Mamlūks were importing their slave-successors from the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe and not, as in the second phase, from the Caucasus, the Venetians were the principal carriers of this valuable human freight.

<sup>4</sup> They also planted two further posts, beyond the north-western corner of the island, at Panormus (Palermo) and Soloeis, towards the western end of the north coast.

colonization of Cyrenaica in and after *circa* 639 B.C.<sup>1</sup> gave them a command of the Libyan as well as the Cretan flank of the sea-passage between the Levant and the Western Mediterranean which might have proved a decisive factor in the struggle if the overseas Phoenicians and Etruscans had not already learnt to dispense with support from their original bases of operations. The foundation in 580 B.C., on the grand scale, of the new colonial Greek city-state Akragas (*Latine* Agrigentum) filled the last gap in a chain of Greek settlements along the south coast of Sicily which thenceforth stretched without a break from Syracuse to a Selinûs that had been planted in 628 B.C. on the threshold of the Phoenician outpost at the island's western tip. The foundation *circa* 600 B.C. of Massilia (Marseilles)—on the brink of the nearest natural harbour to the delta of the Rhône that was out of range of the choking discharge of the delta-building silt—gave the Hellenes the command of the most magnificent of all the natural avenues leading from the shores of the Mediterranean into the interior of Europe.<sup>2</sup> The accidental discovery, *circa* 638 B.C.,<sup>3</sup> by the Samian merchant-adventurer Colaeus, of the 'at that time still virgin market'<sup>4</sup> of Tartessus (Tarshish), on the Iberian shore of the Mediterranean's estuary into the Atlantic beyond the Straits of Gibraltar, promised to give the Hellenes a monopoly of trade with a source of mineral wealth that was a dazzling reward for their being some three-quarters of a century behind the Phoenician founders of Gades (Cadiz) in the long race from the Levant to the Pillars of Hercules.

Even in the shorter race for Egypt, which was the one goal out of the three for which the maritime competitors were contending where the advantage of geographical proximity did not lie with the Hellenes, the seventh century saw the Hellenes carry off the prize. The Hellenes outstripped their rivals here likewise, in spite of their geographical handicap, because they were in a position to supply a now fanatically xenophobe Egyptiac Society with the one service that it was still willing perforce to purchase from alien hands. An Egypt that was up in arms against an atrocious Assyrian conqueror required alien mercenary troops to help it to shake off a yoke which it was too feeble to shake off

<sup>1</sup> If we follow Eusebius in dating the foundation of Cyrene itself *circa* 631 B.C., the first Theraean landing on the Libyan islet of Platea will have been made *circa* 639 B.C. according to the chronology given by Herodotus in Book IV, chaps. 156-8.

<sup>2</sup> The avenue from Marseilles up the courses of the Rhône and the Saône led direct to a gap between the Jura and the Vosges that gave access to the upper valleys of both the Rhine and the Danube (see II. ii. 330). The only other river-route from the Mediterranean into the interior of Europe that could remotely compare with the Rhône Valley avenue was the route up the Vardar (*Graeco* Axios) and down the Morava (*Latine* Margus) to the south bank of the Middle Danube above the Iron Gates, adjoining the south-east corner of the Alföld. This route, which, in the first generation of Alexander's successors, was to be provided, by Cassander's insight, with an adequate port through his foundation of Thessalonica, was inadequately served in the pre-Alexandrine Age by the more securely but less conveniently situated Greek colonial settlements at Olynthus and Methone. Compared with the open roads up the valleys of the Rhône and the Vardar, the Alpine portages into the Danube Basin from the head of the Adriatic were arduous, though they were sufficiently convenient to make the successive fortunes of Aquileia, Venice, and Trieste.

<sup>3</sup> The date was a few months after the Theraeans' first landing on the Libyan island of Platea.

<sup>4</sup> Τὸ δὲ ἐμπόριον τοῦτο ἦν ἀκήρατον τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον.—Herodotus, Book IV, chap. 152.

by its own exertions; and a role which the Egyptians' Anatolian and Syrian fellow victims of Assyrian militarism were powerless to play, even if they had had the will, was left to Ionian and Carian 'brazen men' from the sea whom the Pharaoh-Liberator Psammetichus I (*regnabat* 663/655-610 B.C.<sup>1</sup>) enlisted for the task of expelling the Assyrian garrisons from the Lower Nile Valley in the years 658-651 B.C.<sup>2</sup>

Towards the middle of the sixth century B.C. it looked as if the Hellenes had not only won their maritime competition for the Mediterranean Basin with the Etruscans and Phoenicians but were now also in a fair way to inheriting the Assyrians' continental empire in Egypt and South-West Asia. *Circa* 696 B.C., nearly half a century before Psammetichus's Hellenic mercenaries turned the Assyrians out of Egypt, Sennacherib had been incensed by an audacious insurrection of interloping Hellenic 'brazen men' from the sea on the Cilician<sup>3</sup> coast of his dominions; and it looks as if the Assyrian Empire's Neo-Babylonian successor-state followed the example of its Egyptian successor-state in hiring Hellenic fighting-men, if we may assume that other Hellenic soldiers of fortune served in Nebuchadnezzar's bodyguard besides a Lesbian Antimenidas whose name and record happen to have been saved from oblivion by the accident of his having been a brother of the poet Alcaeus.

### *The Syriac Society's Political Consolidation for Self-Defence*

This employment of Hellenic troops in a South-West Asian Empire whose native Chaldaean warriors were far better military material than the drones of Libyan descent, who were doing duty for a native military caste in a contemporary Egypt,<sup>4</sup> was an augury of a future Hellenic ascendancy over a fallen Assyrian Empire's former domain; and indeed the Hellenes' footing in Egypt and South-West Asia on the eve of the establishment of the Achaemenian Empire was not less favourable than their footing there on the eve of the Achaemenian Empire's fall some two hundred years later, when Hellenic mercenaries were not only once more the mainstay of a once more precariously independent Egypt, but were also being employed by loyal as well as by rebel Persian provincial governors and even by the Achaemenian Emperor himself. In the fourth

<sup>1</sup> Psammetichus was installed as vassal prince of Lower Egypt by Assurbanipal in 663 B.C. and had established his authority over Thebes by 655 B.C.

<sup>2</sup> See IV. iv. 21 and 476, and V. v. 463.

<sup>3</sup> In Sennacherib's day the name 'Cilicia' had not yet been extended to the plain of Adana (Qu'e) and the rock-bound coast to the east of it, but was still confined to the inland province Khilakku, north of the Taurus, round the city eventually named Caesarea Mazaca (i.e. the district of the post-Alexandrine Kingdom of Inland Cappadocia that was still officially known as Cilicia after the name had shifted, in the popular usage, to the country south of the mountains). This shift in the popular application of the name was the consequence of a change in political geography which followed Assyria's collapse. After having been an Assyrian protectorate and even an Assyrian province (Forrer, E.: *Die Provinzeinteilung des Assyrischen Reiches* (Leipzig 1920, Hinrichs), pp. 74 and 82), the principality of Khilakku not only recovered its independence but proceeded to expand to the coast of the Mediterranean by annexing Qu'e (Forrer, loc. cit., and the present Study, VI. vii. 668), as, some seventeen hundred years later, the same desirable lowland country was annexed by a refugee Armenian principality which had established itself in the highlands adjoining the Cappadocian Cilicia on the east (see p. 369, above).

<sup>4</sup> See IV. iv. 422.



century B.C. the Hellenes duly achieved their manifest destiny; but in the sixth century this destiny, imminent though it then already appeared to be, was abruptly postponed for two hundred years by a sudden turn of the wheel of Fortune.

The employment of Greek mercenaries by the Neo-Babylonian warlord Nebuchadnezzar becomes comprehensible when we remind ourselves that the warlike spirit of the Chaldaean tribesmen—as well as the tincture of Assyrian militarism which even the sedentary rural and urban population of Babylonia had perhaps momentarily acquired from the harsh experience of a hundred-years-long struggle for life against an atrocious Assyrian aggressor<sup>1</sup>—was rapidly evaporating under the depressing influence of a new anxiety. The Babylonians' agonizing Assyrian nightmare had promptly returned in the new guise of a threat of being encircled and eventually engulfed by the Median hordes who had been the Babylonians' allies in a common struggle against Assyrian enemies of the Human Race. When, *circa* 550 B.C., this Median cloud, banked on Zagros, that was now overhanging South-West Asia, was swollen to still more menacing dimensions by a sudden transfer of the hegemony over the restless tribes of Iran from the Medes to the Persians, the stricken peoples that had been enjoying a spell of uneasy freedom and peace since the downfall of the Assyrian Power were confronted with a choice between two new candidates for oecumenical dominion. If they were to stem the threatening deluge of Persian conquest from the Iranian Plateau, they must open the sluices to an infiltration of Hellenic mercenary man-power from the Mediterranean.

Either of the two candidates for taking the Assyrians' vacant place had something less uninviting than an Assyrian tyranny to offer. The Persians promised to a convalescent world the rest-cure of an oecumenical peace whose easy-going semi-barbarian conservators would be more inclined to adopt their subjects' institutions and ideas<sup>2</sup> than to impose their own.<sup>3</sup> The Hellenes promised to the patient the shock-treatment of rejuvenation through the impact of an adolescent society whose zest for adventure had not yet been quenched by any taste of the South-West Asian peoples' crushing experience of passing under an Assyrian harrow. At this turning-point in the history of a pre-Alexandrine Hellenic Society's relations with its neighbours, the ghost of an Asshur who in his lifetime had inadvertently played the Hellenes' game by paralysing their Levantine competitors for the thalassocracy of the Mediterranean, tipped the balance of choice against the Hellenic candidate for Asshur's political heritage by moving the victimized peoples, whose memories the Assyrian spectre haunted, to opt for a political sedative in preference to a political stimulant.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See IV. iv. 476–80.

<sup>2</sup> The receptivity of the Persian builders of the Achaemenian Empire has been noticed in V. v. 443.

<sup>3</sup> See VI. vii. 580–689. The forbearance shown by the Achaemenidae in refraining from making use of their political power for the propagation of a Zoroastrianism to which they themselves had become converts has been noticed in V. v. 704–5.

<sup>4</sup> The majority of these peoples acquiesced in the sedative merely as a *pis aller*, as was demonstrated in the event by the general insurrection of most of the subject peoples east of Euphrates in the year of anarchy following the assassination of the Emperor

In this political atmosphere the Hellenes' sixth-century prospects in Egypt and South-West Asia were blotted out within the twenty years or so that elapsed between Cyrus's conquest of the Lydian Empire *circa* 547 B.C. and Cambyses' conquest of Egypt *circa* 525 B.C.<sup>1</sup> Cyrus's stroke, which substituted an outlandish Persian for a familiar Lydian suzerainty over the Hellenic city-states along the western seaboard of Anatolia, was the sharper as well as the more surprising of the two; but Cambyses' conquest of Egypt dealt the Hellenes a further double blow; for, besides depreciating the military prestige of 'brazen men' who had failed to earn their keep by preserving Egypt's independence, it placed Greek commercial interests in Egypt at the mercy of Persian goodwill. Moreover, these reverses that the rapid establishment of an Achaemenian Empire inflicted on the Hellenes were accentuated by the no less signal and sudden benefits which the same swift transformation of the political scene conferred upon the Syrophoenicians.

To the peoples of Syria the establishment of the Achaemenian Empire brought not merely a rest-cure but a liberation and an opportunity; for Syria, unlike either Egypt or Babylonia, had obtained no respite from Assyria's fall. She had become the prey of a Neo-Babylonian successor-state of the Assyrian Empire; and her new conquerors, into whose souls the iron of Assyrian militarism had entered, had taken a vicarious revenge for their sufferings at a now slain Asshur's hands by treating their former fellow victims in Syria with an Assyrian harshness. Indeed, those few Syrian communities that had survived the Assyrian whips had been subjected by the Babylonians to a chastisement with scorpions. The fate of being carried into captivity, which Judah had escaped when Sennacherib had unsuccessfully laid siege to Jerusalem in 700 B.C., had overtaken her when Jerusalem had fallen to Nebuchadnezzar in the successive Babylonian sieges of 597 and 586 B.C.; and the Babylonian siege of 586-573 B.C. had proved a worse catastrophe for Tyre than the Assyrian siege of 674-668. The destruction of the Neo-Babylonian Empire by Cyrus gave the Babylonians' Syrian subjects a relief that their neighbours had been enjoying since the destruction of Assyria; and in this long-delayed reversal of Syrian fortunes the Phoenician experience was even more dramatic than the Jewish.

While the Jews were allowed by the new Persian rulers of the Syriac World to return home from their Babylonian exile and to reconstruct Judah in the modest form of an autonomous temple-state, the four Syrophoenician cities were given, not merely autonomy for themselves, but a dominion, under Achaemenian suzerainty, over other Syrian communities<sup>2</sup> that placed them on at least a par, in both extent of territory

Cambyses' successor on the Achaemenian imperial throne, and by the repeated subsequent revolts of both the Babylonians and the Egyptians against Achaemenian rule. On the whole, however, the Persians managed first to establish and afterwards to maintain their empire without evoking anything like the resistance from the subject peoples that these Persian subjects' ancestors had once offered to their Persian rulers' Assyrian predecessors. The Persians profited by the Assyrians' ferocity, which had broken the South-West Asian peoples' spirit before the Persians came on the scene, as well as by the comparatively unprovocative mildness of their own Achaemenian régime.

<sup>1</sup> These are A. T. Olmstead's dates in his *History of the Persian Empire* (Chicago 1948, University of Chicago Press), pp. 37 and 88.

<sup>2</sup> See V. v. 123, n. 2.

and quantity of population, with the most powerful of the independent city-states of a contemporary Hellenic World: an Athens, an Akragas, a Syracuse, and perhaps even a Sparta. Moreover, the political benefits thus bestowed on the Syrophoenicians were matched by their economic gains from an Achaemenian new order. The Syrophoenicians now found themselves partners in a commonwealth which stretched away inland from the Syrian coast of the Mediterranean into the interior of South-West Asia not merely up to the eastern slopes of the Zagros, like the Assyrian Empire, or up to the Zagros' western foot-hills, like the closer-cropped Neo-Babylonian Empire, but as far as the almost fabulously distant north-eastern outposts of *Homo Agricola* in Khwārizm<sup>1</sup> and Farghānah,<sup>2</sup> on the dry shore of the Great Eurasian Steppe. Under a stable and pacific Achaemenian régime this vast area had become the Syrophoenicians' continental economic hinterland; and, with the united forces of the Achaemenian Empire behind them, they could hope to win a comparable opening for their maritime trade by recovering the lion's share in the commerce of the Mediterranean which the Hellenes had captured from them while the Assyrians and Babylonians had been attacking them from the landward side. In Phoenician, as in Jewish, eyes the Achaemenian Empire was a heaven-sent instrument for the reinstatement of a chosen people in its rightful place in the sun; and it might be anticipated that, if archaeological enterprise were one day to bring to light a Tyrian counterpart of Deutero-Isaiah's tract, the Tyrian worshipper of Melkart would prove, like the Jewish worshipper of Yahweh, to have hailed Cyrus as the Lord's Anointed.

The Jews never had occasion to use the Achaemenian Empire as the instrument of an anti-Hellenic national policy, for the temple-state of Jerusalem, in its secluded inland fastness, did not come into collision with Hellenism till about 160 years after the overthrow of the Achaemenian Empire by Alexander the Great; but the Achaemenian Empire did perform this service for the Syrophoenicians. In political partnership with the Persians they were able at last once again to face on equal, and more than equal, terms the Hellenic competitors who had been pushing them from pillar to post for the past 150 years. For the Phoenicians in their struggle with the Hellenes, union was the key to strength; and this strength through union, which had come to the Syrophoenicians as a Persian windfall, had already been acquired by their Libyphoenician colonists through Punic self-help.

Instead of waiting, like their cousins on the Syrian seaboard, for a semi-barbarian empire-builder to save them, the colonial Phoenician communities in the Western Mediterranean had saved themselves by accepting the leadership of one of their own number, Carthage, and by entering into an alliance with the Etruscans, whose field of enterprise did not overlap with theirs and who were likewise under pressure from the Hellenes' continuing westward expansion. This expansion had not ended with the Rhodians' foundation of Akragas in 580 B.C. The Phocaeans had followed up their foundation of Massilia by planting

<sup>1</sup> The land of the Chorasmiāns (Hvārazmīy).

<sup>2</sup> The land of the Paricāniāns (Pairikās).

a chain of posts along the east coast of the Iberian Peninsula and, *circa* 566 B.C.,<sup>1</sup> a colony at Alalia on the east coast of Corsica which served a twofold purpose by providing both a port of call *en route* for Massilia and a naval base for blockading Etruria. The foundation of Akragas had, however, been immediately followed by the first signal Hellenic reverse at Phoenician hands. An attempt, led by the Cnidian adventurer Pentathlus, to push the Phoenicians out of their all-important foothold at the western tip of Sicily by planting an Hellenic settlement at the strategic point Lilybaeum, commanding the harbour of Motye, was defeated—apparently without Carthaginian aid<sup>2</sup>—by the combined efforts of the Sicilian Phoenicians and the local natives;<sup>3</sup> and, when the surviving Cnidian adventurers succeeded in establishing themselves on the uninviting Lipari islands in lieu of the Sicilian vantage-point which they had failed to win, they found themselves harried here by the Etruscans.

Lilybaeum's destiny was to become, not an Hellenic city-state, but a Carthaginian fortress; for the Carthaginian empire-builders' first step was to establish their hegemony over their fellow Phoenician settlers on the coasts of Sicily, North-West Africa, and the Iberian Peninsula before going into partnership with the Etruscans. The Hellenes' two maritime rivals were soon confronted with a formidable new Hellenic threat by a backwash from the empire-building activities of Cyrus. After conquering Lydia, Cyrus summoned the Continental Asiatic Greek communities that had been under Lydian suzerainty to transfer their allegiance to him, and the Phocaeans—though they had previously refused the offer of a new home in Tarshish<sup>4</sup>—responded to the Persian challenge by migrating *en masse* to their existing Corsican settlement at Alalia.<sup>5</sup> Here they made themselves so intolerable to Etruscans and Carthaginians alike as to provoke within five years a Tyrrheno-Carthaginian joint attack in which the Phocaeans won a battle<sup>6</sup> but lost the war owing to the crippling casualties suffered by their navy. The surviving victors had to evacuate Corsica and make a new home for themselves at Velia, far down the west coast of Italy.<sup>7</sup> Meanwhile the majority of the Ionians, who, unlike the stalwart minority of the Phocaeans, had stayed at home and had been constrained to submit to a Persian suzerainty, had been discussing

<sup>1</sup> i.e. twenty years before the Phocaeans migrated to Alalia *en masse* (Herodotus, Book I, chap. 165).

<sup>2</sup> See Dunbabin, T. J.: *The Western Greeks* (Oxford 1948, Clarendon Press), p. 332.

<sup>3</sup> There is no reason to suppose that these 'Elymi' were not of the same origin and nationality as their diversely named native neighbours the 'Sicans' and 'Sicels'. Each swarm of Greek settlers in Sicily found a local name for the native population on whose territory it was trespassing. The name 'Elymi' may have been coined for the natives of North-Eastern Sicily by some Cnidian or Rhodian Greek settler at Selinus or Akragas whose nearest non-Greek-speaking neighbours at home had been the Lycian 'Solymi'.

<sup>4</sup> See Herodotus, Book I, chap. 163.

<sup>5</sup> The resolute migrants were a minority. A majority succumbed to homesickness and turned back to regain their Asiatic home at the price of submitting to a Persian yoke (Herodotus, Book I, chap. 165).

<sup>6</sup> The date of this decisive naval battle at Alalia is usually taken to have been *circa* 535 B.C.; but, if Cyrus conquered Lydia in 547 B.C. (see Olmstead, A. T.: *History of the Persian Empire* (Chicago 1948, University of Chicago Press), p. 40), and if his summons to the Continental Asiatic Greeks and the consequent migration of the Phocaeans to Corsica followed immediately after, this would indicate *circa* 541–540 B.C. as the date of the Battle of Alalia.

<sup>7</sup> See Herodotus, Book I, chaps. 164–7.

a project submitted by Bias of Priene for escaping from their new subjection by migrating *en masse* to Sardinia,<sup>1</sup> and this suggestion was revived some fifty years later, during the last agonies of the Ionian Revolt of 499-493 B.C., by the irresponsible-minded Milesian insurgent leader Aristagoras;<sup>2</sup> but, even at the date when Bias first mooted the idea, the Hellenes had probably already been forestalled in Sardinia by the Carthaginians.

We know that the Carthaginian empire-builders concentrated their efforts on the conquest of Sardinia as soon as they had made sure of their hold upon the original Phoenician establishments in Western Sicily; and, though the dates of the successive stages in the execution of their grand design are obscure,<sup>3</sup> the terms of the Carthagino-Roman treaty of *circa* 508 B.C.<sup>4</sup> suggest that the structure of the Carthaginian Empire was by then already complete. By the terms of the Carthagino-Etruscan alliance that had borne fruit in the allies' lucrative defeat at Alalia, Sardinia had probably been included in a Carthaginian, and Corsica in an Etruscan, sphere of influence;<sup>5</sup> and, after securing a sufficiently firm grip on the coasts of Sardinia to be able to rule out any possibility of a Greek settlement there, the Carthaginian empire-builders turned westward. They occupied the Balearic Islands; crushed the Kingdom of Tarshish;<sup>6</sup> wiped out the Phoenician Gades' Hellenic rival Mainakê, the south-westernmost Phocæan outpost on the south-east coast of the Iberian Peninsula in the neighbourhood of Malaga;<sup>7</sup> and drew a wooden curtain across the southern half of the Western Mediterranean from Cape Nao to Cape Bon through the Balearic Islands, Sardinia, and the West Sicilian bridgehead of the Carthaginian dominions. In this 'Punic Main' and its Iberian and North-West African hinterlands, Hellenic shipping was thenceforth forbidden to ply and Hellenic wares could not be marketed except through Punic middlemen;<sup>8</sup> and this barred zone remained effectively closed to Hellenic commerce for a quarter of a millennium,<sup>9</sup> till the Punic monopoly was eventually broken by force of

<sup>1</sup> See Herodotus, Book I, chap. 170.

<sup>2</sup> See Herodotus, Book V, chap. 124.

<sup>3</sup> Dunbabin, *op. cit.*, pp. 332-3, tentatively dates the establishment of Carthaginian rule in Western Sicily before the fall of Tyre in 573 B.C.; but Orosius, *Adversum Paganos*, Book IV, chap. vi, §§ 6-9, who is the only surviving Hellenic author to give any indication of a date, assigns not only the operations in Sicily but also the first operations in Sardinia 'temporibus Cyri Persarum regis'.

<sup>4</sup> See Polybius, Book III, chap. 2.

<sup>5</sup> See Dunbabin, *op. cit.*, p. 344.

<sup>6</sup> See Carpenter, *Rhys: The Greeks in Spain* (Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania 1925, Bryn Mawr College), pp. 31-32; Dunbabin, *op. cit.*, p. 344.

<sup>7</sup> See Carpenter, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-30.

<sup>8</sup> See Karstedt, U.: *Geschichte der Karthager von 218-146* (Berlin 1913, Weidmann), pp. 71-73.

<sup>9</sup> The exclusion of the Hellenes by Carthaginian force of arms from a once lucrative field of Phocæan enterprise in the South-Western Mediterranean and the Atlantic was accepted by the Hellenic World as an accomplished fact with a resignation that expressed itself in a symbolic usage of the phrase 'Pillars of Hercules' to signify the limit of what was attainable by human endeavour. By Pindar's day this piece of symbolism had already become proverbial, though Pindar (*vivebat circa* 522-450 B.C.) had been born before the erection of the Carthaginian 'wooden curtain' had been completed. The third of Pindar's Olympian Odes—written to celebrate a victory gained at the Olympian Games in 476 B.C. by Thérôn, the despot of Akragas, who had shared with Hiero of Syracuse the distinction of defeating the Carthaginian attempt to conquer Sicily in 480 B.C.—ends with the celebrated words: 'And now Thérôn in his achievements has arrived at the limit. He has completed the long voyage from his home port



Roman arms in a struggle that took two generations (*gerebatur* 263-201 B.C.) to reach its final decision.

A simultaneous Etruscan endeavour to harvest the fruits of the Battle of Alalia by making an Etruscan *mare clausum* out of the Tyrrhene Sea was not carried to a similarly successful conclusion. An Etruscan attempt to conquer the Hellenes' Campanian outpost, Cumae, was defeated in 524 B.C.; and, though the Etruscans nevertheless managed to retain a footing in Campania thereafter, their prospects of asserting their hegemony south of the Tiber were blighted by Rome's successful revolt against an Etruscan domination *circa* 508 B.C. Yet, even so, the total setback suffered by the Hellenes in the Western Mediterranean in the course of the generation following the Battle of Alalia was severe, and the disastrous failure of a last attempt to turn the tide again compelled them to recognize the hard fact that Carthaginian statesmanship had brought their westward advance to a halt against an insurmountable military barrier. When the Spartan King Cleomenes I's brother Dorieus tried, *circa* 514-512 B.C.,<sup>1</sup> to emulate in Africa the achievement of the founders of Selinus and Akragas in Sicily by extending the belt of continuous Hellenic settlement from Cyrenaica into Tripolitania on the threshold of the cluster of Libyphoenician communities in Tunisia, the Carthaginians turned this Hellenic interloper out; and, when, *circa* 511-508 B.C., Dorieus tried, as an alternative, to emulate the Cnidian Pentathlus's supremely provocative attempt to wrest the western tip of Sicily out of the hands of the Carthaginians and their local Phoenician and Elymian subjects by establishing a Greek settlement at Eryx, the Spartan adventurer met his Cnidian predecessor's fate.<sup>2</sup>

Thus, before the turn of the sixth and fifth centuries B.C., the expansion of the Hellenic World had been arrested in all directions by political combinations on the grand scale between the threatened members of competing societies; and it might now have been expected that the hitherto mobile eastern and western frontiers between an Hellenic and a Syriac World would settle down along the lines that Achaemenian and Carthaginian empire-builders had so firmly drawn. There seemed no reason why the former victims of Hellenic aggression should not remain content with their decisive success in bringing this aggression to a halt, or why the Hellenes, on their side, should not succeed in adapting themselves to this adverse change in their political fortunes by carrying through an economic revolution towards which a sixth-century Athens

to the Pillars of Hercules. What lies beyond is out of reach for sage and fool alike, and I am not the man to commit the folly of seeking to attain the unattainable.'

This despondent Hellenic *Ne plus ultra* was, of course, much to the taste of the Carthaginians, whom it left in unchallenged possession of their exclusive commercial empire. After the Carthaginian monopoly of 'the barred zone' had been finally broken by the Romans through their victory in the Hannibalic War, seventeen more centuries were to pass before a Western Christendom, at the dawn of the Modern Age of its history, was to cap the Phocaean explorer Colaeus's feat of discovering Tarshish by making the transit of the Atlantic from Tarshish to the Antilles. This discovery of a New World, by which Modern Western Man was so lavishly rewarded for his audacity in defying a Pindaric veto, was characteristically commemorated by the minting of Spanish coins displaying the two Pillars of Hercules crossed by a scroll on which the exultant counter-motto *Plus Ultra* was defiantly inscribed; and this image and superscription ultimately gave birth to the United States dollar sign \$ (see XII. ix. 643, with n. 3).

<sup>1</sup> See Dunbabin, *op. cit.*, p. 349.

<sup>2</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 354.

had already shown the way by deliberately changing over from an 'extensive' economy of mixed farming for subsistence to an 'intensive' economy of specialized production for exchange against imports of raw materials and foodstuffs. A solution for the general Hellenic problem of pressure of population that had been worked out locally in one Hellenic city-state, which had happened to let slip her opportunity of joining in the seventh-century race for virgin lands to colonize overseas, offered an opportune means of economic salvation for a Hellas whose geographical expansion had been arrested in the course of the sixth century B.C. by the success of her rivals' political counter-measures.<sup>1</sup>

### *The Achaemenian Empire's Counter-Offensive*

Evidently there were elements in the situation at the close of the sixth century B.C. on both sides that told in favour of a stabilization of the equilibrium between Hellenic and Syriac forces in which a sixth-century struggle between the two societies had resulted; yet, in the event, this equilibrium was upset almost as soon as the fifth century B.C. had entered on its course. How was the historian to account for this surprisingly unhappy denouement? An Hellenic student of human affairs would have found the cause of the calamity in some act of hybris, and a Modern Western inquirer might accept this Hellenic explanation in terms of Human Nature without leaving out of account the contributory effect of a fatality in the geographical setting of this tragedy.

The human cause of the renewal of the conflict between the Hellenes and their neighbours in the fifth century B.C. was an error in Achaemenian statesmanship; and this error was a miscalculation into which empire-builders are prone to fall when they have made sensationally wide and rapid conquests over populations that have proved easy game because their spirit has already been broken by previous harrowing experiences. In such circumstances the successful empire-builders are apt to attribute their success entirely to their own prowess, without recognizing their debt to forerunners whose ruthless ploughshares have broken the soil before the eventual empire-builders' arrival on the scene to reap their easy harvest; and an overweening self-confidence bred by this mistaken belief in their own invincibility then leads the successful empire-builders on to court disaster by rashly attacking still unbroken peoples whose spirit and capacity for resistance take them by surprise. This is the story of the disaster suffered in Afghanistan in A.D. 1838-42<sup>2</sup> by British conquerors of the derelict domain of a broken-down Mughal Rāj in India who had light-heartedly assumed that the unscathed highlanders of Eastern Iran would submit to them as tamely as the stricken population of a sub-continent whose demoralizing experience of five centuries of alien rule had been crowned by the agony of a century of anarchy.<sup>3</sup> The same unpleasant surprise awaited Alexander the Great when, after his swift and easy conquest of the passive main body of the Achaemenian Empire west of the Caspian Gates, he set himself to subjugate the barons

<sup>1</sup> See I. i. 24-25; II. ii. 38-42; and III. iii. 122; IV. iv. 200-14; IX. xi. 387.

<sup>2</sup> This British disaster in Afghanistan has been touched upon on pp. 220 and 231, above.

<sup>3</sup> See xi, maps 44, 45, 52, 52A, 53.

of Khurāsān and Transoxania, whose spirit had been kept alive by their active service as wardens of the Syriac World's north-eastern marches over against the Eurasian Steppe.<sup>1</sup>

The winning of the voluntary allegiance of these spirited Iranian marchmen was the one great political achievement of the Achaemenian empire-builders outside the limits of the broad field within which the ground had been prepared for them by the ruthlessness of their Assyrian forerunners; and here too the Achaemenidae were assisted in their political task by local anxieties springing from painful recollections. The sedentary Iranian peoples to the north-east of the Caspian Gates had felt the full fury of a Cimmerian and Scythian Eurasian Nomad storm which had broken over South-West Asia at the turn of the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. in waves of invasion that had flowed on as far westward as Lydia and Palestine. The Iranian, like the Phoenician, marchmen of the Achaemenian Empire appreciated the support that they stood to gain from membership in this gigantic oecumenical polity for the waging of their perpetual warfare against their traditional enemies.<sup>2</sup> But, when Cyrus pushed on beyond 'the Sown' into 'the Desert' to attack the formidable Central Asian Nomads on their own ground, these Massagetae inflicted on him a disaster that cost him his life; and his third successor Darius was lucky to escape with his life when, some seventeen years later,<sup>3</sup> he essayed the rather less hopeless task of bringing to heel a Scythian Nomad adversary whose freedom of manoeuvre was limited by the relatively narrow confines of the Scythians' domain in the Steppe's Great Western Bay. Cyrus's first successor, Cambyses, brought a similar catastrophe on himself when he tried to round off his facile conquest of an Asshur-haunted Egypt by invading an unscathed Ethiopia; but the supreme Achaemenian miscalculation was made by Darius and his successor Xerxes when they attempted to conquer an Hellenic World which Cyrus had been content to contain within what looked at first sight like 'a natural frontier'.<sup>4</sup>

Probably Cyrus had imagined that he was bequeathing to his successors a definitive north-west frontier when he had completed his conquest of the Lydian dominions by subjugating the Asiatic Greek communities that had previously acknowledged Lydia's suzerainty. Yet Apollo's warning to King Croesus of Lydia that, if he crossed the River Halys, he would destroy a Great Power<sup>5</sup> might have been addressed to Croesus's conqueror Cyrus with no less prescience on a rather longer view; for, in conquering the Lydian Empire, Cyrus was unwittingly bequeathing to his successors an entanglement with the Hellenic World which was eventually to be the death of the Achaemenian Empire.

<sup>1</sup> See II. ii. 140.

<sup>2</sup> See II. ii. 138. In a year of insurrection (522-521 B.C.) in which most of the peoples between the Caspian Gates and the Euphrates attempted to throw off a not very onerous Achaemenian yoke, the Bactrian marchmen did not succumb to the temptation.

<sup>3</sup> Cyrus's campaign against the Massagetae is dated 530 B.C., and Darius's campaign against the Scyths 513 B.C., by A. T. Olmstead: *History of the Persian Empire* (Chicago 1948, University of Chicago Press), pp. 87 and 147-8.

<sup>4</sup> The psychological limit to Achaemenian annexations that was set by the physical limits of previous Assyrian and Eurasian Nomad ravages has been noticed in VI. vii. 684-5.

<sup>5</sup> Herodotus, Book I, chap. 53.

The Achaemenids' Assyrian predecessors, who had been so recklessly aggressive in other quarters,<sup>1</sup> had refrained from trying to carry their north-westward advance beyond the south-eastern fringe of the central desert of Anatolia; and this was not only a genuine natural frontier; it was also a cultural watershed dividing East Anatolian survivors of a broken-down Hittite Civilization over whom the Assyrians had extended their rule<sup>2</sup> from West Anatolian backwoodsmen of an Hellenic World<sup>3</sup> which was still in the full vigour of its youth. This Central Anatolian line of demarcation between two diverse worlds had, however, been overrun during the death agonies of Assyria by barbarian Völkerwanderungen in both directions. An eastward-travelling wave of Phrygian barbarians from a no-man's-land between the Assyrian Empire and Lydia had surged up the Halys Valley into the upper basin of the Euphrates to break against the Dersim<sup>4</sup> Highlands and wash round their south-western foot-hills into the upper basin of the Tigris,<sup>5</sup> while a westward-travelling wave of Cimmerian and Scythian Nomad invaders from the Eurasian Steppe had burst through the Caspian Gates

<sup>1</sup> See IV. iv. 476-80.

<sup>2</sup> While there seems to be no doubt that the south-eastern edge of the Central Anatolian Desert constituted the north-west frontier of the Assyrian Empire in the sector between the Taurus and the Halys, there is some uncertainty about the extent of the Assyrian dominions towards the north. According to E. Forrer: *Die Provinzeinteilung des Assyrischen Reiches* (Leipzig 1920, Hinrichs), pp. 74 and 77, the principality of Kamanu—which appears to correspond to the Hellenic geographers' Southern Comana, and not to their Chamanēnē (see VI. vii. 669, n. 6)—had belonged, before its annexation by Sargon in 712 B.C., to the Kasku, whom we may identify with the Gaska barbarian denizens of the wooded mountains between the Anatolian Plateau and the Black Sea coast who, in the second millennium B.C., had given such trouble to the Hittites even at the height of their power. A prince of Kasku is recorded (see Forrer, op. cit., p. 74) to have paid tribute to Tiglath-Pileser III (*regnabat* 746-727 B.C.); and this indication that Assyrian suzerainty in Eastern Anatolia may have extended northwards towards the mouths of the Halys (Qyzyl Irmāq) and the Iris (Yeshil Irmāq) is supported by the fact that the Cappadocians were called 'Syrians' by the Greeks who settled at Sinope, Amisus, and other points along this coast in and after the eighth century B.C. (see, for example, Herodotus, Book I, chaps. 72 and 76; Book III, chap. 90; Book V, chap. 49; Book VII, chap. 72). The Greek name 'Syria', like the Persian name 'Athura', originally meant simply 'the Assyrian Empire'. The Greeks called the inhabitants of the eastern seaboard of the Mediterranean 'Syrians' because their country had once been under Assyrian rule, and, on this analogy, the application of the name 'White Syrians' to the inhabitants of the southern seaboard of the Black Sea would imply that Assyrian rule had once extended to this coast likewise (see VI. vii. 581).

Whether Pontic Cappadocia as well as Inland Cappadocia was or was not included in the Assyrian Empire, it is certain that the Hittite Civilization of Inland Cappadocia had long since made itself at home in Pontic Cappadocia as well by the time when Augustus's contemporary, the Hellenic geographer Strabo of Amasia, wrote his description of a country that was his homeland. This cultural reclamation of the once barbarian inhabitants of the Pontic Cappadocian country is likely to have taken place at a time when the two Cappadocias were united politically under one sovereignty; and, if they were not united in the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. as provinces or dependencies of the Assyrian Empire, we may conjecture that the radiation of the Hittite Civilization into Pontus began under the Achaemenian régime, after Inland Cappadocia had been detached from the autonomous principality of Cilicia (of which this Inland Cappadocia was the original nucleus) and had been united with Pontic Cappadocia to form a single Cappadocian vicerealty (see VI. vii. 674).

<sup>3</sup> The focus of the Hellenic Civilization was the basin of the Aegean Sea, and the radiation of Hellenism grew progressively fainter at each successive farther remove from the Aegean coast of the continent into the interior on both the Asiatic and the European side. An eighth-century traveller from Phocaea or Smyrna up the valley of the Hermus would have found the light dwindling in Lydia and fading out in Phrygia, as a contemporary traveller from Olynthus or Methone up the valley of the Axios would have found it gradually diminishing as he passed through Macedonia and Paeonia into Dardania.

<sup>4</sup> *Gracē Dērxēnē* or *Xerxēnē* (see VI. vii. 666).

<sup>5</sup> See VI. vi. 604-5.

and broken into Anatolia from Azerbaijan by travelling up the Araxes and down the Halys.<sup>1</sup>

This double deluge of Barbarism had obliterated the old Anatolian landmarks, and the two Powers, Lydia and Media, which had then risen to greatness by sharing the honour of bringing the turbulent flood waters under control, had fallen into conflict with one another over the division between them of Anatolian territories that they had delivered from a barbarian domination. An inconclusive contest had ended in 585 B.C. in a partition of the peninsula along the line of the Lower Halys;<sup>2</sup> and, after Croesus had been tempted by the news of Media's fall to upset this Medo-Lyidian settlement by crossing the Halys in order to lay hands on formerly Median territory in North-Eastern Anatolia, which Cyrus regarded as being his own lawful property by right of his claim to be his deposed grandfather King Cyaxares of Media's legitimate successor, the Persian empire-builder sought to solve an Anatolian frontier problem which he had inherited from his Median predecessors by a wholesale annexation of the Lydian Empire and its dependencies that carried the north-west frontier of the Achaemenian Empire forward from the east bank of the River Halys to the eastern shores of the Black Sea Straits and the Aegean Sea.

If, in making this sweeping westward advance, Cyrus imagined that he was replacing an artificial frontier by a natural one, he was acting under a misapprehension which was mercilessly exposed by the sequel; for the salt sea—which had once poured in to isolate an 'Asia' from a 'Europe' when the God Poseidon's dramatic trident-stroke had cleft an originally unbroken continent in twain from the mouths of the Aegean Sea to the head of the Sea of Azov—had, by Cyrus's day, long since ceased to be 'estranging'.<sup>3</sup> An element whose challenging inroad had stimulated primitive pioneers in the art of seamanship to become the creators of the Minoan Civilization<sup>4</sup> had lost its primeval terrors for post-Minoan Hellenic mariners who had ventured out of a land-locked Aegean into the Mediterranean and on out of the Mediterranean into the Atlantic. For the Hellenes of the sixth century B.C., the once estranging Aegean had become a 'tunny pond' linking, instead of sundering, the 'Asiatic' and 'European' halves of Hellas as, in the twentieth century of the Christian Era, the 'European' and 'American' halves of a Modern Western World were linked together by a 'herring pond' which had once been an impassable gulf. And even the island-studded Aegean, with its chain of submerged mountains lifting their peaks above sea-level to offer a timid wayfarer alternative rows of stepping stones, was not so easy for landmen to cross as the river-like straits at the Bosphorus and at the Dardanelles.

Cyrus's third successor Darius had no sooner completed his re-

<sup>1</sup> See VI. vii. 606-10 and 675-6.

<sup>2</sup> The river line which thus served as a political frontier from 585 to 547 B.C. was to play the same role again some eighteen or nineteen centuries later when, from circa A.D. 1243 to circa A.D. 1335, it formed the frontier between the Mongol Il-Khans of Iran and 'Iraq and their vassals the Saljūq Sultans of Rūm and these Saljūqs' local successors.

<sup>3</sup> See the lines from Matthew Arnold's poem *Isolation*, quoted in II. i. 326.

<sup>4</sup> See the lines from Horace's *Odes*, Book I, Ode 3, quoted in II. i. 327.



organization of the Achaemenian Empire after the Year of Insurrection than he took the short step from the Continental Asiatic Greek headland of Mycale on to the adjacent island of Samos;<sup>1</sup> and, after that, he threw a bridge of boats across the Bosphorus, as easily as across the Danube, in laying his line of communications for his campaign against the Scyths in 513 B.C. The ill-success of this excursion into the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe did not deter Darius from enlarging his foothold on the European side of the Straits next year, when he extended his suzerainty westward as far as Mount Olympus. In the same year 512 B.C. his viceroy in Egypt encroached on the Hellenic World from another quarter by annexing Cyrenaica. In 510-505 B.C.<sup>2</sup> Achaemenian diplomacy made an attempt to cast its imperial net over Athens, and in 500 B.C. the emperor's viceroy in Lydia made an abortive expedition against the Aegean island of Naxos. It might almost have seemed as if Darius were annexing the Hellenic World in a fit of absentmindedness if there had not been a hint of something more like a grand design in his dispatch of a reconnoitring expedition as far afield as Magna Graecia<sup>3</sup> even before his occupation of Samos, and in the interest that he showed (if Herodotus is to be believed)<sup>4</sup> in a scheme for the occupation of Sardinia that was dangled before him by the Milesian adventurer Histiaeus. However that may be, Darius made no secret of his resolve to extinguish what remained of Hellenic independence after the year 499 B.C., when the dispatch of a naval expeditionary force by a still independent Athens and a still independent Eretria had given the signal for an insurrection of the Achaemenian Empire's Hellenic subjects which spread from the west coast of Anatolia to the Bosphorus in one direction and to Cyprus in the other.<sup>5</sup>

Though the immediate occasion of this formidable outbreak had been a personal quarrel between the Persian and the Greek commander of the abortive naval expedition against Naxos in the preceding year, the underlying cause was the irksomeness of even the easy-going Achaemenian régime to an Asiatic maritime people who, unlike the Ionians' unsuccessful Syrophoenician competitors for the economic dominion of the Mediterranean, had never had their spirit broken on the chariot-wheel of Assyrian militarism. Sober reason should have reminded Darius that, though the Continental Asiatic Hellenes had not been crushed by the Assyrians, they had at any rate been partially broken in to political servitude by their previous experience of a Lydian suzerainty which had never been imposed on their European kinsmen, and that in his own day these rebellious Ionian subjects of his were the least warlike of all contemporary Hellenes. If a subject Ionia had nevertheless proved to

<sup>1</sup> See Herodotus, Book III, chap. 139.

<sup>2</sup> See Olmstead, *op. cit.*, pp. 151-2.

<sup>3</sup> See the story of Darius's Crotoniate Greek physician Democédès in Herodotus, Book III, chaps. 129-38.

<sup>4</sup> See Herodotus, Book V, chap. 106, and Book VI, chap. 2.

<sup>5</sup> The revolt was not confined to Asiatic Hellenes whose mother tongue happened to be Greek. The non-Greek-speaking Carian insurgents gave the Persians more trouble than all their Greek-speaking comrades-in-arms (Herodotus, Book V, chaps. 117-21). On the other hand the Cypriots, whose mother tongue was Greek but who were not yet more than semi-Hellenic in their culture, were reconquered by the Persians with comparative ease (Herodotus, Book V, chaps. 108-16).

be a hornet's nest, an Achaemenian empire-builder could not reasonably expect to make an easy conquest of other Hellenic peoples who had never yet lost their independence; but Reason was eclipsed by Anger in the soul of an emperor who had taken the provocation offered him in 499 B.C. as an unpardonable defiance of his pretensions to world-dominion; the eclipse of Reason left the blinded autocrat at the mercy of Hybris; and Hybris betrayed him into the fatal decision to resort to his predecessor Cyrus's dubious policy of cutting his way out of an exasperating geographical entanglement.

Cyrus had got rid of an unsatisfactory river-frontier with Lydia by extending his dominion over the domain of the Lydian Empire; Darius would get rid of an unsatisfactory sea-frontier with an independent remnant of Hellas by bringing the whole of Hellas, in her turn, under his oecumenical sovereignty. After the last embers of Hellenic revolt in Asia had been stamped out in 493 B.C., Darius immediately started operations against Hellas-in-Europe. The year 492 B.C. saw Mardonius's abortive expedition against Continental European Greece along the north shore of the Aegean; the year 490 B.C. saw Datis' and Artaphernes' likewise abortive expedition across the Aegean to Marathon. Thereafter Darius's energies were diverted, for the rest of his life, to the task of suppressing a revolt in Egypt; but the reverses of 492 and 490 B.C. did not move him to reconsider his designs against Hellas; he bequeathed them, unabated, to his successor Xerxes; and Xerxes' dutiful execution of his father's political testament led him into the historic disasters of 480-479 B.C. at Salamis, Plataea, and Mycalê.

### *The Aftermath on the Political Plane*

In retorting to the revolt of his Hellenic subjects in Asia by resolving to conquer their kinsmen and accomplices in Europe, Darius had converted a seven-years-long insurrection (*flagrabit* 499-493 B.C.) into a fifty-one-years-long war (*gerebatur* 499-449 B.C.); for the trial of strength with a still independent Hellas to which Darius had committed the Achaemenian Empire did not end with the failure in 479 B.C. of Xerxes' invasion of Europe. Before peace could be restored the Achaemenidae had to reconcile themselves to the loss of the western seaboard of Anatolia from Lycia to the Bosphorus inclusive, in addition to the loss of their Transhellespontine outposts in Europe, while the Athenians had to recognize their inability permanently to detach Pamphylia, Cyprus, and Egypt as well from the Achaemenian Empire. These disillusioning experiences on both sides did at last beget a peace settlement which was as statesmanlike in its objective of re-establishing peace on terms that would not prove intolerable for either party as it was ingenious in translating this enlightened aim into practical provisions for bilateral demilitarization;<sup>1</sup> and for a few years after the negotiation of the

<sup>1</sup> A masterly elucidation of the terms of the Atheno-Achaemenian peace settlement of 450/449 B.C. by H. T. Wade-Gery will be found in *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, special volume: 'Athenian Studies Presented to William Scott Ferguson' (Cambridge, Mass. 1940, Harvard University Press), pp. 121-56. A cynic might point out that the high contracting parties came to terms with one another at the expense of the Asiatic Hellenes whose aspirations to political independence had been the original cause

Athens-Achaemenian treaty of 450/449 B.C. it looked as if this act of statesmanship might have succeeded in restoring a general equilibrium between the Syriac and Hellenic worlds that had been momentarily attained towards the close of the sixth century B.C., after the Carthaginians had finished rounding off their empire and before Darius had begun to extend the bounds of his.

The destruction of this sixth-century equilibrium in the Aegean and the Levant through the outbreak of the Hellenic-Persian War of 499-449 B.C. had been followed by corresponding upheavals in the Western Mediterranean. A Carthaginian attack on the Hellenes in Sicily which had been delivered in the year of Xerxes' attack on Continental European Greece<sup>1</sup> had ended there in an even greater catastrophe for the aggressor; and Hiero's victory over the Carthaginians had set his hands free to inflict an equally signal defeat on the Etruscans when, six years later, these allies of Carthage belatedly delivered a fresh attack on the Campanian outpost of the Hellenic World at Cumae.<sup>2</sup> Thus in the Western Mediterranean peace had been restored a quarter of a century before its restoration in the Levant in 449 B.C. But an equilibrium that had eventually been re-established in all quarters was upset once again before the fifth century had run its course, and this time the disturbing factor was not any fresh Persian or Carthaginian act of aggression against Hellas, but the outbreak in 431 B.C. of a fratricidal war between Hellene and Hellene which spelled the breakdown of the Hellenic Civilization.<sup>3</sup>

This warfare within the bosom of the Hellenic Society, which dragged on from 431 B.C. until a settlement was dictated in 338 B.C. to the city-states of Continental European Hellas by King Philip of Macedon, upset the equilibrium between the Hellenic World and its neighbours in divers ways.

In the first place it presented both the Carthaginians and the Achaemenidae with an irresistible temptation to take advantage of their Hellenic rivals' apparently suicidal mania. After the crippling of the power of Athens through the disaster that overtook the Athenian expeditionary force in Sicily in 413 B.C., the Carthaginians broke a seventy-years-long truce with their independent Hellenic neighbours by trying their hand in 409-406 B.C. at a conquest of the whole of Sicily, including Syracuse, which the Athenians had just failed to achieve, while the Achaemenidae began to take cautious steps for the recovery of the Asiatic Greek territories which they had lost in 479 B.C. and had been compelled to renounce thirty years later. In this new counter-offensive the Carthaginians were less successful than the Persians. In Sicily after the Carthaginian breach of the peace in 409 B.C. the struggle swayed to of the war. So far from leaving the Asiatic Hellenes independent, the treaty of 450/449 B.C. appears to have left them defenceless against their former masters the Achaemenidae as well as against their present masters the Athenians by providing for the dismantling of their fortifications.

<sup>1</sup> The scanty surviving evidence leaves it an open question whether these two simultaneous attacks on the Hellenic World in 480 B.C. were concerted, or whether their simultaneity was fortuitous.

<sup>2</sup> For the previous attack in 524 B.C., see p. 429, above.

<sup>3</sup> There was a relation of historical effect and cause between the breakdown of the Hellenic Civilization in 431 B.C. and the successful repulse of Xerxes' attack on Hellas in 480-479 B.C. (see pp. 522-5, below).

and for 168 years, during which the Carthaginians always just failed to take Syracuse and the Hellenes to take Lilybaeum, till the Carthaginian wooden curtain across the south-western quarter of the Mediterranean was battered in by Roman rams in the first Romano-Punic War (*gerebatur* 263-241 B.C.). In the Aegean and the Levant, on the other hand, the Achaemenian Imperial Government had the satisfaction in 386 B.C. of dictating to the warring states of Continental European Greece 'the Emperor's Peace' in a communiqué announcing that His Imperial Majesty Artaxerxes II was vindicating the historic rights of his house by resuming possession of all Hellenic territories on the Asiatic mainland, together with the islands of Clazomenae and Cyprus.

At that moment the Achaemenian Empire might have been thought to have achieved by diplomacy all that Darius the Great had dreamed of achieving by force, for the communiqué went on to decree that all other Hellenic communities except the ancient Athenian possessions of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros were to have their independence restored to them by the fiat of the Imperial Court at Susa. Appearances, however, were deceptive; for another effect of the long-drawn-out fratricidal warfare in Hellas was to make the Hellenes past masters in the art of war at the cost of ruining everything that had once made Hellenic life worth living; and the Achaemenian and Carthaginian empires were swept away as soon as the new Hellenic weapons forged at this prohibitive price were turned by Macedonian and Roman war-lords against the Hellenic World's hereditary enemies.<sup>1</sup>

### *The Aftermath on the Cultural Plane*

Thus the military and political aggression of the Hellenic Society against its neighbours, which the victims of it had succeeded in arresting in the sixth century B.C., was resumed in and after the fourth century B.C. in a wider arena which has already been surveyed in an earlier chapter;<sup>2</sup> but there was also a cultural plane of action on which enduring pacific conquests were made by the Hellenic Civilization before, as well as after, the generation of Alexander the Great.

The natives of Sicily, who did their utmost to resist by force of arms the interloping Greek colonists' aggressive attempts to evict or subjugate them, were at the same time voluntarily adopting the language, religion, and art of their Greek assailants.<sup>3</sup> The never conquered Elymi, as well as the Sican subjects of Akragas and Sicel subjects of Syracuse, took to speaking Greek, calling their hereditary divinities by Hellenic names, and honouring them by building them temples in the Hellenic style of architecture. A notable Sicel convert to the Hellenic culture was Ducetius, the defeated patriot leader in the Sicels' last stand against Syracusan imperialism.<sup>4</sup> Even in the 'barred zone' behind a Carthaginian 'wooden curtain', where no Hellenic ships might sail nor Hellenic merchants set foot on land to do business direct with the Carthaginians' African and Iberian native subjects, the militant Carthaginian middle-

<sup>1</sup> See III. iii. 150, and p. 409, above.

<sup>2</sup> On pp. 403-18, above.

<sup>3</sup> See, for example, Dunbabin, *op. cit.*, pp. 177, 191-3, and 334-5.

<sup>4</sup> See V. vi. 235-6, and p. 587, below.

man, who exploited a monopoly won through force of arms by pocketing as large a share of the commercial profits as the trade would bear, found himself constrained to eke out his own Punic poverty of creative power and artistic sensibility by importing the attractive manufactures of the independent Hellenic communities in Sicily to supply the economic demand of the Carthaginian Empire and its vast commercial hinterland; and, however successful the Libyphoenician might be as a business man in fleeing both the natives and the Hellenes between whom he had forcibly interposed himself, it was beyond his power—and no doubt equally beyond the range of his imagination—to think of preventing the native peoples under his control from being influenced by the artistry of Hellenic wares which the Punic importer was compelled to peddle because his own industries were incapable of emulating them.

An Hellenic culture, whose radiation thus triumphantly succeeded in penetrating 'the wooden curtain' that screened the Carthaginian Empire, made relatively easy conquests in a contemporary Achaemenian Empire where the régime was much less restrictive and the population much more cultivated. The Hellenization of Lydia, which had been given an impetus by the incorporation of the Continental Asiatic Hellenes into the Lydian Empire in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C., had gone so far by 401 B.C.—sixty-seven years before Alexander's crossing of the Dardanelles—that in that year a Lydian, who, by assuming a Boeotian accent, had successfully passed himself off as a Hellene in order to enlist in an expeditionary force of Hellenic soldiers of fortune, was able to sustain his part so well that he might have remained undetected by his comrades-in-arms if his pierced ears had not eventually betrayed him to Hellenic eyes sharpened by danger;<sup>1</sup> and between the turn of the century and 334 B.C. the Syrophoenicians capitulated on the cultural plane to the Hellenic style of art, though the persistence on the economic and political planes of their hostility to their hereditary enemy was to be demonstrated in 332 B.C. by the desperate military resistance which Alexander was to encounter at Tyre. But a pre-Alexandrine Hellenism's most fruitful cultural conquests were not made in either of the two great Syriac empires whose establishment in the sixth century B.C. had arrested the Hellenic World's military, political, and commercial expansion. The historic event in the propagation of Hellenism in this age was the Hellenization of the Etruscans and other originally non-Hellenic peoples on the western seaboard of Italy.

The Etruscans had no sooner settled in Italy than they began to be appreciably affected by the culture of an Hellenic World which lay between this transmarine Etruria and an Anatolian homeland with which the colonial Etruscans must soon have lost touch—to judge by the absence of any convincing indication of their place of origin in those echoes of a colonial Etruscan tradition which the historian's ear could catch in the surviving works of Hellenic antiquarians. After the military struggle between Etruscans and Hellenes for the command of

<sup>1</sup> See Xenophon, *Expedition of Cyrus*, Book III, chap. i, §§ 26–32. Already in 480 B.C. the equipment of the Lydian contingent in Xerxes' expeditionary force had been almost identical with the Hellenic equipment of the day (Herodotus, Book VII, chap. 74).



the Tyrrhene Sea had ended on a basis of *uti possidetis* as a result of the Etruscans' naval defeat off Cumae in 474 B.C., the reception of the Hellenic culture in Etruria was so catholic and so rapid that the Etruscans had become Hellenes by adoption before they fell under the rule of Roman empire-builders who acquired much of their own Hellenism at second hand from their Etruscan neighbours and eventual subjects.<sup>1</sup>

The Hellenization of Rome—in the first instance perhaps mainly through Etruscan intermediaries and latterly also through a direct intercourse, of ever increasing intimacy, between Romans and Greeks—was, of course, the most important cultural conquest that the Hellenes ever achieved at any stage of their history either before or after the generation of Alexander; for the Romans, whatever their origin,<sup>2</sup> took up a task which had proved to be beyond the power of the Etruscan settlers on the West Italian coast to the north of them and the Greek settlers on the West Italian coast to the south of them and the Massilian pioneers of Hellenism at the mouth of the Rhône. After the Italic Greeks had succumbed to an Oscan and the Etruscans to a Celtic barbarian counter-offensive, the Romans carried a Latinized Hellenism into the Abruzzi and over the Appennines and the Po and the Alps till they had planted it right across the Continental European hinterland of the Mediterranean, from the delta of the Danube to the mouths of the Rhine and, across the Straits of Dover, in Britain.<sup>3</sup>

### 3. *Encounters with the Syriac Civilization*<sup>4</sup>

In the sinister history of Assyrian militarism the principal episode, as we have already observed, was a domestic conflict between the Assyrian march and the Babylonian interior of a Babylonian World; for this fratricidal struggle ruined the Babylonian Society before ending in a Pyrrhic victory for a short-lived Neo-Babylonian Empire.<sup>5</sup> We have also observed, however, that this disastrous militarism had been generated by the grim ordeal of a life-and-death struggle which had been forced upon Assyria in the eleventh and tenth centuries B.C. by aggressive Aramaean pioneers of a nascent Syriac Civilization<sup>6</sup> whose north-eastward expansion was a belated backwash from a *Völkerwanderung* precipitated by

<sup>1</sup> The acceleration in the process of the Hellenization of Etruria between the sixth and the fourth century B.C. is graphically recorded in the wall-paintings in Etruscan tombs at Caere (Cervetri). On the other hand, in their depiction of the torments inflicted on the damned in Hell, the Etruscan painters betray an un-Hellenic vein of sadism in the Etruscan ethos which was incidentally communicated to the Roman pupils in an Etruscan school of Hellenism, and which reappears even in a latter-day Tuscan Dante's *Divina Commedia*. The origin of this sinister streak in the Etruscan tradition is a mystery. It makes the impression of being of non-Hellenic provenance (though the torments of the damned do figure in Hellenic art and legend); and it is a matter of recorded history that the institution of gladiatorial shows, which was perhaps the most atrocious of all the cruel practices that the Romans learnt from Etruscan instructors, was so abhorrent to Greek feelings that it never gained any foothold in Greek communities under Roman rule. The inference is that this Etruscan sadism was an element in the Etruscans' Anatolian heritage which was too near to the heart of their tradition for the counter-influence of Hellenism to be able to eliminate it. Yet, if the origin of Etruscan sadism may be Anatolian, it can hardly be Hittite; for, to judge by the surviving corpus of Hittite legislation, the Hittite Civilization was as humane as the Hellenic.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 702–5, below.

<sup>3</sup> See II. ii. 160–4 and V. v. 213–15.

<sup>4</sup> See xi, maps 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 31.

<sup>5</sup> See II. ii. 135–7 and IV. iv. 476–84.

<sup>6</sup> See II. ii. 134–5.

the collapse of 'the New Empire' of Egypt in South-West Asia and the overthrow of 'the thalassocracy of Minos' in the Aegean. Thus a collision with an alien society had been the occasion of an Assyrian transgression that was eventually fatal to the society of which the Assyrians themselves were members. The Syriac Civilization was not the only alien society that was to cross the path of the Assyrians before these rabid Babylonian militarists had bled themselves to death. The Assyrians also bore down upon the remnants of an already broken Hittite Society astride the Taurus, and upon an Egyptian Society that had continued to survive in the Nile Valley in a petrified state after repelling 'the Sea Peoples' from the coasts of the Delta at the turn of the thirteenth and twelfth centuries B.C. But, in the history of these three encounters with a Babylonian Civilization represented first by Assyria and, after Assyria's self-annihilation, by Babylonia, the reactions of the Babylonian World's Syriac neighbours were of outstanding historical importance; and the outcome of this interplay between the Syriac and the Babylonian Civilization is an impressive illustration of the truth that 'the meek shall inherit the Earth'.<sup>1</sup>

In a drama which opened in the tenth century B.C. with an Aramaean military offensive against Assyria, the close of this first act left the Aramaeans prostrate and the Assyrians triumphant. In the course of the ninth century B.C. the territories in Mesopotamia and the Upper Tigris Basin that had previously been overrun by Aramaean tribes were conquered by the Assyrians and converted into provinces of an Assyrian Empire. But the very thoroughness with which the subjugated Aramaeans were incorporated into an Assyrian body politic gave them an opening in the second act of the play for a peaceful penetration of the Babylonian body social which these foiled aggressors had never achieved so long as they had been on the war-path; and in this second act the Aramaeans' cultural conquest of their military conquerors proceeded *pari passu* with the extension of the Assyrians' domination over the Syriac World.

Between the accession of Tiglath-Pileser III in 746 B.C. and the annihilation of the last Assyrian army at Harrân in 610-609 B.C. an expanding Assyrian Power followed up its victory over the Aramaean peoples east of the Middle Euphrates by extending its operations to the west bank of the river and subduing all the Aramaean, Phoenician, and Hebrew communities in the homeland of the Syriac Civilization except the single Philistine city-state of Gaza and a still precariously independent Hebrew principality of Judah.<sup>2</sup> The Assyrian empire-builders sought to make their hold on their new conquests permanent by forcibly redistributing the conquered populations;<sup>3</sup> and, although in the event this inhuman Assyrian practice failed to achieve its perpetrators' political purpose, it made its mark on History by assisting the Assyrians' victims

<sup>1</sup> Matt. v. 5.

<sup>2</sup> When a Judah that had just escaped falling into Assyrian hands in 700 B.C. was carried away captive in 597 and 586 B.C. by the Assyrians' Babylonian heirs, the only provinces of the Syriac World that still remained unscathed by Babylonian militarism were the Phoenicians' colonial domain in the Western basin of the Mediterranean, which was insulated by the Sea, and Arabia Felix (the Yaman), which was insulated by Arabian deserts (the Najd and the Hijâz).

<sup>3</sup> See VI. vii. 111-12 and 114-17.

to win a cultural victory which the Assyrian aggressors had not foreseen and which the broken Syriac peoples had not sought.

The 'displaced persons' whom the Assyrians deported from a conquered Syria to their dominions east of Euphrates reinforced the previously conquered Aramaean representatives of the Syriac Civilization in Mesopotamia; this reinforcement gave an impetus to the pacific cultural encroachments which the Mesopotamian Aramaeans had already been beginning to make upon the Babylonian Civilization's domain; and, before Assyria's fall, a thus potentially intensified eastward-streaming radiation of the Syriac culture had produced signal effects that were never to be undone. By the end of the seventh century B.C. the Syriac culture had not only made a lodgement within the Babylonian body social; its influence had penetrated beyond the Babylonian World's easternmost outposts into a no-man's-land tenanted by Iranian barbarians, to compete there with the influence of the Babylonian culture itself for the conversion of these receptive barbarians' souls; and in the sixth century B.C. a third act of the play was opened by a dramatic reversal, through Iranian intervention, of the relations in which the Syriac and Babylonian societies had stood to one another since the ninth century, when the Assyrians had established their military and political ascendancy over the Aramaeans. The liquidation of the Neo-Babylonian Empire by the Achaemenid empire-builder Cyrus in 539-538 B.C. did not merely liberate the Jews and the Syrophenicians from a Babylonian yoke; it actually raised them, as we have seen,<sup>1</sup> to the status of privileged partners of the new Persian masters of South-Western Asia; and this change in the Syriac peoples' political fortunes had latent cultural corollaries which revealed themselves in the sequel.

Achaemenids who, on the political plane, had sought to insure their régime against any risk of a revival of the liquidated Neo-Babylonian Empire by pursuing an anti-Babylonian policy of putting down the mighty from their seat and exalting the humble and meek<sup>2</sup> had at the same time started their imperial career on the cultural plane as still unquestioning proselytes of the Babylonian Civilization. The imperial archives at the newly created imperial residence Persepolis in Persis, as well as those at the ancient capital city Susa in Elam, were recorded, *more Babylonico*, on clay tablets in cuneiform characters in the Elamite language; and the same Babylonian script was employed in the trilingual inscriptions on imperial monuments—such as Darius I's record, on the rock at Behistan, of his acts in the Year of Insurrection—for the conveyance of all three imperial languages—Elamite for Susa, Akkadian for Babylon, and Medo-Persian for Ecbatana and Persepolis—in which these Achaemenian imperial inscriptions were presented. To convey the Iranian imperial people's previously unwritten Medo-Persian mother tongue, a special version of the cuneiform script was expressly devised.<sup>3</sup>

These early Achaemenian measures in the domain of language and writing signified a Persian reception of the Babylonian culture which the Persian heirs of the Neo-Babylonian Empire doubtless took as a matter of course; but the rival Syriac culture revealed its competitive power of

<sup>1</sup> On pp. 425-6, above.    <sup>2</sup> Luke i. 52.    <sup>3</sup> See V. v. 123, n. 2, and VI. vii. 247.

counter-attraction in the no less significant Achaemenian act of state by which the Aramaic language and alphabet were given official currency in all Achaemenian territories west of the Euphrates,<sup>1</sup> including Egypt and Anatolia, where Aramaic was not indigenous even as a vernacular, as well as Syria, where Aramaic was already replacing a Canaanite language that had been the vernacular of Phoenicia and Judaea; and this propagation of the Aramaic language and alphabet through Persian agency among the Persians' non-Aramaean subjects in the West was the prelude to a reception of the Syriac culture in an Aramaic medium by the Persians themselves. An Iranian people that had entered on its imperial career in the sixth century B.C. under the spell of the Babylonian culture had already transferred its cultural allegiance from the Babylonian to the Syriac Civilization before the Achaemenian Empire was overthrown by Alexander. The faultiness of the later Achaemenian inscriptions in Persian cuneiform suggests that the version of a Babylonian script which the Persians had invented for their own use had never gained popular currency;<sup>2</sup> and in the post-Achaemenian Age the Iranians were writing their Middle Persian mother tongue in the Aramaic Alphabet and were even using Aramaic words written in the Aramaic Alphabet as ideograms to stand for their Iranian synonyms.<sup>3</sup>

The post-Achaemenian Age that thus saw the Syriac Society consummate its captivation of once barbarian Iranians who had taken their first lesson in civilization from Babylonian instructors was an age of Hellenic military and political ascendancy in South-West Asia and Egypt; and the same age also saw the same Syriac Society achieve the still greater triumphs of defeating the Hellenic Society in a competition for the cultural conversion of the Babylonian and Egyptian worlds, and dividing the honours with its Hellenic rival in a contemporary struggle for winning the cultural allegiance of the débris of a broken Hittite Society astride the Taurus. It was assuredly no accident that the Syriac Society's most substantial successes in the peaceful penetration of neighbouring worlds should have been gained after the fall of an Achaemenian Power which had patronized the Syriac culture because it had been the political patron of the Syriac peoples. The antagonism which the Achaemenian régime had evoked in Babylonian and Egyptian souls had checked the spontaneous reception of the Syriac culture in these two worlds more effectively than the Achaemenian Government's official patronage could ever promote it; and, when this compromising political association was brought to an end by the liquidation of the Achaemenian Empire, the Syriac Civilization found its opportunities for cultural conquest enhanced under an Hellenic political régime which did not show its Syriac subjects any embarrassing favours.

The victory of the Syriac over the Hellenic culture in Babylonia under a post-Achaemenian Hellenic régime was notable because, of all the Achaemenids' former subjects, the Babylonians were the most readily inclined to welcome their new Hellenic rulers as deliverers from an odious Achaemenian yoke.<sup>4</sup> Yet, under a philobabylonian Seleucid

<sup>1</sup> See V. v. 123, n. 2, and 499, and VI. vii. 248-9.

<sup>2</sup> See I. i. 80 and 81, n. 3.

<sup>3</sup> See V. v. 123, n. 2.

<sup>4</sup> See V. v. 94 and 347.

régime, a handful of Babylonian scholars and astronomers who fraternized with their Greek confrères in a joint pursuit of esoteric common intellectual interests weighed as dust in the balance against the tens and hundreds of thousands of their compatriots who were taking to speaking Aramaic instead of Akkadian and writing, if literate, in the Alphabet instead of in cuneiform. This eviction of the native Babylonian script and language by more convenient Aramaic substitutes for them was a process which had begun in the Babylonian World in the days of the Assyrian Empire;<sup>1</sup> and it was completed by the simultaneous extinction of cuneiform and Akkadian in the first century of the Christian Era, under the rule of the Seleucids' barbarian Arsacid successors.<sup>2</sup>

In Assyria and Babylonia, as in Palestine and Phoenicia, the spread of the Aramaic tongue—which in the Babylonian World was a carrier of the Syriac culture—was facilitated by a kinship between the intrusive language and the sister Semitic native language that it was replacing; and in Babylonia the invading Syriac culture enjoyed, after its reception in Iran, the further advantage of encircling its victim. In Egypt, on the other hand, an invading Syriac culture whose homeland was still nearer to Egypt than it was to Babylonia, and whose competition with Hellenism for the cultural conquest of Egypt was not handicapped by any Egyptian counterpart of a Babylonian philhellenism, was at the same time at a relative disadvantage in being unable to overwhelm its victim by an encircling movement and unable to coax him into conversion by offering him, as the vehicle of the new culture that he was being invited to adopt, a language that had a manifest affinity with his own. On this linguistic ground the Syriac culture's Hellenic competitor was, of course, at an equal disadvantage in Egypt; but, when we proceed with our comparison of the two rival missionary cultures' respective strengths and weaknesses in Egypt as contrasted with Babylonia, we perceive that an Egypt that was not appreciably closer than Babylonia was to Syria and Mesopotamia was within far shorter range and easier reach than Babylonia was of the homeland of Hellenism in the Aegean Basin; and we also observe that Hellenism was in a position to employ against Egypt the manœuvre of encirclement that was being employed by the Syriac culture against Babylonia, since Egypt was exposed to a convergent radiation of Hellenic influence from the rapidly Hellenized city-states of Philistia on the east as well as from the colonial Greek city-states of Cyrenaica on her western flank.

The militant Egyptian reaction against Hellenic rule which declared itself at the turn of the third and second centuries B.C. retarded the Hellenization of Egypt without benefiting Hellenism's Syriac rival, since the xenophobia that had come to be the dominant vein in the Egyptian ethos by that date was too rabid to draw nice distinctions between the peculiar horrors of Phoenician, Jewish, and Greek pariahs; and, when in the third century of the Christian Era the native body social of an Egypt under Roman rule had been superficially assimilated to a genuinely Greek Alexandria and Ptolemais by being given a veneer

<sup>1</sup> See I. i. 79.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 125, n. 3, correcting I. i. 79-80 and II. ii. 138.



of what purported to be Hellenic municipal institutions,<sup>1</sup> it might have seemed as if, whatever the ultimate destinies of Hellenism in Egypt might be, Hellenism's Syriac competitor, at any rate, was now here out of the running. Nor were these prospects materially changed by the contemporary conversion of Egypt to Christianity; for the oecumenical Catholicism that was the original form in which an Hellenic-Syriac higher religion was received in Egypt was conveyed in the media of the Greek language and Hellenic philosophy. The victory in Egypt which was eventually gained over Hellenism after all by a Syriac Civilization whose prospects had long since apparently dwindled to vanishing-point was the consequence of a common movement in the Egyptian and Syriac worlds to declare their independence of Hellenism in the arena of Christian theological controversy by seceding from a Hellenizing Catholic Church to a Monophysitism which could be made the symbol and instrument of an anti-Hellenic reversion to the traditions of a native culture.

This movement started in Egypt when the stubbornly un-Hellenized and covertly anti-Hellenic rural mass of the Egyptian people ran away with a Monophysitism that had first been conceived in the polemical minds of Alexandrian Greek clerics as an incident in a theological warfare between Alexandria and Constantinople which was a reflection of the rivalry between these two competing focuses of a Christian Hellenic culture. Before the close of the fifth century of the Christian Era the native Egyptians had converted this family quarrel within the bosom of the Hellenic World into a new expression of the Egyptian World's seven-hundred-years-old quarrel with a domineering Hellenism. But in the fifth century of the Christian Era, as in the seventh century B.C., a petrified Egyptian Society lacked the strength to evict an alien oppressor without the support of an alien ally; and this indispensable alien aid, which the Saïte Pharaohs had obtained by enlisting the military services of Ionian and Carian 'Brazen men from the Sea', was found by the fifth-century Egyptian fathers of a Coptic Monophysite Church in an ecclesiastical alliance with Syriac fellow Monophysites in the Asiatic dominions of the Roman Empire south-east of the Amanus Range.

This fraternization between a submerged Syriac and a submerged Egyptian Society on the religious basis of a common Monophysitism confronted a moribund Hellenic 'ascendancy' with a mass-opposition in its Oriental dominions which it failed either to repress or to appease; and the sixth-century Syrian champion of Monophysitism, Ya'qūb bar Addai, had virtually undone the Hellenizing work of Alexander the Great and his Macedonian and Roman successors before the seventh-century Muslim Arab barbarian invaders gave the Roman imperial régime in Syria and Egypt its *coup de grâce*. In thus shaking itself free at last from a long endured Hellenic yoke the Egyptian Society was not, however, recovering its ancient cultural independence; it was escaping from a superficial Hellenization at the price of allowing itself to be absorbed into the body social of a Syriac Civilization that was no less alien to it than the Hellenic; and the Egyptian World did not elude its fate by eschewing the reception of the latter-day Syriac versions of an

<sup>1</sup> See VI. vii. 50, and p. 408, above, and p. 586, below.

Aramaic language and alphabet that had been the Syriac Society's instruments for picking Babylonian locks. The Egyptians used their own living vernacular language as their literary vehicle for a Monophysite Christian liturgy and theology, and they took the Greek and not the Syriac Alphabet as the basis for the new script that they invented to convey their new Coptic ecclesiastical language; but the Syriac Civilization needed no linguistic key to open the door into an Egyptian World which was now associated with the Syriac Society by the intimate fellowship of sharing a common Monophysite faith that was menaced by a common 'Melchite' Hellenic adversary. The Egyptian Society had already merged its long jealously preserved identity in the Syriac body social before the Roman régime in Egypt was liquidated by the Arabs; and this captivation of Egypt by the Syriac culture which the Monophysite movement had brought about was already complete before a majority of the people of Egypt underwent a further religious conversion from Monophysite Christianity to Islam and exchanged their ancestral Coptic mother tongue for Arabic.<sup>1</sup>

In the competition between the Syriac and Hellenic societies for the assimilation of the debris of a ruined Hittite Society astride the Taurus, a partition of the prize was dictated by Geography. An Achaemenian fiat could not avail to give the Aramaic language any effective currency in the former domain of the Lydian Empire in Western Anatolia, which was within point-blank range of the radiation of the Hellenic culture from its Aegean focus; and even in Cappadocia, where a convergent Hellenic radiation from Sinope and Ephesus was countered by the proximity of an Aramaic-speaking Syria and Mesopotamia and by the introduction, under the Achaemenian régime, of an Iranian feudal aristocracy and a Zoroastrian clergy, the final victory of Hellenism was demonstrated, as we have seen,<sup>2</sup> by the Hellenism of the fourth-century Cappadocian Fathers of the Orthodox Church. South of Taurus on the other hand—or at any rate east of Amanus, in Northern Syria—the absorption of the local Hittite communities into a Syriac body social was

<sup>1</sup> In Syria, Mesopotamia, and Iraq, where at the time of the Arab conquest the current vernacular and literary language was the derivative of Aramaic known as Syriac, the Arabic language in and after the seventh century of the Christian Era enjoyed the same advantage as had been enjoyed by the Aramaic language in its own antecedent conquest of 'the Fertile Crescent'. The transition from a Semitic Syriac to a likewise Semitic Arabic was as easy as the transition to a Semitic Aramaic from a likewise Semitic Canaanite and Akkadian. A Syriac-speaking 'Fertile Crescent' had, however, like a Coptic-speaking Egypt, already shaken itself free from Hellenism by embracing the anti-Hellenic Nestorian and Monophysite forms of Christianity before its military conquest by the Arabs and its subsequent linguistic conquest by Arabic. The role of the Arabs, their language, and their faith in helping to liberate a submerged Syriac World from the incubus of an intrusive Hellenism was subsidiary everywhere except in the Phoenicians' former colonial domain round the Western Mediterranean. In North-West Africa, the Iberian Peninsula, the Balearic Islands, Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica, the Arabic language and Islam were the instruments by which a Hellenism that, except in Sicily, was here clad in a Latin dress was evicted or submerged in the eighth and ninth centuries of the Christian Era. It is true that in North-West Africa a 'native' cultural reaction against an Hellenic 'ascendancy' had found a religious expression, three hundred years before the advent of Islam, in the fourth-century revolt of Donatism against Catholicism. But Donatism had never succeeded in winning the decisive victory over Catholicism in North-West Africa that Monophysitism had won over Catholicism in Egypt and Syria, and the mission of defeating Hellenism in the religious arena was thus left in North-West Africa for Islam to execute.

<sup>2</sup> On p. 415, above.

merely delayed,<sup>1</sup> without being permanently averted, when in the post-Alexandrine Age this region was intensively planted with Greek colonists by Antigonos Monophthalmus and Seleucus Nicator and Nicator's Seleucid successors. The mass-secession of the rural population of Syria from a Hellenizing Catholic Christianity to an anti-Hellenic Monophysitism in the fifth and sixth centuries of the Christian Era made manifest the startling truth that an Antioch which had been founded as a base for Hellenic military and political power and as a transmitting station for the Hellenic culture was still, in the ninth century of her brilliant life, a closely invested Hellenic enclave in the midst of a beleaguering Syriac country-side whose passive siege of the intrusive alien imperial city had been invisibly maintained below the surface of a dispensation in which Hellenism had fancied itself to be dominant.

The vastness of these pacific conquests which were achieved by the Syriac culture during an age of Hellenic ascendancy between the overthrow of the Achaemenian Empire and the establishment of the Arab Caliphate stands out in striking contrast to the frustration of contemporary Syriac attempts to evict an Hellenic 'ascendancy' by force of arms. The Romans' crushing defeat of a Maccabaeian and Zealot Jewish advance-guard's forlorn hope west of Euphrates is less impressive than their equal success in preventing an Arsacid and Sasanid Iranian main body of the militant Syriac opponents of Hellenism from making any permanent reconquests west of Iran and 'Irāq.<sup>2</sup> Khusrū Parwīz's Persian cavalry who forced their way as far west as Calchedon in Asia and Tripoli in Africa during the last and most devastating of the Romano-Persian wars (*gerebatur* A.D. 603-28) made no more lasting gains of territory than Pacorus's Parthian cavalry who had ranged over Syria in 51-50 and again in 40-38 B.C. A militancy which was thus so ineffective on its own plane did, however, make history on the religious plane by perversely distracting two higher religions from their oecumenical mission of bringing human souls into a closer communion with God in order to enlist these churches as combatants in the trivial mundane military enterprise of liberating a subjugated Syriac Society's domain from the incubus of an interloping Hellenic 'ascendancy'<sup>3</sup>—as the Nestorian and Monophysite forms of Christianity were subsequently diverted from the service of Christianity's authentic spiritual purpose to the role of being used as weapons by the Syriac Civilization in a mortal combat with Hellenism in an ecclesiastical arena.

In a twentieth-century Westernizing World a Jewish and a Zoroastrian Church whose origins could be traced back to the experiences of the internal proletariat of a disintegrating Babylonian Civilization<sup>4</sup> were still in existence side by side with four younger religions of the same species—Christianity, Islam, the Mahāyāna, and Hinduism—which had been brought to birth by similar experiences in the history of a disintegrating Hellenic Society. All six religions were still on the map, and all six had once made their epiphany in the World during the decline and

<sup>1</sup> It had begun as early as the fourteenth century B.C. (see p. 506, n. 2, below).

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 412-13, above.

<sup>3</sup> See V. v. 124-7.

<sup>4</sup> See V. v. 120-2

fall of one of the civilizations of the second generation.<sup>1</sup> In the course of their subsequent histories, however, the post-Hellenic and the post-Babylonian group of higher religions had travelled along such widely divergent lines that, if the record of their origins had been lost, their specific affinity with one another might have been difficult to recognize. While the four post-Hellenic religions had duly continued to fulfil their promise of preaching a gospel to all Mankind, Zoroastrianism and Judaism had found compensation for their mundane failure to liberate a subjugated Syriac Society from an Hellenic 'ascendancy' in their spiritually still more devastating subsequent mundane success in converting themselves into a 'social cement' possessing the astonishing property of being able to hold together a fossilized community in diasporá.<sup>2</sup>

This parochial mundane task was as remote as any function could well be from the oecumenical otherworldly mission with which Judaism and Zoroastrianism, no less than their sister higher religions, had originally been charged; and on this showing the two post-Babylonian higher religions must be judged to have committed the sin or suffered the calamity of throwing away or losing their high spiritual birthright. The parallel history of the Nestorian and Monophysite forms of Christianity, which likewise eventually converted themselves into a 'social cement' for giving cohesion to fossilized communities in diasporá, indicates that the common aberration into which these two Syriacising Christian churches and the two post-Babylonian higher religions fell was not the fore-ordained consequence of some original and intrinsic spiritual flaw in their doctrine, precept, and ethos, but was the penalty for their historic error of allowing themselves to be caught in political entanglements; for all the Christian churches did not go the Monophysite and Nestorian way. When the Nestorian and Monophysite offshoots of Christianity took the fatal Jewish and Zoroastrian wrong turning, the main body of the Christian Church did not make the same mistake of allowing a mundane quarrel between Monophysites and 'Melchites' to distract it irrevocably from the pursuit of its oecumenical otherworldly purpose.

#### 4. *Encounters with the Egyptiac Civilization in the Age of 'the New Empire'*<sup>3</sup>

In a drama in which the Egyptiac Civilization was the protagonist, the opening gambit was the same as in the tragedy of the Babylonian Civilization, with the Egyptiac Society anticipating the Babylonian Society's role, and the Hyksos barbarian invaders of Syria and Egypt setting in motion a tragic train of events by giving the same provocation to Egyptiac marchmen in the Thebaid as the Aramaean barbarian invaders of Mesopotamia were to give to the Assyrian wardens of the northern marches of the Babylonian World. In both tragedies a hard-pressed civilization responded to the challenge of barbarian aggression

<sup>1</sup> The sequence of divers species of the genus Human Society is set out in Table IV in VII. vii, facing p. 772.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 274-5, above.

<sup>3</sup> See xi, map 14.

by succumbing to a militarism that had originally been foreign to its nature;<sup>1</sup> and in both, likewise, this militarism was eventually fatal to its addicts as well as to their victims.

The temporary inundation of Egypt by the Hyksos in the seventeenth century B.C., like the tide of Aramaean aggression against Assyria in the eleventh and tenth centuries B.C., was a backwash from a cataclysm produced by the dissolution of a neighbouring universal state. We have observed that the Aramaean assailants of Assyria were the extreme right wing of a host of Aramaean and Hebrew barbarians from the North Arabian Steppe whose main body had been drawn into a political vacuum in Syria arising from the collapse there of an Egyptian imperial régime in the fourteenth century B.C. In a different context<sup>2</sup> we have also noticed that the Hyksos conquerors of Egypt were the Canaanite counterparts of a host of Aryan Eurasian Nomad barbarians who in the eighteenth or the seventeenth century B.C. had poured into the derelict Mesopotamian, Anatolian, and Syrian domains of a Sumeric universal state that had fallen into decrepitude immediately after its ephemeral restoration by Hammurabi (*imperabat* 1792-1750 or 1728-1686 B.C.).<sup>3</sup> The Aramaeans' challenge to Assyria provoked, as we have seen, an Assyrian assault in the ninth and eighth centuries B.C. upon a Syriac Civilization, affiliated to the Minoan, which had arisen meanwhile in the former Syrian domain of 'the New Empire' of Egypt which the Mesopotamian Aramaeans' kinsmen had invaded from the east. The Hyksos' challenge to the Thebaid similarly provoked an Egyptian assault in the sixteenth and fifteenth centuries B.C.<sup>4</sup> upon an abortive First Syriac Civilization which—but for the Hyksos' transgression against the Egyptian World and the Theban liberators' *revanche*—might have taken its place, side by side with the Hittite and the Babylonian Society, as one of the civilizations of the second generation which the disintegration of the Sumeric Civilization had brought to birth.<sup>5</sup>

In following up their liberation of Egypt from the Hyksos by their conquest of their defeated Hyksos adversaries' Syrian base of operations, the Theban militarists of the Eighteenth Pharaonic Dynasty not only prevented a Syriac Civilization affiliated to the Sumeric from coming to birth; they also brought the Egyptian World into contact with the two

<sup>1</sup> In spite of the standing temptation to succumb to militarism by which Assyria was beset in her exposed position as an outpost—first of the Sumeric World and then of its Babylonian successor—the first appearance of the Assyrians on the stage of History was in the guise of peaceful men of business whose commercial colonies in Eastern Anatolia in the third millennium B.C. had to be rescued from ill-treatment at the hands of a native ruler by military action on the part of the Akkadian militarist Sargon of Agade (see I. i. 110, with n. 3). It required the two successive challenges of a Mitannian and an Aramaean oppression to convert the Assyrian traders of the third millennium into the Assyrian warriors of the last. In a pacific-minded Egyptian World the wardens of the southern marches over against the barbarians of the Upper Nile Valley had always been exceptions to the general rule of the Egyptian ethos; and this explains why 'the Old Kingdom', 'the Middle Empire', and 'the New Empire' in turn all owed their forcible establishment to the military prowess of southern empire-builders (see II. ii. 112). The violence of the xenophobia evoked in Egyptian souls by the Hyksos domination enabled the Theban liberators of Lower Egypt from the Hyksos yoke temporarily to communicate the traditional militarism of the Thebaid to the rest of the Egyptian World.

<sup>2</sup> See the Note on Chronology in vol. x, pp. 167-212, below.

<sup>3</sup> See V. vi. 198-9.

<sup>4</sup> In II. ii. 388-91.

<sup>5</sup> See II. ii. 388-91.



post-Sumeric civilizations that did succeed in establishing themselves. The contact with a nascent Babylonian World did not evoke any appreciable reaction, since the Babylonian march-state, Assyria, had as much as she could do from the seventeenth to the fourteenth century B.C. in saving herself from being overwhelmed by a successor-state of the defunct Empire of Sumer and Akkad which had been established in Mesopotamia by the Aryan Eurasian Nomad barbarian Mitanni, while the interior of the Babylonian World was lying torpid under the sluggish rule of the highlander barbarian Kassites. On the other hand, in impinging on a nascent Hittite Society that was taking shape in the Empire of Sumer and Akkad's former East Anatolian domain, the Theban builders of an Egyptian Empire in South-West Asia involved the Egyptian Society in a hundred years' war (*gerebatur circa* 1370-1278 B.C.) for supremacy in South-West Asia which, like the latter-day Romano-Persian contest for the same elusive prize, was as exhausting to both combatants as it was inconclusive in its political results.

In this case, as in that, a barbarian onlooker was the *tertius gaudens*; and, when an avalanche of mass-migration set in motion by the death-agonies of a moribund Minoan World descended upon the Hittite Empire and the Egyptian Empire in succession, the Hittites suffered at the Sea Peoples' hands what was to be the Persians' fate, and the Egyptians what was to be the Romans', at the hands of the Arabs. The Hittite Power was annihilated, while the Egyptian Imperial Government just succeeded, by a supreme effort, in saving the homeland of the Egyptian Civilization in the Nile Valley at the price of abandoning the residue of its former dominions in Syria.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See the Note on Chronology in vol. x, pp. 199-201.

<sup>2</sup> In the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries B.C. the Hittite Power was in contact, not only with 'the New Empire' of Egypt in Syria, but with an Achaean Power along the south-west coast of Anatolia. An exhaustive treatment of the relations between the Hittites and the Achaeans, in the light of all the evidence known to Modern Western scholars at the time, will be found in C. Schachermeyr's *Hethiter und Achäer* (Leipzig 1935, Harrassowitz). Schachermeyr marshals convincing arguments in favour of the tentative conclusion that the Achaean Power which figures in the archives of the Hittite imperial capital Boghazköy was identical with the Power whose imperial capital was Mycenae and whose 'thalassocracy' in the Aegean in the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries B.C. was the prize of a victorious assault upon an antecedent Minoan 'thalassocracy' whose imperial capital had been Knossos.

In contrast to the hostility which was the usual relation between Hatti and Egypt during the hundred years ending in the peace settlement of 1278 B.C., the contemporary relations between Hatti and the Achaean 'thalassocracy' seem usually to have been friendly. When the Hittite Emperor Muršiliš II was suffering from an illness in the fourth year of a reign which approximately coincided with the third quarter of the fourteenth century, 'the god of Akkhiyawa' was one of three divinities who were brought to his bedside to heal him; and this evidence of mutual goodwill is the more remarkable considering that by that date the Achaean Power had already crossed the Hittite Power's political path by establishing a bridgehead on the mainland of Anatolia in Millawanda (Schachermeyr, *op. cit.*, p. 44; Götz, A.: 'Die Annalen des Muršiliš', in *Mitteilungen der Vorderasiatisch-Ägyptischen Gesellschaft*, 38. Band (Leipzig 1933, Hinrichs), p. 37)—a locality adjoining Luḫa which appears, on the evidence of place-names mentioned in the Hittite documents (Schachermeyr, *op. cit.*, p. 67), to have lain in South-Western Caria, even if we do not identify the name Millawanda itself with the Miletus of the Hellenic geographer's gazetteer.

The delicate situation arising out of this encroachment by the sea-power on the land-power's element seems to have been handled on both sides with sufficient tact to prevent it from resulting in a war when, at some subsequent date which may have been before the end of Muršiliš II's reign (*ibid.*, p. 45), a Hittite subject named Piamaradu took refuge in Millawanda with seven thousand adherents, and gave his two daughters in marriage

If this were the whole story of the encounters with the Egyptian Civilization in the age of 'the New Empire', it would have little significance for the student of History; but in this instance a familiar tale of aggression, revenge, and mutual exhaustion is redeemed by one flash of revelation in a single soul. As far as we know, Ikhnaton was the first of the sons of Man to apprehend the unity and universality of God;<sup>1</sup> and this Pisgah-sight unfolded itself to the eyes of the seer from the eminence of an imperial throne which, under its oecumenical dominion, had brought the Egyptian World into association with an alien civilization in Syria<sup>2</sup> and with a primitive culture in the Upper Nile Valley.

'The lands of Syria and Nubia and the land of Egypt—Thou putteth every man in his place and Thou suppliest their needs. . . . Thou art lord of them all, who wearie himself on their behalf; the lord of every land, who ariseth from them. . . . All far-off peoples—Thou makest that whereon they live.'<sup>3</sup>

If the philosopher Ikhnaton had not also been the Emperor Amenhotep IV, he might never have beheld a vision which an oecumenical autocrat's

to two Achaean subjects who were then holding Millawanda on their sovereign's behalf. When representations from the Court of Khatti to the Court of Akkhiyawa on the subject of Pamaradu's future met with a reply which the Court of Khatti felt to be unsatisfactory, the Hittite Emperor put himself politically in the wrong by invading Millawanda without gaining his object of laying hands on Pamaradu. The Hittite refugee and his adherents avoided capture by taking ship from Millawanda to some adjacent overseas portion of the King of Akkhiyawa's dominions, from which they threatened to make descents upon the Hittite coasts. Thereupon the Hittite Emperor wrote a further letter to the Achaean King, apologizing for his occupation of Millawanda and requesting him either to banish Pamaradu from his dominions altogether or, as an alternative, to intern him somewhere in the metropolitan territories of the Achaean Empire where he would be at a greater distance from the Hittite Empire's frontiers.

This fragment of Hittite-Achaean diplomatic correspondence (summarized *ibid.*, pp. 30-33) that had been retrieved by Modern Western archaeologists threw a flicker of light on an Hellenic legend that had been noticed by Thucydides in the introduction (Book I, chap. 9) to his history of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War of 431-404 B.C. According to this story the Peloponnesus derived its name from an Anatolian adventurer named Pelops, who had won the principality of Pisa for himself by a piece of sharp practice and had afterwards secured a footing at Mycenae by giving his daughter in marriage to the reigning Perseid King Sthenelus. On the strength of this family alliance, Pelops' son Atreus had managed to succeed his nephew Eurystheus—Sthenelus's son and Pelops' grandson—on the throne of Mycenae. In this Hellenic legend the Hittite Emperor Muršiliš II figures as Myrtilus, the prince of Pisa's charioteer, whom Pelops first induced to betray his master and then liquidated by pushing him over a cliff into the sea. Does Pelops derive his own name from the Hittite Empire's frontier province Palā? And is Atreus a legendary ghost of the historical Achaean buccaneer Attarissiya, who made himself a nuisance to the Hittite Empire in the reigns of Tutkhaliya IV (*imperator circa 1260-1230 B.C.*) and Arnuwanda (*imperator circa 1230-1215 B.C.*) by driving the Emperor's feudatory Madduwattaš out of his fief and by making a descent upon Cyprus (*ibid.*, pp. 41 and 46; Götte, A: 'Madduwattaš,' in *Mitteilungen der Vorderasiatisch-Agyptischen Gesellschaft (E.V.)*, 32. Jahrgang (Leipzig 1927, Hinrichs), pp. 11, 15-17, and 39)?

The present footnote replaces V. v. 237, n. 7.

<sup>1</sup> See I. i. 145-6 and V. v. 695.

<sup>2</sup> The century immediately preceding Ikhnaton's accession to the Egyptian imperial throne had seen an influx into Egypt of foreigners of all races from all quarters—first in military, then in civil, employments. Imported foreign slaves had risen in the Egyptian social scale to a level above that of the native Egyptian peasantry, and the Egyptians with whom these immigrants had intermingled had been adopting Syrian and Mycenaean manners and customs and cults (see Wilson, J. A.: *The Burden of Egypt* (Chicago 1951, University of Chicago Press), pp. 186-93). The Imperial House set an example when Thothmes IV married a daughter of King Artatama of Mitanni; and there were at least two more royal marriages between the Egyptian and the Mitannian dynasty (Wilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 201-2). This was the historical background to Ikhnaton's new departures in the realms of religion, the visual arts, and literature.

<sup>3</sup> Ikhnaton's hymn to the Aton (Sun-Disk), quoted in V. vi. 11-12.

political vantage-point could bring within his ken, even though his political authority might be impotent to impose upon the rank-and-file of his subjects the chillingly intellectual and at the same time disturbingly revolutionary theology and liturgy in which the imperial recluse sought to communicate his personal religious experience to an intimate circle of courtier-initiates.<sup>1</sup>

### 5. *Tares and Wheat*

Our survey of encounters between contemporaries has made us aware that the only fruitful results of these encounters are the works of peace, and most mournfully aware that these creatively peaceful interchanges of ideas and ideals are rare indeed by comparison with the frequency of the stultifying and disastrous conflicts that are apt to arise when two or more diverse cultures come into contact with one another.

If we scan once more the panorama of encounters between civilizations of the second generation, we shall observe in the intercourse between the Indic and the Sinic civilization one instance of a peaceful interchange which seems as fruitful as at first sight it seems free from the blight of violence. The Mahāyāna was transmitted to the Sinic from the Indic World without the two societies ever falling into war with one another, and the peacefulness of the intercourse that produced this historic effect was advertised in the traffic of Buddhist missionaries *en route* from India to China, and Buddhist pilgrims *en route* from China to India, which found its way to and fro by both the sea-route via the Straits of Malacca and the land-route via the Tarim Basin from the fourth to the seventh century of the Christian Era.

During this age of peaceful religious intercourse the only incident remotely resembling a passage of arms between a Chinese and an Indian Great Power was one highly creditable act of intervention on the Chinese side in Indian circumstances that forced Chinese hands. On the morrow of the death of an Hellenic Justinian's Indic counterpart Harsha (*imperabat* A.D. 606-47)<sup>2</sup> at the close of the last phase of the disintegration of the Indic Society, an envoy from the T'ang Emperor T'ai Tsung who happened at that moment to be on his way to the dead Indic emperor's court retorted to an Indian usurper's murderous attack upon his mission by evacuating his people from Hindustan to Tibet, enlisting Tibetan and Nepalese reinforcements, and re-entering India *manu militari* without yielding to the temptation to which this Chinese warrior-statesman's Bactrian Greek predecessor Demetrius had succumbed in the second century B.C. Instead of taking advantage of the anarchy into which India had fallen after the disappearance from the scene of the last upholder of a crumbling Indic universal state, the enterprising representative of the T'ang Power in the seventh century of the Christian Era exhibited a political disinterestedness that was as remarkable as his military efficiency. After occupying the last Indic emperor's derelict

<sup>1</sup> Ikhnaton's failure to impose his Aton-worship in the Egyptiac World has been discussed in V. v. 695-6. An authoritative discussion of it is now to be found in Wilson, J. A.: *The Burden of Egypt* (Chicago 1951, University of Chicago Press), pp. 206-235.

<sup>2</sup> See V. vi. 209, n. 3.

dominions in a lightning campaign, capturing the usurper, and restoring order, the ambassador was content to evacuate India for the second time, and this time under no compulsion, with his trouble-making prisoner in his train as the only trophy of a beneficent military triumph.<sup>1</sup>

This politico-military episode in the history of the relations between a Far Eastern and an Indic Power is on the same high moral level as the contemporary religious activities of Chinese pilgrims and Indian missionaries; yet our idyllic picture of a pacific encounter between two civilizations resulting in the transmission of the Mahāyāna to the Far East is incomplete and to that extent misleading; for the opening up of the overland route between India and China via the Tarim Basin—which was in use earlier than the maritime route and, till after the seventh century, was also always the more regularly frequented of the two—was the work, not of the Indic and Sinic societies themselves, but of the Bactrian Greek pioneers of an intrusive Hellenic Society and these Greeks' Kushan barbarian successors; and the establishment of an overland line of communications between the Indic and the Sinic World by Bactrian Greek and Kushan hands was an incidental result of military aggression on the Bactrian Greeks' part against the Mauryan Empire at a moment when it was impotent to defend itself, and on the Kushans' part against the Han Empire's domain in the Tarim Basin in a militarily opportune hour after the Prior Han Dynasty had lost their grip and before the Posterior Han had mustered the strength to vindicate their title to their predecessors' lost dominion.

If we are in search of an instance of a spiritually fruitful encounter between contemporaries in which there is no evidence at all of any concomitant military conflict, we shall have to look farther back into the past than the age of the civilizations of the second generation to a time before the Egyptiac Civilization had been galvanized by the shock of the Hyksos invasion into an unnatural prolongation of an already completed term of life.<sup>2</sup> In the preceding age, from the turn of the twenty-second and twenty-first centuries to the turn of the eighteenth and seventeenth centuries B.C., an Egyptiac universal state in the shape of 'the Middle Empire' and a Sumeric universal state in the shape of the Empire of Sumer and Akkad had been living side by side with one another,<sup>3</sup> and alternating in the exercise of an hegemony over the Syrian land-bridge between their homelands, without, so far as is known, ever falling into a clash of arms. This apparently peaceful contact between the Egyptiac and Sumeric societies during their last rally before their final dissolu-

<sup>1</sup> See Smith, V. A.: *The Early History of India*, 3rd ed. (Oxford 1914, Clarendon Press), pp. 352-3; Eliot, Sir C.: *Hinduism and Buddhism* (London 1921, Arnold, 3 vols.), vol. iii, p. 260.

<sup>2</sup> This effect of the impact of the Hyksos on the course of Egyptiac history has been discussed in I. i. 136-46.

<sup>3</sup> In reckoning that the Empire of Sumer and Akkad, from its first foundation by Ur-Engur (*alias* Ur-Nammu) of Ur down to its decay after the death of Hammurabi, began and ended at approximately the same dates as a 'Middle Empire' of Egypt which was founded by a Mentuhotep and was overthrown by the Hyksos, we are adopting a revised estimate of Sumeric chronology which places all the principal dates of Sumeric history 155 years later according to Sidney Smith, or 219 years later according to W. F. Albright, than they were placed by Eduard Meyer in the light of the scantier archaeological evidence at his command (see the Note on Chronology in vol. x, pp. 167-212).

tion was, however, apparently also sterile; and we have to look still farther back than this to find a transaction between these two civilizations of the first generation that was not merely untarnished by violence but was productive of spiritual effects comparable to the transmission of the Mahāyāna from India to the Far East.

In the investigation of so early a chapter in the histories of civilizations the knowledge gradually accumulated by the progress of Modern Western archaeological discovery still left the twentieth-century historian groping in an historical twilight in which all outlines remained uncertain and all movements elusive; yet, subject to this caution, we may recall here our tentative finding<sup>1</sup> that the worship of Isis and Osiris, which came to play so vital a part in Egyptiac spiritual life after the Egyptiac Society's breakdown, was not the original expression of an indigenous spiritual experience but was a gift from a disintegrating Sumeric World<sup>2</sup> where the heart-rending yet heart-consoling figures of the Sorrowing Wife or Mother and her Suffering Husband or Son had made their earliest epiphany under the names Ishtar and Tammuz. If it be indeed true that a worship which was the harbinger of all other higher religions was transmitted from the society in which it had first arisen to the children of a contemporary civilization without the sinister strife and bloodshed by which so many of the subsequent encounters between contemporaries were to be marred, we may have caught here one glimpse of a bow in the cloud that lowers over the histories of those contacts between civilizations in which the parties to the encounter have met one another in the flesh.

<sup>1</sup> In V. v. 81-82 and 147-52.

<sup>2</sup> If the worship of Ishtar and Tammuz was in truth a response to the challenge of social disintegration, its epiphany in the Sumeric World, and *a fortiori* its radiation from the Sumeric World into the Egyptiac World, cannot have taken place earlier, at the earliest, than a date mid-way through the third millennium B.C. If so, this was not the first encounter between these two civilizations of which there was a record. Material evidence, brought to light by twentieth-century Western archaeologists, testified that several elements of Sumeric technology and artistic style, perhaps even including the happy thought of revolutionizing the art of writing by eliciting phonemes out of pictograms, had been conveyed from Shinar to Egypt in the closing centuries of an Egyptiac Late Predynastic Age, at some date during the second half of the fourth millennium B.C. (see Wilson, J. A.: *The Burden of Egypt* (Chicago 1951, University of Chicago Press), pp. 37-38, and the present Study, X. ix. 682-92). The worship of Ishtar and Tammuz will have come to Egypt from Shinar in the same age as these material culture-elements, if we are to believe that the East Deltaic group of Egyptiac divinities, in which Osiris makes his first appearance, took shape in the Predynastic Age as early as the Nagada II period, circa 3500 B.C. (see Scharff, A.: *Die Ausbreitung des Osiriskultes in der Frühzeit und während des Alten Reiches* (Munich 1948, Biederstein), p. 17), and that the worship of Osiris spread from Busiris to Heliopolis in the age of the First and Second Dynasties (*ibid.*, p. 19). The earliest extant inscriptions of the Pyramid Texts, which are our earliest evidence for the practice of Osiris-worship, are on monuments of the Fifth and Sixth Dynasties (*ibid.*, p. 16).



## C. THE DRAMA OF ENCOUNTERS BETWEEN CONTEMPORARIES (STRUCTURE, CHARACTERS, AND PLOT)

### (I) CONCATENATIONS OF ENCOUNTERS

THE foregoing survey of encounters between contemporaries has made it apparent that these are dramas in which the number of the *dramatis personae* is apt to be greater than the minimum cast of two figures. Encounters tête-à-tête, like the spiritual commerce between the Sumeric and the Egyptiac Civilization which may have carried the rudiments of a higher religion from the banks of the Euphrates to the banks of the Nile,<sup>1</sup> seem to be less frequent than encounters between three parties, such as the triangular contests for command of the Mediterranean Basin between the Phoenicians, Etruscans, and Hellenes of a pre-Alexandrine Age<sup>2</sup> and between the Medieval Westerners, the Eastern Orthodox Christians, and the Monophysite Christian and Muslim representatives of a Syriac Society in a belated last chapter of its history.<sup>3</sup>

A not less frequent and perhaps more characteristic type of encounter is a contest between a protagonist and a deuteragonist for physical and spiritual dominion over weaker competitors. The second of the two triangular contests for the military, political, and commercial control of the Mediterranean Basin turned into a competition between the Franks and the 'Osmanlis for the subjugation and conversion of Eastern Orthodox Christians whose failure to hold their own against their two potently aggressive neighbours had left them no freedom except to make an unpalatable choice between these two alternative alien ways of life;<sup>4</sup> but usually the destiny of more than one wilting society seems to be at stake in such struggles for possession of souls. The Syriac Society wrestled with the post-Alexandrine Hellenic Society for the conversion of the Babylonian and Egyptiac societies as well as for the conversion of the fossilized remnants of a Hittite Society that lay directly in the fairway between the homelands of the two rivals;<sup>5</sup> and, in a latter-day world that had been unified on the technological and economic plane on a literally oecumenical scale by the Modern Western feat of mastering the Ocean, the Russian offshoot of the Orthodox Christian Society had armed itself with the weapons of a Modern Western technique in order to challenge the Western Society's influence over all the other living civilizations and primitive societies.<sup>6</sup>

We may now go on to observe that these dramatic encounters between contemporaries are complex not merely in the point of being apt to bring a considerable number of characters on to the stage but also in the further point of being implicated with one another like the successive tragedies in an Attic trilogy. The discovery that encounters between contemporaries may present themselves, not singly, but in concatena-

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 452-3, above.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 346-403, above.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 442-6, above.

<sup>4</sup> See p. 151, with n. 2, and pp. 395-7, above.

<sup>5</sup> See pp. 126-49, above.

<sup>6</sup> See pp. 478-39, above.

tions, was made in the fifth century B.C. by the pre-Alexandrine Hellenic historian Herodotus when he set himself the ambitious task of giving an illuminating account of the then still recent military and political conflict between the Achaemenian Empire and the independent Hellenic city-states in Continental European Greece. Herodotus's artistic genius divined that, in order to make his story intelligible, he must place it in the setting of its historical antecedents; in viewing it from this angle, he perceived that the Graeco-Persian conflict which had been his original theme was the latest episode in a succession of collisions of the same character; and this insight led him to the discovery that such encounters between contemporaries are apt to occur, not in isolation, but in series, and that these series are not fortuitous, but are the product of psychological 'chain-reactions' which a post-Modern Western student of History might compare with the physical 'chain-reactions' artificially produced by the inauspicious ingenuity of latter-day Western men of science.

In the spiritual field of encounters between human beings which was the pre-Alexandrine Hellenic historian's concern, Herodotus worked out a psychological formula to explain how one encounter could thus give rise to another.<sup>1</sup> In a situation in which two or more societies have come into contact with one another, one party takes an initiative which, from another party's standpoint, is an act of aggression. This challenge confronts the assaulted party with a choice between acquiescing and reacting, and, if he acquiesces, or again if he reacts merely to the extent required in order to re-establish the equilibrium which his neighbour's wanton act of aggression has upset, this failure to hold his own or, in the alternative denouement, this successful act of self-defence will bring to a close not only this particular drama but, with it, the whole of the action which his adversary's original act of aggression has started. A concatenation of encounters in which one tragedy generates another arises when the original victim of aggression is not content simply to redress a balance which the original aggressor has disturbed, but proceeds to pass over into a counter-offensive in which he despoils his discomfited adversary of the ugly role of aggressor in order to clothe himself in his turn in this deadly shirt of Nessus.

This demonic impulse to put oneself in the wrong is one of the fatal fruits of Original Sin in Human Nature;

For Old Sin loves, when comes the hour again,  
To bring forth New.<sup>2</sup>

The 'new sin' of indulging in a retaliation disproportionate to the provocation for it is at least as grievous an act of *hybris*, and as infallible a means of incurring the penalty that *hybris* invariably brings in its train, as the 'old sin' of unprovoked aggression, by which it has been brought forth; and the penalty is the starting of a chain-reaction which, once set in motion, is inordinately difficult to arrest.

<sup>1</sup> Herodotus, Book I, chaps. 1-4.

<sup>2</sup> Aeschylus: *Agamemnon*, ll. 763-6, Gilbert Murray's translation, quoted in IV. iv. 256.

We may profit by Herodotus's discovery of concatenations of encounters and accept the psychological formula in which he finds the explanation of this historical phenomenon<sup>1</sup> without having to accept, as integral parts of it, either his personal reconstruction of the particular series of encounters leading up to the Helleno-Achaemenian War of 499-449 B.C.<sup>2</sup> or his depiction of the chain-reaction of *hybris* in the naïve

<sup>1</sup> It will be noticed that the repetitive action which generates a concatenation of encounters according to the Herodotean formula is the same rhythm that in this Study (III. iii. 112-27) has been detected in the process of the internal growth of a civilization. In both processes the motive power is provided by the recurrent upsetting of an equilibrium which is repeatedly re-established only to be upset each time once again; and, if we translate the language of mechanics into terms more appropriate to a phenomenon which is not a physical movement of inanimate objects but is a psychological reaction of living creatures, we shall find ourselves describing each of our two sets of recurrent reactions in identical terms as a series of challenges which succeed one another because a successful response to one challenge gives rise to a fresh challenge which in its turn evokes a further challenge through having been faced and met successfully. There is thus a generic affinity between the encounter-rhythm and the growth-rhythm; but, when we pursue our comparative analysis of them in greater detail, we also become aware of differences that distinguish them from one another. In the encounter-rhythm the identity of both the challenger and the challenged party changes from round to round *ex hypothesi*, since the upsetting of a re-established equilibrium, which produces a repetition of the movement, is here always due to the initiative of the party which has been the recipient and not the author of the challenge in the previous round, whereas in the growth-rhythm the role of recipient is played by the same party in round after round, and it is this continuity in the identity of the challengee that gives the growth-rhythm its specific character of cumulativeness within the generic form of repetitiveness. The ethical complexion of the challenge that evokes each fresh round is also different in the two rhythms; for an initiative that in the growth-rhythm is an act of God or Satan (see I. i. 271-99) is in the encounter-rhythm an act of human *hybris*.

<sup>2</sup> We shall agree with Herodotus in seeing in the conflict between the Hellenes and the Achaemenidae in the fifth century B.C. the continuation of an older conflict between the Hellenes and the Phoenicians. In fact, we shall see these two conflicts as successive phases in the course of a single encounter; and we shall therefore reject Herodotus's insertion of two intervening links at this point in the chain. According to Herodotus the encounter between the Hellenes and the Phoenicians was followed by one between the Hellenes and the Colchians and another between the Hellenes and the Trojans before the Persians took up the cudgels in an imaginary feud between an Hellenic 'Europe' and an Oriental 'Asia'. We may agree with Herodotus that the establishment of an Hellenic ascendancy over the backward peoples round the coasts of the Black Sea, which is commemorated in the Hellenic legend of the voyage of the Argonauts, must have been later in date than the beginning of the competition between Hellenes and Phoenicians, since the Hellenes did not secure their monopoly of maritime activity in the Black Sea until after they had defeated the Phoenician and Tyrrhenian attempts to compete with them for the command of the entrance to the Dardanelles (see pp. 420-1, above); but we cannot agree that the Phoenicians and the Colchians ever had any notion that they were fighting their respective battles with the Hellenes in a common Asiatic cause. And, as for Herodotus's interpolation of 'the Trojan War' between the date of the Hellenes' penetration into the Black Sea, which does not seem to have begun till after the opening of the seventh century B.C., and the date of the Lydian conquest of the Continental Asiatic Hellenes, which Herodotus treats as a prelude to the Persian assault on Hellas, this only shows how wildly wide of the mark were the endeavours of fifth-century Hellenic rationalists to transmute legend into history. In so far as the Hellenic legend of 'the Trojan War' is a travesty of any authentic historical event, it preserves the memory of a *Völkerwanderung* in the Aegean area which had accompanied the dissolution of a Minoan Society and preceded the rise of an Hellenic and a Syriac Society out of the wreckage of a shattered Minoan World. The competition between the Hellenic Society and the Phoenician representatives of the sister Syriac Civilization did not begin till at least four hundred years after the post-Minoan *Völkerwanderung* had come to a close.

The Modern Western archaeologists' feat of disinterring a Minoan Civilization of which the Hellenes had been almost oblivious gave a twentieth-century Western historian an overwhelming advantage over Herodotus when it was a question of trying to reconstruct the history of the late second millennium and the early last millennium B.C. But Herodotus's errors in his reconstruction of links in a concatenation of encounters which he could reconstruct only by guesswork in the absence of records did not, of course, impugn his presentation of oecumenical history as a concatenation of encounters

imagery of the manners and customs of the Heroic Age<sup>1</sup> or his presentation of this chronic conflict as a feud between 'Asia' and 'Europe';<sup>2</sup> and, if we do find ourselves convinced that the Herodotean analysis of the psychological causation of concatenations is valid, we can apply the formula on our own account to the encounter between the Achaemenian Empire and the Continental European Hellenes and see how far it may carry us from this point of departure in establishing associations between encounters which, in our foregoing survey, we have provisionally studied separately, as so many self-contained dramas, and not as inter-related episodes strung together on one continuous thread.

In our own reconstruction of the concatenation in which the Helleno-Achaemenian War of 499-449 B.C. is one of the links, we may follow Herodotus to the extent of finding the starting-point of the action in a contest between the Phoenicians and the Hellenes for the command of the Mediterranean Basin; but, on our own previous interpretation of this encounter, we shall find the 'beginning of evils'<sup>3</sup> in the Hellenes' aggressive attempt, in and after the last quarter of the seventh century B.C., to add to their own lion's share of the spoils of a new world by making provocative encroachments on the Phoenicians' preserves in Andalusia, Western Sicily, and Tripolitania. The reaction which this act of Hellenic aggression evoked on the Phoenicians' part resulted, as we have seen, after a hundred years of strife, in the restoration of equilibrium through the establishment of a Carthaginian and an Achaemenian Empire each commanding a collective power to keep the uncoordinated aggression of the mutually independent Hellenic communities of the day within bounds on both the western and the eastern front of the Mediterranean arena.<sup>4</sup> The fatal act of counter-hybris which upset a re-established balance and thereby set the stage for the performance of a further tragedy was Darius's decision to seek a solution for the problem of the Achaemenian Empire's awkward north-west frontier by setting

between representatives of diverse and conflicting civilizations. So far from that, these mistakes about matters of fact which for Herodotus were unknown and unknowable threw into relief the brilliance of an intuition which could divine one of the major rhythms of History from such imperfect evidence as the information at Herodotus's command.

<sup>1</sup> It is not till he comes, in Book I, chapter 6, to record the subjugation of the Continental Asiatic Hellenes by Croesus King of Lydia in the sixth century B.C. that Herodotus begins to depict encounters between Hellenes and non-Hellenes in the colours of so-called 'civilized' life. Down to that point he deals in terms of the barbarian manners and customs of the Heroic Age. In the first four incidents in his concatenation the aggressive act of provocation takes the form of the abduction of a princess. The Phoenicians start the feud by abducting an Hellenic Io; the Hellenes retaliate by abducting a Phoenician Europa; the Hellenes then cross the line between retaliation and provocation, to become aggressors in their turn, by abducting a Colchian Medea, and the Trojans retaliate by abducting an Hellenic Helen. After failing to obtain amends for this retaliatory injury, the Hellenes then commit a second act of hybris, fraught with far graver consequences than their first, by resorting to war to avenge an abduction which they could have well afforded to ignore 'since it was obvious that these women would not have got themselves abducted if they had not so desired'. The act of military aggression which the Hellenes committed against the Asiatics in attacking and destroying Troy placed Hellas in a permanent state of war with Asia in the opinion ascribed by Herodotus to latter-day Persian champions of the Asiatic cause. This Herodotean account of pre-Croesean history is, of course, a prose version of the traditional Hellenic epic vein of poetry.

<sup>2</sup> See Annex: "Asia" and "Europe": Facts and Fantasies, on pp. 708-29, below.

<sup>3</sup> See Thucydides, Book II, chap. 12.

<sup>4</sup> See pp. 421-9, above.

out to compel the still independent part of the Hellenic World to submit to an Achaemenian domination.<sup>1</sup> The sensational defeat of this act of counter-hybris did not prevent it from making history; for its failure to attain its own objective was only the first instalment of the penalty that it drew down upon the heads of its perpetrators. The ultimate nemesis of Darius's aberration was Philip of Macedon's decision to turn the tables by conquering the Achaemenian Empire; and Alexander the Great, who was as sensationally successful as Xerxes had been sensationally unsuccessful in executing his father's political testament, opened the first act in a new drama which forged the second link in this tragic concatenation.

The destruction of the Achaemenian Empire in the fourth century B.C. by Alexander and of the Carthaginian Empire in the third century B.C. by Rome gave the Hellenic Society a dominion over its neighbours which far exceeded the most ambitious dreams of sixth-century Hellenic adventurers who had sailed as traders to Tartessus or served as mercenaries at Pelusium or Babylon. In the post-Alexandrine Age of Hellenic history the Hellenes were masters not only of the Libyphoenician and Etruscan colonial domains of the Syriac and fossil Hittite societies in the Western Mediterranean but of these two societies' homelands in the Levant and of the Egyptian, Babylonian, and Indic worlds into the bargain. This portentous career of post-Alexandrine Hellenic aggression duly evoked a reaction on its Oriental victims' part; and the eventual success of this reaction tardily restored a long-upset equilibrium when, a thousand years after Alexander's passage of the Dardanelles, the undoing of his work was at last completed by the Primitive Muslim Arabs' feat of liberating, in lightning campaigns of an all but Alexandrine swiftness, all *ci-devant* Syriac territories, from Syria to the Iberian Peninsula inclusive, that at the opening of the seventh century of the Christian Era had still been under the rule of the Roman Empire and its Visigothic successor-state.

The re-establishment of a Syriac universal state in the shape of an Arab Caliphate which embraced under its single sovereignty the former domains of both the Carthaginian and the Achaemenian Empire<sup>2</sup> promised in the second decade of the eighth century of the Christian Era to terminate a concatenation of encounters, at a stage at which not more than two links in the melancholy chain had yet been forged, by reproducing the stabilization that had been momentarily achieved in the last quarter of the sixth century B.C. through the rise of the Carthaginian and Achaemenian Powers. Indeed, the prospects of stability were decidedly more promising this time than they had been on the earlier occasion, since the Caliphate was stronger in its unity than the Achaemenian and Carthaginian empires had been in their mutual independence, while the two nascent Hellenistic civilizations of Western and Eastern Orthodox Christendom were less capable of challenging the alien oecumenical Power that had set bounds to their domains than the Hellenic Civilization had been in the vigour of its sixth-century adolescence. This second chance of bringing the momentum of strife to a halt by jettisoning the

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 430-5, above.

<sup>2</sup> See I. i. 76-77.



burden of *karma*<sup>1</sup> from which this momentum derived its impetus was, however, once again thrown away by wanton acts of counter-hybris.

Like their Persian predecessors, the Arab avengers of a Syriac Society that had been the victim of Hellenic aggression were not content with their historically legitimate achievement of at last completing the eviction of an aggressor from alien territories on which he had trespassed by force of arms. They proceeded to repeat Darius's error of passing over into a counter-offensive without having the excuse of finding themselves saddled with an untenable frontier that must be moved forward if it was not to be set back. The pressure of physical geography that impelled Darius and Xerxes to seek a natural frontier by embracing European as well as Asiatic Greece in their dominions did not constrain the Arabs to pass the natural frontier of the Taurus in order to lay siege to Constantinople in A.D. 673-7 and again in A.D. 717 or the natural frontier of the Pyrenees in order to invade Gaul in A.D. 732 or the natural frontier of the western basin of the Mediterranean Sea in order to conquer Crete and Sicily and overrun Apulia and seize bridgeheads along the Mediterranean coast of Western Christendom between the mouth of the Rhône and the mouth of the Garigliano in the ninth century of the Christian Era.<sup>2</sup> These wanton acts of Muslim aggression against Eastern Orthodox and Western Christendom in the eighth and ninth centuries incurred their nemesis in the shape of East Roman and Frankish acts of retaliation in the tenth and eleventh centuries; and, though the East Roman counter-offensive broke off as a consequence of the breakdown of the Orthodox Christian Civilization, the Western Crusades went to lengths at which they forged a third link in an Herodotean concatenation of tragic encounters.<sup>3</sup>

This explosive expansion of a Medieval Western Christendom whose latent energies had been fired by the spark of Muslim aggression in the eighth and ninth centuries of the Christian Era evoked the reaction that was to be expected on the part of its victims. The cumulative efforts of Zengī, Nūr-ad-Dīn, Saladin, and the Ayyubids' Mamlūk slave-successors evicted the Frankish intruders from Syria, and the 'Osmanlis completed the Greek Orthodox Christians' unfinished work of evicting them from Romania as well. When the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II the Conqueror (*imperabat* A.D. 1451-81) had accomplished his life-work, a thrice-upset equilibrium had been restored for the third time in this concatenation of historical tragedies, and a third chance of breaking the chain had presented itself; but, this time once again, the opportunity was lost through a wanton act of counter-hybris.

While the Ottoman conqueror of Constantinople had been content to bring together within the political framework of an Ottoman universal state the *disiecta membra* of the main body of Orthodox Christendom,

<sup>1</sup> The Indic conception of *Karma* has been touched upon in V. v. 432-3.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 348-9, above.

<sup>3</sup> One effect of this concatenation between the Syriac Society's successive encounters with the Hellenic Society in its pre-Alexandrine and in its post-Alexandrine phase and with the two Hellenistic Christian societies was to produce 'Sicilian Cycles' that are the theme of one of Freeman's most illuminating essays (Freeman, E. A.: *Historical Essays*, 3rd ser., 2nd ed. (London 1892, Macmillan), pp. 434-42).

his successors Selim the Grim and Suleymān the Magnificent recklessly overstepped the limits within which their wiser predecessor had found a fruitful field for constructive statesmanship. They annexed the domain of the Arabic Muslim Civilization from Syria to the Yaman and from 'Irāq to Algeria inclusive; and they opened an attack upon the homeland of Western Christendom on both a Danubian and a Western Mediterranean front. This Ottoman Muslim aggression against Western Christendom at the opening of the modern chapter of its history had the same explosively stimulating effect as the Arab Muslim aggression against the same Western Christian Society at the opening of the medieval chapter of its history and the Achaemenian aggression against European Greece in the fifth century B.C. The Ottoman sieges of Vienna in A.D. 1529 and A.D. 1682-3 ended in the same sensational failure as the Arab sieges of Constantinople in A.D. 673-7 and A.D. 717 and as the Persian descents upon European Greece in 490 and 480 B.C. But the envelopment of Western Christendom by the horns of the Ottoman crescent nevertheless came near enough to success to do the Westerners the invaluable unintended service of compelling them to cut losses which they had already incurred through the failure of the Crusades and to divert their energies from continuing to fight a lost battle for command of a Mediterranean cul-de-sac to embarking on a conquest of the Ocean which was to give them the dominion over the whole face of the planet.

The consequent world-wide expansion of the Modern Western Civilization forged a fourth link in the Herodotean concatenation of encounters; but at the time of writing it was impossible to foretell whether this self-extending chain of tragedies was to be terminated as a tetralogy, with a modern satyr play for its finale, or whether it was to be prolonged beyond a fourth episode; for at the time of writing the fourth link in the chain was still in process of being heated in the furnace and hammered out on the anvil of the malign artificer Hephaestus. On the analogy of the three preceding dramas in the series it was no doubt to be expected that the unprecedentedly far-ranging and violent explosion of the Modern West, which had opened the current play, would evoke a reaction of comparable range and force; and mid-way through the twentieth century of the Christian Era a would-be reader of the signs of the times might be tempted to cast Russia for the part of organizer of the resistance movement against an arch-aggressor which had been played in previous episodes by the 'Osmanlis and Umayyads and Achaemenidae. A twentieth-century historian, on the other hand, would be less inclined to hazard such conjectures about the future than to be grateful that the accident of his own date of birth should have enabled him to observe, as matters of accomplished fact, three links in the Herodotean concatenation which had been added to the chain between Herodotus's day and his own.

Now that we have followed up the Herodotean concatenation, link by link, from the three-cornered contest between the Phoenicians, Etruscans, and pre-Alexandrine Hellenes for the command of the Mediterranean Basin down to the high-powered impact of the Modern West on all other living societies on the face of the planet, this guiding thread

will enable us to discern at least one other chain-reaction of the same kind which was originally set in motion by a backwash from one of the waves of barbarian invasion that flooded over the derelict domain of a moribund Sumeric Civilization in the eighteenth or the seventeenth century B.C.

In other contexts we have already noticed that the Aryan Nomad barbarian invaders who broke out of the Eurasian Steppe and over the Iranian Plateau into the Mesopotamian and Syrian provinces of 'the Empire of the Four Quarters' in the course of a post-Sumeric *Völkerwanderung* had Semitic-speaking contemporaries and counterparts in Palestine who engulfed the Delta province of 'the Middle Empire' of Egypt.<sup>1</sup> The deceptive facility with which the Hyksos established their dominion over the Egyptiac Society in this initial act of aggression gave no inkling of the demonic violence of the Egyptiac reaction with which they were to be expelled, a hundred years or so later, from the Nile Valley and to be pursued subsequently into Syria and Mesopotamia by Theban wardens of the Egyptiac World's southern marches whose latent militarism had been aroused by the Asian barbarians' impact. But the drama which had opened with the Hyksos' unprovoked assault on the Egyptiac Society, and had found its denouement in this effective Egyptiac counter-stroke and in the consequent encounters between an Egyptiac Society that had thus been galvanized into new life and the Hittite and Babylonian successors of the Sumeric Society, might have been expected thereafter to peter out, without having sown fresh dragon-tooth seeds of *karma*, when 'the New Empire' of Egypt fell into decay and was overrun in its turn by barbarian invaders. At this juncture, however, History repeated itself; for the Aramaic invaders of a dissolving Egyptiac New Empire's domain in Syria swept on into Mesopotamia and surged up against Assyria, as the previous Hyksos invaders of a dissolving Egyptiac Middle Empire's Asian domain had swept on into the Nile Valley and surged up against the Thebaid; and this recurrence of an untoward constellation of historical circumstances generated a concatenation of encounters by begetting a second tragedy in which the motif of the preceding drama reproduced itself on a larger scale and with greater violence.

The backwash from a barbarian flood that had been engulfing the domain of a neighbouring society infuriated the Assyrian wardens of the Babylonian World's northern marches as it had infuriated the Theban wardens of the southern marches of the Egyptiac World;<sup>2</sup> and on this occasion, as on that, the sins of barbarian aggressors who had aroused so formidable a latent force were not visited solely on the heads of these aggressors' children; for the Assyrian militarists who had been goaded into counter-aggression by a provocative challenge from outlying Aramaean members of a nascent Syriac Society fell upon all their neighbours indiscriminately, without sparing either the unoffending members of the Syriac Society west of the Euphrates or the surviving fragments of an already shattered Hittite Society astride the Taurus or even their

<sup>1</sup> See I. i. 105; p. 448, above, and the Note on Chronology in vol. x, pp. 197-208.

<sup>2</sup> See II. ii. 133-5, and pp. 439-40, above.

own kinsmen in the interior of a Babylonian World of which the Assyrian marchmen themselves were members and which it was their historic mission not to attack but to defend.

It will be seen that this 'Hyksos-Aramaean' or 'Theban-Assyrian' concatenation of two encounters overlapped in the Time-dimension with the Herodotean concatenation whose fourth link was still in process of being forged in the twentieth century of the Christian Era; and, though the two chains cannot be reduced to a single series, they also cannot be wholly disentangled from one another.

In the first of the four successive tragedies in the Herodotean tetralogy the outcome of a drama that had the Western Mediterranean Basin for its theatre was influenced, as we have noticed,<sup>1</sup> by the course of a contemporary drama, performed in the South-West Asian 'Fertile Crescent', which was the second of the two tragedies in the Theban-Assyrian series. The *furor Assyriacus* first undesignedly handicapped the Phoenicians and Tyrrhenians in their maritime competition with the Hellenes by harrying their continental homelands in the Levant, and then likewise undesignedly helped them to retrieve their position in the Mediterranean *vis-à-vis* the Hellenes by preparing the ground in South-West Asia and Egypt for the rapid establishment of an Achaemenian Empire that was to give the Syrophoenicians a powerful backing. The Assyrians had made the Achaemenian Empire's fortune, before the Achaemenidae had been heard of, by provoking the consolidation of a Median successor-state whose Assyrian spoils Cyrus the Achaemenid took over, and they had also facilitated the Achaemenian empire-builders' subsequent task by breaking, for their benefit, the spirit of the peoples of South-West Asia and Egypt.

Thereafter, this Assyro-Persian second link in a Theban-Assyrian chain became inseparably intertwined with the Perso-Macedonian second link in the Herodotean chain; for the encounters with the Babylonian Civilization that had been forced upon its Hittite, Syriac, and Egyptian neighbours by successive explosions of Assyrian militarism in the ninth, eighth, and seventh centuries B.C. had brought the Assyrians' victims into intimate relations with one another as well as with the Babylonian World; and this fusion of divers cultures that had been a by-product of the *furor Assyriacus* was extended and intensified when the impact of Hellenic militarism in and after the generation of Alexander the Great brought the Indic and the Sinic Society into contact both with Hellenism and with the four societies that had already been broken up by an Assyrian hammer and thrown together into an Achaemenian melting-pot. In the post-Alexandrine Age of Hellenic and Oriental history the progressive penetration of the Babylonian, Hittite, and Egyptian societies by the Syriac culture, which had been taking place first under Assyrian assault and battery and latterly under an Achaemenian aegis, was overtaken and challenged by the ubiquitous radiation of the Hellenic culture in the train of Macedonian and Roman *conquistadores*. For a thousand years, running from Alexander's passage of the Dardanelles to the final liquidation of an Alexander's and a Scipio's

<sup>1</sup> On pp. 421 and 424-6, above.

work by the Primitive Muslim Arabs, the Syriac and Hellenic Civilizations were competing for the conversion of Babylonian, Hittite, and Egyptian souls;<sup>1</sup> and this competition, which was one of the major incidents in both Syriac and Hellenic history, is a common episode in which our two concatenations of encounters are inseparably implicated with one another.

If Herodotus had happened to be born into the post-Alexandrine instead of the pre-Alexandrine Age of Hellenic history, his unrivalled genius for finding a clue to the tangled skein which is every oecumenical historian's raw material would assuredly have led him to take this post-Alexandrine *Kulturkampf*, in preference to a pre-Alexandrine military conflict between the Achaemenian Empire and the city-states of European Greece, as the point of departure for his own reconstruction of a history of Mankind which presented itself to his eyes as a concatenation of encounters between the divers civilizations in which the Spirit of Man had expressed itself. And indeed this brilliant Hellenic discoverer of the historical phenomenon of concatenations could have found no better vantage-point if the chance that so capriciously allots the time and place of each individual's birth had condemned Herodotus to be born into a twentieth-century Western World; for, in the perspective of an observer posted in that society in that age, the story of the post-Alexandrine competition between the Syriac culture and Hellenism for the conversion of souls still manifested itself to be the stem from which all living branches of human history had ramified.

A Hellenism which in the fourth century B.C. had launched out on a new career of expansion had not passed away till it had made an impact on every other living civilization in the Old World; one response to the challenge of these impacts had been the epiphany of the higher religions; these higher religions had served as chrysalises from which all the old-world civilizations of the third generation had emerged; and one of these tertiary civilizations, in the modern chapter of its history, had brought all other living civilizations into contact with one another by spreading its own tentacles all round the globe. In fact, the histories of all the higher religions and all the civilizations except the Mayan and the Sumeric and the Indus Culture and the Shang Culture could have been housed by an imaginary twentieth-century Herodotus in the authentic Herodotus's capacious house of many mansions; and, in taking a concatenation of encounters as the ground plan for his masterpiece of literary architecture, Herodotus was showing a penetrating insight into the structure of an oecumenical historian's subject-matter; for these encounters between societies that are one another's contemporaries are evidently extremely prehensile; they readily interlock; and the two intertwined concatenations that we have traced out have proved to embrace, between them, the greater part of post-primitive human history down, not merely to the fifth century B.C., but to the twentieth century of the Christian Era.

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 442-6, above.



## (II) ROLES, REACTIONS, AND DENOUEMENTS

## (a) AGENTS AND REAGENTS

Our survey of encounters between civilizations that are one another's contemporaries, and of the concatenations in which these encounters are apt to interlock, has already brought to light a diversity in the roles played by the actors in these social dramas. In each play, and indeed in each act of any one of them, there is a party that precipitates the encounter by taking the initiative and there is another party that reacts to this assault by endeavouring to shake off the ascendancy which the seizure of the initiative has placed in his assailant's hands.

It is no doubt conceivable that the original agent's initiative may be so disconcerting, or his intrinsic strength, vigour, and efficiency so predominant, that the assaulted party may be subjugated or even annihilated without ever having succeeded in offering any resistance whatsoever. Within the five or six thousand years during which the species of human society known as civilizations had been in existence down to the time of writing, a number of primitive societies had suffered the fate of annihilation at the hands of representatives of this younger and more potent variety of their kind;<sup>1</sup> but examples of this decisively simple outcome of an encounter between contemporaries would have been hard to find in instances in which both the parties were civilizations. Societies of this younger type were insured against a doom to which primitive societies were prone to succumb by the relatively considerable size of their areas and populations,<sup>2</sup> in which civilizations even of the lowest physical calibre far outstripped primitive societies of the largest order of physical magnitude.<sup>3</sup> The normal fate of the bodies social of civilizations that had been prostrated by the impact of aggressive contemporaries had been, not extermination, but subjugation; and the historical evidence showed

<sup>1</sup> See I. i. 148-9.

<sup>2</sup> See *ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> In the post-Columbian history of the New World the comparative density of the agricultural population in the domains of the Central American and Andean societies was no doubt one of the reasons why these 'Indians' survived the fearful experience of the Spanish conquest and domination, when the sparse population of hunters in North America was supplanted by the agricultural colonists who streamed across the Atlantic to create the United States. It is noteworthy that the north-western outposts of a subjugated Central American Society in New Mexico managed to survive the conquest of their country by the United States no less successfully than their kinsmen across the border managed to live on under the régimes of the Viceroyalty of New Spain and its successor-state the Republic of Mexico. Even the culturally more backward agricultural peoples of Southern Appalachia survived the ordeal of being deported from their homes in the south-eastern section of the United States and being deposited in reservations beyond the Mississippi which were eventually engulfed in the State of Oklahoma (see p. 36, n. 1, above).

At the same time, the survival of the scions of the Andean and Central American civilizations and the disappearance of the primitive societies of North America cannot be accounted for wholly by the differences between these peoples of the New World, in the matter of their comparative levels of culture and comparative densities of population, at the time of their subjugation by their conquerors from the other side of the Atlantic. We have already noticed in another context (in II. i. 211-27) that there was an historic difference between the respective attitudes of the Catholic and the Protestant conquerors of the 'Indians' towards their victims. The victims of the Protestant conquerors had the misfortune to be reckoned as 'Natives' by a New Israel whose preoccupation with the historical books of the Old Testament had infected them with a race-feeling that remained foreign to the outlook of the Castilian successors of the Cid and Sertorius—cruel and rapacious though these *conquistadores* were.

that it would be rash to assume, in any instance in which both parties were still alive, that the subjugation of one of them by the other was the end of the story, however desperate the subjugated party's initial discomfiture and discouragement.

A striking example of a subjugation that had every appearance of being definitive was the prostration of the Mexic and Andean societies after the military overthrow of the Aztec and Inca Powers by the Castilian pioneers of one of the civilizations of the Old World.<sup>1</sup> Yet the judgement, hazarded in an earlier passage of this Study,<sup>2</sup> that these two subjugated civilizations of the New World might be considered to have been completely incorporated into the Western Christian body social by the time of writing, might have to be suspended in the light of the surprisingly different denouement that had eventually declared itself in certain comparable cases.

An Arabic Muslim Civilization which had been swallowed up by an Iranic Muslim Civilization in the sixteenth century of the Christian Era had unexpectedly re-emerged in the nineteenth century, after a three-hundred-years-long living death in the belly of the whale,<sup>3</sup> to reassert itself by taking an individual path of its own towards the goal of Westernization. The Oriental societies that had lain inert for more than a hundred years, after their Achaemenian house of many mansions had suddenly been brought tumbling about their ears by the blast of an apparently superhuman Alexander's thunderbolt, had lived on to give a counter-shock to their Hellenic conquerors by proving after all to have been, not permanently paralysed, but merely temporarily stunned; and this trick, that was played on the Ptolemies by their Egyptiac subjects and on the Seleucidae by the Jews at and after the turn of the third and second centuries B.C., was likewise played on British rulers of India in the twentieth century of the Christian Era by Indian subjects whose nineteenth-century acquiescence in a British Rāj was proved by their twentieth-century reaction against the same British régime to have been no more than a temporary psychological effect of eighteenth-century political and social tribulations. On the evidence of these three other cases it would have been more prudent in the Central American case to refrain from pre-judging the question whether the Mexican Revolution of A.D. 1910 would prove in the event to have inaugurated the last stage in the Westernization of a subjugated Central American Civilization or the first stage in a reaction of the submerged society which—to judge by the history of the Oriental reactions to the impact of a post-Alexandrine Hellenism—might be none the less vigorous and effective in the long run for having been so long delayed owing to the severity of the shock that had been administered four hundred years before by an alien aggressor's sudden stunning blow.

The truth would appear to be that Life, so long as even a spark of it survives, is irreconcilable with permanent passivity; and on this showing we may expect that there will always be more than one act in the drama of any encounter between societies in which both parties are civilizations,

<sup>1</sup> See IV. iv. 79-81 and V. v. 90-93.

<sup>2</sup> In IV. iv. 81.

<sup>3</sup> See IV. iv. 113-14.

and in which the party that suffers assault will therefore *ex hypothesi* have been proof against the conclusive fate of annihilation. Even when the assaulted party's life has been reduced by the severity of its experience to a state of 'living death', the original act of aggression by which the encounter has been precipitated will stimulate the victim to react in some way sooner or later. In terms that have become familiar in this Study, an encounter between civilizations that are one another's contemporaries may be described as being one terrestrial manifestation of the cosmic action of Challenge-and-Response;<sup>1</sup> and the particular response which this particular challenge evokes will bring into play the dramatic motif of *peripeteia* or 'the reversal of roles,'<sup>2</sup> since the reaction, however feeble it may be, will, as far as it goes, be an endeavour on the victim's part to wrest the initiative out of the assailant's hands.

These terms 'assailant' and 'victim' are not very happily chosen; for, while they have the practical merit of conveying the diversity in the character of the roles in the drama of an encounter between contemporaries, they import a connotation of violence, wickedness, and suffering which are not inherent in this dramatic situation, however few of the encounters known to History might in fact have been entirely gentle, innocent, and innocuous. However that may be, the ethically colourless terms 'agent' and 'reagent' seem preferable to the prejudicial terms 'assailant' and 'victim' for designating two characters in our drama for which we need to find distinctive names in order to bring out the distinction between the parts which these characters play. Now that we have identified the roles and have labelled the characters, we can go on to survey the principal alternative possible types of reaction and the principal alternative possible denouements in encounters of this kind.

#### (b) ALTERNATIVE POSSIBLE REACTIONS

In surveying the alternative types of reaction it may be convenient to begin with those that are retorts in kind to the action by which they have been evoked, and to pass the rest in review in an ascending order of the degree of their difference in character from the challenges to which they are responses.

The most conspicuous form of a retort in kind is a reply to force by force which is one of the commonest of the motifs that have presented themselves in our survey of historic encounters.<sup>3</sup>

For example, the Hindu and Orthodox Christian victims of aggressive Iranic Muslim militarism retorted by turning militant themselves and showing their teeth to their oppressors. This was the Sikhs' and the Marāthās' retort to the Mughals and the hajduks' and the klephts' retort<sup>4</sup> to the 'Osmanlis. Even a moribund Syriac World and its nascent Arabic successor summoned up the military spirit to evict the Crusaders from all except their Andalusian and Sicilian conquests at the expense of Dār-al-Islām; and the apparently unwarlike Greek Orthodox Christians were stung by the outrage of the Fourth Crusade into embarking on the

<sup>1</sup> See II. i. 271-99.

<sup>2</sup> On pp. 106-453, *passim*, above, where some account will be found of all the episodes cited below in the present chapter.

<sup>3</sup> See IV. iv. 245-61.

<sup>4</sup> See V. v. 296-302.

perilous adventure of a resistance movement which succeeded in recapturing Constantinople from the Frankish usurpers within fifty-seven years of the date of their seizure of the Imperial City, and in evicting them from their last foothold in the Morea before the Moreot Greeks forfeited to the 'Osmanlis the liberty that they had recovered from the Franks by the strength of their own right arms.

In an encounter between the Hellenes and their Oriental contemporaries, the Arsacidae, the Sasanidae, and the Primitive Muslim Arabs in turn successfully ventured to try conclusions with a Macedonian military machine that had won a reputation for invincibility by overthrowing the Achaemenian Empire and with a Roman military machine that had captured this reputation from the Macedonians by overthrowing Macedonia itself. The Modern Western Powers retorted effectively to their long-victorious Ottoman assailants' superiority in military technique by mastering the tricks of their adversaries' trade; and Russian autocrats twice over made the same retort to technologically superior Modern Western militarists. A Muscovy that had all but succumbed to Polish aggression in the seventeenth century succeeded in foiling Swedish aggression in the eighteenth century and French aggression in the nineteenth century thanks to Peter the Great's effective adoption of the Modern Western military technique of the day; and a post-Petrine Russia that had collapsed in the World War of A.D. 1914-18 under the impact of a German war-machine driven by the power of twentieth-century Western Industrialism succeeded in triumphantly repelling a second and more formidable German attack in the World War of A.D. 1939-45 thanks to Stalin's effective industrialization of the Soviet Union during an inter-war breathing-space.

Between the date of the military collapse of Germany in A.D. 1945 and the moment in the autumn of A.D. 1949 when these lines were written, Russia was believed by Western observers to have made a third retort in kind to a third challenge from the West in the same field of technological warfare by mastering the 'know-how' of manufacturing an atomic bomb which had been discovered in the United States in time for use in A.D. 1945 in dealing a 'knock-out blow' to Japan. The Japanese had committed the folly of courting destruction by wantonly attacking the United States in A.D. 1941 because they had grossly overestimated their own relative military strength; this inept miscalculation was the nemesis of deceptively facile Japanese victories over technologically backward Russian and Chinese opponents in the course of the preceding fifty years; and these victories had been rewards for the shrewdness of Japanese Elder Statesmen when they had met a challenge of Western military superiority in the third quarter of the nineteenth century by a response which had shot ahead of Peter the Great's and had anticipated Stalin's.

Such illustrations of retorts in kind on the military plane are the traditional classic examples of this rather unimaginative type of response to the challenge of an encounter; but on closer examination some of these cases prove to be not quite the strict observances of the *lex talionis* that at first sight they might seem to be.

The Modern Western Powers, for example, did not simply take the

Ottoman art of war as they found it; they proceeded to make notable improvements on it at the very time when the 'Osmanlis themselves were losing their grip on an instrument that had been of their own invention.<sup>1</sup> The 'Osmanlis had achieved their previous victories over the Westerners and the Mamlûks, and the Mamlûks their own previous victories over the Westerners and the Mongols, not just by pitting pugnacity against pugnacity, but by bringing a creative faculty into action against opponents who had lapsed into resting on their oars. The Mamlûks had worsted the Western cataphracts and the Eurasian horse-archers by creating a cavalry that was both heavy-armed and disciplined,<sup>2</sup> and the 'Osmanlis had worsted the Mamlûks by out-trumping a disciplined cavalry with the new weapon of a disciplined infantry.<sup>3</sup> The horse-archer and the cataphract were thus eventually driven off the field by Mamlûk and Ottoman war-machines which triumphed over them in virtue of being not simply retorts in kind but in some sense new devices of superior efficacy; and the two thenceforth obsolete types of cavalry that had held the field for so many centuries had originally won their entry into it as likewise new and likewise superior inventions in virtue of which the Arsacidae had managed to defeat a disciplined infantry of the Macedonian and Roman schools.<sup>4</sup>

A Communist Russia, too, was not content simply to master the military technique of a Germany and a United States who were her successive Western enemies. While with one hand she was retorting in kind to Germany by harnessing Industrialism to War and retorting in kind to the United States by equipping herself with atomic weapons, her other hand was busy all the time with the creation of a new form of warfare in which the old-fashioned method of fighting by physical force of arms was to be replaced by a spiritual combat in which the battlefield would be the Psyche, the troops would be emotions and ideas, and the master weapon would be a propaganda inspired by an 'ideology' whose captivating power might prove more potent for the achievement of war-aims than even the explosive power of a bomb charged with devastatingly fissile matter.

In inventing 'the cold war' the Russians might prove to have succeeded in wresting at last out of Western hands an initiative which the West had won and maintained in a perennial competition with Russia on the military plane by first adopting an Ottoman military technique and then improving this borrowed art out of all recognition by enlisting in its service an Industrial Revolution and a mastery of atomic energy. It was true that 'the cold war' was not created by the Russians *ex nihilo*, but, like every other human invention, was partly inspired by one of Mankind's previous achievements. The instrument of propaganda, which Communism brought into action as a new weapon in the arena of mundane power politics, had first been fashioned by the missionaries of the higher religions for the more ethereal purpose of converting souls. In any deconsecrated society—post-Christian, post-Muslim, or post-Mahayanian—this once religious art was at *Homo Obcaecatus*'s disposal for

<sup>1</sup> See III. iii. 46-47.

<sup>2</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 450-2.

<sup>3</sup> See IV. iv. 447-50.

<sup>4</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 439-45.



baser uses; and *Homo Obcaecatus Occidentalis* had actually anticipated *Homo Obcaecatus Russicus* in thus bringing propaganda down to earth. A Modern Western society of shopkeepers had turned the religious art of propaganda to account for the commercial advertisement of a mechanized industry's wares; but it had been left by the Modern Westerners to their Russian contemporaries to hit upon the new idea of applying the missionary's methods of influencing his public to the mischievous business of politics instead of to the sordid business of economics; and, when thus suddenly faced with a systematically propagated Communist 'ideology', the West found itself momentarily at a loss for a reply.

While the Communist propaganda could hardly improve on the practice of contemporary Western commercial advertising in the lavishness of its outlay or in the painstakingness of its 'market research', it did show itself capable of reawakening a long dormant enthusiasm in spiritually starved post-Christian Western souls that were so hungry for the bread without which Man shall not live that they recklessly swallowed the word which Communism gave them, without pausing to ask whether this was God's<sup>1</sup> word or Antichrist's. The Marxian Gospel was able to evoke this enthusiastic response because it speciously professed to offer to Man a matchless opportunity for satisfying a desire which was the deepest and noblest motive in Human Nature. Man is spiritually frustrated if he cannot invest his petty transient personal life with abiding spiritual significance by devoting it to some cause that manifestly transcends it in spiritual value; and Communism proffered to Man an objective that might seem worthier than any that had been visible on his mental horizon since the latter-day eclipse of Christianity. Communism called upon post-Christian Man to cure himself of a childish nostalgia for a justly discredited otherworldly utopia by transferring his allegiance from a non-existent God to a very present Human Race to whose service he could devote all his adult powers by working for the attainment of an Earthly Paradise. In an oecumenical struggle between a Communist Russia and a secularized Modern Western Society for the allegiance of the rest of Mankind the apologists for a dampingly prosaic secular Modern Western way of life might find themselves hard put to it to 'sell' their unconvincing apotheosis of the self-interested individual human being in competition with this captivating Communist cult of the colossal idol of Collective Humanity.

It is evident that, in inventing a post-Christian 'ideological' warfare as a reply to a post-Christian warfare waged by physical force, a Communist Russia had crossed the indeterminate borderline between a retort in kind and a retort which was telling in virtue of its difference in character from the challenge to which it was a response. 'The cold war' was a response on the plane of propaganda to a challenge on the plane of physical armaments, and this was not the first response on a non-military plane that the old-fashioned military challenge had ever evoked.

In an encounter between a Syriac and a pre-Alexandrine Hellenic Society we have already seen the Phoenicians make an effective non-military retort to the military aggression of an expanding Hellenic World

<sup>1</sup> Matt. iv. 4; Luke iv. 4.

that had enjoyed the two decisive military advantages of holding the interior lines and commanding a superiority in numbers. The hard-pressed Phoenicians had saved themselves from military disaster by resorting to the non-military counter-measure of political combination on a grand scale, and we have observed that this Phoenician manoeuvre of changing the ground of competition proved effective because the Hellenes were unable or unwilling to emulate the Phoenicians' statesman-like moves on the new ground on to which they had been drawn by the Phoenicians' counter-initiative. While the sixth-century Libyphoenician city-states purchased security by acquiescing in the hegemony of Carthage, and the sixth-century Syrophoenician city-states by acquiescing in the hegemony of the Achaemenidae, the contemporary Hellenic city-states forfeited their previous military ascendancy over their Phoenician rivals by failing to bring themselves, for their part, to pay the inexorable price of a political union that was now the key to strength on the new terms of competition which the Phoenicians' initiative had set.

A similarly effective political response to a military challenge was made by Russian Orthodox Christendom after the Tatars' facile subjugation of a House of Rurik which had fallen a prey to these Eurasian Nomad aggressors largely because it had been divided against itself.<sup>1</sup> How were the subjugated Russians ever to shake off the yoke of a steppe-empire which commanded all the Nomad military man-power of the great open spaces between Russia and Khwārizm? Their only hope of liberation lay in achieving a concentration of Russian political power that would be a match for the military power of Juji's enormous province of Chingis Khan's universal state; and this retort to a challenge on one plane by a response on another was duly accomplished by a line of Muscovite empire-builders who were so grimly intent on their patriotic purpose that they did not shrink from achieving it at the all but prohibitive price of bringing the Medusa head of a defunct Byzantine autocracy out of a chamber of horrors in the museum of Russia's Orthodox Christian cultural heritage.

Such retorts on the political plane to assaults on the military plane may be supplemented by 'geopolitical' manoeuvres. After the Phoenician rivals of the pre-Alexandrine Hellenes had managed to bring their adversaries' aggression to a halt by concentrating their own political forces under the hegemony of two imperial Powers, these Carthaginian and Achaemenian empires attempted to crush the foiled Hellenic aggressors by simultaneous enveloping movements. A Russia which had retorted to the aggression of the Tatars by acquiescing in the autocracy of a Muscovite Third Rome proceeded to turn the northern flank of a Eurasian Nomad World—and of an Islamic Society which by that time had incorporated into itself the western half of Chingis Khan's gigantic ranch—by carrying her eastern frontier forward from the River Moskva to the Pacific Ocean; and a simultaneous envelopment of Dār-al-Islām on the south was the contemporary Western World's retort to an Otto-

<sup>1</sup> Between A.D. 1055 and A.D. 1228 there had been eighty fratricidal wars in Russia between rival Rurikid princes (Vernadsky, G.: *Kievan Russia* (New Haven 1948, Yale University Press), p. 316).

man frontal attack on Western Christendom in the basins of the Danube and the Mediterranean.

Both these anti-Islamic encircling movements were executed in a novel element in which the encircled adversary found himself at a disadvantage. The Cossacks foiled the Nomads by learning how to thread their way through woods, which these steppe-rangers dared not enter, along waterways that the Nomads had learnt to cross but not to navigate.<sup>1</sup> The Portuguese out-trumped 'Osmanlis' who in Mediterranean waters, as well as on continental ground, had established a military ascendancy over their Western Christian adversaries. The Portuguese wrested from Nature the secret of how to navigate an Ocean that had hitherto successfully defied Man's efforts to master it;<sup>2</sup> and, in thus shifting the ground of the competition between the Islamic World and the West from the field of military armaments and tactics on land and on land-locked seas to the field of oceanic ship-building<sup>3</sup> and seamanship, they snatched the initiative out of Ottoman hands. An Ottoman navy that knew how to meet its Western opponents on equal terms in the Mediterranean found itself swept off the Indian Ocean by ocean-faring Westerners whose mastery of their own element decisively tipped the scales against the 'Osmanlis' geopolitical advantage of here holding the interior lines.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The exception that had proved the rule of the Eurasian Nomads' unenterprising indifference to the possibility of utilizing rivers as means of communication had been the use made of the waterways of the Indus and its tributaries in the second and the last century B.C. by Saka conquerors of a Bactrian Greek Empire who had perhaps first taken to the water in their previous haunts along the banks of the Middle Oxus and the Lower Jaxartes (see V. v. 603).

<sup>2</sup> The ultimate failure of the Scandinavians to bring the New World into continuous communication with the Old World by a North Atlantic route which they had come within an ace of opening up has been noticed in II. ii. 438-43.

<sup>3</sup> The swiftness of the evolution of an ocean-worthy type of ship on the Atlantic seaboard of Western Christendom in the fifteenth century of the Christian Era is discussed in XI. ix. 364-8.

<sup>4</sup> The Portuguese achievement of learning how to navigate the Ocean was, of course, not merely a decisive event in an encounter between the West and the Islamic World; it was an epoch-making event in human history, because it made Man master of a medium of communication that was sufficiently conductive, and near enough to being ubiquitous, to knit the entire habitable surface of the planet together into a home for an oecumenical society embracing the whole of Mankind. At the time of writing in the first century of a post-Modern Age of Western history, the social unification of the World which had been brought about by the Portuguese invention of an ocean-faring sailing-ship had found new instruments in the aeroplane and the broadcasting station; but, however high the latter-day conquests of the ether and the air might rank in the honours' list of scientific inventions, it was manifest that they could not compare with the conquest of the Ocean in point of social importance. As means to the social end of knitting the whole of Mankind into a single society, aerial navigation and wireless communication merely served to draw closer a world-encompassing net which Man's conquest of the Ocean had long since flung round the globe. The decisive step in the unification of the World had been the invention of the type of ocean-going sailing-vessel that came to be known as 'the ship' *par excellence*, and Henry the Navigator and his companions had not only required no successors; they had also had no predecessors; for the enduring unification of the whole surface of the globe, which was the fruit of their work, was a social achievement whose consequences in its own sphere differed in a degree that virtually amounted to a difference in kind from the effects of the fitful inter-communication between the civilizations of the Old World that had resulted in earlier ages from the achievements of Minoan pioneers in the navigation of inland seas and of Nomad pioneers in the taming of horses. A discussion of the historical significance of the replacement of Bābur's steppe-ranging horse by da Gama's ocean-faring ship as the sovereign instrument of human intercourse, at and after the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of the Christian Era, will be found in Toynbee, A. J.: *Civilization on Trial* (London 1948, Cumberlege), pp. 62-96: 'The Unification of the World and the Change in Historical Perspective'.

The Modern Western Christian mariners who thus foiled the Ottoman militarists by taking to the Ocean did not entirely break away from the *modus operandi* of the adversaries to whom they were making their novel retort; for, though commerce was the principal quest of the new-fangled Portuguese ocean-faring ships, and though the Manchester School of nineteenth-century English political philosophy may not have been altogether mistaken in idealizing commerce as the beneficently pacific world-unifying activity of Modern Western Man,<sup>1</sup> the progeny of the Crusaders had not undergone so miraculous a change of heart as to have become proof against the temptation of running their predatory ancestral pursuits of piracy and empire-building in double harness with the respectably lawful occasions of their ocean voyages. A less dubious example of a pacific encircling movement in reply to a military frontal attack is the encirclement of the Babylonian World by the Syriac Society in the Achaemenian Age as a result of a cultural conversion of Iranian barbarians who had become the rulers of a universal state.

The missionaries of the Syriac culture who had thus defeated their Babylonian conquerors in a competition for the captivation of Iranian souls had not made the long overland trek from 'the Land beyond the River' to the lands beyond the Zagros as military or even as merchant adventurers; they were 'displaced persons' who had been deported by Assyrian and Babylonian war-lords with the object of making it once for all impossible for them to re-establish their beloved Israel's or Judah's shattered military and political power; and their conquerors' calculation had proved correct as far as it had gone; for neither the Assyrian nor the Neo-Babylonian imperial régime had ever been challenged thereafter by any armed uprising of these deportees. The reaction by which the Babylonian militarists' Syriac victims eventually wrested the initiative out of their oppressors' hands had been quite beyond the oppressors' purview because it was on a wholly non-military plane. The oppressors had so utterly failed to reckon with the possibility of any retort on the cultural plane from victims whom they were effectively rendering militarily and politically impotent that with their own hands they had planted them in a cultural mission-field which these exiles would never have visited if they had not been posted there by force against their will.

In thus exerting itself to impress its cultural influence on the Gentiles among whom it had been scattered abroad, a Syriac diaspora in 'the cities of the Medes'<sup>2</sup> and in Babylonia was being moved by a concern to preserve a communal identity that the oppressor had intended to destroy by uprooting these deportees from their national home. In the histories of the Jewish and other *déracinés*, the same concern for self-preservation in *partibus peregrinorum* was, however, more apt to express itself in the antithetical policy of self-isolation, since a scattered and physically impotent minority might more reasonably hope for success in the limited task of defending its own cultural heritage against contamination through the influence of the surrounding Gentile majority than in the ambitiously offensive-defensive cultural strategy of seeking to ensure its own sur-

<sup>1</sup> See IV. iv. 181-4 for a critique of the Manchester School's outlook.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Kings xvii. 6 and xviii. 11.

vival by converting an alien majority to the minority's peculiar way of life. Self-isolation in reply to molestation is another variety of the type of reaction that operates on a different plane from the action to which it is a rejoinder; and this policy of 'isolationism' presents itself in its simplest form when it is practised, not as a *tour de force* by a diasporà without a home of its own, but as a line of least resistance by a society whose habitat happens to be a physical fastness.

An insular Japanese Society, that was eventually to be driven into responding by a compromising retort in kind to the irresistible importunity of an industrialized nineteenth-century Western Civilization, had once successfully met the less potent impact of a pre-industrial West by insulating itself within the then still effective natural frontiers of its coastline; and this retort of physical self-isolation which a seventeenth-century Japan was able to make to Portuguese intruders on the strength of her insularity was made to the same unwelcome strangers by a contemporary Abyssinia<sup>1</sup> on the strength of her precipitous *cañons* and her impregnable *ambas*. The lesser highland fastnesses of Sasūn and the Tur-'Abdīn enabled a Gregorian Armenian and a Jacobite Syrian fragment of the same Monophysite fossil of an extinct Syriac Society to have recourse to the same policy;<sup>2</sup> and a plateau of Tibet which dwarfed the plateau of Abyssinia provided an all but inaccessible highland fastness for a Tantric Mahayanian fossil of an extinct Indic Society;<sup>3</sup> but none of these resorts to a physical isolationism that was Man's occasional unearned increment from Nature's geographical caprice could compare in historical interest and importance with the psychological isolationism which was a diasporà's retort to the same challenge of a threat to its survival; for a diasporà had to face this threat in geographical circumstances in which, so far from being peculiarly sheltered by some natural rampart or some natural moat, it was peculiarly at the mercy of its neighbours through having been artificially deprived of the home of its own which had been a normal community's patrimony.

While isolationism of either the physical or the psychological type is a conspicuous instance of a retort that is dissimilar in character to the act of aggression which has provoked it, this elusive retort to molestation is a strictly negative way of seeking to capture the initiative by carrying the encounter on to new ground; and, wherever this negative reaction has met with any measure of success, it will usually be found to have been accompanied by other reactions which have likewise differed in kind from the original act of aggression but which have been, in themselves, of a positive order. In the life of a diasporà its psychological self-isolation from the surrounding Gentile majority would be psychologically intolerable if this daily ordeal were not felt to be a necessary negative means to the supremely desirable positive end of safeguarding a precious cultural heritage; and an obstinately peculiar people that was militarily and politically at the surrounding majority's mercy would also be unable to hold its own in the pursuit of this aim of cultural survival if it did not at the same time develop on the economic plane a special efficiency in the exploitation of such economic opportunities as had been left open to

<sup>1</sup> See II. ii. 365-7.

<sup>2</sup> See II. ii. 258.

<sup>3</sup> See II. ii. 405, n. 1.



it by the surrounding majority's inadvertence. An almost uncanny aptitude for economic specialization and a meticulous observance of jots and tittles of a traditional law are indeed a diasporà's two main positive devices for providing itself with artificial substitutes for the loaves and fishes and the *lares et penates* that are the natural birthright of unuprooted communities.<sup>1</sup>

The device of economic specialization, which is one element in a diasporà's response to the supreme challenge of having been uprooted from its home, may also be hit upon by an unuprooted society that has not been deprived of its home but has merely been debarred from continuing to enlarge its bounds. In other contexts<sup>2</sup> we have noticed how, when the Hellenes were prevented by the establishment of the Carthaginian and Achaemenian empires from continuing to provide for an increasing population by enlarging the geographical domain of a traditional subsistence economy, they responded by developing a new-fangled economy of specialized production for export, in exchange for imported food-supplies, that enabled them to find a livelihood for a larger population within now stationary geographical limits.

The device of replying to force by a retort on the cultural plane, which is the second string to a diasporà's bow, has likewise also been practised by societies that have been hard hit by the impact of an alien Power without having been reduced to a diasporà's desperate straits. The Orthodox Christian *ra'îyeh* of the 'Osmanlis and the Hindu *ra'îyeh* of the Mughals both alike succeeded in turning the tables on these victorious men of the sword by a militarily impotent penman's intellectual counter-stroke. The Muslim conquerors of India and Orthodox Christendom allowed the mirage of their own past military triumphs to keep them blinded to the realities of a subsequent chapter of history in which their kingdom was being divided and given to the Franks, till their dethronement by these new amphibious lords of Sea and Land was already an accomplished fact. The *ra'îyeh*, whose one surviving weapon was the nimbleness of their wits, foresaw the coming triumph of the West in time once again to adapt themselves to a new order. A mental flexibility that they had once displayed in mastering the arts of their Turkish conquerors' Islamic Civilization now served them equally well in another timely transfer of their cultural allegiance. This manoeuvre of the Brahmans and the Phanariots—which might be described as a 'mental encirclement' to distinguish it from the geographical encirclement of the same slumbering Islamic World by Portuguese mariners and Cossack backwoodsmen—was a far more effective retort to a Mughal and an Ottoman military domination than the unimaginative reply to force with force which was made by the Marāthās and the klephts.

A Chiot and Bengali intelligentsia's virtuosity in taking the cultural impress of successive alien ascendancies was, on the other hand, a less telling retort to a military conqueror than a Syriac diasporà's feat of impressing its own culture on the Medes and Persians. This Syriac cultural feat of assimilating politically dominant barbarians was emu-

<sup>1</sup> See II. ii. 208-50, and pp. 272-313, above.

<sup>2</sup> In I. i. 24-26; III. iii. 139-40 and 197; and pp. 429-30, above.

lated by the main body of the Far Eastern Society when it successively assimilated the Khitan, the Kin, and the Manchus; but the Far Eastern culture failed to work the same magic with Mongol barbarians whose barbarism had been fortified with a tincture of the Far Western Christian culture before they had crossed the Great Wall; and the Far Eastern Civilization had never, down to the time of writing, achieved any cultural conquest at all comparable to the Syriac Society's culminating cultural achievement of eventually assimilating the entire body social of a Babylonian Civilization that had originally forced this long-drawn-out encounter upon Syriac victims of an Assyrian militarism.<sup>1</sup> This cultural *revanche* for a military conquest which the Syriac Civilization consummated at a far advanced stage of its own decline and fall was perhaps not, however, so extraordinary a triumph as a posthumous pacific retort to a belated Syriac *coup de force* that was made by the Syriac Society's perennial rival, Hellenism. After a moribund Hellenic Society had received its death-blow from Primitive Muslim Arab conquerors who had swept away the last vestiges of Roman rule over rightfully Syriac territory, Hellenism retorted, as we have seen, in the 'Abbasid Age, by winning an entry for Hellenic philosophy and science into a society that had previously shown itself indifferent to all facets of the Hellenic culture. This posthumous radiation of an abstract of Hellenism produced an afterglow of Hellenic intellectual activity in an Arabic medium that was as brilliant as the colours cast upon a cloud-banked eastern sky by a sun whose disk has already disappeared from view below a darkening western horizon.

All these non-violent responses to the challenge of force that have so far been passed in review are, of course, eclipsed by the supremely pacific and at the same time supremely positive response of creating a higher religion. The impact of an Hellenic Society on its Oriental contemporaries was answered in this fashion by the epiphany of Cybele-worship, Isis-worship, Mithraism, Christianity, and the Mahāyāna in the bosom of an Hellenic internal proletariat in which the children of the conquered Oriental societies had been forcibly enrolled. A military impact of the Babylonian Society on the Syriac evoked the epiphany of Judaism and Zoroastrianism; and the Turkish conquests of a Hindu and

<sup>1</sup> The measure of the difference is given by the survival in China, down to the twentieth century of the Christian Era, of an Islam that had been introduced in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries by Muslim military colonists in the service of the Mongol conquerors. These enclaves of Muslim population in China had so far successfully resisted assimilation, though they were geographically isolated from the main body of Dār-al-Islām. One of the secrets of this Chinese Muslim diaspora's success in preserving its identity was no doubt its tact in falling in with traditional Chinese ways in trivial matters of external observance which would have been shockingly conspicuous to non-Chinese Muslim eyes. In the mosque of a Muslim village near Peking which the writer of this Study visited in December 1929 the Arabic texts on the walls were written vertically, Chinese-fashion, instead of being written horizontally from right to left; and the roof-ridges were bestridden by the same figurines of mock-ferocious guardian genii that would have been found there if the building had been a Buddhist or a Taoist temple and not the shrine of a religion which banned 'graven images'. Before the fall of the imperial régime in China, the Chinese Muslims had even reconciled themselves to honouring the reigning emperor in the customary Chinese fashion by setting up tablets in his honour in their places of worship. They had persuaded themselves that this was merely the outward visible sign of a harmless civil rite, and was not 'the abomination of desolation' (see Broomhall, M.: *Islam in China* (London 1910, Morgan and Scott), p. 186).

an Orthodox Christian world were likewise answered on the religious plane by the gospels of Nanak and Bedr-ed-Din. This religious type of response, however, carries us beyond the limits of our present inquiry into the divers ways in which one civilization may respond to a challenge delivered by another; for, when an encounter between two civilizations thus gives occasion for a higher religion to make its appearance on the stage of History, the entry of this new actor signifies the opening of a fresh play with a different cast and plot.

If, on this account, we leave the epiphanies of higher religions out of our reckoning in reviewing the alternative possible reactions to an initiative taken by one of the characters in a play in which the *dramatis personae* are civilizations, we can perhaps arrive at the following conclusions concerning the relative efficacy of divers types of reaction as alternative methods of wresting the initiative out of the original agent's hands. We may conclude that the least effective reply is the retort in kind, particularly when it is a retort to force by force; that the negative retort of isolationism is less effective than positive retorts on either the economic or the cultural plane; and that, of the divers alternative possible cultural retorts, a pliant receptivity to the culture of a militarily or politically dominant aggressor is of less avail than the resilient spirit that turns the tables on the military conqueror by taking him culturally captive.

#### (c) ALTERNATIVE POSSIBLE DENOUEMENTS

Among the divers variations on the plot of the drama of an encounter between contemporaries, the swiftest and simplest denouement is an outright repulse of the original agent's attempt to induce or compel the reagent to become a convert to the agent's way of life.

This was the outcome of the encounter between the Japanese offshoot of the Far Eastern Society and the Western Society in its still would-be Christian 'Early Modern' phase. After giving the intrusive culture a trial, the Japanese decided not to allow themselves to be captivated by it, and they gave effect to their decision by expelling the Portuguese traders, suppressing the Japanese converts to a post-Tridentine Catholic Western Christianity, and almost completely insulating Japan from further contact with the Western World.

This is a classic case of the offer and rejection of an alien culture, because the heralds of the Early Modern Western Christian Civilization in Japan lacked the power to impose their way of life by force or even to offer any forcible resistance to their forcible repulse by the Japanese authorities. When a Medieval Western Christian Civilization was repelled by the Muslims and Orthodox Christians, an Islamic Civilization by the Orthodox Christians and Hindus, and a Babylonian Civilization by the Syriac peoples, the reagent who was thus reasserting himself on the cultural plane was retorting to an assault on the original agent's part which had been, not merely violent, but, on the plane of violence, victorious. The Crusaders, 'Osmanlis, Mughals, Assyrians, and Babylonians had made their impact as military aggressors, not as merchants or missionaries; and we have seen that, when the Crusaders' Medieval

Western Christian culture was rejected by Ayyubids and Lascarids, and the Turkish empire-builders' Islamic culture by hajduks and klephts and Marāthās, the rejection took the form of a retort to force by force. We have also seen that the rejection of the Islamic culture by the Phana-riots and the Brahmans took the alternative form of a pacific transfer of cultural allegiance; and that the Syriac victims of Assyrian militarism triumphantly turned the tables on their conquerors without ever having it in their power to fight this cultural battle by force of arms.

While these encounters thus display a wide diversity in the matter of the use of force, they resemble one another in all ending in the same denouement. An encounter between Japan and the West in which the Japanese retorted by force to pacific Western overtures, and an encounter between the Syriac Society and the Babylonian World in which an Assyrian militarism was foiled by its Syriac victims' 'non-violent non-resistance', both ended alike in the rejection of the intrusive culture by the party on which it had impinged.

In a case in which the act of rejection had been consummated, whether by violent or by non-violent measures on the molested society's part, the historian would be justified in concluding that the incident was thereby closed if the societies concerned were extinct by the historian's own day; but, if they were then still alive, he would be better advised to keep an open mind in the light of other passages of history which justified the proverb that 'where there is life there is hope'. An Orthodox Christendom and an Islamic Society that had rejected the Western Civilization in its medieval phase, and a Japanese Society that had subsequently rejected it in its early modern phase, all afterwards fell under its spell when it offered itself for sale in a deconsecrated form in which a lucrative technology had been substituted for a redoubtable Christianity as the pearl of great price which a buyer was invited to acquire. So long as the parties remained alive, it could never be taken for granted that the repulse of an agent's advances was definitive, since History testified that an apparently conclusive rejection had sometimes been followed by a sensational volte-face; and the same caution was advisable in regard to denouements of the antithetical type in which the agent's advances had been so successful that they had resulted, to all appearance, in the cultural conversion of the party to whom they had been addressed; for History also testified that an acceptance, as well as a rejection, of cultural overtures might prove not to have been definitive. Here, again, the historian could not pronounce a confident judgement except in cases where none of the parties to the encounter was any longer alive.

On this test it could be declared with confidence by a Modern Western student of History that a long since extinct Syriac Society had definitively succeeded in assimilating a long since extinct Egyptian Society by converting it to the Monophysite variety of Christianity in the fifth and sixth centuries of the Christian Era and to Islam between the ninth century and the thirteenth; and there could likewise be no doubt about an extinct Hellenic Society's success in assimilating an extinct Hittite Society's Etruscan offshoot and Cappadocian main body. A nineteenth-century Western observer might have felt an equal confidence in reckoning

as permanent acquisitions of the Western World the territorial gains that a Medieval Western Christendom had made at Dār-al-Islām's and Orthodox Christendom's expense in the Iberian Peninsula, Sicily, and Southern Italy; but this sanguine Victorian's twentieth-century epigoni might be deterred from endorsing their grandfather's verdict on the outcome of an episode in the medieval chapter of Western history by their own experience of witnessing the reopening of a nineteenth-century issue on which their grandfather's verdict would probably have been no less self-assured. In the nineteenth century of the Christian Era it had looked as if the main body of Orthodox Christendom had made up its mind to cast in its lot with the West, and this Orthodox Christian act of conversion to a secular Modern Western culture seemed to be finally confirmed when, after the World War of A.D. 1914-18, the Ottoman Turks decided at last to follow in their former subjects' footsteps without hesitations or reservations. Yet, at the very moment when the Westernization of the Turks, Albanians, Bulgars, Rumans, Serbs, and Greeks might have been thought to be assured, Russia stepped into the arena to contest the West's cultural conquest of an Ottoman Orthodox Christendom's former domain by proclaiming there the gospel of Communism as an alternative ideal to the contemporary Modern Western way of life.

At the time of writing, it was still impossible for an observer to forecast the outcome of this Russian attempt in South-Eastern Europe and Turkey to reverse a process of Westernization that had gone so far as to have come to appear irrevocable before Russia delivered her challenge. But an historian could lay his finger on cases in which a similar process of cultural conversion had in fact been challenged and reversed at a stage at which it had been at least as far advanced.

In a post-Alexandrine Hellenic World, for instance, the dominance of Hellenism seemed in the third century B.C. to be as secure as the dominance of a secular Modern Western culture seemed to be in the nineteenth century of the Christian Era; and on the eve of the first eruption of fanatical Hellenophobia in Egypt *circa* 210 B.C.<sup>1</sup> even an intelligent and perceptive onlooker might have committed himself to the prophecy that the Hittite, Syriac, Egyptiac, and Babylonian worlds, which Hellenism had already subjugated on the political plane, were destined to be converted to the Hellenic culture no less thoroughly than the Hittite Society's already Hellenized Etruscan offshoot. Even if our observer had lived to witness, not only the successive anti-Hellenic outbreaks in Egypt at the turn of the third and second centuries B.C., but also the fateful outbreak in Judaea in 166 B.C., he would probably have been less deeply impressed by these portents of an adverse turn in a cultural tide that had been flowing previously in Hellenism's favour than by the sensational further expansion of the Hellenes' political dominion in 183 B.C., when Demetrius of Bactria achieved at one lightning stroke an Hellenic conquest of India that had proved beyond the range of Alexander the Great.

In this case, however, our acquaintance with the eight-hundred-years-

<sup>1</sup> See V. v. 68.



long subsequent course of an encounter between Hellenism and its Oriental contemporaries informs us that, of all the vast non-Hellenic territories—extending eastward from a Phrygian penumbra of Hellas in Anatolia to the heart of an Indic World in the Jumna-Ganges Duab—which had been conquered by Hellenic arms within 150 years of Alexander's crossing of the Dardanelles, the only fraction that was Hellenized irrevocably in the ultimate event was the fragment of a long since shattered Hittite World that lay to the west of Amanus and Antitaurus. East of that line, which ran at so short a remove to the east of a pre-Alexandrine Hellenism's eastern cultural frontier in the Central Anatolian Desert, the gospel of Hellenism had been decisively rejected everywhere before this cultural defeat was clinched in the seventh century of the Christian Era by the military exploits of the Primitive Muslim Arabs. The denouement of this long-drawn-out drama was the tardy and gradual but ultimately complete and conclusive reversal of a process of Hellenization which had looked irresistible in its heyday.

This dramatic cultural contest between the Hellenic Civilization and its Oriental contemporaries shared the stage of history with another drama in which the same dramatis personae were engaged in the unfolding of a different plot. In the tragedy in which a post-Alexandrine Hellenism was the protagonist the issue was the question whether the Hellenic culture was to be irrevocably accepted or eventually rejected by Oriental societies that had been conquered by Hellenic force of arms, and the denouement was an ultimate expurgation of Hellenism from non-Hellenic souls which had seemed for a time to have been decisively captivated by its charm. In a simultaneously performed mystery play the dramatic theme was not a contest but was an act of creation, and the protagonist was a new-born society of a different species from the civilizations of the second generation whose encounter with one another was the occasion of this protagonist's epiphany. The denouement of this other drama was the entry of a higher religion into the World. The Hellenic Civilization's encounter with the Syriac Civilization gave birth to Christianity, and its encounter with the Indic Civilization gave birth to the Mahāyāna.

The relation between these two plays that were being performed on one stage simultaneously was an ironical one. From the standpoint of the tragedy of a post-Alexandrine Hellenism the nativity play of Christianity and the Mahāyāna was an irrelevant interlude, while from the standpoint of the nativity play the last act in the Hellenic tragedy was an irrelevant epilogue.

The Hellenic tragedy was not concerned with the contemporary epiphany of new societies of a higher order than the Hellenic Civilization and its Oriental adversaries. So long as these new-born higher religions devoted themselves whole-heartedly to their mission of bringing human souls on Earth into a more intimate communion with God than had ever before been within their reach, the religions were above the battle that the civilizations were fighting. It was only in so far as these religions could be tempted into neglecting their Father's business for the pursuit of mundane objectives that they could be enlisted as

gladiators in the conflicting civilizations' arena; and, in so far as they did succumb to this temptation, they were making themselves useful for mundane purposes at the price of selling their heavenly birthright. We have seen Zoroastrianism and Judaism thus miss their true destiny by lending themselves to the mundane enterprise of helping to expel an intrusive Hellenism from Syriac ground. Christianity was guilty of the same spiritually disastrous deviation into a political career when it put on the armour of Nestorius and Eutyches in order to go into action against Hellenism as the champion of a resurgent Syriac culture; and, in the last act of the Hellenic tragedy, Islam was deliberately converted by its own founder from a revelation of God to Arab barbarian souls into an anti-Hellenic engine of physical warfare. In the parallel contest between the Hellenic Civilization and the Indic, Hinduism threw itself with an almost Muhammadan whole-heartedness into an anti-Hellenic cultural campaign in which a Tantric avatar of the Mahāyāna had already half-heartedly implicated itself.

From the standpoint of Civilization, these churches, in thus going into politics, were meritoriously justifying their existence by 'making history', since they were playing a decisive part in an Oriental counter-offensive against Hellenism which was the crowning act in the tragedy of the Hellenes' cultural conflict with the Orientals. Thanks to the intervention of Islam, a Syriac universal state that had been established by the Achaemenidae and had been overthrown by Alexander was re-established in the shape of the Caliphate; thanks to the intervention of Hinduism, an Indic universal state that had been established by the Mauryas and had been swept away by Demetrius of Bactria was re-established by the Guptas. These political achievements of Hinduism and Islam were the conclusive evidences of an intrusive Hellenism's final discomfiture and were on that account events of supreme historical importance from the mundane standpoint of an historical drama in which the *dramatis personae* were civilizations. On the other hand, from the otherworldly standpoint of a mystery play the outcome of a cultural conflict between Hellenism and the contemporary Oriental civilizations was a matter of spiritual indifference. The gospel of Christianity and the Mahāyāna was addressed, not to societies, but to souls; and any soul in any social environment was a potential convert to the way of salvation,<sup>1</sup> whatever might be the colour of the cultural veneer that this soul had casually acquired through the chances and changes of mundane social history.

It will be seen that our religious and our secular drama are written in two different languages which each defy translation into the other. From the religious standpoint of the preachers of spiritual salvation the secular drama is a vanity of vanities;<sup>2</sup> from the secular standpoint of the parties to an encounter between civilizations the religious drama is unto the Jews a stumbling-block and unto the Greeks foolishness.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Acts xvi. 17.<sup>2</sup> Eccl. i. 2.<sup>3</sup> 1 Cor. i. 23.

## D. THE PROCESSES OF RADIATION AND RECEPTION

### (I) THE DIFFUSION OF CULTURE

IF the drama of encounters between contemporaries moves a spectator to inquire into the processes through which the *dramatis personae* produce their social and psychological effects on one another, his first observation will be that such encounters may occur without any such effects following from them. If the original agent's overture meets with a sheer rebuff on the reagent's part, their encounter will have come and gone without any intercourse between them arising from it at all; and, if the overture takes the form of a violent assault to which the reagent replies by a retort in kind, then the interaction may be energetic without appreciably transcending the physical plane that is the field of interaction between inanimate objects. No doubt, in a collision in which the colliding 'bodies' are not stocks or stones but are human beings, we may be sure that—at any rate in cases in which both parties are civilizations—there will always be some spiritual, as well as physical, consequence, and that this transmission of spiritual influences will also always be in some measure reciprocal.<sup>1</sup> In another context we have observed that War—even war between a civilization and its transfrontier barbarians across the estranging barrier of a *limes*—is a social relation through which the parties produce spiritual as well as physical effects on one another.<sup>2</sup> But manifestly the spiritual intercourse that arises from encounters between civilizations can be studied most profitably in cases in which the original agent's initiative results in a successful penetration of the assaulted party's spiritual defences—whether the ultimate denouement be a complete and lasting assimilation of this assaulted party by the assailant or whether it be an eventual expurgation of the intrusive culture from the assaulted party's temporarily infected body social, either with or without a previous act of creation on the religious plane.<sup>3</sup>

Spiritual intercourse has a *modus operandi* of its own. When one civilization does succeed in exerting a cultural influence on the life of a contemporary society, this spiritual event is accomplished through a process of give and take which may be called 'cultural radiation' on the agent's part and 'cultural reception' on the reagent's in terms borrowed from the language of the Modern Western science of Physics. In the language used in this Study for conveying the Soul's obscure intuition of the mysteries of Life, 'cultural radiation' may be described as being a challenge presented to a civilization by one of its neighbours, and 'cultural reception' as being a particular orientation of the challenged party's faculty of mimesis.<sup>4</sup> A mimesis that, in the internal life of a

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 465-6, above.

<sup>2</sup> See VIII, especially pp. 13-19 and 39-44, above.

<sup>3</sup> These alternative possible denouements of encounters between contemporaries have been surveyed on pp. 476-80, above.

<sup>4</sup> The Human Psyche's ability to vary the orientation of its mimesis is one manifesta-

society, is directed backwards towards ancestral guardians of tradition when the society is stagnant, and forwards towards living pioneers when the society is on the move,<sup>1</sup> is directed outwards towards an alien way of life in a society that has fallen under a neighbouring civilization's ascendancy.<sup>2</sup>

tion of a general versatility which is characteristic of Human Nature and is perhaps its most distinctive gift.

Heredity with the human individual comes more and more to mean, not (as in the case of animals) the predisposition or capacity to act or react in certain definite ways, but the general capacity of experience, the capacity to *learn* or acquire in the individual life the power to act in an indefinite number of ways. In the human inheritance general educability takes the place of definite specific hereditary functions. . . . In other words, the inheritance of Mind supersedes the organic inheritance more and more. . . . Nothing shows more clearly the revolution which the appearance of Mind has wrought than this far-reaching transformation which it has effected in the methods and procedure of Organic Evolution. On the animal plane structure still largely determines function, but on the human plane mental plasticity so dominates everything else in the inheritance that the importance of structure is completely dwarfed, and it appears as a subordinate factor in the total human situation' (Smuts, J. C.: *Holism and Evolution*, 2nd ed. (London 1927, Macmillan), p. 261).

<sup>1</sup> See II. i. 192.

<sup>2</sup> An amusing example of the reorientation of the faculty of mimesis in response to the influence of a potentially radio-active alien culture is presented in the following experience of a Western archaeologist who was travelling in an out-of-the-way rural district of Anatolia about the year A.D. 1924, approximately half-way through the first phase of the totalitarian Westernizing revolution that was being carried out at the time in Turkey under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.

The purpose of the archaeologist's journey in Anatolia was to enlarge, by fresh discoveries, the corpus of Greek inscriptions, dating from the post-Alexandrine Age of Hellenic history, that was being built up by Modern Western scholarship. Since a high proportion of the Anatolian Greek inscriptions that had already been brought to light had been discovered on sites that had been holy ground at the time when the inscriptions had been set up there, a pioneer archaeologist's first objective in a previously unexplored locality was to identify the site on which the chief local temple or shrine had stood in the Hellenic Age of Anatolian history; and the vicissitudes of archaeological field-work had demonstrated that the key to the identification of the local holy places of the Hellenic Age was to be found in the continuity of Anatolian religious history. In an Anatolian town or village the local indwelling *numen* had been apt to abide in the same spot through successive metamorphoses of nomenclature, liturgical language, ritual, myth, and theology; and accordingly the spot that was holy ground in the Islamic phase of Anatolian religion would be a promising site to explore for the purpose of unearthing Greek dedicatory inscriptions. Since, in the never more than superficially Islamized rural districts of Anatolia, the principal numinous object was still often a sacred tree, the archaeologist from whose lips the writer heard the story that he is about to recite had made it a rule of thumb to start operations in any Anatolian village that he was visiting for the first time by asking to be shown the sacred tree, and in previous campaigns he had had no difficulty in eliciting this information, since, in the pre-Kemalian Age, the local sacred tree had been the pride of every Anatolian village that had been fortunate enough to possess one of these highly charged batteries of numinous power. When the writer's friend made this usual opening gambit of his in one village some five years after the date of the Kemalian Revolution's outbreak, he was therefore surprised to be met by the assembled male population with a unanimous denial of the existence of any sacred tree in their village. The explanation of this unexpected answer was soon forthcoming, however; for, after the visitor's ceremonial public reception by the villagers *en masse*, the younger men took their leave, and, as soon as the coast was clear, the elders took the stranger aside and whispered to him furtively: 'Of course, we have a sacred tree really, and, now that those young fellows are out of the way, we shall be delighted to take you to see it.' The Western visitor then realized that the old men's lips had been sealed in the presence of young men who, unlike their elders, had become sufficiently Western-minded to feel that a sacred tree was a shameful relic of Antiquity on which a Western visitor must not be allowed to set eyes. The now secretly initiated visitor of course wished nothing better than to put himself in the old men's hands, and they duly led him through the village to a spot where, sure enough, there stood a tree whose exuberant holiness was proclaimed by the luxuriance of the votive offerings of rags with which every twig was adorned. While the archaeologist was looking at this beacon with all the eagerness of a hound that has just caught the scent, the village policeman—who was not only a member of the younger generation but was also the official

Every living human society, like every living individual human being, is all the time emitting waves of spiritual radiation which travel outwards through Space and onwards through Time till they impinge on other societies or other individuals whom they happen to strike. Conversely, every society, like every individual, is also all the time being bombarded by 'rays' or 'projectiles' of spiritual radiation emanating from other societies or individuals, and is all the time either repelling this rain of spiritual missiles or, in so far as its defences are penetrated, is being affected by these influences from outside.<sup>1</sup>

The children of a new era in the history of Mankind that had been inaugurated by the founders of the higher religions were familiar with the truth that the spiritual influence of a prophet might continue to make its effect on human souls long after the prophet's death and far away from the physically circumscribed scene of his activity during his own brief life-time. In a Modern Western city of London in which the writer of this Study was putting these words on paper in the year 1949 of the Christian Era at a point on the surface of the globe that was more than two thousand miles distant from Nazareth as the plane flies, no living resident, among all the millions then congregated there, was exerting an influence on his contemporaries and neighbours that could in any way be compared with the spiritual effect that was being produced by Jesus of Nazareth in London at that moment. If, in the same year, the writer had made the journey from his home in London to the heart of Tropical Africa, he could have verified the truth that societies as well as souls can be spiritually radioactive; for in A.D. 1949 he could have picked up in the Bahr-al-Ghazal or even on the Gold Coast the cultural radiation of an Egyptiac Civilization that had been extinct, at the longest reckoning of its life-span, since the fifth century of the Christian Era, and that had never during its lifetime succeeded in extending its political domain into Tropical Africa farther south than the Jazīrah between the White and Blue Niles.<sup>2</sup>

This continuing radiation of an extinct Egyptiac culture, in competition with a living Western culture, in regions that had been beyond the Egyptiac Society's geographical horizon during its lifetime, is a counterpart in the Spiritual Universe of a phenomenon observed in the Physical Universe by Modern Western astronomers whose calculations showed that, by the time when the light emitted by a star had reached the eyes of observers on our planet in the course of an almost unimaginably long passage through Time and Space, the star which had thus now at last become visible might be no longer in existence and might indeed have

representative, in *partibus agricularum*, of Ankara's new Westernizing ideology—came running up and, perceiving, to his chagrin, that he had not been in time to prevent the confrontation of the Western observer with the tell-tale rag-bedecked branches, began, as soon as he came within hailing distance, to shout: 'Do not touch them! Danger of infection! Microbe! Microbe!'

The story here breaks off, without going on to tell whether in this case the identification of the sacred tree was rewarded with the discovery of an epigraphical treasure-trove.

<sup>1</sup> The impact of the civilizations on the primitive societies has been noticed in I. i. 149, and the impact of the 'unrelated' civilizations on the 'related' civilizations in II. i. 184-7. The question whether the apparently 'unrelated' civilizations themselves may not have been brought to birth by responses to human, as well as physical, challenges has been raised in II. i. 335-8.

<sup>2</sup> See II. ii. 116-17.



been annihilated many aeons ago. In our own study of human history<sup>1</sup> we have similarly had to reckon with the probability that the Egyptian Civilization and the other representatives of the first generation of this species of society had radiated their cultural influence abroad so vigorously that every then still surviving *ci-devant* primitive society in the World had already been adulterated through being affected by this influence in some degree before the genesis of the civilizations of the second generation in the second millennium B.C.

In the view of one twentieth-century Western scholar, this world-wide radiation of the civilizations of the first generation was the source of certain impressively lofty religious activities and ideas that were common to a number of primitive societies still surviving in this century of the Christian Era in physically secluded nooks and corners so remote from one another that it was impossible to suppose that there could have been any direct give-and-take between these widely dispersed societies since their arrival in their respective latter-day habitats. Another twentieth-century Western scholar sought to account for the same cultural phenomenon of the presence of common features in the religion of scattered surviving representatives of Primitive Man by the suggestion that the hypothetical culture-wave which was presumed to have left this uniform impress on them might not have emanated from any civilization even of the first generation, but might have been carried to the ends of the Earth by the primitive migrants themselves as an integral and vital part of a common spiritual heritage from ancestors of sub-human origin who had been transfigured into human beings by this divine illumination of their souls.<sup>2</sup>

Whatever the true answer might be to a question concerning the history of Religion which was as elusive as it was momentous, it was an indisputable matter of fact that, in more recent times, religious practices, institutions, and beliefs had travelled far in Space-Time over the habitable surface of this planet. In the present Part of this Study we have surveyed the diffusion of the Syriac and Hellenic cultures over the Old World, and the diffusion of the Modern Western culture round the globe.<sup>3</sup> The writer of this Study had, in April 1923, the rare good fortune to catch one of these Modern Western culture-waves in the act of reaching one of its successive destinations. In that month of that year he arrived at Ankara at the same moment as 'the Ideas of 1789', and enjoyed the experience—quite invaluable for an historian—of seeing these spiritual potencies, which in their Western birthplace had long since become savourless through familiarity, still produce their primordial stimulating effect with all the vividness of novelty. At Ankara in A.D. 1923 an observer could recapture an experience which his great-grandfather might have enjoyed in Paris 134 years earlier;<sup>4</sup> and, if one of his

<sup>1</sup> In II. i. 187; V. v. 197; and VII. vii. 760-1.

<sup>2</sup> The question at issue between Father W. Schmidt and Mrs. N. K. Chadwick has been examined in VII. vii. 760-1.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 439-47, 403-18, and 126-346, above.

<sup>4</sup> The distance from Paris to Ankara, which it had thus taken 'the Ideas of 1789' 134 years to travel, had been covered by the writer's body in five days, travelling by rail. 'Our echoes roll from soul to soul and grow for ever and for ever', but the persistence and pervasiveness of the diffusion of culture-waves is matched by the slowness of their

rather more remote ancestors had visited Uppsala on the eve of the conversion of Sweden to Christianity, this Frank living at the close of the first millennium of the Christian Era might have caught still alive in Ultima Thule a body of religious ritual and myth which had been launched into the World from a cradle in the Land of Shinar perhaps no less than 3,500 years back.

In other contexts we have observed the phenomenon of 'living museums' where, on the outer edge of the domain of a culture that has been geographically expansive, the culture has been 'frozen' in a phase that has subsequently become obsolete at and round the centre from which the successive waves of this culture's radiation have been emitted.<sup>1</sup> We have likewise watched the first embryo of a higher religion—the worship of a Suffering Son and of his Sorrowing Mother—travelling from its Sumeric source in the Land of Shinar into Egypt via Syria and into Scandinavia via Anatolia in the era of the civilizations of the first generation;<sup>2</sup> and, in the oecumenical history of a later age, we have watched successive waves of Judaic and Indic religion washing round and breaking over the fastness-plateaux of Abyssinia and Tibet.<sup>3</sup>

This social phenomenon of culture-waves can be illustrated from the history of secular institutions as well as from the history of Religion.<sup>4</sup>

One remarkable instance is the re-emergence in the New World, in the sixteenth century of the Christian Era, of a monopolist 'thalassocracy' which, in its original embodiment in the Western Basin of the Mediterranean, had met a violent death before the close of the third century B.C. The Carthaginian Empire was so peculiar an institution<sup>5</sup> that the possibility of its recurrence would have been ruled out in advance by any student of History who had not lived late enough to be cognizant of the creation of the Castilian Empire of the Indies in the sixteenth century of the Christian Era.

The sixth-century Carthaginian empire-builders had fenced off the southern waters of the Western Mediterranean with a 'wooden wall' stretching from the coast of Tripolitania to the coast of Spain; and, behind this maritime anticipation of a latter-day continental 'iron curtain', the Libyphoenicians had monopolized, on their own terms, the foreign trade of a huge hinterland with enormous undeveloped economic potentialities. The profits which the Carthaginian 'thalassocrats' managed to draw from this method of turning naval power to commercial account were, as we have seen,<sup>6</sup> so lucrative that the profiteers never put themselves to the trouble of developing industries of their own to supply the economic demand of their effectively 'cornered' market. They found it more convenient to rely on their insulating sea-power in order to exploit Hellenic producers as well as Iberian and African consumers. They bought cheap from the Hellenes and sold dear to the natives; and this business brought them fabulously high returns until their monopoly was

pace. The communication of feelings and ideas, or even institutions and techniques, from psyche to psyche takes very much longer than the transportation of human bodies and other physical objects from station to station.

<sup>1</sup> See V. v. 81-82 and 147-52, and p. 453, above.

<sup>2</sup> See II. ii. 257, 365, and 402-7.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 426-9 and 437-8, above.

<sup>4</sup> See III. iii. 135-9.

<sup>5</sup> See V. v. 196-7.

<sup>6</sup> On pp. 437-8, above.

broken, after a three-hundred-years-long run, by a fresh shift, on which they had not reckoned, in a balance of naval power on which they had remained content to depend entirely for the maintenance of their system. In the sixth century B.C. the Carthaginians had wrested the naval command of the Western Mediterranean out of Hellenic hands by uniting the naval forces of all the Libyphoenician city-states under a Carthaginian hegemony, and in the third century B.C. they forfeited this vital 'thalassocracy' to a Roman adversary who had overtrumped the Carthaginian sea-power by uniting under a Roman hegemony the naval forces of Magna Graecia. This West Mediterranean drama of the establishment, abuse, and overthrow of a monopolist 'thalassocracy' was re-performed in the Caribbean when the Spaniards adopted there the Carthaginians' myopically selfish policy and afterwards duly suffered at French and Dutch and British hands the Carthaginians' Roman fate.

The Spanish avatar of a peculiar Carthaginian institution is not more extraordinary than the reincarnation of a post-Alexandrine Parthian successor-state of the Achaemenian Empire in a Medieval Western Christian successor-state of the Roman Empire.<sup>1</sup>

'The Holy Roman Empire's' affinity with the Parthian Empire is manifested in a combination of peculiar features that are salient in both dispensations. Both régimes were decentralized on a feudal system in which a *pādishāh's* juridical suzerainty over his feudatory *mulūk-at-tawā'if*<sup>2</sup> was in practice so ineffective that power continually ebbed away from the heart of the body politic into the limbs, without any compensatory return-flow, until the commonwealth eventually died of this inability to maintain a healthy circulation of its life-blood. In both empires the feudal organization of an agrarian society was picturesquely diversified by a sprinkling of urban enclaves representing two other social orders which were as alien to one another as each of them was to the body social in which both were embedded like the currants and sultanas in a nineteenth-century English plum cake. Industry and commerce were concentrated within the walls of constitutionally governed city-states, while a way of life more ancient than either the city-state or the feudal régime was represented by temple-states ruled by priests as vicegerents for a presiding deity.

If the dignitaries of the Parthian Empire could have been recalled to life in order to compare notes with their medieval Western 'opposite numbers', Mithradates I (*regnabat circa 171-138/7 B.C.*) would have recognized in Otto I's (*regnabat A.D. 936-73*)<sup>3</sup> achievement of partially

<sup>1</sup> See Debevoise, N. C.: *A Political History of Parthia* (Chicago 1938, Chicago University Press), pp. xxxviii-xxxix.

<sup>2</sup> In the constitutional terminology of Islamic scholars who had salvaged some tradition of the Parthian Age of Syriac history, the *mulūk-at-tawā'if* ('kings of shreds and patches') was the technical name for the feudatories of a Parthian King of Kings who was entitled to style himself *Pādishāh* ('Foot King') because his foot was officially planted on his vassals' necks.

<sup>3</sup> Mithradates I and Otto I both began their reigns as kings of kingdoms beyond the mountains, and both ended their reigns as emperors of empires bestriding the mountains. Otto made his first descent upon Italy in A.D. 951, but he was not crowned emperor by the Pope at Rome till A.D. 962. The corresponding dates in Mithradates' career are his first descent upon Babylonia in 141 B.C. and his decisive victory over Antiochus Sidētēs in 129 B.C.

reconstituting the Carolingian Empire by reuniting Italy and Burgundy with Germany a repetition of the Arsacid empire-builder's own achievement of partially reconstituting the Achaemenian Empire by reuniting Media and Babylonia with Khurāsān. Artavasdes and Frederick II Hohenstaufen would have condoled with one another over their tragic common experience of a personal failure that had entailed the extinction of the defeated pādishāh's dynasty and the liquidation of the body politic which he had striven in vain to preserve. The parochial princelings of Fars and Brandenburg would have congratulated one another on the assiduity with which they had taken advantage of their imperial suzerains' accumulating embarrassments in order gradually to convert a status of vassalage into a *de facto* independence that was sovereignty in everything except the name. The citizens of Seleucia-on-Tigris and Seleucia-on-Eulaeus would have agreed with the burghers of Augsburg and Cologne that eternal vigilance was the palladium of their precarious civic liberties. The chief priest of the temple of Anahita at Ecbatana (Hamadan) or of the Zoroastrian fire-altar Ādhur-Gushnasp at Ganjak<sup>1</sup> would have been astonished to meet his double in the person of a prince-bishop of Salzburg or of Trier. And a Parthian cataphract, confronted with a Medieval Western knight, would have spent blissful hours in discussing the comparative merits of the two iron-clad horsemen's chargers, coats of mail, shields, and lance-shafts.

The cataphract is an element in this migratory cultural complex which enables us to catch the cultural wave in the act of travelling through Space-Time from the Iran of the second century B.C. to the Germany of the eleventh century of the Christian Era. The Parthian man-at-arms, portrayed in a graffito at Dura,<sup>2</sup> who reappears in Far Eastern figurines of the T'ang Age (A.D. 618-907) and in the Bayeux Tapestry, won his decisive battle against a phalanx of heavy-armed infantry not only in Media in 129 B.C. but at Adrianople in A.D. 378 and at Hastings in A.D. 1066.<sup>3</sup>

It would be superfluous to draw further on the wealth of historical examples of the phenomenon of the diffusion of culture in order to demonstrate its reality and its importance to a generation whose life was being overshadowed by the overwhelming *fait accompli* of a diffusion of the Modern Western culture on a literally world-wide scale. In any attempt to estimate the part played by the diffusion of culture in human affairs the difficulty lies not in proving that such a process as diffusion takes place but in ascertaining whether any particular apparent instance of the phenomenon is a genuine instance or not.

This difficulty arises from the ever present possibility that the event or institution or aptitude or idea whose origin we are seeking to trace may have been produced, not by the radiation of some past achievement

<sup>1</sup> See Christensen, A.: *L'Iran sous les Sassanides* (Copenhagen 1936, Levin and Munksgaard), p. 161.

<sup>2</sup> See IV. iv. 439, n. 4.

<sup>3</sup> This diffraction of a human observer's vision of a single event into a number of instances corresponding to different positions of the same event in Space-Time is the inevitable penalty of the observer's own inescapable handicap of being himself a creature of the Space-Time field in which he is taking his observations (see IV. iv. 445, with n. 10).

from abroad, but by a fresh act of creation here and now. The phenomenon of diffusion does not account in itself for the existence of the objects that are transmitted; on the contrary, there would be nothing to be either radiated or received if some original act of creation had not previously occurred; and an act that has been performed once may be repeated time and again. We have therefore to be perpetually on our guard against falling into the error of invoking the process of diffusion to account for some resemblance or identity between two social situations at different positions in Time-Space when the true cause of this resemblance or identity may be the uniformity of Human Nature, and its consequent capacity to repeat an original act of creation in response to the recurrence of a challenge, without there having been any transmission of influence from the party which made this response on an earlier occasion to the party which has made an identical response to an identical challenge on a later occasion in virtue of an independent reaction of the same Human Nature to the same circumstances.

For example, the indisputable fact that in the twentieth century of the Christian Era all surviving non-Western civilizations had been deeply penetrated and intimately affected by the radiation of the Modern Western culture was no proof that these civilizations themselves were merely so many deposits left by some earlier ubiquitous wave of cultural radiation, and were not original products of so many independent responses to so many separate challenges. In a previous context<sup>1</sup> we have come to the conclusion that, when due account has been taken of the part played in the geneses of the civilizations by the diffusion of culture-elements, either singly or in complexes, the decisive act by which each civilization has been brought to birth proves in every case to have been an act of new creation, and not an act of receiving some ready-made gift from abroad; and, on the strength of this survey of the evidence, we have combated<sup>2</sup> the thesis of a diffusionist school of contemporary British archaeologists who believed, not only that a latter-day Modern Western Civilization's feat of radiating its culture all round the globe had been anticipated by a likewise ubiquitous radiation of the Egyptiac culture, but also that the spread of this migratory Egyptiac culture fully accounted for the existence of all other civilizations known to History—which, on this showing, would not be entitled to rank as separate civilizations at all, but would be described with greater accuracy as being merely so many versions of a single Civilization, to be written with a capital 'C', which had been brought to birth by a unique act of original creation in the Lower Nile Valley in the fourth millennium B.C.

In any particular case of a similarity or an identity between two or more social situations presenting themselves at different positions in Space-Time, a cautiously empirical student of History will beware of committing himself to an *a priori* aetiology based on the demonstrably fallacious assumption that all such similarities or identities must be effects of some single exclusively operative cause; he will approach each presentation of this historical problem with an open mind on the question whether the case in point is an effect of the diffusion of culture or

<sup>1</sup> In II. i. 299-338.

<sup>2</sup> In II. i. 424-40.



whether it is an effect of the uniformity of Human Nature. He will be prepared to find both these causes contributing to produce the result in varying proportions; and he will treat each case as an individual problem on its own merits.

There are, for example, positive grounds for our suggestion that the Castilian avatar, in the New World, of a Carthaginian Empire in the Old World and the Hohenstaufen avatar, astride the Alps, of an Arsacid Empire bestriding the Zagros are two cases of correspondences that are to be regarded as results of the diffusion of culture, and not as products of the uniformity of Human Nature. These grounds are that, in either case, the complex of culture-elements that is common to the histories of two different societies does not present itself in the same historical setting in its two separate appearances on the stage.

The Carthaginian Empire was, as we have seen, a Libyphoenician response to an Hellenic challenge in a contest between Phoenicians, Hellenes, and Etruscans for the command of the Western Basin of the Mediterranean; and this maritime competition in the Mediterranean between three parties in the eighth, seventh, and sixth centuries B.C. has its recognizable historical counterpart in a similar struggle between the Crusaders, the East Romans, and the Muslims in the same natural 'naumachia' in the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries of the Christian Era. The Western Christian 'thalassocracy' in which we have seen an avatar of the Carthaginian 'thalassocracy' does not, however, make its appearance either in the thirteenth century of the Christian Era or in the Mediterranean, where we should expect to find it appearing if its striking similarity to the Carthaginian 'thalassocracy' had been an effect of the uniformity of Human Nature producing an identical, though independent, response to a separate, but identical, challenge. The Castilian 'thalassocracy' presents itself as late as the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and as far away as the Basin of the Caribbean, on the farther side of the Atlantic; and in this different time and place the parts of the play are performed by a different cast of actors. The contest for the command of the Spanish Main was not a further round in the fight between the Crusaders, East Romans, and Muslims who had been competing for command of the Mediterranean in the Medieval Age of Western history; it was a domestic brawl between divers members of the Western Christian family; and in the last act the Castilian monopoly of the New World succumbed to simultaneous but unconcerted attacks on the part of Dutch, English, and French buccaneers—in contrast to the concentration of the naval strength of Magna Graecia under Roman hegemony which was required in order to break the Carthaginian monopoly of the Maghrib in the last act of a West Mediterranean drama in which both the stage and the cast were the same in the third century B.C. as they had been in the eighth.

Thus the Carthaginian and Castilian 'thalassocracies' are analogous to one another in their institutional form without being analogous to one another in their historical roles; and their non-correspondence in point of roles suggests that their correspondence in point of form is unlikely to have been an outcome of the uniformity of Human Nature; for, though

this uniformity can and does generate uniform effects in cases between which there is no historical connexion, it produces this result by returning identical responses to challenges that, though separately delivered at two different positions in Time-Space, are identical in character. We have just seen, however, that the challenges by which the Carthaginian and the Castilian 'thalassocracy' were evoked were not identical in character with one another. In this case, accordingly, the hypothesis of the diffusion of a culture-complex would seem to hold the field as the more convincing explanation for a similarity between two institutions occurring at different positions in Space-Time.

The same explanation for the morphological correspondence between the Holy Roman Empire and the Parthian Empire commends itself for the same reason. In spite of their remarkable similarity in structure and *éthos*, these two politico-social dispensations played widely different roles in the respective histories of the Western and the Syriac Society. The Parthian Empire was a Syriac response to the violent challenge presented by the conquest of the Syriac World by Hellenic force of arms, whereas the Holy Roman Empire was a Western response to a peaceful challenge from an alien civilization which was not the sister, but was the parent, of Western Christendom. In attempting to reconstitute the Carolingian Empire, Otto I was seeking to achieve a second rebirth of the Roman world-order with the object of saving the life of an adolescent civilization which was in less deadly danger from assaults at the hands of external enemies than from its own inconscionable barbarism. On the other hand, in attempting to reconstitute the Achaemenian Empire, Mithradates I was seeking to re-establish a prematurely shattered Syriac universal state with the object of saving the life of a middle-aged civilization whose domain had been overrun by alien conquerors. The respective roles played by the Arsacid Empire and the Holy Roman Empire in Syriac and in Western history are in fact so widely different that, in this case again, the process of the diffusion of culture seems more likely than the operation of the uniformity of Human Nature to have been the cause of the striking morphological resemblance between these two régimes.

On the other hand, uniformity rather than diffusion may best explain the similarity of the Hittite régime in Eastern Anatolia in the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries B.C. to the Arsacid régime east of the Euphrates in the last two centuries B.C. and the first two centuries of the Christian Era and to the Holy Roman Empire in Central Europe in the Medieval Age of Western history; for it seems highly improbable that the Arsacid dispensation's unquestionable resemblance to the Hittite dispensation can have been the effect of a culture-wave travelling from a thirteenth-century Cappadocia to a second-century Khurāsān. We have ample evidence concerning the radiation of culture in South-West Asia during the last two millennia B.C., and this evidence shows that the prevailing set of the cultural current throughout that period was, not from Cappadocia to the Tigris-Euphrates Basin and Iran, but from the Tigris-Euphrates Basin and Iran to Cappadocia. The Sumerian and Akkadian languages and their cuneiform script, the Sumeric science of divination,

the worship of Ishtar, the tale of Gilgamesh,<sup>1</sup> the Assyrian style of art, the religion founded by Zarathustra, the Achaemenian feudal system,<sup>2</sup> all travelled this royal road in this north-westward direction. The only counter-wave that we can catch in the act of travelling in the opposite direction—from the Hittite to the Babylonian World—is a style of domestic architecture which was borrowed in the seventh century B.C. from the Refugee Hittite communities in Northern Syria by the Assyrians under the name of *bit-hilani* ('the house with windows').<sup>3</sup>

The introduction of the Hittite hieroglyphic script from Cappadocia into Syria is not another case in point; for, though the invention of a new script of this type in the second millennium B.C., as an alternative to taking over the Sumerian cuneiform script ready-made, had been a remarkable feat of creativity in its day, the syllabic phonetic as well as the ideographic technique of writing had been superseded in Syria by the Ugaritic and Phoenician alphabets by the time when the Refugee Hittites brought their hieroglyphic script into Syria with them from the north-western side of the Taurus; and there is no evidence that either this script or the Indo-European language<sup>4</sup> conveyed in it was adopted by any of the non-Hittite inhabitants of Syria in the last millennium B.C., while there is impressive evidence of the use of the Aramaean language and alphabet in the Refugee Hittite communities.

On this showing, we shall be chary of trying to explain the correspondence between the Hittite Empire and the Arsacid and Holy Roman empires as an effect of the process of culture-diffusion, which is a possible explanation of the resemblance that the Arsacid and Holy Roman empires bear to one another; and, *a fortiori*, the similarity of *ethos* between 'the New Empire' that established itself in Egypt in the sixteenth century B.C. and the Ming régime that established itself in China in the fourteenth century of the Christian Era is to be explained as an outcome of independent identical responses to separate identical challenges, considering that there is no evidence and no likelihood of any direct culture-radiation from the Egyptian World of the second millennium B.C. to the Far Eastern World of the second millennium of the Christian Era, while there is a manifest similarity between the challenges to which 'the New Empire' and the Ming Empire were responses. The Mongol conquerors who were expelled from Intramural China by the Ming resembled the Hyksos conquerors who were expelled from Lower Egypt by Amosis in being barbarians imbued with a tincture of an alien civilization; and it was this blend of Barbarism with an alien higher culture that aroused in the hearts of the barbarians' cultivated victims the fanatically 'Zealot' temper which was the spirit of 'the New Empire' of Egypt and the Ming Empire alike.<sup>5</sup>

Another case in which culture-diffusion cannot be the explanation of

<sup>1</sup> See I. i. 112.

<sup>2</sup> See VI. vii. 123-4.

<sup>3</sup> See Delaporte, L.: *Les Hittites* (Paris 1936, La Renaissance du Livre), p. 330.

<sup>4</sup> The language conveyed in the Hittite hieroglyphic script had proved to be a third language of the Hittite family, distinct from, though closely akin to, both 'the language of Nyssa', which was the official language of Khatti, and the 'Luvian' language current in the mountainous hinterland of the Mediterranean seaboard of Anatolia.

<sup>5</sup> On this point see V. v. 348-53.

a far-reaching similarity between two social dispensations that lie far apart from one another in the Time-dimension is one in which the later embodiment of an identical dispensation occurred *in situ* in a physical environment whose features were so strongly marked and so static within the chronological limits of the whole period in question that in this case a local uniformity of Physical Nature co-operated with a general uniformity of Human Nature to evoke an identic, though independent, response to a separate, but identic, challenge. The common geographical field of these successive identic responses to an identic challenge from both the physical and the human environment was Continental European Greece; the two periods in which the same drama was performed on the same stage ran respectively from the seventeenth to the twelfth century B.C. and from the thirteenth to the nineteenth century of the Christian Era; and in both these two periods of Continental European Greece's history an identic sequence of events occurred.

First the country was conquered by invaders from overseas who brought with them an exotic culture: Minoan invaders from Crete in the seventeenth century B.C.<sup>1</sup> and French and Venetian invaders from Western Christendom in the thirteenth century of the Christian Era. These invaders adapted their tactics to the physical structure of the invaded country by making artificial fortresses out of some of the natural fortresses in which the landscape abounded. The sites that they were apt to select among the almost innumerable sites at their disposal were those which commanded the rare cultivable plains or the rarer passes leading from one plain to another or, best of all, both a plain and a pass communicating with the next plain in locations where Nature offered to a castle-builder with an eagle eye the possibility of making this economy of precious man-power. An Achaean Menelaion perched on the bluffs overhanging the River Eurotas opposite the site of the town of Sparta was as good a vantage point as a Frankish Mistrà for commanding the vale of Hollow Lacedaemon which lay between these two castles; but Mistrà was a better-chosen site than the Menelaion because a garrison posted there could control not only the Sparta plain but also the Lacedaemonian mouth of the Langádha Pass that gave a passage from Lacedaemon into Messenia. In the Frankish Age William de Villehardouin's castle at Mistrà<sup>2</sup> had its complement in Geoffrey de Villehardouin's castle at Kalamáta commanding the Messenian mouth of the Langádha Pass as well as the southern bay of the Messenian plain, while in the Mycenaean Age an Achaean Menelaion and a Frankish Mistrà had their respective counterparts in the Argolid at Tiryns and Mycenae.

A physical environment which thus made it easy for invaders to establish their control over the principal plains and passes also made it difficult for them to penetrate the surrounding wilderness of mountains, and in these encompassing highlands they found themselves compelled

<sup>1</sup> See I. i. 94, with n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> William's personal choice of the site of Mistrà in A.D. 1248, and the subsequent building of the castle of Passavant on his council's advice, are recorded in *The Chronicle of the Morea*, ll. 2985-3007, on pp. 200-1 of J. Schmitt's edition (London 1904, Methuen).

to leave the native population unsubdued *de facto*.<sup>1</sup> The invaders had, in fact, to content themselves with the skeleton occupation of the country which they had achieved at the first stroke,<sup>2</sup> and they were not even left in undisturbed occupation of these restricted territorial acquisitions; for the very success of the original invaders' feat of arms tempted other, still harder, adventurers, following in their wake, to emulate their prowess by wresting their conquests from them.

In the second millennium of the Christian Era the Burgundian French lords of a medieval Frankish Duchy of Athens were exterminated by Catalan interlopers, the Catalans were superseded by Florentines, the Florentines were ousted by 'Osmanlis; in the second millennium

<sup>1</sup> While Mistra controlled Hollow Lacedaemon and the pass leading from it to Kalomáta in Messenia, Mistra and Passavant, between them, contained the unsubdued highlands of the Southern Taygetus, which, at the time of the Frankish conquest of the Morea, were occupied by a tribe of untamed Slav barbarians, the Melingi. These Slav wild highlanders had managed to maintain their independence here after the East Roman Government's re-establishment of its authority over the rest of the Morea in the reign of the Emperor Basil I (*imperabat* A.D. 866-886). It is noteworthy that the same highland fastness played the same role in at least two other passages of history. It was tenanted by the Albanian Muslim Varduniots from A.D. 1715, when the 'Osmanlis reconquered the Morea from the Venetians, until the Greek Christian uprising in the Morea in A.D. 1821 (see p. 494, below); and in the Archaic Age of Hellenic history it was tenanted by a band of Minyae—survivors from the cataclysm of a post-Minoan Völkerwanderung—whom a rising city-state of Sparta found it difficult to reduce to submission (see Herodotus, Book IV, chaps. 145-8).

<sup>2</sup> The conquerors' one chance of extending and consolidating their first hold lay in the possibility of obtaining reinforcements of their own kith and kin; and we happen to have indications that the Pelopid and the Champenois princes of the Morea alike felt a lively concern about this.

In the *Odyssey* (Book IV, ll. 171-7) Menelaus the Pelopid prince of Sparta is represented as saying to the son of an Odysseus who had been Menelaus's companion-in-arms on the Achaean expedition against Troy:

'I had it in mind, if your father had turned up, to bestow on him tokens of my affection beyond anything that I would have done for any other of the Argives—if only Zeus the all-seeing dweller on Olympus had granted the two of us a happy return across the salt sea in the swift ships. Why, I would have established a fort (πόλις πόλιν) for him here in Argos and have built a home here for him: I would have brought him from Ithaca with his property and his child and his war-band (πᾶσιν λαοῖσι); I would have gutted for him one of the [native] forts in the [unsubdued] hinterland of my own dominions (μὴν πόλιν ἐφ' ἀλαπάξας | αἱ περιαιρούουσιν, ἀνάσσοντας δ' ἰμοὶ αὐτῶ).'

This Homeric strophe has its antistrophe in *The Chronicle of the Morea* (ll. 1847-66, on pp. 124-7 of J. Schmitt's edition) in the account there of Prince William de Champ-litte's investiture of Geoffrey de Villehardouin with the fief of Kalomáta and Arkadhia as a reward for Geoffrey's friendly act in parting company with his Frankish fellow conquerors of Constantinople and Salonica in order to throw in his lot with the Frankish adventurers in the Morea. After William has invested Geoffrey and duly received his homage in return, the prince addresses his new vassal (*ibid.*, ll. 1870-2) as follows:

'Now that you hold your fief under my overlordship, it is meet and right that you should be my true liege in all things, and that I, for my part, should trust all my fortunes in your hands.'

An identical picture of the relations between a Moreot prince and his vassal is drawn by the Homeric Menelaus:

'Had we been here together, how often we should have enjoyed one another's company! Nothing till the fall of Death's black curtain would have parted us—nothing short of this would have stopped us showing, and enjoying, our mutual affection' (*Odyssey*, Book IV, ll. 178-80).

Menelaus was not called upon to say in what quarter of his principality's dissident hinterland he would have planted Odysseus and his Cephallenians; but we know the approximate limits of Geoffrey's fief, and it is a curious coincidence that this medieval Frankish lordship should have been approximately co-extensive with the territory held by a Nelicid Nestor and his Minyans, together with the seven forts that, in the *Iliad* (Book IX, ll. 149-53), Agamemnon is represented as offering to bestow on Achilles as an inducement to the offended leader of the Myrmidons to stop sulking when his hard-pressed companions-in-arms are in such sore need of his help.



B.C. the Minoan lords of the Argolid were superseded by Achaeans, and the Achaeans by Pelopids who—if Modern Western Hittitology were to rehabilitate Hellenic legend—might prove to have made their way to the Morea from an Anatolian homeland in the neighbourhood of the cradle of the Ottoman Power.<sup>1</sup> While the castles built by the original invaders thus repeatedly changed hands, the feudal régime of which these castles were the physical embodiments persisted through these successive changes of ownership; but a monotonously unedifying game of grab came at last to a catastrophic end in both performances of the play. In both cases the unsubdued native highlanders were gradually reinforced by the infiltration of barbarians from the interior of the Balkan Peninsula, and in the last act the interloping feudal régime was successfully assailed and overwhelmed by a resurgence of the indigenous population. In the Morea in A.D. 1821 the Ottoman Turkish Muslim epigoni of the Villehardouins were exterminated by the united forces of native Moreot Orthodox Christian Greeks and immigrant Orthodox Christian Albanians who had seeped into the Morea since the fourteenth century;<sup>2</sup> in the same arena at some date in the course of the twelfth century B.C. the Pelopid epigoni of the seventeenth-century Minoan invaders of the Argolid were overwhelmed by an avalanche of barbarians speaking the North-West dialect of the Ancient Greek language.

This combination of correspondences between the history of Continental European Greece in the second millennium B.C. and the history of the same country in the second millennium of the Christian Era is so remarkable that we may find ourselves wondering after all whether the Pelopids may not have emitted some wave of cultural radiation which the Villehardouins managed to pick up across a twenty-four-centuries-wide Time-interval; and the sheer length of this interval—redoubtable though it be when measured on the Time-scale of the histories of civilizations—might not, perhaps, be an insuperable obstacle to the entertainment of this fantasy. The consideration that makes its entertainment impossible, and compels us in this case to explain the correspondences as effects of the uniformity of Physical and Human Nature, is the gigantic historical fact that this Time-interval of twenty-four centuries between the overthrow of the Pelopids and the arrival of the Villehardouins was occupied in Continental European Greece by the histories of the Hellenic Civilization and its Orthodox Christian successor. Both these intervening cultures used the enduring physical landscape of Continental European Greece for their own purposes; but these purposes were different from the common purpose of the feudal lords who dominated the same country both before and after. A landscape on which a feudal régime was founded by Achaean and Frankish castle-builders was utilized with equal success by the political architects of the Hellenic Civilization for the entirely different purpose of creating a galaxy of city-states. Between the pre-Hellenic and the post-Byzantine feudal régime in Continental European Greece there is a *vitai pausa*<sup>3</sup> that pre-

<sup>1</sup> See p. 449, n. 2, above.

<sup>2</sup> See V. v. 293-4.

<sup>3</sup> Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book III, l. 860.

cludes all possibility of any historical connexion between these two identic feudal dispensations on the same site.

This is perhaps as far as we can carry our investigation of the part played in human history by the process of culture-diffusion, and we may now go on to inquire into the divers conditions in which culture-rays are transmitted from one body social to another.

## (II) THE DIFFRACTION OF CULTURE

### *Culture-Patterns and their Instability*

There are alternative possible conditions in which culture-rays may be transmitted because there are alternative possible states in which a culture may present itself, whether we happen to be observing it in process of radiation from one body social to another or in its birthplace in the bosom of the body social that is its source. The state of the radiating body at any given moment, whichever of the alternative states this may be, will determine the state of the culture-rays that this body is emitting at the time. If the emitting body's state changes, the state of the rays emanating from it will change correspondingly. In fact, the texture of a culture-ray will always faithfully reproduce the fabric of the society that is its source,<sup>1</sup> unless and until the ray, in its passage through Space-Time, comes to be affected by another social force as a result of impinging upon a foreign body.

The instability of the fabric of a culture is something intrinsic in the nature of Culture itself, for it arises from the fact that Human Life expresses and fulfils itself in a diversity of constituent activities; and this primordial plurality of Life cannot be reduced to unity by the crude procrustean operation of eliminating all these activities save one, since Humanity cannot renounce any of them without ceasing to be human. The unity of purpose and direction that is a necessary condition of spiritual health and is indeed the distinctive characteristic of a healthily growing human society is achieved, not by eliminating any of the indispensable elements of human culture, but by co-ordinating all these elements in a harmony such as is maintained by the various instruments in an orchestra when the musicians are playing a symphony under the leadership of a conductor.

What has happened in the great art-styles happens also in cultures as a whole. All the miscellaneous behaviour directed towards getting a living, mating, warring, and worshipping the gods is made over into consistent patterns in accordance with unconscious canons of choice that develop within the culture. Some cultures, like some periods of art, fail of such integration, and about many others we know too little to understand the motives that actuate them. But cultures at every level of complexity, even the simplest, have achieved it. Such cultures are more or less successful attainments of integrated behaviour, and the marvel is that there can be so many of these possible configurations.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This point has been noticed already in III. iii. 152 and V. v. 199.

<sup>2</sup> Benedict, Ruth: *Patterns of Culture* (London 1935, Routledge), p. 48.

This dictum of one of the leading Western anthropologists of the day was being borne out during the lifetime of the writer of this Study by the progress of the sociologists' investigation into the ways of life of societies in process of civilization, side by side with the anthropologists' work on societies of the primitive species. In both these two new provinces which Modern Western Science had been carving out for itself in the realm of Human Affairs,<sup>1</sup> it was becoming clearer year by year that a society's culture—whether, at the time of observation, the society happened to be stationary on the primitive level or in motion in the movement known as civilization<sup>2</sup>—was normally a unity in the sense that the normal relation between all the diverse emotions and ideas and institutions and aptitudes constituting its social stock-in-trade was a condition of interdependence. An inquirer who set out to follow up in the life of any society the relations of any indigenous culture-element (as contrasted with an alien element acquired from abroad) would find these relations ramifying so widely that this single element would prove to have links—and these sometimes in unexpected directions and of a surprising kind—with almost all the other elements in this particular culture-pattern. Such an analysis would reveal connexions between things which at first sight might appear to have nothing whatsoever to do with one another; and, if the course of History performed the equivalent of a laboratory experiment by removing or modifying any single feature in the pattern, this local change would show itself capable of producing a disturbance of the entire social structure, even though the feature in question might have appeared insignificant before the importance of its role in the whole organization had been vindicated by this practical test.<sup>3</sup>

This interdependence which is so characteristic a quality of a culture in its normal state is, of course, conspicuous when salient features of a culture-pattern are taken as the illustrations of it. It could be illustrated strikingly, for example, by tracing the ramifications of the two master-institutions of the Western Civilization of the writer's day: that Modern Western Democracy and Modern Western Industrialism<sup>4</sup> which had been the principal engines through whose potentially reciprocating action an aggressive society had been producing its profoundly subversive effects upon the lives of its contemporaries. In order to understand the nature and genesis of these two imposing and formidable features of the Modern Western way of life, the student would have to make himself familiar with the whole history of the Western Civilization since the Dark Age, and this not merely in its political and economic aspects. He would not be able fully to comprehend the work of a Ford or a Singer without knowing something about the work of a Calvin and a Benedict and running a sensitive finger along the chain of historical development

<sup>1</sup> See XI. ix. 185-9.

<sup>2</sup> This contingent and therefore merely provisional definition of the difference between a primitive society and a civilization, in terms of an observable difference in their respective attitudes towards life at the time of observation, has been offered in II. i. 192-5.

<sup>3</sup> The interdependence of the divers elements in a culture-pattern is illustrated by the effects of a successful assault upon the social life of the assaulted party (see pp. 530-63, below).

<sup>4</sup> See IV. iv. 137-98.

that linked the at first sight mutually incongruous activities of these quaintly diverse personalities at different points far apart in Time-Space. Nor would he be able fully to comprehend Modern Western parliamentary government or political propaganda or ideology without knowing something about Western Christian monastic orders and papal congregations and theology. The truth is that every indigenous culture-element in the life of a society arises within, and in relation to, the whole of that society's social structure, and finds its own proper place and special function in the structure upon coming to maturity.

This normal integration of the indispensable constituent activities of Human Life into one or other of the divers alternative possible culture-patterns—each oriented to some particular activity or complex of activities which gives the culture its distinctive character by playing the dominant part in the co-ordination of its life—is the explanation of that qualitative difference between one culture and another which is discernible in a review of the primitive societies and is conspicuous in a review of the civilizations. In a previous context<sup>1</sup> we have observed that in the histories of the civilizations a progressive qualitative differentiation is one of the characteristics of growth;<sup>2</sup> but we have also found that growth is not an automatic process but is the hard-won reward of an effort that makes a continual and exacting demand on the growing individual's or growing society's will-power, since it has to be perpetually renewed in a series of responses to challenges in which a successful response to one challenge always evokes a fresh challenge, with the consequence that every solution of one problem brings with it the presentation of another.<sup>3</sup> This means that the abiding efficacy of a culture-pattern can never be taken for granted with impunity; for a particular culture-pattern is the imprint of a solution of a particular human problem; and, if spiritual

<sup>1</sup> In III. iii. 377-90.

<sup>2</sup> The choices through which a society acquires its individual character may, of course, be negative as well as positive. In Hellenic history, for example, the aesthetic penchant that is the salient feature of the obverse face of the Hellenic culture has its negative counterpart on the reverse side in the Hellenic Society's neglect to turn to practical account the Alexandrian scientist Hero's invention of the steam-engine—though improvements in the means of communication might have been expected to be at a premium in a post-Alexandrine Hellenic World in which there had been a sudden vast increase in the material scale of Hellenic life as a result of the Macedonians' conquest of the Achaemenian Empire. Even if the failure to apply Hero's invention in the inventor's own generation could be explained as an effect of the political anarchy that was afflicting the Hellenic World in the third century B.C., it would still have to be explained why, after the political unification of the Mediterranean Basin under a *Pax Romana*, steam traction was never applied to the maritime transport of grain from Alexandria to Puteoli or to the overland transport of troops, officials, and mails over the network of imperial roads—considering that the maintenance of an indispensable *Pax Romana* depended on the efficiency of the imperial régime in providing facilities for long-distance traffic.

It is equally significant that the Far Eastern Society showed a similar indifference to the practical potentialities of the Far Eastern inventions of printing, gunpowder, and the mariner's compass—all of which were subsequently turned to such epoch-making practical account, for both good and evil, by Western *entrepreneurs* who might never have succeeded in inventing for themselves these original creations of the Far Eastern genius.

The fact that these inventions were never developed in China in the dynamic style which characterised their effect on the culture of the West ought to be recognised as proof that the genius of Chinese Civilisation chose not to develop in the channels which appeared obvious to the West, but sought by preference other media for the highest expression of the powers of Man' (Lattimore, Owen: *Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict* (New York 1932, Macmillan), pp. 168-9).

<sup>3</sup> See III. iii. 112-27.

health is to be preserved and social growth is to be maintained, solution must follow solution as one problem gives rise to another. The impulse to perpetuate a traditional culture-pattern that has done good service to Society in its day can defeat its own purpose, as we have seen,<sup>1</sup> by producing either an enormity or a revolution. A culture-pattern can be kept in being only by being continually adapted to meet the manifold requirements of ever-changing circumstances; and the intrinsic difficulty of this indispensable task is so formidably great that it is not surprising to find that culture-patterns are precarious structures which are perpetually in danger of breaking up.

When a culture-pattern does break up for one reason or another, the divers constituent activities that have been co-ordinated with one another so long as the pattern has lasted now fall apart and go their separate ways along respective lines of least resistance that at best produce a spiritual chaos and, at worst, a spiritual discord which declares itself in the forms of schism in the Body Social<sup>2</sup> and schism in the Soul.<sup>3</sup> In previous contexts<sup>4</sup> we have noticed in passing what the principal component elements of a culture are. At the present point in our Study it will be convenient to carry our analysis a stage farther.

If we venture, at our peril, to illuminate an obscure subject of inquiry with the borrowed light of a simile, we may perhaps not inaptly liken an integrated culture to a flint that has been compacted by the age-long pressure of enormous forces, and the disintegration of a culture to the work of a demonic flint-knapper who is master of the knack of splitting one flake after another off the core of the stone on which he is exerting his uncanny sleight of hand. In the knapping of a culture the outermost and most easily detachable flake is the economic side of Human Life, which may be defined as the field in which Man exerts his power over Non-Human Nature. The next flake, and also the next most easy to detach, is the political side of Life, which may be defined as the field in which Man exerts his power over his fellow human beings. When these two superficial layers of Life have been split off, a cultural core remains; and this core may be defined, in terms of Life, as the heart of a culture where the Soul participates in God's creative work by grappling with its first and last adversary the Self<sup>5</sup>—a more formidable adversary than either its human neighbour or its physical environment, because this domestic adversary is identical with the Soul against which it contends. The field of cultural action, in this narrower and stricter usage of the term, is not, of course, confined within the bounds of the Self, since Man is a social animal who cannot be himself without being at the same time in communion with other spirits.<sup>6</sup> In the cultural heart, as well as on the political surface, of Human Life, Man encounters not only his Creator but his fellow human beings; but his intercourse with his fellows on the cultural plane takes place on a moral level high above the cañon-

<sup>1</sup> In IV. iv. 133-7.

<sup>2</sup> See V. v. 376-568 and vi. 1-175.

<sup>3</sup> In III. iii. 151-2; IV. iv. 57; and V. v. 199-201.

<sup>4</sup> 'The essential strategies in the war of Good against Evil are conducted within the intimate interior of personalities' (Butterfield, *Herbert: Christianity and History* (London 1949, Bell), p. 91).

<sup>5</sup> See V. v. 35-376.

<sup>6</sup> On this point, see III. iii. 223-30.



floor of politics. On the cultural plane coercion is of no avail; for the only form of power that can here be employed with effect is the power of spiritual attraction through which one soul moves another by love and not by force.<sup>1</sup>

This essence of a culture which remains after the political and economic integuments of the core have been flaked off proves, however, to be fissile in its turn in our satanic flint-knapper's hands. By a supreme *tour de force* of his calamitous 'know-how' this mythical impersonation of Original Sin is able to disintegrate the very core of cultural life by splitting off from it successively a linguistic, an intellectual, and an artistic flake until the religious nucleus of the core is exposed. This religious quintessence of a culture is perhaps proof against disintegration, but it is not proof against stultification through being isolated from all the other activities of Life and thereby being inhibited from exercising the pervasive influence which Religion is able to exercise in a healthily integrated body social.

The social and spiritual effects of the knapping of a linguistic flake from a cultural core have been noticed already in this Study in our survey of the careers of languages which have been set free to travel far and wide as *lingue franche* because they have been divorced from their original function of serving as mother tongues.<sup>2</sup> The knapping of an intellectual flake comprising the technological, scientific, and philosophical substance of a culture for which a *lingua franca* serves as a vehicle, but not comprehending the culture's artistic flake or its religious quintessence, has likewise come to our notice by forcing itself upon our attention in two historic instances: the intellectual abstract of the Modern Western Christian culture that ran like wildfire round the globe, after it had been knapped off by Western Man's own hands towards the close of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era,<sup>3</sup> and the intellectual abstract of the Hellenic culture that eventually captivated the Syriac

<sup>1</sup> 'If Christianity fights in the World it does not (when churches are in their right mind) wage war on actual flesh and blood. . . . For this reason the historian . . . in the last resort . . . sees human history as a pilgrimage of all Mankind, and human achievement as a grand co-operative endeavour, in which whigs and Tories complement one another, both equally necessary to the picture' (Butterfield, *op. cit.*, p. 91).

<sup>2</sup> See V. v. 483-527.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 118-19 and 314, above, and 516-18, below. Assuredly it was no accident that a Western Christian culture which, in its integrity, had been violently rejected earlier in the seventeenth century by the Japanese, was eagerly accepted before the close of the same century by the Greek, Serb, and Russian Orthodox Christians in the secularized version of it that had been produced in the meantime as a result of a Western reaction against the Western temper that had discharged itself in the Western Wars of Religion. It is also assuredly no accident that in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Venetian university of Padua should have been the alma mater both of Modern Western pioneer men of science in the fields of medical and physiological research and of Venetian and Ottoman Greek Orthodox Christian pioneer Westernizers. The precocity of the Venetian régime in adopting a policy of religious toleration before this had yet become the general rule in the Western World made it possible in Padua at the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries for the Protestant Englishman William Harvey [Harvey] to carry out the research that resulted in his discovery of the circulation of the blood, and for the Orthodox Greeks Cyril Loukaris and Alexander Mavrogordáto to give themselves a Western university education. The intellectual impact of Harvey's discovery on Mavrogordáto's mind has been noticed already in this Study on p. 163, n. 3, and p. 171, n. 8. For the part played by the University of Padua in the seventeenth-century Western scientific revolution, see Butterfield, Herbert: *The Origins of Modern Science, 1500-1800* (London 1949, Bell), pp. 41-44.

World after it had been knapped off by Hellenic Man's own hands in the post-Alexandrine Age of Hellenic history.<sup>1</sup> The artistic flake is the most difficult of all to knap off from the religious nucleus of a culture's core; for Art serves Religion, as Language serves Thought, by affording it a vehicle; and we have seen Hellenic Art renew its youth and recover its creativity by entering into the service of the Mahāyāna.<sup>2</sup> Yet even Art can be divorced from its religious source of inspiration at the price of lapsing into either a sordid vulgarity or a repulsive barbarism.<sup>3</sup>

In a twentieth-century Western World the secularization of both Art and Thought, which had been perpetrated progressively by Western hands in the course of a quarter of a millennium, had come to be taken so entirely for granted that the abnormality of this act of cultural self-mutilation was now hardly perceptible to any Western eyes that were not doubly enlightened by the gift of genius and by the experience of penalization. In that age of Western history a distinguished Negro American singer felt the thrill of making a surprising discovery when he came to realize that the primitive culture of his African ancestors, of which a musical echo had survived the shock of enslavement and transplantation to a New World, was spiritually akin to all the non-Western higher cultures, and to the pristine higher culture of the Western World itself, in virtue of its having preserved a spiritual integrity which a Late Modern Western secularized culture had deliberately abandoned.

'Years ago, I would not have said—as I do now—that I am *proud* to be a Negro. I did not know that there was anything to be proud about. Since then I have made many discoveries.

'They began when I was still a student. I came in contact with Russians at college. I heard them sing their native songs and was struck by their likeness to Negro music. What was wrong with our despised music if it was akin to the revered Russian? Had we a value that had been passed by? Were the outcast Negroes, who were struggling to assimilate fragments of the unsympathetic cultures of the West, really akin to the great cultures of the East? It was a fascinating thought.

'I began to make experiments. I found that I—a Negro—could sing Russian songs like a native. I, who had to make the greatest effort to master French and German, spoke Russian in six months with a perfect accent, and am now finding it almost as easy to master Chinese. I discovered that this was because the African languages—thought to be primitive because monosyllabic—had exactly the same basic structure as Chinese. I found that Chinese poems which cannot be rendered in English would translate perfectly into African. I found the African way of thinking in symbols was also the way of the great Chinese thinkers. I found that scientists had been puzzled by the strange similarity between ancient African and Chinese art. I found that I, who lacked feeling for the English language later than Shakespeare, met Pushkin, Dostoevsky, Tolstoi, Lao-tsze, and Confucius on common ground. I understood them. I found myself completely at home with their compatriots.

'Now there is an important thought here. With the coming of the Renaissance something happened to Europe. Before then the art, the

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 405-6, above.

<sup>2</sup> See III. iii. 131 and 247, n. 2, and V. v. 134-5 and 482-3.

<sup>3</sup> The portents of vulgarity and barbarism in Art have been noticed in V. v. 480-3.

literature, the music were akin to Asiatic cultures. With the Renaissance, Reason and Intellect were placed above Intuition and Feeling. The result has been a race which conquered Nature and now rules the World. But the art of that race has paid the price. As Science has advanced, the art standards of the West have steadily declined. Intellectualised art grows tenuous, sterile.

"This is a serious thought. To what end does the West rule the World if all art dies? Jesus, the Eastern, was right. "What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole World and lose his own soul?""

In this intuition of the malady which a Late Modern Western Society had inflicted on itself, Paul Robeson was putting his finger on the difference between an integrated and a disintegrated culture, and he had perceived that the structural and the spiritual disintegration of culture are two aspects of a single process. Some of the phenomena of culture-disintegration within the bosom of a single society have been examined in this Study already;<sup>2</sup> we have now to inquire how the difference between the two diverse possible states of a culture affects the transmission of culture-rays from one body social to another, and here we have to distinguish between several different possible cultural situations in which an encounter between contemporaries may take place. Both parties to the encounter may be in a state of integration, or both in a state of disintegration, or one in the one state and the other in the other state, at the time when the encounter takes place, and we shall find that the difference between these several diverse sets of circumstances is apt to be reflected in a corresponding difference in the outcome in the different cases. We shall also find that, whatever may be the respective states of the two colliding cultures at the time when their encounter occurs, the collision itself is apt to produce a disruptive effect of its own on both the structure of the impinging culture-missile and the fabric of the smitten body social if this collision results, not in a repulse of the attack, but in a penetration of the assaulted party's defences.

#### *The Conduciveness of Cultural Disintegration to Cultural Intercourse*

When the impinging culture is in a state of integration, and *a fortiori* when the state of the smitten body social is the same, the outcome of the collision is apt to be one or other of two opposite extremes. The impinging culture will either rebound from the surface of the smitten body without having succeeded in penetrating it at all, or it will penetrate it with such effect as to succeed in assimilating it. In the light of our simile of the flint, this extreme diversity of the two possible results can be seen to arise from a proportionately extreme variability in the temper and conduct of the party that is taking the initiative. This original agent in the encounter may deliver to his neighbour the unknapped flint that he holds in his hand either by hurling it at him as a missile or by offering it to him as a gift. If he employs his philosopher's stone as an offensive weapon, its mass and weight may bruise his victim's body or even crack his skull, but the very size of the unknapped flint and the roundness of

<sup>1</sup> Robeson, Paul, in *The Daily Herald*, 5th January, 1935, p. 8, cols. 5-6.

<sup>2</sup> In V. v and vi.

its contours in its pristine state make it unlikely that it will pierce the bone and lodge itself in the brain like David's pebble; and the unlikelihood of this happening will be the greater if the assaulted body social's fabric is also in an integrated state; for in this state it will present a compact and close-grained front capable of withstanding the impact even of a missile that has been artificially sharpened to a deadly point; and an assaulted body social that is clothed in this spiritual armour may prove in consequence to be sufficiently master of the situation to be able to reject any alien culture-element which it does not feel itself able to metabolize and assimilate. 'No reception without metabolization' is a healthily integrated society's war-cry in answer to the challenge of a cultural assault; and it would be difficult to find an instance of the successful penetration of a healthily integrated society by an assailant on any terms that were not of the assaulted party's own choosing.

Even when it is sufficiently master of the situation arising from an encounter to dictate its own terms, an integrated civilization does not readily accept a culture-element from an alien civilization; and, on the rare occasions when it allows itself to be receptive, the source of the alien culture-element that it does then receive will be found to be a radioactive civilization that is already in disintegration more often than one that is still in the recipient's own state of cultural integrity. This is, of course, what we should expect in the light of our observation that the state of a radioactive body social's fabric is reproduced in the texture of the culture-rays emitted by it at the time;<sup>1</sup> for this means that a ray emanating from an already disintegrated body social will have been decomposed before issuing from its source, and *a fortiori* before impinging on its target, so that the recipient will have found the preliminary task of splitting the impinging integral ray into its constituent elemental rays already performed for him, and will find the subsequent task of selection proportionately facilitated, whereas he will have to carry out both these successive tasks for himself if he is to give admittance to any culture-elements emanating from a radioactive society that is still in a state of integration and that is therefore still emitting its radiation in an integral form.

As a classic example of the rare phenomenon of the transmission of a culture-element from one integral body social to another, we may cite the reception of the special Calabrian variety of Eastern Orthodox Christian monasticism by Western Christendom at the turn of the tenth and eleventh centuries of the Christian Era,<sup>2</sup> when the model monastery established at Grottaferrata by a Basilian Saint Nilus on an invitation from the Holy See became one of the sources of inspiration for an already active indigenous Western Cluniac movement towards a reform of the monastic life in the Western Christian World. A contemporary second example of the same phenomenon is the reception at Venice of the Byzantine visual arts of architecture and mosaic in the building and decoration of Saint Mark's—though in this case the metabolization and assimilation of the imported culture-elements was less

<sup>1</sup> See p. 495, above.

<sup>2</sup> See IV. iv. 357 and 600.

thorough-going than the spiritual metamorphosis through which an inspiration from Calabria was taken to heart at Cluny.

The local acclimatization of a Byzantine style of architecture in a Western cultural environment at Venice in the tenth and eleventh centuries dwindles, of course, into a mere curiosity of history by comparison with the creation, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, of a new Western style that was at once distinctive and oecumenical when a traditional Western Romanesque architecture gave birth to a revolutionary 'Gothic' architecture sired by an Armenian school whose masterpieces had caught the imagination of Western Crusaders; and we may compare this effect of an alien inspiration on the history of architecture in Western Christendom with the effect produced on the history of the Hellenic art of sculpture in the round in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C. by the impact of an Egyptiac style on the imagination of Hellenic mercenary soldiers and commercial travellers in the Nile Valley. We must note, however, that, while, in our two last-cited examples, as in our two first, the recipient societies were both still in a state of integration at the time as far as we can see, the radioactive societies in these two last cases were neither of them likewise in the same state. In contrast to the Orthodox Christian Society at the time when a monastic and an architectural inspiration were accepted from it by a contemporary Western Christendom, the societies that had produced the Armenian style of architecture and the Egyptiac style of sculpture were, both of them, not merely in course of disintegration, as, for instance, the Syriac and the Indic Society were at the time when elements derived from them were perhaps adopted, metabolized, and assimilated by a still integrated contemporary Hellenic Society which was creating 'a fancy religion' for itself in the shape of Orphism.<sup>1</sup> At the dates here in question, the Armenian and Egyptiac societies were both in a pathological after-state of petrification, and this was the condition in which they exerted their profound cultural influence on an integral Western Christian and an integral Hellenic Society respectively. The radioactive Armenian community was one fragment of a Monophysite 'fossil' of an already extinct Syriac Society;<sup>2</sup> the radioactive Egyptiac Society was a 'Tithonus'.<sup>3</sup>

With this clue in our hands, we may now be able to discern the reason why the Absolute Monarchy that was the master-institution in the political life of Eastern Orthodox Christendom was first rejected, and afterwards accepted, by a Western Christian sister society. On these two occasions the institution in question was the same, and on both occasions Western Christendom was in the same state of integration. The difference between the two situations, which may account for the difference between the two Western reactions to the impact of the same Byzantine culture-arrow, was a difference in the state of the radioactive Orthodox Christian Society on the first occasion and on the second. At the time when the Western World rejected the attempt of the Saxon 'Holy Roman Emperors' Otto II and Otto III (*imperabant* A.D. 973-1002) to acclimatize the Byzantine absolute authoritarian state on Western soil,

<sup>1</sup> See V. v. 84-87 and X. ix. 738-40.

<sup>2</sup> See I. i. 35.

<sup>3</sup> See VI. vii. 47-52.



the Orthodox Christian Society was still in a state of integration in which the divers elements constituting its culture-pattern were so closely knit together that it would have been difficult for another society to accept any one of these alien Orthodox Christian culture-elements without exposing itself to the risk of seeing its own distinctive indigenous culture-pattern obliterated by the descent of a cultural avalanche which would be precipitated by the movement of a single boulder in a moraine where the boulders were bound all to stand or fall together. On the other hand, by the time when the Byzantine absolute authoritarian state was taken over by the Western architects of a Norman successor-state of the East Roman Empire in Apulia, Calabria, and Sicily in order to be transmitted through the agency of Frederick II Hohenstaufen to his immediate heirs, the parochial North Italian despots of the Late Medieval Age of Western history—and, in their version of it, to become the inspiration of the absolute monarchies of an Early Modern Western World<sup>1</sup>—the Orthodox Christian Society from which this now acceptable exotic institution was derived was already in a state of disintegration; and this meant that a culture-element which, in the same society's antecedent state, had been inextricably interwoven with all the other constituent elements in an integrated culture-pattern was now an isolated piece of casual wreckage which could be picked up and appropriated without its necessarily bringing in its train the other ship's timbers to which this plank had been clamped before the blows of wind and wave had prised asunder what the shipwright's art had joined together.

These instances indicate that an integrated body social which comes under a bombardment of cultural radiation emanating from another society is apt to reject any element originating in this alien source which it is not able to take on its own terms; and this means that its resistance is likely to be particularly stubborn when the alien culture-ray that impinges on the assaulted body social's close-grained fabric is not an elemental one but is an integral shaft which is demanding to be taken or left as a whole, without picking or choosing.

There are, it is true, historic examples of the gracious spectacle of the voluntary reception of an integral culture that has been offered by a neighbour as a gift instead of being inflicted by an aggressor on a victim. In the growth-stage of the history of the Hellenic Civilization we can observe Hellenism being accepted by *ci-devant* primitive peoples on the expanding fringes of the Hellenic World of the day—Lydians and Phrygians in the hinterland of Continental Asiatic Greece; Aetolians and Epirotes and Macedonians in the hinterland of Continental European Greece; and Sicels, Messapians, Calabrians, Apulians, and Latins in a new world west of the Straits of Otranto. Hellenism also achieved the miracle of winning the allegiance of representatives of a society of its own species. The Etruscan transmarine pioneers of the Hittite Civilization became converts to the Hellenic Civilization before the close of its pre-Alexandrine Age, while in the post-Alexandrine Age of Hellenic history the cradle of the Hittite Society in Eastern Anatolia was likewise

<sup>1</sup> See VII. vii. 537-9 and X. ix. 97-103.

gradually Hellenized in the course of six or seven centuries ending in the generation of the Cappadocian Fathers of the Eastern Orthodox Church. The bloodless triumphs of Hellenism over primitive peoples were emulated by Orthodox Christendom when it successively converted the Georgians, the Alans, the barbarian Slav intruders into the Balkan Peninsula, the Bulgars, and the Russians; and they were emulated by Western Christendom when it converted the Frankish barbarians in the fifth century of the Christian Era, the English in the sixth, the Frisians, Hessians, Bavarians, and Thuringians in the eighth,<sup>1</sup> and the Poles, Magyars, and Croats at the turn of the tenth and the eleventh. Western Christendom also won the allegiance of two societies of its own species; and, whatever may be our assessment of the roles respectively played by the physical force of coercion and by the spiritual force of attraction in a Latin Christendom's capture of the Far Western Christendom of 'the Celtic Fringe',<sup>2</sup> it is indisputable that the Scandinavian World was captivated by a process of entirely peaceful penetration.<sup>3</sup>

This list of voluntary conversions is not unimpressive as far as it goes;<sup>4</sup> but, if we are to see the historic examples of this social phenomenon in true proportion, we must remind ourselves of three considerations that take some of the light out of this at first sight rather idyllic picture. One of these second thoughts is that the number of known instances of this happy denouement of an encounter between contemporaries was very small by comparison with the total number of known instances of such encounters; another consideration is that a majority of the peoples known to have voluntarily adopted an alien culture in its integral form had been either primitives or barbarians in the penumbra of a civilization; and it has also to be noted that, in the rare cases in which the integral culture of a civilization had been adopted unreservedly by representatives of a society of its own species, these relatively highly cultivated converts all proved to have been in some abnormally weak position, of one kind or another, at the time when their conversion took place.

The Etruscans, for example, were an overseas outpost of a continental society who had been cut off from the main body of their kith and kin by their Hellenic competitors' feat of planting themselves astride all the maritime lines of communication between the west coast of Italy and the south coast of Anatolia; and the subsequent conversion of the Etruscans to Hellenism thus occurred in 'geopolitical' circumstances in which the converts' only alternative to accepting Hellenism was to succumb to it. Moreover, by comparison with their Hellenic contemporaries, the Etruscans laboured from the outset under the handicap of being the children of a society which had been prematurely shattered by the blast of a post-Minoan *Völkerwanderung*. The crippling effect of this peculiar

<sup>1</sup> See II. ii. 336.

<sup>2</sup> See II. ii. 322-40.

<sup>3</sup> See II. ii. 340-60.

<sup>4</sup> It would be rash to attempt to extend it by including in it any of the cases of the reception of the Modern Western culture by contemporary non-Western societies; for none of these current encounters with the Modern West had yet worked itself out to its denouement at the time of writing, and therefore at that date it was impossible to be sure that even the most sensational apparent instance of successful Westernization would not prove in the event to have been delusively ephemeral.

calamity must be presumed to have played its part in moving the Etruscans to adopt an alien culture in place of their Hittite social heritage—unless we have the hardihood to commit ourselves to the paradoxical alternative recourse of writing off as a mere coincidence the remarkable fact that the continental survivors of a shattered Hittite Society appear, side by side with their transmarine colonists in Etruria, in the strikingly short muster role of representatives of civilizations that had voluntarily adopted an integral alien culture in its entirety. Indeed, in this list they appear twice over; for in another context<sup>1</sup> we have already observed that the Hellenization of the Continental Refugee Hittites on the north-west flanks of Taurus and Antitaurus in the post-Alexandrine Age of Hellenic history had been anticipated by the progressive captivity of their fellow refugees on the south-eastern flanks of the same mountain fastnesses by the Syriac culture through the agency of the Aramaic language and alphabet.<sup>2</sup>

The crippling effect of the disaster by which the Hittite Society was overtaken at the turn of the thirteenth and twelfth centuries B.C. has a counterpart in the history of one branch of one of the two nascent civilizations that were successfully absorbed by an adolescent Latin Western Christendom. The Celtic Christians in Britain had had their spirit broken by an avalanche of pagan English barbarian invasion before they tardily and reluctantly accepted the Latin Christian culture in the act of acknowledging the ecclesiastical supremacy of the Roman See. On the other hand the Britons' disheartening experience, which may have predisposed them to renounce their ambition to bring to flower a distinctive culture of their own, was not shared by Irish Celtic Christians who had divided the spoils of a derelict Roman province in Britain with the pagan barbarian English invaders from the Continent; and the prelude to the voluntary incorporation of a pagan Scandinavian World into the body social of a Latin Western Christendom was a fresh barbarian *Völkerwanderung* in which the Vikings took the offensive with such formidable effect that the victimized society which was eventually to captivate these assailants had first to fight for its existence with its back to the wall.

This encounter between 'the heroes of Asgard' and 'the Apostle at Rome' would seem to be a clear case of the voluntary reception of an integral alien civilization by representatives of another society of the same species in circumstances in which the act of cultural conversion cannot be accounted for by any antecedent trauma in the converted society's psychic history. But a unique event, however notable in itself, goes to prove the rule to which it is an exception rather than the rule of which it would remain the solitary instance if rules could ever be estab-

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 445-6, above.

<sup>2</sup> The long-continuing cultural intercourse between Hittites and Aramaeans that eventually resulted in the reception of a Syriac culture by the Hittite communities south-east of Taurus and Antitaurus had begun as early as the fourteenth century B.C., when Northern Syria had been invaded simultaneously by the Hittites from the Anatolian Plateau and by the Aramaeans from the North Arabian Steppe; but the archaeological evidence for the Syriac culture's establishment of its ascendancy over the Hittite culture in this region does not begin to present itself before the turn of the ninth and eighth centuries B.C. (see Cavaignac, E.: *Le Problème Hittite* (Paris 1936, Leroux), p. 166).

lished legitimately on the strength of a single exemplification. In the field of encounters between contemporaries in which both parties are societies of the species that we have labelled 'civilizations', and even in the wider field in which the 'agent's' role is played by a civilization and the 're-agent's' role by a primitive or semi-primitive society, an Orpheus captivating all fellow creatures within earshot by the enchanting harmony of his heavenly music<sup>1</sup> is a rare figure by comparison with a Charlemagne forcibly baptizing the captives of his bow and spear or an Awrangzeb morally alienating intended victims who have proved more than a match for him on the battlefield. The rule at which we thus arrive inductively proves to be that normally an encounter between contemporaries is culturally sterile even when one party, and *a fortiori* when either party, is in a healthy state of cultural integration; and the historical evidence likewise bears out the converse 'law' that a state of cultural disintegration is favourable to cultural intercourse,<sup>2</sup> and most favourable of all when it is the state of both parties to the encounter and when on both sides it has gone to extremes.<sup>3</sup>

This will be found to have been the social setting of most of the encounters, surveyed in earlier chapters of this Part,<sup>4</sup> which have taken the dramatic form of action evoking reaction and thereby producing a *peripeteia*. In terms of our simile of the flint it is easy to see that, when the knapper has split the stone by striking off flakes from the core, and when he has chipped his flakes into slim sharp arrow heads, these tooled fragments will travel faster and farther, and will lodge themselves deeper in their target when shot from a bow, than the unsplit stone when hurled by hand. The radiation of a radioactive body social is, in fact, more apt to make an impression on an alien body on which it impinges if the emitting body is in disintegration than if it is still in its state of pristine integrity; and, if we may infer that successfully radioactive societies will be found to be already in disintegration as a rule, we shall have laid our finger on at least one of the reasons why the process of radiation-and-reception is apt to work itself out piecemeal over a protracted Time-span; for in previous contexts<sup>5</sup> we have already noticed that the divers constituent elements of a culture have different specific velocities, ranges, and penetrative powers when they are in process of transmission from an emitting to a receiving body social, and that each 'arrow' (if we think in terms of Palaeolithic technology) or each elemental ray (if we think in terms of Modern Western optics) will take its own natural course as soon

<sup>1</sup> See IV. iv. 124-6 and 131-2, and V. v. 210-13 and 231.

<sup>2</sup> We have already stumbled on this 'law' at an earlier point in this Study (in III. iii. 128-54), where we have been led to formulate it as an explanation of the empirically demonstrable fact that the increasing command over a human environment which is registered in the geographical expansion of a civilization at the expense of neighbouring societies proves, not only not to be a criterion of social growth, but to be, perhaps more often than not, a symptom of social disintegration.

<sup>3</sup> In IV. iv. 115-19 we have already come to the conclusion that there is no known instance of a civilization's breaking down and disintegrating in which the cause of the breakdown can be demonstrated to have been a blow struck by some other party and not some suicidal act on the part of the broken-down society itself. If this conclusion holds good in cases in which the aggressor society has been a civilization, it applies *a fortiori* to cases in which the domain of a universal state has been overrun by transfrontier barbarians—as we have observed in I. i. 58-60 and in Part VIII, *passim*, above.

<sup>4</sup> On pp. 106-453, above.

<sup>5</sup> In III. iii. 152; IV. iv. 57; and V. v. 199-200.

as it has been released from its wedlock with the core in the unsplit stone or with the rest of the elemental rays in an integral ray of white light.

*Decomposition through Diffraction*

This piecemeal transmission of the constituent elements of a culture cannot, however, be explained solely as an effect of a previous structural disintegration of the radioactive body whose fabric, whatever its state may happen to be, is reproduced in the texture of its effluent culture-rays, nor again solely as an effect of the receiving body social's being likewise in a state of structural disintegration—and therefore being more readily susceptible to penetration by an intrusive alien culture—at the time when it is exposed to the radioactive culture's impact. In the knapping of the flint or the diffraction of the ray of white light—which-ever of the two similes we may prefer to employ—there must also be some other cause at work; for, if a spontaneous antecedent disintegration of the culture-pattern of one party or both parties to the encounter were the only possible cause of this phenomenon of knapping or diffraction, it would be impossible to understand why a culture should not be transmitted integrally and instantaneously in cases, like that of the conversion of the Scandinavians to the Latin Christian culture, in which the culture-pattern of both the parties to the transaction was in an integral state at the time when the act of conversion took place. Both in this case, however, and in that of the conversion of the Etruscans to Hellenism—an episode in which the Hellenic party, at any rate, was still in a state of cultural integration, whatever may have been the state of the Etruscans at the time—we find that, as a matter of historical fact, the migratory culture was transmitted, as in other cases, piecemeal and not all at one delivery, with the consequence that, in these cases likewise, the process of transmission took an appreciable time to work itself out. We must conclude that, in such cases at any rate, some other cause must have been operative; and, if we can identify this other cause, we shall have to allow for the possibility that it may have played some part likewise in those other piecemeal and protracted transmissions of culture in which the disintegrated state of the culture-pattern of the two parties, or of one of them, is the explanation that first leaps to the eye.

A further pursuit of our optical simile may help us to bring to light this latent other cause of the decomposition of culture in the course of its transmission. In the Physical Universe our occasional perception of the diverse elemental colours of the spectrum, which in white light are fused together into so perfect a unity that they are not only inextricable but are indistinguishable, is not the effect of a decomposition of light that has taken place in the body of the Sun before the ray which we perceive in this decomposed state has left its solar source and has impinged on this planet. The reason why, in human visual experience, white light is the normal epiphany of light and the colour-gamut of the spectrum is an exceptional spectacle is because the light that reaches us is in fact emitted from the Sun in rays that are originally integral. The colour-gamut of the spectrum becomes visible to us only when an integral shaft



of sunlight happens to strike a terrestrial target of a particular consistency—a shower of rain or a block of crystal—at a particular angle at which the ray is able to penetrate this particular material obstacle to its farther advance at the cost of being diffracted into its constituent elements by the resistance of the foreign body. The shock of the integral ray's impact from this angle on a target of this texture shakes the precariously integrated bundle of elemental rays apart into a 'spectrum' that is so called because, in it, each primary colour is sorted out from all the rest, with the result that each of the constituents of the original ray of sunlight becomes visible in and by itself at the price of the effacement of the white light that had been the visual effect of the elemental rays' now dissolved association.

If we retranspose our perilously illuminating physical simile into human terms, we shall find no difficulty in seeing why, in the realm of human encounters, the phenomenon of culture-diffraction should be produced by the shock inflicted on a body social by the impact of an alien culture-ray. The intrusion of any alien cultural element into the life of any society, in whatever state of life it may happen to be at the time, is manifestly a dangerously disruptive, and therefore a painfully harassing, experience for the reason that a state of integration is, as we have seen, the normal condition of a healthy cultural life, so that even a society which has already spontaneously fallen into disintegration, and has perhaps since travelled far along this road, before being smitten by the alien culture-ray's impact, will shrink from exposing itself wantonly to this foreign complication of a domestic situation that has already got out of hand. In fact, an assaulted society will never welcome its assailant's culture with open arms or promptly abandon its own indigenous social heritage wholesale in order to substitute for it the importunately obtrusive alien culture-pattern all of a piece in an instantaneous act of deliberate self-transformation. The victim's immediate impulse (though, as we shall see,<sup>1</sup> not always his last, as well as first, resort) will be to put up an anxiously obstinate resistance, fight a succession of rear-guard actions, and swallow the exotic potion that is being forced down his throat in a series of minimum doses, in the reluctant spirit of a child compelled to take nasty medicine. Nothing but a course of disagreeable and disillusioning experience will teach this recalcitrant patient—if he ever learns the lesson at all—that he has chosen the most unpleasant and most inexpedient way of responding to a challenge which he cannot elude.

A classical example of this initial negative reaction of the victim of a cultural assault is the long-drawn-out first chapter in the Ottoman Turks' response to the challenge of the turn in the tide of their perennial warfare with the Western World. As we have seen,<sup>2</sup> they allowed the best part of a century to pass without taking any drastic steps after they had been warned of their danger by their signally disastrous defeat in the Great Turco-Frankish War of A.D. 1682-99; and, when they were stung into action at last by the still more disastrous and much more humiliating experience of being defeated by a Westernizing Orthodox Christian Power in the Great Turco-Russian War of A.D. 1768-74, they

<sup>1</sup> On pp. 580-623, below.

<sup>2</sup> On pp. 232-8, above. See also p. 557, n. 4, below.

stultified their own efforts for the best part of another century and a half by clinging to the impracticable policy of attempting to adopt the Modern Western art of war without simultaneously accepting any of those non-military Modern Western institutions that were in fact the indispensable conditions of Modern Western military efficiency. It required a third shock—the military invasion of their Anatolian homeland by their own *ci-devant ra'îyeh*, the Moreot and Rumelian Greeks, in A.D. 1919—to induce the Turks at last to follow a leader who put it to them that their only chance of survival now lay in embracing the Modern Western Civilization with enthusiasm and remoulding their way of life to fit this alien culture-pattern without reservations. Atatürk addressed his saving message to his countrymen with assurance and authority because he had taken the measure of a disintegrating society's defencelessness against cultural aggression. When the living target of culture-arrows has lost the natural armour constituted by a closely integrated social fabric, its skin will offer an opening at every pore for an arrow-head to insert itself, and the naked body will find itself exposed to penetration on terms that will be of its assailant's setting, and not of its own.

In the first stage, however, of a disintegrating society's encounter with a radioactive alien culture the negative reaction of the eighteenth-century and nineteenth-century Ottoman Turkish conservatives seems to be the rule. As further illustrations of this prevalent initial attitude we may cite the reluctance notoriously shown by the statesmen of a Roman Commonwealth in a post-Hannibalic Age to make annexations of territory belonging to the domains of any of the Hellenic Civilization's Oriental neighbours, though these domains were then lying at the mercy of a Roman Power which had succeeded in overthrowing its sole really formidable competitor. *A fortiori*, these post-Hannibalic Roman statesmen were chary of bringing those alien worlds within Rome's own walls by opening her gates to the importation, manumission, and enfranchisement of Oriental slaves, and they were particularly vigilant to repress or, as a *pis aller*, to sterilize, any immigrant Oriental religions, or at all events never to license them without having first done their best to denature them by insisting that they should not present themselves for admission till they had clothed themselves in an Hellenic wedding-garment.<sup>1</sup>

A Hittite worship of Cybele, an Egyptian worship of Isis, an Iranian Syriac Mithraism, and a Palestinian Syriac Christianity all duly commended themselves to the main body of the Hellenic Society within the frontiers of the Roman Empire by assuming in their outward show the appealingly familiar style of Hellenic visual art, and even the Far Eastern outposts of Hellenism in Bactria and India that had been isolated by the rise of an intervening Arsacid Power and had fallen under Kushan rule were prospective converts of sufficient importance to make it worth while for an Indic Mahāyāna to resort to the same device of visual Hellenization in order to catch the eye of an Hellenic diaspora. West of Euphrates the Syriac missionary religion Christianity and the Babylonian missionary religion Astrology carried the propitiatory process of self-

<sup>1</sup> Matt. xxii. 11-14.

Hellenization a stage farther by translating their ideas and ideals into terms of Hellenic science and philosophy<sup>1</sup> instead of being content merely to lay a veneer of Hellenism over their visual surface; and it is significant that, in the competition between Oriental religions for the conversion of the main body of the Hellenic World in the Imperial Age, the victory should eventually have been won by the competitor that had gone to the greatest lengths in Hellenizing itself and thereby turning the flank of the resistance which even a disintegrating Hellenic Society was still prone to offer to the reception of any alien culture-element that was conspicuously exotic.

Without seeking to anticipate the eventual answer to the enigmatic question whether, at the time of writing, the Western Civilization was already in disintegration or was still in course of growth, we may cite, as evidence relevant to our present inquiry, the unquestionable fact that in the Late Modern and the Early post-Modern Age of Western history a Roman reluctance to incorporate culturally alien territories or to open the gates to immigrant alien bodies or ideas had been displayed by the governments of two Western Great Powers.

The Hapsburg Monarchy was actually led to make the great refusal of its manifest destiny, and thereby condemn itself to an eventual catastrophic liquidation, by its reluctance to add to the numbers of the ex-Ottoman Orthodox Christians under Hapsburg rule when once the Roman Church had reached the limits of its power to transmute Eastern Orthodox Christians into Roman Catholics through the alchemy of the statesmanlike institution of uniate churches. Just two hundred years before the dissolution of the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy in A.D. 1918, it had looked, on the morrow of the peace-settlement of Passarowitz, as if the whole of the Rumeliot main body of Ottoman Orthodox Christendom were on the point of passing under Hapsburg rule; yet Viennese statesmanship acquiesced in A.D. 1739 in the retrocession to Turkey of the Serbian and Wallachian portions of the Ottoman territory acquired by the Monarchy in A.D. 1718; it let slip its opportunity of retrieving this loss in A.D. 1788-91;<sup>2</sup> and thereafter at the eleventh hour, when a Hapsburg Monarchy that had suffered humiliating defeats at Serb as well as Russian hands in the opening phase of the General War of A.D. 1914-18 was taken up for an unearned and unsolicited ride in the cab of a momentarily victorious Hohenzollern ally's triumphal steam-roller, the governments at Vienna and Budapest were gravely embarrassed by the ironical brilliance of a temporary political situation in which the disposal of Montenegro, Serbia, and Rumania momentarily lay in the hands of the Central Powers. To leave these conquered ex-Ottoman Orthodox Christian enemy states independent would mean stultifying the conqueror's victory by leaving in existence so many transfrontier bases of operations for a resumption of pre-war irredentist nationalist movements among the Hapsburg Monarchy's own Yugoslav and Rumanian subjects. On the other hand, to annex the conquered territories would mean undermining the political hegemony of a German and a Magyar 'ascendancy' in what might prove to be

<sup>1</sup> See V. v. 367 and 539, and VII. vii. 470-6.

<sup>2</sup> See II. ii. 180.

a more dangerous way by changing the Monarchy's internal balance of national forces to the subject nationalities' advantage. During the years A.D. 1915-18 Austro-Hungarian statesmanship was tormented by the nightmare of this insoluble problem till it was put out of its agony by the merciful hand of Death.

The General War of A.D. 1914-18, which precipitated the dissolution of the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy, brought the United States face to face with the problem that had eventually defeated Hapsburg statesmanship.

During the hundred years ending in A.D. 1914 an ever more rapidly mounting flood of immigration from the Old World had provided the American people with the copious reinforcements of its man-power that were required for the achievement of its titanic enterprise of mastering a virgin island of almost continental dimensions; but the blithely indiscriminate welcome that had been given to this inflow of immigration into North America during the first chapter of the story had begun to be qualified by some disquiet in American hearts, and consequent reservation in American minds, when, at about the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the composition of the inpouring stream had rather suddenly changed and had at the same time given premonitory indications of further, still more radical, changes that might be expected at no distant future date if the flood-waters were not promptly brought under rigorous governmental control. The first spate of nineteenth-century immigrants had come for the most part from those North-West European countries whose colonists had peopled the Atlantic seaboard of North America before its attainment of political independence; but in the years A.D. 1880-93 a tributary stream had begun to flow from Italy, the Hapsburg Monarchy, and the Russian Empire, and in the years A.D. 1898-1914, in which the total volume of immigration was at its maximum, this parvenu and outlandish South and East European contingent greatly outnumbered the dwindling rear-guard of a familiar and acceptable North-West European column of route.<sup>1</sup>

The distinctive difference between these two diverse streams of latter-day immigration that moved the American people to adopt a discriminatory attitude was not, of course, the mere difference in their geographical provenance, but was the difference in their cultural complexion which this difference of provenance implied. A significant negative common characteristic of all units in the new contingent was the non-Western origin of their native cultural traditions;<sup>2</sup> and this pacific invasion of the

<sup>1</sup> See Toynbee, A. J.: *Survey of International Affairs*, 1924 (London 1926, Milford), pp. 88-89.

<sup>2</sup> Within the boundaries of all the three states in the Old World from which the bulk of this new contingent of immigrants into the United States was drawn there were, of course, populations that were Western in their culture; but the majority even of these were representatives of the Roman Catholic branch of the Western Christian family, and not of the Protestant branch that had been predominant in the United States so far, and a majority of the Italian Roman Catholic immigrants in those years were Neapolitans and Sicilians, who still remained crypto-Byzantines even after a nine hundred years' experience of an association with Western Christendom into which they had been conscripted originally by a Norman military conquest. The immigrants from the Danubian Hapsburg and the Russian Empire included undisguised Byzantines, as well as Jews.

United States by non-Western immigrants whose exotic character was partially concealed under the misleading meaningless label 'European' was already threatening to attract reinforcements from other regions of the Old World whose inhabitants' 'un-American way of life' was advertised by an arbitrary convention that labelled these other non-Western peoples 'Asiatics'.<sup>1</sup>

This new threat which the old institution of immigration had thus come to present to the integrity of the American people's native Western way of life led the United States to follow up the enactment of a Chinese Exclusion Law on the 6th May, 1882,<sup>2</sup> and the establishment of an 'Asiatic Barred Zone' in an act of the 5th February, 1917,<sup>3</sup> by passing the two momentous general Immigration Restriction Acts that came into force respectively on the 3rd June, 1921, and on the 1st July, 1924.<sup>4</sup> The Act of 1924 was designed not merely to restrict the total number of immigrants but to discriminate, within this total, in favour of applicants from North-West European countries.<sup>5</sup> The annual quotas assigned to countries from which a restricted flow of immigration was still permitted were governed by a formula that would tell against applicants of South and East European provenance; the immigration of Orientals was banned altogether;<sup>6</sup> and the Senate at Washington insisted<sup>7</sup> on confirming the application of this Oriental Exclusion Clause in the Immigration Act of A.D. 1924 to applicants from Japan, in lieu of 'the Gentleman's Agreement' that had governed the entry of Japanese nationals into the United States since A.D. 1907.<sup>8</sup>

By the year A.D. 1952<sup>9</sup>—by when it had become manifest in retrospect that this change in United States immigration policy after the First World War had played an appreciable part in the genesis of the Second—the American people had succeeded at this price in checking the cultural adulteration with which their body social had been threatened through an influx of culturally alien immigrants, only to discover, like the Romans before them, that the relatively easy recourse of physically excluding alien bodies left them still face to face with the more baffling problem of contending with alien 'dangerous' thoughts that had a knack of making their way through the most efficiently drawn official 'sanitary cordon' without requiring the services of any physical carrier. 'The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof but canst not tell whence it cometh and whither it goeth.'<sup>10</sup> If the twentieth-century American policy of excluding, restricting, and 'screening' would-be immigrants, and re-educating and assimilating the applicants who had qualified for admission, was a counterpart of the post-Hannibalic Roman policy of regulating the importation and manumission of

<sup>1</sup> The unreality of the conventional partition of the Old World into a 'Europe' and an 'Asia' is exposed on pp. 708-29, below.

<sup>2</sup> See Toynbee, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

<sup>3</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 93-97.

<sup>4</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 147.

<sup>5</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 135-8.

<sup>6</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 90, n. 1.

<sup>7</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 97-99.

<sup>8</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 148-59.

<sup>9</sup> The quota system introduced in the Act of A.D. 1924 was retained, while the discrimination on racial grounds, embodied in legislation hitherto in force, was abandoned in form, but not in substance, in the McCarran-Walter Immigration Act, which was passed in the Senate at Washington, by a vote overriding President Truman's veto, on the 27th June, 1952.

<sup>10</sup> John iii. 8.



slaves and confining the social and political enfranchisement of freedmen within limitations, the Psyche's task of resisting the propagation of Oriental religions, which defeated Roman statesmanship in a five-hundred-years-long 'cold war' of attrition,<sup>1</sup> had its counterpart in a spiritual conflict between 'the American way of life' and the Russified *ci-devant* Western heresy of Communism which, on the morrow of a Second World War, was being waged in the bosom of the United States. The non-military hostilities on this American home front in the rear of the Bureau of Immigration's elaborately fortified *limes* were even showing signs of taking forms that were familiar in the corresponding passages of spiritual arms in the Imperial Age of Hellenic history.

The initial negative reaction on the victim's part which we have been observing in these American, Austro-Hungarian, Roman, and Ottoman instances of it explains why an impinging alien culture is always diffracted in the process of reception and is never swallowed whole at one gulp even in those rare encounters between two integral cultures in which the process finds its smoothest and quickest passage; and the assaulted party's defensive posture suggests another reason why, when the divers elemental rays have thus been shaken loose from one another, they prove, as they go their separate ways thenceforward, to have different speeds, ranges, and penetrative powers. Their difference in degree of prowess in these various respects is not due exclusively to a specific difference in their intrinsic carrying-power; it is also to some extent proportional to the difference in the degree of the resistance that each of them evokes in the psyche of the party that is their unwilling target.

### *Inverse Selection through Transmission*

This further insight into the cause of the manifest differentiation in the elemental culture-rays' carrying power enables us, at the next step, to detect the cause of one of the 'laws' governing the process of cultural radiation-and-reception which we have already seen at work. This 'law' runs to the effect that the carrying-power of a culture-element is proportional to the degree of its triviality and superficiality in the spiritual hierarchy of cultural values.<sup>2</sup> It is a sinister law because it means that a culture, when it goes into disintegration, has to pay for an enhancement of the vigour of its radioactivity by reconciling itself to a deterioration in the quality of the elements that it is transmitting. We may put the point in terms of a homely simile by saying that the same amount of butter is spread wider by the simple expedient of being spread thinner, and by reminding ourselves that skim milk is more digestible than cream for a rice-fed Cantonese or Japanese child that is being introduced for the first time in its life to a novel diet of dairy-produce.

While the unwilling victim of cultural aggression will diffract an impinging shaft of cultural radiation by repelling as many of its con-

<sup>1</sup> The opening date of this Romano-Oriental 'cold war' may be found in the Senate's persecution of the Bacchantes in 186 B.C., and its closing date in Galerius's abandonment, in A.D. 311, of the Diocletianic persecution of the Christians (see II. ii. 215-16).

<sup>2</sup> See V. v. 200.

stituent elemental rays as he finds it possible to repel in the first round of the encounter, the elements that he will be least reluctant to admit, if a total rejection of the aggressive alien culture proves to be beyond his power, will be those elements that seem to him the least difficult or least undesirable to assimilate;<sup>1</sup> and, when he finds himself driven to give admittance to partially intractable elements under the pressure of sheer *force majeure* for the sake of self-preservation—as, for instance, when he has to face the necessity of mastering in some measure a militarily superior assailant's art of war—he will try to confine his reception of these more or less intractable elements to a minimum.<sup>2</sup> For this reason the process of culture-diffusion not only produces the phenomenon of culture-diffraction but also differentiates between the divers elements in the culture-spectrum of a diffracted culture-ray by selecting for the speediest and farthest transmission those elements that are of the lowest cultural value—a perverse operation of the principle of natural selection that awards a premium of efficacy to spiritual cheapness.

We have already observed<sup>3</sup> that, as soon as the divers constituent elemental rays, or constituent flakes and core, of an impinging culture have been released from their pristine association with one another, the latent intrinsic difference between their respective carrying-powers comes into play—whether the cause of their disentanglement happens to be their impact on a diffracting target or happens to be the antecedent disintegration of the culture-pattern of the radioactive body social from which they have emanated. In this situation, in whatever way it may have arisen, the economic elemental ray or arrow manifests the highest carrying-power, the political arrow the next highest, and the untooled residual core of the impinging culture the lowest carrying-power of all. When this culture-core is split up in its turn by the successive detach-

<sup>1</sup> The operation of this 'law' is, of course, most conspicuously manifest on the economic plane. Materials that have a world-wide currency as objects of value—e.g. jewels, gold, amber, jade, ivory, purple dye, spices, silk—may become objects of trade in the commerce between one society and another without carrying with them any infection of cultural influence or indeed any awareness of their original provenance (the *locus classicus* for this culturally uncompromising form of commerce is the account of the transit of offerings from the land of 'the Hyperboreans' to the Island of Delos, given by Herodotus in Book IV, chap. 33); and even treasures in the shape of works of art or specie may pass physically from hand to hand without any concomitant transmission of the culture displayed in the image and superscription on a coin or in the modelling and decoration of a vase. Perhaps the most non-conductive of all treasures are pieces of loot such as the emerald table which was taken by the Umayyad conquerors of the Iberian Peninsula from Visigoths who, in their day, had taken it from a pillaged Rome (see Gibbon, E.: *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chap. xxxi), or the seven-branched golden candlestick which was first carried off from the Temple of Jerusalem to Rome to figure in Titus's triumphal procession and to be portrayed on a bas-relief on his commemorative arch, and was then carried off from Rome to Carthage when Rome was sacked by the Vandals in A.D. 455 (Gibbon, op. cit., chap. xxxvi). Valuable materials and precious objects are received from alien hands with less reluctance than weapons, weapons less reluctantly than non-lethal tools, treasures and tools less reluctantly than staple commodities, and commodities of all kinds less reluctantly than economic services—which are manifestly more compromising than material goods because, unlike these, they cannot be accepted by one society from another without personal contact with the alien hands by which they are being furnished.

<sup>2</sup> When this negative reaction takes the form of hiring alien mercenary soldiers in preference to educating a native personnel in an alien military technique, the attempt to keep an alien culture at arm's length is apt to defeat itself (see pp. 730-2, below).

<sup>3</sup> In III. iii. 152; IV. iv. 57; and V. v. 200.

ment of linguistic, intellectual, and artistic flakes from the core's religious nucleus, the respective intrinsic carrying-powers of these three cultural flakes prove to be different likewise; and here again the premium on spiritual cheapness prevails. The linguistic flake displays a higher carrying-power than the intellectual, and the intellectual than the artistic, while the religious nucleus of the culture-core has a lower carrying-power than the detached cultural arrowheads.

This 'law' to the effect that the carrying-power of a culture-element is in inverse ratio to its spiritual value has a corollary, propounded in an earlier context,<sup>1</sup> which reads that the carrying-power of an integral culture-ray or unsplit philosopher's stone is equal to the average of the respective intrinsic carrying-powers of its constituent elements. While the political, as well as the economic, arrow in isolation proves to have a higher carrying-power than the integral flint before the flakes have been split off, the residual core displays a lower intrinsic carrying-power in isolation than it enjoys when the more expeditious flakes are still attached to it. In virtue of the same law, the carrying-power of the isolated religious nucleus of the culture-core proves to be lower than that of the total core when still unsplit, while on the other hand the carrying-powers of the artistic, intellectual, and linguistic flakes prove all to be higher in isolation than the carrying-power of the core before these superficial components have been detached from the religious nucleus.

Our 'law' and its corollary could both be illustrated from the history of the radiation of the Western culture in the Modern Age.<sup>2</sup> In the writer's generation the diffusion of this Western culture on the political as well as on the economic plane was already virtually world-wide, whereas on the cultural plane its influence beyond the borders of its homeland in the Western World itself was then still exotic and superficial, though by that date it had been radioactive for not less than four and a half centuries.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, the form in which this Modern Western culture—as distinct from Western economic and political technique—had won its world-wide ascendancy, such as it was, had been a utilitarian secular abstract consisting of a linguistic and an intellectual flake which had served as ammunition for a Western Hercules' bow after having been detached from the religious nucleus and from a still undetached artistic flake of an integral Western Christian culture's core.<sup>4</sup>

It was in this superficial form of a parcel of techniques, *lingue franche*, and sciences that the Western culture had been adopted towards the end of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era by Peter the Great in Russia after it had been rejected in its integral unsecularized form at the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by Hideyoshi and Ieyasu in Japan; and its subsequent rejection in China likewise in the very generation in which it was being adopted in Russia was a consequence of the disastrous success achieved by the Franciscan missionaries of a Tridentine Roman Catholic Christianity in China in foiling their broader-minded and farther-sighted Jesuit colleagues' attempt to avert

<sup>1</sup> In V. v. 203.

<sup>2</sup> See xi, map 66.

<sup>3</sup> This point has been noticed already in I. i. 30–31. See also Halecki, O.: *The Limits and Divisions of European History* (London 1950, Sheed and Ward), p. 60.

<sup>4</sup> See pp. 314 and 499–500, above.

in China the fate which had already cut short the propagation of an integral Western Christian culture in Japan; for the Jesuit missionaries' policy in China had been to offer this integral Christian form of the Western way of life to Chinese minds and hearts in the most anodyne version that could be devised by Christian representatives of the Modern Western Civilization who were not prepared to follow their agnostic contemporaries' lead so far as to take the plunge into the unfathomably deep waters of secularization.<sup>1</sup>

The utilitarian secular abstract of the Modern Western culture which did succeed in captivating eventually to some degree not only the Russian, Serb, and Greek Orthodox Christians but also most of the rest of Mankind, including the Japanese and Chinese themselves in the next round of their continuing encounter with the West,<sup>2</sup> had found a readier market abroad in a smoothly 'processed' French decoction than in its racier but rougher English rawness;<sup>3</sup> and it had made its way farthest, by the time of writing, not at the esoteric depth of its revolutionary intellectual reinterpretation of the nature of the Physical Universe, nor even at the less abstruse level to which the gospel of

<sup>1</sup> This defeat of the Jesuit missionaries in China has been noticed in V. v. 365-7 and 539, and V. vi. 23-24.

<sup>2</sup> In the mental vision of the writer of this Study the city of Shanghai stood, ever since he had first set eyes on it in A.D. 1929, as the concrete symbol of the soullessness of this repulsively deconsecrated form in which the Western Civilization had made its latter-day conquest of the non-Western World. In this product of Western commerce on Far Eastern ground a horrified Western observer could see a sight which was not to be seen at the time on Western ground in either hemisphere. Here was a great city, conjured up by Western enterprise and constructed and administered in the post-Modern Western style, which was charged with all the dynamic material energy that was coursing through the veins of a contemporary Chicago or Berlin or London or Paris, without at the same time trailing even one wisp of the cloud of pristine Western Christian spiritual glory that made the contemporary spiritual atmosphere of these American and European Western cities still just possible for a human soul to breathe.

<sup>3</sup> See III. iii. 369-71. This 'processing' role that was played by France in the Late Modern Age of Western history from the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries onwards is depicted with an admirable sureness of touch in the following passage from the pen of a twentieth-century French historian:—

'Puisque nous ne pouvons nous retenir, en suivant le cheminement des idées, de nous émerveiller quelquefois de leurs routes imprévues, étonnons-nous encore de la promptitude, de la facilité avec laquelle la France accepte le rôle que les circonstances lui imposent. Cette puissance qui paraît au nord, et qui menace son hégémonie, non seulement elle l'accepte, mais elle la sert. À sa propre activité créatrice, elle ajoute une activité nouvelle: elle va introduire les valeurs nordiques sur les marchés latins. Empressée, elle jouera le rôle d'introductrice de la pensée britannique auprès de sa clientèle italienne, espagnole, portugaise. Quelquefois même, elles l'interposera entre le nord et le nord, de telle sorte qu'une œuvre venue de Londres passera par Paris avant d'aller franchir le Rhin. Mais, beaucoup plus souvent, elle transmettra non seulement ses productions, mais les productions anglaises, et ensuite les productions germaniques, à Rome, à Madrid, à Lisbonne. Elle les transmettra, non pas comme un simple courrier, indifférent à ce qu'il transporte; au contraire, elle fera leur toilette; elle les accommodera "aux usages communs de l'Europe": c'est-à-dire au goût qui règne en Europe par son fait, au goût français. Ces Anglais ne sont pas clairs, il faut les décanter; ils n'obéissent pas aux lois de la logique formelle, il faut introduire de l'ordre dans leurs idées; ils sont diffus, il faut les abréger; ils sont grossiers, il faut les affiner. Elle se met à l'œuvre, change, coupe, retaille les habits, met sur les visages de la poudre et du rouge. Les personnages qu'elle présente au monde, après son travail, sont encore exotiques, mais à peine: juste assez pour plaire sans effaroucher. Elle connaît ses mérites; elle connaît le goût de son public et dès lors elle prend en mains, avec ses propres intérêts, ceux de l'Angleterre, et ceux de l'Europe. Les traducteurs qu'elle emploie se haussent en dignité; leur tâche n'est plus celle d'un simple manœuvre qui vise à la fidélité servile; ils deviennent des créateurs, en second; à tout le moins des plénipotentiaires' (Hazard, P.: *La Crise de la Conscience Européenne* (1680-1715) (Paris 1935, Boivin), pp. 73-74).

Modern Western Science had been adroitly pumped up by a series of talented popularizers, from Fontenelle<sup>1</sup> to Wells, but on a linguistic *terrain* which was the most superficial of all its layers. The English language, for example, had latterly won its competition with the French by gaining currency in India, China, and Japan as a *lingua franca* serving as a medium of intercourse for the pedestrian practical purposes of trade and politics<sup>2</sup> before the non-Western societies that had taken to using this Western linguistic medium for these purposes had come to be more than slightly affected by the rest of the Western culture—above all, its Christian religious nucleus—of which the English language and the other Western vernaculars were potential vehicles.

These illustrations of our 'law' from the history of the diffusion of the Modern Western culture have their counterparts in Hellenic and Far Eastern history. We have seen<sup>3</sup> that a Syriac World which had not proved receptive to the Hellenic culture in its integral form was captivated eventually, in the 'Abbasid Age, by an intellectual flake of Hellenism in which its science and philosophy were presented apart from its art and religion. In an earlier phase of a post-Alexandrine Hellenism's radioactivity the art of the Attic drama had acquired a carrying-power when a cosmopolitan association of artistes had treated it, as French publicists were to treat the British constitution, by plucking it out of its native ground in the orchestra of the theatre of Dionysus under the shadow of the acropolis of Athens in order to take it on tour and 'produce' it with a virtuosity that Parthians and Celtiberians could appreciate.<sup>4</sup> Artistic flakes of a Far Eastern culture which had similarly been detached from their spiritual core likewise captivated a nascent Iranic Muslim Society in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries of the Christian Era, and a Modern Western Society from the eighteenth century onwards, without any simultaneous radiation of a Confucian philosophy and a Mahayanian religion that were the original settings from which these fashionably superficial *chinoiserie*s had been detached in order to be made exportable at the price of being made meaningless.

We may go on to observe that, on every plane, a recipient society finds it easier to take and use a radiating society's ready-made products, material or spiritual, than to master the techniques, habits, feelings, and thoughts that have to be acquired and appropriated if the recipient is to become, in his turn, a producer of these alien cultural commodities as well as a mere consumer of them. The cultural commodities that have the greatest carrying power of all are lethal tools; but a Pathan trans-frontier barbarian in the no-man's-land beyond the North-West Frontier of the British Indian Empire during the century ending in A.D. 1947<sup>5</sup> would acquire a taste for a Modern Western rifle, and a skill in

<sup>1</sup> An illuminating sketch of the eighteenth-century French popularizers of the seventeenth-century Western Scientific Revolution will be found in Butterfield, H.: *The Origins of Modern Science, 1300-1800* (London 1949, Bell), pp. 143-58.

<sup>2</sup> See V. v. 506-12.

<sup>3</sup> See IV. iv. 243; V. v. 201, n. 1, and 481; and p. 405, above.

<sup>4</sup> On pp. 408-9, above.

<sup>5</sup> The special case of culture-diffusion across a *limes* between a universal state and the barbarians beyond its pale, of which the history of the North-West Frontier of the British Indian Empire is a classical example, has been examined in Part VIII, *passim*, above.



using it, long before he learnt how to manufacture such a rifle for himself, and long indeed before he began to make creative improvements of his own upon the alien pattern in which the rifle had first come into his hands ready-made—in contrast to the circumstances of the original genesis of the rifle in its place of origin in the Western World, where the production and the use and the improvement of the weapon had all been inseparably bound up with one another in the process of the rifle's evolution.

Following this contrast up, we shall find that, while the Pathan might take with lightning rapidity and astonishing success to a rifle or a sewing-machine or a gramophone, and might even teach himself, under the stimulus of intense desire, to manufacture a remarkably exact copy of a complicated contemporary Western weapon of precision with the simple tools that were the sum of his scanty native metallurgical resources, the same masterly Pathan marksman and gunsmith would show vastly less aptitude for appropriating any of those Western political institutions that were part of the secret of the British Rāj's military ascendancy over the transfrontier barbarian. It was easier for the barbarian to submit temporarily under duress to British political dictation than to take even the first toddling step towards mastering the British political art of parliamentary government; and the culture which was the creative inspiration of all the Western Society's political and military and technological achievements was quite beyond the Pathan's ken even in the secularized form, divorced from its religious heart, in which this Western culture had been at the disposal of non-Western importers since the close of the seventeenth century.

For instance, our nineteenth-century Pathan knew nothing of the long and arduous history of a sustained and organized intellectual endeavour that had created Modern Western Science, and nothing either of the tragic irony with which an acquisitive-minded Western Society's lust to wring material profits out of the disinterested labours of Western intellectual pioneers had brought in its train its grimly appropriate nemesis in the shape of the fascinating Victorian invention of a breech-loading rifle which was the earnest of far more deadly future masterpieces of a Modern Western *Homo Faber's* 'Applied Science'. While the Pathan succeeded in becoming a modest profit-sharer in the dividends of this prostitution of a new science to an old barbarism to which the Pathan and the Frank were, both alike, still morally enslaved in the twentieth century of the Christian Era, the Pathan was utterly ignorant of the history of that Western moral progress which—feeble and rudimentary though it might be found to be when measured by the standards of the Saints—had nevertheless succeeded, at the cost of a struggle still more arduous and protracted than the assault of Western Science on Physical Nature, in enabling some of the Western peoples gradually and partially to transmute the Old Adam of government by force into a new covenant of government by consent,<sup>1</sup> and thereby to keep Man's hope of mundane

<sup>1</sup> This faint Late Modern Western emanation of the spirit of the Kingdom of God in the political slum of the Kingdom's refractory secular province was sometimes identified by latter-day Western idealists, naïvely but in all good faith, with the spirit

salvation alive by opening up a possibility that lethal weapons which were so much more dangerous in Frankish than in Pactyan hands might, in the event, be banned by a Modern Western Democracy's crypto-Christian conscience, instead of being recklessly misused in the Ishmaelistic warfare which the still unredeemedly barbarous Pathan was prone to wage with the deadliest weapons that he knew how to employ.

It was still more disconcerting to see the self-same selection of Western culture-elements that had been made in all innocence by the untutored Pathan being made likewise by a sophisticated Chinese whose high state of indigenous culture, at the time in his history when he encountered the Late Modern West, debarred him from pleading the mitigating circumstances that could be pleaded on behalf of his East Iranian barbarian contemporary.

'There is . . . in the process of Westernisation in China a play of fashion which often appears irresponsible to Westerners, because random and unconvinced. Western standards, far from being considered admirable in themselves, are all suspect and feared as "soulless", because inimical to the spirit of China. Accordingly there appears to be, very often, in the course of adaptation to Western standards, a difficulty in distinguishing between the mechanics of any given process and the spirit that informs the process. In this way attempts are often made to take over a method without adopting the spirit of the society in which the method was originally developed, and of which it was the natural fruit. Perhaps the most striking illustration of this type of contradiction is to be found in the adoption on a large scale of Western armaments with the minimum adoption of the Western style in warfare. In the same way, when there is a question of handing over to Chinese control any enterprise originally developed by foreigners, the least of the difficulties is that of training a technical staff. The true crisis comes when, with the full assertion of Chinese control, a standard of enterprise and responsible direction based on adaptation is substituted for one based on assertion.'

These illustrations of the working of our 'law' that the carrying-power of a detached culture-element in process of radiation is apt to be in inverse ratio to its spiritual value point to a conclusion at which we have arrived by a different road in an earlier context.<sup>2</sup> The transmission of the superficial elements of a culture, in isolation from the essence of this radioactive culture's core, is as precarious as it is facile, whereas the

of Christianity itself. This tragi-comically erroneous identification, which was one of the characteristic illusions of Western men of good will in the writer's age, led a distinguished contemporary and friend of the writer's, who, like the writer, paid his first visit to Shanghai in A.D. 1929, to indulge in the unwarranted and unfulfilled expectation that the British complexion of the municipal administration of the International Settlement in the soulless city would serve to educate the Chinese World of the day in both the practice and the principles of Modern Western ethics by initiating Chinese politicians into the neo-pagan mysteries of Modern Western constitutional government. This Modern Western political idealist showed himself to be a true prophet in divining and proclaiming the truth that the Western institution of parliamentary government was built on a rock of ethical principle. The reason why his hopes for China were disappointed was because he had failed to bear in mind the more fundamental truth that the Western World's political morality was a moon which shone only with a borrowed and reflected light, and that the sun of Christianity, which was the ultimate source of this pale political illumination, was a luminary whose radiance was, not political, but religious.

<sup>1</sup> Lattimore, Owen: *Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict* (New York 1932, Macmillan), pp. 153-4.

<sup>2</sup> In V. v. 201.

religious quintessence of a radioactive culture, which penetrates an alien body social only with extreme difficulty, and even then at an extremely slow pace, is capable, if and when it does work its way into this alien body's heart, of producing a spiritually deeper effect on the recipient society's life than the sum of all the radioactive society's merely artistic or intellectual or linguistic or political or economic radiation when these superficial elements are transmitted apart from the religious life-blood of the migrant culture's heart.

## E. THE CONSEQUENCES OF ENCOUNTERS BETWEEN CONTEMPORARIES

### (I) AFTERMATHS OF UNSUCCESSFUL ASSAULTS

#### (a) EFFECTS ON THE FORTUNES OF THE ASSAULTED PARTY

THE effect of an encounter between contemporaries on the life of both parties is apt to be a disturbing one—and this even for a party which, at the time of the encounter, is not yet in process of disintegration but is still in growth. Even in the least untoward possible circumstances the psychological shock produced by a collision between conflicting civilizations may have consequences of a gravity that is illustrated by the fates of two societies which, while still in growth, had each repelled a formidable assault triumphantly.

The Hellenic Society, as we have seen, reacted magnificently to its ordeal in the years 480–479 B.C. It succeeded in repulsing an onslaught delivered by a Syriac Society whose forces were united at the time under the oecumenical sovereignty of the Achaemenian Empire; and the first perceptible social effect of this military and political triumph was to give Hellenism a stimulus to which it responded by bursting into flower in every field of activity.

‘The vastness of the forces employed in the expedition of Xerxes King of Persia against Hellas cast the shadow of a terrible danger over the Hellenic Society. The stakes for which the Hellenes were called upon to fight were slavery or freedom, while the fact that the Hellenic communities in Asia had already been enslaved created a presumption in every mind that the communities in Hellas itself would experience the same fate. When, however, the war resulted, contrary to expectation, in its amazing issue, the inhabitants of Hellas found themselves not only relieved from the dangers which had threatened them but possessed, in addition, of honour and glory, while every Hellenic community was filled with such affluence that the whole World was astonished at the completeness with which the situation had been reversed. During the half-century that followed this epoch, Hellas made vast strides in prosperity. . . . In the forefront of all, Athens achieved such triumphs of glory and prowess that her name won almost world-wide renown.’<sup>1</sup>

Yet, within less than fifty years of the momentous encounter whose cultural outcome was this Attic flowering of Hellenism, the political outcome of the same encounter came to a climax in a disaster which Hellas first failed to avert and then failed to retrieve; and the root of her post-Salaminian political disaster was the same sudden brilliant emergence of Athens which had likewise been the root of the post-Salaminian outburst of Hellenic cultural achievement.

In other contexts<sup>2</sup> we have noticed that, in the age of Hellenic history preceding the Achaemenids’ epoch-making attempt to incorporate the

<sup>1</sup> Diodorus of Agrigum: *A Library of Universal History*, Book XII, chaps. 1–21, quoted in full in II. ii. 109.

<sup>2</sup> See, for instance, I. i. 24–25 and III. iii. 122.

whole of the Hellenic World into their oecumenical empire, Hellas had accomplished an economic revolution through which she had enabled herself to maintain a growing population within a no-longer expanding domain by substituting a new economic régime of specialization and interdependence for an old one in which each single Hellenic city-state, and indeed each single village within each civic territory, had been living as an economically autonomous unit providing for its own subsistence by producing at home all the staple products that it required. In this economic revolution in Hellas in the sixth century B.C., Athens had played a decisively creative part;<sup>1</sup> but the resulting new economic régime of interdependence could not be maintained unless it could be housed within the framework of a new political régime of the same order, while on the other hand it could not with impunity be allowed to collapse for lack of being reinforced by its requisite political complement, since this new economic régime of interdependence had no sooner been achieved than it had become indispensable to Hellas in virtue of its being her sole practicable response to the challenge of finding her aggressive geographical expansion brought to a halt by a successful resistance on the part of her neighbours and competitors in the Mediterranean Basin.<sup>2</sup> Before the close of the sixth century B.C. some form of political unification to match the accomplished fact of economic interdependence had thus become the Hellenic World's most urgent social need; and during the half century ending in the ordeal of 480-479 B.C. it had looked as if the solution of this common Hellenic problem would be found for Hellas—if it was to be found by any Hellenic community—not by the Athens of Solon and Peisistratus but by the Sparta of Chilon and Cleomenes I.

During those fifty years Sparta had been giving a promising lead towards political unification by helping the economically progressive Continental European Greek city-states in the neighbourhood of the Isthmus of Corinth to throw off the despotic governments that had been the Hellenic economic revolution's local political concomitants, and then bringing the communities that had thus been liberated from a domestic tyranny into an easy-going political association with the liberator Power. The Achaemenian Empire's lowering threat to engulf European Greece could perhaps be converted into a blessing in disguise for Hellas if the imperative requirements of self-defence in an impending military struggle against a gigantic alien aggressor were to impel her children to achieve the political unification which her economic transformation was now imperatively demanding; and, incidentally, Hellas' immediate crying need might prove a heaven-sent opportunity for Sparta, if she could rise to the occasion by uniting under her military and political leadership the whole of the still unsubjugated European half of the Hellenic World, as she had already united European Greece's Peloponnesian extremity. Unhappily, in this crisis with which Hellas was confronted by Darius's fateful resolve to bring European as well as Asiatic Greece under Achaemenian rule,<sup>3</sup> Sparta left it to Athens to play the

<sup>1</sup> See II. ii. 38-42.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 430-5, above.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 423-9, above.



*beau rôle*;<sup>1</sup> and, in consequence, the Hellenic World's exhilarating experience in 480-479 B.C. of a deadly danger triumphantly surmounted not only failed, after all, to bring with it for her the boon of political unification under the universally accepted hegemony of a single Hellenic Power,<sup>2</sup> but actually placed athwart her path towards unification an obstacle which her children failed thereafter to surmount.

<sup>1</sup> The sublimity of Leonidas' and his three hundred fellow Lacedaemonians' personal self-sacrifice in their forlorn hope at Thermopylae in 480 B.C. was more than offset, in Sparta's mural account with Hellas, by the political selfishness and strategic fatuousness of the Lacedaemonian Government's contemporary public policy. A Power which, in the crisis of 490 B.C., had ignominiously failed to put in an appearance on the battlefield of Marathon until after the Achaemenian expeditionary force had been repulsed by the Athenians and Plataeans single-handed, ran true to form in the greater crisis of 480 B.C., when Sparta refused to stake the whole of her magnificent infantry on trying to hold the pass of Tempe, or even the pass of Thermopylae, in concert with Athens' magnificent navy. The example shown to Hellas at Thermopylae by Leonidas and his token force was the soldiers' deed and not their Government's. While Leonidas and his companions were sacrificing their lives, the Lacedaemonian Government's one idea was to look after the parochial interests of Laconia and her Peloponnesian neighbours by fortifying the Isthmus of Corinth; and, in compromising their country's honour by staking her existence on this poor-spirited plan, they do not appear to have reflected that, in thus abandoning Attica as well as the central and northern sections of Continental European Greece, they were virtually inviting the Athenians to capitulate to the invader and were thereby doing their worst to deprive themselves of the assistance of the Athenian Navy, without which the Peloponnese would have been indefensible. If, after the Persians' break-through at Thermopylae, the Athenians had shown the same uninspired common sense as was shown by the Thebans, the Athenian Navy would either have gone out of action or would have changed sides, and in either of these events the Peloponnesians' Isthmian wall would have been outflanked by the naval operations of an irresistibly superior enemy sea-power without any need for the land-troops of the Achaemenian expeditionary force to attempt to storm the Isthmus by a frontal attack. The situation was saved for the Peloponnese, as well as for Hellas as a whole, by the Athenians' decision, in this supreme emergency, to emulate the heroism of a Spartan Leonidas whose own Government had failed to catch the hero's inspiration. By summoning up the fortitude to keep the sea after the enemy's occupation of their country and devastation of their city, the Athenians won for Hellas her decisive naval victory at Salamis.

Even after Athens had thus saved the Peloponnese at Salamis in 480 B.C., the Lacedaemonian Government managed nevertheless to come within an ace of losing the war for Hellas after all in 479 B.C. by threatening to 'miss the bus' for Plataea as they had previously 'missed the bus' for Marathon; and, in the event, the Hellenic victory at Plataea, like the Hellenic feat of arms at Thermopylae, was a soldiers' battle and not an achievement of generalship or statesmanship, as far as the Lacedaemonians were concerned. Moreover, the Lacedaemonian soldier's magnificent faithfulness to his traditional standards of military honour and prowess was offset after the Battle of Plataea, once again, by disgraceful conduct in high places. The Lacedaemonian Government's cowardice after Thermopylae was eclipsed after Plataea by the treachery of the Lacedaemonian commander under whose official auspices the victory had been won. When it came, in the next phase of the war, to carrying the hostilities into Achaemenian territory for the purpose of liberating those Hellenic communities that had been under Achaemenian rule before 480 B.C., the Spartan Regent Pausanias demonstrated his own imperviousness to the inspiration of his uncle King Leonidas by surrendering unconditionally to the temptation of allowing himself to be dazzled by a signally defeated Achaemenian Imperial Majesty's tinsel sheen of pomp and circumstance. In the act of disgracing himself by losing his head and becoming a renegade, Pausanias lost for his country the leadership in the war for the liberation of the Asiatic Hellenes from an Achaemenian yoke.

<sup>2</sup> The indispensability of a centralization of leadership in the hands of a single Power, as a condition for the achievement of political unity, must have been impressed on Hellenic minds in the generation of the Great Helleno-Persian War by a then still painfully recent Hellenic experience. Less than fifty years before 480 B.C. a long-sustained Hellenic campaign of aggression against the Hellenes' Phoenician competitors in the Western Mediterranean had been effectively arrested by a union of the Libyphoenician city-states under the hegemony of Carthage (see pp. 426-9, above). The opportunity that the Carthaginians had thus seized when the challenge of Hellenic aggression had presented it was now being offered by the challenge of Achaemenian aggression to

Instead of leaving Sparta the unchallenged leader of a Pan-Hellenic confederacy, the ordeal of 480-479 B.C. liberated Asiatic Greece from Achaemenian rule only to leave the Hellenic World as a whole formidably divided in its political allegiance between a Sparta who had not discredited herself so seriously as to forfeit the goodwill of her pre-war Peloponnesian allies and an Athens who had not distinguished herself so irresistibly as to overcome the repugnance of her post-war insular and Asiatic satellites to their exchange of a Persian domination for an Athenian hegemony. This division of Hellas into two mutually hostile camps was a consequence of the impact of her encounter with the Achaemenian Empire on her problem of transcending her own political parochialism; and this domestic outcome of her victorious repulse of Darius's and Xerxes' assault proved in retrospect to have been a fatal turning-point in her history when she met with the fall that overtakes every house that remains stubbornly divided against itself.<sup>1</sup> The opposing camps eventually drifted into the Atheno-Peloponnesian War, and the outbreak of that war signified the breakdown of the Hellenic Civilization.

The plight of political polarization that was the portentous price of the Hellenic Society's victory in its military encounter with a Syriac universal state in the shape of the Achaemenian Empire was likewise the fate by which the Hellenic World's successor, Orthodox Christendom, was overtaken in the sequel to this civilization's still more amazing victory, in the hour of its own birth, over a Syriac universal state that had been re-established in the seventh century of the Christian Era in the shape of the Arab Caliphate.<sup>2</sup> On the morrow of the defeat of the Arabs' attempt to take Constantinople in A.D. 673-7, an Orthodox Christendom which had purchased by this victory the possibility of coming to life came within an ace of committing suicide when an Anatolic and an Armeniac army corps threatened to engage in a fratricidal struggle for supremacy which would have been as fatal for Orthodox Christendom as the struggle between Sparta and Athens had been for Hellas.

Orthodox Christendom was saved from this fate by the genius of her Emperors Leo III and his son Constantine V;<sup>3</sup> by the *union sacrée* which was forced upon her Anatolic and Armeniac rival champions when the Arab offensive was resumed in A.D. 716-18; and by the abiding and compelling memory of a Roman Empire which had been the master institution of an antecedent Hellenic Society in the last phase of its history. The hold of this memory upon Orthodox Christian hearts and minds made it possible for Leo and Constantine to persuade the two rival army corps to liquidate their feud by agreeing with one accord to merge themselves in a unitary East Roman Empire that made an irresistible appeal to their imagination and their loyalty by presenting itself as a Rome risen from the dead.<sup>4</sup> The raising of a ghost, however, is not a means of salvation that can ever be embraced with impunity; and,

Sparta in the Hellenic World in the next chapter of the story of the encounter between a Syriac and a pre-Alexandrine Hellenic Civilization.

<sup>1</sup> Matt. xii. 25; Luke xi. 17.

<sup>2</sup> The historical relation between the Arab Caliphate and the Achaemenian Empire has been tentatively elucidated in I. i. 76-77.

<sup>3</sup> See IV. iv. 341-2.

<sup>4</sup> See II. ii. 368 and III. iii. 276.

in saddling an infant Orthodox Christendom with the incubus of an absolute authoritarian state, Leo Syrus merely postponed her fall without averting it. He saved her from ruining herself in a fratricidal struggle between an Anatolic and an Armeniac army corps in the eighth century of the Christian Era by giving an unfortunate turn to her political development; and this perversion brought its nemesis when, some 250 years later, the breakdown of the Orthodox Christian Civilization duly declared itself in the outbreak of a more terrible fratricidal struggle between an East Roman Empire and Patriarchate on the one side and a Bulgarian Empire and Patriarchate on the other.<sup>1</sup>

If an Orthodox Christian and an Hellenic Society thus each alike eventually succumbed to untoward after-effects of an encounter with an aggressive contemporary after the aggressor had been triumphantly repelled by Hellas in her youth and by Orthodox Christendom in her infancy, we shall not be surprised to find at least as unhappy an effect following from the discomfiture of aggressors by civilizations that have been already in process of disintegration by the time when they have been overtaken by these critical encounters.

We have already taken note of the price for success in arresting Hellenic aggression that was exacted by History from the Libyphoenician colonies of a Syriac Society which had broken down, some four hundred years before, on the morrow of the generation of King Solomon.<sup>2</sup> The price was a spiritually impoverishing régime of self-insulation behind 'a wooden curtain'.<sup>3</sup> We have also observed<sup>4</sup> that the 'hermit empire' which was established in the sixth century B.C. round the Western Basin of the Mediterranean by Carthage had an avatar in the sixteenth century of the Christian Era on the farther side of the Atlantic Ocean round the Spanish Main; and we can now go on to observe that this Spanish reproduction of a perverse Carthaginian institution was the price exacted by History from the Castilians, in their world and age, for their emulation of the Carthaginian feat of arresting the expansion of Hellenism; for, at this same price, the Spaniards in their turn succeeded in arresting the intrusion of their Dutch, English, and French West European neighbours and rivals into the Americas.

In a Japanese offshoot of the Far Eastern Society an Early Modern Western Christendom's attempt to penetrate this alien body social through the peaceful influence of traders and missionaries at the moment of the final paroxysm of a Japanese Time of Troubles was successfully quashed by drastic Japanese counter-measures on the morrow of the establishment of a Japanese universal state; and this Japanese success in expelling and excluding the Portuguese intruders, and in eradicating or driving underground the Tridentine Roman Catholic Christianity which the Jesuits had been planting in a Japanese mission-field, was purchased, like the abortive contemporary Spanish attempt to keep the Spaniards' fellow West European maritime rivals

<sup>1</sup> The chain of historical cause and effect leading from the establishment of the East Roman Empire by Leo III and Constantine V in A.D. 717-75 to the outbreak of the Great Romano-Bulgarian War in A.D. 977 has been traced in II. ii. 368-9 and in IV. iv. 320-408.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 428-9 and 437-8, above.

<sup>3</sup> See I. i. 82 and IV. iv. 67-68.

<sup>4</sup> On pp. 485-6, above.

out of the Americas, at the price of putting a stop to all Japanese activities beyond the coasts of the Japanese Archipelago and converting a politically united Japan into an hermetically sealed Far Eastern counterpart of the less effectually closed Castilian Empire of the Indies.<sup>1</sup>

These Japanese, Spanish, and Libyphoenician examples of the spiritual toll exacted by History from an assaulted society for its success in repulsing its assailant's attack are all dwarfed by the enormity of the latter end of an Egyptiac Civilization which paid for its success in fending off its Hittite assailants in the thirteenth century B.C., and in arresting the avalanche of a post-Minoan Völkerwanderung at the turn of the thirteenth and twelfth centuries, by incurring the doom of Tithonus.<sup>2</sup>

If we now take a synoptic view of the passages of history which we have cited as illustrations in our present inquiry, our survey may suggest certain tentative findings. Without impugning our conclusion, reached in an earlier Part of this Study,<sup>3</sup> that the coroner's verdict on the 'deaths' of civilizations proves invariably to be 'suicide' and not 'murder' in cases in which there is sufficient evidence to warrant a judgement, our present investigation seems to indicate that an assault, even when successfully repulsed, has a seriously disturbing effect on the assaulted party's domestic life, and that this disturbance presents a challenge which—whether prohibitively severe or not—had in fact proved too much for the parties that had been exposed to it in all cases within the knowledge of historians in the sixth decade of the twentieth century of the Christian Era. In the cases in which the victorious assaulted society had been still in its growth-stage at the time of the assault, its failure to respond successfully to the consequent challenge had resulted in its breaking down, while, in the cases in which, at the time, it had already been in disintegration, the penalty of failure to meet the same consequent challenge had been a spiritual catalepsy and a symptomatic social petrification to which the Libyphoenicians, the Creoles, and the Japanese had each succumbed for a spell, and the Egyptiac Society for all the rest of an unnaturally prolonged life-span.

#### (b) EFFECTS ON THE FORTUNES OF THE ASSAILANT

If we now go on to examine the aftermaths of unsuccessful assaults in the subsequent histories of the foiled assailants, we shall find that the consequent challenges have proved severe *a fortiori*.

The Hittites, for example, were, as we have seen, left so desperately weak by their over-exertion in their eventually unsuccessful attempt to conquer the Egyptian Crown's Asiatic possessions in the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries B.C. that they were subsequently submerged by the wave of a post-Minoan Völkerwanderung which the Egyptiac World just managed to roll back from the coast of the Delta—with the consequence that a Hittite Society, which had been still in growth at the time when it

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 316–24, above. The Dutch trading settlement marooned on the islet of Deshima, which was the solitary unsevered link between Japan and the rest of the World during the Tokugawa Age of Japanese history, has been noticed in II. ii. 232–4.

<sup>2</sup> See I. i. 136–46; IV. iv. 84–6; and VI. vii. 49–50.

<sup>3</sup> In IV. iv. 115–19.

succumbed, survived only in the fragmentary form of a cluster of fossil communities astride the Taurus, whereas the Egyptiac Society survived geographically intact in its posthumous state of life-in-death. The aftermath of the Siceliot Greeks' abortive aggression against their Phoenician and Etruscan competitors took the milder form of a political paralysis which did not cripple their artistic and intellectual activities.

As we have noticed in another context,<sup>1</sup> the exigencies of a long-drawn-out losing battle against the counter-offensive of a Libyphoenician World, that had effectively united its own forces under a Carthaginian single command, constrained the hard-pressed Siceliots to sacrifice their cherished local city-state sovereignties and liberties by allowing themselves to be brigaded under the yokes of military despotisms; but the Siceliots in the fifth, fourth, and third centuries B.C., like the Italians in the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries of the Christian Era,<sup>2</sup> condemned themselves to have the worst of both worlds by failing to go beyond half-measures. Instead of emulating their Libyphoenician antagonists' rewarding sixth-century achievement of an enduring political unity under the hegemony of a single one of their number, the Siceliots never achieved more than local and temporary consolidations of political and military power which deprived them of the boons of national independence and domestic freedom without sufficing to recapture for them the upper hand in their conflict with the Carthaginian Empire; and in the last chapter of the story, when they were within an ace of being totally subjugated by the remorseless advance of this semi-Hellenized Syriac counter-aggressor, they were saved only at the cost of having to exchange the ineffective rule of their home-grown parochial despots for the potent dominion of a Hellenized barbarian Great Power. Rome not only stemmed the Carthaginian attack on the Hellenic World; she banished this Carthaginian peril once for all by breaking through a 'wooden curtain' that had proved impenetrable for over 250 years, and sweeping the Carthaginian Empire off the map. In the Romano-Punic Wars the Romans attained an Hellenic objective which had always eluded the Siceliot Greek despots' aim, in virtue of a Roman genius for empire-building that utterly outranged the shorter-sighted political vision of the Deinomenidae and Dionysii.

If the aftermath of an unsuccessful assault on a contemporary society proved to be as serious as this for a Hittite and an Hellenic World which were both still in process of growth at the time of their fateful encounters with an Egyptian neighbour in the one case and with a Libyphoenician neighbour in the other, it is not surprising to find disaster overtaking the main body of a Syriac World which had tried and failed to make itself mistress of Hellas at a stage of Syriac history at which the disintegration of a broken-down society had arrived at its *ultima ratio*, a universal state. In an earlier chapter of this Part of our Study<sup>3</sup> we have watched the Achaemenian hybris that had inveigled Darius the First into his decision to annex European Greece duly bringing its nemesis in the overthrow of Darius the Last by Alexander of Macedon.

<sup>1</sup> In III. iii. 357, n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> On pp. 430-7, above.

<sup>3</sup> See III. iii. 354-7.



## (II) AFTERMATHS OF SUCCESSFUL ASSAULTS

## (a) EFFECTS ON THE BODY SOCIAL

1. *Symptoms in the Social Life of the Assailant*

We have observed<sup>1</sup> that, in encounters between contemporaries in which 'the agent's' impact on 'the reagent' has resulted in a successful penetration of the assaulted body social by the assailant's cultural radiation, the two parties to the encounter usually prove to have been already in process of disintegration by the time when the interaction between them had begun; and we have also observed<sup>2</sup> that one of the criteria of disintegration is the schism of the body social of a disintegrating society into a minority that has come to be merely dominant instead of being creative and a proletariat that has come to be morally alienated from *ci-devant* leaders who have turned into changeling masters. This social schism is likely to have occurred already in the body social of a society whose cultural radiation is successfully penetrating the body social of one of its neighbours; and the social symptom that is the most signal consequence of this always untoward and often undesired social success is an aggravation of the problem which the secession of an internal proletariat presents to a dominant minority in any case. A proletariat is intrinsically an awkward element in a society, even when it is a purely home-grown product; but its awkwardness is sharply accentuated if its numerical strength is reinforced, and its cultural complexion is variegated, by an intake of alien man-power; and this is the penalty which a successfully aggressive society is bound to pay—and the revenge which its successfully assaulted victim is able to take.

In a previous chapter of this Part<sup>3</sup> we have noticed the efforts of Roman, Hapsburg, and American statesmanship to stem this insidious counterflow of cultural influence; but our earlier survey of the growth and composition of an Hellenic and a Western internal proletariat<sup>4</sup> is a commentary on the futility of attempting to arrest the subtle progress of a culture-ray by placing athwart its path the coarse-grained fabric of a political bulkhead. *Iam pridem Syrus in Tiberim defluxit Orontes*<sup>5</sup> would have been as true a verdict on the efficacy of the Hapsburg Imperial-Royal Government's phobia in A.D. 1915-18 against further annexations of Orthodox-Christian-inhabited territories, or on the efficacy of the United States immigration restriction acts of A.D. 1921 and A.D. 1924 and A.D. 1952, as it was on the efficacy of Augustus's reluctance to increase the relative strength of the Oriental element in the population and the culture of the Roman Empire by salvaging for a post-Alexandrine Hellenism her lost Oriental dominions east of Euphrates.

In a Modern Western World that had made itself literally world-wide by radiating its influence over the whole habitable surface of the Earth, not only the Orontes but the Ganges and the Yangtse had discharged into the Thames and the Hudson, while the Danube had performed the

<sup>1</sup> On p. 507, above.<sup>2</sup> In V. v. 58-194.<sup>3</sup> On pp. 510-14, above.<sup>4</sup> See V. v. 58-82 and 152-94.<sup>5</sup> Juvenal: *Satires*, No. III, l. 62, quoted in V. v. 67.

more sensational miracle of reversing the direction of its flow in order to deposit a cultural alluvium of Ruman and Serb and Bulgar and Greek proselytes up-stream in a Viennese melting-pot. *Si testimonium requiris*, was not the evidence printed *in extenso* and made public in the telephone directories of Vienna<sup>1</sup> and Paris and London and New York and Chicago and a host of lesser cities in the European and American provinces of a Western Society's homeland? And did not these endless columns of close print, bristling with outlandish non-Western surnames, attest the advent, in a twentieth-century Westernizing World, of the blight of promiscuity<sup>2</sup> that had been demoralizing a Hellenizing World in Juvenal's day?

The social price that a successfully aggressive civilization has to pay is a seepage of its alien victims' exotic culture into the lifestream of the aggressor society's internal proletariat and a proportionate widening of the moral gulf that already yawns between this alienated proletariat and a would-be dominant minority.

## 2. *Symptoms in the Social Life of the Assaulted Party*

### (a) *'One Man's Meat is Another Man's Poison'*

The effects of a successful assault on the body social of the assaulted party are more complex, without being less pernicious, than the corresponding effects on the body social of the victim's victorious assailant. On the one hand we shall find that a culture-element which has been harmless or actually beneficial in the body social in which it is at home is apt to produce novel and devastating effects in an alien body in which it has lodged itself as an exotic and isolated intruder. On the other hand we shall find that, when once an isolated exotic culture-element has thus succeeded in forcing an entry into the life of an assaulted society, and in holding its ground in this occupied alien territory, it tends to draw in after it other elements of the same provenance with which the lone pioneer element has been associated in its and their original common home. It will be convenient to examine the working of these two apparent 'laws' of cultural radiation-and-reception in the order in which we have just introduced them; and, in considering first the 'law' that a culture-element which has been harmless at home is apt to work havoc if it is isolated and exported, we may begin by observing that the operation of this law is familiar to us in the realms of Physical Life and Inanimate Nature.

It is, for example, one of the common experiences of every-day physical life that this or that individual human being may have a digestive system that is peculiar in being 'allergic' to foods that are standing dishes in his society's staple diet; and, in the intercourse between one society and another, it is notorious that alcoholic drinks which may have a comparatively innocuous effect upon members of a society in which the use of alcohol is customary may prove deadly when introduced into a society in which strong drink has previously been unknown. In a Westernizing World this had been the effect of the spirituous liquors

<sup>1</sup> See VI. vii. 235, n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> See V. v. 439-568.

imported by Western Christian traders on the health of the native peoples of West Africa and North America; and what had been true of the 'fire-water' that was 'the Paleface's' familiar spirit had been likewise true of the infectious diseases that were his commonplace maladies. A whooping-cough that was a mild complaint when it attacked a Western child, and no worse than an unpleasant ordeal when it attacked a Western adult, might decimate or even exterminate the population of a Polynesian island never previously exposed to attack by a germ whose chosen vessel had been Western Man; and in the writer's generation the operation of the same law in the realm of Inanimate Nature had been shown up in a ghastly light by a horrifying practical application of post-Modern Western Man's intellectually magnificent theoretical feat of discerning the structure of the Atom. The discovery of 'the know-how' for manufacturing atomic bombs and the consequent employment of these unprecedentedly potent weapons in a world war had brought home even to the least scientifically instructed mind of the day the terrifying potentialities of a physical element which was harmlessly or even usefully inert so long as the electron-components of its atoms were duly gravitating round their atomic nucleus in the pattern of atomic structure that had been normal in the physical 'make-up' of this planet during the aeon in which it had been serving as a home for living creatures. The fate of Hiroshima and Nagasaki had demonstrated that a hitherto innocuous substance might become explosive to a degree that would be lethal for all life within range when human ingenuity had learnt the trick of stripping an atom's sun-like nucleus of the electrons that were its planet-like satellites. The disastrous human consequences of this audacious technological feat had been foreshadowed in the Hellenic myths of the unleashing of Aeolus's wind-bag<sup>1</sup> and the opening of Pandora's box.<sup>2</sup>

In this latter-day atomic exposition of our law the explanation of this law's working was manifest. The latent physical energy, of a deadly potency, that was released through the splitting of an atom, had been kept in store in the intact structure of the integral atom through being neutralized there by an equilibrium of forces that was an expression, in terms of force, of the atom's structural pattern. It will be seen that, in the integral atom, the destructive potentialities of the constituents had been held in check by an inanimate equivalent of the sociality which was the working constitution of Physical as well as Spiritual Life. This relation of interdependence and consequent reciprocal obligation between the cells composing a living body and the organism constituted by these components was indeed the elixir of Life—as was demonstrated by the deadliness of the cancer by which a living organism was afflicted whenever any of its cells sought to live just for and by themselves without regard to the social reciprocity which was the necessary condition of survival for body and cells alike.

This law governing the cells' relations with the whole organism and with one another was also operative in their relations with foreign

<sup>1</sup> *Odyssey*, Book X, ll. 19-55.

<sup>2</sup> *Hesiod: Works and Days*, ll. 42-105, especially ll. 83-104.

organic substances, whether dead or alive. The unlucky individual for whom his neighbours' meat was poison was plagued with this personal infirmity owing to some peculiarity in the chemical composition of his body's gastric juices which produced a dyspeptic chemical reaction when these juices encountered the particular food to which this particular individual was 'allergic'—in contrast to the eupeptic reaction produced in a normal stomach by an encounter between exactly the same food and a battery of gastric juices of the standard brew. In the more fateful battles between a living organism's defence-force of soldier-cells and the hostile intrusive germs whose invasion was diagnosed by medical practitioners as one of the recognized diseases, the reason why an identical disease was sometimes apt to be more serious for adults than for children, or vice versa, was presumably because, at different ages, the assaulted organism's defensive equipment for opposing the attack of an identical aggressor would vary according to the stage of life in which the victim of the attack happened to be caught by his assailant, with the consequence that the transitions from one age to another would be accompanied by variations in the relative strength of the combatants in this warfare between bacteria and phagocytes.

On the same view of an ailing human body as the battlefield of two opposing armies, we can also see why the effects of an identical disease on different victims should differ in the degree of their severity when the difference between the victims was not the difference in age between children and adults within the bosom of the same society but the difference in experience and expectation between members of a society in which the disease in question had long been endemic and members of another society which had hitherto been exempt from this particular malady. In a society in which a disease was rife, the white corpuscles in the body of every living human being would have been stimulated, exercised, and trained by their experience of repeated past encounters with a perennial invader to be perpetually on the alert for a fresh attack, and to meet this attack, when it came, with a vigour and skill inspired by an awareness of a familiar enemy's special points of strength and weakness. By contrast, the identically constituted white corpuscles in the bodies of members of a society which this identical disease was visiting for the first time would be apt to succumb to an unfamiliar aggressor whose attack would have taken them by surprise and whose armaments and tactics would have been novel to them.

It will now have become apparent that our 'law' to the effect that 'one man's meat is another man's poison' represents, in the province of external relations between one individual or society and another, the local operation of a law of wider currency which we have already observed in action in the province of an individual's or society's internal affairs.<sup>1</sup> In studying what happens in the domestic life of a society when a fresh dynamic force asserts itself—or a fresh creative movement starts—from within, we have seen that this new event is bound to be a challenge to the existing pattern of culture-elements which is the basis of the society's present state of health, and that this challenge cannot be ignored

<sup>1</sup> See IV. iv. 133-7.

with impunity. In the new situation that the new event has produced, social health can be preserved only through an adjustment of the old pattern to accommodate the new feature, and this adjustment is tantamount to a replacement of the old pattern by a new one, or, in other words, to a thorough-going reconstruction of this particular social universe.<sup>1</sup>

The penalty for ignoring the necessity of making this adjustment, or for seeking to evade it, is either a revolution, in which the new-born dynamic force shatters a traditional culture-pattern that has proved too rigid to afford it accommodation, or else an enormity engendered by the introduction of the new force's demonic driving-power into the structure of an obstinately rigid culture-pattern whose fabric has proved tough enough to withstand the new force's unprecedentedly powerful pressure. It will be seen that the encounter between a new culture-element and an old culture-pattern is always governed by the same law, whether the new element happens to emerge from within or to impinge from outside. In both these variations on a dramatic situation which is the same in both cases in the last analysis, the introduction of the new element condemns the old pattern, *ipso facto*, to undergo a change either in its structure or in its working; and, except in so far as this inexorable summons of new life is effectively met by an evolutionary adjustment of the culture-pattern's structure, the potentially creative and life-giving visitant will actually deal deadly destruction. Its admonition is: 'See, I have set before thee this day Life and Good, and Death and Evil';<sup>2</sup> αἰτία ἐλομένου Θεὸς ἀνάτιος.<sup>3</sup>

In the present place we are concerned with the situation in which the challenging visitant for whom accommodation has to be found if he is not to turn a sleepy heaven into a lively hell is an alien intruder who has taken the kingdom by force;<sup>4</sup> and, unlike the new-born babe who subverts the kingdom from within, the dark invader is an adult who, before Fate cast him for his present cruel role of a miserable *déraciné* and a militant 'displaced person', has enjoyed a previous existence as the comfortable law-abiding citizen of another kingdom where he has been an Israel and not an Ishmael.

Sociality is a facile virtue for an autochthonous son of the soil who possesses a legal domicile as his birthright and who has been brought up into a social system of reciprocal rights and duties which, when the budding citizen was at his formative age, was a going concern hallowed by tradition and tested by experience. This fortunate son of the house finds himself born into a social milieu where he has a *raison d'être* for his existence and a legitimate outlet for his energies in so far as these are directed to socially valuable aims, while, in so far as his aims are socially undesirable, they are prevented from running amok by a salutary system of constitutional checks and balances. But, when Fate transfigures a

<sup>1</sup> In II. i. 277-99 we have noticed the service performed by the Devil in constraining God to resume His work of creation, and thus enabling God to break the deadlock that is the nemesis of the perfection of His workmanship. <sup>2</sup> Deut. xxx. 15.

<sup>3</sup> 'The choice is the chooser's responsibility; God is not responsible' (Plato: *Republic*, Book X, 617 E), quoted previously in IV. iv. 465.

<sup>4</sup> Matt. xi. 12; cp. Luke xvi. 16.



Minoan Rhadamanthus into a Philistine Goliath, or an inoffensive Jewish denizen of the Pale, whose heart and head have been dedicated to the interpretation and observance of the Mosaic Law, into a Zionist *sicarius* blessing the Lord his strength, which teacheth his hands to war and his fingers to fight,<sup>1</sup> this demoralizing metamorphosis brings bane to the Holy Land; and a simile taken from two episodes in the history of Palestine may help us to understand how it is possible for a culture-element that has played the good citizen's part in the culture-pattern in which it is at home to behave like an outlaw<sup>2</sup> when it has been uprooted from its native soil, been divorced from its former associates, and been driven into exile in a strange and hostile land. The isolated vagrant culture-element plays havoc in the foreign body where it lodges because the diffraction that has sundered it from its native setting has, at one stroke, deprived it of its previous *raison d'être* and released it from the discipline of its previous counterweights and antidotes.

Examples of this devastating play of an expatriated culture-element invading an alien social milieu have already come to our notice in our survey of encounters between contemporaries in a previous portion of this Part.<sup>3</sup>

We have noticed, for instance, some of the tragedies that had been inflicted in the course of fourteen centuries on divers non-Western societies by the impact of the Western World's peculiar political institution. The essential feature of the Western political ideology had been its insistence on taking as its principle of political association the physical accident of geographical propinquity, instead of finding the basis for a sense of political solidarity in a spiritual affinity of the kind that is both reflected in and fostered by a community of religious observances and beliefs. At the genesis of a Western Christian Society out of a post-Hellenic social interregnum we have seen<sup>4</sup> the emergence of this distinctively Western political ideal in Visigothia in the sixth and seventh centuries of the Christian Era make life impossible for a local Jewish diaspora when this incompatible Gentile ideal collided with the system of non-territorial autonomy within an ecclesiastical framework that the Jewish diaspora had inherited from its Syriac past. In contrast to the new Western ideology of political, social, and cultural *Gleichschaltung* within the arbitrarily drawn frontiers of some barbarian successor-state

<sup>1</sup> Psalm cxliv. i.

<sup>2</sup> 'Individuals who have become severed from their background are restless, unsatisfied, often desperate creatures, pursued by stinging, reckless impulses. . . . The individual who has been prised away from his collective background usually manifests symptoms parallel to those found among migrating hordes. The recklessness which so easily spreads throughout an unorganized, migrating mass is a terrifying one. A gold-rush, an invading or retreating army in a foreign land, an exodus of people in the mass—all have certain characteristics in common, namely a dangerous lowering of responsibility towards human life and property and a sub-human, unthinking urgency which, like a river in spate, tends to overrun and destroy everything in its path. Man is not the only animal prone to moods of recklessness: all migrating animals moving in vast hordes, as, for instance, the lemmings of the Arctic Circle, salmon, locusts, caterpillars, and, to a certain degree, migratory birds and mammals when moving *en masse*, are inspired by an almost suicidal recklessness quite foreign to their normal adapted character' (Baynes, H. G.: *Mythology of the Soul: A Research into the Unconscious from Schizophrenic Dreams and Drawings* (London 1940, Baillière, Tindall & Cox; 1949, Methuen), p. 460).

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 106-453, above.

<sup>4</sup> On pp. 277-80, above.

of the Roman Empire, the Syriac millet system was, as we have observed, a practical solution, worked out in response to experience, for the problem presented to statesmanship by the geographical intermingling of different communities with one another. In ignoring the problem and attempting to iron the local Jewish millet out of existence by subjecting its members to political, economic, and psychological pressure of an inhuman degree of severity, the rulers of Visigothia inflicted anguish on the Jews at the price of disgrace and eventual disaster for the bigot Power itself.

The havoc worked by a nascent Western political ideology in a seventh-century Visigothia began to afflict the World outside the narrow West European homeland of Western Christendom after the opening of the Modern Age of Western history, when a puissant wave of Modern Western cultural influence carried with it into one quarter after another of the habitable surface of the planet a peculiar Western political ideology which was now keyed-up to an unprecedented pitch of fanatical intensity by the impact of the new spirit of Democracy upon the old Western institution of Territorial Sovereignty embodied in parochial states.<sup>1</sup>

For anyone who happened to have been born and brought up in Western Europe since the eruption of this Modern Western Democracy, the concept of Territorial Nationality was, no doubt, something self-evident. Every West European would be familiar with his own nation, and he would have little difficulty in defining it as being the population of a continuous and clearly demarcated block of territory whose inhabitants were united by the common possession of a distinctive social heritage and by a common membership in a single sovereign independent body politic in which this social heritage had found its political expression. In the social heritage of a West European nation a common national language was apt to be one of the salient distinctive features; and, though this linguistic expression of nationality was not to be found in every West European nation's cultural 'make-up', it counted for much, when it was present (as it usually was), in the evocation and the maintenance of a nation's political consciousness.

All this was taken for granted by West Europeans, simply because, in Western Europe, national heritages, including national languages, happened for the most part to be distributed geographically in separate and severally self-contained blocks, on the pattern of a patchwork quilt, with the consequence that the local political allegiances of the peoples of Western Europe had crystallized, in the course of West European history, in this geographical formation. The political life of Western Europe had set hard on this locally not unnatural and, on the whole, not unsatisfactory basis before another combination of historical causes had happened to give these now national-minded peoples of Western Europe a temporary ascendancy over the rest of the World; and these two chains of historical development combined to invest a latter-day West European political institution with an imposing prestige in alien social milieux where this institution was not indigenous. These alien

<sup>1</sup> See IV, iv, 156-67.

peoples admired, or at any rate envied, the Modern West Europeans' political success, and they assumed that the distinctive West European political ideology of Nationalism had been the cause of it. The West European institution of the Parochial National State was taken by these politically less successful proselytes for a talisman that would automatically confer political efficiency and power on any people who appropriated it; and, with this simple-minded expectation, they hastened to adopt this West European Nationalism without pausing to consider whether the effect that it had produced in its native environment was likely to be reproduced in an alien social setting.

This line of reasoning and action, of course, was not only naïve but was fallacious on more than one account. In the first place the West European social setting which had given birth to the political ideal of Territorial Nationalism was a peculiar local milieu which was an exception, not the rule, in the World as a whole. In Western Europe, where this Territorial Nationalism had originated, it was a natural dispensation in the sense that there it had been a spontaneous growth answering on the political plane to the underlying local pattern of human geography. In the second place the West European peoples had never been pedantic or fanatical in pushing this native and locally natural political ideal of theirs to extremes. The common sense of the West European peoples, as well as the abnormality of the West European social milieu, was one of the keys to an explanation of the contrast between the comparative innocuousness of the principle of Territorial Nationality in its West European home and the havoc that it worked when it was recklessly introduced into alien social milieux by proselytes who were condemned to be doctrinaires because they were following an exotic political theory whose practical application had never come within the range of their own ancestral experience. Since the linguistic aspect of West European Nationalism was the feature that leapt to an alien eye, the pedantry of these doctrinaire nationalists *in partibus alienis* fastened upon this, and, in doing so, made a most unfortunate departure from traditional West European native practice by finding the criterion of Nationality in the shibboleth of Language.

We have indeed observed already in another context<sup>1</sup> that Modern Western Nationalism was comparatively innocuous in its West European birthplace, where, for the most part, it took the political map as it found it, and was content to utilize the existing parochial states, within their established frontiers, as its crucibles for the decoction of its intoxicating political brew of psychic energy. Its noxious potentialities revealed themselves on alien ground where, so far from consecrating the frontiers which it found on the map, this aggressive exotic political ideology denounced them in the name of the explosive academic proposition that all persons who happened to be speakers of this or that vernacular language had a natural right to be united politically with one another in a single sovereign independent national state and therefore had a moral obligation to sacrifice their own and their neighbours' welfare, happiness, and life itself in the pursuit of this pedantic political

<sup>1</sup> In IV. iv. 185-90.

programme. This linguistic interpretation—or caricature—of the West European ideology of Nationalism was never taken *au pied de la lettre* in the West European countries themselves, since here the external bond provided by community of speech was always recognized as being merely one among divers outward signs of an inward sense of political solidarity springing from common political experiences, institutions, and ideals.

The national unity of the French nation, or the British nation, for instance, was not disrupted by the diversity of the French or English mother tongue of a majority of the citizens from the Celtic mother tongue of a minority in Brittany or Wales; and the centuries-old political association of the French-speaking inhabitants of the Val d'Aosta with the Italian-speaking inhabitants of Piedmont under the common rule of the House of Savoy<sup>1</sup> moved the Aostans on the morrow of the Second World War to opt in favour of continuing to be citizens of a defeated Italy, which they felt to be their mother country, in preference to becoming citizens of a France who had come out on the winning side and who was now appealing to them to join her on the strength of their common possession of the same mother tongue. Next door to the Val d'Aosta, in Switzerland, Western Europe offered the spectacle of a nation which had as lively a sense of national solidarity and individuality as any other nation in the Western World, and had preserved its national independence against all comers by showing an unwavering determination to defend it in arms, if necessary, by a *levée en masse*, though these diversely German, French, and Italian-speaking Swiss patriots had not any distinctive national language of their own to serve as an audible symbol of their distinctive national feeling. Switzerland was too hard a nut for Linguistic Nationalism to crack; and the golden opportunities for this travesty of a West European political idea to do its devil's work presented themselves, beyond the confines of Nationalism's West European birthplace, in regions where political inexperience gave political pedantry a free hand.

We have seen<sup>2</sup> how, in the course of the hundred years ending in A.D. 1918, Linguistic Nationalism disrupted a Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy which had been a marchmen's supra-national *union sacrée* symbolized in a common allegiance to a dynasty charged with an oecumenical mission to defend Western Christendom against Ottoman aggression. The revolutionary revision of the political map of Central Europe which swept the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy away bestowed, in the act, the doubtful blessing of an ephemeral political liberation on the submerged peoples of a *ci-devant* United Kingdom of Poland-Lithuania which had been partitioned between the Hapsburg, Hohenzollern, and Romanov empires in the course of the last three decades of the eighteenth century. Poland-Lithuania had been the Hapsburg Monarchy's neighbour and counterpart to the north of the Carpathians, where its mission had been to hold Western Christendom's fourteenth-century conquests of Russian Orthodox Christian territory against the counter-attacks of an unconquered interior of Russia whose formerly divided peoples had made it possible to redress the balance of

<sup>1</sup> See IV. iv. 285.

<sup>2</sup> In II. ii. 182-6.

power between themselves and their aggressive Western neighbours by submitting to a unification of their parochial principalities into a Muscovite Russian universal state.<sup>1</sup> The Polish-Lithuanian United Kingdom which had once performed this anti-Muscovite task for Western Christendom had been, like the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy, an *union sacrée* of marchmen which transcended the parochial loyalties of its component peoples; but these peoples had no sooner regained their political liberty through the outcome of the First World War than the demon of Linguistic Nationalism, which had made its sinister epiphany in the World during the period of their political eclipse, entered into them and drove them to perpetrate, within twenty years, the act of political suicide which it had taken the peoples of the Hapsburg Monarchy a hundred years to accomplish.

After the collapse in A.D. 1918 of all the three East European Powers that had partitioned Poland-Lithuania in A.D. 1772-95, a melagomaniacally imperialistic Polish aspiration to re-establish the frontiers of A.D. 1772<sup>2</sup> as park-walls for a privileged Polish nation's *Lebensraum* provoked a passionate resistance on the part of myopically parochial-minded Lithuanians and Ukrainians who had been the Poles' partners and not the Poles' subjects in the supra-national commonwealth that had been constituted in A.D. 1569 by the Treaty of Lublin.<sup>3</sup> In the carving out of an inter-war political map of Eastern Europe the Lithuanians succeeded in establishing a short-lived independence at the cost of losing to the Poles, by force of arms, the Jewish city and White Russian 'corridor' of Vilna, while the Uniate Catholic Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia and the Orthodox Christian Ukrainians of Volhynia were annexed to an inter-war Poland, by the same ephemerally victorious Polish force of arms, as subject and penalized minorities. Through the deadly feuds engendered by these tragic *coups de force* that compromised the future of both Eastern Europe and the Western Civilization in the critical years A.D. 1918-21, the evil spirit of Linguistic Nationalism prepared the way first for a fresh partition of the historic patrimony of Poland-Lithuania in A.D. 1939 between a Third German Reich and a Muscovy disguised as a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and then for the establishment in A.D. 1945 of a Russian ascendancy over the whole of this demon-ridden area.

<sup>1</sup> See II. ii. 157-8 and 174-7; and pp. 126-8, 398-9, and 403, above.

<sup>2</sup> The Polish thesis that a nation which had come out on the winning side in the World War of A.D. 1914-18 was entitled to the frontiers of A.D. 1772 would have made a contemporary Englishman first rub his eyes and then burst out laughing when a consultation of Spruner-Menke's historical atlas had reminded him that in A.D. 1772 one of the frontiers of the British Empire ran along the thalweg of the Mississippi. Yet, on the fantastic principle of Linguistic Nationalism, the Englishman's title was a better one than his Polish contemporary's, since in A.D. 1918 the Englishman's mother tongue was current in the United States not merely up to the line of the Mississippi but right across North America up to the Pacific coast, whereas the Pole's mother tongue was current in A.D. 1918 in less than half the area that, in A.D. 1772, had been included within the frontiers of the United Kingdom of Poland-Lithuania. In A.D. 1918 the larger part of this area was occupied by populations whose mother tongues were Lithuanian, White Russian, and Ukrainian, and these populations were duly claiming the right to possess sovereign states of their own, embracing the territories in which their respective languages were prevalent. The indisputability of Great Britain's linguistic title to reannex the United States was Linguistic Nationalism's *reductio ad absurdum*.

<sup>3</sup> See II. ii. 175.



This havoc worked by a Modern West European refinement of a traditional Western ideology in the East European marches of the Western World was not so tragic as the devastating effect of the same Western virus of Nationalism in an Ottoman body politic, since neither the fatuously licensed anarchy that had been the bane of an eighteenth-century Poland-Lithuania nor the fitfully enlightened monarchy that had been the palladium of the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy could compare with the Ottoman millet system in point of value as an alternative solution for a common problem of finding a practicable political constitution for a commonwealth consisting of geographically intermingled communities which bore a greater resemblance to the trades and professions than to the territorially segregated nationalities of Western Europe. The Procrustean methods of barbarism by which the Ottoman millets were wrenched and hacked into the exotic shape of sovereign independent national states *alla Franca*, in the course of a century that opened with the extermination of the Moreot Muslims in A.D. 1821 and closed with the eviction of the Anatolian Orthodox Christians in A.D. 1922, have been noticed in a previous passage of this Part<sup>1</sup> which need not be recapitulated here. In this place we have merely to point out that the no less shocking cruelties that accompanied the partition of a British Indian Empire into the two mutually hostile states of India and Pakistan,<sup>2</sup> and a British mandated territory of Palestine into the two mutually hostile states of Jordan and Israel,<sup>3</sup> on the morrow of a Second World War, were likewise examples of the destructively explosive effect of the Western ideology of Nationalism in social milieux in which geographically intermingled communities had previously been enabled to live together in virtue of being organized in millets.

The National State was not, of course, the only Modern Western political institution that had insinuated itself into the life of contemporary non-Western societies; the Enlightened Monarchy that had eventually been worsted by Linguistic Nationalism in the Danubian dominions of the Hapsburgs was another Western political institution that had also been a Western export in its day; and the secular-minded *Weltanschauung* which this Late Modern Western form of autocracy had brought in its train had anticipated the subsequent ravages of Nationalism in the subversiveness of the effects that it had produced when it had run amok in a post-Petrine Russia.

'The influence of the West upon Russia was absolutely paradoxical; it did not graft Western criteria upon the Russian spirit. On the contrary its influence let loose violent, Dionysiac, dynamic, and sometimes demonic forces. Spirits were unshackled and revealed a dynamic force unknown in the period before Peter. The limitless aspirations of the Faustian Man of the West, the man who belongs to modern history, in Russia revealed themselves in an entirely peculiar way, in their own distinctive manner, and found expression in the creations of Dostoyevsky's genius. The Russia which had been inherited from the past, the Russia of the nobility, of the merchant class and the shop-keepers, which the period of empire had kept in being, came into conflict with the Russia of the

<sup>1</sup> On pp. 189-92, above.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 290-2, above.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 204, above.

intelligentsia,<sup>1</sup> which was revolutionary and social-revolutionary in spirit, which aspired after the infinite and sought the City which is to come. This clash let loose dynamic forces and led to explosions. At the time when, in the West, enlightenment and culture were establishing a sort of order in accordance with fixed standards—although, of course, a relative order—in Russia enlightenment and culture overthrew standards, obliterated boundaries, and evoked a revolutionary dynamic.<sup>2</sup>

In another context<sup>3</sup> we have taken a glance at the history of the Late Modern Western institution of Enlightened Monarchy which was to produce these demonically explosive effects when it was let loose in Russia without the accompaniment of those salutary checks and balances that had kept this dispensation in order in the Western World; and we have traced the origins of this secular form of Western autocracy back to an ideology with which a Medieval Western Christendom was indoctrinated by the Emperor Frederick II Hohenstaufen. In the same context we have seen that this necromantic medieval renaissance, on Western ground, of a post-Constantinian Hellenic ideal of autocracy was not a feat of Western sorcery. The spirit of Caesaropapism that captivated Frederick II's soul was not a *revenant* evoked from Western Christendom's own dead Hellenic past; it was an intruder breaking in from the living world of an Orthodox Christian Society that was Western Christendom's contemporary and sister; and the magician who had succeeded in reanimating this Late Hellenic autocracy in Orthodox Christendom was not the thirteenth-century Swabian prince of an East Roman Empire's Apulo-Sicilian successor-state, but was the East Roman Empire's own eighth-century founder, Leo Syrus. Leo's effective revival of Justinian's autocracy was a Byzantine culture-element which made its way into a thirteenth-century Western Christendom via Sicily and Apulia; and, coming, as it did, in isolation from its Byzantine cultural setting into an alien body social organized on a different cultural pattern, it produced in *partibus Occidentis* an explosive effect which it had never produced in an Eastern Orthodox Christian World.

The crux lay in the impossibility of making room in a thirteenth-century Western World for this intrusive Byzantine ghost of a latter-day Hellenic institution without pushing to the wall a Hildebrandine Papal hierarchy which, by Frederick II Hohenstaufen's day, was not merely a going concern in the West but had come to be Western Christendom's master institution. In an earlier Part of this Study<sup>4</sup> we have already had occasion to watch the tragic spectacle of the self-destruction of the Medieval Western Christian order of society through a war to the knife between the Holy Roman Empire and the Papacy that was precipitated by the *Stupor Mundi's* attempt to bewitch the Western World of his day with his Byzantine political enormity. In the present place we need only remind ourselves that this thirteenth-century internecine struggle had had a twelfth-century overture, and that a conflict in which the

<sup>1</sup> The origins, ethos, and significance of this unhappy social product of encounters between contemporaries have been examined in this Study in V. v. 154-9.—A.J.T.

<sup>2</sup> Berdyaev, N.: *The Origin of Russian Communism* (London 1937, Bles), pp. 98-99.

<sup>3</sup> In VII. vii. 537-9. See further X. ix. 9-14.

<sup>4</sup> In IV. iv. 537, 540, and 560-7.

Papacy had joined forces with the North Italian city-states to resist Frederick II's grandfather and namesake had been precipitated by Barbarossa's own impolitic adoption of the same exotic ideal of autocracy when this revolutionary departure from the native practice of the feudal monarchies of Barbarossa's own world had been suggested to a restlessly ambitious Medieval Western mind by the impressive image of a Late Roman Emperor's prerogatives in the mirror of a recently disinterred Justinianean *Corpus Iuris*.<sup>1</sup>

The destructive potentialities that culture-elements are apt to display when they have been torn out of their original framework and been introduced into an alien social milieu are also illustrated by examples on the economic plane which are as striking as the political episodes that we have just been surveying. An observer of human affairs in the twentieth century of the Christian Era could not look around him without perceiving that the malaise that met his eyes everywhere had been produced by the radiation of Modern Western economic techniques as well as Modern Western political institutions. The demoralizing effect of an imported Western Industrialism was particularly conspicuous in South-East Asia, where an exotic industrial revolution, speeded-up by the forced draught of importunate Western economic enterprise, had produced a geographical mixture of socially still unannealed communities in the process of gathering the human fuel for its economic furnace.

'Everywhere in the Modern World economic forces have strained the relations between Capital and Labour, Industry and Agriculture, Town and Country; but in the Modern East the strain is greater because of a corresponding cleavage along racial lines. . . . The foreign Oriental is not merely a buffer between European and native but a barrier between the native and the Modern World. The cult of efficiency merely built up a monumental Western skyscraper on Eastern soil, with the natives in the basement; all inhabited the same country, but the building was of a different world, the Modern World to which the native had no access. In this plural economy competition is much keener than in the Western World. "There is materialism, rationalism, individualism, and a concentration on economic ends, far more complete and absolute than in homogeneous Western lands; a total absorption in the exchange and market, a capitalist world with the business concern as subject, far more typical of Capitalism than one can imagine in the so-called capitalist countries, which have grown slowly out of the past and are still bound to it by a hundred roots."<sup>2</sup> . . . Thus, although these several dependencies have in appearance been remodelled along Western lines, they have in fact been remodelled as economic systems, for production and not for social life. The mediaeval state has, quite suddenly, been converted into a modern factory.'<sup>3</sup>

An intrusive exotic culture-element's potency for working havoc is raised to its maximum when this cultural arrowhead is not only detached from its original setting and launched as a free lance into an alien body

<sup>1</sup> See VI. vii. 265-8; VII. vii. 538-9; and X. ix. 9.

<sup>2</sup> Boeke, Dr. J. H.: 'De Economische Theorie der Dualistische Samenleving', in *De Economist*, 1935, p. 781.

<sup>3</sup> Furnivall, J. S.: *Progress and Welfare in Southeast Asia* (New York 1941, Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations), pp. 42-44. The picture drawn in outline in the passage just quoted is amplified *ibid.*, pp. 61-63.

social but is also transferred, in the act, from one plane of human activity to another. The devastating effect of a Modern Western industrialism imported into the economic life of South-East Asia was not so severe, subversive though it was, as the effect of a Eurasian Nomad Pastoralism imported into the life of a sedentary society and diverted in this alien milieu from its proper economic function of tending live-stock to the incongruous political enterprise of improvising a régime for the government of human beings. The policy of treating a conquered sedentary population as human sheep to be shepherded with the aid of marvellously trained human sheep-dogs, which is an obviously natural recourse for a Nomad empire-builder in *partibus agrorum*, is, of course, a grotesquely preposterous outrage in the eyes of this pastor's sedentary victims; and for this reason the lives of such Nomad empires on cultivated ground had, as we have seen,<sup>1</sup> usually been short.

The relative longevity of the Ottoman Empire is the exception that proves this rule;<sup>2</sup> and the 'Osmanli Turkish Eurasian Nomad conquerors of the main body of Orthodox Christendom succeeded in obtaining this exceptionally long lease of their human sheep-run partly because, in this case, the conversion of a pastoral economic technique into an instrument of government was carried out with a rare vision and skill by shepherd-kings who were also men of genius,<sup>3</sup> and partly because the sedentary society whose domain the Ottoman patriarchs happened to overrun had previously fallen into such a desperate state of anarchy, and had proved so hopelessly incompetent to put its own house in order, that this grievously sick main body of Orthodox Christendom was constrained to purchase peace even at the almost prohibitively high price of submitting to a *Pax Ottomanica*.<sup>4</sup> The exorbitancy of the price can be measured by the intensity of the odium which the 'Osmanlis incurred by their inhuman performance of an indispensable social service.<sup>5</sup>

(β) 'One Thing Leads to Another'

Our second 'law' of cultural radiation-and-reception<sup>6</sup> is the tendency of a culture-pattern that has established itself in an emitting body social to reassert itself in a receiving body social through a reassemblage and reunion there of constituent culture-elements that have come to be divorced from one another in the process of transmission. This *nisus* towards reintegration has to contend with the opposing tendency of an assaulted society to resist the penetration of alien culture-elements and to admit them, if it must, only in the smallest possible quantities and at the slowest possible rate.<sup>7</sup> Accordingly, even when some single intrusive alien element has succeeded in opening a way for its original associates to follow and rejoin it, the tension between the pioneer trespasser's constant pull and the invaded body social's no less constant resistance constrains the pathfinder's old comrades, in bringing up their reinforcements, to travel in Indian file, to make their entry one by one,

<sup>1</sup> In III. iii. pp. 23-25.

<sup>4</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 26-27.

<sup>6</sup> See p. 530, above.

<sup>2</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 26.

<sup>3</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 27-50.

<sup>5</sup> See V. v. 348.

<sup>7</sup> See pp. 508-21, above.

and therefore to make it, as the pathfinder element has made it in advance, each in isolation from its pristine cultural context.

As we watch this arduous process of infiltration making a headway that carries it to the bitter end of introducing the whole besieging host of Midian inside a beleaguered Israel's defences, the astonishing aspect of this excruciating miracle is not, of course, the needle's obstructiveness of the camel's importunity; it is the camel's feat of negotiating his passage piecemeal through the needle's eye.<sup>1</sup> The assaulted body social's resistance to the painful and disruptive intrusion of alien culture-elements can be taken as a matter of course. What requires explanation is the invariably recurring failure of the defence at each successive repetition of the attack, when the defence has achieved the initial tactical success of compelling the assailant to disperse his forces and to dribble them into action one by one instead of throwing in all of them simultaneously *en masse*. When the assailant has thus been constrained to deploy his troops in an order—or disorder—which is the most uneconomical way of using his strength according to the classical theory of war, how is it that one dribble after another actually succeeds in forcing its way through the breach? What is the stimulus that gives each assaulting soldier in his turn the hardihood to engage in single combat and the prowess to win his isolated way through to his, and his comrades', common objective? And whence comes the prodigious discipline that prompts soldiers who have had to break the ranks in the act of delivering their assault to perform the *tour de force* of falling once more into their original formation when their *élan* has carried them all successively into the enemy's castle-yard through a crevice in the curtain-wall that is too narrow to give entry to more than one soldier at a time?

The explanation of this miracle would appear to be that the two alternative possible states—a state of integration and a state of disaggregation—in which any given set of culture-elements may be found,<sup>2</sup> are not on a par with one another in point of naturalness, normality, and healthiness. If an integral ray of cultural radiation that has been diffracted into its constituent elements in process of transmission from one body social to another shows a tendency to reconstitute itself into its original pattern after it has achieved the penetration of an obstacle which it has had to penetrate piecemeal, does not this tendency towards reintegration signify that the relatively complex state in which the primary culture-elements constitute an integrated pattern is in some sense more natural, more normal, and more healthy than the relatively simple state in which each of the primary culture-elements goes its own separate way without there being any mutual relation of reciprocity and interdependence between any one element and the rest?

If a mutual attraction towards combining to constitute a culture-pattern is a natural property of culture-elements which normally holds its own against a counter-tendency towards a spontaneous dissolution of their partnership,<sup>3</sup> this would account for a tendency to recombine when the partnership has been dissolved forcibly by the disruptive process of diffraction, and we should have put our finger here upon an

<sup>1</sup> Matt. xix. 24.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 495-501, above.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 498, above.



explanation of the impulse that moves the elemental rays of a diffracted integral ray of cultural radiation to follow one another through any breach in the defences of an assaulted body social into which any one of their number has once pushed its way, and to reassociate with one another in their original formation when they have completed their re-assemblage on the farther side of a cultural Maginot Line which they have carried by means of a succession of individual assaults.

If this gregarious instinct that thus seems to be inherent in the nature of a primary culture-element is as deep-seated and as dynamic as the evidence indicates, this in turn would explain an apparent paradox in the assaulted party's usual reaction to the aggressor's attack. The usual course of an encounter between contemporaries in which the assailant's forlorn hope has once made a lodgement within the assaulted party's defences is a mechanical resolution of the opposing forces at work in the tension between the intrusive elements' successful efforts in a winning battle to rejoin one another and the invaded society's unsuccessful efforts in a losing battle to keep each and all of the intrusive elements at arm's length; and this ineffectual kicking against the pricks in a struggle of which the outcome is a foregone conclusion defeats the recalcitrant victim's intentions and falsifies his expectations<sup>1</sup> by producing the untoward result of ensuring that his inevitable sufferings shall be of a maximum severity. It ensures, in fact, that the agonizing social and spiritual cancer started by the successful lodgement of the first single pioneer intrusive culture-element shall take, when once started, the longest possible time to run its dreadful course; and that, throughout this maximum Time-span, the devastating process of cultural invasion shall be perpetually extending its range and accentuating its effect in the invaded society's tormented body social.<sup>2</sup>

At first thoughts an observer of this strange tragedy might perhaps have expected that the painfulness of the initial experience of invasion by an exotic culture-element would have provided its own remedy by impelling the patient to make sure that this initial invasion should have

<sup>1</sup> See III. iii. 252.

<sup>2</sup> This latter rule is subject to exceptions which may occur if and when, after the act of cultural penetration has taken place, but before it has made any considerable progress, the impinging society disintegrates to a degree at which it becomes impotent to carry its cultural invasion of the assaulted alien body social any farther. If this situation arises, it offers to the aggressor society's victim a chance of giving a distinctive turn of its own to those elements of the exotic culture that have succeeded in making a lodgement in its body by that time. Classical cases in point are the histories of the Russian branch of an Orthodox Christendom and the Japanese branch of the Far Eastern Civilization. The Russian and Japanese converts to these two civilizations had been mere barbarians at the time of their conversion, and might therefore have been expected *a priori* to be more docile in their adoption of the invading exotic way of life than, for example, the Celtic or the Scandinavian converts to the Western Christian Civilization, who, before their conversion, had created at least the rudiments of distinctive civilizations of their own. Russian and Japanese history took a different turn from this because the main bodies of the Orthodox Christian and the Far Eastern Society broke down and went into disintegration at a time when their branches—which had struck root in the ground of Russia and Japan like the drooping branches of a banyan tree—were still tender shoots. The Russian branch of Orthodox Christendom and the Japanese branch of the Far Eastern Civilization did duly show their solidarity with their parent stems to the extent of following them into decline; but they went on to assert a distinctive cultural individuality of their own by the dismal process of going through a disintegrating civilization's normal experiences of a Time of Troubles and a universal state on independent lines.

no sequel. When a child has burnt its fingers, we should expect it to stop playing with fire. Why was it, then, that, in the classical examples presented by those encounters with the West which all the living non-Western societies had been experiencing in the Modern Age of Western history, every victim of the Modern Western Civilization's cultural radioactivity which had once allowed some importunate Western technique, institution, or idea to gain a foothold within the non-Western victim's defences should invariably have gone on to give admission to one further Western culture-element after another, in spite of the suffering and loss that this piecemeal reception of alien elements had brought with it from the start? The truth in all these cases is, of course, that the victim was not courting a maximum experience of torment deliberately, but was incurring it through *force majeure*. In falling back from one position to another, he was not making a masterly retreat according to plan; he was helplessly 'on the run'.

Assaulted societies are not always blind to the consequences that are likely to follow from allowing even the most apparently trivial and innocuous exotic culture-element to make an entry. We have already taken note<sup>1</sup> of certain historic encounters in which an assaulted society has succeeded in repulsing its assailant's attack without having given him a chance of making even a temporary lodgement; and an uncompromising policy of self-insulation that has won these rare victories has also been tried in many other cases where it has proved a failure. This policy is the practical expression of a spirit of 'Zealotism' which is, as we shall see,<sup>2</sup> one of the alternative possible psychological responses to the challenge of a cultural assault; and, while a 'Zealot's' characteristic *éthos* is emotional and intuitive, there have also been 'Zealots' who have been led to adopt a policy of isolationism by a train of reasoning from an empirical discovery of the truth that cultural intercourse is governed by the social law that 'one thing leads to another'. A classic case of this rationalist variety of 'Zealotism' is the severance of relations between Japan and the Western World that was gradually carried through, after careful investigation and mature reflexion at every stage, by Hideyoshi and his Tokugawan successors in the course of the fifty-one years ending in A.D. 1638. It is more surprising to find a similar awareness of the inherent interdependence of all the divers elements in an intrusive alien culture-pattern leading, by a similar train of reasoning, to a similar conclusion in the mind of an old-fashioned ruler of a secluded and backward Arab country.

The rationalist 'Zealot's' state of mind is piquantly illustrated by a conversation which took place in the nineteen-twenties between the Zaydī Imām Yahyā of San'ā and a British envoy whose mission was to persuade the Imām to restore peacefully a portion of the British Aden Protectorate which he had occupied during the World War of A.D. 1914-18 and had refused to evacuate thereafter, notwithstanding the defeat of his Ottoman overlords. In a final interview with the Imām, after it had become apparent that the mission would not attain its object, the British envoy, wishing to give the conversation another turn, complimented

<sup>1</sup> On pp. 476-7, above.

<sup>2</sup> On pp. 581-2, below.

the Imām upon the soldierly appearance of his new-model army. Seeing that the Imām took the compliment in good part, he went on:

'And I suppose you will be adopting other Western institutions as well?'

'I think not,' said the Imām with a smile.

'Oh, really? That interests me. And may I venture to ask your reasons?'

'Well, I don't think I should like other Western institutions,' said the Imām.

'Indeed? And what institutions, for example?'

'Well, there are parliaments,' said the Imām. 'I like to be the Government myself. I might find a parliament tiresome.'

'Why, as for that,' said the Englishman, 'I can assure you that responsible parliamentary representative government is not an indispensable part of the apparatus of our Western Civilization. Look at Italy. She has given that up, and she is one of the great Western Powers.'

'Well, then there is alcohol,' said the Imām. 'I don't want to see that introduced into my country, where at present it is happily almost unknown.'

'Very natural,' said the Englishman; 'but, if it comes to that, I can assure you that alcohol is not an indispensable adjunct of Western Civilization either. Look at America. She has given up that, and she too is one of the great Western Powers.'

'Well, anyhow,' said the Imām, with another smile which seemed to intimate that the conversation was at an end, 'I don't like parliaments and alcohol *and that kind of thing*.'

The Englishman could not make out whether there was any suggestion of humour in the parting smile with which the Imām's last words were uttered; but, however that might be, those words went to the heart of the matter and showed that the inquiry about possible further Western innovations at San'ā had been more pertinent than the Imām might have cared to admit. Those words indicated, in fact, that the Imām, viewing the Western Civilization from a great way off, saw it, in that distant perspective, as something one and indivisible and recognized certain features of it which to a Westerner's eye would appear to have nothing whatever to do with one another—the West's addiction to alcoholic beverages and its addiction to parliamentary institutions—as being organically related parts of that indivisible whole.

The moral of this story is that, in manifesting the perspicacity of his intellectual insight, the Imām Yahyā had implicitly indicted the infirmity of his purpose. In revealing his cognizance of the social 'law' that, in cultural intercourse, 'one thing leads to another', he had tacitly admitted that, in weak-mindedly abandoning his own principles to the extent of adopting even just the rudiments of a Western military technique, he had already introduced into the life of his people the thin end of a wedge which in time would inexorably cleave their close-compacted traditional Islamic Civilization asunder. He had started a cultural revolution which would leave the Yamanites, in the end, with no alternative but to cover their nakedness with a complete ready-made outfit of Western clothes.

If the Imām had met his Hindu contemporary the Mahatma Gandhi, that is what he would have been told by a Hindu statesman-saint who could have spoken with the double authority of genius and experience.

The moral which the Imām Yahyā had failed or refused to draw had been duly drawn by Gandhi, with his seer's eye, from his own divination of the inherent tendency of diffracted culture-elements to reassemble in their pristine formation. Gandhi had understood that an assaulted society which intended to strive in earnest for the preservation of its cultural integrity could not afford to make one single concession to its assailant—not even the clever-seeming feint of yielding so far as to adopt the aggressor's military technique with a view to thus enabling itself to mount a counter-offensive on less unequal terms. Such purposive feigned retreats were apt, the Mahatma perceived, to degenerate into routs that were as genuine as they were involuntary; and accordingly Gandhi exhorted the Hindu Society of his day to cut the threads binding it to the Western World by renouncing, not only the importation from Great Britain, but also, even more firmly, the still more gravely compromising manufacture in India, of machine-made cotton yarn and cotton cloth.<sup>1</sup>

In calling upon his fellow Hindus to revert to spinning and weaving their cotton by hand, Gandhi was indeed showing them the way to extricate themselves from the visible meshes of a Western economic spider's web; but this Gandhian policy of total economic divorce from the West was based on two assumptions which must both be justified in the event if the policy was to achieve its aim; and neither of these assumptions actually proved able to stand this searching test of experience. The first assumption was that the Hindus of Gandhi's generation would be prepared to make the economic sacrifices demanded by the Gandhian prescription for purchasing immunity from a Western cultural virus, and on this point the Hindu prophet failed to carry his people with him. The Hindu masses could not bear to condemn themselves to a self-imposed depression of their material standard of living below its present abysmal nadir, while the Hindu textile manufacturers at Bombay and at Gandhi's second home, Ahmadabad, would not forgo the profits which they were earning by the mass-production of cheap cotton goods. Since the party funds of the Indian Congress were largely provided by free-will offerings of a fraction of these profits of Indian industry *alla Franca*, Gandhi's policy was virtually doomed to defeat;<sup>2</sup> but, even if Gandhi had not been disappointed in his high expectations of his countrymen's economic disinterestedness, his policy would still have been brought to naught by the falsity of its second implicit assumption, which was not a miscalculation of the assaulted society's moral capacity, but was a misapprehension of the intrusive alien culture's spiritual quality.

The error in Gandhi's diagnosis here was that in this context he was allowing himself to see nothing more in the Late Modern Western Civilization than the secular social structure, with Technology substituted for Religion as the key-stone of the social arch, which the West in Gandhi's day self-complacently proclaimed itself to be. If the cultural radiation, emanating from the West, that was bombarding India in Gandhi's day had been in truth exclusively technological in its texture,

<sup>1</sup> See III. iii. 190.

<sup>2</sup> See III. iii. 203.

then Gandhi's policy of rendering the Hindu body social totally impervious to penetration by technological culture-rays of Western provenance might have proved an effective solution of the Hindu Society's Western problem, supposing that Gandhi had been successful in securing his people's effective support in this campaign. The baffling feature to which Gandhi seems—to judge by his policy—to have been blind in his scrutiny of contemporary Western cultural phenomena was the political and spiritual corona that was playing round the fringe of a self-eclipsed cultural sun's perversely darkened disk. This irrepressible *khvarenah*<sup>1</sup> continued to bear visual witness to the truth that spiritual suicide is not an easy crime to commit;<sup>2</sup> and it is the more strange that Gandhi, of all men, should have been blind to this portent, seeing that these clouds of Western glory had demonstrated their radioactive potency *ad hominem* by gathering round the Hindu prophet's own head and illuminating his own heart.

Gandhi's masterly use of contemporary Western methods of political organization, publicity, and propaganda<sup>3</sup> to serve his campaign against the compromising use of Western methods of economic production might perhaps be dismissed as one of the ironic curiosities of history; but an open-eyed and candid-minded observer, Occidental or Hindu, could hardly refuse to take seriously the manifest conquest of Gandhi's soul by the undying spirit of a Christianity which had been repudiated by a majority of its Late Modern Western carriers. The spiritual event that had liberated Gandhi's creative 'soul-force' was an encounter, in the sanctuary of this sublime Hindu soul, between the spirit of Hinduism and the spirit of the Christian Gospel embodied in the life of the Society of Friends.<sup>4</sup> A cultural barrage designed to keep out the power-loom was no obstacle to the entry of the Inner Light; and the captivation of Gandhi's soul by an alien culture on the religious plane was as decisive as it was auspicious.

The truth is that, if once the besieged have permitted even one isolated member of the besiegers' storming column to force his way inside their enceinte, their only remaining chance of saving their fortress from ultimately falling is to take the intruder prisoner before any of his eagerly following comrades-in-arms have had time to rejoin and re-

<sup>1</sup> 'Hallowed by the halo of the *Khvarenah*' might perhaps be the common meaning of the Hittite word *houirwanas* denoting a client prince of a Hittite emperor who styled himself 'the Sun' (see Delaporte, L.: *Les Hittites* (Paris 1936, La Renaissance du Livre), p. 187), the Greek words *κόρανος* and *Κόρανος* (*Macedonici Κόρανος*: see I. i. 409, n. 1), and the Persian word *κάραμος*, which, according to Xenophon, *Hellenica*, Book I, chap. iv, § 3, was the official title borne by Cyrus the Younger as viceroy of an Anatolian military district of the Achaemenian Empire (see VI. vii. 183, n. 7, and VI. vii. 673-4). Did this Persian title survive in the family name of the House of Kārēn, which, under the Arsacid and Sasanid régimes, ranked as the second family in the Empire after the reigning dynasty itself? And, if Kārēn stands for *κάραμος*, does Sūrēn stand for *seren* (*Græce rūpavos*), the title given to 'the Lords of the Philistines' in the Hebrew text of the Old Testament? (See Macalister, R. A. S.: *The Philistines* (London 1913, Milford), p. 79).

<sup>2</sup> 'Just as the corona asserts the fact that the Sun is not actually engulfed but only darkened, so there are certain marginal events or intuitions which inform the individual, temporarily engulfed by the Unconscious, that the light of Consciousness will emerge again' (Baynes, H. G.: *Mythology of the Soul* (London 1940, Baillière, Tindall & Cox; 1949, Methuen), p. 557).

<sup>3</sup> See III. iii. 203.

<sup>4</sup> See III. iii. 190-1 and V. v. 190.



inforce the audacious pioneer. An intrusive alien culture-element cannot easily be purged of its dangerous capacity for attracting to itself other elements, of the same provenance, with which it was associated in its original cultural setting. The rash recipient's only chance of demagnetizing his formidable acquisition is to metabolize and assimilate it to a degree at which it becomes amenable to being worked into his native cultural pattern as an enrichment and not a dissolvent of the prevailing harmony. If the intrusive alien element succeeds in defeating the operations of its host's digestive system by retaining its magnetic alien quality after lodgement, the unhappy host will find himself condemned to look on helplessly while the defiantly intrusive culture-element behaves in his body social like a loose electron disintegrating an atom or like a cuckoo's egg laid in a hedge-sparrow's nest.<sup>1</sup>

The changeling chick into which this alien egg hatches out provides for the satisfaction of its own inordinate appetite by insisting on its foster parents' making this the first call on their energies, at the expense of their duty to their own brood; and the ruthless interloper makes room in the diminutive nest for its own disproportionately expanding body by throwing its foster-brothers out, one by one, until a nest which the parent hedge-sparrows have built for the rearing of their own young has been turned by the presence of the intruder into an incubator for propagating the absentee parent cuckoos' species through the hoodwinked and brow-beaten hedge-sparrows' misguided ministrations. At this far-gone stage in the lamentable game the parent hedge-sparrows are constrained to acquiesce in the servitude of foster-parenthood as the one mission in life still open to them—even though their one foster-chick happens to be the murderer of their own progeny.

In general terms of encounters between civilizations, this is to say that, when the assaulted party has failed to prevent even one single pioneer element of the aggressively radioactive culture from making a lodgement in his body social, and when he has furthermore failed to isolate and sterilize this alien entering wedge by metabolizing and assimilating it, his only chance of social survival lies in making a psychological *volte face*. He may still be able to save himself alive by abandoning the 'Zealot' attitude of tooth-and-nail opposition to an irresistible invader's inexorable advance and adopting, instead, the 'Herodian's' opposite tactics<sup>2</sup> of learning to fight a militarily superior adversary with his own weapons, as a prelude to winning his goodwill by welcoming him with open arms. In the particular terms of the encounter between the 'Osmanlis and the Late Modern West the moral would be that Sultan 'Abd-al-Hamīd's grudging policy of Westernization at a minimum was never practical politics when once the invading Western culture had forced its way through the Porte and entrenched itself in the Ottoman Imperial Government's war department,<sup>3</sup> whereas Mustafā Kemāl Atatürk's whole-hearted policy of Westernization to a maximum<sup>4</sup> offered the 'Osmanlis a just practicable way of salvation even when adopted as a last resort at the eleventh hour.

<sup>1</sup> See the instances cited in V. vi. 106-7.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 234-6, above.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 582-4, below.

<sup>4</sup> See pp. 263-8, above.

The Ottoman and the Russian Society's experiences in their encounters with a Late Modern Western Civilization afford classical illustrations of the inefficacy of the principle of homeopathic medicine when the virus to which the patient is trying to make himself immune is a cultural infection. Peter the Great in Russia, Mehmed 'Ali in Egypt, and Mahmūd II in Turkey each in turn began by setting himself the limited objective of Westernizing his fighting forces in order to be able to hold his own militarily and diplomatically in a Westernizing World; and in each case the act of self-inoculation with a serum extracted from the contemporary Western art of war, so far from conferring the hoped-for immunity, started a galloping consumption. In Mehmed 'Ali's Egypt the potency of a Westernized army's contagious cultural effect in promoting the Westernization of the rest of the body social was recognized in retrospect by an able British observer when Mehmed 'Ali had been master of Egypt for a third of a century.

'At an early period of his military career, Mahomet Ali saw enough to convince him of the superiority of European tactics over those of the East; for he was himself engaged against the French Army in Egypt, and conceived a high opinion of the value of martial science. But the introduction of Western organisation into the armies of the Levant brought with it other important results; for the appliances of mechanical art, of education, of medical knowledge, and a general system of dependence and subordination, were the needful companions of the new state of things. The transfer of the military power from unruly and undisciplined hordes to a body of troops regularly trained through the various grades of obedience and discipline was in itself the establishment of a principle of order which spread over the whole surface of Society.<sup>1</sup>

In Egypt, Turkey, and Russia alike the sequel to the Westernization of the fighting forces from above downwards by an autocrat's fiat demonstrated that this new departure in the military field could not be followed out effectively to its own intendedly limited objective unless it were also followed up and supported by a series of further new departures, in the same Westernizing direction, in other departments of social life.

A fighting force of the genuine Late Modern Western quality could not be brought into being without provision for the professional training of a corps of officers in accordance with the Western standard of the day,<sup>2</sup> and it could not be kept in being without provision for a medical

<sup>1</sup> Bowring, John: *Report on Egypt and Candia* dated the 27th March, 1839, and addressed to the Right Hon. Lord Viscount Palmerston (London 1840, Clowes & Clowes), p. 49. This British visitor's judgement was confirmed by the contemporary testimony of the French physician A. B. Clot, who had spent fifteen years of his working life in Mehmed 'Ali's service (see his *Aperçu Général sur l'Égypte* (Paris 1840, Fortin and Masson, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. vi). Clot Bey's dictum (*ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 199) that in Egypt, as Mehmed 'Ali found it, 'tout était à faire, et tout a commencé à être fait à la suite de l'organisation militaire', has been quoted already on p. 234, above. In the same passage, Clot Bey credits his Rumeliot Turkish employer's new model army *alla Franca* with the two particular achievements of having created order in Egypt and having inspired the native Egyptians with a national consciousness.

<sup>2</sup> In Mehmed 'Ali's new-model army there was a systematic provision for the general education of the conscripts in the ranks during their period of service (Bowring, J.: *Report on the Commercial Statistics of Syria*, dated the 17th July, 1839 (London 1840, Clowes), p. 109), as well as a preparatory system of professional education for officer-cadets.

service to look after the physical welfare of the rank-and-file of a standing army or navy living at close quarters under unnatural conditions.<sup>1</sup> It proved impossible, however, as we have seen,<sup>2</sup> to confine the Western education of military and naval officers in a non-Western society to a professionally indispensable minimum of technical instruction when their autocratic master was so unintelligent as to be able to delude himself, first, into imagining that it would be within his power thus to blinker the mental vision of his cadets and then into flattering himself that the robot human product of his fancy would have been capable—had it been possible for him to produce it in real life—of fulfilling its professional mission of holding its own against the less illiberally educated officers' corps of Western or Westernizing neighbours.

We have noticed the nemesis by which Sultan 'Abd-al-Hamid II's delusion was overtaken and confuted in A.D. 1908 when a political revolution that cost him his throne was led by junior officers who had acquired their 'dangerous thoughts' at this fatuously unenlightened Ottoman despot's painfully sterilized military academy. It is more surprising to find military officers leading abortive political revolutionary movements in Egypt in A.D. 1879-82 and in Russia in A.D. 1825,<sup>3</sup> considering that 'Abd-al-Hamid's delusion had not ever clouded the clearer spirits of a Mehmed 'Ali or a Peter. So far from seeking to confine the Western education of their subjects to a strictly technical minimum training of naval and military cadets, these two Herodian-minded men of genius were tempted to plunge out of their depth in the abuse of their autocratic power by exerting it for the opposite purpose of driving their subjects into a Western course of education on a front that they were perpetually extending;<sup>4</sup> and this progressive widening of their

<sup>1</sup> Hellmuth von Moltke, when attached to Hâfiz Pasha's Turkish army in A.D. 1839, was struck by the magnitude of the rate of sickness among the troops, notwithstanding the excellence of their conditions of life (*Briefe über Zustände und Begebenheiten in der Türkei aus den Jahren 1835 bis 1839* (Berlin, Posen, & Bromberg 1841, Mittler), p. 301). He estimated this army's average peace-time losses by death from sickness at 33½ per cent. for all arms (*ibid.*, pp. 350-1) and at 50 per cent. for the infantry (*ibid.*, p. 382).

<sup>2</sup> On pp. 232-8, above.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 234-5, above. In the issue of *Le Monde Slave* for December 1925 (Nouvelle Série, 2<sup>me</sup> Année, No. 12, Paris 1925, Alcan), which is devoted to 'le Centenaire des Décabristes', it is pointed out (p. 345) that the Decembrists were the last military conspirators and the first political theorists in the history of Petrine Russia. In the eighteenth century there had been five Russian palace revolutions (in A.D. 1725, 1730, 1740, 1741, 1761), all led by guards officers recruited from the nobility, and the revolution of A.D. 1801 had been of the same character (*ibid.*, p. 335). The Decembrists, whose abortive revolution in December 1825 marked the sociological transition in Russia to a revolutionary movement of a new type, were representatives of the fifth of the eight generations spanning the period between the date of Peter the Great's death and the year A.D. 1925 (*ibid.*, p. 334). Perhaps one reason why the abortive liberal revolution of A.D. 1825 in Russia had military officers for its leaders, notwithstanding the impulse given by Peter the Great, a hundred years before the Decembrists' day, to civilian as well as military education on Western lines, was that, as a result of the part which Russia was forced, by French aggression, to play in the Napoleonic Wars, the Russian military officers of that generation had been brought into more direct personal touch with the West than the majority of their Russian contemporaries of the same Western-educated class in civilian life. The effect on the Decembrists' outlook that was produced by their service abroad on Western ground, where the contrast between the Western World and a superficially Westernized Russia made its impression on their minds with all the sharpness of a first-hand experience, is noticed in the study here cited (*Le Monde Slave*, num. cit., pp. 336, 338, 351, and 376). The effect was particularly strong in the case of those Russian officers who took part in the occupation of Paris in A.D. 1814.

<sup>4</sup> Mehmed 'Ali, like Peter, used the moral pull of his own personal example, as well

educational programme is the more remarkable considering that it was dictated to them by their practical experience in the pursuit of educational aims which, in intention, were strictly, and indeed narrowly, utilitarian from first to last.

Both Peter and Mehmed 'Alī were led towards their ambitious Herodian educational objective along two convergent routes. On the one hand they both realized that, in order to secure an intake of military and naval cadets equipped with a general cultivation in the Western style as a background for their technical training in a Western art, they must create a reservoir of boys endowed with a preparatory education on these non-technical Western lines. On the other hand they both also realized that, however effective an education they might succeed in providing in their naval and military cadet schools and in the civilian preparatory schools leading up to them, these new institutions by themselves would not avail to produce and maintain those fighting forces of a Western pattern and standard that were the practical object of their educational endeavours. Such fighting forces required auxiliary services which in turn required a special technically trained personnel; this expensively elaborate establishment could not be kept up without an expansion of the public revenue; the revenue could not be expanded without a rise in the taxable income of the community; production could not be increased without technical improvements in agriculture and industry;<sup>1</sup> none of these requirements could be met without providing a further personnel of Western-educated civil servants and economic experts; and the requisite intake of civilian cadets could only be secured by furnishing the general preparatory education *alla Franca* which was likewise a necessary condition for ensuring a supply of naval and military cadets of the proper quality.

In Mehmed 'Alī's Egypt the Westernization of education 'was in origin the natural corollary to the reform of the Army'.<sup>2</sup> The infantry, cavalry, and artillery schools under Western commandants, which we have noticed in an earlier chapter of this Part,<sup>3</sup> were supplemented by engineering

as the physical push of political coercion, as a means of moving his subjects to take the Westward road. The celebrated initiative shown by Peter in mastering one branch of contemporary Western technology after another has been noticed in an earlier passage of this Study (in III. iii. 279-80) and needs no further exposition here. Mehmed 'Alī, who had grown up without being educated even in the Islamic culture that was his own social heritage, and who never mastered any other language beyond his native Turkish, picked up an acquaintance with the contemporary Western Civilization by taking opportunities of talking to Frankish visitors, learnt to read at the age of forty-five, and studied the histories of Alexander the Great and Napoleon (Clot, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. lxxvii). Moreover, this Ottoman apostle of Westernization was more fortunate than his Muscovite counterpart in finding an enthusiastic disciple, and not a sullen opponent, in his eldest son and heir. Ibrahim Pasha was energetic, orderly minded, and Petrine in his practice of sharing the hardships of his soldiers on campaign (*ibid.*, p. lxxxiii). He had been educated to read and write Turkish, Arabic, and Persian, and he was versed in Islamic history (*ibid.*, p. lxxx). He gave a lead to his officers in schooling himself in the Western art of war (*ibid.*, p. lxxxi), and also showed a practical interest in the improvement of Egyptian agriculture on Western lines (*ibid.*, p. lxxxiv). Another of Mehmed 'Alī's sons, Sa'īd, learnt to speak French fluently and received a mathematical education as the basis for his professional training as a naval officer (*ibid.*, p. lxxxv).

<sup>1</sup> Mehmed 'Alī's policy of Westernization on the economic plane has been touched upon on p. 249, above.

<sup>2</sup> Dodwell, H.: *The Founder of Modern Egypt* (Cambridge 1931, University Press), p. 237.

<sup>3</sup> On pp. 243-4, above.

and naval schools<sup>1</sup> and were reinforced by the establishment, in the citadel of Cairo, of a mathematical and drawing school under an Italian master<sup>2</sup> and a cannon foundry under a Turkish manager, Edhem Bey, whose intellectual and administrative gifts won high praise from the Duke of Ragusa (*alias* A. F. L. V. de Marmont, the Napoleonic French marshal);<sup>3</sup> and the technical training of personnel for Mehmed 'Ali's fighting forces and their auxiliary services was underpinned by the introduction of a system of general education *alla Franca* in Egypt itself and was at the same time improved in quality by arrangements for enabling an *élite* of the students to pursue courses of Western study on Western ground.

As early in Mehmed 'Ali's reign as A.D. 1812, a school was opened in Cairo by his director of the supply of materials, Muhammad Efendi Tubbāl.<sup>4</sup> In A.D. 1816 the Pasha himself opened a school of engineering and surveying in his own palace with eighty Egyptian students and with Western instructors and instruments.<sup>5</sup> In A.D. 1833 a polytechnic was founded, as a preparatory school for the military cadet colleges, with two French, two Armenian, and six Muslim instructors;<sup>6</sup> primary schools were founded at Cairo and Alexandria to feed the polytechnic; several local schools were also established in each provincial *müdirlik*; and these educational establishments at divers levels were so many rungs in a ladder leading up to the public service.<sup>7</sup> The year A.D. 1836 saw the inauguration of a French-inspired Council of Education (*Majlis-al-Ma'arif*) administering fifty elementary and secondary schools distributed over the country. The pupils of these schools were recruited by conscription<sup>8</sup> and the secondary schools were organized on military lines;<sup>9</sup> but, on the other side of the account, these schoolboy-conscripts enjoyed the advantage of drawing pay and rations from the Government.<sup>10</sup>

In reply to a questionnaire drafted by Bowring when he was collecting materials for the report which he submitted to Lord Palmerston in A.D. 1839, Mukhtar Bey, an official in Mehmed 'Ali's service, made a return of the number of pupils receiving instruction at the time in non-military special schools in the Pasha's dominions. According to this statement there were then 300 pupils in the medical school, 120 in the veterinary

<sup>1</sup> See Dodwell, H.: *The Founder of Modern Egypt* (Cambridge 1931, University Press), p. 238. Native Egyptians were not accepted as candidates for entry into the cadet schools at Cairo and Alexandria (Kramers, J. H.: s.v. 'Khedīw', in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, vol. ii (London 1927, Luzac), p. 952).

<sup>2</sup> See Dodwell, op. cit., p. 238.

<sup>3</sup> See Clot, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 206-7. The same highly qualified foreign observer also praised Mehmed 'Ali's small-arms factories, which were organized on a French model (*ibid.*, vol. ii, pp. 277-8).

<sup>4</sup> See Jabarti, Shaykh 'Abd-ar-Rahmān al-: *Ajā'ib-al-Āthār fi't-Tarājim wa'l Akhbār* (French translation, Paris 1888-96, Leroux, 9 vols.), vol. viii, p. 373.

<sup>5</sup> See Jabarti, op. cit., vol. ix, p. 192. Jabarti records (in op. cit., vol. ix, on p. 207) that, in opening his first school, Mehmed 'Ali had been acting on the suggestion of a Muslim traveller, linguist, and man of science named Hasan Darwish al-Mawsili, who made the welfare of the poorer students his particular personal concern. A master was brought from Turkey to teach pupils whose mother tongue was not Arabic.

<sup>6</sup> See Dodwell, op. cit., p. 238. Three of the Muslim instructors had been educated in France, and three in England.

<sup>7</sup> See *ibid.*

<sup>8</sup> See Bowring, *Report on Egypt and Candia*, p. 135.

<sup>9</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 128.

<sup>10</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 126.



school, 225 in the polytechnic, 150 in the school of Western languages, 150 in the school of music, 50 in the school of agriculture, 20 in the school of midwifery, and 300 in the school of book-keeping. The numbers of students in the schools of agriculture and midwifery were to be increased—in the latter school from 20 to 100.<sup>1</sup> This systematic network of special and general educational institutions on Western lines<sup>2</sup> was eventually completed in A.D. 1867.<sup>3</sup> The extent and the limits of this progressive broadening of a Westernizing educational system that had been introduced originally for the particular technical purpose of creating a new-model army go far to explain, between them, both the subsequent rise of a nationalist movement in the ranks of a callow Egyptian intelligentsia and the failure of this movement, at its first outbreak under 'Arābī's leadership, owing to its inability at this stage to enlist the support of the illiterate masses of the peasantry, from whom the intelligentsia had become culturally alienated in the act of imbibing the tincture of Western culture that was the intelligentsia's distinctive hall-mark and *raison d'être*.<sup>3</sup>

Side by side with this development of education *alla Franca* in Egypt itself, Mehmed 'Alī and his successors maintained, from A.D. 1826 to *circa* A.D. 1870, an Egyptian Scientific Mission (*Al-Ba'that-al-'Ilmiyah*) in Paris.<sup>4</sup> The first batch of students to benefit by this scheme, who were sent to Paris in A.D. 1826,<sup>5</sup> were placed under the superintendence of Jomard, the French official commissioner for the publication of the discoveries of the Napoleonic Institut d'Égypte. There were forty-four of them,<sup>6</sup> all native Egyptians;<sup>6</sup> and they were followed in the years A.D. 1827–33 by other batches, amounting to about sixty students in all,<sup>7</sup> consisting likewise mostly of fallāhīn.<sup>8</sup> One hundred and fourteen students, in all, had been sent from Egypt to Paris by A.D. 1840, the date of publication of Clot Bey's book.<sup>9</sup>

The same educational policies were pursued with greater violence in Petrine Russia.<sup>10</sup> Like Mehmed 'Alī, Peter found it impossible to start

<sup>1</sup> See Bowring, *Report on Egypt and Candia*, p. 194.

<sup>2</sup> The particular Western lines followed in Egypt were the French (Bowring, *op. cit.*, p. 126).

<sup>3</sup> See Kramers, *ibid.*, p. 952.

<sup>4</sup> These were not actually the first Egyptian Muslim students to go to the West. They had predecessors who had already studied in Italy and France; and one of these, 'Uthmān Efendi Nūr-ad-Dīn, who had been appointed head of a college at Qasr-al-'Ayn, founded a staff school at Khānqāh in A.D. 1826 (Clot, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 312).

<sup>5</sup> See Clot, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 313. Dodwell, *op. cit.*, p. 203, gives the number as forty-five on the authority of a dispatch of the 4th April, 1826, from Salt, the British Consul-General in Egypt at the time (F.O. 78/147); but Clot's figure is more worthy of credence, since he gives the details. Eleven of the students in this batch were trained in administration and diplomacy, 8 in navigation, military engineering, and gunnery; 2 in medicine and surgery; 5 in agriculture, mining, and natural history; 4 in chemistry; 4 in hydraulics and metallurgy; 3 in engraving and lithography; 1 in translation; and 1 in architecture, while 5 went back to Egypt without having qualified in any discipline.

<sup>6</sup> See Dodwell, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

<sup>7</sup> The batch sent to Paris in A.D. 1833 was twelve strong (Bowring, *op. cit.*, p. 140).

<sup>8</sup> See Clot, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 313. Out of these later batches of Egyptian students sent to Paris, forty students were allocated to mechanical arts and twelve to pharmacy and medicine.

<sup>9</sup> See Clot, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 313. Besides the students at Paris, there were at this time also Egyptian apprentices in France at Elboeuf and at Rheims (Bowring, *op. cit.*, p. 42).

<sup>10</sup> Education by force was the key-note of Petrine educational policy (see Mettig, C.: *Die Europäisierung Russlands im 18. Jahrhundert* (Gotha 1913, Perthes), p. 80).

the process of Westernization without importing Western experts;<sup>1</sup> but Peter's ambition likewise<sup>2</sup> was to replace these aliens as soon as possible by Western-trained subjects of his own; and in Russia, as in Egypt, the education of native officers for Westernized fighting services was reinforced by a training of native technicians for Westernized auxiliary services. A school of navigation, for example, was opened at Moscow in A.D. 1701, under the direction of a Scottish mathematician from Aberdeen named Farquharson, whose Russian pupils were recruited from children of all classes;<sup>3</sup> and a technical education was forced upon all male members of the Russian nobility by an edict of A.D. 1714 forbidding them to marry till they had passed an examination in geometry, arithmetic, and navigation.<sup>4</sup> In A.D. 1736 compulsory education, between the ages of seven and twenty, was imposed on all noblemen's sons, and these aristocratic educational conscripts were subjected to a series of three examinations, with compulsory service in the ranks of the Army as the penalty for failing to pass.<sup>5</sup> A corps of pages was founded in A.D. 1730<sup>6</sup> and a cadet corps in A.D. 1731,<sup>7</sup> and garrison schools were started in A.D. 1732.<sup>7</sup> Schools for non-Christian subjects of the Russian Empire were founded at Astrakhan in A.D. 1732 and at Qazān in A.D. 1735.<sup>8</sup> The University of Moscow was opened in A.D. 1755;<sup>8</sup> and a commission for the promotion of elementary education was appointed in A.D. 1778, with a Hungarian Serb *savant*, Yanković, as its moving spirit.<sup>9</sup>

This progressive widening of the range of a new-fangled Western system of education at home was accompanied in Peter's Russia, as in Mehmed 'Ali's Egypt, by an effort to improve this exotic education's quality through sending an *élite* of the students to school in the West.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>1</sup> During 'the Great Embassy' of A.D. 1697-98, 'at least 750 men were recruited for service in Russia. Most of them were Dutchmen, but there were also a good number of Italians, Slavs, and Greeks from the Adriatic lands, skilled in the building and handling of galleys' (Sumner, B. H.: *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia* (London 1950, English Universities Press), p. 35; cp. p. 89). A small team of English master-shipwrights were given specially favourable treatment (*ibid.*, p. 90). A Norwegian sea-captain named Cruys, who was persuaded in A.D. 1698 to transfer from the Dutch to the Russian service, rose to be an admiral in the Russian Baltic fleet (*ibid.*, p. 36). The employment of Westerners (other than those who became Russian subjects as a result of the conquest of the Baltic provinces in A.D. 1710) was, however, mostly confined to the technical field. Not only the higher posts in the fighting services, but also those in business and industry, were normally reserved for Russian subjects, and 'no instance is known of any establishment started in Peter's reign from imported capital' (*ibid.*, pp. 167-8).

<sup>2</sup> For Mehmed 'Ali's policy on this point, see p. 603, n. 1, below.

<sup>3</sup> See Mettig, *op. cit.*, p. 78; Sumner, *op. cit.*, pp. 35 and 152.

<sup>4</sup> See Sumner, B. H.: *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia* (London 1950, English Universities Press), p. 153; Mettig, *op. cit.*, p. 412, followed in III. iii. 282, n. 2.

<sup>5</sup> See Mettig, *op. cit.*, p. 412.

<sup>6</sup> A.D. 1730 was the date according to Sumner, B. H.: *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia* (London 1950, English Universities Press), p. 153; A.D. 1759 according to Mettig, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

<sup>7</sup> See Mettig, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

<sup>8</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 96-97.

<sup>8</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 84.

<sup>10</sup> In Muscovy, as in the Ottoman Empire, this was a revolutionary departure from traditional practice. In general the only missions on which Muscovite subjects had been allowed to go abroad before Peter's reign had been embassies, pilgrimages, and theological studies in Eastern Orthodox Christian foreign countries. When Peter's early seventeenth-century predecessor Boris Godunov (*imperabat* A.D. 1598-1605) had tried to break with this tradition by sending five students to Lübeck, six to France, and four to England, only one of these fifteen doves had returned to the Muscovite ark. Of the four

Fifty young Russian noblemen were sent to the West for technical instruction a few months ahead of Peter's own departure on his grand tour as a technological apprentice in A.D. 1697;<sup>1</sup> and more than a hundred Russian students were expatriated in that year.<sup>2</sup> Students of the languages of the Islamic World were sent to Persia in A.D. 1716; and the first Russian naval students to go to Western countries were a batch sent abroad in A.D. 1719.<sup>3</sup> These early Petrine Russian students abroad were unwilling pupils;<sup>4</sup> but their recalcitrance was countered by exacting instructions and by the prospect of seeing their estates confiscated by the Tsar if they did not bring home satisfactory evidence that they had performed the tasks laid upon them.<sup>5</sup> Peter maintained a strict control over these student-conscripts during their period of foreign service,<sup>6</sup> and in Holland he appointed a resident inspector to look after them.<sup>7</sup> On the other hand he rewarded Russian technological students who had made a success of their tour of study abroad by providing them, on their return to Russia, with capital to enable them to set up for themselves in business.<sup>8</sup> These eighteenth-century Russian students in Western countries, like their nineteenth-century Egyptian counterparts, came under the general influence of the contemporary Western culture in the process of acquiring their Western technological training.<sup>9</sup> The learning of Western languages, for example, initiated them into a new world of Western manners, morals, and letters;<sup>10</sup> and Peter himself took a broad enough view of his utilitarian purpose to include the Western arts of painting and architecture among the subjects that his Russian students were sent to study abroad at first hand.<sup>11</sup>

In the educational, as in the technological, field, Peter's utilitarian bent<sup>12</sup> never relaxed.

"To the end of his life Peter looked on education as a training for some specific form of state service: if men went abroad to learn economics, it was for the sake of his new tariff; if they were trained in languages, it was

sent to England, one became a clergyman of the English Episcopalian Protestant Church, another became an official of the English Government in Ireland, and a third became an East India merchant. In the reign of Peter's precursor the first Romanov Tsar, Michael (*imperabat* A.D. 1613-45), there had been a strong reaction in Muscovy towards the traditional anti-Western attitude. When Prince Khvorostinin had expressed a preference for Western culture, he had been compelled to recant; the Polish-educated son of Prince Ordin-Nashchokin had fled to the West from the intolerably anti-Western atmosphere of the Holy Russia of his day, and an official ban had been placed on foreign travel, in the manner of contemporary Japan (see Brückner, A.: *Peter der Grosse* (Berlin 1879, Grote), pp. 169-72).

<sup>1</sup> See Brückner, A.: *Peter der Grosse* (Berlin 1879, Grote), p. 174.

<sup>2</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 175; Sumner, B. H.: *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia* (London 1950, English Universities Press), pp. 34-41.

<sup>3</sup> See Brückner, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

<sup>4</sup> See Brückner, *op. cit.*, p. 176. Brückner cites a diary (preserved in manuscript at Qazán) which had been kept by one of them—a member of the Tolstoy family, who was fifty-two years old at the time of his compulsory expatriation as a student of Western technology (*ibid.*, p. 177). The spectacle of the Western World seen at first hand struck Tolstoy with amazement (*ibid.*, p. 192).

<sup>5</sup> See Brückner, *op. cit.*, p. 175, followed in III. iii. 282, n. 2.

<sup>6</sup> See Brückner, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

<sup>7</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 184.

<sup>8</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 174.

<sup>9</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 189.

<sup>10</sup> See Mettug, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

<sup>11</sup> See pp. 674-5, below.

<sup>12</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 181.

in order to act as translators or to serve as diplomats. . . . Just as in Russia the foreigners played mainly a rather narrow technical, training rôle,<sup>1</sup> so . . . the Russians whom Peter sent to the West were assigned almost exclusively to technical training.<sup>2</sup>

This invincible narrowness of Peter's own educational outlook would have prevented the achievement even of Peter's utilitarian educational purposes if the operation of our 'law' that 'one thing leads to another' had not run away with Peter's educational policy after his death.

'In his own lifetime . . . going to school in the West . . . neither led to the results he desired nor had much immediate effect upon Russian culture. His own intensely practical bent and his coarse heavy-handedness caused him to treat his subjects far too much like inanimate objects upon which could be rapidly imposed a new impress or novel tasks . . . [Yet] this . . . aspect of his Westernisation . . . was perhaps in its ultimate influence the most far-reaching of his innovations . . . [for,] within the next two generations . . . , very different results began to flow from Peter's peremptory insistence on training abroad. Among many of the upper class a taste for foreign travel rapidly developed, once it was no longer obligatory and no longer to be spent in antipathetic apprenticeship to navigation or gunnery. From such travel, and from Peter's opening of the door to foreign books and foreign ideas, modern Russian literature and culture were born.'<sup>3</sup>

The vigour with which an exotic Western culture was introduced through these primarily utilitarian educational channels by Peter the Great into Muscovy and by Mehmed 'Ali into Egypt makes the parallel measures in Mahmūd II's Turkey seem feeble and desultory by comparison; yet here too we can observe the same progressive expansion of a new-fangled educational system *alla Franca* from a narrowly naval and military nucleus.<sup>4</sup> Mahmūd II's unsuccessful forerunner Selim III (*imperabat* A.D. 1789-1807) had given a new impetus to a military engineering school founded by 'Abd-al-Hamid I (*imperabat* A.D. 1773-89) by reorganizing it under French and British management.<sup>5</sup> Selim had also opened a school of navigation;<sup>6</sup> and one of the professors at Mahmūd II's military engineering school, who was the son of a *khoja* of Jewish origin, became a pioneer translator of Western technological works into Turkish.<sup>7</sup> Though an Imperial Military School

<sup>1</sup> See p. 551, n. 1, above.—A.J.T.

<sup>2</sup> Sumner, *op. cit.*, pp. 152 and 205.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 205.

<sup>4</sup> See Davison, R. H.: *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876* (thesis submitted to Harvard University for the degree of Ph.D., 1st April, 1942), p. 98, cited here, by permission of the author, while in process of revision for possible publication.

<sup>5</sup> See Kramers, J. H., s.v. 'Selim III', in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, vol. iv (London 1934, Luzac), p. 220. 'The Westernising movement did not spring fully armed from the head of Selim III. Mahmūd I (*imperabat* A.D. 1730-54) employed the Comte de Bonneval to reorganise the Corps of Bombardiers on Western lines. Under Mustafā III (*imperabat* A.D. 1757-73) Baron de Tott did the same for the Artillery and taught at the newly established School of Naval Engineering. Nor should Hâilî Hamid Pasha in the next reign be forgotten: he opened a School of Military Engineering and strove vigorously to modernise the Army until 'Abd-al-Hamid I (*imperabat* A.D. 1773-89) began to suspect him of preparing a *coup d'état*'—G. L. Lewis in *The Listener*, 4th December, 1952, p. 934.

<sup>6</sup> See Kramers, *ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> See Davison, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

was founded in Turkey in A.D. 1830,<sup>1</sup> it was said<sup>2</sup> that the only manual of instruction possessed by Mahmūd II's new-model Turkish army as late as *circa* A.D. 1835 was an elementary handbook with the title *L'École du Soldat* which had been bought by Khosrev Pasha from a French corporal named Gaillard; but a polytechnic for officers under the management of three French instructors was opened *circa* A.D. 1846;<sup>3</sup> and this step was followed up by the opening of an agricultural school in A.D. 1848<sup>4</sup> and a veterinary school in A.D. 1850.<sup>4</sup> The opening, in the same year 1850, of a school for training civil servants in the mosque of the Vālideh Sūltān in Istanbul followed up Mahmūd II's foundation of schools for the same purpose in the mosques of Sultan Ahmed and Sultan Suleymān.<sup>4</sup> A scheme for secular primary education in Turkey was approved on paper in A.D. 1846, but the first effective steps in this direction were not taken till some twenty years later,<sup>5</sup> and then only at French instigation.

In the history of the Westernization of the Ottoman and Russian worlds the waves of Western cultural influence that were sent coursing through the veins of the Westernizing society's body social by an Herodian-minded autocrat's initial measures for the limited purpose of providing himself with an officers' corps trained in the contemporary Western art of war were reinforced by waves of comparable potency arising from parallel measures, likewise inspired by the example of contemporary Western practice, for looking after the health of the troops and crews of standing armies and navies modelled on a Western pattern.

In Russia the organization of public hygiene, which Peter had first approached from a naval and military standpoint,<sup>6</sup> had progressed far beyond its narrow original limits by the end of Peter's reign. An Imperial Medical Chancery was established in Russia in A.D. 1725;<sup>7</sup> precautionary measures were taken against the plague;<sup>7</sup> and, when this scourge attacked Moscow in A.D. 1773, the public health service demonstrated its efficiency.<sup>8</sup> In A.D. 1764 the Empress Catherine II set a personal example in the field of preventive medicine by submitting to vaccination.<sup>9</sup>

In Egypt, Mehmed 'Ali's approach to the exotic Western institution of public hygiene was the same as Peter's in Russia. His motives in introducing Western medicine into his dominions were a concern for the health of his new-model army<sup>10</sup> and a terror of the plague.<sup>11</sup> He was

<sup>1</sup> See Engelhardt, E.: *La Turquie et le Tanzimat* (Paris 1882-4, Cotillon & Pichon [successeur]), 2 vols.), vol. ii, p. 8, n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> See Rosen, G.: *Geschichte der Türkei von dem Siege der Reform im Jahre 1826 bis zum Pariser Tractat vom Jahre 1856* (Leipzig 1856, Hirzel, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. 232.

<sup>3</sup> See Engelhardt, op. cit., vol. i, p. 82.

<sup>4</sup> See Engelhardt, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 8, n. 1.

<sup>5</sup> See Engelhardt, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 296.

<sup>6</sup> See Mettig, op. cit., p. 266. The first hospital in Russia was a military one founded by Peter the Great (see Sumner, op. cit., p. 206).

<sup>7</sup> See Mettig, op. cit., p. 266.

<sup>8</sup> See op. cit., p. 92.

<sup>9</sup> See op. cit., p. 94. The officiant on this occasion was an English doctor. Russian doctors did not rise to taking equal rank with foreigners till after the beginning of the nineteenth century (ibid., p. 91), and Russians were originally debarred altogether from practising as apothecaries (p. 90).

<sup>10</sup> See Clot, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 369.

<sup>11</sup> As early in his reign as A.D. 1812—thirteen years before the arrival of the French



fortunate in being served by a French medical officer, Dr. A. B. Clot, who was not only competent but was also imaginative, public spirited, and courageous. In the course of his fifteen years' service in Egypt, Clot succeeded in propagating his new-fangled and unwelcome organization of public hygiene *alla Franca* from its first narrow lodgement in Suleymān Pasha's cantonments into the remotest corners of native Egyptian civil life.

With five years' study of medicine in his native France behind him,<sup>1</sup> Clot arrived in Egypt in A.D. 1825<sup>2</sup> to organize a medical service for the Egyptian Army, and managed to secure the adoption of the French Army's health regulations and the establishment of a *conseil de santé* on the same French military pattern.<sup>3</sup> He showed his imagination in arranging that the officers of his medical corps should wear exactly the same uniforms as the combatant officers of corresponding rank,<sup>4</sup> and his courage in insisting that Christian members of the corps should be given the same status as their Muslim colleagues;<sup>5</sup> but the great achievement in his career was his victory in a struggle to break out of the narrow confines of the barrack square into the vast virgin field of native Egyptian civil life.

Against a violent opposition—inspired by a general spirit of Islamic conservatism and a particular Islamic prejudice against the practical study of anatomy by the experimental method of dissection—Clot succeeded in persuading Mehmed 'Ali to found a medical school.<sup>6</sup> The school was opened in A.D. 1827<sup>7</sup> with a hundred Egyptian pupils, who were maintained and paid by the Government, and with seven Western professors of divers nationalities.<sup>8</sup> A midwives' school, a maternity hospital, a pharmaceutical school, a preparatory school, and a school for learning French<sup>9</sup> were attached to the medical school itself,<sup>10</sup> and the two last-mentioned subsidiary institutions for providing Egyptian medical students with a general education on Western lines were manifestly indispensable adjuncts to the undertaking, since, to begin with, the teaching had to be given through interpreters.<sup>11</sup> Twelve of the original batch of pupils were sent on to Paris, where they were examined (in French) by the Academy of Medicine and were given the degree of doctor of medicine by the medical faculty of the university.<sup>12</sup> The popular

physician Clot in Egypt to organize a public health service for him—Mehmed 'Ali set up a quarantine control at the port of Alexandria, on the advice of resident Western physicians in private practice there, after receipt of the news that the plague had broken out in Constantinople (Jabarti, *op. cit.*, vol. viii, p. 341). Early in A.D. 1813 the Pasha, without lifting his outlandish quarantine, reinforced it by the more familiar traditional Islamic preventive measure of giving orders for the liturgical reading aloud of Al-Bukhārī's theological works in the Mosque of Al-Azhar; but after three days the 'ulamā broke off the recitation out of laziness (*ibid.*, vol. ix, p. 9). The Grand Qādi of Egypt declared his official approval of the quarantine (*ibid.*, p. 19), but the troops paid no attention to it (*ibid.*, p. 22).

<sup>1</sup> See Clot, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 373.

<sup>2</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 375.

<sup>3</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 383-4.

<sup>4</sup> French, Italian, Spanish, German (*ibid.*, p. 391). These Frankish professors were required, as part of their duties, to attend at the hospitals (Bowring, *op. cit.*, pp. 134-5).

<sup>5</sup> The French professors in this school taught mathematics, history, and geography, as well as their mother tongue (Bowring, *op. cit.*, p. 134).

<sup>6</sup> See Clot, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 385-7.

<sup>7</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 384.

<sup>8</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 370.

<sup>9</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 376.

<sup>10</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 384.

<sup>11</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 388.

prejudice against dissection was successfully overcome;<sup>1</sup> but the military discipline, to which Clot's medical students were subject, had to be rigorously enforced;<sup>2</sup> and, like his colleague and compatriot the French soldier Sève (*alias* Suleymān Pasha), this intrepid French medical officer risked his life in doing his duty.<sup>3</sup>

Clot had his reward when his medical school was transferred from its original site at Abu Za'bal to the Qasr-al-'Ayn Palace in Cairo,<sup>4</sup> and when he was allowed to turn the former military hospital on the Ezbekīyeh Square in Cairo into a civilian hospital in the Western style<sup>5</sup> and to transfer to it the patients languishing in an old-fashioned *mārastān* that had been founded by the Mamluk Sultān Qalā'ūn (*dominabatur* A.D. 1279-90).<sup>6</sup> By the year A.D. 1840 (the date of publication of Clot's book) the Ezbekīyeh civilian hospital had seven hundred beds (divided in equal numbers between the men's and the women's wards), with additional provision for maternity cases and for lunatics, while there were now eighteen hundred beds in the Cairo military hospital, which had been transferred to Qasr-al-'Ayn.<sup>7</sup> Side by side with these medical establishments in and around Cairo, Alexandria had been equipped by the same date with an *intendance de santé*, a naval hospital containing 1,200-1,500 beds, and a military hospital containing 500-600 beds.<sup>8</sup> Clot's original maternity hospital, which remained at Abu Za'bal, had a French directress, recruited from the maternity hospital of Paris, and a staff of Sudanese and Abyssinian midwives.<sup>9</sup> Madame Gault taught her apprentices the French language as well as the Western midwife's art, and the negro women, as well as the Amhāras, proved to be intelligent.<sup>10</sup> A new maternity hospital, with a school of midwifery attached to it, was afterwards opened in Cairo.<sup>11</sup>

One of the most valuable fruits of Clot Bey's labours was the translation into Arabic, and publication in Egypt, of Western medical works;<sup>12</sup> and this indefatigable propagator of Western culture in Dār-al-Islām through a medical channel had full justification for claiming that

'L'École de médecine a été déjà et sera toujours un foyer de lumières rayonnant sur toute la population.'<sup>13</sup>

A traditional Islamic fanaticism and superstition had been successfully eradicated from the souls of Clot Bey's medical students;<sup>14</sup> and by A.D.

<sup>1</sup> See Clot, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 385.

<sup>2</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 385 and 389.

<sup>3</sup> One of Clot Bey's pupils attempted to assassinate him (*ibid.*, pp. 388-9). The attempt made on Sève's life by the recruits whom he was training has been recorded on p. 242, n. 2, above.

<sup>4</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 396.

<sup>4</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 392.

<sup>5</sup> See Clot, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 282.

<sup>6</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 393, n. 2.

<sup>7</sup> See Clot, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 393. A pagan Sudanese or a Monophysite Christian Abyssinian would be free from the prejudice that inhibited a Muslim Egyptian woman of that generation from qualifying for a profession which was likewise still without honour in contemporary Western eyes that had less excuse for looking down upon it, considering that by this time they were already aware of its practical utility.

<sup>10</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 393 and 394, n. 2.

<sup>11</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 394, n. 2.

<sup>12</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 397.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 397-8.

<sup>14</sup> This claim of Clot's that Western medicine was breaking down religious barriers in Egypt was endorsed by Bowring in *op. cit.*, p. 141. The introduction, into a traditional Islamic social milieu, of Western medicine for the benefit of human beings probably had to contend with a more stubborn opposition than the contemporaneous introduction of the Western veterinary art, since, in a department of medicine in which the

1840 it was already possible for this benevolent Western Lucifer to observe that

'Ces progrès intellectuels portés dans les familles y fructifient peu à peu, et de là se répandent parmi leurs compatriotes.'<sup>1</sup>

Clot Bey's claim that the Western art of medicine had proved in Egypt to be a particularly potent vehicle for the radiation of the Western culture is borne out by a piquant illustration preserved in the dossier of an official British observer who was visiting Egypt about the time when Clot was sending his book to the press. In his report submitted to Lord Palmerston on the 27th March, 1839, Sir John Bowring mentions that

'There is a hospital at Alexandria, for the special use of the Navy—though sometimes a few persons are admitted, on an order of the governor, who are not employed in the public service, and a department of the hospital has lately been applied to the reception of pregnant women, whose acceptance of the aid of Frank medical men is one of the most remarkable evidences of the growth of a more tolerant and enlightened spirit.'<sup>2</sup>

The presence of a lying-in ward within the precincts of a naval hospital seems as incongruous to Western minds imprisoned in their own preconceived order of ideas as the initiation of a liberal political revolution by subaltern military officers; yet in this case, as in that, a combination of circumstances that would have been bizarre on native Western ground turns out to have been natural and normal in a non-Western social milieu that was in process of being penetrated by Western cultural influences. The master-link in a chain of social cause and effect leading inevitably to a result that is surprising only at first sight is duly pointed out in a report on the medical schools in Mehmed 'Ali's Egypt, from the pen of Clot Bey himself, which is incorporated in Bowring's general report to Palmerston.

'In commencing the great work of reformatations that he determined upon, Mahomet Ali made offers to European officers of every rank and department; a general military organisation was introduced; and then, as a matter of course, a medical service was created for the preservation of the Egyptian forces.'<sup>3</sup>

The key here provided by Clot makes it easy for us to solve the riddle that is presented at first sight by the presence of a lying-in ward in a naval

beneficiaries were animals, the Islamic prejudice against the dissection of human bodies did not arise, while on the other hand Muslim minds were predisposed in its favour by a humane Islamic tradition (which put contemporary Western practice to shame) of showing mercy to non-human living creatures. Veterinary surgeons were introduced by Mehmed 'Ali into Egypt from the West in A.D. 1827, and a veterinary school, originally located at Rosetta, was afterwards transferred to Abu Za'bal, where it was placed on the same footing as Clot Bey's medical school there. The head of this veterinary school, who was a Frenchman named Hamont, won Mehmed 'Ali's heart by improving the quality of the Pasha's stud. The course of study at the school extended over five years; and here, as in the medical school, one of the fruits of Westernization was the translation into Arabic, and publication in Egypt, of the principal Western scientific works on the subject (Clot, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 407-14).

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 397-8.

<sup>2</sup> Bowring, J.: *Report on Egypt and Candia* (London 1840, Clowes & Clowes), pp. 55-56. *Cp.* p. 141, n. \*

<sup>3</sup> Clot Bey in Bowring, *op. cit.*, p. 139. This passage from Clot's pen is reproduced in paraphrase by Bowring in his own report on p. 138.

hospital at Alexandria in A.D. 1839. In an earlier chapter of this Part,<sup>1</sup> we have already noticed that Mehmed 'Ali had been quick to learn, from his experience in the Napoleonic Wars, the lesson that, in the contemporary play of Western power politics, sea power was a supremely potent instrument of policy. Upon his acquisition of the Pashalyq of Egypt, he had promptly translated observation into action by equipping himself with a navy of the contemporary Western pattern; and, after losing the best part of his newly acquired fleet at Navarino in A.D. 1827, he had turned a disaster to good account by setting himself to re-create his navy on a sounder basis than before. At this second essay, he had no longer been content just to buy up ready-made Western warships and to hire ready-trained Western naval officers. He had decided to establish at Alexandria a naval arsenal in which warships designed on Western lines by Egyptian naval architects and built by Egyptian artificers were to be commanded and navigated by Egyptian naval officers and manned by Egyptian crews. This was Mehmed 'Ali's ultimate objective when he founded his arsenal at Alexandria in A.D. 1829; but so ambitious a goal as this was manifestly impossible to attain at one bound. The new Egyptian naval arsenal could not become a going concern without receiving at least a first impetus from the hands of imported Western naval officers, naval architects, and shipwrights. Accordingly, negotiations were opened for enlisting the services of a fresh batch of Western naval experts. But these Western technicians who were still indispensable agents for the execution of Mehmed 'Ali's purpose in this field were unwilling to accept the Pasha's invitation to take up employment in Egypt, even on attractive financial terms, unless they could bring their families with them; and they were unwilling to expose their wives and children to the plagues of Egypt without being assured of having Western physicians on the spot to look after their health.

No doctors, no arsenal! The instalment of a Western medical staff was a condition *sine qua non* if the Pasha was to be successful in enticing the indispensable Western naval experts to accept his offers. A proper complement of Western physicians therefore accompanied the imported Western technicians and their families, gave adequate attention to their Frankish clientele's health, and found themselves with energy still to spare and time still on their hands. Like the Franks that they were, these under-employed physicians were not content, as a contemporary 'Osmanli might have been, to accept this golden opportunity of indulging in *keyf alla Turca*. The restlessness which was the curse or blessing of the Frankish *ethos* impelled them to keep themselves busy on something; and the obvious next 'other business' on their agenda, when they had done all that they could for a handful of Frankish residents, was to try to meet the most urgent medical needs of the native population. In any mammalian society the most constant demand for medical aid is that presented by maternity cases; and thus the idea of opening a lying-in ward in their naval hospital, so far from being far-fetched, was the all but inevitable first step in the quite inevitable enlargement of the range of these imported Frankish physicians' practice.

<sup>1</sup> On p. 244, n. 1, above.

How one thing led to another in the thoughts and actions of these Western medical practitioners in *partibus Agarenorum* has now been explained; but it is none the less amazing that, through the unforeseen and unsolicited agency of Franks imported into Egypt to tend their own kind, a Macedonian Turkish Pasha's determination to provide himself with a navy on the Western model should have revolutionized the social life of the native population of the country by breaking down one of the strongest of all traditional Islamic tabus. Within the living memory of the Muslims and the Franks of Mehmed 'Ali's and Clot's generation, the best-beloved of the wives of a theoretically autocratic Ottoman Pādīshāh had been debarred by an inexorable Islamic sense of propriety from receiving, even if she were sick unto death, any more intimate ministrations from an infidel Western physician than the reading of the pulse on the wrist of a timidly exposed hand,<sup>1</sup> while the rest of the patient's sorely ailing body was condemned to remain decently invisible and unsuccoured behind the bed-curtains. The selfsame Frankish doctor, practising in Dār-al-Islām, might have had, within the normal span of a professional career, both of the two bewilderingly irreconcilable experiences of being thus constrained to fumble in the dark and of being invited to assist an accouchement with the sovereign scientific disregard for a traditional prudery that he would have been expected to show in ministering to one of his own Frankish countrywomen. And this revolution in Egyptian Muslim behaviour in one of the most intimate of all medical affairs had taken place within the brief Time-span of, at the longest, slightly less than forty-one years, reckoning back from the date of Bowring's submission of his report to the date of Napoleon's landing in Egypt,<sup>2</sup> or a mere fifteen years if we take Dr. Clot's instead of General Buonaparte's arrival in Egypt as our *terminus post quem*.

<sup>1</sup> See Penzer, N. M.: *The Harēm* (London 1936, Harrap), p. 133.

<sup>2</sup> The traditional Islamic habit of keeping middle-class and upper-class urban women in seclusion had been battered by French blows from outside before a spontaneous impulse to take advantage of proffered Frankish medical facilities made it begin to crumble from within. A lively fear of the plague, and a proportionately strong determination to take preventive measures of public hygiene, had moved the French Army which had occupied Egypt in A.D. 1798 to violate the sanctity of a haram which had previously been the Muslim householder's castle (see Jabartī, Shaykh 'Abd-ar-Rahmān al-: *'Ajā'ib-al-Athār fi'l-Tarājīm wa'l Akhbār* (French translation: Paris 1888-96, Leroux, 9 vols.), vol. vi, p. 276). The houses of Muslim families in Cairo were forcibly entered and disinfected by the French in systematic domiciliary visits (*ibid.*, p. 155), and the Chief Medical Officer of the French forces distributed a tract on smallpox to the members of the diwān (*ibid.*, p. 268). This body was an advisory council of native Egyptian notables, originally nominated by Napoleon himself, which had been instituted to serve as a link between the French occupying authorities and the Egyptian people. The diwān had at first been composed of mayors, merchants, and 'ulamā in equal numbers (see *Correspondance, Bulletins, et Ordres du Jour de Napoléon*, vol. iv: *Expédition d'Égypte* (Paris, no date, Méricaut), p. 198). It was afterwards reorganized to consist of 'ulamā exclusively (Jabartī, *op. cit.*, vol. vi, p. 259).

The insurrection in Cairo against an alien military régime provoked the French into going farther. When, in the course of suppressing this revolt, they took the suburb of Būlāq by storm, the French soldiers seized Egyptian Muslim women and taught them to adopt the Western dress and manners of the day. The sequel confirmed the truth of a dictum of the Attic poet Menander that is quoted by Saint Paul in his First Epistle to the Corinthians, chap. xv, verse 33: 'Evil communications corrupt good manners.' Egyptian Muslim women who had not been abducted by *force majeure* began to be corrupted by the gallantry of the French soldiers and by the manners of the French women who had accompanied the French expeditionary force (Jabartī, *op. cit.*, vol. vi, p. 305). Many Muslim women were voluntarily given by their fathers or other legal



This illustration shows that, when once an assaulted society's outer defences have been penetrated by an aggressively radioactive alien culture's rays, our law that 'one thing leads to another' may operate at almost break-neck speed.

(b) RESPONSES OF THE SOUL

1. *Dehumanization*

In turning our attention from the social to the psychological consequences of encounters between contemporaries, we shall still find it convenient to give separate consideration to the respective effects on the parties playing the antithetical roles of 'agent' and 'reagent'; and here again it will be best to examine the effect on the 'agent' first, since the terms of the psychological relation between our two dramatis personae are set by the party that has been the first to seize the initiative and that has thereby gained an initial ascendancy over his fellow performer.

The representatives of an aggressively radioactive civilization that has been successful in penetrating an alien body social are prone to succumb to the hybris of the Pharisee who thanks God that he is not as other men are.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, a dominant minority is apt to look down on the recruits conscripted into its internal proletariat from a subjugated alien body social as infra-human 'under-dogs'. The nemesis attending this particular vein of hybris is peculiarly ironical. In treating as an 'under-dog' the fellow human creature who happens to be momentarily at his mercy, the implicitly self-designated 'top-dog' is unconsciously reaffirming a truth to which he is intending to give the lie. The truth is that all souls are equal in the sight of their Creator; and the only result achieved by a human being who seeks to rob his fellows of their humanity is to divest himself of his own. A human being's title to say *homo sum* is contingent, as Chremés knew, upon his also saying and feeling 'humani nihil a me alienum puto';<sup>2</sup> and 'inhumanity' is a double-edged word for describing behaviour that has a twofold effect. It is impossible for a human being to commit the sin of denying the humanity of other human souls without incurring, in the act, the penalty of dehumanizing himself. This is the besetting sin of the party that happens to be in the ascendant in an encounter between contemporaries in which the assaulted body social has been successfully penetrated by the aggressor society's attack. All manifestations of inhumanity are not, however, equally heinous. In this *descensus ad inferos* there are different degrees.

The least inhuman form of inhumanity is apt to be displayed by guardians to French soldiers in lawful wedlock, in return for a nominal conversion to Islam on the French bridegroom's part; and these Muslim wives of Frankish husbands learnt their husbands' alien ways (*ibid.*). On the other hand, an 'ālim's daughter suffered the death penalty, with her father's consent, at the hands of the French authorities for having miscondacted herself with French soldiers (Jabarti, *op. cit.*, vol. vii, p. 44); and other Muslim women likewise paid with their lives for having committed the same offence (*ibid.*, p. 45). Other Muslim women, again, who had managed to commit this misdemeanour with impunity, were afterwards married off by their families to unsuspecting soldiers of the Turkish army which took over the occupation of Egypt after the French army's capitulation (*ibid.*, p. 51).

<sup>1</sup> Laïke xviii, 11.

<sup>2</sup> Terence: *Hautontimorumenos*, l. 77 (Act I, scene i, l. 25).

representatives of a successfully aggressive civilization in whose culture-pattern Religion is, and is felt and recognized to be, the governing and orienting element. In a society which has not secularized its life by breaking its way out of a religious chrysalis, the denial of 'under-dog's' humanity will take the form of an assertion of his religious nullity. A dominant Christendom will stigmatize him as an unbaptized heathen; a dominant Islamic Society, as an uncircumcised unbeliever. In thus trusting in themselves that they are righteous, and despising others,<sup>1</sup> on account of a difference in ecclesiastical allegiance, these Christians and Muslims are manifestly guilty of hybris; yet, in recognizing that 'under-dog', too, has a religion of a kind, albeit one that is erroneous and perverse, 'top-dog' is implicitly admitting that 'under-dog' is, after all, a human soul; and this means that the gulf fixed is not a permanently impassable one when the distinction between sheep and goats has been drawn in terms of religious practice and belief. A soul that has demonstrated its capacity for Religion by following even a religion that the Pharisee rejects as false and bad has at any rate thereby proved itself capable of conversion to the alternative religion that the Pharisee regards as being exclusively true and good. The ugly line dividing the human family into a superior and an inferior fraction could be obliterated eventually through the progressive conversion of the whole of heathendom to the Pharisee's persuasion; and, according to the tenets of most of the higher religions, including those of the Buddhaic as well as the Judaic school, this is not just a theoretical possibility; it is a practical goal which the true believer must do his utmost to help the Church to attain, in the pious expectation that these missionary labours will not be in vain.

This potential universality of the Church was symbolized, in the visual art of a Western Christendom in its Medieval Age, in the convention by which one of the three Magi came to be portrayed as a Negro;<sup>2</sup> and, in the practice of an Early Modern Western Christendom which had forced its presence upon all other living human societies by its feat of mastering the art of oceanic navigation, the same sense of the Church's universality had shown its sincerity in action in the readiness of the Spanish and Portuguese *conquistadores* to go to all lengths of social intercourse, including intermarriage, with bona fide converts to a Tridentine Roman Catholic Christianity, without any longer taking account either of a transcended difference of religion or of an abiding difference of language or race.<sup>3</sup> The Spanish conquerors of Peru and the Philippines were so much more eagerly concerned to impart their Christian religion than to propagate their Castilian language that they endowed the native languages of the conquered peoples with the means of resisting the spread of Castilian at their expense by developing these languages into vehicles for literary expression in order to convey the Catholic Western Christian liturgy and literature to populations that spoke these languages as their mother tongues.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Luke xviii. 9.

<sup>2</sup> See II. i. 224.

<sup>3</sup> See II. i. 224.

<sup>4</sup> In V. v. 523-4 we have already noticed that the Incas' policy of promoting the use of the Quichua language as the *lingua franca* of an Andean universal state was taken over

The readiness of the Early Modern Roman Catholic Christian agents in the diffusion of a Western culture to intermarry with their converts was impressively attested in the twentieth century of the Christian Era by the physical evidence of the mixture of blood in the contemporary populations of all *ci-devant* or subsisting dominions of the Spanish and Portuguese empires in which there had been an indigenous population of any considerable density at the time of the original conquest. A racial amalgam including cross-breeds of every degree from an all but pure West European strain to an all but pure indigenous race of the pre-Columbian or pre-da Gaman stock was at this date characteristic of the populations of the successor-states of the former Spanish Empire of the Indies, from Mexico to Bolivia and Paraguay inclusive; and it was likewise characteristic of Brazil, Portuguese West and East Africa, Goa,<sup>1</sup> and those coastal districts of Ceylon that had been annexed to an expanding Western Christendom by Portuguese conquerors before they had been wrested out of Portuguese hands by the Dutch, and out of Dutch hands by the British.

In thus demonstrating the sincerity of their religious convictions by receiving into their society all alien converts to their faith, the Spanish and Portuguese pioneers of an expanding Early Modern Christendom

and carried farther by the Catholic Christian hierarchy in the Spanish Viceroyalty of Peru. The corresponding ecclesiastical policy of using native languages, in preference to Castilian, as vehicles for the propagation of Christianity in the Philippine Islands is noticed by Wyndham, H. A.: *Problems of Imperial Trusteeship: Native Education* (London 1933, Milford), pp. 103-4. In their single-minded determination to carry out their religious mission of instructing the Filipinos in the Tridentine Catholic Christian Faith, the missionary orders in the Philippines persistently and successfully flouted the Spanish Crown's order—originally given in A.D. 1550 by Charles V and reiterated in 1636, 1770, 1772, 1774, and 1792—that the language of religious instruction for Filipinos should be Castilian (Wyndham, loc. cit., following Blair, E. H., and Robertson, J. A.: *The Philippine Islands, 1493-1893* (Cleveland, Ohio 1903-9, Clark, 55 vols.), vol. xxix, p. 265; vol. xxxv, p. 310; vol. xxxvii, p. 104; vol. xxxviii, p. 211; vol. xlv, pp. 184-6, 221, 222; vol. l, p. 15).

<sup>1</sup> In A.D. 1952 it seemed probable that, of the three West European Powers between whose empires the whole of Continental India had been partitioned five years back, Portugal would be the last to lose her surviving Continental Indian possessions, in spite of the fact that in this age Portugal was militarily and politically very much weaker than either Great Britain or France. The ground for this expectation was that the decisive factor determining the political future of Asiatic countries that had been under Western rule was the will of their inhabitants. The British had been led to evacuate India in A.D. 1947 by a recognition of, and respect for, a will to political independence among their former Indian fellow subjects which had been steadily growing in intensity, and had at the same time been captivating an ever larger proportion of the population of British India, over a period of more than half a century. In A.D. 1952 it looked as if the population of the enclaves of French-ruled territory in India would opt for a political *Gleichschaltung* with the majority of their fellow Indians, who by that date had become citizens of a fully self-governing and potentially independent Indian Union. Already in A.D. 1949 the population of Chandernagore had voted for entry into the Indian Union in virtue of an agreement, concluded between the Indian Union and France in A.D. 1948, that plebiscites should be held in Pondicherry, Mahé, Chandernagore, Karikal, and Yanam. The contemporary population of Portuguese India was hardly distinguishable in race from the inhabitants of the rest of the sub-continent, since the Portuguese blood that had been infused into the veins of the Goanese in the course of some four and a half centuries was no more than a tincture. This tincture, however, was significant, not in virtue of its physical strength, but because it was an outward visible sign of an inward spiritual union which the Portuguese conquerors of Goa had consummated with a conquered native Indian population that had embraced the conquerors' religion. In A.D. 1952 it remained to be seen whether the community of religion that was a voluntary bond between Goa and Portugal might not prove morally stronger than the community of race and the geographical contiguity that would tend to attract the tiny territory of Goa towards the mighty mass of an encompassing India.

had been anticipated by the Muslims, who, from the outset, had intermarried with their converts, without regard to differences of race. The Primitive Muslim Arab conquerors of the Sasanian Empire and Transoxania were not deterred from mingling their blood with the blood of their converted Persian and Turkish subjects by their consciousness of the physical difference between these Northerners' unattractive rudeness<sup>1</sup> and the comely swarthinness of their own noble Arab breed;<sup>2</sup> and in a later age a ruddy-cheeked and auburn-haired Ottoman Turkish Muslim empire-builder who had accentuated the peculiarities of his pristine Turkish physique by intermarriage with Orthodox Christian and Western Christian renegades of European provenance would demonstrate his abiding loyalty to his adopted Islamic faith by also intermarrying, not only with his unattractively swarthy Arabic-speaking Muslim subjects, but even with the repulsively black-skinned and frizzle-haired Sudanese, when once these uncouth barbarians had redeemed their physical and cultural defects in the 'Osmanli's eyes by embracing the true faith of Islam.<sup>3</sup>

The Islamic Society had also inherited, from a precept enshrined and consecrated in texts of the Qur'ān by the Prophet Muhammad himself, a recognition that there were certain non-Islamic religions which, in spite of their inadequacy by comparison with Islam, were authentic partial revelations of divine truth and goodness. In the pre-Islamic 'Days of Ignorance', these broken lights<sup>4</sup> of God's countenance<sup>5</sup> had been, in Muhammad's eyes, the brightest lights shining in an uncomprehending darkness;<sup>6</sup> and, on this view, they would have continued to be the best means yet vouchsafed by God to Man for his salvation if they had not been superseded in the fullness of time by a complete and definitive revelation in the shape of Islam. The affinity with Islam that was to be recognized in Judaism and Christianity as two morning stars preceding and heralding an Islamic sunrise was acknowledged in the Islamic ecclesiastical vocabulary by the bestowal of the name 'People of the Book' (*Ahl-al-Kitāb*) on communities possessing a Tōrah and a Gospel which, in the Prophet Muhammad's theophany, were divinely revealed prefaces to the Qur'ān; and this Islamic recognition of the validity of the Jewish and Christian faiths up to the limits of their imperfect spiritual illumination carried with it a political corollary. The Islamic *Shari'ah* declared that, when once any non-Muslims who were 'People of the Book' had submitted to Muslim rule and had agreed to pay a surtax to the Islamic state in token of their submission and in return for a Muslim guarantee of their security, this transaction conferred on these *dhimmi's* a right to be protected by the Muslim 'ascendancy' without being required to renounce their inherited non-Muslim faith.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The Arabs' use of the term *hamrā'* as a depreciatory epithet for their northerly subjects is noticed by Al-Balādhuri in his *Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān* (see the English translation published by the Columbia University Press, vol. i (1916) p. 441, and Part II (1924), p. 251).

<sup>2</sup> See II. i. 226.

<sup>3</sup> Tennyson: *In Memoriam*, Invocation, stanza 5.

<sup>4</sup> Job xxix. 24 and Psalm iv. 6.

<sup>7</sup> See II. ii. 245; IV. iv. 225-6; V. v. 674-5; and V. vi. 204-5.

<sup>1</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 226-7.

<sup>6</sup> John i. 5.

A privilege which had perhaps been confined originally to the Jews and Christians and Sabians was tacitly extended, in the event, to cover not only the Zoroastrians<sup>1</sup> but also even the polytheistic and idolatrous Hindus; so that in practice the Muslims came to recognize that the adherents of all other higher religions had a moral claim to be tolerated by the followers of Islam on the implicit ground that they too, in their degree, had been recipients of revelation from the One True God. This treatment *de facto* as 'People of the Book', which the Zoroastrians and Hindus enjoyed in Dār-al-Islām, was accorded to the Jews in Christendom;<sup>2</sup> for, though the status was not recognized *de jure* in the canon law of the Christian Church, it was no more possible for Christianity than it was for Islam to cut the ground of its own moral claims to theological validity from under its own feet by proscribing another higher religion which was not only older than it was, but was its forerunner according to its own contention.<sup>3</sup>

The positive attitude, manifested in this Islamic concept of 'People of the Book', towards another religion that can be recognized as being spiritually akin to one's own, has its antithesis in a negative attitude manifested in the Christian concepts of 'schismatics' and 'heretics'. From this antithetical negative standpoint the spiritual affinity with the Church that is displayed by a community which is nevertheless beyond the Church's pale is not a merit carrying a title to toleration; it is a perversity calling for extirpation by physical force if persuasion cannot wean these lost souls away from their provocative sin against the light. An Islam which had succeeded in rising to a spiritually higher level in its attitude towards non-Islamic 'People of the Book' descended to the prevailing Christian level in its attitude towards enemies that were men of its own house.<sup>4</sup> The feud within the bosom of Islam between a usually dominant majority which eulogized its own version of the True Faith by calling it 'the Beaten Track (*Sunnah*)', while it denigrated its usually down-trodden minoritarian opponents' version by calling it 'the Sect (*Shī'ah*)', came to display all the rancour, violence, and cruelty that, in a pre-Islamic Christendom, had been displayed in the successive feuds between Catholics and Gnostics, Trinitarians and Arians, Christolatrists and Nestorians, Melchites and Monophysites; and Christendom, for its part, remained blind to the import of the disaster that had been the penalty of a fratricidal civil war when a Christian house divided against itself by the Melchite-Monophysite feud had fallen<sup>5</sup> at one blow from a Muslim sword. If this lesson had been read and taken to heart by the Christians of the seventh century of their era, Christians of subsequent centuries might not have had the face to revive the Christian scandals of

<sup>1</sup> See the Qur'ān, Surah xxii. 17, quoted in V. v. 674, n. 2.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 272-313, above.

<sup>3</sup> The historical and theological relation of Christianity to Judaism explains why the Christian Church never extended its tacit toleration of Judaism to an Islam which was in one aspect a post-Christian reversion to Judaism from Christianity. In the Christian view the tolerance morally due to a truly though imperfectly inspired pre-Christian approximation towards Christianity could not properly be extended to a perverse back-sliding from the Christian summit of religious attainment.

<sup>4</sup> Micah vii. 6; Matt. x. 21 and 35-36; Mark xiii. 12; and Luke xxi. 16.

<sup>5</sup> Matt. xii. 25; Mark iii. 24-25; and Luke xi. 17.



a pre-Islamic age of Christian history in the latter-day feuds between Eastern Orthodox Christians and Western Catholics and between Roman Catholics and Protestants within the fold of a Western Church which, in contemporary Eastern Orthodox eyes, was uniformly schismatic in its Protestant as well as in its Roman aberration.

Apart from this stiff-necked refusal to admit that their professed principles of toleration were applicable to their family quarrels, the followers of higher religions of Judaic origin could not always bring themselves to apply these principles in practice to the believers in other Judaic faiths. The Western Christian barbarian conquerors of the Iberian Peninsula gave the subjugated Jews, as well as the subjugated Muslims, a choice in which the grim three proffered options of annihilation, expulsion, and conversion to Christianity were substituted for Christendom's traditional offer, to the Jews in her midst, of toleration at the price of penalization;<sup>1</sup> and, when the progeny of the Jews who had chosen to profess conversion in Spain in preference to exile, or who had been constrained to profess conversion in Portugal as the only way left open to them there of escaping death, came to prosper in the Christian community which they had thus entered under duress, the envy of their non-Semitic compatriots and co-religionists found vent in witch-hunts whose victims forfeited their property and were put to death by the fiendishly cruel torment of burning them alive if they were convicted of having remained crypto-Jews or having secretly embraced some heretical form of Christianity.

We have still to take note of the greatest intellectual and moral inconsistency of all in the conduct of 'top-dog' towards 'under-dog' when 'top-dog's' denial of 'under-dog's' humanity has taken the form of asserting his religious nullity. The free passage from one ecclesiastical allegiance to another, as a sequel to becoming convinced of the spiritual superiority of the religion to which the spiritual pilgrim's loyalty is being transferred, had always been 'a one-way street' under the ecclesiastical by-laws of the dominant religious party. In Islamic customary practice, for example, a meritorious conversion that was rewarded with the guerdon of a genuinely unreserved admission into the bosom of the Islamic body social took on the polar aspect of an abominable apostasy whose inexorable penalty was death if ever it was a question of a Muslim seeing the light in some other religion, and following this new light that he saw to the non-Islamic goal to which it led. Inconsistency, injustice, and intolerance are the inevitable fruits of inhumanity in all its forms; yet the relative innocuousness of inhumanity in the form of religious discrimination becomes apparent when we observe the noxiousness of its effects in the lower forms to which it is capable of descending.

The next least noxious form of 'top-dog's' denial of 'under-dog's' humanity is an assertion of 'under-dog's' cultural nullity in a society that has broken out of a traditional religious chrysalis and has translated

<sup>1</sup> See II. ii. 244. This threefold choice was the ultimatum presented to the Castilian Jews in A.D. 1391 and A.D. 1492. The choice placed before the Portuguese Jews in A.D. 1497 was one between the two harsher alternatives only; they were not given the option of going into exile (see II. ii. 247, n. 3.).

its values into secular terms. In the history of the cultural aggression of the civilizations of the second generation, this was the connotation of the distinction drawn by members of an Hellenic Society between 'Hellenes' and 'Barbarians',<sup>1</sup> and by members of a Sinic Society between their cultivated selves and the miserable 'E' who still languished in outer darkness on the fringes of a Sinic World which, in Sinic belief, was the unique treasure-house of 'Civilization' with a capital 'C'. In a Late Modern Western World this cultural dichotomy of Mankind into 'civilized people' and 'barbarians' had found exponents in the French, who had half-consciously revived or half-spontaneously re-conceived this Hellenic concept in working out their relations with the North American Indians in the eighteenth century, with the Maghribis and Annamese in the nineteenth century, and with the Negro peoples of the French African Empire south of the Sahara in the twentieth century of the Christian Era. In the same Late Modern Age of Western history the same attitude had been adopted by the Dutch in their relations with the Malay peoples of Indonesia. In the Cape Province of South Africa, Cecil Rhodes had sought to kindle the same cultural ideal in the hearts of his Dutch-speaking and English-speaking fellow

<sup>1</sup> In the Hellenic usage of this pair of antithetical terms the dichotomy of Mankind for which the terms stood in the fifth century B.C. and in all subsequent ages of Hellenic history except the last age of all was a distinction between people who led and people who did not lead the Hellenic way of life as this was lived in whatever the age might be. In this established classical usage of the terms the criterion by which a human being or community was numbered either among the Hellenic sheep or among the barbarian goats was cultural, not religious or linguistic.

The Aetolian, Epirot, Macedonian, and Paconian Greek-speaking barbarians in Continental European Greece to the west of the Ozolian Locris and to the west and north of Thessaly were not accepted as Hellenes in this prevailing cultural sense until the post-Alexandrine Age, and it was not till the penultimate phase of Hellenic history, in which the Hellenic World was united politically in a universal state established by Latin-speaking empire-builders, that the most northerly of these barbarians with a Greek mother tongue—the Agriānes and Dentheletae round the headwaters of the rivers Strymon (Struma) and Oescus (Isker)—were brought within the fold of the Hellenic culture by its latter-day non-Greek-speaking Roman propagators whose forebears had graduated as masters of Hellenic arts in the generation of Titus Quinctius Flamininus in the early years of the second century B.C. On the other hand there were non-Greek-speaking peoples—first and foremost the Carians and the Lycians at the south-east corner of the Aegean Basin—who had been Hellenes in the cultural sense since the earliest date at which a distinctively Hellenic culture had been discernible. This non-concomitance of the area in which the Greek language was spoken and the area in which the Hellenic way of life was lived has already been noticed in other contexts (see III. iii. 478; V. v. 484; and pp. 412–14, above).

In origin, however, the term 'barbaros' was an onomatopoeic word signifying the speaker of a language that sounded like gibberish to ears attuned to Greek, and it still bears the linguistic meaning suggested by its etymology in the Homeric phrase *Kāper βαρβαρόφωνοι* (*Iliad*, Book II, l. 867). The term 'Hellen', again, originally denoted, not a follower of the Greek way of life, but a citizen of some one of a number of political communities that enjoyed the privilege of membership in a local religious association of the friends, neighbours, and patrons ('Amphictyones') of a pair of shrines in the central segment of European Greece: the temple of the Anthelan Artemis at Thermopylae and the temple of the Pythian Apollo at Delphi. It is noteworthy that, in the last phase of Hellenic history, the antithesis between Hellenic and Barbarian reacquired the religious connotation that had been the word 'Hellen's' original significance. The Greek-writing Early Christian Fathers' self-consciously defiant laudatory use of the word 'barbarian' to denote a Jewish and Christian religious revelation that was to supersede the Hellenic philosophy proved to be too bizarre a *tour de force* to establish itself; but, after the official conversion of the Roman Empire to Christianity, the term 'Hellenic' eventually came to signify, in Christian Greek parlance, a crank whose notion of loyalty to the Hellenic culture took the perversely religious form of clinging to some pre-Christian form of Paganism.

Whites when he had coined his slogan 'Equal rights for every civilized man south of the Zambesi'.<sup>1</sup>

In South Africa this spark of idealism had been smothered, after the establishment of the Union in A.D. 1910, by the eruption of a narrow-hearted and violent-minded Afrikaner Dutch Nationalism which, not content with waging a fratricidal linguistic warfare against the English-speaking members of a dominant minority of West European provenance, was also bent on asserting its ascendancy over its South African fellow countrymen of Bantu, Indonesian, and Indian origin in the name of a superiority to which the Afrikaner laid claim on the score neither of his Early Modern Western culture nor of his Calvinist religion but of his Nordic race. The French, on the other hand, had gone to impressive lengths in giving political effect to their cultural convictions.<sup>2</sup>

Even in the Maghrib—where, as in South Africa, public policy was constrained to accommodate itself to the ambivalently hostile feelings of a dominant minority of West European origin that was fearful of being swamped by a native majority which it not only feared but also despised—the acquisition of full French citizenship had been open since A.D. 1865 to native Algerian subjects of the Islamic faith on condition of their acquiescing in the jurisdiction of the French civil law which the status of full French citizenship automatically imposed on its recipients. It is true that the French 'ascendancy's' insistence on the maintenance of this condition ensured, as it was intended to ensure, that the number of Maghribi French subjects applying for full French citizenship should

<sup>1</sup> When challenged to define his phrase 'civilized man' in the course of the debate on the third reading of the Glen Grey Bill in the Cape of Good Hope House of Assembly, Rhodes is reported to have responded by declaring on the 9th August, 1894, that he meant 'a man, whether Black or White, who has sufficient education to write his name, has some property, or works—in fact is not a loafer' (see McDonald, J. G.: *Rhodes, A Life* (London 1927, Philip Allen), p. 171). In his speech during the debate on the second reading of the Glen Grey Bill, Rhodes is reported to have said: 'We fail utterly when we put natives on an equality with ourselves. . . . What we may expect after a hundred years of civilization, I do not know. If I may venture a comparison, I would compare the natives generally, with regard to European Civilization, to fellow-tribesmen of the Druids, and just suppose that they were come to life after the two thousand years which have elapsed since their existence. That is the position' ('Vindex': *Cecil Rhodes, His Political Life and Speeches, 1881-1900* (London 1900, Chapman & Hall), p. 379).

Neither of these passages is to be found in the Cape of Good Hope 'Hansard' entitled *Debates in the House of Assembly in the First Session of the Ninth Parliament of the Cape of Good Hope, 17th May to 18th August, 1894* (Cape Town 1894, 'Cape Times' Printing Works), in which the context of the words reported by 'Vindex' appears on p. 364, col. 2, as part of Rhodes' speech of the 26th July [not the 30th July, which is the date given by 'Vindex'] on the second reading, while the debate on the third reading is reported there on pp. 464, col. 2, to 470, col. 1. But this non-appearance of Rhodes' alleged words in 'Hansard' does not, of course, constitute a disproof of their authenticity.

In his speech in the House of Representatives on the 26th July, 1894, as reported in 'Hansard', Rhodes is represented as saying that 'he had based all his replies on the understanding that, in so far as brains, the Natives were different' (p. 369, col. 1). This apparent profession of a belief in the existence of insurmountable intellectual differences correlated with physical differences seems to be in contradiction with a reference (reported on a lower line of the same column) to 'this barbarian or this gentleman who had just emerged from barbarism' and with an earlier statement (reported on p. 367, col. 1) that Rhodes 'thought they might first allow those children just emerged from barbarism to manage their own local affairs'. In the adjourned debate on the second reading of the Bill on the 2nd August, he is represented in 'Hansard' (p. 418, col. 1) as talking of 'the second stage of the Natives—that was, when they were emerging from pure barbarism, as compared with the third stage, when they were, apart from colour, apparently the same as the Whites'. This last-quoted passage has a decidedly French or Roman flavour.

<sup>2</sup> See II. i. 225.

be negligibly small, since a submission to the French civil law was incompatible with the retention of an Islamic 'personal statute' which few Maghribi Muslims in that age were willing to renounce. The opposition of the West European colonists in French North-West Africa proved powerful enough, during the interval between the two world wars, to prevent the passage through the parliament in Paris of legislation for enabling an *élite* of culturally *évolués* Muslim native Algerian French subjects to acquire full French citizenship without their any longer being required to sacrifice their Islamic 'personal statute'<sup>1</sup> as the purchase price of this political privilege; and it was not till the 7th March, 1944, that the Algerian Muslims were granted exemption from having to fulfil this, for them, all but prohibitive condition in virtue of an ordinance adopted on that date by the French Committee of National Liberation.<sup>2</sup>

This ordinance conferred full French citizenship, without forfeiture of Islamic 'personal statute', on Algerian Muslim French subjects falling within certain specified categories,<sup>3</sup> and provided for their registration on the same electoral lists as their non-Muslim fellow citizens, while all other Algerian Muslim adult males were enrolled in electoral colleges empowered to elect two-fifths of the members of the Algerian General Assembly and departmental and municipal councils, except in those municipalities in which the Muslims constituted less than two-fifths of the local population—where proportionate reductions in their communal representation were to be made. The ordinance of the 7th March, 1944, also proclaimed the abolition of all discrimination between Muslims and non-Muslims in Algeria; and the quota of Muslim seats on Algerian public bodies was raised from 40 per cent. to 50 per cent. by the terms of the French Constitution promulgated on the 27th October, 1946, though this concession to Algerian Muslim French subjects was offset by the simultaneous doubling of the numbers of the non-Muslim French electors in Algeria as an automatic consequence of the enfranchisement of female non-Muslim (but not female Muslim) French nationals. Thereafter, the Statute of Algeria, passed by the Parliament in Paris on the 1st September, 1947, transformed the former Financial Delegations in Algeria into a Financial Assembly in

<sup>1</sup> See Toynbee, A. J., and Boulter, V. M.: *Survey of International Affairs, 1937*, vol. i (London 1938, Milford), pp. 496-7 and 511-27. This abortive French inter-war legislation had a notable precedent in the Roman practice of allowing Jewish Roman subjects to become Roman citizens without renouncing the observance of the Law of Moses. The Jews of the Roman Empire were accorded this politic exceptional privilege by the Roman Imperial Government because—like the Muslim, and unlike the Jewish, indigenous French subjects in the Maghrib—the Jews, alone among the multifarious subjects of Rome, had shown themselves unwilling to purchase the political treasure of citizenship at the religious price of renouncing their hereditary 'personal statute' (Toynbee, *op. cit.*, vol. cit., p. 496, n. 1, and p. 497, n. 5).

<sup>2</sup> See Kirk, George: *The Middle East in the War* (London 1953, Cumberlege), Part III (viii) (e), p. 422, in the *Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946*.

<sup>3</sup> The members of these categories amounted to at least 60,000 persons in all, as against the 7,817 Algerian Muslims who had possessed French citizenship in A.D. 1936. There were, however, about 400,000 non-Muslim French citizens entitled to vote in the national parliamentary elections in the three Algerian Departments of France (Kirk, *op. cit.*, p. 422), while, according to the Algerian census of the 8th March, 1936, the total number of French citizens of European origin in the three Algerian Departments at that date had amounted to not more than 978,297 out of a total population, in these three Departments, of 6,592,033 (Toynbee and Boulter, *op. cit.*, p. 491, n. 1, and p. 493).

which French citizens and French subjects were to be represented in equal numbers; but the last word remained, as before, with the Governor-General.

Meanwhile in Tropical Africa, where French public policy did not have to contend with the pride and fear of European colonists, it had been carried by this time to its logical conclusion in individual cases which were as striking as they were rare.

The sincerity of the French in acting on their ideal of opening all political and social doors in France and the French Empire to anyone who had successfully graduated in the French version of a Late Modern Western culture was demonstrated, within the present writer's lifetime, by an incident which, in vindicating the honour of France, had an appreciable effect on the outcome of the World War of A.D. 1939-45. In the phase of this war that followed the fall of France in June 1940, it was a question of great moment whether Marshal Pétain's Government at Vichy or the Free French Movement temporarily based on Great Britain would succeed in rallying to its cause the strategically and economically important French territories beyond the limits of a temporarily prostrate European France. At this critical juncture the Governor of the Chad Province of French Equatorial Africa was a French citizen of Negro African race, Monsieur Félix Eboué; this Negro African Frenchman by cultural adoption duly exercised the political responsibility attaching to his post in the French public service by opting in favour of General de Gaulle; and the moral effect of his lead on the hearts and minds of his European French colleagues as well as his African French kith and kin produced the momentous political result of giving the Free French Movement its first foothold in the French Empire in Africa.

This French example shows that the cultural as well as the religious criterion for drawing the inhuman distinction between 'top-dog' and 'under-dog' is a form of denying 'under-dog's' humanity that does not fix an impassable gulf between the two fractions into which it artificially divides the human family. On the acid test of 'top-dog's' reaction to the question of intermarriage with his alleged inferiors on the other side of his arbitrarily drawn dividing line, the response of French agnostics in Africa and Dutch Protestants in Indonesia<sup>1</sup> was no less positive than that of Portuguese Catholics at Goa and Creole Catholics in Mexico; and, in both cases alike, this transcendence of a sexual tabu was proved to be a genuine fruit of humane feeling, and not just a surrender to the demon of physical incontinence, by the favourableness of the social status accorded to the children born of these unions, including those begotten out of lawful wedlock. At the same time, it is evident that this

<sup>1</sup> The contrast between the relative liberalism of the Dutch in Indonesia and the extreme inhumanity of their kinsmen in South Africa in their attitude towards 'under-dog' is a striking example of the variability in the character of the local responses to a challenge in diverse local circumstances. The same contrast was illustrated at the same date by a similar difference in the attitudes of British temporary resident officials and British would-be permanent settlers in Kenya; and we have already observed that even the French, Spanish, and Italian settlers in French North-West Africa were not saved by the comparative humanity of their Catholic and Roman traditions from lapsing into an Afrikaner-like attitude towards the Muslim indigenous Algerian population upon whose homeland this immigrant West European minority had intruded.



right of way across an inhuman gulf will not be guaranteed in such explicit terms by a cultural as it will be by a religious passport.

The right to exchange one higher religion for another was ensured in theory—however flagrantly this theory might be flouted in practice—in virtue of the convention that a soul's allegiance even to the church into which it had been born had been contracted, not by the involuntary physical experience of birth, but by a voluntary act of spiritual affiance. A male child born of Muslim parents obtained its initiation into membership of the Islamic Church by undergoing the rite of circumcision at puberty, while a daughter as well as a son of Christian parents obtained her initiation into membership of the Christian Church by a rite of baptism in which the voluntariness of the declarations and undertakings by which this physical rite was accompanied was signified in the appointment of godparents to speak on the infant's behalf words implying an exercise of free will that was not practicable for a human being till she had arrived at the years of discretion. In contrast to this theory that an ancestral religion is adopted by a personal act of free choice, it is impossible even to pretend that the way of life in which a child is educated is not inculcated as a habit before the pupil has had a chance of saying 'yes' or 'no' to it; and a culture which has thus *ex hypothesi* been imposed must be presumed to be less easy to change than a religion that has *ex hypothesi* been chosen. On this showing, the patently involuntary 'Barbarian' was a less promising subject for conversion than the reputedly deliberate 'Unbeliever'. The decisive downward step, however, in 'top-dog's' *descensus Avernii* is not the change from 'Unbeliever' to 'Barbarian', but the change from 'Barbarian' to 'Native', in the definition of the stigma by means of which the oppressor seeks to rob his victim of an inalienable humanity.

In stigmatizing the members of an alien society as 'Natives' of their homes, 'top-dog' is denying their humanity by asserting their political and economic nullity. While admitting the indisputable fact that he has found them already in possession at the time of his own appearance on the scene, he is making this admission without conceding that these 'Natives' mere priority of occupation gives them any title, either legal or moral, as against himself. By designating them as 'Natives' *sans phrase*, he is implicitly assimilating them to the non-human fauna and flora of a virgin 'New World' that has been waiting for its predatory and acquisitive latest human discoverers to enter in and take possession in virtue of a right of 'eminent domain' over a 'Promised Land' deemed to be in the gift of some war-goddess of Private Enterprise. On these premises the fauna and flora of the wilderness may be regarded by the human pioneer in one or other of two alternative lights. Either he may treat them as vermin and weeds to be extirpated in order to clear the ground for stocking it with cattle or cultivating it for crops, or alternatively he may treat them as valuable natural resources to be carefully conserved and efficiently exploited. The pioneer's choice of economic policy will be determined partly by his estimate of the value of the natural environment and partly by his own temperament; but, whatever the policy that he may elect to adopt, and whatever the considerations

or feelings by which he may be prompted, he will be acting in any event on the assumption that he is morally at liberty to pursue his own best interests as he sees them, without being called upon to treat the 'Natives' as anything but wolves to be exterminated or sheep to be shorn.

In previous contexts<sup>1</sup> we have found the classical practitioners of this abominable social philosophy in those Eurasian Nomad hordes that had succeeded occasionally in establishing their rule over conquered sedentary populations. In their treatment of militarily routed fellow human beings as if they were either game or livestock, the Ottoman empire-builders were both as ruthlessly and as sublimely logical as the French empire-builders were in their treatment of their subjects as barbarians; and, while it was true that unemancipated French subjects were vastly better off than the Ottoman *ra'iyyeh*, it was also true that a human domestic animal which an 'Osmanli shepherd of men had successfully trained into becoming an efficient human sheep-dog found open to his talents an even more brilliant career than awaited the African *évolué* when he succeeded in becoming a French official or man of letters.

This parallel brings out the fact that, even when 'under-dog' is stigmatized as a 'Native', it is not impossible for him, within 'top-dog's' repressive social system, to cross the line dividing the human chattel from the man of property. The American Negro colonists of Liberia, whose African forebears had been not merely subjugated but uprooted, enslaved, and deported across the Atlantic, had raised themselves to the status of honorary Lords of Creation by acquiring unuprooted African 'Native' subjects of their own in the hinterland of the strip of West African coast on which these Negro American freedmen had been installed in the nineteenth century of the Christian Era by White American philanthropists. Subjugated Scottish Highlanders who had been treated as 'Natives' by their more recently disembarked Sassenach fellow islanders within two hundred years of the time of writing, and subjugated Maoris who had received the same treatment from the still more recent West European settlers in New Zealand within a hundred years of the same date, had succeeded in the meantime in transforming themselves *en masse* from 'Natives' into joint heirs of their own expropriated kingdoms.<sup>2</sup>

If it is thus possible for people to raise themselves from the depressed status of an effectively subjugated 'Native' population, this feat of self-emancipation is less difficult for people on whose necks this inhuman yoke has not yet been firmly fixed. In the social etiquette of the Modern Western World there was a tacit convention that 'Natives' had to be recognized as being human after all if and when they succeeded in acquiring the economic technique, or, *a fortiori*, the military armaments, that were the credentials of a Modern Western Great Power. 'Natives' and 'Powers' were mutually exclusive concepts for Modern Western minds, and the exigency of this Modern Western way of thinking promptly liberated a post-Petrine Russia from the stigma of the opprobrious

<sup>1</sup> See, for example, I. i. 151-2 and III. iii. 22-50.

<sup>2</sup> See II. i. 237, 238, and 466, and V. v. 322-3 for the transformation of the Highlanders, and V. v. 322 for the similar transformation of the Maoris.

brrious epithet, whereas the Russians' Orthodox Christian co-religionists who were the 'Osmanlis' *ra'iyeh* continued to be known as 'Native Christians' in Western Christian parlance till they succeeded, in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries of the Christian Era, in carving out sovereign independent successor-states for themselves. In virtue of the same principle of Western power politics the Japanese ceased to be 'Natives' after the inauguration of the Meiji Era in A.D. 1868, while the Chinese continued to be 'Natives' until they gradually extricated themselves from the same status *pari passu* with the progressive abrogation of 'the Unequal Treaties' after the First World War.

In the Late Modern Age of Western history the English-speaking Protestant West European pioneers of the Western Society's expansion overseas had been the worst offenders in committing the Nomad empire-builders' sin of making 'Natives' out of alien human souls; and, in this repetition of an old crime by a new criminal, the most sinister feature had been the English-speaking peoples' proneness to go over the edge of a further downward step<sup>1</sup> to which the 'Osmanlis had never descended. These West European 'Lords of Creation' had been apt to clinch their assertion of their victims' political and economic nullity by going on to stigmatize these 'Natives' as the spawn of 'inferior races'.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This moral lapse had recorded itself in a linguistic medium in the discrepancies between the literal meaning of the phrase 'the English-speaking peoples', the connotation of the term in its users' minds, and the actual current usage of it. The connotation was that the cream of the common heritage of the peoples speaking this West European vernacular as their mother-tongue was not a mere community of speech but was a community of political ideals and achievements—above all, parliamentary government, civil liberty, and a respect for human personality which was the moral foundation of these social institutions. On the other hand, the actual current usage belied this connotation by tacitly leaving outside the English-speaking family circle those English-speaking citizens of the United States whose physique denounced them as being Negroes of African provenance.

<sup>2</sup> The Protestant background of a Modern Western race-feeling has been examined in II. i. 211-27. In this context it has been pointed out that, though this moral and intellectual aberration was inspired by an interpretation of the Pentateuch (ibid., pp. 211-12), this latter-day Protestant Western Christian reading of the Hebrew Scriptures had no warrant in the traditional attitude of the Jews, whose consciousness of being distinct from, and superior to, the rest of Mankind was founded on a belief that they were a 'Chosen People' in virtue of an historic Covenant made with Abraham by the One True God, and not on a belief that they were scions of an aboriginally and indefeasibly superior physical race (ibid., pp. 246-7). The recognition that their enjoyment of their privilege was contingent on their keeping their part of a contract between themselves and God helped the Jews to resist their perpetual temptation to succumb to the sin of hybris (as Kipling realized when he wrote the fourth stanza of his *Recessional*), while the substitution of the optional physical rite of circumcision for the involuntary physical imprint of race as the outward visible sign of membership in the Jewish Church made it possible for Jewry to admit *ci-devant* Gentiles as proselytes. The Jews themselves never fell into their Protestant Western Christian parodists' error of ascribing a rigidly racial significance to the historic distinction between 'the seed of Abraham' and 'the Goyyim' till the Zionists caught this psychic infection from their Nazi persecutors.

The true forerunners of the latter-day Western racists were not the 'Semitic' strangers in their midst whose traditional attitude towards the Gentiles was misrepresented in this Gentile caricature of it. The first authentic racists known to history were those Aryan barbarian speakers of an Indo-European language who had broken into the domains of the Sumerian Civilization in South-West Asia and the Indus Culture in North-West India in the second quarter of the second millennium B.C. The curse of Racism was inflicted on India by this Aryan *Völkerwanderung* for the same reason that explains its infliction on North America by the African Negro slave-trade. Both these great wrongs perpetrated by the strong against the weak had the social effect of suddenly bringing human beings of conspicuously diverse physique into intimate physical contact with one another in political and economic circumstances in which the representatives of one of the races were dominant, while the representatives of the other

Of the four stigmata with which 'under-dog' had been branded by 'top-dog', this stigma of racial inferiority was the most malignant, and this for three reasons.<sup>1</sup> In the first place it was an assertion of 'under-dog's' nullity as a human being without any qualification, whereas the appellations 'Heathen', 'Barbarian', and 'Native', libellous and injurious though they might be, were merely denials of this or that human quality and refusals of this or that corresponding human right.<sup>2</sup> In the second place this racial dichotomy of Mankind differed from all the religious, cultural, and politico-economic dichotomies alike in fixing a gulf that was an impassable one<sup>3</sup>—at least in the belief of the

race were at this racially alien 'ascendancy's' mercy. Thus, in hailing the Aryas as their authorities for a policy of persecuting 'non-Aryans' on the score of their racial diversity from the Indo-European-speaking barbarians of Western Europe, the Nazis showed themselves better students of History than those Pilgrim Fathers who had cited the Israelites as their authorities for exterminating the 'Canaanite' Natives of a New World (see II. i. 211-12 and 465-7).

Those English pioneers of Western Christendom's expansion overseas whose ships carried them to India instead of North America virtually adopted the institution of caste which a Hindu Society had inherited from its Indic predecessor (see pp. 207-13, above). If they had been asked to justify themselves by showing reason why they should not suffer the same condemnation as the Nazis, the last generation of the English 'ascendancy' in India would perhaps have pleaded that they had not embraced a doctrine of Racialism deliberately and selfconsciously, but had merely succumbed insensibly and involuntarily to the effects of an Indian social atmosphere that had proved too potent for them to resist; and this line of defence might have secured them their acquittal if the Indian descendants of previous Muslim conquerors of the Hindu World had not confuted their English successors' specious plea by the accomplished fact of their Muslim sires' intermarriage with their Hindu converts. This Indian Muslim feat of breaking the bonds of caste was a conclusive proof that an endemic Hindu Racialism had no power to prevail, even on its own Indian ground, over the humanity of the votaries of a Judaic religion that preached the brotherhood of Man as a corollary of its belief in a common fatherhood of God which was all men's birthright. The Arab, Turkish, and Afghan Muslim conquerors of India had all been Whites, and the Turks and Afghans had been of the same fair variety of the breed as India's English invaders from Western Europe and her Aryan invaders from the Eurasian Steppe. On this showing, English Christian virtue ought not to have been worsted by a challenge to which Afghan Muslim virtue had responded with a sincerity which an impartial English Christian observer was bound to admire. Moreover, the nineteenth-century and twentieth-century Englishman in India ought to have found his Christian virtue come more easily to him considering that he was only a pilgrim sojourning in India as in a strange country (Heb. xi. 13 and 9) where he had no intention of finding a permanent home for himself and his offspring. The challenge presented by the geographical intermingling of peoples of conspicuously diverse race was more formidable for the White citizen of the United States, and far more formidable for the White citizens of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, or Kenya, where the Whites, instead of constituting, as in the United States, an overwhelming majority of the population, were heavily outnumbered by the Negro 'Natives'. It will be appreciated that the Indian Muslims had always been in the predicament of these White settlers in Black Africa.

<sup>1</sup> The second and third of these points have been noticed already in II. i. 223-4.

<sup>2</sup> The inhuman treatment of 'barbarians' by Modern Western masters of the art of oceanic navigation is censured in a passage written by an English hand in the first generation of the Late Modern Age of Western history:

'The greatest invention that I know of in later ages has been that of the loadstone . . . The vast continents of China, the East and West Indies, the long extent and coasts of Africa, with the numberless islands belonging to them, have been hereby introduced into our acquaintance and our maps, and great increases of wealth and luxury, but none of knowledge, brought among us, further than the extent and situation of the country, the customs and manners of so many original nations which we call barbarous, and I am sure have treated them as if we hardly esteemed them to be a part of Mankind' (Temple, Sir William, in 'An Essay upon the Ancient and Modern Learning', first published in A.D. 1690 in the second volume of the author's *Miscellanea*).

<sup>3</sup> A passionate desire to engrave in indelible letters the gulf which divided them from barbarian aggressors who seemed like veritable human ogres explains the East Romans' choice of the word *'Ayapvol'* ('Children of Hagar') to be their standing term of abuse for the Normans. This spitefully chosen nickname accomplished two vindictive purposes

• racialists' who had so deftly dug it along an alinement that left the diggers comfortably ensconced, on the right side of the invidious dividing line, in a Nordicized Abraham's bosom.<sup>2</sup> In the third place the racial stigma differed from the religious and cultural stigmata (though in this respect it resembled the politico-economic stigma) in singling out for its criterion of distinction between one hypothetical kind of human being and another the most superficial, trivial, and insignificant aspect of Human Nature that could have been selected for this inauspicious purpose.

If the inhuman line between human sheep and human goats is to be drawn at all, the religious and cultural tests have at any rate the most to be said for them both intellectually and morally; for the most important and significant manifestation of the spirit of a spiritual creature is assuredly his religion and, next to his religion, his secular culture, whereas the curve of his nose, the proportions of his skull, the strength of the pigmentation under his skin, the shape of a segment of his hair, or any other physical accident of his spiritual constitution and character that we may care to name, tells us nothing about anything that concerns a man's relations with his fellow men, himself, and God. No doubt the racist will retort hotly that this is a caricature of his point of view, inasmuch as it ignores his conviction that these physical characteristics are outward visible signs of an inward spiritual grace in himself and

at one stroke. It exposed the hollowness of the Normans' profession of Christianity by assimilating them to the Muslim 'unbelievers'; and it branded their shame upon them ineffaceably by proclaiming it to be an inborn quality of their race.

<sup>1</sup> 'Can the Ethiopian change his skin, or the leopard his spots?' (Jer. xiii. 23) was the text on which the Late Modern Western racialists founded their doctrine (see II. i. 209); but, in the writer's day, this reed-staff threatened to pierce the hand that leant upon it (2 Kings xviii. 21), by turning out to be an open question and not the rhetorical question that it had been assumed to be by the militant doctrinaires who had put their trust in it. The social history of the United States had shown that neither legislation nor the public feeling of a dominant majority could prevent individual human beings of diverse race from mating—even when the physical diversity was conspicuous—in a population in which these diverse races were geographically intermingled. The result in the United States had been a blending of races in which the gulf between the local representatives of a 'pure' Negro race and a 'pure' White race had been bridged by intermediate shades of every degree of colour from 'near-Negro' to 'near-White'; and it was notorious that appreciable numbers of 'near-Whites' were perpetually 'passing', without detection, out of the 'under-privileged' into the unpenalized caste of North American Society. Meanwhile, those citizens of the United States whose tincture of pigmentation was still too strong to allow them to 'pass' were at any rate able to assimilate themselves physically to their White fellow citizens to some extent by artificially uncurling their hair (see II. i. 228); and, at the moment of writing, it was being rumoured that some enterprising man of science had discovered a trick for bleaching Negro skins by reducing the strength of their pigmentation to the quantity present in skins popularly described as 'White'.

This application of Science to the social purpose of producing a physical metamorphosis, which was a question of such lively interest for Negro citizens of the United States, mattered less to Negro citizens of France, who did not feel the same urge to 'pass' physically because it was open to them, as we have seen, to arrive socially by a cultural avenue along which they would not find their progress impeded by any racial barrier. The openness of this French road is illustrated in the story of an impromptu repartee which Dumas père is reported to have made to an unsuccessful contemporary French man of letters who had rashly given vent to his envy of the dusky star by saying to Dumas, in the presence of witnesses: 'On dit que monsieur est nègre!'—'Vous avez raison', the great man instantly replied: 'Mon père était nègre; mon grand-père était sînge; ma famille a commencé où la vôtre a terminé!' It is perhaps questionable whether this French colloquy is authentic or legendary, but it is certain that Booker Washington could not have ventured, even on the north side of the Mason and Dixon line, to make the equivalent repartee to a White fellow traveller in an American pullman car.

<sup>2</sup> Luke xvi. 22–26.



absence of this grace in other breeds which on this account he stigmatizes as inferior. It is indeed a fundamental and indispensable doctrine of the false religion of Racialism that the racial characteristics discernible in our human bodily physique are supposed to be correlated—and this permanently and precisely—with hypothetical racial characteristics of a psychic order;<sup>1</sup> but this dogma was a bare postulate which had never been borne out by any scientific demonstration down to the time of writing; and the burden of proof had still to be discharged by the credulous before the task of disproof need be shouldered by the sceptics.

If the conventional classification of physical races by differences in strengths of pigmentation were adopted, provisionally and without prejudice, for the sake of the argument, it would be found, as we have ascertained in another context,<sup>2</sup> that, even within the relatively short Time-span of five or six thousand years during which the species of human society known as civilizations had been in existence up to date, contributions to civilizations had been made by people of all colours except the Black. Within the period of less than half that length which had seen the epiphany of the higher religions, contributions to the spiritual life of these best-inspired activities of the spirit of Man had also been made by people of all colours except the Black and the Red;<sup>3</sup> and a twentieth-century racialist who sought to justify his superstition by drawing attention to the comparative spiritual sterility of the Red and Black races so far could be confronted by a contemporary geographer-sociologist with evidence that the same sterility had been displayed, within the same brief periods, by certain representatives of the allegedly superior Brown, Yellow, and White races whose other representatives had been demonstrating their spiritual prowess.

In the Westernizing World of the twentieth century of the Christian Era there were still Brown, Yellow, and White, as well as Red and Black, 'Natives' and 'Barbarians'. In this place we need not reproduce our previous inventory of them.<sup>4</sup> We need only remark that the then fast-dwindling pockets of Raw Whites in the Rif, the Atlas, Albania, the Caucasus, Kurdistan, and North-Eastern Iran, who had not yet emulated their former peers, the *ci-devant* 'Wild Highlanders' and 'Wild Irish' in a Celtic Fringe of the British Isles, by catching a cultural infection from their neighbours, were a less disconcerting spectacle for the representatives of Civilization in this age than the recently formed patches of Mean Whites in the United States,<sup>5</sup> the Union of South Africa, and other countries overseas which had been added to the domain of the Western Civilization in its Late Modern Age by English-speaking colonists from Western Europe. These Mean Whites were an alarming phenomenon, because, unlike the Raw Whites, they were not laggard barbarians but

<sup>1</sup> The unprovenness of this doctrine has been exposed in II. i. 208-9.

<sup>2</sup> See the tables in II. i. 232 and 239.

<sup>3</sup> In II. i. 232-3, nn. 6 and 7, it has been pointed out that the so-called 'Red Race' and 'Yellow Race' were misnomers for arbitrarily dissociated fractions of a single-Mongolo-American Race distinguished, not by the colour of the skin, but by the texture of the hair and the set of the eyes.

<sup>4</sup> In II. i. 236.

<sup>5</sup> See II. i. 466-7 and II. ii. 309-13.

were the lapsed successors of predecessors who had been bearers of the Western culture of their day. Yet the lapsed Whites of Appalachia were not so terrifying a portent as the apostate Whites who had risen up in the writer's generation within the European homeland of the Western Civilization to preach and practise those perverse Neo-Pagan religions Fascism and National Socialism in which a Western White Man had deliberately repudiated a Western Christian spiritual heritage by reverting, like the Communist heirs of an Orthodox Christian spiritual heritage, to an idolatrous worship of Collective Humanity.<sup>1</sup>

## 2. Zealotism and Herodianism

### *A Pair of Polar Standpoints*

In the preceding chapter we have found that, in an encounter between contemporaries in which an impact of an aggressively radioactive culture on an alien body social has resulted in the penetration of the assaulted party's defences by the attacking forces, the inhumanity which is the dominant party's characteristic response to the spiritual ordeal of finding alien souls at his mercy is a single-track *descensus Avernii* in which the only perceptible diversification of an essentially uniform reaction's character is produced by the passage to some lower step in the one-way traffic down this sinister stairway. When we turn to examine the response of the party at bay against an inhuman enemy within its battered gates, we are confronted with an apparent contrast; for the victim of a successful assault seems to have a choice between two alternative possible reactions which look at first sight as if they were not merely diverse but antithetical.

For minds educated in a Christian tradition, the most familiar historical embodiments of these two psychological poles are the opposite attitudes towards Hellenism, and contrary policies for coping with it, of two Jewish parties in the Palestinian province of the Syriac World in the time of Christ that appear in the New Testament under the names 'Zealots' and 'Herodians'. This example has the triple advantage of being not only familiar but momentous, because the historic collision between Hellenism and Jewry released the dynamic spirit of Christianity, and not only momentous but illuminating, because these two Jewish antithetical reactions to a pressure exerted by Hellenism were so sharply pronounced that they can be used as indicators for detecting and sorting out other instances of the same psychological phenomena in other passages of the histories of encounters between contemporaries.

In that age, Hellenism was pressing hard upon Jewry on every plane of social activity—not only in economics and in politics, but also in art, ethics, and philosophy. No Jew could escape or ignore, turn where he would, the question of becoming or not becoming a Hellene. It was a question by which every Jew in that age was inevitably obsessed. The only choice open to him was an apparent choice between alternative ways of meeting this single insistent challenge; and this was the issue over which the 'Zealots' and the 'Herodians' parted company to strike

<sup>1</sup> See V. v. 334-7.

out separate paths for themselves in what might appear to be diametrically opposite directions.

The Zealot faction was recruited from people whose impulse, in face of attacks delivered by a stronger and more energetic aggressive alien civilization, was to take the manifestly negative line of trying to fend off the formidable aggressor. The harder Hellenism pressed them, the harder they strove, on their side, to keep themselves clear of Hellenism and all its works, ways, feelings, and ideas; and their method of avoiding contamination was to retreat into the spiritual fastness of their own Jewish heritage, lock themselves up within this psychic *donjon*, close their ranks, maintain an unbroken and unbending front, and find their inspiration, their ideal, and their acid test in the loyalty and sincerity of their observance of every jot and tittle of a traditional Jewish law.

The faith by which the Zealots were animated was a conviction that, if they were thus meticulously conscientious in abiding by their ancestral tradition and observing the whole of it and nothing else, without ever again yielding to the temptation to go a whoring after other gods,<sup>1</sup> they would be rewarded by being given grace to draw from the jealously guarded source of their own spiritual life a supernatural strength that would enable them to repel the alien aggressors—no matter how overwhelming the aggressors' superiority over the Zealots in material power might appear to be on a matter-of-fact view.<sup>2</sup> The Zealot's posture was that of a tortoise who has withdrawn his head and feet into his shell, or of a hedgehog who has tucked away his tender snout and pads inside the prickly ball, with its *chevaux-de-frise* of spines all pointing outwards, into which the shy animal has curled himself up as his retort to the approach of a dangerous enemy.<sup>3</sup> (The Zealot's sardonically observant

<sup>1</sup> Judges ii, 17. Cp. Exod. xxxiv. 15-16; Lev. xvii. 7; Deut. xxxi, 16.

<sup>2</sup> This fundamental article of the Zealot's faith has been given a classical expression in 2 Macc. viii. 36, in the confession here put into the mouth of the Seleucid King Antiochus IV's general Nicānōr after the disastrous repulse of his expedition against Jerusalem circa 165 B.C. 'He was fain to confess, now, that the Jews had God Himself for their protector, and, would they but keep His laws, there was no conquering them!' (*The Old Testament newly translated from the Latin Vulgate* by Mgr. Ronald A. Knox, vol. ii (London 1949, Burns, Oates, & Washbourne), p. 1518). The original Greek runs: κατήγγελλεν ὑπέρμαχον [τον Θεόν] ἔχειν τοὺς Ἰουδαίους καὶ διὰ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ἀπρώτως εἶναι τοὺς Ἰουδαίους διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθεῖν τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ προτεταγμένοις νόμοις.

<sup>3</sup> This characterization of Zealotism as a negatively defensive reaction to an apprehension of danger is borne out by celebrated episodes in the domestic histories of the Hellenic and the Western Civilization.

The conflict between traditional Hellenic religion—or superstition—and the rationalist intellectual enlightenment of the fifth century B.C. produced explosions of Zealotism in Athenian souls subjected to unwontedly severe psychological stresses and strains by the great Atheno-Peloponnesian War of 431-404 B.C. and by the great plague which in 430-429 B.C. and again in 427 B.C., ravaged a city overcrowded by refugees from an invaded country-side. This Athenian wave of Zealot feeling manifested itself in a series of prosecutions of prominent 'intellectuals' on charges of offences against Attic religious orthodoxy (see VII. vii. 472). The series began with the prosecutions of the resident aliens Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (? *in absentia* and not *nominatim*) and Aspasia of Miletus (perhaps both as moves in the temporarily successful political campaign against Pericles, which led to his fall in 430 B.C.), and it was continued in the throng of prosecutions in and after 415 B.C., when, besides the judicial proceedings against the alien philosophers Protagoras of Abdera and Diagoras of Melos, the native Athenian aristocrat-politician Alcibiades was prosecuted on the same charge of having profaned the Eleusinian Mysteries, and a regular witch-hunt was set on foot to find human scapegoats to atone for the mutilation of the Hermae. The climax and conclusion of the series was the prosecution of Socrates in 399 B.C. (See Seck, O.: *Geschichte des Untergangs der Antiken Welt*, vol. iii, 2nd ed., Stuttgart 1921, Metzler), pp. 47-48; Adcock, F. E., in

Herodian rival would, no doubt, have been more inclined to describe his foolish brother's attitude as that of an ostrich who has buried her head in the sand). The Zealot's watchwords were *Debout les morts!*<sup>1</sup> and 'Upon this rock I will build My Church and the gates of Hell shall not prevail against It'.<sup>2</sup>

The anti-Zealot Herodian faction was recruited from the servants, supporters, and admirers of an opportunist statesman whose Idumaean provenance worked together with his personal genius to enable this son of a recently incorporated *ci-devant* Gentile province of a Seleucid Hellenic Monarchy's Maccabaeian Jewish successor-state to take a fresher and less prejudiced view of Jewry's Hellenic problem than was open to contemporary Judaeian Jews, whose line of vision had been so heavily depressed by the crushing incubus of a long accumulated cultural heritage that their horizon was confined within the patch of ancestral ground to which their feet were rooted.<sup>3</sup> Herod the Great's

*The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. v (Cambridge 1927, University Press), pp. 477-8; Nilsson, M. P.: *Greek Popular Religion* (New York 1940, Columbia University Press), p. 122).

In the legal proceedings involving Anaxagoras and Aspasia and in the trial of Socrates, popular feeling was no doubt exploited for political purposes. This motive in the prosecution of Socrates has been noticed already in the present Study in VII. vii. 472; and, in recording Diopithea's motion for the prosecution of 'disbelievers in the supernatural and teachers of theories about the heavenly bodies', Plutarch, in his *Pericles*, chap. 32, states that Diopithea was 'gunning for' (ἀμειβομένης εἰς) Pericles by exploiting the feeling against [Pericles' friend and protégé] Anaxagoras. But *cherchez la politique* is not an adequate explanation of the outburst in 415 B.C. 'On this occasion a real religious hysteria broke out, for these events took place just before the great fleet sailed for Syracuse' (Nilsson, op. cit., loc. cit.).

These manifestations of Zealotism at Athens during the Atheno-Peloponnesian War on the eve of the expedition against Syracuse had their counterparts at Rome during the Hannibalic War on the morrow of the Roman disaster at Cannae. When, at this juncture, two Vestal Virgins were found guilty of having broken the tabu against their indulging in sexual intercourse, one of them was punished by being buried alive, while the other only escaped this fate by an anticipatory suicide. One of the seducers, who was a pontifical clerk (*scriba pontificis*), was beaten to death by the Pontifex Maximus in person. But these savage punishments of members of the Roman official religious establishment who had been convicted of a ritual offence are not so horrifying as the propitiation of an angry Roman Pantheon by the gruesome rite of burying alive in the Forum Boarium four innocent aliens: a male and female Greek and a male and female Gaul (see Fowler, W. Warde: *The Religious Experience of the Roman People* (London 1911, Macmillan), pp. 319-20).

In the Early Modern Age of Western history an Athenian Zealot reaction against a rationalist enlightenment that had culminated in the judicial murder of Socrates had its counterpart in A.D. 1600 in the judicial murder of Giordano Bruno by a death which was as cruel as the deaths inflicted on their victims by Etruscan-minded pagan Roman ecclesiastical authorities in the panic following the catastrophe at Cannae.

<sup>1</sup> The heroically absurd word of command by which, according to a legend of the World War of A.D. 1914-18, a French subaltern, turned Tertullian-minded by the exaltation of despair, had conjured up into action again the no longer living effectives required for repelling an irresistible German assault on a trench which the Frenchman had been ordered to hold at all costs.

<sup>2</sup> Matt. xvi. 18.

<sup>3</sup> It is no accident that the Idumaean Jewish statesman who offered to the Jews of his day a mundane solution of their Hellenic problem should have shared with the Galilaean Jewish Saviour who offered to them the insight to sublimate the same problem on to the spiritual plane the one common characteristic of being the offspring of new ground beyond the limits of a hard-baked Judaea. The cultural background of 'Galilee of the Gentiles' has been indicated in II. ii. 73-74 and in V. vi. 477-8 and 499. The policy of Herod the Great has been touched upon in V. vi. 123. This ex-Gentile statesman who forcibly kept a post-Alexandrine Palestinian Jewry out of trouble during his lifetime by compelling them to allow him to manage their affairs is 'the opposite number' of an ex-Jewish statesman who rehabilitated a nineteenth-century British Conservative Party by inducing them to place the management of their affairs in his hands. If Herod showed

prescription for Jewry's problem of coping with Hellenism was, first, to take the objective measure of this alien social force's irresistibly superior power with a sober eye, and then to learn and borrow from Hellenism every Hellenic accomplishment that it might prove necessary for the Jews to acquire for the judicious and practicable purpose of equipping themselves for holding their own, and even contriving to lead a more or less comfortable life, in the Hellenizing World that was their inescapable new social environment.

In a Zealot's eyes this Herodianism was a compromise that was as dangerous as it was impious and cowardly; but the Herodians could argue plausibly on behalf of their policy that it was preferable to the Zealots' impulse in every respect that was of any practical consequence. It was positive instead of being negative, and was therefore free to be active instead of condemning itself to be passive, whereas the Zealot line was hopelessly passive in spirit, however violently it might simulate activity in its foolhardy physical exercises. More than that, the Herodians could represent that, in following their own line, they were exhibiting a greater moral courage than any to which the Zealots could lay claim, since the attitude which the Zealots denounced as an Herodian opportunism was in truth simply the realism of minds strong enough to look facts in the face without flinching, to take these indisputable facts as they were, and to frame a straightforward policy on this firm basis.

Hellenism, the Herodians would say, was a hard fact which had successfully intruded itself into Jewry's social universe, and from which there was no possibility of escape. The Zealots' attitude of uncompromising non-recognition of the presence and power of this triumphant alien force was an attitude of moral cowardice entailing an impolicy of impossibilism that courted certain defeat. The one effective way for Jewry to cope with Hellenism was for the Jews to take to heart the manifest limitations of their own power; to recognize that their social universe could never be the same again since the emergence of Hellenism above the Syriac World's horizon; and to grasp, and act upon, the truth that Hellenism could be fought successfully only by the adoption of Hellenic weapons. According to the Herodian exposition of the case, the real choice lay between a voluntary Hellenization of Jewish life to whatever extent might be found necessary in the course of an empirical solution of the Hellenic problem *ambulando*, and an irresponsible Zealot impulse to ride for a fall in which Judaism would succumb to Hellenism altogether—with nothing to show for such a stupidly purposeless sacrifice beyond the poor consolation of having managed to make the mock-heroic Zealot gesture of shaking an infantile fist in an unimpressed Destiny's face. The Herodian's watchwords were *Fas est et ab hoste doceri*<sup>1</sup> and 'when you are in Rome, do as Rome does'. And, if a Zealot had been shocked by the Herodian's impiety into putting to him the searching question, 'Which of you by taking thought can add one cubit

himself less adroit than Disraeli in proving unable to carry out his policy without resorting to the crude expedient of repression, this was because, of these two audacious political acrobats, the ex-Gentile had committed himself to performing the greater *tour de force*.

<sup>1</sup> Ovid: *Metamorphoses*, Book IV, l. 428.



unto his stature?',<sup>1</sup> the Herodian would have replied without hesitation that he, for one, could answer that question in the affirmative—an answer indicating that, in spite of his air of rationalism, the Herodian, like the Zealot, was actuated by a faith which, in its Herodian vein, was perilously akin to hybris.

*A Survey of Zealot and Herodian Reactions<sup>2</sup>*

We cannot listen to the Herodian's and the Zealot's competitive expositions of their cases without being moved to ask ourselves two questions. How do these melodramatically contradictory attitudes stand to one another in fact? And does either of them prove to be an effective retort to the successful penetration of an assaulted body social by the cultural radiation of an aggressive alien society which is the common challenge evoking both these ostensibly opposite responses? It would be premature, however, to take up either of these questions before making a wider survey of the field of our present inquiry; for the two psychological reactions which we have just identified in the attitudes, and labelled with the names, of two factions which disputed between them the protagonist's role on the stage of Palestinian Jewish politics during the hundred years ending in A.D. 70 can, of course, be detected in many other passages of history; and these other manifestations of them may be expected to throw further light on their respective characters and on their mutual relations.

In the history of the Jews' encounter with Hellenism—to look no farther afield than this episode, for the moment—the phenomenon of Herodianism is already discernible by a date that anticipates Herod the Great's seizure of power in the Hasmonaeen Jewish principality in Palestine by at least a century and a half. Even if we reject as unhistorical the legendary account of the Septuagint's translation of the Jewish scriptures from the Hebrew and Aramaic into the Greek by a Ptolemaic royal command in the reign of Philadelphus (*regnabat* 283–245 B.C.),<sup>3</sup> we can trace the beginnings of a voluntary self-Hellenization of the immigrant Jewish community in Alexandria right back to the infancy of this melting-pot city on the morrow of its founder's death; and even in the comparatively secluded hill-country of Judaea the High Priest Joshua-Jason, who is the archetype of the Herodian school of statesmanship, was busy as early as the fourth decade of the second century B.C. on his devil's work (as it appeared in Zealot eyes) of seducing his younger colleagues in the Jewish hierarchy into an indecently naked exposure of their bodies in an Hellenic palaestra and a shockingly vulgar screening of their heads under the broad brim of an Hellenic *petasus*.<sup>4</sup> The *damnatio memoriae* through which Jason's Herodian escapade has been immortalized in the

<sup>1</sup> Matt. vi. 27.

<sup>2</sup> Much of the evidence cited in the following survey has already been presented in this Study in other contexts, especially in Part IX B, in the present volume, and in V. v. 58–712 and V. vi. 1–132, as well as in V. vi. 213–42. In the present chapter, references are given to the relevant passages in Part V but not to those in Part IX B.

<sup>3</sup> According to Edwyn Bevan, in *A History of Egypt under the Ptolemaic Dynasty* (London 1927, Methuen), p. 112, 'the translation of the Old Testament was made, bit by bit, in Egypt during the last three centuries before the Christian Era'.

<sup>4</sup> See V. vi. 103–5, with the passage quoted from 2 Macc. iv. 7–17 on p. 104, n. 1.

Second Book of Maccabees is a revealing exhibition of the animus that Herodian policies arouse in Zealot hearts; and this provocation in high places at Jerusalem duly evoked a 'Zealot' reaction at least five generations before these anti-Hellenic Jewish fanatics had eventually acquired their historic soubriquet from a zeal for the Lord<sup>1</sup> which had long since eaten them up.<sup>2</sup>

Nor was Jewish Zealotism crushed out of existence by the military and political catastrophe of A.D. 70, nor even by its conclusive repetition in A.D. 135;<sup>3</sup> for the gentle vein of Jewish Zealotism, consecrated in the legends of the old scribe Eleazar and of the Seven Brethren and their Mother,<sup>4</sup> which had declared itself before the alternative violent vein had found vent in the militancy of the Maccabees, came into its own at last when Rabbi Johanan ben Zakkai responded to the tremendous challenge of the fall of Jerusalem under the assaults of Titus's storming columns by endowing Jewry with an inertly rigid institutional framework and a passively obstinate psychological habitus that enabled it to preserve its distinctive communal life in the frail clay tenement of a politically impotent diaspora.<sup>5</sup>

Jewry, however, was not the only Syriac community, nor the Syriac Society the only Oriental Civilization, to be divided against itself into an Herodian and a Zealot camp by the challenge of having to react to the impact of a post-Alexandrine Hellenism in one way or other. The Maccabaeian-tempered Zealot insurrections of non-Jewish Syrian plantation-slaves in Sicily in the latter decades of the second century B.C.<sup>6</sup> were balanced at Rome, in the ensuing Imperial Age, by the Herodian flow of a stream of Syriac freedmen-converts to Hellenism which was satirized by a contemporary spokesman of an Hellenic dominant minority, in a celebrated phrase, as a noisome and unnatural discharge of the Orontes into the Tiber.<sup>7</sup> Conversely, the Herodianism of a more well-to-do and more sophisticated stratum of the Syriac Society, which an Hellenic dominant minority was prepared to take into social partnership with itself on terms of virtual equality, was balanced by the conscription of other Syriac higher religions, besides Judaism, for the spiritually irrelevant and desecrating Zealot fatigue duty of serving as instruments for the waging of a secular cultural warfare. Zoroastrianism,<sup>8</sup> Nestorianism and Monophysitism,<sup>9</sup> and Islam<sup>10</sup> all, in turn, followed Judaism's lead in making this spiritually disastrous deviation from Religion's true path. Yet the last three of these perverted religious movements all eventually made some subsequent atonement for their Zealot aberration by the Herodian act of translating into their Syriac and Arabic liturgical languages the classical works of Hellenic philosophy and science; and the Oriental manuscripts which survived in twentieth-century Western libraries to bear witness to the Herodian

<sup>1</sup> 2 Kings x. 16.

<sup>2</sup> Psalm lxxix. 9, quoted in John ii. 17. Cp. Psalm cxix. 139.

<sup>3</sup> See V. v. 68.

<sup>4</sup> 2 Macc. vi. 18-vii. 42, cited in V. v. 72.

<sup>5</sup> See V. v. 75-76.

<sup>6</sup> See V. v. 69-72 and V. vi. 238-9.

<sup>7</sup> Juvenal: *Satires*, No. III, ll. 60-80, quoted in V. v. 67.

<sup>8</sup> See V. v. 125-6 and 659-61.

<sup>9</sup> See V. v. 127-8.

<sup>10</sup> See V. v. 673-9.

life-work of these assiduous translators would count for more in a judicious historian's estimation than the legend that the Caliph 'Umar had given orders for the burning of the books in the library at Alexandria.<sup>1</sup>

In this pharos from which, by 'Umar's day, an Hellenic intellectual light had been streaming out into an encompassing Oriental darkness for a thousand years, the way had been prepared for the Syriac intellectual Herodians of the 'Abbasid Age by a Jewish Philo<sup>2</sup> and a Christian Clement and Origen.<sup>3</sup> And even a stubborn Iranian rear-guard of the Syriac World's anti-Hellenic battle-order, which was not called upon to face the fire of Hellenism at the murderously point-blank range at which this artillery was discharged against a devoted Jewish vanguard, had to suffer first the annoyance of seeing a militantly Zealot anti-Hellenic Zoroastrian Church's domestic competitor, Mithraism, take an Herodian path into a mission field in *partibus Hellenicis*, where Zoroastrianism had made itself too odious to gain an entry, and then the humiliation of seeing the Zoroastrian True Faith itself sacrilegiously 'processed' for export to the Hellenic World by the ingeniously Herodian-minded heresiarch Mani.<sup>4</sup>

When we turn to consider the reactions to Hellenism in the other Oriental societies that had shared the Syriac World's experience of being subdued by Hellenic arms in and after the generation of Alexander the Great, we find the outburst of Jewish Zealotism in Judaea in the fourth decade of the second century B.C. being anticipated in the last decade of the third century B.C. by a Zealot *émeute* in Egypt,<sup>5</sup> while the swift failure of Joshua-Jason's audacious Herodian attempt to Hellenize the priesthood of the Temple of Yahweh at Jerusalem was balanced in the Egyptiac World by the eventual success of a gradual movement towards converting the metropoleis of the Egyptian nomes into simulacra of Hellenic municipalities which began with the enrolment of young native Egyptian notables as Hellenic gymnasiasts.<sup>6</sup> In a post-Alexandrine Babylonia a dwindling band of astronomer-priests, who were fighting a losing battle to preserve a more and more esoteric native cultural heritage against an invading Syriac culture's progressive encroachments, were so zealously bent on eluding the contaminating touch of the Syriac aggressor who was delivering this frontal attack that they inadvertently leaned over backwards into an Herodian Philhellenism;<sup>7</sup> and it was no accident that in a later act of this play with three *dramatis personae* a fossilized remnant of the Babylonian Society which had managed to keep its head above the encompassing Syriac flood-waters on an unsubmerged Mesopotamian islet at Harrān should have taken a hand in the intellectual conversion of the Syriac Society to Hellenism in the 'Abbasid Age.<sup>8</sup> In an Indic World which had been forced into an intimate contact with Hellenism by the Bactrian Greek war-lord Demetrius's invasion of

<sup>1</sup> See V. vi. 111-12.

<sup>2</sup> See V. v. 366-7 and 539.

<sup>2</sup> See V. v. 539-40.

<sup>4</sup> An appreciation of the respective relations in which Mithraism and Manichaeism stood to Hellenism has been offered in V. v. 575-8.

<sup>6</sup> See VI. vii. 50, and pp. 408 and 443-4, above.

<sup>5</sup> See V. v. 68.

<sup>7</sup> See V. v. 94 and 123, n. 2.

<sup>8</sup> The work of the Harrāni Thābit b. Qurrah has been noticed on p. 408, n. 5, above.

the Mauryan Empire's domain *circa* 183 B.C., we can likewise observe symptoms of our two familiar alternative psychological reactions in the Herodian Philhellenism of a Mahayanian Buddhist religious art<sup>1</sup> and in the anti-Hellenic vein in a Zealot-minded Hinduism.

This survey of the psychological reactions in the societies which encountered an aggressive post-Alexandrine Hellenism would be incomplete if we failed to notice one figure whose attitude cannot be accounted for adequately unless we are prepared sometimes to find the Herodian and the Zealot nature both incarnate in the same person. Mithradates VI Eupator, the Iranian-descended king of a successor-state of the Achaemenian Empire on the Hittite soil of Pontic Cappadocia,<sup>2</sup> presented an attractively Herodian countenance to the eyes of European as well as Asiatic Hellenes who welcomed him in 88 B.C. as their deliverer from a barbarous Roman yoke; yet the same war-lord wore the opposite appearance of an anti-Hellenic Zealot to the Cyzicenes who closed their city's gates against him in 74 B.C. and greeted the Roman general Lucullus as their saviour from the doom of falling under the alien yoke of an Oriental despot. The cultural ambivalence of this North-East Anatolian actor on a post-Alexandrine Hellenic stage is reminiscent of the enigma presented, in the pre-Alexandrine chapter of the same Hellenic story, by a Ducetius<sup>3</sup> who, after having made his name as the unsuccessfully gallant Zealot leader of his Sicel fellow barbarians in the last round of their losing battle against Hellenic imperialism, lived to return to Sicily from an exile in the heart of the Hellenic World on the Herodian errand of founding in his homeland a new commonwealth in which Greek colonists and Sicel natives were to fraternize with one another in virtue of the natives' voluntary adoption of the intruders' alien culture.

If we pass on now to glance at the psychological reactions manifested in the societies that encountered a Medieval Western Christendom, we shall find the most thorough-going practitioners of Herodianism known to History up to date in those *ci-devant* pagan Scandinavian barbarian invaders who, as a result of one of the earliest and most signal of all Western cultural victories, became the Norman exponents and propagators of a Medieval Western Christian way of life. The Normans proceeded to embrace not only the religion but the language and the poetry of the Romance-speaking Western Christian native population of the successor-state that they had carved for themselves out of a Gallic province of the Carolingian Empire. When the French-named Norman minstrel Taillefer lifted up his voice to inspire his fellow knights as they were riding into battle at Hastings, he did not recite to them the *Völsungasaga* in Norse but chanted to them the Song of Roland in French;<sup>4</sup> and, before William the Norman Conqueror of England high-handedly promoted the growth of a nascent Western Christian Civilization by a military act of self-aggrandizement which brought a backward and isolated province of Western Christendom under the influence of the metropolitan culture of the West in the most progressive of its

<sup>1</sup> See V. v. 58 and 540.

<sup>2</sup> See V. vi. 235-6.

<sup>3</sup> See V. v. 69.

<sup>4</sup> See II. ii. 201.

contemporary versions, other Norman military adventurers had embarked on the enterprise of enlarging the bounds of the Western Christian World in the opposite quarter through conquests at the expense of Orthodox Christendom and Dār-al-Islām in Apulia, Calabria, and Sicily.

The readiness of the Scandinavians to divert their psychic energy from the creative task of building up a promisingly precocious civilization of their own to the Herodian pursuit of adopting some alien civilization over whose native representatives they had established their military ascendancy was displayed in the adhesion of Scandinavian converts to other cultures besides that of Western Christendom, and in the conversion, not only of a vanguard that had planted itself within the domains of the civilizations to whose attractions it succumbed, but also of a rear-guard that received these alien culture-rays either in some barbarian no-man's-land or in the Vikings' Scandinavian home. The adoption of the Western Christian Civilization by the Scandinavian settlers in Normandy and the Danelaw, the influence of Byzantine and Islamic art and institutions on the Norman conquerors of Sicily, and the tincture of Far Western Christian Celtic culture that was acquired by the Ostmen in Ireland, and by the Norse colonists in the Western Isles, Iceland, and Greenland, are not such remarkable exhibitions of Herodianism—remarkable though they are—as the eventual conversion of the Scandinavian communities in and beyond the Celtic Fringe and in Scandinavia itself to the Western Christian culture, or as the adoption of the Orthodox Christian culture by the Russian Scandinavian conquerors of Slav barbarians in the basins of the Dniepr and the Neva.<sup>1</sup>

In the encounters between the representatives of a nascent Scandinavian Civilization and their culturally alien neighbours, this Herodian tide had no difficulty in sweeping off their feet the 'die-hard' Zealot champions of an indigenous Scandinavian culture, though this original creation of the Scandinavian genius had a value which was worth preserving and a charm which might have been expected to inspire a more enthusiastic defence, while the victorious alien cultures had no physical force of their own, beyond the right arms of their Scandinavian converts, to pit against the spiritually abashed but militarily undefeated Berserkers. When we turn to survey the psychological reactions evoked by the impact of Medieval Western Christendom on the Syriac World and on the main body and the Russian offshoot of Orthodox Christendom, we find the balance between Zealotism and Herodianism rather less uneven here.

In the Syriac World a predominantly Zealot reaction against Medieval Western Christian aggression, which came to a head in an *union sacrée* of Dār-al-Islām against the lodgements made in Syria by the Crusaders,<sup>2</sup> was set off to some extent by the Norman-minded Herodianism of the Cilician Armenian Monophysite Christian converts to a contemporary Western Christian way of life. In the main body of Orthodox Christendom a likewise predominantly Zealot reaction expressed itself, as we have seen, in an execration of the Normans as 'Children of Hagar' and in a refusal to accept ecclesiastical union with the Western Christian

<sup>1</sup> These conversions of divers Scandinavian communities to divers alien cultures have been noticed in II. ii. 348–55.

<sup>2</sup> See V. v. 354, and pp. 353–6 above.



Church at the price of acknowledging the Papacy's supremacy over the Eastern Orthodox Churches, even though the manifest price of non-acceptance was the doom of falling under Ottoman Turkish Muslim rule; yet this demonically Zealot Orthodox Christian antipathy towards an aggressive sister Christian civilization was tempered, in a few East Roman hearts and minds, by an Herodian appreciation, not only of the expediency of an unpalatable ecclesiastical union, but of the nobility of the Western ideal of chivalry and the fertility of the audacious Western innovation of employing the currently spoken vulgar tongue as a vehicle for literature.<sup>1</sup>

In the victorious revolt of Orthodox Christian Zealotism against an ecclesiastical union under Papal supremacy in accordance with the terms agreed at the Council of Florence in A.D. 1439, the Orthodox Church in Russia took the lead among the sundry national churches within the Orthodox communion in the resistance to Western ecclesiastical aggression, while the simultaneous Western political aggression against Russian Orthodox Christendom in the shape of sweeping Polish and Lithuanian conquests of derelict Russian territory, after the Mongols' catastrophic impact on Russia in the thirteenth century of the Christian Era had reduced her to military and political impotence, was countered in Muscovy by a political manifestation of Zealotism in the shape of an absolute authoritarian state in which an East Roman tradition and ideal of autocracy were re-embodied in new institutions that were original creations of the Russian political genius. Yet this Zealot seedling of Byzantine autocracy at Moscow, which had originally been called into existence as a windbreak against the icy blast of a Mongol Eurasian Nomad domination before being used to defend an unsubjugated remnant of Russian Orthodox Christendom against the predatory eastern marchmen of a Late Medieval Western Christian World, could not claim to be a more characteristic Russian response to the challenge of Western pressure in this age than the Herodian seedling of Medieval Western civic liberty which was bedded out contemporaneously at Novgorod.<sup>2</sup>

It is true that the *Gleichschaltung* of Novgorod's Western-inspired institutions and outlook, through the forcible incorporation of this *ci-devant* sovereign city-state into the dominions of a Muscovite 'Third Rome' in the eighth decade of the fifteenth century of the Christian Era, gave the Zealot answer a definitive victory over the Herodian answer to an insistent Western question in all parts of Holy Russia that had

<sup>1</sup> This contemporary Western example was the genial influence that encouraged the buried living waters of a rudimentary vernacular Greek literature to ooze up into the open through cracks in the ice-cap of a Byzantine classicism and to breed a native school of drama *alla Franca* in Crete in the course of the long-maintained Venetian political dominion over this Greek Orthodox Christian island (see pp. 392-4, above, and X. ix. 73-74).

<sup>2</sup> The voluntary entry of a Russian Orthodox Christian Novgorod into the commercial and cultural comity of a Medieval Western city-state cosmos is a more conspicuous, though more ephemeral, example of the cultural metamorphosis that is likewise exemplified in the history of the city-states founded on the coasts and adjoining waterways of Ireland by Ostmen who were kinsmen and contemporaries of Novgorod's original Scandinavian founders. In this context we may remind ourselves of a pre-Alexandrine Hellenic city-state cosmos's success in winning the cultural allegiance of the colonial city-states founded by the Hellenes' Libyphoenician and Etruscan commercial and political rivals in the Western Basin of the Mediterranean.

succeeded in keeping themselves politically inviolate from the stain of subjection to an alien Western rule; yet, even after the fall of Novgorod, Herodianism maintained an ascendancy over Zealotism during the next three centuries in those Russian Orthodox Christian territories that had been incorporated into the Western Christian kingdoms of Poland and Lithuania. On the ecclesiastical plane this Herodian proclivity revealed itself in a widespread—though not unchallenged and never all-embracing—acceptance of union with the Roman Church, on the terms agreed in A.D. 1439, by the Polish and Lithuanian Crowns' *ci-devant* Orthodox Christian subjects;<sup>1</sup> on the secular cultural plane the same vein of Herodianism found expression in a spontaneous progressive self-Polonization of the Orthodox and Uniate White Russian and Ukrainian, as well as the Latin Catholic White Russian and Lithuanian, nobility and gentry in the dominions of a Polish-Lithuanian United Kingdom.

Our pair of antithetical psychological reactions can also be detected in the histories of an Ottoman Orthodox Christendom's and a Hindu World's respective encounters with an aggressive Iranic Muslim Civilization.

In the main body of Orthodox Christendom under the *Pax Ottomanica*, a majority of the *ra'îyeh* belonging to the Millet-i-Rûm still clung to an ancestral religion whose ecclesiastical independence they had chosen to preserve at the price of submitting to an alien political régime; yet this Zealotism was partially offset, even on the religious plane, by the Herodianism of a minority who, from the fourteenth down to the seventeenth century of the Christian Era, were lured into apostasy from Christianity to Islam by tempting social advantages and dazzling political prizes that were the rich rewards for conversion to the religion of an Ottoman 'ascendancy'. A political ambition, that had sometimes prompted Orthodox Christian parents to welcome the conscription of their children into the Pādishāh's Slave-Household,<sup>2</sup> became a far stronger incentive to Herodianism in the hearts of Orthodox Christian subjects of the Porte when, in the course of the seventeenth century, new exigencies created by the rising pressure of the Western Christian Powers upon the Ottoman Empire moved the Porte to create new-fangled high offices of state to be held by Orthodox Christian *ra'îyeh* without their being called upon either to renounce their ancestral faith or to forfeit their personal freedom.<sup>3</sup> Meanwhile, the rank-and-file of the Millet-i-Rûm, who, short of becoming free Muslims or Ottoman public slaves, did not enter the Ottoman public service even as unconverted freemen, had long since

<sup>1</sup> This comparative success of the Uniate movement among the Orthodox Christian subjects of the Western Catholic Polish and Lithuanian Crowns, by contrast with its signal failure among the Orthodox Christian subjects of an Orthodox Christian East Roman Empire, was remarkable, considering that the Ukrainian and White Russian converts to Uniatism lacked the political incentive which, in Greek Orthodox Christendom, had moved a sagacious Michael Palaiologhos to action as early as A.D. 1261 and had become so obviously urgent there by A.D. 1439 that it could then be ignored there only by a Zealot's wilfully blind eyes. In Greek Orthodox Christendom the choice was one between ecclesiastical union with Rome and subjection to an alien political yoke, whereas the converts to Uniatism among the Orthodox subjects of Poland and Lithuania could not imagine that they were purchasing their escape from a political calamity that had already long since overtaken them.

<sup>2</sup> See III. iii. 37, n. 1.

<sup>3</sup> See II. ii. 224-5.

succumbed to Herodianism in much larger numbers in the more trivial, yet nevertheless significant, ways of learning to talk their Ottoman masters' language<sup>1</sup> and to ape their dress.

The story of the Hindus' psychological reaction to the rule of an Iranic Muslim 'ascendancy' runs on much the same lines. While a vast majority of the Hindu *ra'īyeh* of the Timurid Mughal Muslim emperors of India and their Afghan and Turkish Muslim forerunners emulated the Orthodox Christian *ra'īyeh* of the 'Osmanlis in zealously resisting the temptation presented by potent social and political inducements to apostatize, there were local mass-conversions to Islam—particularly among the socially depressed *ci-devant* pagan converts to Hinduism in Eastern Bengal—that would appear to have been on a greater scale, not only absolutely but also relatively to the total head of population in question in either case, than the corresponding local mass-conversions to Islam among the Albanian, the Epirot and Cretan Greek, and the Pomak Bulgar Orthodox Christians and among the Bosniak Bogomils. Moreover, the Brahmans showed the same alacrity as the Phanariots in entering a Muslim Power's public service as unconverted freemen, and the same facility in adopting their Muslim masters' language<sup>2</sup> and dress.

The history of an Iranic Muslim Society's impact on the Orthodox Christian and Hindu worlds also offers us two examples of psychological ambivalence. The new religions founded by Sheykh Bedr-ed-Dīn Simāvi in a fifteenth-century Western Anatolia<sup>3</sup> and by Guru Nanak in a fifteenth-century Panjab<sup>4</sup> were ostensibly expressions of a radical Herodianism; for both prophets proclaimed the fraternity and equality, on their own new common spiritual ground, of all their converts, whatever their divers religious antecedents; and the common ground on which, according to Nanak's revelation, the traditional divisions between Hindus and Muslims and between members of different Hindu castes were no longer valid was an article of Nanak's faith that was not of Hindu but of Islamic provenance. Like all converts to Islam, all converts to Sikhism became one another's brethren and peers in virtue of their having all alike given their allegiance to one Lord whom they had been taught to worship as the sole True Living God; and this tenet was so fundamental that Sikhism might be described with no less truth than brevity as an Herodian response to the impact of an Islamic monotheism upon the Hindu consciousness. Yet these intellectually convincing grounds for classifying Sikhism and Bedreddinism as expressions of Herodianism would have seemed academically irrelevant to the Mughal Emperors Jahangir and Awrangzib, and to the Ottoman Emperor Mehmed I, when they were encountering their Sikh and Bedreddini *ra'īyeh* on the battlefield in armed rebellion against an Islamic 'ascendancy'; and, if these Iranic Muslim potentates had been required to employ the psychological terminology of this Study, we may feel sure that they would have entered the names of Har Govind, Govind Singh, Bedr-ed-Din, and Mustafā Börklüje in the Zealot, not the Herodian, column of our present inventory.

<sup>1</sup> See V. v. 514-22.

<sup>3</sup> See V. v. 111 and 537.

<sup>2</sup> See V. v. 514-22.

<sup>4</sup> See V. v. 106 and 665-8.

When we come to the encounters with the Modern Western Civilization which had overtaken all the contemporaries of this potentially expansive society, we see the offshoot of the Far Eastern Society in Japan reacting to the impact of the West with vigour along both the two alternative lines.

The strength of the Herodian current in Japan was demonstrated more impressively by its persistence in adversity than by its exuberance before it fell on evil days. The eager curiosity that inspired a facile adoption of the Western weapons, dress,<sup>1</sup> and religion imported by Portuguese traders and missionaries during the honeymoon period, when Japan was making her first acquaintance with the West in the latter decades of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era, was justified by the silent heroism of this dubious wisdom's children<sup>2</sup> when, after the Tokugawa régime had ordered its subjects, under pain of death as the penalty for disobedience, to break off relations with the West and to renounce the imported Western religion,<sup>3</sup> a remnant of Japanese crypto-Christians remained secretly loyal to their proscribed alien faith for more than two hundred years—as became apparent when, after the Meiji Revolution in A.D. 1868, it became possible for them at last, in the ninth or tenth generation, to come out into the open again.

This second outburst of Herodianism in Japan in the middle decades of the nineteenth century was also, as we have seen, partly the work of other heroes who had risked and lost their lives in a non-religious Herodian cause by secretly studying Modern Western Science in a Dutch medium without waiting for the fall of an intolerantly Zealot-minded Tokugawa Shogunate. In the rediscovered light of these long-hidden candles<sup>4</sup> the Meiji Revolution in its day looked like a deferred but definitive triumph of an Herodianism which had been the predominant vein in the original Japanese response to the challenge of the West; yet, in this second bout, as in the first, the experience of half a century was to put a Zealot face on the reality behind Herodian first appearances—with the implication, for an historian's long-sighted eye, that the Tokugawa period, in which Zealotism had been in the ascendant, had, after all, been something more than an irrelevant interlude in a Japanese psychological drama in which Herodianism was the 'secular' trend (in the economists' technical use of the word).

The strength of the Zealot current in Japan had been indicated from the outset by the assiduity with which the Japanese had equipped themselves for holding their own against the formidable Western strangers by the ostensibly Herodian feat of learning how to make, as well as use, new-fangled Western fire-arms; and it was significant that the Tokugawa Government, when it set itself to sever relations between Japan and the West, cannily refrained from following up its veto on Western commodities and Western religion by renouncing the employment of Western weapons. This statesmanlike disregard for logic was justified by the sequel; for the Tokugawa eventually forfeited a political ascendancy founded on military force when their military impotence to prevent

<sup>1</sup> See V. vi. 102.

<sup>2</sup> See V. v. 365.

<sup>3</sup> Matt. xi. 19; Luke vii. 35.

<sup>4</sup> Matt. v. 15; Mark iv. 21; Luke viii. 16 and xi. 33.

Commodore Perry's squadron from entering Yedo Bay in A.D. 1853 made it alarmingly manifest to the Japanese public that, in the course of 215 years of deliberate self-isolation, the Bakufu had allowed its stationary seventeenth-century Western armaments to be left so far behind by the never-ceasing and ever-accelerating progress of Western military technique that the régime had at last become altogether incompetent to live up to its acknowledged *raison d'être* of keeping the West at arm's length from the sacrosanct Land of the Gods. Between A.D. 1853 and A.D. 1868 this public zeal in Japan for an effective fulfilment of the Tokugawa's neglected Zealot mission displayed itself not only in a growing insubordination towards the authority of this now discredited indigenous régime but in a rising wave of xenophobia, foaming over into physical assaults, against Western intruders whom, in the meanwhile, the Bakufu had been constrained by Western political pressure to readmit within its precincts; and the revolution in which a thus patently irreclaimable Tokugawa régime was ruthlessly liquidated was the work of descendants of Kyushuan pupils of the Portuguese who had made up their minds to repeat their sixteenth-century ancestors' achievement of mastering Destiny by acquiring the superior military technique of the West in its most up-to-date form.

While this Japanese revolution can be presented as a triumph for Herodianism in the accurate statements that its economic programme was a thorough-going adoption of the material technique of the contemporary Western World and that its political programme was the entry of Japan into the contemporary Western comity of nations, the same revolution can be presented simultaneously as a triumph for Zealotism in the likewise accurate statements that the intention inspiring the technological revolution was to turn Japan into a Great Power of the contemporary Western standard, and that she was resigning herself to the necessity of entering the arena of Western power politics because she had come to realize that this was the only condition on which she could continue to hold her own against the West on the face of a planet that had now been magnetized by Western arts into a single indivisible field of force. The latent Zealotism of the strategy behind the Herodianism of Japan's tactics during the three-quarters of a century ending in A.D. 1945 was indeed divulged as early as A.D. 1882 in the official organization of the State Shintô, in which a resuscitated pre-Buddhaic paganism<sup>1</sup> was utilized as a vehicle for the deification of a living Japanese people, community, and state through the symbolism of an archaic cult of an Imperial Dynasty that was reputed to be the divine offspring of the Sun

<sup>1</sup> The origins of this archaistic Neo-Shintô movement can be traced back to the seventeenth century of the Christian Era, and its antecedents to the fifteenth century (see V. vi, 90, with n. 4). It was always suspect to the Tokugawa on account of its potentialities for serving as the ideology for an alternative régime based on a revival of the latent prestige of the Imperial Dynasty (see *ibid.*, p. 91, n. 3). The Tokugawa régime had sought to parry this threat to its stability by patronizing rival religions and philosophical movements. It had favoured the Mahāyāna and had encouraged an archaistic revival, not of Shintô, but of Confucianism (see *ibid.*, pp. 90-91, and Murdoch, J.: *A History of Japan*, vol. iii (London 1926, Kegan Paul), p. 97). In promoting the propagation in Japan of a Neoconfucian Movement that had originated in contemporary China, the Bakufu was employing Herodian tactics for attaining its Zealot strategic objective.



Goddess and that offered its hereditary collective divinity for worship here and now in the epiphany of a god perpetually incarnate in the person of the reigning Emperor.<sup>1</sup>

It will be seen that, during the four hundred years ending in A.D. 1952, the Japanese psychological reaction to the ordeal of encountering the West had been ambivalent through and through.

The ultimately Zealot motive underlying a superficially Herodian-looking policy that has here been ascribed to the Japanese in and after the Meiji Revolution of A.D. 1868 was ascribed to the contemporary Chinese, on the morrow of the consummation of the Kuomintang Revolution in China in the third decade of the twentieth century, by a learned and acute student of Far Eastern history who was inclined at that date to take current Japanese Herodianism at its face value, or at any rate to judge that the latter-day Japanese importers of Western cultural wares were deceiving themselves in so far as they seriously expected to succeed, by the sophisticated means of a nicely calculated and strictly regulated dole of cultural rations, in eluding our empirically established social 'law' that, when once a society's defences have been penetrated by the radiation of an intrusive alien culture, 'one thing leads to another' inexorably until, willy nilly, the assaulted party has to resign himself to adopting the assailant's way of life *in toto*.

'The first approach of the West was resisted in Japan, as in China; but, when Perry demonstrated that the West "amounted to something", the effect approximated to a revelation, and was so accepted. . . . It is China, on the contrary, which has endeavoured to use the weapons of the West to preserve itself from the West. . . . The whole history of Chinese relations with the West implies an underlying instinctive playing for time, in the hope that the West would exhaust itself and China be able to assert once more the superiority of which the Chinese are morally convinced.'<sup>2</sup>

Twenty years after the publication of the book from which these passages are quoted, at a moment when Japan was under Western military occupation and China was under the rule of an indigenous Communist régime, it was manifestly rash to make a more than tentative and provisional estimate of the 'secular' psychological trend in either of these two provinces of the Far Eastern World; but it was nevertheless possible to observe unmistakable symptoms of both Herodianism and Zealotism in this episode of Chinese history, and also to notice certain likenesses and differences between the Chinese and the corresponding Japanese episode in respect of both the interplay and the relative strengths of the two alternative reactions.

The light-hearted adoption of current Western fashions by late-sixteenth-century and early-seventeenth-century Japanese barons and their retainers had its counterpart in the frivolous curiosity in regard to astronomical instruments and other toys of Modern Western Science that the Jesuit guests at the Imperial Court in Peking had the wit to arouse in the minds of Ming and Manchu emperors and Confucian literati; yet

<sup>1</sup> See V. v. 707, n. 2, and V. vi. 93.

<sup>2</sup> Lattimore, O.: *Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict* (New York 1932, Macmillan), pp. 85-88.

in China, as in Japan, the interest in Western fire-arms was both more serious and more sinister; and in China, as in Japan, again, adversity, in the severe form of official persecution, demonstrated the sincerity of the Herodianism of converts who became martyrs to their alien Christian faith,<sup>1</sup> while the eventual obsolescence of the ban on the profession of Christianity brought to light the persistence of Herodianism on the religious plane in China likewise when a fresh harvest of converts was reaped there by nineteenth-century successors of the proscribed Early Modern Western Christian missionaries.

This second wave of Herodianism was transmitted, in China too, from the religious plane, on which it first made its reappearance, to the secular planes of education and business. Mission-educated Chinese converts to Protestantism completed their studies in the universities of the United States, and penurious Chinese emigrants established themselves in force as efficient and prosperous Westernizing business men in a number of South-East Asian countries—the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaya, Indo-China, and Burma—that had fallen under Western rule and had in consequence been incorporated into a Westernizing World on the economic plane as well as the political.<sup>2</sup> This Chinese commercial diasporá, as well as the Chinese *alumni* of Western educational campuses on both Chinese and Western ground, had played a part, out of proportion to their numbers, in an Herodian political movement—Sun Yat-sen's Kuomintang—which had attempted in the second quarter of the twentieth century of the Christian Era to emulate the achievement of the Japanese authors of a Meiji Revolution who had succeeded in obtaining admittance for their country into the contemporary comity of Western states on a footing of equality with the original members of the club.

On the other hand, a Zealotism that had gained the upper hand in Japan eventually—in the fourth decade of the seventeenth century—had declared itself in China promptly at the beginning of the history of Chinese intercourse with the West. Ming emperors who had welcomed Western apostles of Christianity to their imperial capital had anticipated the Tokugawa Government's tardy precaution of confining the Dutch remnant of a Western commercial community in Japan to the islet of Deshima; for the Chinese imperial authorities had never permitted Western traders of any nation to reside on Chinese soil outside the confines of the Portuguese settlement at Macao and the mudbank of Shamen in the West River off the water-front at Canton, which was made to serve the purpose of a convict hulk for the internment of Western traders of all nations during their strictly limited and regulated seasonal visits. Even after the jealously locked, barred, and bolted gates of a Chinese Earthly Paradise had been blown in by British naval broadsides in the Sino-British 'Opium War' of A.D. 1839-42, a humiliatingly defeated Chinese Government still managed, in the ensuing peace settlement, to prevent the now inevitable enlargement of the resident Western

<sup>1</sup> The Battle of the Rites and its tragic outcome have been noticed in V. v. 366-7 and 539.

<sup>2</sup> The Chinese diasporá in Siam should be added to this list, notwithstanding Siam's success in preserving her political independence down to the time of writing.

traders' 'pale' from being extended beyond half a dozen specified 'treaty ports'. Missionaries of the Christian religion were the only Westerners who were then granted the privilege of travelling and residing at will throughout the length and breadth of Chinese territory; and the progressive increase in the number of Western treaty ports and in the weight of Western influence in China in the course of the last six decades of the nineteenth century provoked a cumulative resentment in Chinese hearts which culminated in demonic eruptions of militant xenophobia.

The Boxer Rising of A.D. 1900, like the sporadic outbreaks of Zealotism in Japan during the years A.D. 1853-68, was directed in the first place against a decadent indigenous régime whose dubious title to legitimacy was now challenged on the score of its manifest incompetence to resist the encroachments of Western intruders who were the rebels' ultimate target. An incurable inability to carry out the Zealots' anti-Western requirements was the offence that cost the Manchu imperial régime in China its life in A.D. 1911, as it had been the cause of the Tokugawa Shogunate's downfall in Japan in A.D. 1867-8. The Manchu Dynasty's doom had been sealed by its supreme and unpardonable offence of having owed its reprieve, eleven years back, to the bayonets of the alien international expeditionary force that had raised the Boxers' siege of the Legation Quarter in Peking; and the execution done by the Western sword with which the Boxers had perished<sup>1</sup> in A.D. 1900, and the T'ai-p'ing before them in A.D. 1864,<sup>2</sup> like those militant Jewish followers of Theudas and Judas who had once ventured to try conclusions with the Romans,<sup>3</sup> did not deter a third generation of Chinese Zealots in A.D. 1925 from rushing into a fresh campaign of militancy which, in the teeth of all the forbidding precedents, was to justify itself by its success in bringing about the progressive abolition of 'the Unequal Treaties':

Moreover, the ambivalence which we have found pervading all phases and aspects of the Japanese psychological reaction to the impact of the Modern West was discernible in the Chinese arena likewise in at least two movements. We have just now classified the T'ai-p'ing as a Zealot revolt against a semi-alien Manchu imperial régime which, in Zealot Chinese eyes, had forfeited any mandate to which it might have been able to claim title through its failure to prevent the unceremonious pioneers of a wholly alien Western World from breaking their way into the Middle Kingdom's sacrosanct precincts by force of arms. But such an account of the T'ai-p'ing would be misleadingly incomplete if we did not go on to remind ourselves that the inspiration of its founder Hung Hsiu-ch'uan's mountain-moving faith had come, not from the Confucian Classics, which he had studied without showing the ability required to qualify as a litteratus, but from tracts compiled by a Chinese convert of a Protestant Western Christian missionary;<sup>4</sup> and the Western manufacture of the spring that thus released this Chinese prophet-pretender's

<sup>1</sup> Matt. xxvi. 52.

<sup>2</sup> A Manchu régime whose old-fashioned troops had signally failed to suppress the T'ai-p'ing had owed its salvation in this crisis to a new-model force organized and led for it by a Western mercenary soldier who consequently came to be known among his compatriots as 'Chinese Gordon'.

<sup>3</sup> Acts. v. 36-37.

<sup>4</sup> See V. v. 107, n. 1.

energies requires us to enter his name in the Herodian column of our inventory as well.

This recourse to the device of double entry was also the only adequate method of classifying the more recent phenomenon of Chinese Communism; for, while this movement, too, had an indisputable claim to a place in the Zealot column on the score of its implacable enmity towards its Herodian contemporary and rival the Kuomintang, the subtly pervasive taint of Herodianism also betrayed itself in the war-gear of a Chinese anti-Western movement that had borrowed the ideology of Communism from a Russian armoury; for Russia was not herself the artificer of the Marxian thunderbolt, but had imported this ideological weapon for her own use from the forge of a nineteenth-century Western heresiarch before re-exporting it to China for employment on the local anti-Western front in a 'cold war' that was then coming to be waged on an oecumenical scale.

In the psychological reactions of the pre-Columbian civilizations in the Americas to the appalling advent of militarily irresistible aggressors from a previously quite unheard-of and all but undreamed-of alien world overseas, the Zealot heroism of the Inca 'die-hards', who held out in an Andean mountain-fastness for thirty years after the Empire of the Four Quarters had fallen before the horse-hoofs and the fire-arms of the Spanish *conquistadores*,<sup>1</sup> flared up again, more than three hundred years later, in the insurrection of a pretender to the tragically inspiring name of Tupac Amaru in A.D. 1780-3;<sup>2</sup> but this vein of Zealotism in an overwhelmed Andean cosmos was balanced in the original Tupac Amaru's generation, on the morrow of the conquest, by the Herodianism of half-breed children of Spanish *conquistadores* and Inca mothers. The work of the half-breed Jesuit Father Blas Valera perished in manuscript, before publication, in the siege of Cadiz by the English in A.D. 1596,<sup>3</sup> but the work of his fellow half-breed Garcilaso de la Vega<sup>4</sup> (*vivebat* A.D. 1540-1616) was preserved to be the principal repertory of the Incas' traditions about themselves in the libraries of these Andean empire-builders' Western supplanters. This soldier-historian had gathered his ancestral traditions in his Quichuan mother-tongue from the survivors of the last generation of antediluvian Inca grandes before he left his Andean fatherland for ever at the age of twenty to serve on European battlefields as an officer in the Spanish Army; but he survived thirty years of military service to set down on paper in Castilian at Cordova in his ripper years the oral information that he had garnered in Quichuan at Cuzco in his boyhood.

This evanescent Herodianism of a handful of half-breeds belonging to a single generation in the sixteenth century is a less impressive instance of the Herodian psychological reaction in the Andean World than the subsequent miracle of the adoption of the current Western Civilization in a Catholic Christian medium by the Guaraní transfrontier barbarians

<sup>1</sup> See V. vi. 213.

<sup>2</sup> See I. i. 120, n. 1.

<sup>3</sup> See Baudin, L.: *L'Empire Socialiste des Inka* (Paris 1928, Institut d'Ethnologie), p. 12, n. 3.

<sup>4</sup> A note of Garcilaso de la Vega's career will be found *ibid.*, p. 12.

in Paraguay *en masse*. In the Paraguayan 'reductions' the spell-binding charm of the Jesuits' Orphean music worked the magic of securing a truce to the ferocity which these Western Christian culture-heroes' temporarily docile Guaraní converts, pupils, and protégés had displayed, before this interlude, as barbarian invaders of the Andean World, and which they were to display again as cannon-fodder in the international and civil wars of the Latin-American successor-states of the Spanish and Portuguese Empires. This summer of unwonted peace and prosperity between two bouts of frantic militarism lasted in Paraguay for the best part of two centuries (*circa* A.D. 1580-1773) and was terminated only by the Spanish Crown's wanton crime of liquidating an idyllic hierocracy.<sup>1</sup>

When we turn our eyes from the Andes to Central America, we find there an illustration of the Herodian reaction in the readiness with which a subjugated indigenous peasantry in the Spanish Viceroyalty of New Spain embraced a version of a Tridentine Catholic Christianity in which the natives' Castilian religious instructors discreetly overlooked the infusion of a reassuring alloy of their converts' pristine paganism. On the northern fringes of the same Mexic World the antithetical *éthos* of Zealotism displayed itself in the gentle persistence with which an indigenous religion and way of life were treasured by the Pueblo and other agricultural sedentary communities that had been ceded by the Republic of Mexico to the United States in A.D. 1848; while, still farther afield, among the Nomadic hunting tribes of North America, the same Zealot spirit gave birth to new indigenous religions<sup>2</sup> under the agonizing ordeal of an assault by which these most unhappy of all American victims of aggression from overseas were being deprived, not merely of political freedom, but of the possibility of continuing to lead an ancestral way of life that had depended on a freedom to range over their now stolen hunting grounds.<sup>3</sup>

In the psychological reactions in the Central American World we also find examples of the phenomenon of ambivalence. The revolution that broke out in Mexico in A.D. 1910 might look, on the surface, like a social conflict in which the line of division between the combatant parties conformed to the conventional Western pattern of the day; yet a more penetrating eye would discern that these Mexican laymen, peasants, and workers in revolt against prelates, landlords, and employers who were largely of West European and North American provenance were also Zealot champions of a submerged Mexic culture against the ascendancy of an alien civilization that had originated in the Old World. In a neighbouring section of the same continent in an earlier generation the savage military resistance offered to the encroachments of White Men from overseas by Apaches, Comanches, and other Indian denizens of the Great Plains who had learnt from their assailants the Eurasian art of

<sup>1</sup> For the work of the Jesuits in Paraguay, see Cunninghame Graham, R. B.: *A Vanished Arcadia*, 2nd ed. (London 1924, Heinemann), and O'Neill, G.: *Golden Years on the Paraguay* (London 1934, Burns, Oates, & Washbourne).

<sup>2</sup> See V. v. 328-32.

<sup>3</sup> The contrast in *éthos* between the Plains Indians and the Pueblos is brought out by Ruth Benedict in *Patterns of Culture* (Cambridge, Mass. 1931, The Riverside Press), pp. 78-95. The resistance of the Plains Indians is examined on pp. 630-50, below.



horsemanship was likewise impossible to describe adequately without calling these fierce warriors both Zealots, in virtue of their recalcitrance to their White executioners' lethal designs, and Herodians, in virtue of their receptivity in borrowing from their adversaries an imported animate weapon which was providentially apt for use in a hitherto horseless 'Centaur's' paradise'.

In the psychological reactions of the Jewish fossil of an extinct Syriac Civilization to an encompassing and oppressive Western Christendom among which this Jewry was dispersed, we shall find a classical illustration of Zealotism in the meticulous observance of the Mosaic Law by orthodox Jews who had faithfully followed Rabbi Johanan ben Zakkai's admonitions to seek in the practice of this social drill their palladium for preserving their distinctive communal identity in diaspora; and in the same field we shall also find a classical illustration of Herodianism in the whole-heartedness and the virtuosity with which all the Jews in the West—Ritualists, Liberals, and Zionists alike—participated in the secular activities of the Western Gentile World on the economic plane.

In a Late Modern Western World in which the walls of the ghetto had fallen at the sound of a Revolutionary French trumpet, a latter-day Liberal School of Jews seized the opening thus offered to them for carrying their Herodianism beyond the economic plane on to the political and the personal. When once the pungent elixir of Rabbinical Judaism had been volatilized in the Jewish Liberal's Late Modern Western intellectual crucible to a degree of insipidity at which a Jewish citizen of the Netherlands, France, Great Britain, or the United States could be described as 'a Dutchman, Frenchman, Englishman, or American of Jewish religion' not less accurately than his Gentile fellow Liberal and fellow countryman could be given the corresponding label of a Dutchman or what-not of such-and-such a Christian denomination, it became comparatively easy, in the intellectual and emotional environment of an ex-Christian Liberal World, for latter-day Jewish Herodians to carry the process of assimilation to the further stage of abandoning even their formal membership in a Jewish community and intermarrying with neighbours and fellow citizens of Gentile origin. What sense was there, for a Liberal's rational mind, in a Mosaic ban that debarred Jews from *connubium* with Gentiles with whom all Jews in diaspora must always practise *commercium* in order to earn their daily bread?

The effort of breaking with traditional Jewish habit and prejudice which was entailed in such a defiance of a Mosaic tabu on mixed marriages might come easiest when the parties could meet and mate on a common ground of ex-Jewish and ex-Christian religious agnosticism; but an ex-Jew who had gone that far would no longer find it very difficult to pay a tribute to conventionality at a cheap rate by submitting to the formality of a baptism that would purchase for him a nominal membership in one of the less unfashionable of the Christian churches of the day. The anti-clockwise pilgrim's progress of the Jewish Herodian in a Late Modern Western World had illustrated the facility with which 'one thing leads to another' by going to these lengths before an outraged Moses was vindicated and avenged by a maniac Hitler who provided

himself with pariahs for penalization *more Visigothico* by routing out these 'non-Aryans' from the Gentile communities into which they had passed so adroitly, in order to thrust them back against their will into their deliberately abandoned invidious traditional role of being 'a peculiar people'.

At the time of writing on the morrow of a Second World War, both the Herodian 'non-Aryan' and the Zealot Ritualist survivors of the Jewish diaspora in the Western World had lost the lead in a Western Jewry to a Zionist movement that differed from both these other diasporan reactions alike in displaying an ambivalent affinity with both of them simultaneously.<sup>1</sup>

The Zionists' deliberate and enthusiastic recultivation of a distinctively separate Jewish consciousness stamped them with the authentic hall-mark of Zealotism. Yet these Zionist Neo-Zealots were anathema to diasporan devotees of the Ritualistic Zealot tradition inaugurated by Rabbi Johanan ben Zakkai, in whose eyes the Zionists were guilty of flagrant impiety in presuming to bring about on their own initiative a physical return of the Jewish people to Palestine which it was God's prerogative to accomplish at His own good time according to *Agudath Israel's* hyper-orthodox belief. And, even when the Zionists had partially attained their objective *manu militari*, the Jewish Ritualists' joy at having lived to see the Mosaic Law reinstituted in a reconquered Eretz Israel must have been damped by the observation—to which no sharp-sighted lover of this Law could blind himself—that the Zionists had been moved to re-enact the Torah by the same cynical motive of making religious formalities serve secular purposes as had animated the 'non-Aryan' candidates for Christian baptism.

On the other hand, in the Assimilationist Jews' estimation, the Zionists' Herodian loss of their ancestral Jewish faith was a common experience that did not avail to atone for a Zealot vein in Zionism which, in the Assimilationists' eyes, was deplorably retrograde. The Assimilationists could not bear the Zionists' relapse into their common ancestors' irrational Zealot belief that the Jews were 'a peculiar people'. Yet an orthodox Jewish polemical theologian, or even a neutral Gentile scientific observer, who chose to charge the Zionists with being guilty of the same crime of 'Assimilationism' as those avowed Assimilationists who gloried in the name, would not have found it difficult to secure a conviction.

The truth was that, while the professed Assimilationists were seeking to assimilate themselves individually to their individual Gentile neighbours, the Zionists were unavowedly aiming at the same objective of assimilation in the more radical form of a corporate transformation of the Jewish community into the likeness of 'all the nations'<sup>2</sup> of a Western or Westernizing World in which a latter-day Jewry found itself living. The Zionist prisoner in the dock would, no doubt, protest that his aim, in parting company with the non-violent Jewish Zealots of Rabbi Johanan ben Zakkai's school, was not to arrive by a better alternative road at the goal of assimilation which was his Liberal Jewish contemporary's Herodian

<sup>1</sup> See II. ii. 252-4.

<sup>2</sup> 1 Sam. viii. 5 and 20.

objective, but was, on the contrary, to reinvigorate a tame non-violent rendering of the theme of Jewish Zealotism by reverting to the militancy of those Theudas and Judases who had come so promisingly near to success in the glorious years A.D. 66-70, 115-17, and 132-5.<sup>1</sup> But, even if this hypothetical plea of our imaginary Zionist defendant had not been open in A.D. 1952 to being impugned by a damningly odious comparison of it with the speculations of some irreclaimable contemporary German chauvinist on Germany's chances in a third world war, it would have been confuted by the evidence of the historic *sicarii* themselves, if Jewish Zealots of the classical period could have been raised from the dead to be placed in the witness-box by the counsel for the prosecution.

We may be sure that these inexpugnably authoritative witnesses, so far from being grateful to the Zionist in the dock for having cited them as his revered exemplars, would have scornfully dissociated themselves from him after pointing out to the Court that the Zionist's ideology did not vindicate but bewrayed him. In basing the Jewish people's title to the soil of Eretz Israel on the physical ground that they were a master race in virtue of having Abraham for their father,<sup>2</sup> the Zionist was unwittingly testifying that he had been ensnared by the lure of a post-Modern Western Gentile Racialism in which a Late Modern Western Gentile Nationalism had denounced itself, through the self-exposure of a self-caricature, as being the naked Neo-Paganism that it was. In pursuit of this inveterate Gentile idolatry in the particularly sinister form of Man's self-worship of a human herd, the Zionist Jewish addict to a pagan cult of 'blood and soil' had abandoned his fathers' faith that the Jews were a chosen people in virtue of God's grace in having condescended to make a covenant with Abraham and his seed in which the Lord's choice of Israel was conditional upon Israel's continuing to obey the Lord's commandments. In thus leaving God's will and Israel's conduct out of his reckoning, the Zionist was parting with the spiritual ground which was the only sure basis for the Jews' title to the soil of the Holy Land just because this orthodox version of the traditional Jewish faith compelled the faithful who adhered to it to recognize, with fear and trembling, that their privilege was contingent upon their keeping faith with their Maker and Chooser. What surer way of losing Jewry's title could the Zionists have devised than to deviate, in the blindness of a pagan hybris, into the delusion that a revocable grant from Almighty God was an inalienable birthright automatically transmitted through the physical medium of an Abrahamic blood-stream?

It will be seen that Zionism betrayed its ambivalence by laying itself open to simultaneous charges of Herodianism and Zealotism which, unfortunately for the Zionists, did not cancel one another out.

The psychological reactions in the Islamic World to the aggression of a Late Modern Western Civilization were strikingly reminiscent of the reactions to Hellenic aggression in Jewry during the two centuries ending in A.D. 135.

The insurrections of Jewish militant fanatics embattled on the desert fringes of Palestine against Idumaeen tetrarchs and Roman procurators

<sup>1</sup> See V. v. 68.

<sup>2</sup> Matt. iii. 9.

who had been invested by Caesar with the stewardship of the former dominions of Herod the Great had their counterpart in the fanatical outbreaks of the Wahhābī, Idrīsī, Mahdist, and Sanūsī Muslim puritans<sup>1</sup> who sallied out of their fastnesses in the Najd, 'Asīr, Kordofan, and the desert hinterland of Cyrenaica on the forlorn hope of overthrowing an Ottoman régime which, in their censorious eyes, had proved itself unworthy of its pretension to be the heir of the Caliphate. As these Islamic Zealots saw it, the Pādishāh had aggravated a heinous first offence of losing the military and political initiative to his infidel Western adversaries by committing the unpardonable second offence of allowing the Ottoman body politic to become a channel for the infection of the heart of Dār-al-Islām with the triumphant infidel's contaminating influence. In this light, nineteenth-century Ottoman sultans and pashas cut the same odious figure as the Herods and Pilates had once cut in the sight of leaders of a Zealot Jewish resistance movement; and the lamentable spectacle of the Theudases and Judases falling suicidally upon devouring Roman swords was duly reproduced in the execution done by Modern Western weapons when the Najdī Wahhābīs were smitten by Ibrāhīm Pasha, the Sudanese Mahdists by Kitchener,<sup>2</sup> the Libyan Sanūsīs by Graziani,<sup>3</sup> and the Maghribī patriot leaders, an 'Abd-al-Qādir in Algeria and an 'Abd-al-Karīm in the Moroccan Rif,<sup>4</sup> by Bugeaud<sup>5</sup> and by Boichut. Only the Pathan highlanders<sup>6</sup> in an East Iranian no-man's-land between a now independent Pakistan and a still independent Afghanistan had succeeded, down to the time of writing, in emulating in a latter-day Dār-al-Islām the Arsacids' and Sasanids' feat of thwarting all Roman attempts to recapture for Hellenism an 'Irāq and a Western Iran that Arsacid arms had salvaged for Zoroastrianism from the Hellenic domination of the Romans' Seleucid predecessors.

These latter-day Islamic reproductions of Zealot Jewish prototypes were balanced, in the same chapter of Islamic history, by avatars of the Herodians' eponymous Idumaeen hero, the great son of Antipater himself, in the titanic Herodian figures of a Mehmed 'Alī Pasha (thrown into relief by his reactionary grandson and successor 'Abbās I), a Sultan Mahmūd II, and a Ghāzi Mustafā Kemāl Atatürk who, in his own lifetime, was successfully imitated in Persia by a Rizā Shāh Pahlawī and was unsuccessfully parodied in Afghanistan by an Amānallāh;<sup>7</sup> and we have already observed that Rizā Shāh's and Atatürk's radical Herodian reforms<sup>8</sup> had been anticipated by an abortive Westernizing revolution in Persia in A.D. 1906 and in Turkey in A.D. 1908.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See V. v. 294-5 and 324, and V. vi. 227.

<sup>2</sup> See Theobald, A. B.: *The Mahdiyya, A History of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1881-1899* (London 1951, Longmans, Green); Trimmingham, J. S.: *Islam in the Sudan* (London 1949, Oxford University Press).

<sup>3</sup> An account of the warfare in Libya between the Sanūsīs and the Italians during the years A.D. 1911-32 will be found in Evans-Pritchard, E. E.: *The Sanusi of Cyrenaica* (Oxford 1949, University Press), chaps. 5-7.

<sup>4</sup> See V. vi. 227.

<sup>5</sup> 'Abd-al-Qādir's surrender was actually received by Bugeaud's lieutenant Lamoricière.

<sup>6</sup> See V. v. 305-8 and 332-3, and V. vi. 228.

<sup>7</sup> See V. v. 333.

<sup>8</sup> The imposition of Western dress in Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan has been noticed in V. vi. 102-3, and the imposition of the Latin Alphabet in Turkey *ibid.*, on pp. 112-13.

<sup>9</sup> The temporarily successful constitutionalist revolution in Turkey in A.D. 1908 was,

On the other hand the Islamic Society may be credited with originality in having given birth to two nobly tragic martyrs to Herodianism in the persons of an imaginatively prescient Sultan Selim III and a beneficently efficient Midhat Pasha, while the doubtful honour of producing such oddly compounded monsters as Zealot-drones, for which it might be hard to find a precedent in Syriac history, was shared by the Islamic Society with the Russian branch of Orthodox Christendom, where the massacre of the Janissaries by Selim III's cousin and avenger Mahmūd II, and the massacre of the Mamlūks by Mehmed 'Alī, had been anticipated in the massacre of the Streltsy by Peter the Great.

There was, however, a residual tinge of Zealotism even in Mehmed 'Alī's aggressively Herodian *éthos*,<sup>1</sup> and in the writer's day the Islamic World had produced an unmistakably ambivalent culture-hero in the kingly person of an 'Abd-al-'Azīz b. 'Abd-ar-Rahmān Āl Sa'ūd,<sup>2</sup> the restorer of the fortunes of his house and sect who proved himself a successor of his Wahhābī Zealot forebears when he purged the Haramayn in the Hijāz of the taint of idolatrous corruption after his conquest and annexation of the Islamic Holy Land, but went on to prove himself also a successor of those same primitive Wahhābī Zealots' Herodian Ottoman bugbears when he set himself to consolidate the political independence of a salvaged Arabia by coaxing his turbulent and fanatical tribesmen to exchange the nomadic shepherd's leisure for the labours of a sedentary husbandry in oases whose productivity Ibn Sa'ūd did not hesitate to multiply by resorting to the unhallowed Western technique of boring artesian wells. When the Badu had thus been broken in to an Herodian revolution in their way of life, it was less difficult for their Janus-faced patriarch to provide himself with the financial sinews of war or welfare by earning royalties from leases granted, with his now semi-domesticated Badawī subjects' acquiescence, to American *entrepreneurs* who were thirsting to tap the liquid mineral wealth of an Arabian desert's subsoil by probing it, not now for water, but for oil.

In the reaction to the West in the Hindu World the Islamic Zealotism of Wahhābī, Idrīsī, Mahdist, and Sanūsī puritans had its psychological counterpart in a Zealot revival of an orgiastic Kali-worship and recultivation of a desiccated Vedic lore, while the Brahmans' Zealot-minded anxiety to elude the ritual contamination that they would have incurred through eating and drinking in the company of their British 'fellow

as we have seen, the work of a 'New 'Osmanli' movement which had made its first abortive attempt to turn the Ottoman Empire into a parliamentary constitutional state *alla Franca* as early as the third quarter of the nineteenth century. A recent Western student of this episode of Ottoman history had summed up his appreciation of the policy of Nāmyq Kemāl, one of the leading 'New 'Osmanli' publicists of the pioneer generation, by putting it that 'his aim was to regenerate the state by borrowing from the West the means to oppose to the West a stronger and more united nation' (Davison, R. H.: *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876* (thesis submitted to Harvard University for the degree of Ph.D., 1st April, 1942), p. 241 of the typescript copy in Harvard University Library, quoted here by permission). This sentence puts in a nutshell the objective that is the common goal of all Herodians.

<sup>1</sup> In his *Report on Egypt and Candia* of the 27th March, 1839 (London 1840, Clowes), p. 30, Sir John Bowring records the Egyptians' confident belief that they had now learnt enough from their Frank instructors in Western technique to be able to afford to dispense with their costly services—though, in Bowring's own opinion, experience had proved the contrary (cp. *ibid.*, pp. 48 and 151).

<sup>2</sup> See V. v. 333-4.



Aryans'<sup>1</sup> was amusingly reminiscent of the Pharisees' similar embarrassments in their unavoidable contacts with their uncircumcized Roman lords and masters. Yet these ritualistic scruples did not deter Brahmans from deliberately setting foot within an unclean British lion's den in order to serve the new alien rulers of India as administrators, in the footsteps of those Brahmans of earlier generations who had served the now fallen Muslim predecessors of the British in the same capacity. The British empire-builders' Brahman coadjutors equipped themselves for this Herodian profession of their choice by learning English<sup>2</sup> with the same industry and virtuosity that their fathers had shown in learning Persian.<sup>3</sup>

In this post-Mughal phase of the Hindu Society's experience of alien political domination, Brahmans, as well as Kshatriyas, extended the breadth of their front on their Herodian line of march by also taking service in the professional armies, on a Western model, that were raised, in and after the later decades of the eighteenth century, by a variegated pack of Hindu, Muslim, and Western adventurers who were now contending with one another in a competition to carve successor-states out of the carcass of a defunct Timurid Mughal Empire. When a combination of two complementary reductive processes—destruction and absorption—had duly reduced these inchoate Westernizing military forces on Indian ground first to the two surviving military establishments of a British East India Company and a Sikh war-lord Ranjit Singh, and finally to one sole surviving British Indian Army, as a result of a hundred years of costly experimentation in 'the survival of the fittest', this Western-organized, Western-trained, and Western-officered Indian military machine fed by voluntary enlistment kept open a wide vent for Hindu Herodian proclivities—at first mainly among the so-called 'martial races' of the North-West,<sup>4</sup> but eventually also among Hindus of all castes and quarters whom a Western education had qualified and inspired to become candidates for officer-cadetships in an Indian Army when the cadre of officers was deliberately and rapidly 'Indianized' in the last phase of the British régime. The strength and volume of a Hindu Herodian movement that had been gathering momentum for the best part of two hundred years, as its triple stream swept forward down a military, an

<sup>1</sup> The mirage of a common physical stock to which latter-day Hindus and latter-day Europeans alike could trace back their descent had been conjured up by the unwarranted inference that the existence of 'an Aryan race' was implied in the authentic discovery of an *Ursprache* from which all the latter-day languages of an 'Indo-European' family were genuinely derived. In India under a British Rāj, this mistaken physiological induction from a correct linguistic premiss was not taken sufficiently seriously to move either the Brahman to sit at table with the Englishman or the Englishman to elect the Brahman to membership in his club. It was left for the Nazi fellow countrymen of Bopp to exploit the Aryan racial myth as an instrument of torture for use in their persecution of the Jews long after it had become manifest to scholars that there was little or no correspondence between the family-trees of languages and the genealogies of races. Such a mischievous use does not appear ever to have been made of the analogous legend of a common origin of the Spartans and the Jews that was invented to serve current political purposes in the post-Alexandrine Age of Hellenic history.

<sup>2</sup> See V. v. 507.

<sup>3</sup> The Brahmans' linguistic prowess was the more praiseworthy inasmuch as most of them remained unaware that these graceless alien tongues which they were mastering from a utilitarian motive were akin to the sacred Sanskrit in which they themselves were zealous litterati.

<sup>4</sup> See II. ii. 128, n. 1.

administrative, and also an industrial channel, was demonstrated in and after the summer of A.D. 1947, when the management of an Indian Union was successfully taken over from British hands by an efficient working party of Hindu statesmen, staff officers, and business men.

In previous contexts attention has been drawn to the ambivalence of the reaction of a Mahatma Gandhi whose conduct of his Zealot campaign for a radical severance of the economic threads implicating the Hindu Society in a Western way of life revealed this Hindu Janus's Herodian counter-face in both the Quaker-minded gentleness and the publicity-conscious efficiency with which the Gandhian political strategy of non-violent non-co-operation was put into action. In this place we have only to make the one further observation that a similar ambivalence revealed itself in the *éthos* of a would-be Zealot Arya Samāj,<sup>1</sup> which, though founded for the purpose of providing a corrective to the Brahmō Samāj's out-and-out Herodianism,<sup>2</sup> was itself open to the damaging charge that it had derived its own anti-Herodian inspiration from an Herodian sensitiveness to the exotic influence of a Western Romantic Movement.

The psychological reaction to the impact of the Modern West in the main body of Orthodox Christendom has come to our notice in the sullen retreat of a Zealotism that had still been murderously militant when, in A.D. 1638, it had compassed Cyril Loukari's death in retribution for his Herodian crime of Calvinism. Thereafter, the Greek Orthodox hierarchy still showed their teeth in occasional rear-guard actions. Their frustration of Evyénios Voulgaris' eighteenth-century pioneer educational work advertised their disapproval of Herodianism even when this obnoxious outlook was confined to the intellectual plane, while their subsequent obstruction of the educational activities of nineteenth-century American Protestant missionaries betrayed a perhaps less unreasonable suspicion that in this case an educational programme might have the conversion of souls as its covert ulterior object. Their last losing battle in a Zealot cause was fought in opposition to the plans adopted by an Herodian-minded post-Mahmudian Ottoman Porte for reforming the constitution of the Millet-i-Rûm by giving the laity as well as the clergy a place on its governing body and by introducing into its organization the latter-day Western constitutional devices of representative government by election and of parliamentary control over public finance.

At the same time there was also an Herodian vein in the cultural evolution of an Ottoman Greek Orthodox Christian oligarchy in this age; for, in the course of two hundred years ending in the nineteenth-century last stands of clerical Greek 'die-hards', a ring of Phanariot Greek families<sup>3</sup> had secured something like a monopoly of the patronage in the making of appointments to the higher posts in the Orthodox ecclesiastical hierarchy throughout the Ottoman dominions thanks to the wealth and power which these Phanariots had won for themselves by entering the Ottoman public service under unprecedentedly favourable new conditions that had been offered to them since the middle of the seventeenth century; and the professional asset which had purchased for the Phanariots

<sup>1</sup> See V. vi. 94.

<sup>2</sup> See V. v. 106.

<sup>3</sup> See II. ii. 222-8.

from their Ottoman masters these unwontedly attractive terms of employment had been the Herodian familiarity with the languages, manners, and customs of a contemporary schismatic Western Christendom which these Greek Orthodox Christian Brahmans had not disdained to acquire for the sake of the increasingly lucrative profits that they found themselves able to earn by serving as middlemen in the commerce between an Ottoman World and the Occidental 'Children of Hagar'. When these enterprising seventeenth-century and eighteenth-century Greek Orthodox Christian merchants had once set their feet on this Herodian Broadway,<sup>1</sup> it was not surprising that the rank-and-file of a nineteenth-century Ottoman Millet-i-Rûm should have followed the Phanariots' lead to Broadway's terminus by indulging in the more hazardous Herodian conceit of sorting themselves out, in imitation of the Western fashion of the day, into a patchwork of territorially segregated linguistically homogeneous sovereign national states.

In the Russian branch of Orthodox Christendom the psychological reactions to the impact of the Modern West surpassed the contemporary reactions in the main body of Orthodox Christendom in the lengths to which they ran in both directions. In the irreligiously prophetic figure of Peter the Great,<sup>2</sup> Russia produced the archetype of all the high-handed autocrats who were to impose their Herodianism 'from above downwards' on their fellow creatures in other societies that were likewise confronted with a ubiquitous and inescapable 'Western Question', while in the opposite swing of her psychological pendulum the same Russia reproduced Jewry's uncompromising Pharisees in her Old Believers<sup>3</sup> and Jewry's desperate Theudases and Judases in her Cossack

<sup>1</sup> Matt. vii. 13.

<sup>2</sup> See III. iii. 278-83. Peter's Herodian figure cast its Zealot shadow in the shape of his son, heir, opponent, and victim, Alexei.

<sup>3</sup> See V. vi. 120-1. Some two hundred different sects of dissenters (*raskolniki*) were generated (see Mettig, C.: *Die Europäisierung Russlands im 18. Jahrhundert* (Gotha 1913, Perthes), pp. 161-72) in the last chapter of the pre-Petrine phase of Russian history by the liturgical reforms of the Romaicizing Patriarch of Moscow, Nikôn (*pontificali munere fungebatur* A.D. 1652-58 *de facto* and 1652-66 *de jure*). Though the issue over which they had parted company with the officially Orthodox Russian Church of the day was their indignation at an assimilation of current Russian liturgical practice, not to a schismatic Western Roman Catholicism or Protestantism, but to the contemporary Greek version of Russia's own cherished Orthodoxy, many of the dissenting Russian sects eventually also took a Wahhâbi-like stand against Western innovations; and their Zealot puritanism was apt to fasten upon such spiritually neutral 'Yankee notions' as the cultivation of the Italian style of church music and religious painting, the smoking of tobacco, the drinking of tea, and the wearing of Western clothes (*ibid.*, p. 162; Brückner, A.: *Peter der Grosse* (Berlin 1879, Grote), p. 281). This Francophobia was common ground between the dissenters and their Nikonite bugbears (see Brückner, *op. cit.*, pp. 96 and 212), and it was particularly violently excited by Western innovations in dress (see the present Study, III. iii. 283, n. 1, and V. vi. 102)—even when these innovations were recognized as being merely what they were, and did not give rise to such horrifying misapprehensions as the mistaking of wig-stands for idols which led, at Astrakhan in A.D. 1705, to an armed insurrection in which the unfortunate bewigged Western officers in Tsar Peter's garrison there were massacred (see Brückner, *op. cit.*, pp. 287 and 289; Sumner, B. H.: *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia* (London 1950, English Universities Press), p. 66). This detestation of Western dress was shared with the dissenters by their own detested adversaries the patriarchs. The wearing of Western clothes was forbidden by Nikôn himself (Brückner, *op. cit.*, p. 19), and this ban of Nikôn's was repeated by the Patriarch Joachim (*fungebatur* A.D. 1674-90) in a testament (*redactum* A.D. 1690) in which he also called for the rasing of all churches erected by non-Orthodox Christians on Russian soil as a practical way of acting on his general warning against 'Latins, Lutherans, Calvinists, and Tatars' (Brückner, *op. cit.*, p. 97).

militant Zealots Stenka Razin and Pugachev,<sup>1</sup> whose 'die-hard' deaths put to shame Peter's drone-like Zealot victims the Streltsy.

Even a pre-Petrine Imperial Government that had already taken the first steps to equip itself with Western armaments proved able to inflict on Razin (*erupit* A.D. 1667-71) the fate that was to overtake Pugachev, when he dared to measure his strength against the post-Petrine army of the Empress Catherine, and was likewise to overtake the Wakhābis when they provoked the Ottoman punitive expedition that was eventually launched against them by Mehmed 'Alī. Yet the Petrine régime of Catherine and her successors, whose flagrant Herodianism stamped them in the Old Believers' eyes with so indubitable a mark of the Beast as to certify their satanic *archégetés* Peter's identity with Antichrist,<sup>2</sup> harboured a lingering residue of Zealotism which betrayed itself in this régime's ecclesiastical policy towards the Uniate element in the Ukrainian and White Russian population that was reunited with a still aggressively 'holy' Muscovite Russia as a result of the three successive partitions of Poland-Lithuania between the years A.D. 1772 and A.D. 1795. Though in theory the ecclesiastical allegiance of their new subjects ought to have been a matter of studied indifference to an Occidentally enlightened late-eighteenth-century Russian Imperial Government, the statesmen at St. Petersburg nevertheless departed from their professed principle of religious toleration by abusing their political power in compelling the Orthodox Church's Ukrainian and White Russian Uniate lost sheep to return to Orthodoxy by entering a Muscovite ecclesiastical fold—for all the world as if these Voltairian martinets were not quite incredulous of the Orthodox superstition that an ecclesiastical association with the schismatic Western Church of Rome was a murrain from which these infected stragglers from the flock must be decontaminated by being re-dipped in Orthodoxy's sterilizing chrism.

In our gallery of Janus-faced heads, we have long since observed that Lenin's bust has no rival except Gandhi's for the distinction of being labelled as the most perfect specimen in the collection. In the vehemence of their anti-Western Zealotism, even the fifteenth-century Russian Orthodox Christian prelates who led the fanatical Orthodox opposition against the Union of Florence were surpassed by the twentieth-century Russian Communist opponents of a secularist Liberalism which had come to be the prevalent Western ideology of the age; yet the Bolsheviks' Zealot indictment of a contemporary Western way of life was uttered in the name of a Western-made Marxian ideology in obedience to which the Bolsheviks subjected Russia to an Herodian regimen that made Antichrist Peter's Herodianism seem mild by comparison when the Russian soil whose surface Peter's horse-drawn iron-shod plough had turned was cloven to its depths by Stalin's power-driven adamant blade. In this place we have only to add that the nineteenth-century Russian Slavophiles had anticipated the Bolsheviks in their ambivalence by drawing their inspiration for a would-be Zealot criticism of the current

<sup>1</sup> See V. v. 104 and V. vi. 227.

<sup>2</sup> See Brückner, A.: *Peter der Grosse* (Berlin 1879, Grote), pp. 274-9; Sumner, B. H.: *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia* (London 1950, English Universities Press), pp. 65-66.

Western way of life from an Herodian acquaintance with a Western Romantic Movement which was likewise to inspire the Zealot-meant gestures of a Hindu Arya Samāj.

A no less equivocal interplay of Zealot and Herodian *motifs* accounts for the fineness of the water of those pearls of literary art that were secreted in a nineteenth-century Russia's morbidly Westernizing body social. The elusive riddle of an Herodian-Zealot Russian literature holds a Western reader fascinated as he finds himself sinking below its seemingly familiar aesthetic surface into the disquietingly alien underworld of its spiritual depths; and this magic is no monopoly of 'the inspired dog' Dostoyevski's mantic genius. It also animates the rarefied atmosphere and subdued colours of the exquisite psychological landscapes painted by the naturalized Parisian Turgeniyeu. We feel it as we admire the masterly portraiture with which, in the character of Bazarov, he creates the Janus-faced archetype of the Bolshevik's forerunner the Nihilist.<sup>1</sup>

Our tale of Zealots and Herodians would still be incomplete if we neglected to round up a few stray goats and sheep from Cain's and Abel's meeting-ground on the fringes of the Great Eurasian Steppe. An Herodianism that cost the crypto-Hellenist Scythian Nomad prince Scyles his life at his Zealot tribesmen's hands in the fifth century B.C.<sup>2</sup> was practised with impunity in the same Great Western Bay of the Steppe in the eighteenth century of the Christian Era by overt converts to Orthodox Christianity among the Lamaistic Mahayanian Calmuck Nomad subjects of a Petrine Russian Empire,<sup>3</sup> and likewise by the Sinomane prince of 'Wei' Hiao Wên-ti (*regnabat* A.D. 490-9), though this aggressive Herodian autocrat asked for trouble by going out of his way to impose his policy of Sinification upon his *ci-devant* Nomad To Pa fellow tribesmen in the successor-state which his and their barbarian forebears had carved out for themselves from a defunct Sinic universal state's carcass.<sup>4</sup> Conversely, we find the lure of the Nomadic life evoking an Herodian response in the heart of an Hellenic representative of the Sedentary World in the fifth century of the Christian Era and in the hearts of Chinese representatives of the same world in the seventeenth century. The renegade Greek captive who had transformed himself into a Hun warrior by the time when he ran into the Constantinopolitan envoy Priscus in Attila's camp was matched, as we have seen,<sup>5</sup> by Chinese settlers who transformed themselves into Manchu 'bannermen' in Southern Manchuria. In the gamut of the husbandman's and business man's psychological reactions to the impact of Eurasian shepherd-kings, these two instances of a thorough-going Scythophil Herodianism have their antitheses in two outbreaks of a Scythophobe Zealotism that went to no less extreme lengths. The Zealot reaction which threw the Mongols out of a conquered China in the fourteenth century of the Christian Era<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The 'Nihilism' which in Russia was a premonitory symptom of the characteristic malady of an intelligentsia has been noticed in V. v. 157. A sensitive appreciation of this phenomenon will be found in Weidlé, W.: *La Russie Absente et Présente* (Paris 1949, Gallimard), pp. 119-21.

<sup>2</sup> See II. ii. 372, n. 3; III. iii. 281, n. 2, and 429, n. 1.

<sup>4</sup> See V. v. 477-8.

<sup>5</sup> In V. v. 409-10.

<sup>3</sup> See III. iii. 429, n. 1.

<sup>6</sup> See V. v. 348-51.



had been anticipated in the sixteenth century B.C. by a Zealot reaction of a no less demonic vehemence which had thrown the Hyksos out of a conquered Lower Egypt.<sup>1</sup>

These antithetical 'Zealot' and 'Herodian' types of psychological reaction which we have found declaring themselves so conspicuously in encounters between contemporary representatives of different civilizations may also be expected, in virtue of the psychic uniformity of Human Nature, to be discernible and identifiable in other encounters in which the parties represent, not different civilizations, but merely different communities within a single world, or different individuals within a single community; and, before we bring this survey to a close, it may be as well to put this *a priori* expectation to at least one empirical test.

After the schism between the Catholic core of a Western Christendom and the Protestant flake that split off from it in the Early Modern chapter of Western history, there were characteristic manifestations of both Zealotism and Herodianism in the psychological reactions of the Catholic party to this Western family quarrel.

We can trace the Zealot vein in the ecclesiastical sphere in a cult of Papal autocracy, as an end in itself, which was inaugurated at the Council of Constance (*sedebat* A.D. 1414-18) by Pope Martin V<sup>2</sup> and was carried to its climax at the Vatican Council (*sedebat* A.D. 1869-70) by Pope Pius IX.<sup>3</sup> The same rise of emotional temperature in a Zealot furnace can be read on the gauge of ecclesiastical discipline in the difference between the relentless severity of a Spanish Inquisition and the relative mildness with which the repression of heresy had been conducted by the Roman Church before the Spanish Inquisition had come to dominate this field of Catholic action, while, in the intellectual field, we can observe a comparable difference between the Vatican's Herodian open-mindedness towards a fifteenth-century Italian Renaissance of Hellenism and the obscurantism of its resistance to a seventeenth-century indigenous Western scientific revolution.<sup>4</sup> On the political plane, too, this Zealot vein in the Modern Western Catholic Christian reaction to the challenge of Protestantism declared itself in the Spanish Crown's attempt to insulate its Empire of the Indies by immuring this hermit kingdom behind a wooden wall of Castilian sea-power.

On the other hand we see Herodianism asserting itself in a Late Modern Catholic social environment in the tacit relaxation, in an eighteenth-century Italy, of the seventeenth-century Papal ban on an empirical study of Physical Science without regard for the authority of Holy Church's doctor of secular theology, Saint Aristotle, while, in a France where Protestantism had been suppressed by Counter-Reformatory zeal, we see an Herodian crypto-Protestant-mindedness reasserting itself in the successive guises of an abortive Augustinian Jansenism and of a triumphant rationalist agnosticism which followed up its conquest of France by eventually conquering all the Catholic as well as Protestant

<sup>1</sup> See V. v. 351-2.

<sup>2</sup> See IV. iv. 573-4.

<sup>3</sup> See IV. iv. 638.

<sup>4</sup> This scientific revolution was not only a new departure; it was a move in a different direction from that of the foregoing Renaissance of Hellenic culture (see the passage quoted from Herbert Butterfield, *The Origins of Modern Western Science, 1300-1800*, in X. ix. 67-68).

provinces of a Late Modern Western World.<sup>1</sup> In a French Revolution in which the ideas of the eighteenth-century French rationalist philosophers went into action on the political plane, a *ci-devant* Catholic France adopted from her *ci-devant* Protestant neighbours, Great Britain and the United States, the modernized Medieval Western institution of a parliamentary national state; and, in this elegantly rounded French version,<sup>2</sup> an unattractively angular Anglo-Saxon political attitude was eventually adopted—at least in outward show—even by such old-fashioned Catholic countries as Spain, Portugal, the Latin-American successor-states of the Spanish and Portuguese Empires, and a *gleichgeschaltet* Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.

The Zealot vein in the Catholic reaction to the eruption of Protestantism in the Modern Western World had its counterpart in the contemporary Zealotism of the Safawī Qyzylbash devotees<sup>3</sup> whose swords achieved the trowel's work of building a new city of refuge, in the heart of an encompassing and indignant Sunnī Iranic Muslim World, for a long repressed and scattered Shī'ah, while the antithetical Herodian vein can be detected in Nādir Shāh's unsuccessful attempt<sup>4</sup> to redirect a latter-day Shī'ī Persia into the Sunnah's beaten track.

### *A Meeting of Extremes*

If we now proceed to take stock of the impressions left on our minds by the spectacle that we have just been watching, we may find that these impressions are confused and that our minds are correspondingly bewildered. As we took the salute from the mixed force under review, the Zealot and the Herodian components of these motley troops both made a parade, as they presented arms in passing the saluting point, of the distinguishing marks blazoned on their respective accoutrements. In the conspicuousness of these badges and the emphasis of these gestures alike, they were insisting with one accord upon their diversity from one another; yet this unanimous assertion of theirs was being contradicted all the time by the evidence of our own observant eyes; for the most striking of all the impressions made upon us was our observation—as frequently repeated as it was perpetually surprising—that the classical examples of either one of the two types turned out, as often as not, to be also classical examples of the other type of soldier under arms for the defence of an assaulted society.

The list of these Janus-figures that we have been jotting down so assiduously turns out, on inspection, to be a veritable roll of celebrities. It includes King Mithradates Eupator; the Sicel patriot Ducetius; the Sheykh Bedr-ed-Dīn of Simān; Guru Nanak the founder of the Sikh Church (who had a likewise Janus-faced forerunner in the poet-prophet Kabīr);<sup>5</sup> all the Japanese statesmen who had been wrestling with the

<sup>1</sup> See X. ix. 304-5.

<sup>2</sup> The role of France in Late Modern Western history as an interpreter of English ideas which were peptonized by being 'processed' in a French mill has been noticed in III. iii. 360-71; IV. iv. 200, n. 1; and on p. 517, above.

<sup>3</sup> See I. i. 366-7 and V. v. 661-5.

<sup>5</sup> See IV. iv. 231; V. v. 106, 537, and 668.

<sup>4</sup> See I. i. 399.

Western Question for the past four hundred years; Hung Hsiu-ch'uan, the father of the T'ai'ping movement in a nineteenth-century China, and the twentieth-century Chinese apostles of Communism; the authors of the revolution in Mexico that broke out in A.D. 1910; 'the Horse Indians' on the Great Plains of North America; the Zionists; King 'Abd-al-'Aziz Āl Sa'ūd; the Arya Samāj; Mahatma Gandhi; the Slavophiles; the Bolsheviks; and the creators of a nineteenth-century Russian literature. This dubious array of caprine Zealot sheep and ovine Herodian goats may well make us sceptical of the authenticity of either of the two *soi-disant* diverse breeds that are both alike represented in the ambiguous physiognomy of each of these Protean creatures; and we may be moved to ask: Then were those contradictory-sounding Zealot and Herodian slogans 'Antichrist!' and 'Die-hard!' insincerely rhetorical exclamations? And was that dumb-show of mutual antipathy and opposition a sly piece of play-acting in which the actors were in collusion to deceive us?

Our Zealot and Herodian demonstrators' now suspect sincerity can hardly be vindicated unless the alleged antithesis between their two ideologies, which both schools unanimously call upon us to recognize, proves to be guaranteed by some objective distinguishing mark in the nature of a finger-print or a shibboleth; but none of the marks borne by the representatives of either party will prove, on examination, to be either party's distinctive livery.

There is, for example, a distinction, empirically traceable in our foregoing survey, between movements from above downwards and movements from below upwards; and, if we were to make our first test of this possible differentia between Zealots and Herodians by applying it to the classic case that we have taken as our prototype, a first glance at the relations between Herod the Great and the Jewish Zealots of his day might tempt us to jump to the conclusion that Herodianism could be distinguished from Zealotism as a policy imposed from above downwards on a passion surging up from below.

This criterion might seem accurately to distinguish a common characteristic of Herod and his forerunner Joshua-Jason from a common characteristic of the Maccabees and the Pharisees. It might also appear to hold good as between Herod's Hellenizing patrician contemporaries and counterparts in the Philistine and Phoenician city-states and their anti-Hellenic kinsmen the insurgent Syrian slaves in Sicily; and, again, as between an insurgent Egyptian peasantry and the Egyptian notables in the métropoleis of the nomes who proclaimed themselves philhellenes by enrolling themselves as gymnasiasts. A latter-day series of anti-Hellenic Zealot movements flying religious colours—a Nestorian and a Monophysite Christianity and a more militantly Zealot Islam—all also duly respond to our test by patently revealing themselves to be eruptions from below upwards. Our criterion fails us, however, when we apply the same test to Zoroastrianism; for here we find an anti-Hellenic Zealot movement—likewise flying religious colours—that did not erupt from below upwards but was, on the contrary, imposed from above downwards by Zealot-minded Arsacid and Sasanid autocrats who 'established'

a Zoroastrian Church as the official religious organization in their dominions. And, if this Zoroastrian Zealot movement from above downwards thus proves recalcitrant to our test, we shall find our tentative criterion doubly discredited when we light upon the inverse intractable phenomenon of an Herodian movement from below upwards. Yet we are bound thus to characterize the peaceful penetration of the upper levels of the Hellenic Society by freedmen successors of insurgent slaves who had failed to throw off an Hellenic yoke, and by latter-day missionaries of Cybele-worship, Isis-worship, Mithraism, and Manichaeism who commended their Oriental religious wares to an Hellenic public by putting them into an Hellenic dress.

If we pass from the field of the encounter between Hellenism and its contemporaries to the other plots on our map, we shall meet with the same experience. In an encounter between a nascent Western Christendom and the Scandinavians, an Herodian response in the Scandinavian World to the Western Christian challenge duly took the form of a movement from above downwards in the kingdoms of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, but could not take effect otherwise than from below upwards in the anarchic political environment of Iceland. In the encounter between a Medieval Western Christendom and a Russian Orthodox Christendom, again, our criterion holds good as between the Hanseaticizing patrician Herodians in the city-state of Novgorod, or the Polonizing Ukrainian and White Russian nobles in the kingdoms of Poland and Lithuania, and the anti-Uniate Zealot Ukrainian and White Russian Orthodox Christian subjects of the Polish and Lithuanian Crowns. But what are we to make of the Ukrainian and White Russian Uniates? Are we not confronted here with an Herodian movement rising from below upwards? And what of those Muscovite autocrats who patronized the Orthodox Christian Church? Are they not unmistakable counterparts of the Zealot Arsacid and Sasanid patrons of Zoroastrianism? And does not this affinity identify them for us as being likewise Zealots working from above downwards?

The farther we proceed, the more frequently our tentative criterion fails us. The Phanariot and Brahman ministers of Muslim empire-builders, who were Herodians duly transmitting the adopted language, dress, and other external insignia of an alien Muslim culture to the lower castes of their societies from above downwards, are counterbalanced by members of those very lower orders who propagated the same Herodian movement from below upwards in the more radical act of becoming converts to Islam. In a Far Eastern World under pressure from the Modern West, an Herodianism duly working from above downwards at the Chinese Imperial Court under the Ming and Manchu régimes and in the Meiji Revolution in Japan is counterbalanced by the spectacle of a Zealotism likewise working from above downwards in Japan under the Tokugawa régime and returning to the charge in the same direction, even after the Meiji Revolution, in the subsequent establishment of Neo-Shintō as a state religion, while in the same Far Eastern World the reactions to Western pressure that come up from below are more frequently Herodian than Zealot in character. The Zealot eruption of the

Boxers is counterbalanced here by the Herodianism of the seventeenth-century Japanese and eighteenth-century Chinese Catholic Christian martyrs; and similar well-springs of Herodianism rising from below can be detected in the subterranean heroism of Japanese crypto-Christians and secret students of Western learning in defiance of the Bakufu, in the recrudescence of conversions to Christianity in nineteenth-century Japan and China alike, and in the emergence of the Kuomintang. In the submerged indigenous societies in the Americas the aristocratic Herodianism of a Garcilaso de La Vega is counterbalanced by the Herodian mass-conversions of Andean, Paraguayan, and Mexican peasantries to a Tridentine Roman Catholic Christianity.

If we go on to apply our test to the encounter between the Modern West and the Islamic World, we shall find it at first sight appearing to answer better here. An Herodianism imposing itself from above downwards is represented by antitypes of King Herod the Great in the persons of Sultans Selīm III and Mahmūd II,<sup>1</sup> Mehmed 'Alī Pasha and Mīdhat Pasha, President Mustafā Kemāl Atatürk, Rizā Shāh Pahlawī, and King Amānallāh; and this imposing array of Herodian statesmen operating from above is confronted by a no less imposing array of Zealot insurgents erupting from below: the explosive Wāhhābī, Idrīsī, Mahdist, and Sanūsī fanatics on the Afrasian Steppe; the romantic patriots 'Abd-al-Qādir and 'Abd-al-Karīm in the Maghrib; the untamed Pathan barbarians in the highlands of Eastern Iran. Yet here, too, we find phenomena that do not conform to our experimental pattern; for those 'Zealot-drones' the Janissaries and Mamlūks were incubuses weighing upon Society from above, not jacks-in-the-box bursting the lid by springing up from below.

In the Hindu Society's reactions to the Modern West the downward-working Herodianism of a British Serkār's Brahman clerks and the upward-working Zealotism of a resurgent Kali-worship and a Neo-Vedism conform to our test only to be offset by the anomalously upward-working Herodianism of a British Indian Army's recruits and a Brahmō Samāj's converts. In a latter-day Ottoman Orthodox Christendom the Herodianism *de haut en bas* displayed by Westernizing Phanariot Ottoman Ministers of State is offset by the Zealotism *de haut en bas* of an anti-schismatic Phanariot Orthodox Christian hierarchy, while Greek, Serb, Bulgar, and Ruman nationalists *alla Franca* anticipate a Chinese Kuomintang in propagating Herodianism from below upwards. In Russia the classic contrast between Peter the Great's Herodianism from above downwards and the Zealotism from below upwards displayed by obstinate Old Believers and explosive Cossack insurgents is blurred by the anomalous spectacle of a Zealotism from above downwards which reasserted itself in the repression of Ukrainian and White Russian Uniatism by an eighteenth-century Petrine Russian Imperial Government after Peter the Great had crushed an earlier manifestation of the

<sup>1</sup> 'Reform in Turkey, as in Russia (until the mid-nineteenth century), came from above, because the rulers were more revolutionary than their conservative subjects' (Bailey, F. E.: *British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement: A Study in Anglo-Turkish Relations, 1826-1853* (Cambridge, Mass. 1942, Harvard University Press), p. 223).



same anomalous phenomenon of a Zealotism in high places in the act of ridding Russia of the incubus of those Zealot-drones the Streltsy.

In the encounters between Cain and Abel along the borderline between the Desert and the Sown the Herodianism from above downwards practised by Scythian, Calmuck, and To Pa khans who cultivated the Sedentary World's alien way of life within the shelter of city walls, and the Zealotism from below upwards that was displayed by the sedentary subjects of Eurasian Nomad empire-builders in demonic revolts against hated alien masters, are counterbalanced by a Zealotism from above downwards through which these harshly oppressive sons of Abel incurred their sedentary subjects' implacable hatred, and by the Herodianism from below upwards that moved Greek and Chinese renegades from the ranks of a sedentary society to take service in the armies of Hun and Manchu Nomad invaders of the fields and cities of the Children of Cain.

When we glance, in conclusion, at our two instances of encounters between two conflicting ideals within the bosom of a single society, we shall find our tentative identifications of Zealotism with movements from below upwards and of Herodianism with movements from above downwards only partially corresponding with the facts here likewise. In the encounter between a resurgent Shi'ah and an encompassing Sunni World, Zealotism, it is true, duly erupts from below in the explosion of Ismā'il Shah Safawi's Qyzylbashys, while Herodianism likewise conforms to pattern by emanating from above downwards in Nādir Shāh's unsuccessful attempt to undo Shah Ismā'il's work by an exercise of his own autocratic power. On the other hand, in the history of the psychological reactions of a Tridentine Roman Catholic Church that had been thrown on to the defensive by the shock of the Protestant Reformation, the Vatican's eighteenth-century latitudinarianism *vis-à-vis* a Late Modern Western scientific revolution was an exhibition of Herodianism from above downwards that was as exceptional as it was belated. The Vatican's characteristic reaction was the Zealotism from above downwards exhibited in a burning of Giordano Bruno which was one of the sensational sequels to the Spanish Inquisition's investiture with the supreme command in the Roman Church's perennial holy war against heresy; and the same Zealot spirit moved the Papacy, from the pontificate of Martin V to the pontificate of Pius IX, persistently to subordinate other considerations to the obsessive over-riding aim of preserving and augmenting its own autocratic control over the Roman Church's government. Conversely, the most impressive manifestation of Herodianism in this domestic scene in Western Christendom's modern life was a crypto-Protestant movement which had rocketed up from below—driven aloft, like a jet-plane, by the successive explosions of Jansenism, Voltairianism, and Jacobinism.

Now that an empirically observed difference between movements rising from below upwards and movements descending from above downwards has proved, on trial, not to furnish us with a satisfactory criterion for distinguishing Zealots and Herodians from one another, let us see whether a likewise empirically observed difference between violent and gentle responses to challenges will serve our purpose any better.

*A priori* this might seem improbable, since our study of schism in the body social,<sup>1</sup> which was the context in which this antithesis between the spirits of Violence and Gentleness first came to our notice, has shown us both spirits manifesting themselves indiscriminately in the responses of Proletariat and Dominant Minority alike to the challenge of disintegration. Yet, if we apply this criterion in turn to our prototype case, at first sight it does seem to be valid, as we register the contrast in temper between Zealot Theudas and Judases, who were spoiling for a fight with Roman masters of the World, and a Herod who earned his title to be acclaimed as great in statesmanship by his determination to restrain his ineptly fanatical Jewish subjects from indulging their mad impulse to challenge Rome's omnipotence. On this showing, we might tentatively identify Zealotism with the violent and Herodianism with the non-violent vein in an assaulted society's feeling towards its alien assailant; but these provisional identifications also will not stand the test of further confrontation with the facts.

In the classic case in point, for instance, a suggestion that Herod's studious appeasement of Rome certified this appeaser to be a man of peace would have been received with bitterly derisive laughter by *sicarii* whose childish schemes for resorting to violence against Herod's Roman overlords had been anticipated by the better calculated violence with which Herod had nipped such 'dangerous thoughts' in the bud. We have lighted here upon a political dilemma that faces every Herodian potentate. The stronger his conviction of the necessity of coming to terms with an alien civilization of decisively superior potency, the greater will be his sense of the urgency of insisting that his subjects shall fall in with his policy; and, if this policy is ever placed in jeopardy of being frustrated by violent manifestations of Zealotism on their side, he will deem it the lesser evil to meet violence with violence in his struggle to save his Herodian statesmanship from being frustrated by the Zealots in his own household, rather than to shrink from repressing these wild men by force at the cost of allowing them to sweep him into a desperate insurrection against a paramount alien Power. He can take no other line if he is not to be untrue to himself, for the penalty of capitulation to the Zealots would be not merely the negation of the weakling ruler's own Herodian policy; it would also be the death of the community for whose welfare he is politically responsible.

Our prototype-episode also brings to light another point in which our tentative equations of Herodianism with Gentleness and of Zealotism with Violence both break down. Any Herodian statesman who is in earnest will be concerned not only to save his policy from being sabotaged by Zealot violence but also to ensure that it shall not be frustrated by Zealot passive resistance.<sup>2</sup> A lively awareness of this second, more insidious, danger in Herod's lucid mind gave his ruthless will the signal to chastise awkward Pharisees<sup>3</sup> as well as froward *sicarii*; and the states-

<sup>1</sup> In V. v. 35-376.

<sup>2</sup> The non-violent vein in the Zealot Jewish opposition to a post-Alexandrine Hellenism has been noticed in V. v. 72-73.

<sup>3</sup> The ethos of the Pharisees has been noticed in V. v. 73, n. 4.

manlike consistency with which Herod thus meted out chastisement to Pharisees and *sicarii* alike will remind us that Zealots are no more invariably violent than Herodians are invariably gentle. In the encounter between a post-Alexandrine Hellenism and its Oriental contemporaries the violent Zealotism inherited by the Jewish *sicarii* from Maccabee fore-runners and likewise displayed in the Maccabean Age by insurgent peasants in Egypt and plantation-slaves in Sicily—not to speak of the latter-day violence of Zoroastrian Sasanidae and of Primitive Muslim Arabs who gave a by then senile Hellenic 'ascendancy' its *coup de grâce*—divided the allegiance of Zealotism's devotees with the gentle fanaticism of the Pharisees, Rabbi Johanan ben Zakkai, and the Nestorian and Monophysite Christian Hellenophobes, while, on the other side, Herod the Great was not the only Herodian reagent to the impact of Hellenism who was drawn into using violence by the exigencies of a policy of appeasement. This statesman's dilemma, which did not beset the non-violently Herodian Egyptian gymnasiasts, freedmen *novi homines*, and missionaries of Cybele-worship, Isis-worship, Mithraism, and Manichaeism, inexorably led other Oriental client princes besides the Herods into taking repressive measures against their own subjects in pursuance of a pacific policy *vis-à-vis* the Roman Imperial Government which invested these appeasers, in their victims' eyes, with all the Satanic attributes of the powers of darkness.

Our classic test case of the encounter between a post-Alexandrine Hellenism and its Oriental contemporaries thus indicates that an empirically observed distinction between veins of Violence and Gentleness does not, in fact, provide us with an objective differentia for distinguishing between Zealots and Herodians; and this indication will be confirmed by an extension of our field of vision.

The Hellenic spectacle of a Herod the Great being drawn into a domestic policy of repression in defence of a foreign policy of appeasement is reproduced in the political careers of Herodian potentates in the histories of other encounters between the representatives of conflicting cultures. This was likewise the tragic destiny of the Varangian war-lord Vladimir the Great,<sup>1</sup> the Norwegian King Olaf Tryggvason,<sup>2</sup> the Kuomintang Government of a Chinese Republic, Mehmed 'Alī Pasha, Sultan Mahmūd II, President Mustafā Kemāl Atatürk, Rizā Shāh Pahlawī, King Amānallāh of Afghanistan, the leaders of Greek, Serb, Bulgar, and Ruman Orthodox Christian militant nationalist movements, Tsar Peter the Great,<sup>3</sup> the Sinomane To Pa Prince Hiao Wên-ti, Nādir Shāh, and a Jacobin Committee of Public Safety that set up a Reign of Terror in a Revolutionary Paris.

The successfully violent Herodian potentates in this catalogue of successes and failures would have sought to justify their crimes by insisting that it was not only better to succeed like a Vladimir and an Atatürk than

<sup>1</sup> See II. ii. 352.

<sup>2</sup> See *ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> Peter was a believer in the use of violence in dealing with his Zealot-minded subjects, not merely for the negative purpose of suppressing revolts against his policy of Westernization, but also for the positive purposes of forcing down their throats a Western system of education and a Western industrial technique (see Brückner, A.: *Peter der Grosse* (Berlin 1879, Grote), pp. 514-16).

to fail like an Olaf and an Amānallāh, but was also better to make even an unsuccessful attempt than to show oneself, like Selim III, 'too proud to fight',<sup>1</sup> or to make, like Scyles, a futilely craven attempt to evade an unescapable issue, or to be manœuvred, like Midhat, into 'missing the bus'.<sup>2</sup> And these impenitently high-handed Herodian advocates of force who had been rewarded by success for having the courage of their convictions would not have accepted Selim's Frankish historical adviser's plea that this 'Osmanli Herodian's Norman counterpart Rollo had been able to induce his Scandinavian warriors to follow his Herodian lead without having to take them by the scruff of the neck, or Scyles' shaman *clairvoyant's* plea that Scyles' bloodily terminated crypto-Hellenic life within the walls of Borysthènes had been justified posthumously by his latter-day Calmuck counterparts' adroitness in 'getting by' with their conversion to a Petrine Russian Orthodox Christian culture within the precincts of Stavropol. The triumphantly violent champions of Herodianism would have dismissed this Calmuck and this Norman episode as being exceptions which proved their own robust rule, and they would have despised the tolerantly latitudinarian Popes of an eighteenth-century school as traitors to the august office whose traditional prerogatives these Laodiceans were thus permitting to go by default. Nor would the red-handed Herodians have been impressed by non-violent Phanariot ministers of an Ottoman Porte or non-violent Brahman ministers of a Mughal and a British Rāj; for they would have pointed out that these Herodian-minded civil servants were non-violent by necessity and not by choice, since their masters always withheld from them the exercise of the power of the sword.

If, in the teeth of these testimonies and arguments, we still sought to vindicate our tentative identification of Herodianism with Non-Violence, we could, of course, present a counter-list of non-violent Herodians, including the nineteenth-century Jewish Assimilationists in the Western World; the whole of the Jewish diaspora—and all other diasporas at all times in all places—on the economic plane; the Andean and the Mexican converts to a Roman Catholic Christianity, ranging from the aristocrat Garcilaso de la Vega to the primitive Guaranis; the Japanese and Chinese converts to the same religious faith who died for it as martyrs or lived for it in the catacombs; the Japanese pagan martyrs who paid with their lives for their secret study of a secular Late Modern Western Science; and the Jansenist and Voltairian apostles of a Modern Western *Weltanschauung* who waged their 'cold war' of aggression against an apprehensively Zealot-minded Tridentine Roman Catholicism with the Orphic weapon of propaganda. This list, however, would remain inconclusive even if it could be lengthened *ad infinitum*; for, if once we have conceded that Herodianism is apt to find itself drawn into violence by the exigencies of its own aims when its exponents are political potentates, we have implicitly conceded that the spirit of Non-Violence cannot be a distinctive characteristic of the Herodian ethos.

<sup>1</sup> Woodrow Wilson on the 10th May, 1915.

<sup>2</sup> Neville Chamberlain on the 5th April, 1940, referring to Hitler, who was to make Chamberlain's taunt recoil on its author's own head before the month was out.

Conversely, we shall find, if we complete our application of this test to our array of exponents of Zealotism, that the Oriental Zealot reactions against a post-Alexandrine Hellenism are not peculiar in displaying non-violent as well as violent manifestations. The split in Jewish Zealot ranks between *sicarii* and Pharisees, and in servile Zealot ranks between slave insurgents and freedmen *arrivistes*, is reproduced in a Russian Orthodox Christendom in the split between the violence of Stenka Razin or Pugachev and the non-violence of the Old Believers, and in an Ottoman Orthodox Christendom in the contrast between the martial spirit of Maniot and Montenegrin wild highlanders and the tameness of a conservative-minded Greek Orthodox hierarchy. On the northern fringes of a submerged Central American World the same parting of the ways is proclaimed in the piquant juxtaposition of pugnaciously Zealot 'Horse Indians' and pacifically Zealot Pueblos; and the hunter peoples of North America who were engulfed by a tidal wave of immigration from the Old World, that was rolling westwards, with irresistible force, from the Atlantic seaboard of the United States, were likewise divided between pacifists and believers in resistance. If we apply the same test to the Jewish diaspora in the Western World, we find here, of course, that the non-violent Zealotism of the Ritualist disciples of Rabbi Johanan ben Zakkai had been a far older and far more widespread response to the challenge of an encompassing alien culture than the recrudescence of the spirit of the *sicarii* among a rabid minority of the Zionist settlers in Palestine.

These instances suffice to demonstrate conclusively that Violence is no more characteristic of Zealotism than Gentleness is; and this inference cannot be cancelled by citing other instances in which the men of violence in the Zealot ranks do not appear to be counterbalanced by the presence of any men of peace. It might be difficult, for example, to cite any non-violent Islamic Zealots to neutralize the cumulative impression made on an observer's mind by the militancy of Wahhābīs, Idrīsīs, Mahdists, Sanūsīs, Pathans, and Maghribīs, whose retort to Frankish honey-thieves was to burst furiously out of their plundered hive like bees eager to give their lives for the sake of lodging their stings in an insufferable aggressor's flesh. In the Far Eastern World, again, the violent Zealotism of the Ming, the Tokugawa, and the Boxers appears to hold the field unchallenged by the contrary example of any alternative non-violent school. Yet these obvious exceptions will not avail to rehabilitate a decisively discredited rule.

Perhaps the clearest proof that Violence is no distinctively Zealot spirit is presented by the spectacle of the professional soldiers' impartially indiscriminate distribution of their forces, of both higher and lower quality, between the Zealot and Herodian camps. The most highly distinguished of the professional soldiers begotten from encounters between diverse civilizations had, indeed, been Herodians and not Zealots. Peter the Great, Nādir Shāh, Mehmed 'Alī, Mustafā Kemāl Atatürk, and Rizā Shāh Pahlawī were conspicuous representatives of the Herodian category. By contrast, the most conspicuous professional soldiers whom we have come across in the Zealot hive are the discredibly



drone-like latter-day Streltsy, Mamlûks, and Janissaries. To find Zealot professional soldiers worthy to compare with the most eminent of their Herodian brothers-in-arms, we must call up those stalwart Illyrian soldier-emperors<sup>1</sup> who showed their mettle in leading the last counter-attack of a demoralized Hellenism against a triumphant Christianity, and those indomitable Spartiate 'Peers'<sup>2</sup> who defended, with their backs to the wall, 'the peculiar institution' of a culturally dissident Hellenic city-state which had deliberately parted company with the main body of the Hellenic Society in order to march straight into a spiritual desert of Militarism at the very moment when the rest of Hellas was emerging out of darkness into light. Yet the height of heroism to which a Spartiate Leonidas rose gives the measure of the depth of demoralization to which his nephew Pausanias sank; and, moreover, if we expand the Zealot contingent in our muster of professional soldiers by bringing up reinforcements that are of dubious quality, we shall be bound, in equity, to dilute the Herodian contingent likewise by calling up those barbarian mercenaries who had been enlisted in the professional military defence of Civilization on the anti-barbarian frontiers of so many oecumenical empires.<sup>3</sup>

Our now manifest failure in our repeated search for a valid criterion for distinguishing Zealots and Herodians from one another suggests that this quest may be a wild goose chase and prompts us to make a fresh attack on our problem from a different quarter. Instead of taking as our point of departure a professed antithesis and antagonism for which we have no better evidence than the two parties' own concordant, but perhaps collusive, protestations, let us take the Janus-faced ambivalence of many of the most impressive of the soldiers on parade, which is a fact open to observation by the spectator with his own unprejudiced eyes, in the teeth of the troops' unsupported and perhaps not disinterested assertions. If we now remind ourselves of the nature of the emergency that has brought both Zealots and Herodians into action, we shall see that this ambivalent appearance, so far from being surprising, is actually just what we should expect. For both parties alike are engaged in the desperate enterprise of counter-attacking an alien enemy force that has lodged itself within the gates of their assaulted city. The common objective of both the Zealot and the Herodian defenders of their common home is to retrieve this perilous situation; and, in so far as they may be taking different lines, these are merely different tactical approaches to an identical strategic objective.

Moreover, it is manifest that neither warrior can hope to achieve a common practical purpose if he insists on pushing his own tactical theory to the extremity of its logical conclusions. A Coroebus, accoutred in the arms of a fallen foeman,<sup>4</sup> who carried his *ruse de guerre* to the point of falling in, shoulder to shoulder, with his slain adversary's combatant comrades in the enemy assaulting column, would be reducing his Herodianism *ad absurdum* by assisting in the capture of a Troy that he had taken up arms to save from falling; and in real life we do not

<sup>1</sup> See V. vi. 207.

<sup>2</sup> See III. iii. 50-79.

<sup>3</sup> See V. v. 461-6, and pp. 40-41, above.

<sup>4</sup> Virgil: *Aeneid*, Book II, ll. 383-401.

find historical instances of Herodians thus stultifying themselves by a suicidal self-caricature. Even those Herodian potentates who have gone farthest in imposing an aggressive enemy civilization's culture on their subjects on the technological, economic, social, and intellectual planes have usually gone to these unwelcome lengths with the object of thereby preserving intact at least the continuity and independence of the commonwealth for whose government they have been responsible, while non-violent Herodians whose policy has not been dictated to them by any political responsibilities have usually been aiming at the preservation of some other element in their own assaulted cultural heritage—for instance, an ancestral religion or, at a minimum, the bare memory of the submerged society's former existence through the registration of an entry, such as Garcilaso de la Vega made, in the records of the victorious aggressor society by whose act the victim society has been sent to join the shades in Sheol.

On the other side of an imaginary line dividing an Herodian from a Zealot track, those devoted Jewish and Red Indian violent Zealots whose scruples have inhibited them from carrying on their 'holy war' on the Sabbath Day<sup>1</sup> or from conducting it with the White Man's weapons<sup>2</sup> have condemned their own cause to defeat by these sublimely unpractical sacrifices on the altar of superstition. By contrast, every practical-minded Zealot has made concessions to Herodianism, while every practical-minded Herodian has seasoned his own Laodicean philosophy with a grain of Zealot salt. On this showing, the Zealot and Herodian standpoints look, not so much like two isolated peaks sundered by an impassable gulf, as like the upper and lower ranges of the gamut of a musical instrument in which the interval between this instrument's two acoustical extremes is bridged by a continuous gradation of intermediate notes, and on which the highest and lowest notes of all are seldom or never struck by any player who is an even barely competent performer.

Thus a Zealot who has the common sense and the strength of mind to refuse to bring his principle to grief by being guilty of a suicidally pedantic loyalty to it will find himself perforce stepping one pace forward from his own bridgehead on to the bridge that spans the gulf between his own and his Herodian twin brother's standpoint; but 'la distance n'y fait rien; il n'y a que le premier pas qui coûte';<sup>3</sup> and, when once this first step has been taken, the insidiously potent law that 'one thing leads to another' will guide our Zealot pilgrim's feet into the way, not of peace,<sup>4</sup> but of progressive compromise, until it has carried him, *pedetemptim et gradatim*,<sup>5</sup> right over the keystone of Chinvat's arch on to the approaches towards an Herodian bridgehead on the farther side of an insensibly traversed intervening space.

This self-defeat of Zealotism in its tug-of-war with Herodianism on a

<sup>1</sup> See V. v. 331, n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> See *ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> The Marquise du Desfand (*vivebat* A.D. 1739–1823) in a letter of the 7th July, 1763, to d'Alembert, apropos of the legend that Saint Denis had no sooner been beheaded than he picked up his head in his hands and proceeded to carry it for a distance of two leagues (*The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations* (London 1941, Oxford University Press), p. 562, col. b).

<sup>4</sup> Luke i. 79.

<sup>5</sup> Cicero: *Ad Familiares*, Book IX, Letter xiv, § 7.

hazardous pitch dizzily overhanging a deadly gulf calls up an image that has haunted our imagination once before. We have had a pre-view of this play in looking on at the awesomely ironic pageant of the self-defeat of Archaism,<sup>1</sup> and in seeing this dumb show translated into a play in which the dramatis personae have all been divers impersonations of a Protean 'saviour with the time-machine'.<sup>2</sup> In the plot of that psychological drama the way in which Archaism defeats itself is by passing over into Futurism; and we can now see that Zealotism is the psychological equivalent of Archaism, and Herodianism of Futurism, in a situation in which the internal challenge of social disintegration has been replaced—or reinforced—by the external challenge of an alien enemy within the gates of the challenged society's cultural citadel.

Nor is this the only memory of previous intuitions that we recollect, as the spectacle of the metamorphosis of Zealotism into Herodianism passes before our eyes. The examples, cited at the close of our foregoing survey, of psychological reactions along recognizably Zealot and Herodian lines in the domestic histories of civilizations are reminders that we have also already come across other equivalents of Zealotism and Herodianism in studying the intractability of institutions in the course of our inquiry into the reasons why civilizations break down.<sup>3</sup> We have watched this intractability asserting itself by frustrating Man's attempts to adjust his existing institutions to meet a new situation produced by the genesis of new dynamic forces or creative movements within a society's bosom, and we have seen that this frustration may take either of the two alternative courses of precipitating revolutions or engendering enormities. We can now see that these crises arising from the emergence of newly created forces welling up from within are analogous to the crises produced by the impact of newly encountered forces impinging from outside, and that the enormities in which a civilization comes to grief are fruits of Zealotism, while the revolutions which are the alternative penalty for maladjustment are no less characteristic fruits of the antithetical Herodian response to the same challenge.

### *The Ineffectiveness of the Zealot-Herodian Response*

If we have been right in our verdict that the ostensible contrast between Zealotism and Herodianism masks a family likeness, and that these two psychological reactions to the intrusion of an alien culture are, in truth, merely two variations on an identical theme, we should expect to find this affinity of character translating itself into a similarity of effect; and, sure enough, we do find the unmasked resemblance between Zealotism and Herodianism betraying itself in nothing so patently as in their common failure.

The ineffectiveness of this Zealot-Herodian response to the challenge of a cultural assault is manifest in the historic case that we have taken as our prototype. In Jewry's encounter with a post-Alexandrine Hellenism, neither variant of the assaulted society's defensive reaction availed to achieve the common purpose of finding a solution for Jewry's Hellenic problem that would be practicable and at the same time tolerable.

<sup>1</sup> See V. vi. 94-97.

<sup>2</sup> See V. vi. 213-42.

<sup>3</sup> See IV. iv. 133-245.

Herod the Great and his school of Herodian *politiques* failed to persuade or compel their Zealot-minded compatriots to acquiesce in a political autonomy under Roman hegemony which would have given the Palestinian Jewish community a chance of coming to terms with Hellenism without losing its own communal identity in its ancestral home, while the Zealots succeeded in sabotaging this Herodian policy, only to bring the Palestinian Jewish community to the destruction which the Herodians had foreseen and foretold as being inevitable if the Zealots should once succeed in taking the bit between their teeth. The catastrophes of A.D. 70 and A.D. 135 proclaimed the bankruptcy of Herodianism in closing the door on the possibility of a cultural compromise between Judaism and Hellenism, and at the same time exposed the folly of Zealotism by turning a Jerusalem that, in the Zealots' dreams, was to have been the sacrosanct capital of a Messianic Jewish state into the forbidden city Aelia Capitolina, whose pagan precincts were placed out of bounds for all heirs of the Covenant of Circumcision.<sup>1</sup> Thereafter, any Jew who wished to share in the good things of Hellenic life had to purchase his freedom of the Hellenic cosmopolis by making a clean cut with his own Jewish cultural heritage, in the fashion set by the Alexandrian Jewish Platonist philosopher Philo's nephew the Roman citizen and civil servant Tiberius Alexander, while the only way left open for maintaining a distinctive Jewish communal life was Rabbi Johanan ben Zakkai's forlorn hope of ritualism-in-diaspora.

It would be superfluous to call up again the rest of our muster of Zealots and Herodians to demonstrate that the same pair of psychological reactions resulted in the same failure in all other encounters between an assaulted society and an assailant culture in which the tragedy had already been played out to its conclusion by the time of writing; for these repetitions of Jewry's classic experience stand on record in this work in our foregoing survey of encounters between contemporaries.<sup>2</sup> In this place we need only observe that the ineffectiveness of the Zealot-Herodian reaction has been registered implicitly *a priori* in our identification of Zealotism with an Archaism that breeds enormities, and of Herodianism with a Futurism that precipitates revolutions, since revolutions are confounded with enormities, and futurists with archaists, in the common grave of their uniform failure.

The nature of the corresponding failure of Zealotism and Herodianism may be probed to its spiritual essence, below its social surface, by an intellect that does not disdain the immemorially ancient symbolism in which the subconscious depths of the Soul express intellectually ineffable spiritual truths. A poetic imagery in which the spirit reveals itself in the physical disguise of water has already given us an insight into the 'conductivity' of a universal state;<sup>3</sup> for, when we liken an oecumenical empire to the Ocean into which all Earth's rivers discharge, we find that this apparently still and dead expanse of salt water is in constant and creative motion, and that the rivers, which appear so mobile and lively by contrast, would soon cease to flow if their sources were not perpetually being fed by the life-giving rain that is perpetually being distilled from the

<sup>1</sup> Acts vii. 8.

<sup>2</sup> On pp. 346-453, above.

<sup>3</sup> See VI. vii. 60-61.

surface-water of the Sea as it perpetually ascends into Heaven. In our subsequent study of the spiritual influences derived by transfrontier barbarians from their proximity to the body social of a civilization on the other side of the *limes* of a universal state, we have found our insight in a simile<sup>1</sup> in which we have likened this *limes* to a dam that first converts the upper basin of a mountain torrent into a reservoir and then brings the accumulated waters down in spate when the barrage collapses at last under a pressure that has mounted to the breaking-point.

In terms of the same expressive imagery, we may liken the Zealot-Herodian reaction to the *riposte* contrived by a pixie whose Lake of the Woods, inviolate hitherto since the beginning of Time, has suddenly and unexpectedly been sullied by the keel, and ruffled by the paddle, of an audacious backwoodsman's canoe. What apotropaic use will this outraged pixie's fury and dismay move her to make of her superhuman magic power in order to checkmate the sacrilegious human intruder? If her defensive psychological reaction takes a Zealot turn, the Lady of the Lake will render her waters unnavigable by freezing them solid, while, if it takes an Herodian turn, she will render navigation impossible by the alternative retort of draining her lake-bed dry. Whether the sacrosanct water is frozen or whether it is drained away, it will have been made equally impervious to the passage of a man-made vessel. Yet, in working either miracle, the luckless nymph will have betrayed her sub-human *naïveté*; for, in her single-minded anxiety to put the boatman out of action, she has lost sight of the devastatingly simple truth that Man's sophisticated and hazardous art of navigation<sup>2</sup> comes considerably less easy to him than the human biped's natural method of locomotion. A lake that has been closed to navigation by being either drained or frozen can be traversed by a land-lubber dry-shod. In short, the nymph will have reacted to the human intruder in a way that will have defeated her intentions by serving his purposes. So far from effectively arresting the invader's progress, her magic *tour de force* will have appreciably facilitated it.

### 3. *Evangelism*

Was this uniform self-defeat of Zealotism and Herodianism the last word that the oracles of History and Mythology had to speak when asked for light on the spiritual consequences of encounters? If it were indeed the last, then the outlook for Mankind would be forbidding, for then we might be driven to the conclusion that our present enterprise of Civilization was an impracticable attempt to climb an unscalable pitch.<sup>3</sup>

This great enterprise was initiated, as we may recollect,<sup>4</sup> by a new departure in which Human Nature's powers of imagination, intrepidity, and versatility proved a match for the difficulties besetting the change of orientation which Mankind managed to achieve at that momentous stage in human history. A Primitive Man, who had long since been brought to a halt by an Epimethean direction of his faculty of mimesis

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 3-11, above.

<sup>2</sup> See II. i. 326-7.

<sup>3</sup> This simile of the climber's pitch has been propounded in II. i. 192-5.

<sup>4</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 192.



towards his stick-in-the-mud elders and ancestors, now reliberated his Promethean *élan*<sup>1</sup> by redirecting this same socially indispensable faculty towards creative personalities who offered themselves to him as path-finding pioneers. How far, a latter-day inquirer was bound to ask himself, was this new move going to carry these primitive culture-heroes' epigoni? And, when its momentum had been exhausted, would they be able to draw upon a hidden store of psychic energy by repeating the creative stroke with which Moses had once conjured the water out of the rock?<sup>2</sup> If the answer to this last question were to be in the negative, it would be a bad look-out for a half-baked Man-in-Process-of-Civilization; and this was why, for him, an archaistic Zealotism's and a futuristic Herodianism's common curse of ineffectiveness was, in itself, so disquieting an omen.

The omen was disquieting because the Zealot-Herodian reaction in particular, like the Archaist-Futurist reaction in general, was manifestly an unsuccessful attempt to re-perform the miraculous act by which a creative minority of Primitive Mankind had once succeeded in passing over from the Yin-state of an apparently hard-set stagnation into the Yang-movement of an astounding renewal of progress. In that successfully negotiated transition from Primitive Life to Civilization the adoption of the forward-looking attitude had released a creative energy strong enough to overcome the backward-looking attitude's inertia; but, in the Archaist-Futurist and Zealot-Herodian reactions of a Civilization in trouble, neither of the two formally antithetical component attitudes was proving to have any virtue in it. Was this the end of the story?

Perhaps the true answer to this anxious question was that this might well be the end if the whole story was comprised in the history of Civilization, but not if Man's attempt at Civilization was no more than one chapter in the story of a perennial encounter between Man and God. In the myth of the Flood as recounted in the Book of Genesis, the sequel to a cataclysm in which Adam's brood had been all but annihilated by their outraged Maker was God's proclamation of an 'everlasting covenant between God and every living creature of all flesh that is upon the Earth'. The Creator's promise to Noah and his salvaged crew was that 'the waters shall no more become a flood to destroy all flesh';<sup>3</sup> the token of this covenant was the bow set and seen in the cloud; and indeed we have discovered, in the act of registering the equal failure of Archaism and Futurism, and, likewise, of Enormities and Revolutions, that, in either of those two apparently inescapable dilemmas, there is a third possibility which offers a hard-pressed Theseus a chance of escaping imminent destruction by boldly vaulting between the terrible horns on which a Minotaur has been seeking to impale his puny human antagonist.

When Life is challenged by the emergence of some new dynamic force or creative movement from within, the living individual or society is not thereby condemned to make the futile choice between breaking down by perpetrating an enormity and breaking down by detonating a revolution; there also lies open a middle way of salvation in which a mutual adjust-

<sup>1</sup> See III. iii. 114.

<sup>2</sup> Exod. xvii. 1-7.

<sup>3</sup> Gen. ix. 8-17.

ment between the old order and the new departure can arrive at a harmony on a higher level which is another name for growth.<sup>1</sup> And similarly, when Life is challenged by a breakdown that has become an accomplished fact, an individual or society that is striving to recapture from Fate the initiative in its fight for life is not condemned to make the no less futile choice between the two inherently impracticable escapades of attempting to jump clear of the Present up the Time-stream into a lost Past and attempting to jump clear down the Time-stream into an unattained Future;<sup>2</sup> for, here too, there lies open the middle way of a withdrawal through a movement of Detachment followed by a return that reveals itself in a Transfiguration.<sup>3</sup> In the prosaic language of a nascent post-Modern Western science of Psychology,

'In every conflict a dynamic opposition occurs, and in this opposition some elements transcend from one side to the other and *vice versa*. Through this reciprocal action . . . a new condition is reached which was not a predictable outcome of the conflict.'<sup>4</sup>

Is this divine act of new creation performed likewise when the encounter between Man and God achieves itself in a collision between two diverse human societies, and when the pair of equally barren psychological reactions in the souls of the children of the assaulted society are the two that we have now learnt to know as Zealotism and Herodianism? As we stand on the marge of the Pool of Bethesda<sup>5</sup> and watch a savage Zealot seeking to save the sacred water from a dominant Gentile's polluting touch by freezing it, while a ruthless Herodian is seeking simultaneously to secure the same ritual satisfaction by draining the precious water away, our eyes turn towards the surrounding porches to gaze pityingly upon that 'great multitude of impotent folk—of blind, halt, withered'—whom we see lying there 'waiting for the moving of the water'.

The Zealot's and the Herodian's feelings remain stonily unmoved by this spectacle of their afflicted fellow human beings' piteous plight and sore need for healing. These two rival self-appointed champions of Jewry are both so inhumanly intent on the waging of their cultural war with Hellenism in accordance with their respective tactics that, in the service of an alleged military necessity, they neither of them feel any compunction as they deprive their own forefather Abraham's suffering children of their last ebbing hope of salvation. Will this unmerciful pair of pedants succeed, between them, in consummating their futile atrocity before the season arrives for the angel to go down into the pool and trouble the water with the miraculously transfiguring effect, for the sufferer who then first steps in, of making him whole of whatsoever disease he has had? No answer to our question is to be expected from combatants in a cultural war who are totally preoccupied with the conduct of their Lilliputian hostilities; but, above the un-Homeric hubbub

<sup>1</sup> See IV. iv. 133.

<sup>2</sup> See V. v. 383-90.

<sup>3</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 390-7.

<sup>4</sup> Baynes, H. G.: *Mythology of the Soul* (London 1940, Baillière, Tindall & Cox; 1949, Methuen), p. 320. Compare the present Study, II. i. 300-1.

<sup>5</sup> John v. 2-9.

of a Judaeo-Hellenic Battle of Frogs and Mice, let us hear also what Saint Paul saith:<sup>1</sup>

'Is He the God of the Jews only? Is He not also of the Gentiles? Yes, of the Gentiles also;<sup>2</sup> for there is no difference between the Jew and the Greek; for the same Lord over all is rich unto all that call upon Him.<sup>3</sup> For by one spirit are we all baptised into one body, whether we be Jews or Gentiles, whether we be bond or free.<sup>4</sup> There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female; for ye are all one in Christ Jesus<sup>5</sup>—where there is neither Greek nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, Barbarian, Scythian, bond nor free; but Christ is all and in all.<sup>6</sup>

The blessing vouchsafed to Saint Paul and his fellow evangelists is:

'He that shall lose his life for My sake and the Gospel's, the same shall save it.'<sup>7</sup>

In Paul, Judaism did lose its life in so far as, for some two hundred years and more before Paul's day, Judaism had been living for the ideal of preserving its own ancestral Syriac way of life against penetration by the masterfully intrusive alien culture of Hellenism. Paul was born and brought up in a Gentile Tarsus as a Pharisee—a cultural 'isolationist'<sup>8</sup>—and at the same time and place he received a Greek education and found himself a Roman citizen. The Zealot and the Herodian path thus both lay open in front of him, and as a young man he opted for Zealotism.

<sup>1</sup> In the Tarsian evangelist's heavenly Christian strains we can catch echoes of the lovely pagan music of a Mantuan poet who, like Paul, had been a Roman citizen. Paul's discernment that 'there is no difference between the Jew and the Greek' had been anticipated, almost phrase for phrase and rhythm for rhythm, in a Virgilian Dido's *Tros Tyriusque mihi nullo discrimine agetur* (*Aeneid*, Book I, l. 574), while Aeneas' *Paribus se legibus ambae* *invictae gentes aeterna in foedera mittant* (*Aeneid*, Book XII, ll. 190-1) foreshadows Paul's 'By one spirit are we all baptised into one body, whether we be Jews or Gentiles'. Virgil's poem is, in truth, the pagan gospel of the cult of an Occumenical Collective Humanity—Mankind incorporated into one universal body politic under the aegis of a Dea Roma and under the auspices of a Divus Caesar—and it was no accident that a spiritual war to the death with this noblest of all avatars of the most vicious of all forms of idolatry should have been the earliest ordeal of an infant Christian Church.

With an eye to the particular theme of the present chapter of this Study, we may notice, in passing, that Virgil was aware of the spiritual truth that a declaration of the common bankruptcy of Herodianism and Zealotism is, in the same breath, the revelation of a saving middle way. When the inevitable detection of Coroebus's Herodian ruse of putting on the armour of a slain and despoiled antagonist has been followed by the slaying of Coroebus himself and those other comrades of Aeneas who have followed Coroebus's example (*Aeneid*, Book II, ll. 424-9), the mythical Dardanian prototype of a mundane Roman saviour of Society is restrained, by the intervention of the Gods, from acting on a suicidal impulse to find his alternative to an Herodian's abortive stratagem in a Zealot's heroic death. When the epiphany of Venus has been frustrated by the obstinacy of Anchises, and the hero sprung from the union of the goddess and the mortal reverts, in desperation, to his Zealot watchword *Moriatur et in media arma ruamus* (l. 353) in his cry *Arma, viri, ferite arma: vocat lux ultima victos* (l. 668), the Man of Destiny's heart is lifted, at this critical moment, above an ephemeral battle by the sudden miracle of the child Iulus's transfiguration (ll. 681-4). The tongue of fire that sits upon Iulus's head, and the *khevenah* that plays about his locks and temples, are Virgilian counterparts of the tongues of fire that crown the heads of Christ's apostles on the Day of Pentecost (Acts ii. 3), and of the sheen of Christ's own face and raiment in the manifestation of His divinity on the mountain (Matt. xvii. 2; Mark ix. 3; Luke ix. 29).

<sup>2</sup> Rom. iii. 29.

<sup>3</sup> Rom. x. 12.

<sup>4</sup> Gal. iii. 28.

<sup>5</sup> 1 Cor. xii. 13.

<sup>6</sup> Col. iii. 11.

<sup>7</sup> Mark viii. 35. Cp. Matt. x. 39 and xvi. 25; Luke ix. 24 and xvii. 33; John xii. 25.

<sup>8</sup> See V. v. 73, n. 4.

But, when he was plucked out of this perverse initial Zealot course by his vision on the road from Jerusalem to Damascus, Paul did not then perforce become an Herodian. He did not then find himself confined to a choice between one or other of these two barrenly defensive and uncreative lines of action; there was revealed to him a creative way which transcended them both.

Paul traversed the Roman Empire preaching neither Judaism versus Hellenism nor Hellenism versus Judaism, but a new way of life—Christianity—which drew, without prejudice, upon the spiritual wealth of both those two contending cultures and offered itself, with an impartially benignant hospitality, to any member of either of those two societies—or of any other civilization within the oecumenical theatre of the Evangelist's spiritual operations. No cultural frontier could stand in this Gospel's way; for the Christian Church was not just a new society of the same species as the civilizations whose encounters with one another we have been investigating in the present Part of this Study; it was a society of a different species, distinguished by a new revelation of the nature of God and of the character of Man's relation to Him. The creatively dramatic *peripeteia*, or 'reversal of the situation', which followed from the encounter between Jewry and Hellenism, was thus not achieved in any episode among the vicissitudes of alternating victory and defeat in these two civilizations' long-drawn-out duel; it was manifested in the transcending of both these civilizations by a newly revealed higher religion that had made its epiphany 'above the battle' which Judaism and Hellenism were fighting with one another.

At the date at which these present words were being written, the Syriac and the Hellenic Civilization alike had long since passed out of existence, and even the Jewish relic of the Syriac Society was extant only in the shape of a social fossil; but the Christian Church, born of a creative response to the challenge which the encounter between those two now extinct civilizations had once presented to their children, was then still the outstanding spiritual force in the oecumenical mission-field of a Westernizing Latter-day World; and, in the light of the first nineteen centuries of Christianity's earthly pilgrimage, a twentieth-century historian might venture to predict that Christianity's transfiguring effect on the World up to date would be outshone by its continuing operation in the future.

A Christian-bred historian, however, would be a traitor to the genius of his ancestral faith if, in allowing himself to think this serenely sanguine thought, he were also to allow the abominable and desolating idol of a corporately worshipped Self to resume possession of his soul in the sacrilegious guise of a chauvinism on behalf of one finite revelation of God's infinite light, merely because the Judaeo-Hellenic facet of a terrestrial lamp's dark glass<sup>1</sup> happened, as a fortuitous consequence of his time and place of birth, to be more familiar to him personally than Christianity's Indo-Hellenic counterpart. To guard against the sin of both heart and head that a Christian would be committing most grievously against God's Divine Majesty, provoking most justly God's wrath

<sup>1</sup> 1 Cor. xiii. 12.

and indignation<sup>1</sup> against the sinner, if he should refuse to honour any manifestation whatsoever of the one and indivisible Divine Light, the Christian-bred student of God's dealings with Man will remind himself that a post-Alexandrine Hellenism, after forcing an entry into a Hittite, an Egyptian, and a Babylonian, as well as a Syriac, World in the fourth century B.C., had proceeded, in the second century B.C., to push its way into an Indic World likewise, and that, out of this Indo-Hellenic encounter, a higher religion akin to Christianity had made its epiphany.

The Mahāyāna transfigured the self-regardingly Self-dispelling *askēsis* of the Hinayanian arhat into the unselfishly Self-detaining evangelism of the Mahayanian bodhisattva.<sup>2</sup> A philosophy that had offered the spiritual athlete (on condition of his proving able to stay the arduous course) his salvation through the achievement of a complete detachment from both himself and his fellow living creatures, was transformed into a religion whose ideal figure was not the sage attaining *Nirvāṇa* for himself but the saviour of his fellows who, for their sakes, had made the supreme personal sacrifice, not of suffering the pains of a voluntarily accepted death, but of enduring the pains of a voluntarily protracted existence, in order to guide the feet of others into the way of peace<sup>3</sup> at the price of postponing, in *saecula saeculorum*, this Buddha-Saint's own entry into his hard-won rest.<sup>4</sup>

At the time of writing, half-way through the twentieth century of the Christian Era, Christianity and the Mahāyāna were the two great living witnesses<sup>5</sup> to the spiritual significance of the social phenomenon of encounters between civilizations—a phenomenon that had been recurring with an ever greater frequency and at an ever higher potency since the species of societies called civilizations had made its first appearance some five or six thousand years ago. Humanly speaking, it was a creative response to the challenge of one of these encounters that had brought to birth Christianity and the Mahāyāna and Islam and Hinduism.

In an age in which the entire habitable and traversable face of the planet had been roped in by far-reaching Western hands to constitute thenceforth a single common arena, common exercise-ground, and, perhaps one day, common home for a united human family, it might be predicted that, in the next chapter of a henceforth oecumenical human history, the four higher religions sprung from the ruins of civilizations of the second generation were destined to have an intimate spiritual encounter with one another; and, whatever the outcome of this great imminent spiritual event might prove to be, it was evidently likely to inaugurate a new era in human life in This World.

The goal of Man's spiritual endeavours in an unborn age beyond the historian's horizon might be divined by an understanding heart<sup>6</sup> from a reading<sup>7</sup> of the words that the Tarsian Jewish apostle of Christianity

<sup>1</sup> The General Confession in the Order of the Administration of the Lord's Supper, or Holy Communion, in the Book of Common Prayer according to the Use of the Church of England.

<sup>2</sup> See V. v. 133-6 and 552; V. vi. 148 and 164, n. 3; and XII. ix. 632-5.

<sup>3</sup> Luke i. 79.

<sup>4</sup> Psalm xcvi. 11.

<sup>5</sup> See V. v. 370-2.

<sup>6</sup> 1 Kings iii. 9.

<sup>7</sup> Matt. xxiv. 15; Mark xiii. 14.



*in partibus Gentilium* is reported to have uttered in an impromptu address<sup>1</sup> to an Athenian audience on the Areopagus.

'God that made the World and all things therein . . . hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the Earth, and hath determined the times before appointed, and the bounds of their habitation, that they should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after Him and find Him—though He be not far from every one of us; for in Him we live and move and have our being, as certain also of your own poets have said:<sup>2</sup> "For we are also his offspring".'

<sup>1</sup> Acts xvii. 22-31.

<sup>2</sup> Aratus's *Phaenomena*, l. 5, echoed in Cleanthes' Hymn to Zeus, l. 4 (see V. vi. 11, n. 2).—A.J.T.

## VIII. C, ANNEX

### THE TEMPORARY HALT OF THE WESTERN CIVILIZATION'S FRONTIER IN NORTH AMERICA AT THE EDGE OF THE GREAT PLAINS

THE occupation of North America by a Western Civilization which had originated on the other side of the Atlantic had been one of the greatest feats of expansion known to History down to the time of writing. This gigantic enterprise had been carried out within a period of less than four hundred years, reckoning from A.D. 1519, the year in which Cortés and his companions had made, in Mexico, the first permanent lodgement of West European invaders on Continental North American ground, to A.D. 1890, the year in which the internal frontier of agricultural settlement within the expanded political boundaries of the United States had been wiped out by the completion of the effective occupation and settlement of the whole national territory. Within those 371 years the whole of North America had in fact been occupied up to its natural frontiers—the Pacific coast and the southern edge of the Esquimaux' preserve in the Arctic Zone<sup>1</sup>—by conquerors and colonists who had landed at divers points on the Atlantic coast from A.D. 1519 onwards.

The magnitude of this achievement of the pioneers of the Western Civilization in North America may be measured by comparing it with the same civilization's previous expansion in the Old World. Starting from its original patrimony—those derelict western provinces of the Roman Empire in which the North European and Eurasian barbarian invaders had been converted to Latin Christianity without being subsequently conquered either by the Arab Caliphate or by the East Roman Empire—the Western Civilization, during its Dark Ages and Middle Ages, had taken more than six hundred years, reckoning from the opening of Charlemagne's counter-offensive against the pagan Saxons in A.D. 772 to the conversion of the pagan Lithuanians to Latin Christianity in A.D. 1386, to occupy the northern zone of Western Europe from the northern fringes of the Rhine Basin and the Upper Danube Basin up to the southern fringe of the Arctic Zone. Before that, the Hellenic Civilization's occupation of Western Europe, from the Appennines up to a natural frontier provided by the shores of the Atlantic and an artificial *limes* drawn along the Rhine-Danube river line,<sup>2</sup> had taken a quarter of a millennium, reckoning from the beginning of the Roman advance into the Po Basin after the close of the First Romano-Punic War in 241 B.C. down to Augustus's decision, after the Roman military disasters of A.D. 6-9 at the hands of the Pannonians and the Cherusci, to abandon his attempt to carry the frontier forward to the line of the Elbe. In this post-Alexandrine Hellenic and in the subsequent Medieval Western expansion of a civilization into European territory previously

<sup>1</sup> See III. iii. 4-7.

<sup>2</sup> See 'The Rhine-Danube Frontier of the Roman Empire', in V. v. 591-5.

occupied by barbarians or by primitive peoples, the area occupied had in either case been trifling by comparison with the area in North America, within the natural frontiers indicated above, that was occupied by the Western Civilization between A.D. 1519 and A.D. 1890.

Moreover, the major part of this Western achievement in North America that was consummated in A.D. 1890 had been accomplished within the last 127 years out of the total span of 371 by the people of the United States within the middle transcontinental zone of North America over which the United States' political domain had expanded. The eventual area of the Continental United States west of the Appalachian and Alleghany Mountains had been occupied and settled since the end of the Seven Years War (*gerebatur* A.D. 1756-63).

The American people's spectacular contribution to the total result was, of course, matched, and was also, no doubt, at least partly accounted for, by the unusual advantages which the United States had enjoyed during this expansive period. She had, in fact, succeeded in having the best of both worlds for a hundred years and more. She had managed to remain economically 'in' the Old World after having extricated herself from being politically 'of' it.

Between A.D. 1763 and A.D. 1820 the whole of North America had been liberated from European political entanglements as a result of the elimination of French rule from Canada and the Mississippi Basin in the Seven Years War (*gerebatur* A.D. 1756-63), the elimination of British rule from the Thirteen Colonies and Florida in the Revolutionary War (*gerebatur* A.D. 1775-83), the Louisiana Purchase completed in A.D. 1803, the acquisition of Florida from Spain by the United States in A.D. 1819, the liquidation of Spanish rule in Mexico in A.D. 1820, and, above all, Great Britain's policy of drawing a cordon of sea-power round the Continental European bases of the other Great Powers of the day. If the British Navy had not made it impracticable for Napoleon to take delivery of Louisiana after he had extorted from the Spanish Government a retrocession of the title deeds, President Jefferson would not have found the purchase so easy to negotiate. This British benefaction to the United States had been incidental and undesigned; but, after the close of the Anglo-American War of A.D. 1812-14 and the final overthrow of Napoleon at Waterloo, it had become a standing rule of British policy that Great Britain should keep clear of Continental European entanglements inside her naval cordon and should at the same time keep on good terms, outside it, with the United States, which, in the nineteenth century, was the only naval Power in the World that could have threatened Great Britain's strategic position from the rear; and in these circumstances the maintenance of Canada's political association with the United Kingdom had not, during the century ending in A.D. 1914, threatened to entangle North America in European conflicts.

Meanwhile, during the same century ending in A.D. 1914, a United States who had thus escaped from European political entanglements had been able still to draw on European economic resources—both on European population in the shape of immigrants and on European capital in the shape of loans transferred through the importation of

European manufactures—to assist her in pushing forward her western frontier of effective occupation and settlement from the line of the Appalachians and the Alleghanies, along which it had run in A.D. 1763, right across North America to the Pacific Coast within little more than 125 years. During the same period the effectiveness of Western economic resources—whether imported from Europe or produced in North America itself—had been vastly enhanced by the Industrial Revolution in Technology, which had given Western Man an unprecedented command over the rest of terrestrial creation, human and non-human alike.

In these nineteenth-century circumstances the conquest of North America by the people of the United States, impressive though it had been, could not be regarded as an inexplicable miracle. The remarkable feature in the story was not that the American people should have won the West, but that their puissant westward advance should have been checked, even temporarily, by any section of the pre-Columbian population of North America whose habitat had lain athwart the pioneers' path. The distinction of having made this exceptional and remarkable stand belonged to the Plains Indians.

"The Plains Indians constituted for a much longer time than we realise the most effectual barrier ever set up by a native American population against European invaders in a temperate zone. For two and a half centuries they maintained themselves with great fortitude against the Spanish, English, French, Mexican, Texan, and American invaders, withstanding missionaries, whisky, disease, gunpowder, and lead."<sup>1</sup>

It was not, perhaps, so surprising that the Plains Indians should have maintained themselves from A.D. 1535 to A.D. 1848 against the Spaniards and their Mexican successors; for, apart from the notable invention of firearms, the equipment of Early Modern Western Man—particularly in means of transportation, which were of vital importance on the Great Plains—was not more efficient than the equipment of the Romans had been; and the epigoni of the Spanish conquerors of Mexico were more backward in their technology than most of their contemporaries in other parts of an expanded Western World.<sup>2</sup> It was more noteworthy that for more than fifty years—from about A.D. 1821 till the eighteen-seventies—the eastern edge of the Great Plains should have set a limit to the westward advance of the agricultural frontier of the United States.

Between A.D. 1763, when French rule had been eliminated from the Mississippi Basin, and A.D. 1821, when Missouri had been admitted to statehood in the United States, the westward-flowing tide of American agricultural settlement, when once it had gathered sufficient head to force its way over the barrier of the Appalachian Mountains, had found no halting place at the line of the River Mississippi, which had been the western political frontier of the United States for the first twenty years (A.D. 1783–1803) after the end of the Revolutionary War. The Mississippi, like the Rhine and the Danube, had indeed been designed by Nature to serve human purposes not as a *limes* but as an artery of inland

<sup>1</sup> Webb, W. P.: *The Great Plains* (New York 1931, Ginn), p. 48. The quotations from this book have been made with the permission of the author and the publishers.

<sup>2</sup> See the example noticed in III. iii. 136, n. 1.

water communications, and the advancing host of migrant farmers had taken the passage of the great river in its stride.<sup>1</sup> Missouri had been settled between A.D. 1815 and A.D. 1819, and the town of Independence, near the north-western corner of the new state, had been founded in A.D. 1827.<sup>2</sup> At the western boundary of Missouri, however, the pioneers of an agricultural civilization had reached a limit that, in contrast to the Western Waters which had floated them on their way by providing them with a ready-made means of transportation, proved to be a really formidable obstacle to their farther westward progress. They had reached the end of the timbered country and the beginning of a treeless steppe,<sup>3</sup> and at this line their advance was checked.

During the half-century following the year A.D. 1821, in which Missouri was admitted to statehood, the American farmers and planters completed their occupation of the timbered country in the Mississippi Basin by bringing under cultivation Arkansas, Eastern Texas, Wisconsin, and Eastern Minnesota; and within the same period they also brought under cultivation the Great Eastern Bay of the treeless prairie, which penetrated the timbered country in a salient extending eastwards across Iowa and over the greater part of Illinois.<sup>4</sup> During the second half of the period they began to nibble at the fringe of the Great Plains themselves in Kansas; but the American pioneers on the Great Plains were not the farmers; they were the cattlemen who made their first drive northward from the south-western corner of Texas to the Missourian section of the borderline between woodland and prairie in A.D. 1866;<sup>5</sup> it was not till the eighteen-seventies that the American farmers began to conquer the Great Plains for the plough on the grand scale; the resistance of the Plains Indians was not completely overcome till A.D. 1876; and in that year Chief Sitting Bull's war-band of Sioux, hardly more than four months before their surrender on the 31st October, inflicted on the United States Army the most severe reverse that it ever suffered at Indian hands when, on the 25th June, they wiped out Custer's attacking force of 265 men.<sup>6</sup>

What is the explanation of these exceptional powers of resistance—displayed by the Great Plains and their pre-Columbian human occupants—to which the history of the United States as well as Mexico bears witness? The prime cause is to be found in the physical intractability of the *terrain* itself to cultivation by a sedentary society not yet equipped with the appropriate tools that were eventually to be forged by a Late

<sup>1</sup> See Paxson, F. L.: *History of the American Frontier, 1763-1893* (Boston 1924, Houghton Mifflin), chaps. 21-24. The quotations from this book have been made with the permission of the publishers.

<sup>2</sup> See Billington, R. A.: *Westward Expansion, A History of the American Frontier* (New York 1949, Macmillan), pp. 467 and 468.

<sup>3</sup> See the map in Webb, op. cit., between pp. 4 and 5.

<sup>4</sup> This salient of the North American prairie was a counterpart of the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe—extending, between the southern limit of the Russian forests and the north shore of the Black Sea, up to the eastern foothills of the Carpathians—which a southward-flowing tide of Russian peasant pioneers had been bringing under cultivation since A.D. 1774, simultaneously with the American farmers' and planters' westward advance up to the eastern edge of the timberless zone of North America.

<sup>5</sup> See further pp. 648-9, below.

<sup>6</sup> See Billington, R. A.: *Westward Expansion, A History of the American Frontier* (New York 1949, Macmillan), p. 666.



Modern Western Industrial Revolution; and a secondary cause is to be found in the mistakes committed by the pioneers of the Western Civilization in dealing with the Plains Indians after these pioneers had made their first contacts with them. West European Man in North America duly repeated the classical mistake, examined in the Part of this Study to which the present Annex attaches, which, on other frontiers between a civilization and barbarians, had eventually given the barbarians the victory; and it is not inconceivable that History might have followed the same course in North America as in the Old World if the southern edge of the Great Plains, where these impinged on Mexico, had not been forcibly taken over from Mexico by the United States in A.D. 1846-48<sup>1</sup> and if thereafter the conquest of the Great Plains for agriculture had not been made possible for the American farmer by the invention and mass-production of new-fangled tools for dealing with unprecedented agricultural problems.

In a pre-industrial age of Western history the settlement and cultivation of the Great Plains by Spanish *encomienderos* with their Mexican peons or by planters from the South-Eastern United States with their Negro slaves or by farmers from the North-Eastern United States with their own hands was precluded by the absence of timber and the dearth of water near the surface. The Spanish explorers who reconnoitred the Great Plains from both the south-west and the south-east in A.D. 1535-41, and at least two American explorers who reconnoitred them in the second decade of the nineteenth century, were unanimous in declaring that this country was an irreclaimable desert. Hugh M. Brackenridge, in his *Journal of a Voyage up the River Missouri*, published in A.D. 1816, wrote that, from a point six hundred miles above the debouchure of the Missouri into the Mississippi, the country

'becomes more dreary and desert till it reaches the Rocky Mountains, and can never have any other inhabitants than the few that may exist at certain stations along the river. . . . It combines within its frightful and extensive territory the Steppes of Tartary and the moving sands of the African deserts.'<sup>2</sup>

Thereafter Major Stephen H. Long, in his report on an expedition into the Plains that he had made in A.D. 1820, committed himself to the statement that,

'In regard to this extensive section of country, I do not hesitate in giving the opinion that it is almost wholly unfit for cultivation, and of course uninhabitable by a people depending on agriculture for their subsistence.'<sup>2</sup>

A twentieth-century American historian comments that 'Major Long not only failed to unlock the secrets of the Far West; he set up a psycho-

<sup>1</sup> In thus annexing from Mexico the southern extremity of the Great Plains, which had been under Mexican sovereignty *de jure* but not *de facto*, the United States was doing for Mexico the same unintended and unwelcome yet nonetheless valuable service that Russia did for Persia when she conquered and annexed Transcaspia and Transoxania between A.D. 1863 and A.D. 1886. While Russia thereby relieved Persia from raids by Türkmens and Uzbegs, the United States relieved Mexico from raids by Comanches and Apaches.

<sup>2</sup> Quoted by Paxson in *op. cit.*, p. 216.

logical barrier that kept others from disproving his falsehoods'.<sup>1</sup> 'The tradition of the Great American Desert was at its height in the decade between 1850 and 1860.'<sup>2</sup> 'Until after the Civil War the impression persisted that the farming frontier could never invade that inhospitable region.'<sup>3</sup> Yet, as a later passage in Billington's book testifies, Brackenridge's and Long's appreciation of the Great Plains was not incorrect in the technological circumstances of the time at which it was made. It was falsified only when the technique of the Industrial Revolution was brought to the baffled farmers' assistance.

'The Plains were opened to pioneers during the eighteen-seventies not by adventurous trailblazers but by inventors toiling over drafting boards, labourers sweating over whirring machines, and production managers struggling with the complexities of assembly-lines; for those were the men who applied the techniques of the Industrial Revolution to the unique problems of America's last frontier. Their success made expansion possible.'<sup>4</sup>

The inventions that eventually conquered the Great Plains for the plough were the railroad, barbed wire for fencing in a treeless landscape, machinery for drilling deep wells instead of digging shallow wells, windmills for raising water from these deep wells automatically instead of by human muscle-power, and ingenious and complicated new agricultural implements.<sup>5</sup>

'The Industrial Revolution freed American farmers from Time-shackles which had bound them since land was first tilled.'<sup>6</sup>

And the tale of this technological triumph is recapitulated in a comparison between two sets of figures.

'407,000,000 acres were occupied and 189,000,000 improved between A.D. 1607 and A.D. 1870; 430,000,000 acres peopled and 225,000,000 placed under cultivation between A.D. 1870 and A.D. 1900.'<sup>7</sup>

Meanwhile, between A.D. 1519 and the eighteen-sixties, the pioneers of the Western Civilization in North America who had reached the edge of the Great Plains had made, as has been noted already, a classical mistake which, in the Old World, had repeatedly enabled barbarians to turn the tables on their assailants; and the same mistake had been committed by the Spanish Government in Mexico and by the United States Government in turn. This mistake had been to allow themselves, when once they had given provocation to neighbouring primitive societies by starting an aggressive advance into their country, to be deterred, upon reaching the edge of an apparently forbidding tract of *terrain*,<sup>8</sup> from proceeding with their occupation, in the teeth of this local obstacle, until their advance had brought them to a natural frontier with no potential transfrontier barbarians beyond it. In the Old World such rashly unsustained and inconclusive advances into the domains of the

<sup>1</sup> Billington, *op. cit.*, pp. 452-3.

<sup>2</sup> Webb, *op. cit.*, p. 159. *Cp.* pp. 147 and 152-160.

<sup>3</sup> Billington, *op. cit.*, p. 413.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 688. *Cp.* Webb, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

<sup>5</sup> See Billington, *op. cit.*, chap. 34; Webb, *op. cit.*, chaps. 7 and 8.

<sup>6</sup> Billington, *op. cit.*, p. 695.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 703.

<sup>8</sup> See p. 36, n. 1, above.

primitive societies had been apt to cost a half-heartedly aggressive civilization dear. The more catastrophic of the two alternative possible consequences had been the prompt precipitation of an avalanche of barbarian counter-invasion;<sup>1</sup> the less immediately disastrous alternative had been the establishment of an artificial *limes* along the outer edge of the intractable *terrain*; but in the long run this alternative had been no less fatal than the other, since the fundamental 'law' of the *limes* had proved to be that the passage of Time tells in the barbarians' favour. This 'law' duly asserted itself in North America when Spain and the United States made successive attempts to establish a permanent artificial *limes* along the edge of the Great Plains.

The policy of drawing a would-be permanent artificial *limes* at the edge of the Great Plains was inaugurated by the Spaniards after a series of four discouraging reconnaissances from Mexico and Florida into the heart of North America<sup>2</sup> within the six years A.D. 1535-41.<sup>3</sup> One of the liabilities of the Mexic Civilization which its Spanish conquerors had taken over perforce was a chronic feud between the warlike hunting tribes on the Plains and the northernmost outposts of a pre-Columbian sedentary agricultural society.<sup>4</sup> In A.D. 1593, little more than half a century after the Spaniards' first encounters with the Plains Indians, they suffered their first serious reverse at their hands.<sup>5</sup> The policy of peaceful penetration and conversion through the activities of Roman Catholic Christian missionaries, feebly supported by military force, which proved successful in dealing both with the sedentary agricultural pueblos in New Mexico<sup>6</sup> and with the primitive food-gathering tribes in California, was of no avail with the Plains Indians. A mission planted on the San Saba River, in the Apache country, in A.D. 1757 was wiped out by the Apaches in A.D. 1758.<sup>7</sup>

The Spanish authorities' reaction to this disaster was to adopt, in A.D. 1772, a recommendation, made by the Marquess de Rubí after an official inspection of the frontier zone in A.D. 1766-7, that, in order to set limits to the raids of the Plains Indians into New Spain, a *limes*, in the form of a chain of fifteen forts, should be drawn from coast to coast along a line which—everywhere except in its easternmost sector, where it was drawn through San Antonio, Texas, to Bahia del Espiritu Santo on the shore of the Gulf of Mexico—ran to the south-west of the Rio Grande, well within the future frontier between Mexico and the United States that was to be established by the peace settlement of A.D. 1848 and the Gadsden Purchase of A.D. 1853.<sup>8</sup> When this Augustan policy

<sup>1</sup> See p. 12, above. Instances of this historical phenomenon have been noted in V. v. 209, n. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Brief accounts of the expeditions of Cabeza de Vaca, Marcos de Niza, Coronado, and de Soto will be found in Webb, *op. cit.*, pp. 95-114.

<sup>3</sup> These four Spanish incursions overland, like the five Norse incursions from Greenland into the north-eastern fringes of Continental North America (see II. ii. 292-3), were all made on the morrow of the original settlement and were never thereafter followed up. The Norse incursions were all made within forty years of the Norse colonization of Greenland in A.D. 985-6, the Spanish incursions all within twenty-two years of Cortés' landing in Mexico in A.D. 1519.

<sup>4</sup> See Webb, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

<sup>5</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 124.

<sup>6</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 129-31, with the map on p. 119.

<sup>7</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 121.

<sup>8</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 127-9.

likewise proved a failure, the Spanish authorities in A.D. 1777-8 planned, but never carried out, an assault upon the Apaches, with the assistance of the Comanches, on the lines of Marcus Aurelius's attempt—abandoned after his death by Commodus—to subjugate, and incorporate into the Roman Empire, the domains of the Quadi and Marcomanni beyond the Augustan *limes* along the middle course of the Danube.<sup>1</sup>

'One would judge that, with experience, the task of conquest and occupation would grow lighter; but, on the contrary, it became heavier, and eventually impossible. . . .<sup>2</sup>

'As late as A.D. 1842, George W. Kendall, a member of the Santa Fé expedition, records that, as far south as Durango, the miserable inhabitants remained within their walled towns out of fear of the raiding Apaches. At the end of the Spanish régime the Plains Indians were more powerful, far richer, and in control of more territory than they were at the beginning of it. The problem of subduing them had to be solved by another race.<sup>3</sup>

Indeed, in the light of the usual denouement in the histories of anti-barbarian *limes*, it does not seem fanciful to imagine that, if the United States had not forcibly taken the problem out of Mexican hands in A.D. 1846-8, the year A.D. 1952 might have seen Mexico being ruled by the descendants of Apache and Comanche barbarian *conquistadores*, since it is hard to discern any indigenous social force within Mexico itself which would have been powerful enough to keep these now formidable transfrontier barbarians at bay after the fall, in A.D. 1820, of a Spanish Viceroyalty of New Spain that had provided the Mexic World with its universal state.

How was it that, in the course of the three centuries of Spanish rule over the Mexic World, the Plains Indians had become a serious danger to the sedentary society whose domain adjoined the southern edge of theirs, instead of remaining the mere nuisance to the north-westernmost Mexic agricultural pueblos that they had been before the Spaniards' advent? The answer to this question is that these barbarians in this one section of North America had rendered themselves formidable by the means by which so many of their counterparts in the Old World had made their fortunes. They had adopted one of the weapons introduced by their assailants and had adapted this weapon to their own *terrain* with a local efficiency which the wardens of the intrusive civilization's *limes* had proved unable to emulate. The Spanish authorities' task on the frontier of the Mexic World over against the Great Plains had become 'eventually impossible owing to the fact that the Indians learned to use horses';<sup>4</sup> and, in the chapter of the present Study to which this Annex attaches,<sup>5</sup> we have observed<sup>6</sup> that this was a repetition, in North America, of the Arab barbarian Nomads' adoption of the same animate weapon, on the eve of the Primitive Muslim Arab conquests, from the civilizations occupying the adjoining 'Fertile Crescent'; of the Berber barbarian Nomads' previous adoption of the camel from Arabia via Egypt; and of the Arya barbarian Nomads' earlier adoption of the chariot from

<sup>1</sup> See V. v. 593.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 138.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 15-19, above.

<sup>4</sup> Webb, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 98.

<sup>6</sup> On pp. 17-18, above.

the Sumeric World on the eve of their descent upon the Indus Basin and South-West Asia in the eighteenth or seventeenth century B.C.

In order to appreciate the revolutionary increase in the Plains Indians' power which was the consequence of their acquisition of the horse from Spanish trespassers on the southern fringe of their domain, it must be borne in mind that the Great Plains were a North American equivalent of the Great Eurasian Steppe. The North American prairie extended north-north-westwards, in the same general direction as the Rocky Mountains which bounded it on the west, from the north coast of the Gulf of Mexico, between the east bank of the Lower Rio Grande and the western limit of the timbered eastern half of Texas, right into the southern sections of what were eventually to be the two Canadian provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan; and this huge expanse of open grass-land shared with the Eurasian and Afrasian steppes the property of having a higher social 'conductivity' than any other physical medium of human intercourse except the Sea. Before the introduction of the horse, this conductivity of the prairie had made it possible for eleven Nomad hunting tribes<sup>1</sup> to make their living there, but at the same time the poverty of their pre-equine equipment had set narrow limits to their exploitation of the prairie's latent resources for human purposes.

The Plains Indians might never have been able to make themselves at home on the Plains at all if, in a pre-Columbian Age, the conductivity of the Plains had not propagated two implements all over the Plains when once the diffusion of these implements had carried them to the Plains' north-western edge. One of these instruments was a domesticated animal: the sled-dog,<sup>2</sup> presumably borrowed originally from the Esquimaux, which had provided the Plains Indians with a means of transportation. The other implement was the composite bow:<sup>3</sup> a potent weapon which had presumably come to the North American Plains from as far afield as the Great Eurasian Steppe, where it had been one of the characteristic weapons of the Eurasian Nomad herdsmen. The possession of these two implements had enabled the eleven tribes to make a living on the Great Plains by hunting the two great herds of buffalo with which they shared this habitat; but, while the composite bow was an effective weapon for warfare as well as for hunting, the dog-sled, transferred to a grass-surface from an ice-surface, was an inadequate means of transportation. In the horse, which spread over the Plains from the south-east as the sled-dog and the composite bow had spread over them from the north-west,<sup>4</sup> the Plains Indians suddenly acquired a means of transportation that was ideal for their habitat, and, in the act, they as suddenly became for the first time fully masters of the prairie for the twin purposes of hunting the buffalo and making war on their fellow men.

'The student of social origins and institutions would like to put his finger on the exact spot where the Spanish explorer's horses (mares and stallions, for gelding was not then practised) broke their tethers and rushed away into the wild country. Perhaps the horses were stamped by Indians

<sup>1</sup> See the maps in Webb, *op. cit.*, pp. 50 and 51.

<sup>2</sup> See Webb, *op. cit.*, pp. 52 and 57.

<sup>3</sup> See Billington, *op. cit.*, p. 410.

<sup>4</sup> See Webb, *op. cit.*, p. 57.



or by herds of buffalo; but it is more than likely that some were set free because they became too poor or footsore or crippled to be of further use to their masters. It is not remarkable that horses escaped; but it is remarkable that they survived, multiplied, and spread over the region west of the Mississippi and Missouri rivers. Not only did they spread as beasts of burden for the Plains Indians, but they grew wild in vast herds, proving that they had found a natural home. It is generally accepted by anthropologists that these herds originated from the horses lost or abandoned by de Soto about A.D. 1541. Whether they came from de Soto's horses or from those of Coronado or from other explorers is not material; we know that the Kiowa and Missouri Indians were mounted by A.D. 1682; [the Kiowa-Apache, by A.D. 1684;]<sup>1</sup> the Pawnee, by A.D. 1700; the Comanche by A.D. 1714; the Plains Cree and Arikara by A.D. 1738; the Assiniboin, Crow, Mandan, Snake, and Teton, by A.D. 1742; and the most northern tribe, the Sarsi, by A.D. 1784.<sup>2</sup>

'It was indeed a momentous event when a Plains Indian, half afraid and uncertain, threw his leg for the first time across the back of a Spanish horse and found himself borne along over the grassy plain with an ease and speed he had never dreamed possible of attaining. . . . From that time, slowly and by degrees, he worked out his technique. . . . His world was enlarged and beautified, and his courage, never lacking, expanded with his horizon and his power. God save his enemies!'<sup>3</sup>

The Plains Indians' Mexican enemies were saved by falling into the hands of the Americans instead of the Apaches. In the sweeping annexations, made by the United States in A.D. 1848, of vast tracts of juridically Mexican territory in which Mexican sovereignty had been effective only at a few widely scattered points, the victorious aggressor Power was inadvertently taking over responsibility for an anti-barbarian frontier, along the southern edge of the Great Plains, which the Republic of Mexico's predecessor, the Spanish Viceroyalty of New Spain, had inherited, some three hundred years and more before that date, from the Aztec builders of a Mexic universal state whose work the Spaniards had completed. Meanwhile, on the eastern edge of the Great Plains, adjoining the wooded eastern section of North America that had been effectively occupied by American planters and farmers, the United States had already committed itself to the very policy of establishing a permanent *limes*, over against the Plains Indians, which by this time had been discredited on the southern edge of the Plains by the failure of a corresponding Spanish experiment there;<sup>4</sup> and, while this American repetition of a Spanish mistake was in train, Jefferson Davis capped de Soto's or Coronado's feat of presenting the Plains Indians with the horse that had once made the fortune of the Arabs by doing his best to endow them with the further gift of the camel, which had once made the fortune of the Berbers.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 117.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 56-57.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 115-16.

<sup>4</sup> Accounts of the United States Government's attempt to establish a permanent *limes* along the eastern edge of the Great Plains between A.D. 1823 and A.D. 1840, and of the breakdown of this policy between A.D. 1851 and A.D. 1861, will be found in Paxson, *op. cit.*, chaps. 31 and 46; in Billington, *op. cit.*, pp. 468-73 and 653-4; and in Macleod, *W. C.: The American Indian Frontier* (London 1928, Kegan Paul), chaps. 30 and 31.

<sup>5</sup> A brief account of this entertaining incident will be found in Webb, *op. cit.*, pp. 199-200.

Under the influence of the picture of the Plains as an inhospitable desert which had been given currency, in the course of the first two decades of the nineteenth century, in a series of reports by American explorers, culminating in Major Long's report on his expedition in A.D. 1820,<sup>1</sup> a proposal had been made in A.D. 1823 by John C. Calhoun, at that time Secretary of War at Washington, for permanently segregating, within the political domain of the United States, an area that was still to be left open for settlement by American farmers from an area that was henceforth to be reserved for occupation by the Indian peoples. The dividing line was to be drawn approximately at the ninety-fifth meridian, which coincided more or less with the borderline between the eastern woodlands and the western prairie. Indian peoples living east of this line—including 'the five civilised nations' in the South-Eastern United States—were to be induced or compelled to move to the west of the line in consideration of their being guaranteed the permanent possession of new lands there, while the Plains Indians were to be induced to make room for these Indian newcomers from the East in consideration of their being guaranteed the permanent occupation of the rest of their hunting-grounds west of the line. The security of title with which the Indians of both provenances were thus to be invested was to be the first step towards reclaiming them for Civilization.

'The great object to be accomplished,' wrote President Monroe in recommending Calhoun's proposal to Congress on the 27th January, 1825, 'is the removal of these tribes to the territory designated . . . conveying to each tribe a good title to an adequate portion of land . . . by providing . . . a system of internal government . . . and, by the regular progress of improvement and civilisation, prevent . . . degeneracy.'<sup>2</sup>

This proposal was duly carried out in the course of the next fifteen years.

'The approval of Congress was given. A group of treaties made with the western Indians in A.D. 1825 gave a sort of pledge that was followed up by specific laws of 1828 and 1830, in which the policy of [Indian] colonisation was described as an accepted thing. In A.D. 1832 Congress recognised its responsibility to the [Indian] emigrants and created a Bureau of Indian Affairs in the War Department, under a Commissioner whose duty was to care for the Indian wards. Two years later, the great charter of the frontier Indians was enacted in the Indian Intercourse Act, which forbade any White person, without licence from the Indian Commissioner, to set foot in the Indian Country. . . . Schools were promised, to teach the Indians letters and trades. In some cases blacksmiths and other artisans were to be maintained by the United States. There was a serious attempt to carry out the suggestion that, once the tribes had been shifted to their final place of residence, they must be lifted to a higher scale of civilization by the Government of the United States. . . . By the end of A.D. 1840 most of the tribes had been removed to the frontier, the Indian Country was solid, and the administrative details of the arrangement were complete. The American citizen, by his own enactment, no longer possessed a right to advance his settlements towards the West.'<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 634-5, above.

<sup>2</sup> Paxson, *op. cit.*, pp. 277-8 and 284.

<sup>3</sup> Quoted in Paxson, *op. cit.*, p. 277.

The military implications of this would-be permanent political settlement were clearly recognized. A chain of forts had been built along the western border of the area already settled by American farmers as early as A.D. 1816-27.<sup>1</sup>

'The Secretary of War in A.D. 1837 recommended "a chain of permanent fortresses . . . and a competent organisation of the militia of the frontier states" as the best means of maintaining the peace. . . . The commander of the army in the West, General E. P. Gaines, recommended in A.D. 1838 that the cordon of military posts along the Border be built of stone, to outlast the century at least. . . . [Actually,] while the Indian frontier lasted, the defence of the frontier settlements was entrusted to moving bodies of United States troops, to a regiment of mounted dragoons that were enlisted early in the 'thirties, and to the militia.'<sup>2</sup>

This policy of freezing the western frontier of American agricultural settlement along the borderline between the woodlands and the prairie was maintained for more than thirty years. The first inroad upon it was made in A.D. 1851, when the Sioux and other Plains Indians were cajoled by the United States authorities into consenting, in negotiations conducted that summer at Fort Laramie, to a limitation of their ranges within the area that had previously been guaranteed to them as their permanent domain;<sup>3</sup> and 'in the summer of A.D. 1854 the first land office in the Indian Country was opened across the Border from Missouri, to retail to settlers the tribal lands that had been dedicated to perpetual Indian use'.<sup>4</sup> Yet, 'as late as A.D. 1853, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs' had 'reported that there was no serious encroachment of squatters upon the lands of his wards west of Iowa and Missouri';<sup>5</sup> and the policy that had been inaugurated by the United States Secretary of War, J. C. Calhoun, in A.D. 1823 was still being pursued by one of his successors, Jefferson Davis, in A.D. 1853-7.<sup>6</sup>

The first premiss on which Davis founded his policy for the frontier was the assumption, traditional in the United States since the eighteenth century, that the Great Plains were irreclaimable. He referred to them as 'that unpopulated desert . . . which, I believe, is, the most of it, to be unpopulated for ever'.<sup>7</sup> From this first premiss it followed that there could be no question of abandoning President Monroe's policy of maintaining a permanent military frontier between the American planters' and farmers' country in the woodlands to the east of the hundredth meridian and the Indian hunting-tribes' country on the prairie to the west of the same line. The technical military innovations which Davis advocated were all concerned merely with the location of the *lines* and the disposition, type, and equipment of the troops by whom it was to be held. He proposed to replace the existing chain of numerous small and scattered American military posts, thrown out into the fringe of a prairie on which the frontier of American agricultural settlement had not caught up with them, by a small number of strong garrisons that were to be located much farther to the rear, within the already settled and

<sup>1</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 213-14.

<sup>2</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 424-6.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 424.

<sup>4</sup> Quoted in Webb, *op. cit.*, p. 198.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 284-5.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 426.

<sup>7</sup> See Webb, *op. cit.*, pp. 194-6.

cultivated area. The forward zone, from which the existing posts were to be withdrawn, was to be dominated intermittently by sending out strong patrolling expeditions into it during the season when there would be grass there to provide fodder for cavalry horses and baggage animals.

In recording Davis' proposals, Webb points out<sup>1</sup> 'that Davis was advocating a policy very similar to that proposed by Rubi in his report advocating a reorganisation of the Spanish policy on the southern border of the Great Plains'. A student of the frontier policy of the Roman Empire will discern in Davis' proposal the familiar transition from an Augustan policy of holding a single continuous brittle forward line to a Diocletianic policy of defence in depth through a war of movement, with provision for more adequate reserves than the Augustan system had allowed.<sup>2</sup> The inference is that, by a date at which the United States' *limes* along the eastern edge of the Great Plains had been in existence for some thirty years, the defence, here too, was beginning to be subjected to a strain through the operation of the 'law' that, on a stationary military frontier between a civilization and barbarians, Time tells in the barbarians' favour; and the increases in both the cost and the difficulty of maintaining the American *limes* were, in fact, the grounds explicitly put forward by Davis himself for the technical changes that he was suggesting. He had found that the existing 'garrisons were small and weak, and the soldiers poorly paid and dispirited'.<sup>3</sup> The inability of troops dispersed among numerous small forward posts 'to pursue and punish' offending Indian war-bands, which had been committing depredations almost under their noses, had 'tended to bring into disrepute the power and energy of the United States'.<sup>4</sup>

The truth was that, by the eighteen-fifties, the Plains Indians had made themselves into fighting men whose efficiency was formidable not merely for a Republic of Mexico, but even for a Power of the contemporary calibre of the United States; for, in mounting the Spaniard's horse, the Plains Indian had not left the Scythian's composite bow lying idle on the ground. He had converted himself not merely into an expert horseman but into an expert horse-archer in the Parthian style; and the horse-archer who had thus been reborn in the New World was more than a match for the dragoon from the West European extremity of the Old World whose weapon—a pair of horse-pistols—had given the most recent demonstration of its inefficiency at Waterloo. When, in the eighteen-twenties, the American pioneers in Eastern Texas came within close enough range of the western plains to provoke Comanche raids upon them,

'in most respects the Indian had the best of it. In the first place the Texan carried at most three shots; the Comanche carried twoscore or more arrows. It took the Texan a minute to reload his weapon; the Indian could in that time ride three hundred yards and discharge twenty arrows. The Texan had to dismount in order to use his rifle effectively at all, and it was his most reliable weapon; the Indian remained mounted throughout the combat.'<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Webb, *op. cit.*, p. 196, n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 26–28, above.

<sup>3</sup> Webb, *op. cit.*, p. 194.

<sup>4</sup> Jefferson Davis, quoted *ibid.*, p. 195.

<sup>5</sup> Webb, *op. cit.*, p. 169. Cp. Billington, *op. cit.*, pp. 410 and 652.

An officer of the United States Army, in a book published as late as A.D. 1866,<sup>1</sup> still found it necessary to explain to his readers that 'the modern schools of military science are but illy suited to carrying on a warfare with the wild tribes of the Plains' and that the horse-Indians' 'tactics are such as to render the old system almost wholly impotent'.

It is true that the Industrial Revolution, which was eventually to provide the American farmer with the appropriate tools for bringing the prairie under the plough, first came to the American soldier's rescue by providing him with an appropriate weapon for fighting the prairie Indian horse-archer. The six-shooter revolver invented by Samuel Colt of Boston was in use among the Texan Rangers before A.D. 1840.<sup>2</sup>

'The six-shooter . . . stands as the first mechanical adaptation made by the American people when they emerged from the timber and met a set of new needs in the open country of the Great Plains. It enabled the White Man to fight the Plains Indian on horseback.'<sup>3</sup>

Yet the equipment of American cavalrymen with the revolver was not the end of the armaments race between the Plains Indian and the West European invaders of North America which had begun when the Indian had acquired the Spanish cavalryman's horse; for the transfer of the military ascendancy from the Indian to the American horseman, which was the first effect of the advent of the revolver, was only temporary.

'The revolver . . . multiplied every soldier by six and produced such an inspiring moral effect on the troops, and so entirely depressing an effect on the Indians, that the fights became simply chases—the soldiers attacking, with perfect surety of success, ten or twenty times their numbers. [But] after some years the Indians began to obtain and use revolvers, and the fighting became more equal. It remained, however, for the breech-loading rifle and metallic cartridges to transform the Plains Indian from an insignificant, scarcely dangerous, adversary into as magnificent a soldier as the World can show. Already a perfect horseman, and accustomed all his life to the use of arms on horseback, all [that] he needed was an accurate weapon which could be easily and rapidly loaded while at full speed.'<sup>4</sup>

This passage, recording the personal experience of an American officer who had himself seen active service on the Indian frontier in the last chapter of this frontier's history, brings out the point that, down to the eve of the date at which the Plains Indians were crushed and corralled once for all by their American adversaries, their military efficiency and prowess continued to increase in a geometrical progression through their practice of the transfrontier barbarians' master-art of borrowing the enemy civilization's weapons and then turning them to better account by adapting their use to the nature of a local *terrain* on which the barbarian is at home while the pioneer of the intrusive civilization is out of his element there. The book from which this passage has been quoted was published in A.D. 1882, some six years after the campaigning season

<sup>1</sup> Marcy, R. B.: *Thirty Years of Army Life on the Border* (New York 1866, Harper), pp. 67 ff., quoted in Webb, op. cit., p. 196, n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> See Webb, op. cit., p. 173.

<sup>3</sup> Webb, op. cit., p. 179.

<sup>4</sup> Dodge, Colonel R. I.: *Our Wild Indians* (Hartford, Conn. 1882, Worthington), pp. 450-1, quoted in Webb, op. cit., p. 175, n. 2.



of A.D. 1876, which had been signalized, in the annals of the warfare between the United States and the Sioux, both by the final débâcle of this barbarian war-band and by its previous infliction on the United States Army of the most grievous reverse ever suffered by United States troops at Indian hands.<sup>1</sup> The explanation of Sitting Bull's swan-song victory over Custer is made clear by Colonel Dodge:<sup>2</sup>

'That he [the American soldier] can still contend with the Indian on anything like equal terms is his highest commendation; for the Indian is his superior in every soldierlike quality except subordination to discipline and indomitable courage.'

If this verdict on the comparative military qualities of the United States Army and the Plains Indians in the eighteen-seventies is as just an appreciation as it would have been, supposing that it had been pronounced, apropos of the Roman Army and the Goths, by Ammianus Marcellinus, it does indeed go far towards explaining how it came to pass that in A.D. 1876 the United States Army suffered, in miniature, a disaster as deadly as the Roman catastrophe at Adrianople in A.D. 378; but we have then still to find the explanation of the extreme difference between the respective sequels to two episodes of military history that appear to run parallel up to this point. The victory of the Goths at Adrianople on the 9th August, 378, was the prelude to a sweeping barbarian conquest of half the Roman Empire, whereas the victory of the Sioux on the Little Big Horn on the 25th June, 1876, was the prelude to a decisive collapse of the barbarian victors.<sup>3</sup> The explanation of this diversity in the outcome is not to be found simply in an industrialized Western Society's fertility in spawning ever more lethal new-fangled mechanical weapons, considering that each new weapon of the kind was successively acquired, and turned to still better account on barbarian *terrain*, by the Western Civilization's Indian opponents on the North American Great Plains. The ultimate reason why the transfrontier barbarian who had triumphed over the Roman Empire in the Old World and had worsted the Spanish Empire and its Mexican successor-state in North America was eventually overwhelmed in North America by the United States was not because of the superiority of the American people in mechanical equipment but because of their numbers and, perhaps even more, their enterprise.

Before the last round in the warfare between the Americans and the Plains Indians was fought out to a decisive conclusion in the Americans' favour in the course of the years A.D. 1861-76, the Plains Indians had been outmanœuvred in advance through being encircled by their American assailants, as the Eurasian Nomad herdsmen who were crushed by the Russians and the Manchus in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of the Christian Era had previously been encircled by these two sedentary Powers when the Russian and Manchu outposts had collided with one another in the seventeenth century in the Amur

<sup>1</sup> See Billington, *op. cit.*, p. 666.

<sup>2</sup> Quoted in Webb, *op. cit.*, p. 175, n. 2.

<sup>3</sup> The details of the last convulsions of Indian resistance on the Plains between A.D. 1876 and A.D. 1890 will be found in Billington, *op. cit.*, pp. 666-7. The accompanying religious phenomena have been noticed in the present study in V. v. 329-32.

Basin.<sup>1</sup> And, like the seventeenth-century Russo-Manchu feat of encircling the Eurasian Nomads, the nineteenth-century American feat of encircling the North American Plains Indians was achieved with no better weapons than de Soto's or Coronado's, and with no better means of transportation than Alexander's, Caesar's, or Napoleon's.

Like the contemporary South African pioneers who were trekking northward across the Orange River into the heart of Africa, the American pioneers who traversed the Great Plains of North America in the course of the years A.D. 1821-49 were armed only with non-repeating fire-arms, and were equipped, at the best, with 'covered wagons' of the kind in which the Goths had made their transit from the Baltic to the Black Sea coast of the Eurasian Continent in the early centuries of the Christian Era, and the Philistines' theirs from the Aegean coast of Anatolia to the eastern approaches to Egypt in the early years of the twelfth century B.C. Indeed, the nineteenth-century American pioneers reckoned it a triumph when they succeeded in finding a way for the passage of these immemorially old 'houses on wheels' which not only made the journey physically practicable for children, women, sick persons, and household goods, as well as for able-bodied men, but also made it possible to protect the caravans against attack by Indians behind the rampart of a wagon-lager.<sup>2</sup> In some of the earliest of their treks across the Plains into the Far West, the American pioneers failed to manœuvre their wagons through the mountains and were compelled to finish the journey with pack-horses. In the summer of A.D. 1856 a party of five hundred men, women, and children actually made their way over the twelve hundred miles of trail from Iowa City to Salt Lake City pushing a hundred two-wheeled hand-carts!<sup>3</sup>

The trans-Plains pioneers were no doubt eventually assisted in arriving at their jumping-off places at the western edge of the eastern timbered country by the gradual development of mechanical transportation, in the shape of river-steamships and railroads, in their rear. Yet the first sod was not turned for the construction of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad till A.D. 1828,<sup>4</sup> seven years after the first wagon caravans had made their way across the Plains from Missouri to Santa Fé; the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad did not reach the Ohio River till A.D. 1852; and 'it was five years more before there was a continuation west of the Ohio to Cincinnati and St. Louis'.<sup>5</sup> Thus the trans-Plains West had already been won by the pioneers before railhead had reached their jumping-off places on the western border of the State of Missouri at the eastern edge of the prairie. Work on a transcontinental railroad was not started till A.D. 1863—when, significantly, the first start was made at the Far Western end, from west to east, and not from east to west at the westernmost railhead in the Mississippi Basin—and the through-track from coast to coast was not completed till May 1869, in the year following the campaigning season in which the United States Army had broken the back of the Plains Indians' resistance.

<sup>1</sup> See III. iii. 19.

<sup>2</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 542-3.

<sup>3</sup> See Paxson, *op. cit.*, p. 404.

<sup>4</sup> See Billington, *op. cit.*, pp. 463-4 and 525.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 405.

What was it that moved the American people, without waiting for the weapons and tools that the Industrial Revolution was forging for them, thus to encircle the Plains Indians by breaking out of the United States Government's artificial *limes* along the western verge of the timbered country and pushing across the prairie and over the mountains to a natural frontier at the Pacific coast? For half a century and more, running from about A.D. 1820, the American people believed, as unquestioningly as the United States Government, that the Great Plains were permanently irreclaimable for agriculture. What prompted the people to reply to the challenge of this apparent barrier across their path by making a response that, unlike their Government's response, was positive, not negative? While the Government was trying to establish a permanent military frontier along the eastern edge of the Plains, pioneer American traders, farmers, and miners were pushing their adventurous way right across the Plains in the hope of finding—not on them, but beyond them—a fresh land of promise which would equal, and perhaps surpass, the timbered eastern section of the United States which by this time they had already colonized.

This daring leap of the American pioneers across the prairie in the nineteenth century of the Christian Era is reminiscent of the leap across the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe that was made in the tenth century by missionaries from the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin who converted Great Bulgaria to Islam and by rival missionaries from Constantinople who converted Russia to Eastern Orthodox Christianity. But the driving force that gave an irresistible impetus to the American pioneers' trek across two-thirds of the breadth of the great North American island from the western edge of the eastern timbered country all the way to the Pacific coast was not that concern for the salvation of souls which had previously carried the Jesuit missionaries to California from Mexico; it was the mounting pressure of an American population, east of the *limes*, that was now being reinforced by the rapidly increasing population of a nineteenth-century Western Europe.

"The whole population of the United States rose from 9,638,453 in A.D. 1820 to 17,069,453 in A.D. 1840. Of this increase of almost seven and a half millions, more than four millions were to be found in the states and territories west of the Appalachian Mountains. The total western population was about 6,300,000, . . . and this total was nearly 200 per cent more than it had been in A.D. 1820. The whole United States increased about 80 per cent in twenty years. The eastern states, even with the help of their frontier elements, increased only some sixty per cent in the same period."<sup>1</sup>

The pressure of this potent head of population mounting up against the inner face of the United States Government's *limes* was the force that catapulted the pioneers—by sheer muscle-power without mechanical aids—right across the Plains to the western mountains, and, over these, to the Pacific, between the years A.D. 1821 and 1849.

This abundance of man-power, working together with a contemporary release of the United States from political and military entanglements

<sup>1</sup> Paxson, *op. cit.*, pp. 286-7.

overseas, perhaps suffices to explain the contrast between the Americans' triumphant nineteenth-century response to the challenge of the Great Plains and the Spaniards' previous dismal failure. Even after the Spaniards had established themselves in Texas, on the opposite fringe of the Great Plains to New Mexico, in A.D. 1716-18,<sup>1</sup>

'if a Spaniard wanted to go from San Antonio [in Texas] to Santa Fé [in New Mexico], he did not make a direct journey across the Great Plains: he took the Camino Real, went south to Durango, then turned west and north and skirted the mountains until he came to Santa Fé. He went hundreds of miles out of the direct way, thus avoiding the open Plains country.'<sup>2</sup>

In the event, a trail across the Great Plains to Santa Fé in New Mexico from the timbered eastern section of North America was opened up, not from Texas, but from Missouri.

The news that Mexico had thrown off Spanish sovereignty in A.D. 1820 was promptly followed up by the arrival at Santa Fé, in A.D. 1821, of no fewer than three rival American caravans, racing one another to be the first in the New Mexican market;<sup>3</sup> and the arrival of a single great organized American caravan from Independence, Missouri, was an annual event at Santa Fé during the years A.D. 1830-44.<sup>4</sup> The American occupation of Oregon, which had been begun by seamen sailing round Cape Horn, was confirmed by a north-westward overland trek across the Great Plains which was first achieved in A.D. 1832<sup>5</sup> and which was consummated in A.D. 1843, when for the first time wagons went all the way.<sup>6</sup> The first overland trek from Kansas to California was made in A.D. 1841,<sup>7</sup> and in A.D. 1844 wagons went all the way on this trail likewise.<sup>8</sup> The Mormons made their trek from Iowa to Utah, right across the middle zone of the Plains, in A.D. 1847, and in A.D. 1849 the 'Gold Rush' to California was made overland across the Plains, as well as by the more circuitous maritime route round Cape Horn. The first coach travelled from Tipton, Missouri, to San Francisco on the 15th September-10th October, 1858.<sup>9</sup>

These divers transits of the Great Plains from the Eastern United States to the Rocky Mountains, and beyond these to the Pacific Coast, between A.D. 1821 and A.D. 1859,<sup>10</sup> all occurred during a period when, as we have observed, it was the United States Government's official policy to maintain, *more Hispanico*, a permanent *límite* along the borderline, east of Meridian 98°, between the woodland and the prairie; and there was an inconsistency between policy and practice that was fraught with eventual trouble; for these widely ramifying and rapidly multiplying American trespasses on the hunting grounds of the Plains Indians were provocative, and 'the discovery of gold in the Pike's Peak country touched off the inevitable conflict. A hundred thousand miners crossed the Plains in

<sup>1</sup> See Billington, *op. cit.*, p. 435.

<sup>2</sup> Webb, *op. cit.*, p. 86. See the maps in Paxson, *op. cit.*, p. 307, and in Billington, *op. cit.*, p. 430.

<sup>3</sup> See Billington, *op. cit.*, p. 462.

<sup>4</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 513-14.

<sup>5</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 563-4.

<sup>6</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 635-6.

<sup>4</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 463.

<sup>6</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 524-6.

<sup>8</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 564.

<sup>10</sup> See the map in Webb, *op. cit.*, on p. 148.

1859, elbowed their way into Cheyenne and Arapaho lands, and drove the Indians from their homes. Resentment bred of those outrages was infectious,<sup>1</sup> and the sequel was the series of wars between the Plains Indians and the United States Army which went on from A.D. 1861 to A.D. 1876. These wars ended, as we have seen, in the Indians being defeated on the battlefield and being corralled in reservations; in other words, they ended in the abandonment, after a forty years' trial, of the policy of maintaining a *limes* at the eastern edge of the Great Plains. But the denouement which thus liquidated the United States' *limes* along the eastern edge of the prairie was, of course, the opposite of the classical denouement along artificial *limites* between civilizations and barbarians. The catastrophe that eventually turned the *limes* here into a superfluous anachronism was not the collapse of the Power that had established it; it was the crushing of the transfrontier barbarians against whom it had been designed as a defence for the society that had been domiciled on the inner side of it.

The United States' Army's victory over the Plains Indians in the warfare of A.D. 1861-76 was conclusive because, by this time, the Army's military striking power was being reinforced by the impetus of an expanding population that was now pressing in upon the Great Plains from the Far West as well as from the East. The military decision was clinched on the economic plane by the extermination, between A.D. 1867 and A.D. 1883, of the game on which the Plains Indians had lived as parasites. The discovery in A.D. 1871 of a profitable commercial use for buffalo hides led to an annual slaughter, at the rate of three million victims a year, over the years 1872-4; the Great Southern Herd was extinct by A.D. 1878, the Great Northern Herd by A.D. 1883; and by A.D. 1903 no more than thirty-four living specimens were to be found of a species which had probably been represented on the Plains by about thirteen million head before the advent of the rifle.<sup>2</sup> This destruction of the non-human, as well as the human, fauna that had tenanted the Great Plains hitherto left the American people in command of the solitude that they had made; but the eviction of the previous pre-Columbian tenants had not settled the question how the new occupants of Transatlantic provenance would utilize their tardily acquired prairie estate.

The American farmer was not to bring the Great Plains under the plough till he had followed up the United States' Army's conclusive victory over the Plains Indian Nomad hunting tribes by fighting, on the morrow of the overt Civil War of A.D. 1861-5, an undeclared civil war in which the opposing parties were neither the North versus the South nor the farmer versus the planter but the sedentary tiller of the ground versus the Nomad keeper of livestock.<sup>3</sup> After farmer Cain had rid himself of hunter Nimrod,<sup>4</sup> he had still to settle accounts with herdsman Abel; and in North America, as in the Old World, the struggle for life between Cain and Abel was as savage as the stakes were high. Even before the Plains Indian and the buffalo had disappeared from the scene, the contest for possession of the Great Plains of North America

<sup>1</sup> Billington, *op. cit.*, p. 654.

<sup>2</sup> Gen. iv. 2.

<sup>3</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 667-8.

<sup>4</sup> Gen. x. 9.



was already being fought out between an American farmer with the traditions of some six to ten thousand years of husbandry behind him and an American avatar of the Eurasian Nomad herdsman who, in A.D. 1866, sprang fully armed from the dragon's-tooth seed which the Civil War of A.D. 1861-5 had sown in the pastures of the Nueces Valley at the southernmost extremity of the Great Plains on the Gulf Coast of Western Texas.

This economic and social conflict between an American Cain, branded with the mark of his Transatlantic provenance, and an American Abel, who had made a dramatic second epiphany in a New World, lasted four times as long as the military Civil War to which it was an epilogue; for, though the American farmer, with the aid of the American industrialist, succeeded in making an effective lodgement on the Great Plains in the course of the eighteen-seventies, the American cowboy had anticipated him by spreading all over the Plains between A.D. 1866 and A.D. 1880,<sup>1</sup> and it was not till after the speculative boom of A.D. 1880-5 in the cattle industry had precipitated the crash of A.D. 1885-7,<sup>2</sup> and till after the shepherd had made a half-hearted attempt to elbow his way in,<sup>3</sup> that the farmer found himself relieved of his competitor the herdsman thanks to Abel's follies and misfortunes rather than to Cain's own prowess. Even then, when the farmer's successive human rivals in the fight for possession of the Great Plains of North America had all passed away, Cain's acquisition of the disputed territory was by no means assured; for the Indian hunter, Texan cowboy, and Far Western shepherd had none of them been such formidable adversaries as Physical Nature was to show herself to be; and in A.D. 1952 it still remained to be seen whether the Great Plains would prove permanently amenable to Cain's high-handed attempt, with the aid of his offspring Tubal-Cain the artificer,<sup>4</sup> to annex these dry grasslands to Ceres' empire.

Whatever the ultimate destiny of Agriculture on the Great Plains might be, there was no indication in the sixth decade of the twentieth century of the Christian Era that Cain's discomfited pastoral rival was likely to try conclusions with him here again. In the economic and social history of the United States the rise and fall of 'the Cattle Kingdom' had been no more than a brilliant flash in the trigger-pan;<sup>5</sup> yet, for a student of the geneses of civilizations, the amply recorded history of an abortive pastoral civilization in North America which had come and gone between A.D. 1866 and A.D. 1887 was an episode of surpassing interest in so far as it provided authentic materials for reconstructing, by analogy, the lost history of the genesis, round about the turn of the third and second millennia B.C., of a pastoral civilization on the Eurasian Steppe which had had a subsequent life-span of some four thousand years' duration—in the course of which it had produced momentous effects on the histories of all its sedentary neighbours.

In the abortive yet none the less illuminating nineteenth-century

<sup>1</sup> See Billington, *op. cit.*, p. 679.

<sup>2</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 683-6.

<sup>3</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 687.

<sup>4</sup> Gen. iv. 22.

<sup>5</sup> Accounts of this episode in the history of the United States will be found in Paxson, *op. cit.*, chap. 56; Webb, *op. cit.*, chap. 6; Billington, *op. cit.*, chap. 33.

North American instance an historian could watch the process by which, in the Nueces Valley, a composite society, in which human beings, horses, and cattle were co-operating with one another, under human management, to make a living off an uncultivated grassland,<sup>1</sup> came into existence as an economic and social appendage to a neighbouring sedentary agricultural society<sup>2</sup> and then suddenly made what was tantamount to a declaration of economic and social independence by taking the whole vast prairie for its realm<sup>3</sup> and claiming to deal, on terms of equality, with agricultural neighbours to whose economy 'the Cattle Kingdom' had previously been subsidiary. This significant passage of history on the southernmost sector of the borderland between the eastern woodland and the western prairie in North America offered an insight into the process through which some sector of the borderland between the Desert and the Sown in the Old World—perhaps the fringes of the oasis of Anau in Transcaspia—had once given birth to a Nomad pastoral society which had then proceeded to propagate itself over the entire Eurasian Steppe—as rapidly, for all that we know, as the nineteenth-century North American 'Cattle Kingdom' spread northwards over the Great Plains from the Nueces Valley into Canada between A.D. 1866 and A.D. 1880.

Even the fratricidal warfare between Cain and Abel, which had played so large a part in the histories of the civilizations of the Old World for not much less than four thousand years, was rekindled in North America during the twenty years for which the North American 'Cattle Kingdom' lasted; and in the New World, as in the Old World, Cain took upon his head the guilt of playing the part of the aggressor. As recently as A.D. 1865 the farmers of Western Missouri had, at least in sympathy if not in action,<sup>4</sup> been on the same side as the cowboys of South-Western Texas in a fierce civil war between a Southern Confederacy and a Union from which it was striving to secede. Yet in A.D. 1866, when the Texan cowboys, on the first of their annual northward cattle-drives, were bearing down upon railhead at Sedalia, within the limits of cultivation in Western Missouri, they were attacked and robbed by 'embattled farmers' who, the year before, had been, at least in spirit, their fellow Confederates.<sup>5</sup> 'Ferocious Plains Indians . . . were to be preferred to the Missourians';<sup>6</sup> for the feud between South and North on the political surface of life did not avail, even in the year following the date of the Confederacy's overthrow, to maintain the solidarity of the South against the disruptive effect of a more ancient feud between Cain and Abel that had suddenly erupted from a source deep down in the abyss of a Collective Subconscious Psyche with a violence almost equal to that of the still more ancient feud between Cain and Nimrod.

<sup>1</sup> See III. iii. 10 and 13-14 for this feature in the organization of the Nomad pastoral societies of the Old World.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. III. iii. 10-11.

<sup>3</sup> Cp. III. iii. 11-13.

<sup>4</sup> Missouri was one of the border slave-states that had failed to secede from the Union in A.D. 1861; but the hearts of perhaps a majority of her population had been on the Southern side throughout the Civil War of A.D. 1861-5.

<sup>5</sup> See Webb, *op. cit.*, pp. 217-19; Billington, *op. cit.*, pp. 673-5.

<sup>6</sup> Webb, *op. cit.*, p. 219.

# VIII. D, ANNEX

## 'THE MONSTROUS REGIMENT OF WOMEN'

THE Heroic Age might have been expected to be a masculine age *par excellence*. Does not the evidence convict it of having been an age of brute force? And, when force is given a free rein, what chance can women have of holding their own against the physically dominant sex? This *a priori* logic is confuted by the facts; for the facts show that this Heroic Age of unbridled adolescent barbarism can challenge comparison with a Matriarchal Age of primitive agriculture and with a Shorthand-typist Age of elderly business organization as an age in which women were in the ascendant. Let us survey these paradoxical facts before we try to discover the explanation of them.

In the Heroic Age the great catastrophes are apt to be women's work, even when the woman's role is ostensibly passive. If Alboin's unsatisfied desire for Rosamund was the cause of the extermination of the Gepidae, it is credible that the sacking of Troy was provoked by the satisfaction of Paris' desire for Helen,<sup>2</sup> and that Haethcyn brought disaster on himself by carrying off a Swedish Queen.<sup>3</sup> More commonly the women are undisguisedly the mischief-makers whose malice drives the heroes into slaying one another. The legendary quarrel at Worms between Brunhild and Kriemhild, which eventually discharged itself in the slaughter in Etzel's Danubian hall, has its Icelandic counterpart in Hallgerda's quarrel with Bergthora which eventually resulted in Njal's house being burnt over his head; and, though, in the saga as well as in the epic, the maker's art has spun fiction out of fact, we may assume that the fiction has commended itself because it is true to life.<sup>4</sup> It is indeed all of one piece with the authentic incidents of the historical quarrel between the legendary Brunhild's nobly ferocious namesake<sup>5</sup> and her basely ferocious enemy Fredegund, which cost the Merovingian successor-state of the Roman Empire forty years of civil war.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *The First Blast of the Trumpet against the Monstrous Regiment of Women* is the title of a pamphlet published by John Knox in A.D. 1558.

<sup>2</sup> The legendary Trojan War is presented by Herodotus (Book I, chap. 5) as the first round in a thenceforth perennial warfare between Hellenes and Orientals which is the plot of his historical drama, while the Rape of Helen, which was the Trojan War's legendary cause, was, according to him (Book I, chaps. 1-4), the fourth of a series of incidents of the kind, in which Io, Europa, and Medea had been Helen's predecessors (see pp. 454-7, above). The Orientals had started this series of abductions by carrying off Io, but the Hellenes had been the first to commit the criminal folly of making an abduction a *casus belli*. 'To abduct women was a crime, but to take their abduction seriously enough to insist on reprisals was a folly, since it was obvious that these women would not have got themselves abducted if they had not so desired' (Book I, chap. 4). In this satirical introduction to a work of genius the sophisticated Hellenic historian has wittily travestied one of the traditional motifs of a post-Minoan 'heroic' saga.

<sup>3</sup> Beowulf, ll. 2930 ff., cited by H. M. Chadwick in *The Heroic Age* (Cambridge 1912, University Press), p. 337.

<sup>4</sup> See I. i. 449-50.

<sup>5</sup> An appreciation of the historical Brunhild's character will be found in Dill, S.: *Roman Society in Gaul in the Merovingian Age* (London 1926, Macmillan), pp. 172-3 and 232-4.

<sup>6</sup> For the causes of the quarrel between Brunhild and Fredegund, to which this forty-years' war was the sequel, see p. 654, below.

'It is well to bear in mind the story of the war between the Angli and the Warni, a war which owed its origin to Radiger's repudiation of his marriage contract with the English King's sister. . . . This story comes, not from a poem, but from the work of a strictly contemporary Roman historian. . . . In the story of Radiger we see how a young princess was able to gather together a huge army and bring about a sanguinary struggle between two nations on account of an insult offered to her by a neighbouring king. Again, Paulus Diaconus<sup>1</sup> states that the war between the Heruli and the Langobardi was due to the murder of the Herulian King's brother by a Langobardic princess. Even if this story is untrue, it is significant enough that it should obtain credit. . . . According to Gregory of Tours<sup>2</sup> the overthrow of the Burgundian kingdom [in Savoy] was due to the instigation of Hrothhild, who implored her sons to exact vengeance for the murder of her parents—a case not unlike the Norse version of the story of Hamdhir and Sörlí. Hildeberht's invasion of Spain was undertaken in answer to messages from his sister Hlothhild, who had been ill-treated by her husband, the Visigothic King Amalaric.<sup>3</sup> The dissensions which eventually brought about the downfall of the Thuringian kingdom had their origin in the proud and jealous character of Amalaberga, the wife of Irminfrith.<sup>4</sup> Unless we are prepared to shut our eyes to the plain evidence of History, we are bound to recognise that the personal feelings of queens and princesses were among the very strongest of the factors by which the politics of the Heroic Age were governed.<sup>5</sup>

These words ring as true to Macedonian barbarian life in a post-Achaemenian heroic age as to Teutonic barbarian life in a post-Hellenic heroic age.

'It was in the character and action of the Seleucid and Ptolemaic queens that the Macedonian blood and tradition showed itself. Both dynasties exhibit a series of strong-willed, masculine, unscrupulous women of the same type as those who fought and intrigued for power in the old Macedonian Kingdom. The last Cleopatra of Egypt is the best known to us, but she was only a type of her class. There was no relegation of queens and princesses to the obscurity of a harem. They mingled in the political game as openly as the men. It was in the political sphere, rather than in that of sensual indulgence, that their passions lay and their crimes found a motive. Sometimes they went at the head of armies. . . . It is only in the intensity and recklessness with which they pursue their ends that we see any trace of womanhood left in them.'<sup>6</sup>

The influence of women over men in the Heroic Age had not, of course, been exhibited solely in the crudely malevolent practice of goading the men into fratricidal strife. No women had left deeper marks on history than Alexander's mother Olympias and Mu'āwīyah's mother Hind, and these two viragos had immortalized themselves, not by their recorded deeds of passion and violence,<sup>7</sup> but by their life-long moral

<sup>1</sup> See his *Historia Langobardorum*, Book I, chap. 20.

<sup>2</sup> See his *Historia Francorum*, Book III, chap. 6.

<sup>3</sup> See *ibid.*, Book III, chap. 10.

<sup>4</sup> Chadwick, *op. cit.*, pp. 337-8 and 372.

<sup>5</sup> See *ibid.*, Book III, chap. 4.

<sup>6</sup> Bevan, E. R.; *The House of Seleucus* (London 1902, Edward Arnold, 2 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 279-80.

<sup>7</sup> Hind is reported to have bitten the liver of her slain enemy Hamzah's corpse on the battlefield of Uhud (Margoliouth, D. S.: *Mohammed and the Rise of Islam* (New York 1905, Putnam), p. 306). As for the deeds of Olympias, the charge-sheet was graven on

ascendancy over their redoubtable sons—an ascendancy that was not impaired by their separation from the husbands to whom these sons had been born by them. Mu'āwiyah always delighted in speaking of himself as 'the son of Hind', and used to put his mother at the head of the list when he was enumerating the glories of his family;<sup>1</sup> and Alexander, for his part, was at heart his mother's son, who had cloven to Olympias when her estrangement from Philip had come to an open breach—a resolution of psychological forces which is aptly symbolized in the myth that the hero was begotten on his mother, not by his legitimate human father, but by an imperious heavenly sire.<sup>2</sup>

After Alexander's premature death, Olympias entered the arena of Macedonian cut-throat politics as a principal and duly met her own death at the hands of as ruthless a criminal as herself in the person of Cassander. Zenobia, the widow of Odenathus prince of Palmyra, and 'Ā'ishah, the widow of the Prophet Muhammad and the daughter of his first *khalīfah* Abu Bakr, embarked on similar ventures without being made to pay for failure with their lives. Zenobia's life was spared by her grim conqueror Aurelian,<sup>3</sup> even after she had repeated her attempt to carve a Palmyrene Arab barbarian successor-state out of the Roman Empire;<sup>4</sup> and 'Ā'ishah was left in peace by her chivalrous conqueror 'Alī after he had defeated her in the one signal victory in his otherwise disappointing career.<sup>5</sup> The death of the Seleucid Emperor Antiochus II, 'the god', was the signal for his rival widows, a Seleucid Laodice at Ephesus and a Lagid Berenice at Antioch, to plunge the Asiatic Macedonian successor-state of the Achaemenian Empire into civil strife which festered into an international war between the Seleucid and Ptolemaic Powers when Berenice's brother Ptolemy III Euergetes of Egypt took up arms to avenge his sister's death after she had been assassinated through the treachery of a trusted physician who was secretly in Laodice's service.<sup>6</sup> The Merovingian successor-state of the Roman Empire in Gaul was similarly plunged into a civil war—which dragged on for forty years<sup>7</sup>—by two rival queens who did not wait for

the hearts of two men—Philip and Antipater—who, on this subject, found Alexander infatigably blind.

<sup>1</sup> Lammens, S. J., *Le Père H. : Études sur le Règne du Calife Omayyade Mo'āwīa I<sup>er</sup>* (Paris 1908, Geuthner), p. 69. Cf. eundem: *La Mecque à la Veille de l'Hégire* (Bayrūt 1924, Imprimerie Catholique), p. 170. The spirit which captivated Hind's son is exemplified in her bearing towards Muhammad at the *levée* at which she found herself constrained to declare her allegiance to the conqueror after the capitulation of Mecca (see Margoliouth, *op. cit.*, p. 390), and in her trading venture, financed with money borrowed from the public treasury by leave of the Caliph 'Umar, after she had been divorced by her husband Abu Sufyān (see Lammens, *op. cit.*, pp. 169-70).

<sup>2</sup> See V. vi. 267-8.

<sup>3</sup> Aurelian's death-warrant was addressed, not to Zenobia, but to her male academician Longinus.

<sup>4</sup> The successor-state that Zenobia did momentarily establish at her first attempt was an abortive anticipation of the Ghassanid phylarchy on the Roman Empire's Syrian *limes*, and of Muhammad's oasis-principality of Medina whose capital was transferred by Mu'āwiyah to Damascus (see I. i. 74; II. ii. 11; VI. vii. 131 and 208-9).

<sup>5</sup> At the Battle of the Camel (*commisum* 9 Dec., A.D. 656) it was not 'Ā'ishah, but her male confederates Talhah and Zubayr, who lost their lives.

<sup>6</sup> See Bevan, E. R.: *The House of Seleucus* (London 1902, Arnold, 2 vols.), vol. i, pp. 181-3.

<sup>7</sup> See Dill, S.: *Roman Society in Gaul in the Merovingian Age* (London 1926, Macmillan), p. 174.



their husbands to be removed from the arena by assassination before taking into their own hands the pursuit of a quarrel which for them was a personal blood-feud.

Fredegund of Neustria had a grievance against her paramour Chilperic that was comparable to the grievance of Laodice of Ephesus against her husband Antiochus—though not indeed a grievance of equal magnitude, since Laodice was not only Antiochus's wedded wife but was also his half-sister, whereas Fredegund was a maidservant who was her master's concubine. Chilperic dismissed his concubine Fredegund, besides repudiating his lawful wife Audovera, in order to contract a politically advantageous marriage with Galswintha, the daughter of Athanagild King of the Visigoths and the sister of Chilperic's brother Sigiberht's wife, Queen Brunhild of Austrasia.<sup>1</sup> Chilperic's and Antiochus's second marriages had the same motive and the same denouement in the literal sense of the word. In the sequel in either case the fickle king's first love prevailed over *raison d'état*, but Galswintha was more unfortunate than Berenice; for the Lagid queen survived her desertion by her Seleucid husband, to seize and hold half his inheritance before she met her violent end, whereas Galswintha's life was taken by Fredegund with Chilperic's connivance—a complicity that was flagrantly advertised when Chilperic rewarded his former concubine for the murder of his royal sister-in-law's royal sister by taking the bondwoman-murderess to wife. The blood-feud thus ignited between Brunhild and Fredegund was inflamed when Brunhild's husband Sigiberht was treacherously stabbed to death (with poisoned daggers) by agents of Fredegund in the hour of his victory, while he was being saluted by his brother Chilperic's Neustrian warriors as their king,<sup>2</sup> and it was exacerbated still further when, nine years later,<sup>3</sup> Chilperic in his turn was assassinated by an unknown hand whose stab was never brought home to its instigator. Fredegund died in her bed;<sup>4</sup> Brunhild was done to death sixteen years later<sup>5</sup> by Fredegund's son Chlothar II under tortures<sup>6</sup> which Olympias was spared in her judicial murder by Cassander.

These militant queens were not always content to leave even the physical fighting entirely to their male proxies. The fight in which 'Ā'ishah's warriors were worsted by 'Alī's acquired its name 'the Battle of the Camel' from 'Ā'ishah's personal presence on the field in her curtained camel-howdah 'wie ein Kriegsheiligtum';<sup>7</sup> and Berenice the rival of Laodice literally took up arms at a crisis in her fortunes, when Laodice's partisans in Antioch had succeeded in kidnapping Berenice's infant son, whose claim to the Seleucid crown was the indispensable cloak under which his mother, like her rival, was fighting for her own hand.

'In this extremity Berenice showed the spirit of a lioness. The child was

<sup>1</sup> For the antithesis between Austrasia and Neustria, see II. ii. 167.

<sup>2</sup> See Dill, *op. cit.*, pp. 133 and 182. Sigiberht's end was a reproduction, 'in real life', of Siegfried's legendary death—for which a legendary King Gunther mourned as hypocritically as Queen Galswintha's authentic murder was mourned by an historical King Chilperic.

<sup>3</sup> Sigiberht was assassinated in A.D. 575, Chilperic in A.D. 584.

<sup>4</sup> In A.D. 597.

<sup>5</sup> In A.D. 613.

<sup>6</sup> See Dill, *op. cit.*, pp. 211 and 232.

<sup>7</sup> Becker, C. H.: *Islamstudien*, vol. i (Leipzig 1924, Quelle and Meyer), p. 101.

believed to have been carried to a certain house. Berenice instantly mounted a chariot, took in her own hand a spear, and galloped to the spot. On the way, Caeneus [Laodice's leading partisan at Antioch] met her. The Queen aimed her spear at him. It missed. Nothing daunted, Berenice followed it with a stone, which brought her enemy down.<sup>1</sup>

This historical episode lends colour to a legendary scene; for Brunhild likewise, in her assault-at-arms with Gunther, in which the female combatant's hand and the male combatant's life are the stakes, follows up with a stone's throw a spear-cast that has failed to kill.<sup>2</sup>

The evidence that we have now reviewed is perhaps sufficient to demonstrate that the Heroic Age is the age of opportunity for Goneril and Regan. Aristotle notices that 'most of the military and warlike breeds of men are under the regiment of women';<sup>3</sup> but he does not discover for us the explanation of these facts that he has observed, for he records this observation incidentally to a discussion of the reason why gynaeocracy—'the regiment of women'—prevailed likewise at Sparta under the Lycurgean *agôgê* in its decadence, and his solution for this problem of Spartan psychology—a solution that is as convincing as it is acute<sup>4</sup>—is manifestly inapplicable to 'the regiment of women' over barbarian warriors in the Heroic Age.

To explain this peculiar phenomenon at Sparta, Aristotle puts his finger on the peculiar severity of the discipline to which the male half of the Spartiate community was subjected. As he points out, the authors and administrators of the *agôgê* had neglected—or had tried in vain—to impose on the Spartiate women a way of life that they had succeeded in imposing on the men with all too complete a success—with the result that the Spartiate women were at an advantage, in their dealings with the men, thanks to their own unrestricted enjoyment of a liberty, and even a licence, which were rigorously denied to their fathers, brothers, and husbands. Manifestly this explanation is as inapplicable to the barbarians as it is convincing apropos of the Spartans; for, in this matter of libertarianism, the barbarian warrior labours under no handicap whatsoever *vis-à-vis* his mother, sister, or wife. As we have already observed in the chapter to which this Annex attaches, the life of the barbarian warrior squatting in his moral slum<sup>5</sup> inside a fallen *limes* is as

<sup>1</sup> Bevan, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 182. Berenice's presence of mind and physical prowess did not avail to enable her to recover possession of her child's body, alive or dead; but they did avail to win her such a preponderance of popular sympathy among the citizens of Antioch that the slain Caeneus' fellow municipal magistrates, who had been his accomplices in kidnapping Berenice's child on Laodice's behalf, found themselves constrained to exhibit a child to the people as the infant king.

<sup>2</sup> We are not, of course, suggesting that the assault-at-arms between Brunhild and Gunther, described in the *Nibelungenlied*, was an historical event. In the legendary Brunhild we have, not a poetic reminiscence of an historical personage, but a poetic transformation of a goddess into a human heroine. The legendary Brunhild, as her name bears witness, was originally a war-goddess clad in a coat of mail; and this origin, which is no longer discernible in the High German *Nibelungenlied*, is still manifest in the Norse *Volsungar Saga*.

<sup>3</sup> Aristotle: *Politics*, Book II, chap. vi, § 6 (1269 B, 24-27). He notes, as exceptions to this 'law', 'the Celts and others who openly practise and approve homosexuality.' This subsidiary law of Aristotle's had been further illustrated, since Aristotle's own day, by the *mores* of the Egyptian Mamlûks.

<sup>4</sup> See the present Study, III. iii. 75.

<sup>5</sup> See the passage quoted from H. G. Wells in VIII D, on p. 33, n. 2.

lawless as the Spartiate 'peer's' life is regular (so long, at least, as the Spartiate 'peer' is held fast within the *cadres* of his mess in peace-time and his unit on active service). The explanation of the 'regiment' of women over the barbarian war-band must therefore lie in some non-Spartan direction. There are perhaps two lines of explanation, one sociological and the other psychological.

The sociological explanation is to be found in the fact that the Heroic Age is a social interregnum in which the traditional habits of Primitive Life in its latter-day Yin-state<sup>1</sup> have been broken up, while no new 'cake of custom' had yet been baked by a nascent civilization or nascent higher religion. In this unusual and ephemeral social situation a temporary social vacuum is filled by an individualism so absolute that it overrides even the intrinsic differences in nature between the sexes. This individualism does, of course, tell against women as well as in their favour. In the brutal anarchy of the Primitive Muslim Arab heroic age the normal inferiority of women to men in sheer physical strength did expose the women to the scourge of outright physical ill-treatment—at any rate among the Qurayshite lords of creation, whose standard of behaviour towards women had previously, in the pre-Islamic 'Days of Ignorance', already been conspicuously lower, not only than that of their sedentary neighbours at Medina, but even than the standard of their Nomad contemporaries.<sup>2</sup> Again, it can hardly be an accidental coincidence that the Macedonian, Merovingian, and Primitive Muslim Arab heroic ages should, all alike, be infamous for the facility with which the heroes divorced their wives—a wrong which was not righted by the corresponding facility with which the discarded women were able to obtain successive husbands. It is all the more remarkable to find this unbridled individualism bearing, in the political field, fruits hardly distinguishable from those of a doctrinaire feminism that is altogether beyond the emotional range and the intellectual horizon of the women and men of the Heroic Age,<sup>3</sup> and to see these openings for the exercise of political power presenting themselves to Umayyad Qurayshī princesses,<sup>4</sup> as well as to their Macedonian forerunners and their Merovingian sisters.

In the Heroic Age the state appears to have been regarded as little more than the property of an individual—or rather, perhaps, of a family, which itself was intimately connected with a number of other families in similar positions. . . . It is worth noticing what is recorded in *Beowulf* on an occasion of great emergency. Hygelac, King of the Geatas, lost his life in the disastrous expedition against the Frisians and left an only son, Heardred, who seems to have been scarcely more than a child. *Beowulf* escaped from the slaughter; and, on his return, "Hygd offered him the treasury and the government, the rings and the throne. She trusted not that her child would be able to hold his patrimony against foreign

<sup>1</sup> See II. i. 191-5.

<sup>2</sup> See Lammens, S.J., *Le Père H.: Études sur le Règne du Calife Omayyade Mo'awia Ier* (Paris 1908, Geuthner), pp. 314-24.

<sup>3</sup> 'Le féminisme, il faut bien en convenir, ne rencontrait pas à cette époque des partisans en Arabie, même dans les rangs du beau sexe' (Lammens, *op. cit.*, p. 316).

<sup>4</sup> See Lammens, *op. cit.*, p. 329. Under the subsequent 'Abbasid régime, princesses lost the prestige and power that had been theirs under the Umayyad dispensation.

nations, now that Hygelac was dead."<sup>1</sup> There is no reference to any action on the part of the council or court; but the queen offers the throne to the late king's nephew. The whole passage seems to indicate that the throne, with all its rights, was regarded very much like any ordinary family property. Its disposition is arranged by the family itself, without any notion of responsibility to others; and the members of the court are not taken into account any more than the servants in a private household. It may perhaps be argued that court poets would be apt to exaggerate the power of the royal family, and consequently that the picture of its authority given here is misleading. Yet Amalaswintha, who was a contemporary of Hygelac, appears to have acted on her own authority when she associated Theodahath, the nephew of Theodric, in the sovereignty with herself after her son's death.<sup>2</sup>

In the legend of a post-Minoan heroic age that was current in an Hellenic World, the succession of the interloping Pelopidae to the preceding Perseid holders of the lordship of Mycenae was traditionally accounted for, as Thucydides points out,<sup>3</sup> by the fact that the mother of the last Perseid king, Eurystheus, was the sister of the first Pelopid king, Atreus. On the strength of this relationship on the female side, Eurystheus, when he took his departure from Mycenae on a campaign against Athens from which he was never to return, was reputed to have left his castle and his kingdom in Atreus' charge; and the queen was the living hinge on whom politics turned in the lordship of Ithaca likewise, as the story is told in the *Odyssey*.

Though, even according to the unexacting standards of the Heroic Age, the Cephallenian *palikaria* have got shockingly out of hand as a result of the twenty years' absence of their lawful king Odysseus, they have not the audacity to liquidate Odysseus' lordship by formally reducing their lost king's son and heir, Telemachus, to a station on an equality with their own, until the lost king's queen, Penelope, shall have consented to leave her missing husband's house in order to marry one of these lordlings' own number; and, though it is assumed that, if she does contract a second marriage, she will return for this purpose to the house of her father Icarius, to be given away for a second time from there, it is also assumed that, in the choice of her new husband from among her 108 suitors,<sup>4</sup> the last word will lie, not with her father, but with her herself. 'Send your mother away and make her marry the man whom her father chooses and whom she prefers' is the course that is proposed to Telemachus by Antinous, parleying as spokesman for all the suitors.<sup>5</sup> The implication seems to be that, so long as the missing king's living queen remains mistress of her absent husband's house, her loyalty to him—or even merely to his memory, if he should prove to be dead—effectively preserves the royal prerogative for Odysseus himself, should he live to return, or for his son Telemachus, should he live to grow to man's estate. So long as Penelope can contrive to continue to avoid mak-

<sup>1</sup> *Beowulf*, vv. 2369 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Chadwick, H. M.: *The Heroic Age* (Cambridge 1912, University Press), pp. 336-7 and 371-2.

<sup>3</sup> See Thucydides, Book I, chap. 9.

<sup>4</sup> The number counted up by Telemachus in *Odyssey*, Book XVI, ll. 245-55.

<sup>5</sup> *Odyssey*, Book II, ll. 113-14, as translated by E. V. Rieu (London 1945, Penguin Books), p. 37.

ing the operative change in the *status quo adhuc*, all that her exasperated suitors can do is to continue, for their part, to exercise an indirect pressure on their queen and her son by wasting the substance of Odysseus' estate. They do not venture positively to coerce the queen into marrying again against her will, notwithstanding their resentful impatience with her interminable procrastination.

'The regiment of women' which these episodes reveal is a feature of the Heroic Age which fades away as the age itself passes.

'In the earliest records [of English history] which we possess, women of high rank seem to hold a very important and influential position. This feature is often ascribed to Southern and Christian influence; but, if so, it is not a little remarkable that it is much more prominent in the seventh century than in the eighth or ninth. Thus we find Eanfled, the wife of Oswio, pursuing a very independent line of action within half a century of the conversion, while Cynwise, the wife of the heathen king Penda, would seem to have been acting as regent in her husband's absence, perhaps like Hygd the wife of Hygelac. Above all, Seaxburg, the wife of the convert Coenwalh, is said to have occupied the throne herself after his death. Bede's account of Saint Aethelthryth shows that queens had estates and retinues of their own; and this custom also must go back to heathen times, for the first reference that we have to Bamborough, the chief residence of the Northumbrian kings, is the statement that it was given by the heathen king Aethelfrith to his wife Bebbe.'<sup>1</sup>

The evidence that we have considered so far suggests that 'the regiment of women' in the Heroic Age is the product of an individualism that is temporarily let loose by the breaking of a cake of primitive custom. But this explanation is still only a negative one. It indicates the favourableness of the opportunity that the Heroic Age offers to women, without explaining the women's success in turning this opportunity to account. A positive explanation is suggested by the reflection that, in the deadly game which the criminal barbarian successors of a decadent civilization have condemned themselves to play against one another, the trump card is not, after all, the sheer physical force in which the male barbarian has the advantage over his female opponent as a rule—notwithstanding the exceptional physical prowess of a legendary Brunhild and an historical Berenice. If the triumphant barbarians' fratricidal conflicts were really nothing but trials of physical strength, these jousts would be morally as innocent as the fights between rival bulls for supremacy in the herd; but even the triumphant barbarian is branded as being still recognizably human by the mark of an unexpunged Original Sin; and the fate of many a barbarian hero—or villain—of legend or history proclaims that, in a struggle for existence between sinful human beings, even when the competitors are barbarian-bred, mere physical strength by itself weighs light in the scales against demonic psychological forces. The winning cards in the barbarians' internecine struggle for existence among themselves are the energy, persistence, vindictiveness, and implacability that spring from a perversion of will-power, and the cunning and treachery that are hatched by a prostitution of intellectual ability. These are moral

<sup>1</sup> Chadwick, H. M.: *The Origin of the English Nation* (Cambridge 1907, University Press), pp. 314-15.



and mental qualities with which sinful Human Nature is as richly endowed in the female as in the male; and the masculine victims of a Kriemhild, a Fredegund, a Cleopatra, and a Rosamund might aptly echo the Pauline cry of distress:

'We wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of This World, against spiritual wickedness in high places.'<sup>1</sup>

The Cleopatra whose wickedness most aptly illustrates this text is not the notorious daughter of Ptolemy XI Auletes who was the last Macedonian queen to seize and lose a throne (though in her, too, a formidable vein of barbarian female ruthlessness lurked beneath a sophisticated 'make-up' of decadent Hellenic charm); the prime virago of the name<sup>2</sup> is the Cleopatra who was the daughter of Ptolemy VI Philometor and was by turns the wife of three male incumbents of the throne of the Seleucidae,<sup>3</sup> Alexander Balas and the brothers Demetrius II Nicator and Antiochus VII Sidetes; for this Cleopatra was the veritable 'Erinyes of the House of Seleucus'.<sup>4</sup>

Cleopatra ran amok when her incompetent second husband Demetrius, turning up again in Syria from a ten years' captivity (140/139-129 B.C.) in Parthia, lost no time in demonstrating, by making as deplorable a failure of his second reign as he had made of his first, that there was nothing new about him beyond the outlandish Parthian beard which advertised that, as a captive of the barbarians, he had not even been able to resist the temptation to 'go native'. When the restored Demetrius tried to make war on his brother-in-law Ptolemy VII Euergetes II and then suffered yet another resounding military defeat at the hands of a pretender to his own throne whom Ptolemy had unleashed against him as the simplest way of settling accounts, Cleopatra took the law into her own hands. She shut the gates of Ptolemais in her fugitive husband's face; and, when Demetrius was slaughtered on board ship in the harbour of Tyre, by orders of the governor, in an attempt to take sanctuary in the temple of Melkart, the suspicion that the governor was acting on Queen Cleopatra's instructions was warranted by her unquestioned responsibility for the subsequent assassination of her elder son Demetrius when he proclaimed himself his father's successor without submitting to his mother's tutelage. Cleopatra thereupon mounted the throne herself with her younger son Antiochus VIII 'Grypus' as her associate; and, when 'Grypus' began to show signs of restiveness in the role of his mother's puppet, Cleopatra attempted to make away with him in his turn, and, this time, lost her own life as the penalty for failing to take his. Her designs had been

<sup>1</sup> Eph. vi. 12.

<sup>2</sup> This originally Seleucid family name was introduced into the House of Lâgus by Cleopatra, daughter of Antiochus III, who was married to Ptolemy V Epiphanes and governed the Ptolemaic dominions as regent for her son Ptolemy VI Philometor from the time of her husband's death until she died herself, still occupying the seat of power.

<sup>3</sup> This identification of her through her Seleucid marriages serves to distinguish her from her mother and namesake, who was the daughter, by the Seleucid Cleopatra, of Ptolemy V Epiphanes, and who married successively her brothers Ptolemy VI Philometor and Ptolemy VII Euergetes II, and also from a sister and namesake who, like their mother, was married to Ptolemy VII Euergetes II and who seized control of the Ptolemaic Government after Euergetes II's death.

<sup>4</sup> Bevan, E. R.: *The House of Seleucus* (London 1902, Arnold, 2 vols.), vol. ii, p. 212.

betrayed to her intended victim by traitors in her own household; and, when she offered 'Grypus' a poisoned cup, he forced her to drink the lethal draught herself.<sup>1</sup>

Gepid Rosamund died the same death as Macedonian Cleopatra; but Rosamund's paramour and fellow murderer Helmechis was less lucky than Cleopatra's son and fellow sovereign Antiochus. Helmechis had received no information in advance to prepare him for the emergency, and he swallowed half the potion which Rosamund had offered to him before he realized that it was poisoned—though he did realize this just in time to make 'Grypus's' effective retort of forcing the rest of the poison down the viper lady's throat; so Helmechis merely compelled his murderess-mistress to share with him a death which overtook him according to her plan, whereas Antiochus VIII 'Grypus' outlived his mother to spend the rest of his reign, no longer incommoded by her leading-strings, in fighting an inconclusive civil war with his half-brother and first-cousin Antiochus IX. Cyzicenus, the son whom Cleopatra had born to her third husband, 'Grypus's' uncle, Antiochus VII Sidētēs.

Rosamund's career, which thus had the same ending as Cleopatra's, is an epitome of the Heroic Age which illustrates almost every aspect of barbarian criminality.

In the first act, as we have noticed,<sup>2</sup> Rosamund undergoes Helen's legendary experience of being the passive, and perhaps innocent, cause of the extermination of a people and the slaying of its king—with the miserable difference that, in Rosamund's historical tragedy, the exterminated people are her own countrymen, the slain king is her own father, and her personal fate is the excruciating one of being taken to wife by her father's slayer, as the prize of a successful act of bloodthirsty aggression to which the Lombard king Alboin has been prompted by his unsatisfied desire to possess the Gepid King Cunimund's daughter.

The second act shows Rosamund, some seven years later, in residence with her husband in his palace at Verona: the capital of a successor-state of the Roman Empire in Italy which Alboin has been carving out for himself since his destruction of Rosamund's race on a Central European battlefield. In an inauspicious hour, Alboin, being already the worse for drink, sends for the drinking-cup which has been made for him out of Cunimund's skull, and tells his cup-bearer to offer it to the queen with an invitation 'to drink merrily with her father'. Rosamund duly drinks from the skull without visible demur, and inwardly determines on a revenge which, in the third act, she duly executes.

In this third act Rosamund incites King Alboin's foster-brother and armour-bearer Helmechis to conspire with her for the compassing of Alboin's death. She lures her chosen instrument with the offer of her own hand and the prospect of entering into her husband's and his master's heritage—for it is assumed that the Lombard crown will pass with its murdered owner's Gepid queen, even if the queen is, by proxy,

<sup>1</sup> This last chapter in Cleopatra's life is recounted by E. R. Bevan in *The House of Seleucus* (London 1902, Arnold, 2 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 250-2.

<sup>2</sup> On p. 651, above.

the king's murderess. Helmechis succumbs to his temptress, but makes the enlistment of Alboin's chamberlain Peredeo a condition of his own participation; and, when Rosamund proceeds to approach Peredeo, the chamberlain rejects the queen's overture. Peredeo's negative loyalty to Alboin puts Rosamund in a quandary. Her murderous machinations have been brought to a halt, and her own life is now at the mercy of an unresponsive confidant; but in this crisis she succeeds in turning the tables on the chamberlain by a move in which she exhibits a shamelessness which is as remarkable as her presence of mind. Peredeo's loyalty to Alboin has not gone to the positive length of leading him to warn the King of the conspiracy which the chamberlain has refused to join; and, without giving Peredeo time to have any saving second thoughts, Rosamund effectively compromises her potential *delator* by taking the place of one of her ladies-in-waiting with whom the King's chamberlain has a *liaison*, and confronting Peredeo with the *fait accompli* of having unwittingly seduced the King's wife. It is now no longer Rosamund, but Peredeo, who is in danger of being denounced to Alboin; his peril ensures his treason, and in the last scene of this third act of the drama—a scene in which King Alboin, like King Malcolm, is murdered in his bed—it is apparently Peredeo, not Helmechis, who plays Macbeth's part. Perhaps Helmechis has found himself unable to summon up the hardihood—which assuredly would not have failed Rosamund had she been either of her masculine accomplices—to break a twofold tabu by personally taking the life of a foster-kinsman who is at the same time his lord.<sup>1</sup>

The fourth act shows us Rosamund's deed of vengeance duly accomplished, but Helmechis disappointed of the political prize that was to have been half his reward for lending himself to the execution of his royal temptress's criminal plot. The crime has proved too shocking to be condoned even by barbarian consciences; and, instead of mounting together the murdered Alboin's throne, Rosamund and Helmechis have had to flee together for their lives. They have been given asylum by the Constantinopolitan viceroy of Italy, who has found it easier to ship Alboin's murderers, with Alboin's treasure in their baggage, from Verona to the viceroy's water-girt fastness-capital at Ravenna than to withstand a living Alboin's prowess in wresting from the Roman Empire a recently recovered dominion which it is the viceroy's duty to defend. In the astonishing transformation scene now staged in Fortune's kaleidoscope the initiative is thrown into the viceroy's hands, and he proves himself as brilliant in intrigue as he has been contemptible in war. The achievement of her revenge has left Rosamund still unsatisfied; for her vindictiveness has been alloyed with ambition, and her dream of ruling at Verona with Helmechis as her consort-puppet, which was in her mind when she offered the wretch her hand in exchange for her first husband's death, has been shattered by the Lombards' disconcerting

<sup>1</sup> When Alexander did slay his foster-kinsman Cleitus, there was at least only one tabu violated, since in this case the foster-victim was the King's retainer, while the King himself played the foster-murderer's part; and, besides that, the Macedonian counterpart of the Lombard crime was committed, not premeditatedly in cold blood, but at a moment when both men were drunk and when neither of them was *compos mentis*.

squeamishness. To find herself married to Helmechis as her fellow refugee at Ravenna is a predicament for which she has not bargained; and the viceroy is as quick to espy and attack the barbarian virago's *côté faible* as Rosamund herself has been to get Helmechis and Peredeo into her toils. 'Why not,' whispers the viceroy to the virago—'Why not repeat your exploit of murdering a husband and thereby put yourself in a position to marry me? Though unfortunately I cannot reinstate you in your late husband's kingdom, which I have failed to prevent his carving out and which you have failed to seize for yourself, I can at any rate make you vicereine of what Alboin has left to me of Roman Italy.' The temptress, thus tempted in her turn, readily swallows her tempter's bait and thereby meets her death, as has been narrated, in the process of carrying out the viceroy's sly suggestion.

On learning that Rosamund, as well as Helmechis, was dead, the viceroy must have breathed a sigh of relief, for manifestly a lady who had successfully made away with two husbands would not have scrupled to mete the same measure to a third, had she lived to take this into her head. Lucky Longinus! He had escaped the lady and inherited her treasure. A Lombard hoard in which the spoils of the Gepidae had been augmented by the plunder of the richer half of Italy was something worth having. The unfortunate Gepids' involuntary contribution could fairly be booked by the Imperial Auditor-General as interest due on capital that had been levied by Alboin in Italy without its lawful Roman owners' leave. Like the good civil servant that he may well have been, the viceroy Longinus duly remitted Rosamund's treasure from Ravenna to Constantinople, where it was as utterly out of reach of itching barbarian hands as was the treasure of the Nibelungs after Hagen had sunk it in the Rhine.<sup>1</sup>

The ironical or censorious spectator who views the tragedy of Rosamund from the ivory tower of some place and time far removed from the moral slum of the Heroic Age—though not on that account immune from other exhibitions of Original Sin—will be better advised to apply to the daughter of Cunimund the more charitable verdict that has been pronounced by a Christian historian on Philometor's daughter Cleopatra.

'From her girlhood she had been treated as a thing whose heart did not come into consideration, a mere piece in the political game. What wonder that she became a politician whose heart was dead?'<sup>2</sup>

If we ask ourselves whether these women who exercise their 'monstrous regiment' in the inferno of the Heroic Age are heroines or villainesses or victims or elusive participants in all three roles, we shall arrive at no clear-cut answer to our question. Unquestionably, on the other hand, this tragic moral ambivalence makes them ideal subjects for poetry; and it is no accident that, in the epic legacy of a post-Minoan heroic age, one of the favourite *genres* should have been 'catalogues of

<sup>1</sup> The story of Rosamund is recounted by Thomas Hodgkin in *Italy and her Invaders*, vol. v, Book VI (Oxford 1895, Clarendon Press), pp. 134-40 and 168-73. On p. 168, Hodgkin notes that, in the sagas of the Lombards, 'women had already played a leading part'.

<sup>2</sup> Bevan, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 250.

women' in which the recital of one legendary virago's crimes and sufferings called up the legend of another representative of her kind, in an almost endless chain of poetic reminiscences.<sup>1</sup> The historic women whose grim lives echo through this poetry would have smiled, with wry countenances, could they have foreknown that a reminiscence of a reminiscence would one day evoke *A Dream of Fair Women* in the imagination of a Victorian poet. They would have felt decidedly more at home in the atmosphere of the third scene in the first act of *Macbeth*.

<sup>1</sup> The epic formula  $\eta\ \sigma\iota\eta$  ('or such as was'), by which each link in this tragic chain was attached to its predecessor, generated the nicknamed *HOIAI* for catalogues of this type. The fragments of two collections of the kind—the *HOIAI*, alias *KATAΛΟΓΟΣ*, and the *ΜΕΤΑΛΛΙ HOIAI*—will be found in Aloisius Rzach's edition of the works of Hesiod, to whom the authorship of this poetry came to be ascribed (*Hesiodi Carmina* recensuit Aloisius Rzach, editio altera (Leipzig 1908, Teubner), pp. 131-87). A longer specimen is embedded in *Odyssey*, Book XI, ll. 225-332.



# VIII E (I), ANNEX

## OPTICAL ILLUSIONS IN HESIOD'S VISTA OF HISTORY

IN A Dark Age that is pregnant with a new civilization a speculative mind is both stirred by the quickening of its social environment and cramped by the cribbedness of its historical horizon.

This lowness in the degree of historical visibility, with which an intellectual worker in a Dark Age is condemned to contend, handicapped the superlative genius of Ibn Khaldūn in his study of the rises and falls of empires; for all the empires of which the great Maghribī historian-philosopher had any substantial knowledge belonged to the particular—and peculiar—class of empires founded by Nomads.<sup>1</sup> Even the Baghdādī 'Abbasid and Cordovan Umayyad caliphates were derivatives of a Damascene Arab Nomad successor-state of the Roman Empire; and, in Ibn Khaldūn's vista, this antecedent non-Nomadic universal state was barely visible. The authentic sources of Roman history were not accessible to the Maghribī scholar; and the inductions on which he bases his historical 'laws' are thus perforce drawn almost exclusively from the histories of a Caliphate originating in the Primitive Muslim Arab Völkerwanderung and of this Caliphate's Berber, Arab, Turkish, and Mongol Nomad successor-states. A similar limitation of historical outlook betrayed the author of the Hesiodic catalogue of races into falling a victim to a series of optical illusions.

We have already noticed<sup>2</sup> that Hesiod is fantastically out of his reckoning in his attempt to take his own generation's historical bearings. From his Epimethean standpoint he has mistaken the expectant darkness before dawn for an eternal night of unrelieved gloom.<sup>3</sup> We have also noticed<sup>4</sup> that his vision has played him false even when it has been directed towards the past age lying nearest to his own. His astigmatism has diffracted the social interregnum immediately following the dissolution of the Minoan Civilization into a mirage of two separate ages—an Age of Bronze and a subsequent Age of Heroes—which, in reality, are merely diverse aspects of a single episode of history. But Hesiod's mental vision has not only played him this trick of diffracting one age into the semblance of two; it has also led him into the contrary error of 'telescoping' two, or perhaps even three, ages into the semblance of one.

The Race of Gold, as Hesiod depicts it,<sup>5</sup> may be interpreted as standing, in the first instance, for 'the thalassocracy of Minos'—the imposing universal state which is the earliest form in which the Minoan Civilization will have made an enduring mark on the imagination of its Achæan

<sup>1</sup> This point has been noticed in III. iii. 24.

<sup>2</sup> On pp. 57 and 79-80, above.

<sup>3</sup> This illusion of an Hellenic poet in the eighth century B.C. has its counterpart in Western history in the expectation—widely current in Western Christendom at and after the opening of the eleventh century of the Christian Era—that the end of the World was at hand (see I. i. 171, n. 1).

<sup>4</sup> In VIII. (i) *passim*, above.

<sup>5</sup> In *Works and Days*, II. 109-26.

barbarian successors whose epic poetry is Hesiod's *Book of Genesis*. On this interpretation the Race of Silver, who are the Golden Men's epigoni, will stand for these same Minoan 'thalassocrats' in the subsequent *dégringolade* which results in their being swept away to leave the field to a barbarian Race of Bronze. The Silver Men's contemptible combination of babyishness with aggressiveness and godlessness accords with this reading of the passage, while, on the same interpretation, the, at first sight, surprising meed of honour that is paid to them retrospectively, after their unceremonious liquidation, is explicable, not as a tribute to virtues with which the Race of Silver is not credited, but as a protest against atrocities, perpetrated by an interloping Race of Bronze, which make the liquidated Silver Men's viciousness look amiable by comparison.

While this is undoubtedly one component of Hesiod's picture of the Race of Gold, it can hardly be the only one; for a vista of a civilization that sees no farther back than the heyday of its universal state is, of course, a drastically foreshortened view; and we may guess that, on a different plane of vision, Hesiod's races of Gold and Silver cover, between them, the whole history of the Minoan Civilization from start to finish—the Race of Gold standing for a Minoan age of growth, and the Race of Silver for a Minoan age of disintegration.

On this interpretation, Hesiod's Race of Gold and Race of Iron, which, in the poet's vista, seem to stand out at the two poles of his graduated series of morally deteriorating phases of society, prove really to be two instances of an identical phase, which feels like an age of iron to a poet born into the growth-phase of the Hellenic Civilization, but looks golden to him when he is viewing the growth-phase of the alien and mysterious Minoan Civilization through the kindly mist of a tradition that has been mellowed by the passage of the centuries.

Yet the posthumous glitter of the growth-phase and of the Indian Summer of the Minoan Civilization does not account for all the elements in the life of the Race of Gold, as Hesiod describes it. A feature to which the poet gives prominence<sup>1</sup> is the Golden Men's effortless enjoyment of an abundant food-supply which the soil produces for them of its own accord without exacting from them any agricultural labour; and, though this may be no more than a naïve barbarian observer's impression of the mysteriously organized life of an urban population whose industry commands supplies of food which it has not produced for itself, it may also be a genuine recollection of a food-gathering phase of human economy—antecedent to the birth of the Minoan or any other civilization—in which Primitive Man, after his arduous feat of becoming fully human, had rested for a season from his labours in a static Yin-state.<sup>2</sup> This is the interpretation of the Hesiodic *ἐνὶ Κρόνου βίος* that was current among latter-day Hellenic men of letters—though the likewise Hesiodic myth of Cronos's overthrow by his usurper-son Zeus<sup>3</sup> looks more like a reminiscence of the replacement of a fallen Minoan

<sup>1</sup> In *Works and Days*, ll. 116-19.

<sup>2</sup> See II. i. 192-5 and 290-3, and IV. iv. 585-8.

<sup>3</sup> See *Theogony*, ll. 71-73.

'thalassocracy' by one of its Achaean barbarian successor-states.<sup>1</sup> In an age in which this food-gathering economy had been observed in the life by Modern Western anthropologists who had tracked down the last of the food-gatherers in the fastnesses where they had sought shelter from the disturbing impact of the parvenu civilizations, these latter-day observers had been able to ascertain that this régime of casual labour was indeed a life of relatively low psychological tension by comparison with the organized and disciplined life of the husbandman, the shepherd, and the industrial worker; but, just because of this, it had proved not to be a life of material plenty or comfort.

On this analysis, Hesiod's Golden Age dissolves into three ages, one of which turns out to be identical with an Iron Age that is not, after all, the dead end that Hesiod felt it to be, but is the dayspring that, in retrospect, looks like gold. On the other hand, Hesiod's Bronze Age and Heroic Age lose their separate identities and melt into a single age for which Hesiod's sombre picture of the Iron Age would serve as an apt description.

<sup>1</sup> See I. i. 96 and III. iii. 113-14.

## IX. B (I), ANNEX

### THE RELATIVITY OF THE UNIT OF CLASSIFICATION TO THE OBJECT OF STUDY

THE ground on which some twenty-one or twenty-three units have been treated in this book as so many distinct representatives of a species of society that we have labelled 'civilizations' is our finding that each of them constitutes, in itself, an intelligible field of study.<sup>1</sup> Whereas the parochial communities into which most of these civilizations were articulated at some stages of their histories prove to have shared their main historical experiences with most of the other parochial communities comprised within the same society, so that the history of any single parochial community is intelligible only in the setting of the history of the whole society in whose life it has been a participant, the history of each of these larger social units, the civilizations, proves, by contrast, to be more or less intelligible in itself, because each civilization, in so far as it has met with the typical specific experiences of the species of which it is one representative, will be found to have met with them in circumstances, in places, and at dates that were peculiar to its own history, so that these episodes can be studied and comprehended in isolation from the corresponding experiences in the histories of other civilizations.

It is true that, where we have a pair of civilizations—for instance the Muslim pair or the Christian pair—in which the two sister civilizations are both affiliated to one and the same antecedent society, each of the two may prove to have emerged at approximately the same date from the intervening social interregnum; but, thereafter, even when the two sister civilizations are conjuring up 'renaissances' of elements in the life of their dead common parent, we shall find<sup>2</sup> that they are each apt to revive different elements of this common heritage in response to different challenges, and we have already found that their histories are apt to follow equally independent and distinctive courses in other respects.

For example, the main body of the Orthodox Christian Society broke down, on our interpretation of its history, at a date signalized by the outbreak of the Great Romano-Bulgarian War of A.D. 977-1019, i.e. at a date before the Russian offshoot of the Orthodox Christian Society had yet been planted out. This means that the breakdown of this Russian Orthodox Christendom, whatever date we may assign to it, must, *ex hypothesi*, have been later than the date of the breakdown of the main body of Orthodox Christendom, and must therefore have occurred in different circumstances, as well as in a different geographical theatre; and, when we go on to ask ourselves about the breakdown of the sister Western Christian Civilization, we shall find ourselves unable, on the historical evidence forthcoming midway through the twentieth century of the Christian Era, to certify that, by that date, the experience of breakdown had yet overtaken a long since broken-down Orthodox Christendom's Western sister. It was certain, at any rate, in the year

<sup>1</sup> See I. i. 17-50, cited on p. 88, above.

<sup>2</sup> In X. ix. 1-166.

A.D. 1952 that the Western Society had not yet entered into a universal state, whereas by that date each of the two Orthodox Christian societies had not only entered into a universal state of its own but had already passed out of this again—if we are right in seeing the universal state of the main body of Orthodox Christendom in the Ottoman Empire and the universal state of the Russian offshoot of Orthodox Christendom in the Muscovite Empire.

If these historical findings are correct, they warrant our practice of treating our twenty-one or twenty-three units as so many distinct representatives of one and the same species of society for the purpose of studying some, at least, of this species' specific experiences. We have found, for instance, that this practice has justified itself, by proving to answer to the historical facts, in our study of the geneses, growths, and breakdowns of civilizations and in our study of encounters between contemporaries, and we shall find it justifying itself again, on the same empirical test, when we come to study the renaissances of elements of the cultures of antecedent civilizations. Moreover, in our study of institutions generated in the course of the disintegrations of civilizations, we have found that each of our units can be treated as an intelligible field in itself for a study of the universal states established by dominant minorities<sup>1</sup> and a study of the war-bands mustered by the transfrontier barbarians.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand we have found that, in studying the recruitment of internal proletariats and the epiphanies of higher religions within their bosom in the histories of the disintegrations of civilizations of the second generation, the confines of a single civilization no longer afford us an intelligible field of study for the purpose here in view. For this purpose, we have had to expand our historical horizon by taking cognizance of contacts or encounters between two or more civilizations that have been one another's contemporaries.

In finding this we are, of course, simply finding—as we should indeed have expected *a priori*—that the range of the intelligible field of historical study is not the same for all purposes but varies in accordance with the nature of the object that is being studied in each case. Each different historical object will be found to have a specific field of its own, with a specific range that is the optimum for the study of this particular object; and all that we are claiming for the twenty-one or twenty-three units with which we have operated in Parts I–VI and in Part VIII of this Study, as well as in the present Part IX, and with which we shall operate again in Part X, is that these prove to be intelligible fields for the study of the geneses, growths, and breakdowns of civilizations, for the study of universal states and barbarian war-bands, for the study of encounters between contemporaries, and for the study of renaissances. We do claim that, for these purposes, it is both correct and illuminating to treat these units as so many distinct members of one and the same species of society; but, in claiming this, we are not claiming that our units are necessarily all on a par with one another in other respects.

Supposing, for example, that we were studying, not the experiences of civilizations, but their heritages from the Past, then manifestly, for

<sup>1</sup> See VI. vii. 1–379.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 1–87, above.



the purpose of that study, the relation between the three 'Hellenistic' Christian civilizations or between the two 'Syriatic' Muslim civilizations or between the two 'Sinistic' Far Eastern civilizations would not be found to be on a par with the relation between, let us say, a 'Syriatic' Iranic Muslim civilization and an 'Indistic' Hindu civilization that had collided with one another, without coalescing, in India. For the particular purpose of studying heritages, we should begin by sorting out the mutual relations between our twenty-one or twenty-three units into two distinct classes: one class of relations in virtue of which the members of a pair or a trio of societies might be called one another's 'sisters', in virtue of their being affiliated, alike, to one and the same antecedent civilization, and another class of relations in which the parties were not linked with one another by any common heritage derived from one identical predecessor. In studying the heritages of the civilizations of the third generation, we should have to take account, not only of the antecedent civilizations to which they were affiliated, but also of the churches that had served them as their chrysalises; and, for this purpose, we might find ourselves reducing the number of our units in this generation from eight to two, namely one great society—comprising the three Christian and the two Muslim civilizations—which had derived its religious inspiration and acquired its moral *éthos* mainly from Judaism, and a second great society, comprising the Hindu Civilization and the two Far Eastern civilizations, whose religious inspiration and moral *éthos* could be traced back in some part to Buddhism. The spiritual affinity between the Judaistic Muslim hero the Mahdi Muhammad Ahmad and his adversary the Judaistic Christian hero General Charles George Gordon would leap to the eye of a Buddhist monk or a Confucian philosopher, while conversely a Muslim or a Christian observer would perceive the spiritual affinity between an Indistic Hindu sanyasi and an Indistic Japanese practitioner of the Zen discipline of Mahayanian Buddhism.

These considerations seemed to the writer of this Study to suggest the answer to a pertinent and trenchant criticism, by Prince Dmitri Obolensky, of the writer's classification of the main body of Orthodox Christendom, the offshoot of Orthodox Christendom in Russia, and the Western Society as three separate civilizations.

'The picture we shall have of Byzantium and the Mediaeval West,' Prince Obolensky writes in his critique of this classification, 'will be of two different but closely interwoven halves of one Graeco-Roman Christian and European civilisation.' Neither half, on this reading, was in any real sense a self-contained unit or a fully "intelligible field of historical study", at least until the fifteenth century. . . . From the eighteenth cen-

<sup>1</sup> The same view of the relation between these two Christendoms was expressed by B. H. Sumner, the late Warden of All Souls College, Oxford, in a letter of the 25th January, 1951, to the writer of this Study:

'Where I differ, with great hesitation, from you is in regarding Western Christendom and Eastern Christendom as [being] sufficiently close to each other to be grouped together. I look upon them as, on the whole, one Christendom, or one "West", with two facets.'

B. H. Sumner's view is expounded in a paper on 'Russia and Europe' in *Oxford Slavonic Papers*, vol. ii (Oxford 1951, Clarendon Press), pp. 1-16.—A.J.T.

ture. . . . Russia's Byzantine heritage, overlaid with influences from the contemporary West, ceased to be the primary source of Russian culture, and the "intelligible field" of Russian history in this period should be widened to include the greater part of Europe. In any case the realm of Byzantine Civilisation, which in geographico-cultural terms can, both in mediaeval and [in] modern times, be largely described as Eastern Europe, was never a self-contained unit, but should be regarded as an integral part of European Christendom.<sup>1</sup>

In so far as Prince Obolensky's criterion, in this paper, for his classification of civilizations is the presence or absence, in their heritages, of common legacies from antecedent civilizations, the writer of this Study would not only agree that, for this purpose, three of the units which, in this Study, have been distinguished from one another for a different purpose could and should be treated as so many parts of a single more comprehensive unit; he would go on to submit that, for the purpose of classifying societies by their heritages, if the criterion of unity or separateness is to be their participation or their non-participation in a dual heritage from both Hellenism on the one hand and Christianity on the other, then the ambit of Prince Obolensky's 'one Graeco-Roman Christian and European Civilization' must be extended, as has been suggested above, to include the present writer's two Muslim civilizations as well—considering that Islam originated as a Christian heresy<sup>2</sup> and that thereafter, in the 'Abbasid Age, Islam followed Christianity's example in receiving into itself the heritage of Hellenism in the two intellectual provinces of Philosophy and Science<sup>3</sup> and worked out for itself a Hellenistic Islamic theology on the pattern of the Hellenistic Christian theology previously worked out by the Greek Fathers of the Christian Church. The Muslims cannot be ruled out of membership in a society for which the certificate of membership is a participation in both the Christian and the Hellenic heritage; and, though their inclusion requires the abandonment of Prince Obolensky's geographical limitation of his Graeco-Roman Christian Civilization to the confines of Europe, this limitation cannot in any case be maintained unless Orthodox Christendom, as well as Dār-al-Islām, is excluded, considering that the cradle of the Orthodox Christian Civilization lay on the Asiatic side of the Black Sea Straits, in Asia Minor.<sup>4</sup> Indeed, even Western Christendom could hardly be claimed as a product of Europe, considering the importance, in its life and thought, of the influence of Latin Fathers whose home was North-West Africa.

On the other hand, for the purposes of studying the geneses, growths, and breakdowns of civilizations and the histories of universal states, barbarian war-bands, encounters between contemporaries and renaissances, a unitary Helleno-Christian 'great society' is not, in the present writer's view, an effective or an illuminating unit for the conduct of intellectual operations. These seven lines of study can be pursued, in his view, with better chances of success if, for these purposes, an Helleno-

<sup>1</sup> Obolensky, D.: 'Russia's Byzantine Heritage', in *Oxford Slavonic Papers*, vol. i (Oxford 1950, Clarendon Press), pp. 53 and 56.

<sup>2</sup> See V. v. 230, n. 4, and p. 347, above.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 408, with n. 5, above.

<sup>4</sup> See I. i. 63-64; II. ii. 79; and p. 726-7, below.

Christian monolith is dissected into five separate civilizations. These smaller units seemed to the writer to be indicated for these purposes because an empirical inquiry showed—so it appeared to him—that, in so far as these experiences had been met with in the histories of these five units up to date, each unit had had its own separate experience of genesis, growth, and breakdown, had generated its own separate universal states and war-bands, had had its own separate encounters with contemporaries, and had evoked its own separate renaissances, whereas he could not recall a single case in which any of these experiences had been shared by all the five units in question. So far from that, it appeared to him that the experience of passing through a universal state, which had already overtaken the two Orthodox Christian civilizations, had not yet overtaken the Western Civilization or either of the two Muslim civilizations. If this diagnosis was correct, it seemed to follow that the study of universal states could not be illuminated, but could only be obscured, by operating with the Helleno-Christian civilizations as the single unit that would be the key to a successful intellectual operation when the objects of study were, not experiences, but heritages.

It seemed to the writer that the five smaller units were decidedly more efficient keys than the single monolithic unit when the object of study was the historical phenomenon of encounters in the Space-dimension between civilizations that were contemporary with one another. The frequency and intimacy of the encounters between the three non-Muslim Helleno-Christian societies had been taken by Prince Obolensky as a sign that in truth these were, not three societies, but one society. In the second of the two passages quoted above he adduces the penetration of Russia by cultural influences radiating from the Modern West as evidence that, in this chapter of history at least, Russia and the West ought to be regarded as being provinces of one single cultural realm, and in the sequel to the first passage of the two he similarly adduces the penetration of a Medieval Western Christendom by cultural influences radiating from Byzantium as evidence that Byzantium and the Medieval West ought to be regarded as being 'two different but closely interwoven halves of one Graeco-Roman Christian and European civilization.'

'If,' he continues, 'we were inclined to doubt the truth of this interpretation, we have only to think how much will remain unintelligible in the mediaeval history of Western and Central Europe unless we consider the Byzantine contributions to its culture: Anglo-Saxon scholarship of the eighth century, the Carolingian art of the ninth, Otto III's restoration of the Roman Empire, the growth of the Norman Kingdom of Sicily, the cultural aftermath of the Crusades, the Italian Renaissance, these and other important events of European history cannot be understood without reference to Eastern Europe. The Basilica of St. Mark in Venice, the Art of Giotto and El Greco, are these not eloquent signs of how much the Western World owed to the genius of Byzantium?'<sup>1</sup>

Indisputably they are; but are they not also signs that the body social which was the recipient of this cultural radiation was a separate and a different entity from the body by which the radiation was emitted?

<sup>1</sup> Obolensky, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

For, when we turn our attention from the impact of Byzantium on the Medieval West to the impact of the Modern West on its contemporaries, we find parallels to all the phenomena cited by Prince Obolensky from the history of the encounter between Byzantium and the Medieval West in the relations between the Modern West and three Buddhaistic societies—the Hindu, the Far Eastern in China, and the Far Eastern in Korea and Japan—which neither Prince Obolensky nor any other student of history would be likely to classify, in virtue of these relations, as being so many subdivisions of a single all-embracing civilization in which the Western Civilization was likewise to be reckoned as being included.

The inspiration of eighth-century Anglo-Saxon scholarship and ninth-century Carolingian art by the genius of Byzantium has its counterpart in the inspiration of nineteenth-century Bengali scholarship and twentieth-century Bengali art by the genius of the Modern West. Otto III's restoration of the Roman Empire in Byzantine dress has its counterpart in the restoration of the Mughal Rāj in Western dress by the British East India Company. The establishment of a Norman successor-state of the East Roman Empire in Sicily is matched by the establishment, in A.D. 1947, of three Asian successor-states of the British Rāj in India: Pakistan, the Indian Union, and Burma. The cultural aftermath of the Crusades in Western Christendom has its counterpart in the cultural aftermath, in the Ottoman Muslim World, of the 'Osmanlis' likewise temporarily victorious *jihāds* against the Christendoms (if we may allow ourselves to cite this one example from the history of the relations between the Modern West and an Islamic Civilization that shared with the West its Hellenic-Christian heritage). The Byzantine contribution to the Italian renaissance of an Hellenic literary culture consisted in initiating the fifteenth-century Italian humanists into the Greek originals of Roman copyists' Latin imitations through which the Italian Humanists had previously been cultivating Hellenism at second hand;<sup>1</sup> and, in the history of the impact of the Modern West upon the Hindu World, this Byzantine service to the Italian Humanists has its counterpart in the initiation of nineteenth-century and twentieth-century Hindu pandits into a scientific study of Sanskrit by the Western pioneers in the science of the comparative study of the Indo-European languages. The imprint of Byzantium on the Basilica of St. Mark in Venice has its counterpart in the imprint of the Italian Renaissance on the Taj Mahall at Agra. The Byzantine *motifs* in the art of Giotto and El Greco have their counterparts in the Western *motifs* in the art of a twentieth-century Japan.

On this showing, the evidences of the penetration of Western Christendom by the radiation of Byzantine cultural influences would seem, in the present writer's eyes, to indicate, not that Byzantium and the Medieval West were provinces of one and the same cultural realm, but rather that they were two distinct societies whose relations were on a par with those between a Modern Western Society and its contemporaries in India and the Far East.

<sup>1</sup> See IV. iv. 275, n. 1, and 363, n. 1; and X. ix. 63.

As the present writer saw it, however, the lesson to be learnt from Prince Obolensky's critique of the writer's classification of civilizations was not that either the writer's own classification or Prince Obolensky's alternative classification was right or wrong in any absolute or universal sense. The lesson appeared to be that all such classifications, analyses, and dissections were keys which were useful in so far as they served the practical purpose of opening locks. Any one of them would have been proved to be a genuine key if it did effectively unlock a door; and some of these keys were good for opening more doors than one; but there did not seem to be any master key that rendered all its fellow keys superfluous by unlocking all doors alike; and therefore a resourceful researcher who had been moved by his curiosity to explore the wonderland of History would keep on adding to the bunch of keys on his key-ring. Whenever he ran into a closed door barring the way to further progress in his intellectual quest, his first recourse would be to try whether any of the keys already on his ring would turn this next door's lock; but, if none of them proved to fit, he would neither try to force the door nor despair of succeeding in opening it, but would set about casting a new key to fit a lock that had been proved by experiment to be one of a novel structure.



## IX. B (ii) (a) 1, ANNEX I

### THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGICAL COMPETITION IN THE WESTERNIZATION OF RUSSIA

THE part played in the Westernization of Russia by a spontaneous response to the appeal of the Modern Western culture, as contrasted with a reluctant capitulation to a recognized necessity of adopting Western weapons for the purpose of keeping the West at bay, is underlined in the following note by Prince D. Obolensky:

'I would say that to describe the relations between Russia and the Modern West solely, or mainly, in terms of a technological race between a rapidly expanding Western military and economic technique and a Russian resistance to the resultant menace of military conquest or cultural absorption would be to paint only part of the picture. It is, of course, true that Peter's reforms were primarily dictated by military considerations and by Russia's need, in order to maintain and improve her military and political status as a great European power, to "catch up" with the economically more advanced West. Moreover, I would agree, up to a point, that the Westernizing movement among the educated minority of the Orthodox population of Western Russia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries found its *raison d'être* in the policy of resisting encroachments of the West (i.e. of the Roman Catholic Church) by adopting Western weapons (i.e. from Catholicism and Protestantism). But . . . I would say that this Westernising movement, not only in the Ukraine but in Muscovy as well, was due just as much to a genuine belief held by some of its leaders in the superiority of the contemporary Western culture, and to their desire to imitate Western habits and institutions because they were good in themselves. This is surely true of such outstanding statesmen and diplomatists of the second half of the seventeenth century as Ordin-Nashchokin and Prince V. Galitsin, who pursued a policy of "selective Westernisation".'

On the other hand it is surely also true that Peter the Great himself, spiritual 'changeling' though he was in his native Muscovite cultural environment, was an *anima naturaliter Occidentalis* only in the narrowly limited sense of having a gift and a passion for the contemporary Western World's technology. We have noticed in another context<sup>1</sup> that this technological approach of his was distasteful to cultivated Westerners of that age—for example, Bishop Burnet and King William III—who had not been broken in to a future Industrial Age of Western Civilization in which this exotic young barbarian man of genius was already living by anticipation; and, though Peter's genius was so great that he soon became aware of the necessity of broadening his approach if he was to succeed in attaining his primary technological objective, his spontaneous appetite for the non-technological elements in the Western Civilization always remained comparatively feeble except in so far as it was whetted by a partially enlightened view of the requirements of a technological utilitarianism.

<sup>1</sup> In III. iii. 279.

Within the province of Technology, Peter did give proof, as soon as military necessity allowed, of a spontaneous impulse to extend the range of his Westernizing policy from the manufacture of Western weapons to the manufacture of Western non-military commodities.

'Between A.D. 1695 and A.D. 1709 nearly three-quarters of the new manufactories were state works, and nearly all of them were designed for military and naval needs. Between 1710 and 1725 the picture changes, as the needs of war become rather less absorbing. The new works in his later years were far less concentrated on military needs; silk, velvet, and ribbon manufactories were started; china, glass, and brickworks made their appearance. A number of the state factories were handed over to private operation, and Peter pressed forward the opening of new works by individuals or companies, granting them important exemptions and privileges'.<sup>1</sup>

In thus becoming less exclusively military, Peter's Westernizing activities did not, however, become less utilitarian—as is shown by the persistent utilitarianism of his educational policy;<sup>2</sup> and, though, here too, the scope of the Westernizing movement in Russia broadened rapidly after Peter's death, this subsequent progress of Russia's cultural Westernization beyond the limits of military or even civil utilitarian requirements seems to have been due, not so much to a Russian 'desire to imitate Western habits and institutions because they were good in themselves', as to the operation of a cultural 'law'<sup>3</sup> that, in any encounter between contemporaries, a single element of a radioactive alien culture, when once admitted into a recipient society's body social, tends to draw in after it other elements of the same alien culture-pattern.

<sup>1</sup> Sumner, B. H.: *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia* (London 1950, English Universities Press), p. 166.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 554-7, above.

<sup>3</sup> Examined on pp. 542-64, above.

THE BYZANTINE INSPIRATION OF THE  
RUSSIAN POLITICAL ÊTHOS

IN the first draft of the chapter to which this Annex attaches, the writer assumed that the autocratic régime that was built up in Muscovy in and after the fourteenth century of the Christian Era had drawn its inspiration from the Byzantine political tradition; but the comments on this draft which he received from B. H. Sumner<sup>1</sup> and from Prince D. Obolensky convinced him that the Muscovite political institutions which took shape during the period of Mongol ascendancy over Eastern Russia were, for the most part, home-grown responses to the challenge of pressure from alien civilizations on two fronts: from a Eurasian Nomad Society on the south-east and from a Western Christian Society on the north-west. At the same time the historical evidence still seemed to the writer to indicate that the political climate of a Russian Orthodox Christendom, in which a home-grown Muscovite autocracy had found so favourable an environment for establishing itself, had been predominantly Byzantine in its origin.

One consequence of the supremacy which a resuscitated Imperial Régime had established over the Orthodox Christian Church within the frontiers of the East Roman Empire in the course of the eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries of the Christian Era<sup>2</sup> had been that, when a hitherto independent pagan state received Christianity from the East Roman Church, it could not place itself under the ecclesiastical authority of the Oecumenical Patriarch at Constantinople without thereby implicitly acknowledging the political sovereignty of the Oecumenical Patriarch's secular lord and master the East Roman Emperor.<sup>3</sup> This political implication of conversion to Orthodox Christianity was, as we have seen, the cause of a war to the death between the East Roman Empire and a converted Bulgaria that was responsible for the breakdown of the main body of Orthodox Christendom in the very generation in which Russia was entering the Orthodox Christian fold. This juridical consequence of conversion was in practice much less serious for the Russians than it had been for the Bulgarians, because Russia, instead of lying, as Bulgaria lay, on Byzantium's threshold, was insulated from the East Roman Empire by the double barrier of the Black Sea and the Eurasian Steppe;<sup>4</sup> and the princes of Kiev and her successor-states, including Muscovy, appear to have acquiesced, with only a few symptoms of restiveness, in the East Roman Empire's pretension to a political supremacy over the Oecumenical Patriarchate's Russian ecclesiastical subjects throughout the period of more than four centuries' length that elapsed between the enthronement of Theóemptos, the first Greek Metropolitan of Kiev, in A.D. 1039 and the extinction of the last remnants of the East Roman Empire by the 'Osmanlis in A.D. 1453-61.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See VI. vii. 577-9.<sup>2</sup> See IV. iv. 592-612.<sup>3</sup> See IV. iv. 377.<sup>4</sup> See p. 152, n. 6, above.<sup>5</sup> See pp. 399-400, above.

'The fourteenth-century rulers of Muscovy', Prince Obolensky observes in a note on the present writer's first draft, 'continued to acknowledge, at least in theory, the quasi-religious sovereignty of the Byzantine Emperors, whose oecumenical authority and legislative power were still recognised in Russia in the fifteenth century: thus, for example, the Emperor John VI Cantacuzenus wrote to the Grand Prince Symeon of Moscow (*füngebatur* A.D. 1340-53): "Yes, the Empire of the Romans and the most holy and great Church of God are, as you have written, the source of all piety and the school of law and sanctification". And the Grand Prince Basil II of Moscow (*füngebatur* A.D. 1425-62), writing to the Emperor after the Council of Florence, calls him "the pious and holy autocrat of the whole Universe".'

Considering that the juridical sovereignty of the East Roman Empire was thus acknowledged by Russian princes, including the latter-day Grand Dukes of Muscovy, over a Time-span of more than four centuries, it is hardly credible that the political *éthos*, as distinct from the administrative institutions, of a Russian Orthodox Christendom should not have been deeply influenced by the political *éthos* of 'the Second Rome'; and W. Weidle is surely right in stating, in his brilliant *Russie Absente et Présente*,<sup>1</sup> that 'les conceptions politiques investies dans l'ancien État moscovite étaient de provenance byzantine'.

By contrast, the *éthos*, as well as the institutional structure, of a post-Muscovite Petrine autocracy in Russia was manifestly derived from a contemporary Western World, and the writer would agree with Prince Obolensky's view 'that Peter's "enlightened autocracy" owes far more to contemporary Western models than to any Byzantine prototype', and that 'Peter's ecclesiastical reform, which led to the partial subjection of the Russian Church to the Imperial power in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and to the breakdown of that relationship between the spiritual and temporal powers which Medieval Russia had inherited from Byzantium, was based on Western Lutheran, not East Roman, models.' The writer of this Study would, however, go on to point out that this seventeenth-century Western 'enlightened autocracy' proves, on a scrutiny of its origins, not to have been a native Western product; for its lineage can be traced back through the Late Medieval North Italian despots to the Holy Roman Emperor and King of Sicily, Frederick II Hohenstaufen; through Frederick to the Norman founders of a Sicilian and Apulian successor-state of the East Roman Empire; and through them to the East Roman Empire itself.<sup>2</sup>

The writer would also venture to suggest an amendment to Prince Obolensky's view that 'the notion of a purely secular state, regarded as the source of all authority and legislation and the ultimate object of men's loyalty, and in which the clergy are no more than civil servants whose very spiritual authority is delegated to them by the Government, would, from the Byzantine view-point, have seemed a strange aberration.' On the writer's interpretation of the Byzantine *Weltanschauung*, it would indeed have seemed to a Byzantine critic strangely naïve, inelegant, and impolitic, to the point of being shocking, for an East Roman

<sup>1</sup> Paris 1949, Gallimard, p. 73, quoted on p. 395, above.

<sup>2</sup> See III. iii. 300-1, 305, and 354-63; IV. iv. 198-200; and pp. 363 and 395, above.

statesman to claim in so many words—as a Western Frederick II and his eventual Lutheran successors were to stake their claim—that the Secular Power was the source of spiritual as well as temporal authority; but assuredly it would also have seemed, in Byzantine eyes, no less strangely incompetent and irresponsible for the secular Power to refrain from exercising *de facto* an effective control over the Church which, until the East Roman Empire fell on evil days, was always within an East Roman Emperor's grasp so long as he took care not to commit the gross Frankish Frederician indiscretion of publicly laying claim to this 'totalitarian' authority *de jure*.



THE CONFLICT OF CULTURES IN THE SOUL OF SOLOMÓS<sup>1</sup>

THE career of the conventional Italian poet Dionisio Salomone, who became the original Greek poet Dhionýsios Solomós, is one of the curiosities of the history of the transmission of culture. His genius found its opportunity for making its literary fortune thanks to the lucky accident of his being the bastard son, by a Zantiot Greek servant-girl, of a Zantiot landowner—Venetian in culture and origin, though Orthodox in religion—who, on his death-bed, married Dionisio's mother and left Dionisio and his brother handsome shares of his estate. At the age of ten, Dionisio was sent by his guardian to Italy for his education, and he remained there for ten years on end (A.D. 1808–18), first at Venice, then at Cremona, and finally at the Venetian university of Padua. During these years in Italy he received a thorough schooling in Italian and Latin literature; made friends with Monti, Manzoni, and other Italian men of letters; and became a disciple of the Western Romantic movement. After his return to Zante he joined an aristocratic Italianate literary circle there whose parlour-game was the extemporization of sonnets in Italian on some given subject or given set of line-endings; and there seemed no reason why he should not end his days in this conventionally cultivated obscurity.

Solomós found his true *métier* when, after the outbreak of the Ottoman Greek insurrection in A.D. 1821, a Mesolonghiot patriot-publicist, Spiridhòn Trikoúpis, visited him in Zante at his country villa in A.D. 1822 and invited him to become the Dante of a Greek Parnassus. 'I don't know Greek', Solomós replied, meaning that he had never been taught the Byzantine ecclesiastical Attic *koiné*. 'The language which you imbibed with your mother's milk is Greek', Trikoúpis retorted, meaning that Solomós could have communicated with his low-born mother in no other tongue than her Zantiot Romaïc Greek patois. Thereupon Solomós sprang into fame by composing in this mother tongue of his, in Italian metres, Western poetry, first in Byron's vein and later in Schiller's. Thanks to his being a Heptanesian aristocrat, Solomós was a highly cultivated man who did speak one of the dialects of living Greek as his mother tongue without knowing the dead language. In the early nineteenth century the Ionian Islands were perhaps the only place in Greek Orthodox Christendom where this could have happened, and the composition of Western poetry in living Greek—without murdering the language by trying to transform it into a resurrected Attic—was Solomós' inestimably valuable service to a new Greek nation that was seeking to enter the Western comity.

Solomós' work suffered, nevertheless, from another form of pedantry that was likewise inimical to poetry. His method of composing a Romaïc Greek poem was to take Italian notes, expand these into Greek

<sup>1</sup> See Jenkins, R.: *Dionysius Solomós* (Cambridge 1940, University Press).

prose, and then hammer this prose into verse! And in his latter years, when his mental vigour was on the decline, he relapsed into writing his poetry in the Italian which, in spite of his Romaic Greek *tours de force*, was, from first to last, his natural medium of literary expression. Moreover, his invincible native Westernism, which made him so effective a psychopompus for Greek souls seeking initiation into the Western culture, also inhibited him from going out to meet his Ottoman fellow Greek Orthodox Christians in deed as well as in word. When, on the eve of the fall of Mesolónghi, just across the water, the cannonade bombarded his ears in his peaceful villa on Zante, he suffered anguish but did not seek relief by going to the front in defiance of British regulations; and, though he lived on for a quarter of a century after a fragment of the Ottoman Empire had been transformed into a sovereign independent Kingdom of Greece with its capital at Athens, he preferred to end his days at Corfu under a British régime.

'In the days when I was young', wrote the Moreot klepht Kolokotronis, who had taken refuge on Zante in A.D. 1806, 'Zante seemed as far away as the ends of the Earth do now. What America is to us now—that is pretty well what Zante was to them [i.e. to the *fin-de-siècle* Moreot Ottoman Greeks]. When they went to Zante, they called it "going to the Western World" ("Phrangiá").'<sup>1</sup> Solomòs' career testifies that, in the feelings of a Zantiot aristocrat who was younger than Kolokotronis by the span of a whole generation, an adjacent ex-Ottoman Morea was still the *alter orbis* that an adjacent ex-Venetian Zante had been to the Moreot klepht in days before Solomòs was born.

<sup>1</sup> Kolokotronis, Th: *Διήγησις Συμβάντων τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς Φυλῆς, 1770-1836* (Athens 1889, Estia, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. 49, quoted in V. v. 301.

## IX. B (ii) (a) 2, ANNEX II

THE MOREA ON THE EVE OF THE UPRISING  
OF A.D. 1821

In A.D. 1821 the eyâlet of the Morea did not include the Mani, which, since A.D. 1776, had been under the jurisdiction, not of the Vâlî of the Morea, but of the Qapudân Pasha. On the eve of the uprising of A.D. 1821 the population of the eyâlet, excluding the Mani from the reckoning, is estimated to have been about 400,000, of whom about 360,000 were Greek and Albanian Orthodox Christians and about 40,000 were Turkish and Albanian Muslims.<sup>1</sup> The Turkish Muslim Moreots were concentrated in the towns: Corinth, Návplia, Mistrà, Monemvasía, Kóron, Navaríno, Arkadhíà, Pátras, Phanári, Leondári, Gastúni, Módhon. The populations of Návplia, Kóron, Módhon, and Navaríno were exclusively Muslim; those of Tripolítsa and Corinth were mixed in approximately equal proportions. Except in these two last-mentioned towns, the Christians, where there was a Christian element in the urban population, lived in separate quarters from the Muslims.<sup>2</sup>

At the same date about three-quarters of the agricultural land in the Morea is estimated to have been in the hands of the Muslim 10 per cent. of the population, and only one quarter in the hands of the Christian 90 per cent.: 41·7 per cent. of the land was accounted for by Imperial Ottoman fiefs, which were, of course, conferred on Muslim fiefcees; another 25 per cent. was accounted for by Muslim privately owned real estate; and the remaining 33·3 per cent. by Christian privately owned real estate.<sup>3</sup> The Muslim, as well as the Christian, estates were, however, cultivated by Christian tenants and hired labourers, who were at liberty to change their employers;<sup>4</sup> and the Christians, including labourers and tenants as well as freeholders, are estimated to have received 87·5 per cent. of the annual value of the agricultural produce, as against 12·5 per cent. received by the Muslims, who thus took only about 25 per cent. more than what would have fallen to them under a strictly proportional allocation.<sup>5</sup>

It will be seen that the economic conditions in the Morea between A.D. 1715 and A.D. 1821 were not seriously inequitable, and during the same century the administrative arrangements were remarkably favourable to the Orthodox Christian population or (it would be more accurate to say) to an Orthodox Christian oligarchy.<sup>6</sup> A system of local self-government, dating from the preceding period of Venetian occupation, had been maintained in the Morea after the Ottoman reconquest; and this self-government was not confined to the communes but extended to the departments (*Turcicè qazās*; *Graecè ἐπαρχίαι*) and to the province (*Turcicè eyâlet*) as a whole.<sup>7</sup> In each commune the aldermen (*Turcicè*

<sup>1</sup> See Sakellarios, M. V.: *Ἡ Πελοπόννησος κατὰ τὴν Δευτέραν Τουρκοκρατίαν, 1715-1821* (Athens 1939, Byzantinisch-Neugriechische Jahrbücher), p. 226.

<sup>2</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 118-19.

<sup>3</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 53.

<sup>4</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 49.

<sup>5</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 95.

<sup>6</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 51.

<sup>7</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 87.

khōja-bāshys; *Graecē δημογέροντες*) were elected annually,<sup>1</sup> and these in turn elected the Christian members (*Graecē προεστῶτες*) of the council of the voyevoda of the department, who in their turn, again, collectively constituted a provincial assembly which elected the two Christian members (*Graecē μωραγιάνιδες*) of the vāli's permanent council of five members including, besides the two Christian deputies, two Muslims and one Christian dragoman.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, the Greek Orthodox Christian community in the Morea had two or three political agents (vekils) accredited to the Porte at Constantinople.<sup>3</sup>

It can be said that [the departmental *προεστῶτες*] shared the administrative power with the voyevoda and the judicial with the qādi. They concentrated so much power in their hands that they were able fearlessly to hold their own against the Turkish authorities on their own level. Without their assent, no taxation could be imposed either for local or for general purposes. They were able to refuse to carry out orders of the voyevoda's if they considered these inexpedient. . . . If there were complaints against the voyevoda, and they had the qādi's concurrence, they could proceed at once to depose the voyevoda, subject only to referring their action retrospectively to the vezir [i.e. the vāli].<sup>4</sup>

Sakellarios concludes<sup>5</sup> that 'the *προεστῶτες* were the real rulers of their department'. A Moreot Greek Orthodox Christian born in A.D. 1798 saw the Ottoman régime in the Morea in its last phase in a more jaundiced light that does not necessarily give a more objective picture:

'The people appointed on their own initiative a headman (*πρωτόγερος*) or crier to carry out the general purposes of the commune and to give notice in the evening of any corvée on behalf either of the commune or of the Government. This notice was cried in the following terms: "Oyez! Oyez! to-morrow no one is to go about his own private business, because we are going to do so and so". Anyone who ignored the notice suffered for it; his neighbours wrecked his house; and, if he complained to the Government, the Government paid no attention—unless it were to punish him for insubordination . . .

'In every large village, and sometimes in small ones, they had an alderman (*γέροντας*) or two aldermen, according to the size of the population, who, in collaboration with the priests, assessed the taxes imposed on the commune among its individual members in accordance with their means . . .

'Whenever the potentate chose to oppress a town or a family, he would send a government official straight away and would demand whatever he chose, and the inhabitants, as I have said, would assess among themselves what was required, whether it was a money payment or some form of corvée, through the agency of the aldermen. The Turks had to allow their *ra'i'ye'h* all these rights in order that they might prosper and be at the Turks' disposal as slaves. On this account they looked after our well-being, and everyone among the *ra'i'ye'h* had some important Turk for a patron, while the whole commune in each town and village likewise had

<sup>1</sup> See Sakellarios, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

<sup>2</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 89–92; cp. Finlay, G.: *A History of Greece from its Conquest by the Romans to the Present Time, B.C. 146 to A.D. 1864* (Oxford 1877, Clarendon Press, 7 vols.), vol. vi, p. 25.

<sup>3</sup> See Sakellarios, *op. cit.*, p. 94; Finlay, vol. vi, p. 25.

<sup>4</sup> Sakellarios, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

<sup>5</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 91.

some powerful patron for its own special preservation and protection. In the large towns, however, things were rather better, owing to their more advanced development.<sup>1</sup>

At the same time there was complete religious toleration in the Morea;<sup>2</sup> by the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the behaviour of the Moreot Muslims towards their Christian fellow Moreots had become less harsh,<sup>3</sup> and the Muslim Moreot minority was becoming assimilated in its culture to the Christian majority. The Moreot Turks spoke and wrote Greek, and even the 'ulemā swore by Christ and by the Panayia.<sup>4</sup> The Albanian Muslim Moreots, who were new-comers in A.D. 1715,<sup>5</sup> were wilder and fiercer than their Turkish coreligionists; yet the Varduniots in their fastness in the Southern Taygetus and the Laliots and their neighbours at Phlóka in their fastness on Pholoë all bore Christian as well as Muslim names.<sup>6</sup> Meanwhile the Moreot Greek Christian oligarchs betrayed their provincialism by continuing to cultivate an Ottoman Muslim style of living which had long since been in process of being abandoned in favour of a Western style by the sophisticated metropolitan Phanariots.

'The khōja-bāshy imitated the Turk in everything, including dress, manners, and household. His notion of living in style was the same as the Turk's, and the only difference between them was one of names: for instance, instead of being called Hasan the khōja-bāshy would be called Yānni, and instead of going to mosque he would go to church. This was the only distinction between the two. All the same, the Turk would cut off the khōja-bāshy's head whenever he chose, and keep his corpse exposed for three days in public, with the head placed by the backside as an additional humiliation, whereas the Turk's head would be placed under his arm-pit. From these facts you will be able to judge whether the khōja-bāshy was, or was not, a popularly elected magistrate.'<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Khrysanthópoulos, Ph. [Photákos]: *Ἀπομνημονεύματα περί τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς Ἐπαναστάσεως* (Athens 1899, Sakellarios, 2 vols.), vol. i, pp. 34-37.

<sup>2</sup> See Sakellarios, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

<sup>3</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 226-7.

<sup>4</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 117.

<sup>5</sup> Khrysanthópoulos, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 33-34.

<sup>6</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 227.

<sup>7</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 120, n. 4.



## IX. B (ii) (a) 3, ANNEX I

### THE PEASANT MAJORITY OF MANKIND AND THE AGRARIAN POLICY OF THE SOVIET UNION

To see the problem of a depressed peasantry in India in its true perspective, we must extend our field of observation far beyond the Indian sub-continent's limits; for this depressed peasantry in India was one contingent of an immense host of human beings in the same plight which, at the time of writing, still accounted for perhaps not less than three-quarters of the living generation of Mankind<sup>1</sup> and which was massed, not only in India, but in Indonesia, Indo-China, China, Japan, the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Egypt, and those superficially Latinized 'Indian American' countries, from Mexico to Bolivia inclusive, which had inherited an indigenous peasantry from the submerged Central American and Andean civilizations.<sup>2</sup>

Could the condition of this vast and widespread rural depressed class be effectively improved by any orthodox devices of Modern Western democratic 'social engineering'? To be democratic in the Modern Western sense of the term, the solution of the problem must be one which could be introduced by consent, without having to be imposed by coercion; and it remained to be seen whether the peasantry, in its prevailing mood of self-assertiveness and expectancy not yet illuminated by more than a glimmer of intellectual enlightenment, would voluntarily agree to the things necessary for its economic salvation. The peasantry's divers desires at this time seemed, indeed, likely to prove mutually incompatible. The peasants now wanted an improvement in their material condition, but they also still wanted to go on living their customary life and using their traditional agricultural technique; and the ambition of

<sup>1</sup> According to E. M. Patterson, *An Introduction to World Economics* (New York 1947, Macmillan), p. 5, Table I, following and supplementing A. M. Carr-Saunders, *World Population: Past Growths and Present Trends* (London 1936, Oxford University Press), p. 42, 'Europe', including the whole of the Soviet Union, and North America, excluding Mexico, together contained 33.2 per cent. of the total population of the World in A.D. 1938. To arrive at an approximate estimate of the respective percentages of non-peasants and peasants in the total population of the World at that date, we have to allow on the one side of the account for a small non-peasant minority in Asia, Africa, Oceania, and South and Central America, and on the other side for a large peasant majority in the Soviet Union and in the adjacent countries of Eastern Europe. On this basis the ratio of the peasant element in the population of the World in A.D. 1938 would work out at something like 75 per cent.; and it would be still higher if calculated on the population estimates for mid-year A.D. 1950, given in the *United Nations Demographic Year Book, 1951* (New York 1951, Statistical Office of the United Nations). The estimate, as at this date, for the aggregate population of the predominantly non-peasant parts of the World (the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Western Europe) amount to about 487,637,000, and those for the predominantly peasant remainder of Mankind to about 1,910,989,000; and, on this reckoning, the peasant element will have accounted for not much less than 80 per cent. of the World's total population in A.D. 1950.

<sup>2</sup> Paraguay, where a native American Indian population had been initiated into the arts of Civilization by Jesuit Roman Catholic Christian missionaries from the Old World, should be added to this list. The Jesuits' achievements in Paraguay have been noticed on pp. 597-8, above.

every peasant household was not only to own a plot of land but to work its own plot as a separate unit of labour and production. Yet, short of there being any hope of raising their standard of living, there might be no chance of saving it from being further depressed to a nadir which would be disastrous for them and for the World as a whole, if the other points in the peasants' dimly conceived programme were to be treated as sacrosanct. Could this rustic Gordian knot be untied? Or could it only be got rid of by being cut? And, if it should prove impossible to avoid a summary operation, what scabbard was to furnish the latter-day counterpart of Alexander's sword?

Could the problem of this vast non-Western peasantry be solved by a culturally alien Modern Western régime such as the late British Rāj in India? Probably not, since an alien régime can seldom venture to interfere with the deep-seated prejudices of its subjects,<sup>1</sup> however well placed it may be for carrying out useful reforms on the surface of life. Then could the task be achieved under the régime of a native intelligentsia of the kind that, in India, had become the British Rāj's heir? Such rulers might perhaps be expected, *a priori*, to have better prospects of success in commending a policy framed by their Westernized minds to a peasantry from whom their hearts were not altogether alienated. Yet in A.D. 1948-9 Pandit Nehru and his colleagues must have felt some misgivings as they looked on from India at the death agonies in China of a Kuomintang régime which was so similar to their own in composition, character, and outlook, and which had come to power in China little more than twenty years before the Congress régime's own advent to power in India. In those few years the Kuomintang had rapidly degenerated from being the generous apostles of the Ideas of the French Revolution into becoming the corrupt conservators of traditional Chinese vested interests; retribution for this breach of trust had been no less quick to overtake them; and this nemesis had taken the form of a mass-secession of the Chinese peasantry from the Kuomintang to the Communist camp. Was Communism now to take its turn in trying to solve in China a problem with which an abortive Chinese experiment in Modern Western Democracy had failed to come to grips? And, if this was to be the next chapter of Chinese history, was that a portent of what was likely to happen next in other non-Western societies in which an antique peasantry was likewise being shaken out of a long-established psychological and economic inertia by the impact of Modern Western Democracy and Technology?

In bidding for a mandate to take the world-wide problem of the peasantry in hand, Communism had at any rate one strong card to play mid-way through the twentieth century. At this date its advocates could argue that, of all the societies that were saddled with the problem, Russia was the only one so far in which an effort to grapple with it had been made on a scale and with a vigour that were worthy of the greatness and the gravity of the challenge; and they could go on to point out that

<sup>1</sup> The British Rāj in India had nevertheless ventured to use its power to put down infanticide, sati, and the self-immolation of the devotees who had formerly offered themselves year by year to be crushed to death by Juggernaut's car.

this notable effort in Russia had not been made until after the establishment there of the existing Communist régime.

This was, indeed, one of the points in which Lenin and his companions could justly claim to have done in Russia a deed of pressing urgency and momentous importance that had been perpetually left undone by their Western-minded predecessors; for neither Tsar Peter the Great nor Tsar Alexander II had attempted to solve the problem of the peasantry in the terms in which their Communist successors envisaged it.

Peter, indeed, had not tried to solve it at all, but had actually aggravated it by piling a top-heavy superstructure of Modern Western military organization and civil administration upon the frail foundation of a traditional rural economy which he had neglected to reinforce without calculating whether it would be capable of bearing the additional load that he was remorselessly laying upon it. Peter made no serious attempt to increase the agricultural production which was virtually the sole economic resource of the Russia of his day, and, so far from relaxing the legal obligations of the serfs to their owners, he tightened them up in pursuance of a short-sighted policy of using the institution of serfdom as an agency for the indirect collection of public revenue from the peasant producers of Russia's national income through the direct taxation of the personal incomes of the serf-owners.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Peter had little cognizance of the sufferings inflicted on the population of his empire by the social heritage of Russian Orthodox Christendom and by his own innovations (Brückner, A.: *Peter der Grosse* (Berlin 1879, Grote), p. 513); he was concerned to place taxation on a statistical basis (*ibid.*, p. 513), and he looked at the peasantry primarily from a fiscal standpoint (p. 524). Hence he not only rejected the idea of emancipating the peasants (p. 524), but actually increased the powers of the landlords over their serfs with a view to increasing the landlords' tax-paying capacity (p. 523). The fugitive serf laws were made more stringent (p. 296); the practice of selling serfs apart from the land to which they were attached, which had occurred for the first time in A.D. 1675, became frequent in Peter's reign (p. 523); industrialists were permitted to buy peasants as a means of providing themselves with man-power (p. 523); freeholders disappeared (p. 523). The truth was that Peter did not care for agriculture, and the result was that he made the condition of the Russian peasantry still worse than it had been before his time (p. 522).

This deterioration in the peasantry's condition went on in Russia under the Petrine régime until A.D. 1861 (Mettig, C.: *Die Europäisierung Russlands im 18. Jahrhundert* (Gotha 1913, Perthes), p. 439), on the principle, established by Peter himself, that the state should lend its power to force the serf to work for his master in consideration of the work performed by the serf-owner for the state (*ibid.*, p. 441). In A.D. 1747 the nobility were given the right to sell their serfs, and in A.D. 1760 the right to send them to penal servitude in European Russia or to exile in Siberia (p. 418). Passages recommending the emancipation of the serfs, which had been included in the first draft of the Empress Catherine II's celebrated instructions for the abortive legislative commission that met in Moscow in A.D. 1767-8, were omitted from the final draft at the instance of the Empress's advisers (p. 246). In A.D. 1780-3 the Great Russian institution of serfdom was introduced into the Ukraine (pp. 255 and 443).

In Northern Russia, which had been opened up in relatively recent times and where the individual initiative of the pioneer settlers was still reflected in the frequency of peasant proprietorship, the Imperial Government was forcing communal ownership of the land upon the local peasantry in the fourth decade of the nineteenth century (Mettig, *op. cit.*, p. 447). The village communities (*miri*) were apt to treat rich peasants as the municipal *curiales* had been treated in the western provinces of the Roman Empire in the fourth and fifth centuries (*ibid.*, p. 448), and the Imperial Government, for its part, was hostile (p. 448) to the growth of a class of well-to-do peasants (the class pilloried as *kulaks* by the subsequent Communist régime). Even under the emancipation scheme of A.D. 1861, the ownership of the land, in so far as it passed out of the hands of the former serf-owners, was acquired communally by the *mir* and not individually by the peasants composing the village community, and the Imperial Government forced

As for Tsar Alexander II, his success in securing the abolition of serfdom with the former serf-owners' acquiescence was, from a Modern Western standpoint, certainly the greatest achievement of Russian statesmanship under the Petrine régime, and perhaps the greatest under any régime that had ever ruled in Russia down to the time of writing. In this act an autocratic empire which was a recent convert to the Modern Western way of life showed itself a more sincere and more effective devotee of Modern Western liberal ideals than the ostensibly democratic Southern States of a republican American Union whose slave-owning citizens were children of the Western Civilization by birth and not by adoption. The same decade of the nineteenth century which saw a voluntary emancipation of the serfs in Russia saw these American slave-owners bring disaster and disgrace upon themselves by driving their Northern fellow countrymen to abolish slavery in the South by *force majeure*, at the cost of a civil war, as a penalty for the Southerners' own persistent failure to rid themselves of their 'peculiar institution' on their own initiative. Yet, in relieving Russia, by bloodless revolution,<sup>1</sup> of her institutional agrarian malady, Tsar Alexander II did nothing to cure her technological agrarian malady; for the legal change in the peasants' personal status was not accompanied by any appreciable change in methods of cultivation. About half the total arable land of Russia continued to be cultivated by the peasants individually for their own benefit,<sup>2</sup> and about half by their former masters on a larger scale of agri-

the *mir* to serve, in place of the former serf-owner, as its instrument for collecting public revenue from the peasants and keeping them under governmental control.

Though in the latter days of serfdom in Russia there were enlightened serf-owners who, in their treatment of their serfs, distinguished themselves by their philanthropy (Metigg, *op. cit.*, p. 449), the landowners as a class were out of touch with the peasantry, as Peter the Great had been, and this was true of the circles from which the 'Decembrists' of A.D. 1825 were drawn (*Le Monde Slave*, Nouvelle Série, 2<sup>me</sup> Année, No. 12, December 1925 (Paris 1925, Alcan): 'Centenaire des Décabristes', p. 366). The 'Decembrists' were military officers recruited from the landowning nobility. The private soldiers, who were recruited from the nobility's peasant serfs, were apt, for their part, before they had worked out their sentence of twenty-five years' military service, to lose a contact with the peasantry that their officers had never possessed (*ibid.*, pp. 366-7).

<sup>1</sup> Though, unlike the abolition of slavery in the Southern States of the American Union, the abolition of serfdom in Russia was achieved without the owners having to be coerced by defeat in a civil war, the Russian reforms in the eighteen-sixties were undoubtedly accelerated and facilitated by the antecedent defeat of Russia in a war against foreign adversaries. The Crimean War (*gerebatur* A.D. 1853-56) was a military reverse abroad which opened the way for a triumph of Liberalism at home by bringing to a discreditable end the oppressive reign of Tsar Nicholas I (*imperabat* A.D. 1825-55). Such harvesting of liberal reforms at home from military reverses abroad was, indeed, characteristic of Russian history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The abortive liberal revolution of A.D. 1905 was the fruit of defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of A.D. 1902-4, and the abortive liberal revolution of A.D. 1917 the fruit of defeat in the General War of A.D. 1914-18. Conversely, military successes abroad were apt, in this chapter of Russian history, to play into the hands of political reactionaries on the home front. The tyrant Nicholas I was the principal beneficiary from the Russian people's victory over a French invader of Russia in A.D. 1812, and this tyrant's hold on Russia was confirmed by the victories of his armies over the Turks in A.D. 1829 and over the Poles in A.D. 1831. The working of the same ironical law of Russian history revealed itself again when the Russian people's victory over a German invader of Russia in A.D. 1940-5 served to clamp upon their shoulders, more tightly than ever, the yoke of a Soviet Communist régime.

<sup>2</sup> The peasants were still more eager to preserve and enlarge the allotments of land which they cultivated individually for their own benefit than they were to obtain their personal freedom from the bondage of serfdom. Their attitude was indicated in a reply which an inquiring nineteenth-century serf-owner, I. Zakushkin, drew from his own

cultural operations; and the fact that the peasants now cultivated their land as free men, and the larger landowners theirs with hired instead of servile labour, did not have any magic effect upon a stagnant agricultural technique.<sup>1</sup>

No doubt, in contemporary France and Belgium and Denmark, peasant proprietorship might be wedded with specialization in agricultural production and technique to yield increased economic returns thanks to the auspiciously combined effects of the richness of the soil, the proximity of favourable markets, and the peasant's personal industry, intelligence, and zeal in working as his own master; but these achievements of peasant proprietorship here and there in Modern Western Europe were irrelevant to the situation in contemporary Russia. In the vast inefficiently cultivated expanses of Russia, agricultural productivity could be increased only by mechanical cultivation on the grand scale, and this was the radical reform which the Soviet Communist régime had dared to impose by force on a Russian peasantry which would never have adopted it of its own volition.

After the Bolsheviks had incited the peasantry to bring them into power on a mandate to distribute the lands that Alexander II had left in the possession of the *ci-devant* serf-owning landlords, a duly established Communist régime used the power which they owed to the peasants' support in order to reverse the policy by which this support had been purchased. They took out of the peasants' hands by force not only the lands which Lenin had distributed among them individually but also those which had been left in their hands by Alexander, and they rode rough-shod over the peasants' habits, prejudices, and aspirations by compelling them to cultivate virtually all the land thenceforward in large-scale mechanized collective farms. It could hardly be denied that the Russian peasantry had been first deceived and then coerced by their demonic latter-day rulers, but it would have been more difficult to refute the Soviet Government's contention that the Russian peasantry and, with them, Russia herself had been dragooned into economic salvation by this high-handed and unscrupulous act of state. If it is possible for human beings to be saved in spite of themselves, and, if physical survival is not too dearly bought at the price of forfeiting both liberty and happiness, the Soviet Government might claim to have been the Russian peasantry's saviour from economic disaster; and, since the establishment of their ascendancy over the peasant countries of Eastern Europe after the general war of A.D. 1939-45, they had seen to it that the same medicine should be administered to the agrarian economy of these satellite states by the puppet governments that had been hoisted into office there on the points of Russian bayonets.<sup>2</sup>

serfs: 'We belong to you, but the land belongs to us' (*Le Monde Slave*, Nouvelle Série, 2<sup>me</sup> Année, No. 12, December 1925 (Paris 1925, Alcan): 'Centenaire des Décabristes', p. 368).

<sup>1</sup> There had been little change in agricultural technique in Russia since the introduction of a money economy in the sixteenth century (Mettig, C.: *Die Europäisierung Russlands im 18. Jahrhundert* (Gotha 1913, Perthes), p. 390). The *raskolniki* (i.e. the archaizing dissidents from a Romeicizing Russian Orthodox Church) had refused to cultivate potatoes from a feeling that any new food-plant must be Satanic (*ibid.*, p. 396).

<sup>2</sup> The agrarian social policy of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union and its



In A.D. 1952 it was impossible to foretell whether the same destiny was in store for the Chinese and Indian peasantries in their turn. At this stage all that could be seen was that the problem of the starveling peasantry had now been placed on the agenda for the governments of all countries where such a peasantry was still to be found, and that in the handling of this problem the Communists now held the initiative. This was as much as to say that this problem had now become crucial for the Modern Western World. At the time, no doubt, the Western Society's first concern was to put its own house in order; but a successful achievement of this urgent and difficult task at home would not suffice to ensure the West's salvation; for even an internally united Western World would find itself in a precarious position in the World as a whole if the great peasant majority of Mankind were to be gathered into the Communist fold; and this might be the peasantry's cultural destiny if the Modern Western way of life failed to offer any practical prescription for the peasantry's economic malady; for in that event the Communists' prescription, however unpalatable in itself, would hold the field *faute de mieux*.

satellites was all of a piece with their social policy for the urban industrial workers. In town and country-side alike, they were deliberately creating a proletariat of the kind which, in nineteenth-century England, had been heedlessly brought into existence as a social by-product of the private economic enterprise of farmers and industrialists. The children of these English employers of rural and urban labour had taken stock of the social result of their fathers' economic handiwork, and had seen that it was very bad, long before the Communist critics of Western Capitalism had come into power in Russia and had used this power to create the very social conditions which were being denounced by them elsewhere. If a proletariat may be defined as a class whose members have no personal stake in the society in which they find themselves, and no say in the ordering of their own lives, the twentieth-century workers in the factories and collective farms of the Soviet Union would pass this test as well as the factory workers and agricultural labourers of a nineteenth-century Great Britain. No doubt a spokesman of Communism would lose no time in reminding a bourgeois observer of one obvious difference in the situation of the proletariat in a communist and in a capitalist country. Whereas in a capitalist country the proletariat's masters were private employers, in a communist country the proletariat's sole master was the state. The difference was certainly an important one; but, if the proletariats of the Soviet Union and the Western World could have compared notes in A.D. 1952 on the relative rigours of their respective lots, the proletarian employees of an omnipotent totalitarian state would probably have been judged to be more helplessly at the mercy of their masters than those of even the most powerful and oppressive private employers under a régime of free individual economic enterprise.

## IX. B (ii) (a) 3, ANNEX II

### SOME HISTORICAL CLUES TO THE RIDDLE OF PAKISTAN'S FUTURE

DURING the century and three-quarters that had elapsed between Russia's acquisition of a sea-board on the Black Sea in A.D. 1774 and the transfer of the responsibility for India's security against foreign aggression from British to Indian hands in A.D. 1947, the imaginations of British strategists and statesmen had been haunted by the bogey of a Russian descent upon India from the Central Asian side of the Hindu Kush. Was this British anxiety to be inherited by the Indian heirs of a British Rāj? In Indian minds in A.D. 1948-49 that question could hardly fail to be raised by the spectacle of a sweeping triumph of Communism in China. Perhaps an Indian student of history might seek comfort in recalling that, when, in the thirteenth century of the Christian Era, all the rest of Asia, up to the Euphrates and the Halys and the Carpathians, had been overrun by the Mongols, the Indian sub-continent alone had remained unmolested by world-conquerors who were lowering upon India simultaneously from a subjugated Burma and from a subjugated Afghanistan. Yet, if our Indian knew his history well and could bring himself to read its lessons without flinching, he might be driven to conclude that India's escape from the Mongols, like her encounter with the English, was an exception to an historical rule that India's foreign conquerors were usually to be looked for across the Hindu Kush; and, if he was also a student of political geography, the new political map that had emerged from the partition of an occumenical British Indian Empire into three successor-states would call up in his visual memory some disquieting reminiscences.

The main body of Pakistan—extending, as it did, from the south-eastern foothills of the Hindu Kush to the coast of the Indian Ocean at the delta of the Indus—would remind him of the Transparopanisian limb of the mountain-besriding empire of the Bactrian Greeks and their Kushan, Ghaznawī, Ghūrī, and Durrānī<sup>1</sup> successors; and, if he went on to search the contemporary map for counterparts of the other members of this geographically paradoxical yet historically familiar composite body politic,<sup>2</sup> these would leap to his eye in the contemporary shapes of Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics of the Soviet Union. In the second century B.C. and in the first, the eleventh, the twelfth, and the eighteenth century of the Christian Era, Central Asian empire-builders with a land-locked base of operations within the borders of the territories latterly known as Afghan and Soviet Uzbekistan had forced the passage of the Hindu Kush and cleft their way through Indian territory down the valley of the Indus till they had carried their

<sup>1</sup> Previously known as Abdālī.

<sup>2</sup> This remarkable recurrent political phenomenon of an empire besriding the Hindu Kush has been investigated by Sir W. Kerr Fraser-Tytler in *Afghanistan* (Oxford 1950, University Press), *passim*, but especially Part III, chap. 1.

advancing south-eastern frontier to the shores of an open sea; and in the twentieth century it required no great stretch of the political imagination to envisage a fresh repetition of this recurrent episode of history. Had not the creation of Pakistan prefabricated for a future empire-builder from Central Asia the complementary Indian dominion which a Demetrius and a Kadphises<sup>1</sup> and a Mahmūd Ghaznawī and a Muhammad Ghūrī and an Ahmad Durrānī had been required to carve out for themselves? And, if land-locked Central Asian Powers whose metropolitan territories were confined within the modest limits of the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin had been impelled by claustrophobia to make a strenuous march to the sea across the breadth of a sub-continent, might not the same stimulus be expected to launch on the same course an empire embracing not merely a land-locked Central Asia<sup>2</sup> but the entire land-locked 'heartland' of the Old World?

Since the days of Tsar Ivan the Terrible (*imperabat* A.D. 1533-84), Russia had been seeking an outlet to an ice-free open sea. She had battered her way to the east coast of the Baltic, only to find this outlet masked by Denmark's command of the Sound; she had battered her way to the north coast of the Black Sea, only to find this outlet likewise masked by Turkey's command of the Bosphorus. The exit from Russia's remote north-western ice-free port of Murmansk was commanded by the adjoining coast of Norway; Archangel was ice-bound for half the year; Vladivostok could barely be kept open in the winter by the constant labour of ice-breakers whose crews saw the water freeze again behind them in their wake.<sup>3</sup> These results were little to show for nearly four hundred years of Russian endeavours to reach the open sea in all directions but one. For Russia in the twentieth century, an outlet on the Indian Ocean was the sole still untried possibility. Was not Karachi a tempting bait to dangle before eager Russian eyes? And could the transfer of Karachi from British to Pakistani hands have failed to suggest 'dangerous thoughts' to calculating Russian minds?<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Kadphises II Kushan *regnabat circa* A.D. 50-68 (see V. v. 275, n. 3.).

<sup>2</sup> The Central Asian Republics of the Soviet Union were represented at the Asian Congress, convened on Pandit Nehru's initiative, which met at Delhi on the 23rd March-2nd April, 1947.

<sup>3</sup> The writer saw this happen with his own eyes from on board a Japanese packet-boat which made its way into the harbour of Vladivostok, piloted by an ice-breaker, on the 13th January, 1930.

<sup>4</sup> A corridor to Karachi was not the only attractive possibility that the creation of Pakistan had opened up for expansive-minded Russian geopoliticians; for the shape of this Muslim successor-state of the British Indian Empire was one of the curiosities of political geography. While its main body in the Indus Valley offered an open road to Karachi from the North-West Frontier of India, its enclave in Eastern Bengal, which was separated from the main body of Pakistan by the whole breadth of the Indian Union, offered an equally inviting ingress into India across a North-East Frontier which had been opened up, in the course of the general war of A.D. 1939-45, by the building of the Burma Road. At the moment when, in China, Communism seemed to be carrying all before it, a Russian historian would have the pleasure of recollecting that in the thirteenth century of the Christian Era the Mongol cavalry had succeeded in making their way from Transbaikalia to Burma, across the whole breadth of China, without any Burma Road to speed them on their path.

## THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF PANISLAMISM

THE remarkable success of the core of the Islamic World in preserving or regaining its freedom from alien political control during the 270 years that had elapsed between A.D. 1683 and A.D. 1952<sup>1</sup> was, no doubt, one explanation of the equally remarkable miss-fire of a nineteenth-century Panislamic Movement that was the response which the Muslims might have been expected to make to the challenge of an increasing Western and Russian pressure upon them. The nineteenth-century Muslims to whom the Panislamic programme of strength through solidarity made an appeal were those outlying Muslim communities that did lose their independence in this age.

Both the local Ottoman dominant minority and the Arab and Berber subject majority of the population in Algeria, Tunisia, and Tripolitania, for example, reversed their attitude towards the Ottoman Empire after the initiation in A.D. 1830 of the French conquest of the Maghrib. During the preceding two centuries or so, the ruling element in the Ottoman Barbary States had been bent on asserting its *de facto* independence of the Porte; from A.D. 1830 onwards both the anti-French resistance movement in Algeria and the local Ottoman régime in the now likewise threatened adjoining Ottoman principality of Tunisia began to look to the Porte for support against French aggression. In A.D. 1864 the reigning Bey of Tunis sought to strengthen his ties with the Porte by sending on a mission to Constantinople the Circassian slave-statesman Khayr-ad-Dîn, who published in A.D. 1867 a book advocating the adoption of Westernizing reforms by Muslim countries as a means towards their becoming more competent to hold their own against Western imperialism.<sup>2</sup> A further move in the same direction was made by the Tunisian Government in A.D. 1871.<sup>3</sup>

From the opposite extremity of the Islamic World, similar embassies from Central Asian Turkish Muslim rulers, soliciting the help of the Porte against Russian imperialism, began to arrive at Constantinople in the seventh decade of the nineteenth century, after the Russians had begun to direct their military energies from the by then all but completed conquest of the Caucasus to the conquest of Central Asia.<sup>4</sup> In A.D. 1863 a Western traveller in Central Asia found that Central Asian khans were taking pride and comfort in being invested with honorary

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 219-32, above.

<sup>2</sup> Khayr-ad-Dîn Pasha: *Muqaddamât Kitâb Aqwam al-Masâlik fi Ma'rifat Ahwâl al-Mamâlik*, first published in Arabic in A.D. 1867 and in a French translation, under the title *Réformes Nécessaires aux États Musulmans*, in A.D. 1868. The writer of this Study possesses a copy of the second French edition (Paris 1875, Dentu) and of an Arabic edition published at Constantinople in A.H. 1293 (A.D. 1876) at the Jevâ'ib ('News') Press.

<sup>3</sup> See Davison, Roderic H.: *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876* (thesis submitted to Harvard University for the Degree of Ph.D., 1st April, 1942), pp. 263-5 and 349. [The author had kindly permitted the writer of this Study to read and cite a typescript copy of this still unpublished work which was deposited in the Library of Harvard University.]

<sup>4</sup> See Davison, *op. cit.*, pp. 343-7.

offices in the Ottoman Pādishāh's household;<sup>1</sup> and from A.D. 1869 onwards there were contacts between the Porte and Ya'qūb Beg, the Turkī Muslim rebel against Manchu rule in the Tarim Basin. From A.D. 1873 onwards Ya'qūb caused the Pādishāh's name to be inscribed on his coinage and invoked in the *Khutbah* within his dominions, and an Ottoman mission made its way from Constantinople to his headquarters. Envoys from Afghanistan and from the Panthai Muslim rebels against Manchu rule in Yunnan also presented themselves, on similar errands, at the court of Sultan 'Abd-al-'Azīz (*imperabat* A.D. 1861-76), and in A.D. 1873 he received an appeal from the Achinese Muslims in Sumatra for help against the aggression of the Dutch.

A sentimental attachment to an idealised conception of the Ottoman Empire began to appear about the same time among the Muslim diaspora—Shī'ī as well as Sunnī—in India, as a psychological compensation for the loss of their own former imperial dominion over a Hindu majority of the population of the sub-continent and for the painfully overwhelming service which the subsequent British conquerors of India had done for these local Muslim predecessors of theirs in saving them from the vengeance of the resurgent Hindus by imposing an impartial British Rāj on both these Indian communities.

The Ottoman Empire was, indeed, the only political rallying point on which the Muslim victims of Western and Russian imperialism could fall back—not so much in virtue of her dubious and long-neglected title to the inheritance of the Caliphate as because, even in her nineteenth-century infirmity, she was by far and away the most powerful, efficient, and enlightened Muslim state in existence. At the same time, her patent weakness in this age by comparison with the encircling non-Muslim Powers made it an embarrassment rather than an opportunity for her to find herself the cynosure of nineteenth-century Muslim eyes. Out of fear of France, she forbore from making any serious response to Tunisian overtures to her between the date of the French descent on Algeria in A.D. 1830 and the date of the long-dreaded establishment of a French protectorate over Tunisia in A.D. 1881, and she was quite impotent to help the Caucasian and Central Asian Muslims in their desperate struggle to resist the imposition on them of a Russian yoke. All that the Porte could do was to take a modest advantage of the revulsion of Maghribī feeling in her favour by establishing her direct rule over Tripolitania and Cyrenaica in A.D. 1835 and to salve her conscience for her inability to assist the Maghribī and Caucasian resistance movements in the field by giving new homes in still intact Ottoman territory to Algerian and Circassian 'displaced persons' after their struggles to maintain their independence had ended in an inevitable ultimate defeat.

Thus Panislamism fell between two stools. On the one hand neither the Ottoman Empire nor, *a fortiori*, any other still independent Muslim state was capable in the nineteenth century of the Christian Era of constituting itself into an effective agency for vindicating the integrity and independence of the Islamic World as a whole, while on the other hand

<sup>1</sup> See Vambéry, A.: *Travels in Central Asia, 1863* (London 1864, Murray), pp. 434-5.



the fact that all but a few fragments of the core of the Islamic World had succeeded in remaining independent on a low level of vitality took the edge off the appeal of the Panislamic gospel of self-preservation through an increase of inter-Islamic solidarity. If, in the course of the nineteenth century, the whole of the Islamic World, instead of a few fragments and fringes, had been engulfed in the British, French, and Russian empires, the nineteenth-century apostle of Panislamism, the Sayyid Jamāl-ad-Dīn<sup>1</sup> al-Afghānī (*vivebat circa* A.D. 1838–A.D. 1897),<sup>2</sup> might have found a more favourable mission-field for his propaganda.

Jamāl-ad-Dīn's message to his fellow Muslims was twofold. They were to defend themselves against the West in the first place by transcending their own traditional sectarian and political divisions and rallying round the Ottoman Pādīshāh as Caliph, and in the second place by adopting Western ideas, institutions, and techniques that were the secret of the Modern's West's strength;<sup>3</sup> and it is significant that the Sayyid was far more successful in his advocacy of the second of these two prescriptions. In his preaching of Islamic solidarity he was, it is true, unprecedentedly successful in gaining a following among Sunnis and Shī'is alike. In a Sunnī Egypt he was the inspiration of Shaykh Muhammad 'Abduh, and in a Shī'ī Persia he moved the mujtahids in A.D. 1891–2 to crush Nāsir-ad-Dīn Shāh's attempt to grant a tobacco monopoly to a group of British *entrepreneurs*. Yet the chief practical effect of his missionary work was to promote the birth of a parochial nationalist movement in Egypt and a parochial nationalist movement in Persia, and thereby to create new, and perhaps insurmountable, obstacles to the political unification of the Islamic World under the aegis of a universal state crystallizing round the nineteenth-century torso of the Ottoman Empire. In so far as Jamāl-ad-Dīn's Ottoman admirer and patron Sultan 'Abd-al-Hamid II (*imperabat* A.D. 1876–1909) tried to translate the Sayyid's ideas into practice, he largely stultified the Sayyid's intentions by seeking in Panislamism a political prop for the declining strength of Turkey rather than attempting to use Turkey's residual strength as a pillar for the support of Panislamism.<sup>4</sup>

The inference from this aftermath of Jamāl-ad-Dīn's career seems to

<sup>1</sup> Accounts of the Sayyid Jamāl-ad-Dīn's career and ideas will be found in Browne, E. G.: *The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909* (Cambridge 1910, University Press), pp. 1–30, and in an article by Goldziher, I.: s.v. 'Djamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī', in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, vol. i (Leyden 1913, Brill), pp. 1008–11.

<sup>2</sup> According to Browne, op. cit., p. 4, the As'adābād which was Jamāl-ad-Dīn's birthplace was probably not the place of that name near Kābul, which was claimed as his birthplace by the Sayyid himself, but the As'adābād near Hamadan, as asserted by Nāzim-al-Islām of Kirmān in his *Ta'rikh-i-Bidārī-i-Irānīyan*. If so, the Sayyid was born a Shī'ī and a subject of the Shah of Persia.

<sup>3</sup> The Panislamic strategy of resistance to Western aggression against the Islamic World could, of course, be combined equally well with either Herodian or Zealot tactics. As an example of a Zealot-minded exponent of Panislamism we may cite the North Caucasian Panislamic leader the Amir Shaykh Uzun Hajji Khayr Khan, who was active in A.D. 1919. 'Uzun Hajji was distinguished by simplicity and directness, as much as by his fanaticism. "I am twisting a rope in order to hang all engineers, students and, in general, people who write from left to right." These words of Uzun Hajji's... (Arshurani, A., and Hābidullin [?Hābidullin], Kh: *Ocherki Panislamicizma i Panturkizma v Rossii* [Studies in Panislamism and Panturkism in Russia] (Moscow 1931, Bezbozhnik [Anti-religious] Press), p. 67, communicated to the writer by B. H. Sumner).

<sup>4</sup> 'Abd-al-Hamid's exploitation of the Ottoman Caliphate has been touched upon in VI. vii. 22–24.

be that the nineteenth-century Western and Russian pressure on the heart of the Islamic World was not sufficiently severe to make the still unsubjugated Muslim peoples feel that Western nationalism was a luxury in which they could not afford to indulge. In any case it is an historical fact that the still independent Islamic peoples Westernized piecemeal, like the Ottoman Orthodox Christian peoples, instead of Westernizing *en bloc*, like Russian Orthodox Christendom, within the political framework of a universal state.

THE EXPLOITATION OF EGYPT BY  
MEHMED 'ALĪ

EGYPT was not just a passive piece of Mankind's physical environment; it was a creation of human audacity, industry, and genius out of the unpromising raw material of a forbidding jungle-swamp;<sup>1</sup> and, unlike its sister creature the Land of Shinar, the system of embanked and irrigated fields in the Lower Nile Valley had never ceased, even in the periods of its worst neglect, to be the going concern that had been made of it in the fourth millennium B.C. by the founders of the nomes, who had tamed the valley piecemeal, and by the subsequent founders of the United Kingdom, who had co-ordinated these works of local reclamation into a single technologically and administratively centralized concern. Through these abiding results of their handiwork, the genius of the fourth-millennium makers of Egypt set its stamp more than once in the course of subsequent history on the policy of later masters of Egypt who had sufficient genius of their own to enter into the founding fathers' labours.

The founders' original lay-out of their Nilotic estate imposed on their successors the necessity of subjecting the population to a centralized autocratic régime in order to harvest the potential productivity of a regimented soil and water—whatever the proportions in which the joint product of management and labour might afterwards be distributed between the human parties to this vast economic enterprise<sup>2</sup>. This permanent idiosyncrasy of Egypt herself must be the explanation of the astonishing similarity between the régimes respectively inaugurated by Mehmed 'Alī in the first half of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era and by the Ptolemies at the turn of the fourth and third centuries B.C., since it is improbable that Mehmed 'Alī was aware, even dimly, of the methods employed by these predecessors of his who were also his Macedonian fellow countrymen, while it is impossible that he should have been familiar with the details of the Ptolemaic administration that were brought to light after his death by the excavation and study of documentary papyri. Yet so masterful was Egypt herself in dictating to her rulers the methods by which they must exploit her that a survey of the acts of Mehmed 'Alī and his son Ibrāhīm might also serve, with a mere change of names, to describe the acts of Ptolemy Soter and Ptolemy Philadelphus.

The Turkish Macedonian rulers of Egypt, like their Greek Macedonian forerunners, planted Egypt with fruit and forest trees;<sup>3</sup> extended the area of irrigation and cultivation;<sup>4</sup> dictated what crops should be

<sup>1</sup> See II. i. 302-15.

<sup>2</sup> On this question see III. iii. 214-15.

<sup>3</sup> See Clot-Bey, A. B.: *Aperçu Général sur l'Égypte* (Paris 1840, Fortin et Masson, 2 vols.), vol. i, p. 153.

<sup>4</sup> See Jabarti, Shaykh 'Abd-ar-Rahmān al-: *'Ajā'ib-al-Āthār fi'l-Tarājīm wa'l-Akhbār* (French translation: Cairo 1888-1896, Imprimerie Nationale; Paris 1888-1896, Leroux), vol. ix, p. 194; Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 242 and 247; vol. ii, pp. 436-7;

sown in what quantities;<sup>1</sup> laid out model farms and botanical gardens;<sup>2</sup> introduced new crops, of which cotton was the chief,<sup>3</sup> but which also included silk, indigo, sugar, hemp, and opium;<sup>4</sup> imported agricultural experts from abroad and sent Egyptian students of agriculture to Europe and the West Indies;<sup>5</sup> and monopolized for the Government the purchase of the cotton, rice, gum, indigo, sugar, opium, and other crops.<sup>6</sup>

Under Mehmed 'Alī's régime in Egypt the peasants had become the Government's tenants—holding the arable land in usufruct only, and paying *kharāj*—in the course of the years A.D. 1808–14, when Mehmed 'Alī had abolished tax-farming (*iltizam*), eliminated the tax-farmers (*multazims*), and expropriated the waqf endowments invested in arable land (as distinct from gardens and houses) against compensation in the form of annuities from the public treasury.<sup>7</sup> The new system of direct collection of the land-tax by the Government itself was based on a new survey of the land.<sup>8</sup> By the time when the Government had also taken it upon itself to direct the peasants' agricultural operations, to supply them with the means of production, and to buy their non-cereal crops at fixed prices, the peasants had become mere hands on a state-managed plantation coextensive with the cultivated area of the country,<sup>9</sup> and the

Kramers, J. H., s.v. 'Khediw', in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, vol. ii (Leyden 1927, Brill), p. 947.

<sup>1</sup> See Jabarti, op. cit., vol. ix, p. 190; Bowring, *Report on Egypt and Candia* (London 1840, Clowes), pp. 14 and 19. 'He not only compelled the fellāh to cultivate, but in some areas he determined what crops should be grown, and required the produce to be delivered into the government warehouses at a fixed rate' (Dodwell, H.: *The Founder of Modern Egypt* (Cambridge 1931, University Press), p. 218).

<sup>2</sup> See Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 154–60, and vol. ii, p. 394; Bowring, op. cit., pp. 26–27.

<sup>3</sup> Cotton culture was started in Egypt in A.D. 1821 and Sea Island cotton seed from South Carolina was introduced in A.D. 1828 (Kramers, op. cit., pp. 947–8).

<sup>4</sup> See Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 260–9; Bowring, op. cit., pp. 21–22 and 23; Kramers, op. cit., p. 948. According to Bowring, loc. cit., Ibrāhīm Pasha started a sugar plantation and sugar mills, and sent a certain Ōmer Efendi to the West Indies to study rum-making. According to Kramers, op. cit., the cane-sugar culture in Upper Egypt was started only in A.D. 1867, in the reign of the Khedive Ismā'īl.

<sup>5</sup> See Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 257; Bowring, op. cit., pp. 23 and 26.

<sup>6</sup> See Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 186; Bowring, op. cit., p. 20.

<sup>7</sup> See Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 182–3; Kramers, op. cit., p. 946. Details are given in Dodwell, op. cit., p. 32. In A.D. 1808 Mehmed 'Alī investigated the *multazims*' titles and records, and then annulled all irregular grants and expropriated (on pensions) all *multazims* who were in arrears with their payments to the Treasury. The surviving *multazims* were expropriated in A.D. 1814 (see Jabarti, op. cit., vol. ix, p. 79).

<sup>8</sup> See Jabarti, op. cit., vol. ix, p. 90.

<sup>9</sup> Mehmed 'Alī 'succeeded in centralising the entire production in his own hands [by his monopoly system] and of [sic] disposing of it freely; the peasants were no more than day-labourers who were obliged to sell their products at fixed prices to the Government and to pay likewise their taxes in kind' (Kramers, op. cit., p. 947; cp. Clot-Bey, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 182–3). The impact made by Mehmed 'Alī's monopoly system on the life of the Egyptian people reverberates through Jabarti's narrative. In A.D. 1812 Mehmed 'Alī monopolized the marketing of the entire cereal crop of Upper Egypt and the entire rice crop (ibid., vol. viii, pp. 344 and 348); but the practice was not confined to the handling of agricultural produce. In the same year, the Pasha monopolized the marketing of imports, at the same time raising the prices (ibid., vol. viii, p. 345), and established a hold over internal transport by building a river-fleet which he operated himself (ibid., vol. viii, p. 345). He also monopolized slaughter-houses (ibid., vol. viii, p. 351) and even forbade artisans to work for private employers (ibid., vol. viii, p. 357). According to Jabarti the new monopolies were devised by Greeks and Armenians and were farmed out by the Pasha to them (ibid., vol. viii, p. 355). In A.D. 1814 Mehmed 'Alī monopolized the transport of Ottoman pilgrims to the Islamic Holy Places in the Hijāz, and exacted his price from them (ibid., vol. ix, p. 100). In A.D. 1816 he established a virtual monopoly over all shipping (ibid., vol. ix, p. 197). The objective of these monopolies was, of course,

servile status to which they had been reduced was brought home to them by the conscription of their labour for public works.<sup>1</sup>

It will be seen that, unlike Peter the Great, Mehmed 'Alī did not neglect the agricultural basis of his Western superstructure; but the measures which he took in his fundamental economic policy have to be credited—or debited—to the dictates of Egypt as well as to the promptings of Mehmed 'Alī's own genius. Peter's economic insight was certainly not inferior to his; and we may indeed surmise that Mehmed 'Alī, had he been Tsar of Muscovy, would have neglected agriculture as Peter did, and that Peter, had he been Viceroy of Egypt, would have fostered agriculture by the drastic but dubious methods of Mehmed 'Alī.

price-control with a view to price-raising. The state slaughter-houses sold their product to the butchers at fixed wholesale prices, and the butchers' retail prices were likewise fixed by the state (op. cit., vol. ix, p. 226). According to Jabarti (vol. ix, pp. 224 et seqq.) the imposition by the state of maximum retail prices without regard to seasonal variations in the relation between supply and demand, and even without regard to the levels of the state-imposed wholesale prices, proved paralysing for trade. In A.D. 1817 Mehmed 'Alī established a monopoly of hides at fixed prices (ibid., vol. ix, p. 252) and a monopoly of the operation of all looms. The raw materials of the textile industry were bought up by the Government and were distributed by it to the weavers, and the product was then sold by the Government at about three times the previous price (pp. 252-3). In A.D. 1820 Mehmed 'Alī monopolized soap (ibid., vol. ix, p. 317).

One of the objects of British policy in the negotiation of the Anglo-Ottoman commercial treaty of the 16th August, 1838, was to secure the abolition of monopolies in the Ottoman Empire with an eye to insisting on the application of this treaty provision to Ottoman territories under Mehmed 'Alī's administration. An escape-clause in previous Ottoman capitulations which had left the Ottoman Government a loophole for establishing monopolies at will was duly eliminated by the terms of the new treaty (Dodwell, op. cit., pp. 220-1; Bailey, F. E.: *British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement, 1826-1853* (Cambridge, Mass. 1942, Harvard University Press), p. 125); but subsequent local negotiations between representatives of the British Government and Mehmed 'Alī ended in a compromise. It was agreed that Mehmed 'Alī should maintain his monopolies on condition of his selling the produce at public auction (Dodwell, op. cit., p. 222).

<sup>1</sup> Jabarti records that in A.D. 1817 peasants were conscripted to dig a new Alexandria canal (op. cit., vol. ix, p. 240). In A.D. 1819 they were conscripted again for canal digging, and this just before the maize harvest, so that it was no wonder that they had to be secured with ropes round their necks (ibid., vol. ix, p. 299). In 1818, 4,000 young men were conscripted to work in government factories (ibid., vol. ix, p. 274).



## JEWISH HISTORY AND THE MILLET IDEA

BY JAMES PARKES

THE conception of community evolved between the first and fourth centuries of the Christian Era by a Rabbinic Judaism fitted admirably into the millet idea; and, so long as the majority community was prepared to allow a Jewish community milletal autonomy, the essential minimum requirements of Rabbinic Judaism could be maintained in any country in the World. In tolerating a variety of legal and social systems within a larger whole, Medieval Christendom as well as Islam made a Jewish Millet an acceptable social organisation for Judaism, and in the Western Society the Jewish Millet outlived by centuries all its peers, surviving until the nineteenth-century emancipation.

It seems to me, however, necessary to recognize that the millet idea in East and West, while it made Jewish survival possible by its recognition of communal autonomy, yet contained elements which made it intolerable as a permanent social organization. In particular the idea of inequality seems to me to be inherent in it. Neither Islam nor Medieval Christendom recognized Jews as equals; and both tolerated Jewish autonomy because both had the power to circumscribe it at will in their own interests. In both East and West there was also the social factor, in the sense that the inferiority of status implicit in the milletal dispensation encouraged a contempt which was always there, even if under the surface. A great deal of rubbish is talked about the excellent situation of Jews under Islam before Zionism. Existence for all but a few rich merchants was unenviable in the ghettos and malās of the Islamic World for many centuries before Zionism as a political movement was born.

Emancipation, by its emphasis on Judaism as an individual ethic, and on Jews as citizens manifesting a personal difference only in the religious buildings which they attended (or did not attend) for worship one day a week, created just the situation described by you.<sup>1</sup> Gentile societies that could afford not to fear Jewish competition accepted Jews; Gentile societies that had a still unfulfilled ambition to breed a native Gentile 'bourgeoisie' of their own hated the Jews and were jealous of them. But either situation dealt only with that aspect of Jewish life which expressed itself in economic structures and adaptabilities; and both ignored the fact that the heart of Judaism and of Jewish communal life was left unsatisfied by an economic liberty supplemented by a right to go to synagogue on Saturday instead of going to church on Sunday. The core of Rabbinic Judaism, inherited from its interpretation of the Law and the Prophets of the Old Testament, was a belief in a community that would give scope for a social justice and a righteousness which were the divinely appointed objectives of Man's life in This World. The ideal had been narrowed, ossified, and even perverted by the conditions of millet life; but within the Millet it had at least a chance of survival.

<sup>1</sup> On pp. 285-8, above.—A.J.T.

After the dissolution of the Millet, Jews individually plunged, where free, with enthusiasm into all movements for social reform and humanitarianism in a nineteenth-century Western World; but in Eastern Europe, where most of the Jewish people lived, the local conditions ruled out the possibility of any such individual Jewish participation in a liberal Gentile life; and therefore here one of two things was bound to happen. Some East European Jews sought an outlet for their inner malaise in taking part in Gentile revolutionary movements, some in an attempt to find a new communal basis for Jewish life. When a recrudescence of Antisemitism in Western Europe inhibited, or prevented, individual Jews there from expressing themselves in Gentile national movements aiming at the achievement of greater social righteousness, Jews in Western Europe likewise began to be attracted to one of the two alternatives which had grown out of the Eastern European situation.

In both East and West a return to a milletal dispensation was ruled out. With all its merits a millet system is only possible either in a society that is at a much more developed stage than any society had yet reached at the time of writing, or else in a society in which there is no effective devolution of responsibility and authority from the central government to the local geographical administration—the city, the county, or what not. The Islamic Society's weakness in this respect had enabled the millet system to survive in Dār-al-Islām down to recent times, and had allowed minorities a certain liberty and vitality, but this only at the cost of their having to live within a general framework of stagnation. It was inevitable that to many Jews the only alternative should seem to be the autonomy (or independence) of the national community (it is interesting that Austrian Jewish 'revolutionaries' for some time sought to cope with the nationality problem in Eastern Europe along the lines of 'personal nationality', which was an attempt to adapt the millet idea to contemporary European conditions).

Jews turned to Nationalism, not only because it was the contemporary vogue, but also because, with the failure of the idea of 'personal nationality', it was the only framework within which the unsatisfied longing for a medium in which to work for greater social righteousness could be satisfied. In other words, there were deeper Jewish roots for Jewish nationalism than you have allowed for.

It is also interesting to discover the way in which the emergence of a Jewish nationalism—which was, as you say, fantastic in terms of the non-existence of a territory where Jews cultivated the soil—followed a period of intense Jewish intellectual activity which had been devoted largely to the study of Jewish history, and not merely to the study of a Rabbinic Judaism which a Rabbinic orthodoxy had come to regard as the Jewish intellect's sole legitimate field. The flowering of a *Jüdische Wissenschaft* is an integral part of the picture of the emergence of a Modern Jewry; and this must also be regarded as being one of the outstanding events in the Jews' encounter with the Western Society, since it was the product of Jewish access to Western academic and intellectual life.

## THE WELTANSCHAUUNG OF ALEXANDER HERZEN

ALEXANDER HERZEN (*vivebat* A.D. 1812-70) was the natural son of a Russian nobleman by a German mother. While still a student at the University of Moscow, he fell foul of the autocratic régime of Tsar Nicholas I. He left Russia in A.D. 1847 and spent the rest of his life in Western Europe in a society of Russian and Western liberal exiles. In taking this personal course, Herzen was opting for Westernization, and he accounted himself an opponent of his 'Slavophil' Russian contemporaries; yet in the same breath he proclaimed his affinity with them:

'Yes, we were their opponents, but very strange ones. We had the same love, but not the same way of loving, and, like Janus or the two-headed eagle, we looked in opposite directions, though the heart that beat within us was but one.'<sup>1</sup>

The love which these nineteenth-century Russian 'Herodians' and Russian 'Zealots' shared was, of course, their love for Russia; but an even stronger bond between them was a hatred which they likewise shared for a middle-class outlook and way of life that had become dominant in the contemporary Western World. Herzen revolted as violently as the Slavophiles themselves against any suggestion that Russia might renounce her historic identity by abandoning herself to this Modern Western middle-class culture. This idea seemed outrageous to him because he believed no less fervently than the Slavophiles in Russia's destiny; and this belief that Russia had a destiny incompatible with conversion to the Modern Western middle-class way of life brought Herzen into line, not only with his Slavophil Russian contemporaries, but also with his Communist Russian successors. As an anti-bourgeois Russian aristocrat he became a Russian prophet of a socialism that was to be attained in Russia through revolution and was to lead to a sanguinary conflict between Russia and a Western World from which Russia—Slavophil or Socialist—was divided by a permanent and unbridgeable moral gulf.

These features in Herzen's outlook are brought out in his memoirs with a wealth of illustration of which only a few characteristic specimens can be cited here.

'The Western European is not in a normal condition; he is moulting. . . . The historical process has left in the foreground the slimy stratum of the petty-bourgeois, under which the fossilised aristocratic classes are buried and the rising masses submerged.'<sup>2</sup> . . . The petty-bourgeois were not produced by the Revolution. . . . Set free, they passed over the dead bodies of those who had freed them, and established their own régime.'<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This passage from Herzen's periodical *The Bell*, p. 90, is quoted in Herzen, A.: *My Past and Thoughts*, English translation by Garnett, C. (London 1924-7, Chatto and Windus, 6 vols.), vol. ii, pp. 254 and 302. The quotations from Mrs. Garnett's translation have been made with the permission of the publishers.

<sup>2</sup> Herzen, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 228-9.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. iii, p. 134; *cp.* p. 147.

... Parliamentary government ... is simply the wheel in a squirrel's cage, and the most colossal one in the World.<sup>1</sup> ... Under the influence of petty-bourgeoisie, everything is changed in Europe. Chivalrous honour is replaced by the honesty of the book-keeper, elegant manners by propriety, courtesy by stiff decorum, pride by a readiness to take offence, parks by kitchen gardens, palaces by hotels open to *all* (that is, all who have money).<sup>2</sup> ... Bourgeoisie is the final form of Western European Civilisation, its coming of age. ... This closes the long series of its visions. ... By hard work the nations of the West have won their winter quarters. Let others show their mettle.<sup>3</sup>

How infinitely remote from all this is the Russian spirit!

'Petty Bourgeoisdom is incompatible with the Russian character—and thank God for it.<sup>4</sup> ... There is ... something irrational in our lives, but there is nothing vulgar, nothing stagnant, nothing bourgeois. ... You are restrained by scruples, you are held back by second thoughts. We have neither second thoughts nor scruples; all we lack is strength ... We have no law but our nature, our national character.'<sup>5</sup>

Russia's character is her destiny, and a nineteenth-century Herzen is as sure of this destiny as a sixteenth-century Philotheus.<sup>6</sup>

'Are we not perhaps satisfied with vestibules because our history is still knocking at the gate?' ... In our attitude to the Europeans ... there are points of resemblance to the attitude of the Germans to the Romans. In spite of our exterior, we are still barbarians.<sup>8</sup> ... We have nowhere those hard-and-fast prejudices which, like a paralysis, deprive the Western European of the use of half his limbs.<sup>9</sup> ... [The Polish émigrés] had a rich past; we had a great hope. Their breast was covered with scars, while we were toughening our muscles to receive them. Beside them, we were like recruits beside veterans. The Poles are mystics; we are realists.<sup>10</sup> ... Have we not ... the right to look upon Russia as ... the centre towards which the Slav World, in its striving toward unity, is gravitating?<sup>11</sup> ... Do you not think it would be as well to become more closely acquainted with this inconvenient neighbour who makes himself felt throughout the whole of Europe, in one place with bayonets, in another with spies?<sup>12</sup>

The next manifestation of Russia's puissant non-Western destiny will be an anti-bourgeois revolution.

'The free and rational development of Russian national existence is at one with the ideas of Western Socialism.'<sup>13</sup> ... The Russian enjoys a terrible advantage over the European; he has no traditions, no habits, nothing akin to him to lose. The man who has no wealth of his own or of others goes most safely along dangerous paths.<sup>14</sup> ... The Russian imperial autocracy ... is a military and civil dictatorship with far more resemblance to the Caesarism of Rome than to a feudal monarchy. A dictatorship ... cannot be permanent.<sup>15</sup> ... Who will be the predestined saviour? ... Whoever it may be, it is our task to meet him with warm welcome.'<sup>16</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Herzen, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 144.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. vi, p. 65.

<sup>3</sup> See VI. vii. 35-36.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. vi, p. 46; *cp.* vol. iv, p. 23.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. iv, p. 209.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 278.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. vi, p. 115.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 229.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. vi, p. 240.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. vi, p. 220.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. vi, p. 106.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. v, p. 331.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. iii, p. 142.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. vi, p. 240.

<sup>15</sup> Herzen, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 114.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. vi, p. 92.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. vi, p. 211.

Herzen's exultation over his vision of Russia's revolutionary future is seldom chilled by the cold touch of doubt.

'We perhaps ask for too much and shall get nothing. That may be so, but yet we do not despair.'<sup>1</sup>

He seems naïvely blind to the trenchancy of Western comments on the Russian *éthos*, which he records *en passant*. 'You Russians are either the most absolute slaves of your Tsar or . . . anarchists, and it follows from that that it will be a long time before you are free', the conservative and monarchist-minded Duc de Noailles once remarked to Herzen.<sup>2</sup> 'I tell you what, gentlemen: Hard as it may be for us with the Russian Government, anyway our position under it is better than what these socialist fanatics are preparing for us', declared the Polish émigré Demontowicz after prolonged arguments with the Russian émigré Bakunin.<sup>3</sup>

Herzen is not dismayed by the prospect, which he foresees, of a head-on collision between a revolutionary Russia and a conservative West.

'Our classic ignorance of the Western European will be productive of a good deal of harm; race hatreds and bloody collisions will develop from it later on.'<sup>4</sup> . . . Much hatred yet will be engendered and much blood yet will flow through this difference in the two stages of growth and education<sup>5</sup> . . . from "the conflict of these two different forms of culture".<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Ibid., vol. vi, p. 241.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., vol. v, p. 174, n. 2.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., vol. iv, p. 24.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., vol. iii, pp. 13-14.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., vol. iii, p. 140.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., vol. vi, p. 47.



## SICILIAN LIGHT ON ROMAN ORIGINS

IN rejecting as a professional pedigree-maker's fake the story, immortalized by Virgil, that the ancestors of the Romans were refugees from a foundering Minoan World who had been cast up on the coast of Italy by the same tornado that stranded the Philistines on the coast of Syria, we need not rule out the possibility that the Romans may in fact have been descended from immigrants of a later date.

This possibility is suggested by a consideration of the linguistic map of Italy in the period between the establishment of the Greek and Etruscan settlements on Italian ground and the subsequent Latinization of the Peninsula as a result of a Roman conquest. In the intervening age, languages of the Latin type were spoken by three peoples: the Sicel natives of Sicily,<sup>1</sup> the Ligurians in the North-Western Appennines and the Maritime Alps,<sup>2</sup> and the Latins and Falisci in the lower basin of the River Tiber. The rest of the Italian Peninsula, apart from the Greek and Etruscan settlements, was occupied in that age by peoples speaking other languages who would appear to have spilled over into Italy from the north-east in three successive waves. A wave of Umbrian-speakers had reached the west coast both north and south of Latium; for Umbrian dialects were spoken by the untamed Volscians ('marshmen') in the Pomptine swamps, as well as by the natives of an Etruria where, under an alien ascendancy, the largest river in the land testified to the nationality of the subject population by continuing to bear the name Umbro (Ombrone). Behind the Umbrian-speakers stood the Oscan-speakers, and behind these the Illyrian-speaking peoples of Venetia, Apulia, and Northern Calabria.

The general configuration of this linguistic map suggests that the speakers of languages of the Latin type in this age were survivors of an earlier wave of immigrants into Italy who had been pushed out south-westward into Sicily beyond the Straits of Messina and north-westward into a Ligurian highland fastness by three waves following in their wake; but this interpretation still leaves to be explained the presence of a Latin-speaking population in the open country of Latium. How are we to account for this Latin enclave in an elsewhere Umbrian and Oscan

<sup>1</sup> The fragmentary surviving relics of the Sicel language have been presented and discussed by R. S. Conway in *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. iv (Cambridge 1926, University Press), pp. 436-7; by J. Whatmough in *The Foundations of Roman Italy* (London 1937, Methuen), pp. 365-6; and by T. J. Dunbabin in *The Western Greeks* (Oxford 1948, Clarendon Press), pp. 189-90. As it appears to the writer of this Study, the evidence proves conclusively that the Sicels' mother tongue was virtually identical with Latin, and that it can be classed at any rate as a language belonging to the same sub-group as Latin within an Italic family in which the other two sub-groups were the Oscan and the Umbrian.

<sup>2</sup> The relics of the Ligurian language have been presented and discussed by Conway in loc. cit., pp. 433-5, and by Whatmough in op. cit., pp. 129-30. Whatmough agrees with Conway that Ligurian is an Indo-European language of Sicel affinities, and, *pace* Whatmough's judgement that it is not a member of either the Italic or the Celtic family, the present writer ventures the opinion that Ligurian, as well as Sicel, will turn out to be an Italic language of the Latin sub-group.

Central Italy, just beyond the south-eastern limits of the Umbrian territory that had been occupied by the Etruscans? We may find a clue to the puzzle if we turn our eyes for a moment to a point just beyond the opposite extremity of Etruria, along the coast to the north-west of the mouth of the River Arno.

Here, at the eastern end of the Italian Riviera, we find four place-names—not of Roman mintage, and therefore presumably ante-dating the Roman conquest—that are identical with the principal place-names in the Elymian country in the north-western corner of Sicily. The Gulf of Spezia is flanked by a Port of Eryx (the latter-day Lerici), bearing the name of the celebrated Sicilian mountain, and by a Portus Veneris, dedicated to the same goddess as the celebrated temple of Aphrodite on the Sicilian mountain's flank. Again, about half-way between the Gulf of Spezia and Genoa, the mouth of the River Labonia (Lavagna) is flanked on one side by a Segesta (the latter-day Sestri Levante) and on the other by an Entella (still commemorated in the name of a local stream). This fourfold correspondence between place-names in Sicily and on the Riviera can hardly be accidental; we cannot reject the inference that the places known by these four names in Liguria had been called after the four places with identical names in Sicily, or vice versa; and the probability that the group of names in Liguria was derived from the group in Sicily is indicated by the fact that in Liguria, as in Sicily, the mountain-name appears in the Graecized form 'Eryx' and not in a Ligurian equivalent of the Latin form 'verruca' ('peak'), which we should expect to find surviving here if the name had originated in Liguria and had been carried thence to Sicily.

The reappearance of these four Sicilian names on the Riviera thus indicates that the Sicilian Elymi had planted settlements here at some date; and this date must be earlier than the Roman Age; for the Romans did not draw on their Graecized Sicilian subjects for the colonists whom they planted at Luna and other points in and around Liguria in and after the second century B.C. The hypothesis that most naturally suggests itself is that these Elymian settlements along the Eastern Riviera were part of the older colonizing movement that had created Magna Graecia and Etruria. We know that the Elymi were particularly receptive to Hellenic influences, besides being particularly hard pressed by the encroachments of Greek intruders on their territory. It might well have occurred to them to relieve the pressure of population in a shrunken homeland in Sicily by resorting to the Greek expedient that had borne so hard upon the Elymians themselves. Why should they not follow the Greeks' example by colonizing some stretch of West Mediterranean coastline where the natives were sufficiently backward to be easily subdued or expelled? If, at some stage in the colonizing movement that was in process from the eighth to the sixth century B.C., the Elymians did join in the game, an obvious field for them to choose would have been the Riviera between the north-western outposts of the Etruscans and the eastern outposts of the Massiliots. The Italian Riviera had a promising commercial hinterland in the upper basin of the River Po, and thus in their general location the four Elymian settlements were

well placed—though the Hannibalic War was eventually to demonstrate that, in overlooking the superlative advantages of Genoa, the Elymian prospectors had been no less blind than those Megarian Greek prospectors who passed by the vacant site of Byzantium in order to settle at Calchedon.<sup>1</sup>

The Elymian settlers along the Eastern Riviera had, however, at any rate chosen a location where they could count on a 'natural frontier' to safeguard them against Etruscan encroachments; for, as late as the time of the Hannibalic War, the lower valley of the Arno was a pestilential swamp, which Hannibal's army found it almost as difficult to traverse as the Alps, and which cost their leader the loss of an eye. The Etruscans' Latin neighbours at the opposite extremity of the Maremma likewise enjoyed the benefit of a protective river-barrier which enabled the Romans to repulse the Etruscan war-lord Lars Porsenna's attempt to reconquer them after they had expelled their Etruscan tyrant Tarquin. On the analogy of the Elymian settlements along the Riviera, is it too rash a conjecture to guess that the cluster of Latin-speaking communities adjoining the lower course of the Tiber, which appear on the linguistic map of Italy in the period intervening between the colonization of Magna Graecia and Etruria and the Roman conquest, were not relics of an aboriginal deposit of peoples speaking languages of the Latin type, but were colonists from Sicily who had succeeded in thrusting themselves into a promising site in between the farthest south-eastern outpost of Etruria and the farthest north-western outpost of Magna Graecia?

A scrutiny of the map of Latium and the adjoining Faliscan country confirms the impression that this Tiberine enclave of Latin-speaking population was not, like the Volscians' marshes or the Hernicans' crags, a fastness in which a hard-pressed native people had managed to hold out against aggressive assailants, but was a 'bridgehead' established by invaders from overseas who had made a landing *vi et armis* on the beaches just south-east of Ostia. On this reconstruction of an unrecorded chapter of history, the Falisci would be a vanguard of the Sicel invaders who rashly pushed up the Tiber Valley and settled on its right bank, only to fall permanently under the domination of Etruscans on whose preserves they were trespassing. A more cautious Latin rear-guard would have confined its encroachments within an area covered by a number of natural frontiers: the river-line constituted by the courses of the Lower Tiber and its tributary the Anio, the south-western spurs of the Sabine Mountains, and the natural system of fortifications provided by the rampart-like slopes of the craters-within-craters known as the Alban Hills. The fortresses built by the Latin interlopers to protect this perimeter would have been Rome, Tibur, Praeneste, and Alba Longa.

On this showing, there would be a sense in which Rome had been 'an Hellenic city'<sup>2</sup> already before the first stone of her material structure had been laid, since it would have been an Hellenic example that had inspired her Sicel founders to join in a colonizing movement that in the eighth, seventh, and sixth centuries B.C. was planting the west coast of

<sup>1</sup> See II. ii. 43-48.

<sup>2</sup> See V. v. 212, n. 3.

Italy, from a Chalcidian Rhegium on the Straits of Messina to an Elymian Entella on the Riviera, with sea-borne settlers of Greek, Etruscan and Sicilian origin.

This inference from a linguistic map has some support in the Roman literary tradition, for Siculi or Sicani are located in Latium by both Virgil and Pliny. Siculi are named by Pliny in a list of early peoples of Latium,<sup>1</sup> and Sicani in a list of 'carnem in Monte Albano soliti accipere populi Albenses.'<sup>2</sup> Sicani are thrice enumerated by Virgil among the peoples already established in Latium before the advent of Aeneas.<sup>3</sup> In the first and the third of these passages of the *Aeneid*, these Latian Sicani are associated with the Rutuli and the Aurunci, and in the third passage these three peoples are described as being one another's neighbours.

This Virgilian tradition of a Sican element in the population of Latium is, of course, quite independent of the tale of a Trojan invasion of Latium which is the main theme of the *Aeneid*. Indeed, Virgil makes his Latian Sicans join with the other old inhabitants of Latium in attempting to resist the Trojan intruders. While continuing to reject the tale of a Trojan settlement in Latium as fictitious, we may perhaps accept the tradition of a Sican settlement in Latium with the amendment that these Latian Sicans were colonists from Sicily who had not settled in Latium before the eighth century B.C. at the earliest.

<sup>1</sup> Plinius Secundus, C.: *Historia Naturalis*, Book III, chap. v (ix), § 56.

<sup>2</sup> Op. cit., Book III, chap. v (ix), § 69.

<sup>3</sup> See *Aeneid*, Book VII, l. 795; Book VIII, l. 328; Book XI, l. 317.

## IX. C (i), ANNEX

### 'ASIA' AND 'EUROPE': FACTS AND FANTASIES

IN the introduction to his history of a concatenation of encounters culminating in a collision between the Achaemenian Empire and the Hellenic World,<sup>1</sup> Herodotus professes to reproduce a Persian exposition of the motive that had impelled the Achaemenidae to take the offensive against the Hellenes, and of a theory of history which was the ground of the Persians' Hellenophobia according to this story. The alleged motive is one of the characteristic points of honour in the barbarian *Weltanschauung* of the Heroic Age. The Persians, according to Herodotus, believed that they had inherited a blood feud in which the latest entry in the running account was a still unavenged injury, suffered by predecessors of theirs, which it was their moral duty to requite. The alleged theory in virtue of which the Persians are represented by Herodotus as believing themselves to be saddled with this obligation is as sophisticated as the blood-feud *motif* is primitive. The Persians, according to Herodotus, felt it incumbent on themselves to exact vengeance from the Hellenes for the siege and sack of Troy because, on the Persian theory of history, the Persians' own encounter with the Hellenes, the Trojans' encounter with them, and the Colchians' and the Phoenicians' encounters with them before that, were so many incidents in an historic feud between Asia and Europe. The hypothetical continuity of the feud would make these incidents historically continuous with one another and so create a moral solidarity between successive representatives of Asia in this quarrel of the continents.

The wrong inflicted on Asia which the Persians are declared by Herodotus to have felt it to be their duty to avenge was the Hellenes' wanton offence of retaliating for the abduction of a princess by waging a war of annihilation and thereby opening a new and unprecedentedly devastating chapter in the feud between Europe and Asia.<sup>2</sup>

'Up to this point the injuries that they had inflicted on one another had been confined to abductions, but at this juncture the Hellenes put themselves monstrously in the wrong. They committed an unprovoked act of military aggression against Asia when the Asiatics were still innocent of any such outrage against Europe. . . . The Persians claim that "they" (identifying themselves with the Asiatics) had let the abductions pass without taking any notice, whereas the Hellenes had exacted vengeance for the abduction of a Lacedaemonian princess by collecting a great expeditionary force and then invading Asia and destroying Priam's empire. From that date, the Persians say, "they" had always regarded the Hellenic World as being in a state of war with "them"—the point being that the Persians lay claim to Asia and to the non-Hellenic Asiatic peoples as their own domain, while they think of Europe and the Hellenic World as being an *alter orbis*. This is the Persians' version of the course of

<sup>1</sup> This Herodotean concatenation of encounters has been discussed on pp. 454-60, above.

<sup>2</sup> The 'chain-reactions' that 'in real life' are apt to be set in motion by such wanton acts of hybris have been discussed on pp. 454-63, above.



historical events: they see in the sack of Troy the origin of their own quarrel with the Hellenes.<sup>1</sup>

If any of Herodotus's Persian contemporaries had ever taken Hellenic life and letters seriously enough to think of reading this Asiatic Greek historian's introduction to his story of an oecumenical concatenation of encounters, the Persian explorer of an alien Hellenic mental world would assuredly have been taken aback at finding his countrymen credited with the motive and the theory that Herodotus has here attributed to them. The authentic motive behind the Persians' unsuccessful attempt, between 492 and 479 B.C., to conquer the then still independent residue of the Hellenic World was certainly not to avenge legendary wrongs supposedly inflicted on Trojan victims by Achaean aggressors. The number of Persians who had heard of 'the Trojan War' cannot have exceeded the number who were familiar with the epic poetry of their Asiatic Greek subjects,<sup>2</sup> and a Persian who knew Homer must indeed have

<sup>1</sup> Herodotus, Book I, chaps. 4-5. Caricature is perhaps the best comment on this Herodotean reconstruction of the historical antecedents of the encounter between the Achaemenidae and the Hellenes. Let us imagine that, at a date still in the future at the time of writing, Continental Western Europe has been militarily overrun and politically subjugated by the Soviet Union and that Herodotus has returned to life to write the history of a consequent conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. We can imagine him transposing this episode in an encounter between the Western and the Russian civilizations into terms of a 'war of the worlds' in which the Old World and the New World are the perennial parties to an inter-mundane feud.

'The Castilians', Herodotus might have written, 'were the authors of the original crime out of which this feud between the New World and the Old World arose. After wantonly drawing upon themselves the Envy of the Gods by venturing to make their way across an Ocean which no man-made ship had ever previously traversed, they proceeded to provoke the Godhead further in another way by attacking and overthrowing the empires of the Aztecs and the Incas, when these legitimate sovereigns of the New World had never thought of committing aggression against the Old World on their part. The wrong thus inflicted on the New World by Castilian hands was avenged by the colonists planted there by the Castilians themselves and by the English, who rebelled against their mother countries, and thereby put an end to the Old World's dominion over the New World, in retaliation for the arbitrary action of a King of England named George III in imposing a tax in his American dominions on the importation of an old-world herb called tea, from which the colonists had learnt to brew a drink to take the place of wine. This re-establishment of American independence would have balanced the account between the two worlds if the equilibrium had not been upset again by the intervention of the United States in the World War of A.D. 1914-18. The Americans defend this intervention by arguing that they were acting in self-defence, on the ground that, if they had allowed the Germans to win that war, then the Germans, who are notoriously deficient in a sense of moderation, would never have been content with having made themselves masters of the Old World but would have proceeded to mobilize all the Old World's resources for an attack upon the New World in which the United States would assuredly have lost her liberty. The Russians, on the other hand, argue that, in intervening in the affairs of the Old World, the United States was committing an act of aggression and that, since the overthrow of Germany in the Second World War, the duty of championing the cause of the Old World has fallen on Russia's shoulders. On this ground they maintain that their own recent occupation of the countries along the Atlantic seaboard of the Old World, facing the United States, was not an act of aggression on Russia's part but was a necessary measure of precaution, taken in the occupied countries' own interests, to forestall a further act of aggression against the Old World which was to be expected from a United States which had committed two such crimes already. This, then, was the origin of the Great Russo-American War, in which all the forces of the Old World and the New World were arrayed against one another.'

<sup>2</sup> It is perhaps worth noting that the Herodotean interpretation of 'the Trojan War' as an episode in a feud between 'Europe' and 'Asia' has no warrant in the Homeric Epic. The authors of the two catalogues of the opposing forces (*Iliad*, Book II, ll. 484-759 and II. 811-77) describe an Achaean confederacy astride the Aegean making war on a Trojan coalition astride the Dardanelles; and, whatever the relation between these passages and other parts of the poem may be held to be, there is at any rate no inconsistency between them on this particular point of political geography.

been a *rara avis*. In another context<sup>1</sup> we have already observed that the authentic motive for Darius's forward policy was, not any romantic impulse to pursue an imaginary feud, but the prosaic need to find a tenable north-west frontier for the Achaemenian Empire in lieu of an existing line which had been proved to be untenable by the painfully cogent experience of the Asiatic Greek and Carian revolt of 499-494 B.C. And, as for the theory of a perennial feud between 'Asia' and 'Europe', there is no serious evidence that the Persians of the Achaemenian Age ever applied to such mundane matters as Geography, History, and Civilization a capacity for thinking in abstract general terms which they displayed in the transcendental sphere of a Zoroastrian theology that concerned itself, not with a merely terrestrial Habitable World, but with the Universe, and that made its grand dichotomy, not between Asia and Europe or between Orientalism and Hellenism, but between Light and Darkness and between Good and Evil.

The motive and the theory that Herodotus attributes to the Persians were both manifestly invented by some Hellenic mind. The Hellenic inventor was not Herodotus himself, for Asia is already a current synonym for the Achaemenian Empire in Aeschylus's *Persae*,<sup>2</sup> which was produced for the first time in 472 B.C., and the same antithesis between Asia and Europe reappears in Hellenic medical works of the Hippocratean school which were probably written in Herodotus's own generation. Nor does Herodotus himself explicitly endorse an interpretation of history which he has borrowed from Hellenic predecessors without acknowledgement and has attributed to Persian contemporaries without permission. Yet, in effect, 'the Feud between Europe and Asia' is the dominant and unifying theme of Herodotus's work, and the masterliness of his workmanship is largely responsible for the subsequent vogue of this fifth-century Hellenic fantasy of a 'quarrel of the continents'.

This fantasy had been begotten when some imaginative Hellenic mind had given a revolutionary change of meaning to the two traditional Hellenic geographical names 'Europe' and 'Asia' by transferring them from the mariner's chart to the publicist's political map and to the sociologist's diagram of the habitats of cultures. This feat of imagination had been unluckily inspired; for, though Herodotus was to turn it to such good literary account, it was, all the same, a fantasy that had turned sense into nonsense. The mariner's navigational distinction between 'Asia' and 'Europe', as far as it went, could have had as long a life as the physical geography of the Quaternary Age of the planet's geological history, whereas a constellation of political forces in which the waterway between 'Asia' and 'Europe' coincided with a political frontier had never arisen, from the dawn of recorded human history down to the time of writing of the present work, except during the two brief periods 547-513 B.C.<sup>3</sup> and 386-334 B.C., when this waterway constituted the north-west frontier of the Achaemenian Empire.<sup>4</sup> As for the identifica-

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 430-5, above.

<sup>2</sup> See, for example, ll. 12, 61, 249, 270, 549, 584, 763, and 929.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 434, above.

<sup>4</sup> It is true that the frontier of the Lydian Empire had gradually approximated towards his water-line in the course of the century preceding Cyrus's conquest of Lydia in

tion of the mariner's 'continents' with the domains of diverse cultures, this was, if possible, even more fantastic than the political misapplication of these nautical terms; for the historian cannot lay his finger on any period at all, however brief, in which there was any significant cultural diversity between 'Asiatic' and 'European' occupants of the all but contiguous opposite banks of a tenuous inland waterway which would have continued to be the fresh-water river that it originally had been if Poseidon had not high-handedly enlarged his own domain by a mighty trident-stroke that had brought the salt water flooding in, up the rift which the god had cleft, from the mouth of the Aegean to the head of the Sea of Azov.<sup>1</sup>

Whatever the ultimate origins of the names 'Asia' and 'Europe' may have been,<sup>2</sup> their usage as a pair of antithetical but mutually complementary physiographical expressions must have been first brought into currency by navigators of the Aegean who had succeeded in mastering the challenge of 'the estranging sea'<sup>3</sup> and who had consequently become disagreeably aware of limitations set by *terra firma* to their freedom of movement in an element which they had now made their own.

It is the mariner's nomenclature that first draws the distinction between his friends the islands, which offer him ports of call and harbours of refuge, and his enemies the 'continents' whose continuous coastline disappointingly bars his passage, as gulf after gulf which promises to be a strait turns out to be a cul-de-sac. The Hellenic mariner who had inherited a mastery of the Aegean from Minoan predecessors could not fail to note and name the two continents that proved to set an eastern and a western bound to his sea-faring. Feeling his way northwards along the Asiatic and the European coast of the mainland, he summoned up the courage to hazard the passage of three successive straits—the

547 B.C.; but even Croesus, the last and widest-ruling of the Kings of Lydia, had never succeeded in extending his dominions up to the continental Asiatic water-front all along the line. Miletus, the leading Continental Asiatic Greek city of the day, as well as the non-Greek-speaking Hellenic country Lycia, had successfully maintained their independence until, after the fall of Sardis, they had been compelled to submit to Lydia's Persian conquerors.

<sup>1</sup> See I. i. 326, n. 2.

<sup>2</sup> The Aegean mariner's term 'Asia' to denote the continent which set the eastward limit to his freedom of movement in his own element appeared to have been derived from the local name for a marsh or watermead in the valley of the River Cayster, presumably somewhere not far from its mouth (*Iliad*, Book II, l. 461); and the documents retrieved by Western archaeologists from the wreck of the Hittite imperial archives at Boghaz-qa'eh indicated that this Asian mead was called after the thirteenth-century West Anatolian principality Assuwa. The etymology of the name 'Europe' was obscure. It might be a Greek travesty of the Phoenician word '*ereb*' (corresponding to the Arabic *gharb*) meaning the dark quarter where the Sun sets in the West; or, if it was not a technical term borrowed by Greek mariners from their Phoenician confrères, but was a native Greek word, it might signify the 'broad faced' *terra firma* which had proved itself to be a 'continent' by stretching away continuously without a break through which a ship could thread its passage, in contrast to the islands of the Archipelago round whose circumscribed coasts the Aegean mariner had learnt readily to find his way. This literal interpretation of the word is perhaps too rational to be convincing, and another possibility is that the Continent of Europe may have derived its name from a goddess who was 'broad-faced' because she was bovine. 'The Tyrian princess Europa' (Herodotus, Book I, chap. 2) who had been abducted, according to the Hellenic myth, by Zeus in the guise of a bull seems likely to have been a goddess in the guise of a cow, and we may identify her, according to our fancy, with 'the cow-faced Hera' or with the goddess incarnate in a heifer whom the Hellenes knew as Io and the Egyptians as Hathor.

<sup>3</sup> The genesis of the Minoan Civilization has been traced back to a victorious response to this physical challenge in I. i. 323-30.

Dardanelles, the Bosphorus, and the Straits of Kerch—where Asia and Europe all but clasped hands and threatened to crush between their fingers the audacious ship that ventured to run the gauntlet. For each of these daring transits the adventurous Hellenic mariners of the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. were rewarded by finding their way into a new Aegean in the shape of another inland sea; but, when they had thus successively won their way from the Aegean into the Marmara, from the Marmara into the Black Sea, and from the Black Sea into the Sea of Azov, and had ascended the River Don to the head of fluvial navigation, they there at last came to a point where their own element finally failed them and where the opposing continents, which had so far thrice alternately converged and receded, at length lost their separate identities by melting into one.

Even on the plane of physical geography, the mariner's distinction between 'Europe' and 'Asia' made sense only so far as the physical effect of Poseidon's trident-stroke extended. The distinction could neither have been invented nor even have been understood by a Nomad who in his own peculiar element could range at will over a steppe which afforded him passage without any appreciable break—when once he had made his discovery of the waterless Dardanelles called the Zungarian Gap—all the way between the eastern slopes of the Carpathians and the western slopes of the Khingan Range. The distinction drawn between an Asiatic and a European continent in an Hellenic nautical nomenclature would have been equally unintelligible to the Eurasian Nomad's northern neighbour and adversary the Eurasian peasant, whose element was the belt of Black Earth extending from the eastern slopes of the Carpathians to the western slopes of Altai. The sedentary cultivator of the soil would have agreed with the nomadic herdsman in dismissing, as the ineptitude that it was, an arbitrary division of his realm between two continents invented in another region of the globe by alien seamen for navigational purposes; and an Herodotean 'quarrel of the continents' would have been brushed aside, as a meaningless irrelevancy, by a pair of landmen who were both intent on Cain's and Abel's historic conflict between 'the Desert' and 'the Sown'.<sup>1</sup>

The boundary between the Hellenic mariners' continents of Asia and Europe was a navigable waterway, and this continuous channel of salt water which carried their ships from the Aegean through the Dardanelles and the Marmara and the Bosphorus and the Black Sea and the Straits of Kerch came to an end at the head of the Sea of Azov. This last link in a chain of inland seas still served to demarcate an Asia and a Europe from one another;<sup>2</sup> but beyond that point the Hellenic geographers never succeeded in laying their finger on any inland feature in the physical landscape that could offer any convincing line for partitioning an indivisible Eurasia which no Poseidonian trident-stroke had here cleft asunder; and this problem of drawing a land-frontier between Asia and Europe proved equally baffling to Modern Western geo-

<sup>1</sup> See III. iii. 7-22.

<sup>2</sup> The Sea of Azov was the boundary between Asia and Europe according to Hippocrates, *Influences of Atmosphere, Water, and Situation*, chap. 13.

graphers who had saddled themselves with this Hellenic intellectual incubus as one of the penalties of profiting by a Modern Western Renaissance of the corpus of Hellenic culture.<sup>1</sup>

It was in vain that these Hellenomane Western geographers shifted an imaginary boundary eastward from the line of the Don to the lines of the Volga and the Caucasus, and subsequently followed the Russian Empire's military advance into Transcaucasia in order to find a boundary between the continents of Europe and Asia in Russia's fluctuating political frontiers *vis-à-vis* Turkey and Persia.<sup>2</sup> Even this desperate expedient of equating the bounds of a continent with transitory political frontiers was of no avail to the perplexed geographers in the formidably broad torso of Eurasia between the north shore of the Caspian and the south shore of the Arctic Ocean; for on this front the political frontier of Russia had long since rolled on eastward up to the shores of the Pacific Ocean, and to have stretched the Continent of Europe, in Russia's train, to extend as far as Okhotsk and Vladivostok would merely have multiplied the geographers' embarrassments. They were reduced to dissecting the living body politic of Russia into an imaginary 'Russia-in-Europe' and 'Russia-in-Asia' along the unconvincing line of the Ural River and the Ural Mountains, and garnishing their fictitious 'Russia-in-Asia' with a non-existent political capital at Irkutsk for the edification of school-children who would feel their geographical education incomplete if they could not name a capital for every so-called state on the list that they were given to learn by heart. Thereafter the geographers belatedly discovered that the Ural Mountains which they had made into a household word were no more noticeable a feature in the physical landscape than the Chiltern Hills,<sup>3</sup> and that this vaunted physical barrier between Europe and Asia was not strongly enough pronounced even to serve as a boundary between one local province of the Russian Empire and another.<sup>4</sup>

The geographers' dissection of Eurasia into a 'Russia-in-Europe' and a 'Russia-in-Asia' was almost surpassed in fatuity by their dissection of the Ottoman Empire into a 'Turkey-in-Europe (capital: Constantinople)' and a 'Turkey-in-Asia (capital: Smyrna)'; and they could not save their reputation by pointing out that 'European' and 'Asiatic' Turkey, unlike 'European' and 'Asiatic' Russia, were physically demarcated from one another by Poseidon's salt-water-filled rift.<sup>5</sup> The geographers' error here lay in attempting to translate a serviceable piece of navigational nomenclature into political and cultural terms. In the daily life of Hellenes whose element was the sea, the salt water was a bond between continents

<sup>1</sup> This is acknowledged by Oskar Halecki in *The Limits and Divisions of European History* (London 1950, Sheed and Ward), p. 85.

<sup>2</sup> On this political principle of demarcating continents, the Transcaucasian districts Qars, Ardahan, and Batum 'changed continents' twice within forty years—from Asia to Europe in A.D. 1878 and back again from Europe to Asia in A.D. 1918.

<sup>3</sup> On the 23rd January, 1930, the writer of this Study traversed the Urals *en route* across Eurasia from Vladivostok to Ostend via Sverdlovsk (Yekaterinburg), and found them as unobtrusive as the Chilterns on the road from London to Oxford via High Wycombe.

<sup>4</sup> This is acknowledged by Halecki, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

<sup>5</sup> Halecki, in *op. cit.*, pp. 75-76, acknowledges that the Straits do not sunder Europe from Asia Minor.



which were barriers to intercourse by navigation; and in the daily life of latter-day inhabitants of Constantinople the Bosphorus was the central thoroughfare of a city bestriding it. The twentieth-century Turkish business man who worked every day in Pera and slept every night in Scutari would have been astonished to hear that the *thalweg* of the familiar metropolitan waterway which he crossed in a penny steamer twice a day on the way to and fro between his dormitory and his office marked the boundary between two of the major divisions of the land-surface of the globe, and that this thread of 'salt estranging sea' was so potent an insulator that Scutari, Haydar Pasha, and the other 'Asiatic' quarters of the Bosphoran imperial city had a closer affinity with Calcutta and Peking than they had with Pera and Istanbul, while conversely Istanbul and Pera had a closer affinity with a 'European' Paris and Madrid than they had with Haydar Pasha and Scutari.

No citizen of Constantinople could ever have been persuaded to swallow such nonsense; for the Republic of Turkey which bestrode the narrow seas between Asia and Europe at the time of writing was only the latest of a series of states with the same geographical configuration. In the political geography of the Ottoman Empire, the East Roman Empire, the Roman Empire itself since the age of Diocletian and Constantine, and the abortive empire of Alexander the Great's local successor Lysimachus, the waterway between the Aegean and the Black Sea had proved itself to be the body politic's spinal cord by attracting the site of the seat of government to its shores. Lysimachus had laid out a capital on the Dardanelles, in the neck of the Gallipoli Peninsula, for an empire which he had momentarily extended to the Danube in one direction and to the Taurus in the other. The capital of the Roman Empire had gravitated from the banks of the Tiber to the shores of the Marmara,<sup>1</sup> and Diocletian had governed the Hellenic World from Nicomedia (Ismid)<sup>2</sup> before Constantine had converted Byzantium into the Second Rome which an East Roman Empire and an Ottoman Empire successively adopted as their capital.

When the East Roman Imperial Government at Constantinople was overthrown by Western Christian adventurers in A.D. 1204, the Greek Orthodox Christian resistance movement which immediately declared itself at half a dozen places in the provinces found its most effective base of operations at Nicaea, a provincial city which combined the political advantage of proximity to the East Roman Empire's central waterway with the military advantage of being fortified by Nature as well as by art. Nicaea, like the landward face of Istanbul, was encased in a triple line of fortifications; a ring of mountains encircled the inland basin in which the city lay; and the western half of this basin was filled by a lake which drained through a defile into the Gulf of Cius (Gemlik) and thence into the Sea of Marmara. The Greek Orthodox Christian principality which was established at Nicaea in A.D. 1204 by the refugee patriot Theodore Lascaris gave a practical demonstration of the working of local laws of political geography which was not lost upon the 'Osmanlis' when, 122 years later, these Turkish Muslim empire-builders gained

<sup>1</sup> See VI. vii. 219-20.

<sup>2</sup> See VI. vii. 217-18.

possession of a neighbouring and comparable site at Brusa.<sup>1</sup> The princes of Nicaea demonstrated between A.D. 1204 and A.D. 1261 that a provisional capital within a stone's throw of the Asiatic shore of the Marmara afforded a practicable base of operations for a conquest of Thrace and Macedonia which could then be rounded off by the capture of a straits-bestridden empire's inevitable ultimate capital at Constantinople.

Nicaea and Brusa successively fulfilled their destinies by reinstating Constantinople as the capital of an empire which these two temporary queens of the narrow seas had built up for the benefit of their still more auspiciously situated sister on the Bosphorus; but a twentieth-century Republic of Turkey, whose capital was not Constantinople but Ankara, had other predecessors which, like itself and unlike the Ottoman and Palaeologan empires, had bestridden the narrow seas without planting the seat of government on their shores. The Dardanelles were thus bestridden first by the Seleucid and then by the Pergamene successor-state of the abortive empire of Lysimachus. Though both these Hellenic empires, like the latter-day Republic of Turkey that emerged from the wreckage of the Ottoman Empire after the World War of A.D. 1914-18 and like their own predecessor the Achaemenian Empire, were land-powers centred on Asiatic ground and not sea-powers centred on the Straits, the water-boundary between the continents of Asia and Europe was too slight a barrier to provide them with 'a natural frontier'; and they both found it advisable, for the defence of their Asiatic dominions, to hold a European bridgehead across the water.

The salt-water boundary between the mariner's continents Asia and Europe was as insignificant a feature on the cultural, ecclesiastical, and ethnographical maps as it was on the political map.

The Aegean Sea was bestridden by the Hellenic World and by the main body of the Orthodox Christian World since the first emergence of each of these two societies, and by the Iranic Muslim World since the Ottoman conquest of Rumelia in the fourteenth century of the Christian Era. In the internal structure of the sea-faring Hellenic Society in its pre-Alexandrine Age, the waters of the Aegean proved themselves to be, not a barrier, but a bond by knitting together an Asiatic and a European half of an indivisible Hellas as a European and an American half of an indivisible Western World were knit together by the conductive waters of the Atlantic in the ocean-faring age of Western history; and, when we turn to the ecclesiastical map, we find that the water-boundary between Asia and Europe was crossed by religious missionaries as readily as by military conquerors.

In his two days' voyage from Troas to Neapolis,<sup>2</sup> Saint Paul, as we have seen,<sup>3</sup> was following in the wake of Seleucus Nicator and of Darius the Great's lieutenant Mardonius; and, some thirteen hundred years later, Islam, in its turn, was propagated from Asia to Europe with equal facility by Ottoman disciples of the Prophet Muhammad who pursued

<sup>1</sup> The Lascarids' role as path-finders for the 'Osmanlis has been noticed already in III. iii. 27.

<sup>2</sup> Acts xvi. 11.

<sup>3</sup> In VI. vii. 95-97.

the missionary's aim by the conqueror's methods. In the history of the Eastern Orthodox Church the distinction between 'Europe' and 'Asia' was not merely meaningless but was positively misleading. A division of the World's land-surface into continents was inapplicable to the ecclesiastical geography of a commonwealth of churches whose two oldest members were an 'Asiatic' Patriarchate of Antioch and an 'African' Patriarchate of Alexandria, and whose senior member was an Oecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople in which 'Asiatic' and 'European' sees were indissolubly associated with one another, while the largest and most powerful member of the group at the time of writing was a Patriarchate of Moscow whose ecclesiastical subjects were scattered over the face of an indivisible Eurasia from the shores of the Baltic Sea at Leningrad to the shores of the Pacific Ocean at Vladivostok.

The linguistic map tells the same tale as the ecclesiastical, cultural, and political maps at which we have just glanced. In the spread of languages, as in the propagation of religions and cultures and the building of empires, the narrow seas dividing an 'Asia' from a 'Europe' never proved to be a barrier and frequently provided a highway. The waters of the Aegean wafted the Greek language from the 'European' to the 'Asiatic' side of this conductive sea at least as early as the age of the post-Minoan Völkerwanderung (*circa* 1425-1125 B.C.). The Thracian-speaking peoples, who spread north-westward perhaps as far as Upper Silesia after they had broken out of the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe into the preserves of *Homo Agricola*, also spread south-eastward perhaps as far as North-Western Kurdistan<sup>1</sup> as easily as if the continuity of the hills and dales over which they drove their flocks had not been broken in this quarter by 'the silver streaks' of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.

The ineffectiveness of the narrow seas as an obstacle to the spread of the Thracian-speaking peoples was attested by the appearance of the same Thracian tribal names on both the European and the Asiatic side. There were Thyni on the Ismid Peninsula, as well as in the Istranja Mountains overhanging the west shore of the Black Sea just across the Bosphorus. The Phrygians of the Anatolian Plateau and Bebryces of the Qaramursal Peninsula on the Asiatic shore of the Marmara had left a rear-guard in Europe whose name might have passed into oblivion<sup>2</sup> if these Macedonian Brygi had not once crossed the path of History by falling foul of the Persian Mardonius's expeditionary force in 492 B.C.<sup>3</sup> An equally obscure rear-guard of the Mysian occupants of the Asiatic hinterland of the Marmara survived in a nook between the Balkans and the Lower Danube to give their name to the Roman province Moesia. Conversely, the Dardani whose main body had dug themselves in on the watershed between the basins of the Morava and the Vardar in the heart of the Balkan Peninsula had thrown an advance party into the

<sup>1</sup> See VI. vii. 604-5 and 660-2, and pp. 432-3, above. Herodotus (Book V, chap. 3) estimated that the Thracians were the most numerous of all peoples with the sole exception of the Indians.

<sup>2</sup> Like the forgotten name of the European rear-guard of the Hittites who had blazed the trail for the Phrygians in the second millennium B.C.

<sup>3</sup> See Herodotus, Book VI, chap. 45.

Troad across straits that preserved the record of this tribal migration by acquiring from it the name 'Dardanelles'.<sup>1</sup>

The Thracian-speaking peoples' migration across the Straits in and after a post-Minoan *Völkerwanderung* was emulated in the third century B.C. by the Celtic-speaking peoples when a sudden diversion of Macedonian arms from the conquest of the barbarian hinterland of European Greece to the conquest of the Achaemenian Empire invited Celts, whom Philip's aggression had provoked, to take a hand in the scramble for Alexander's spoils;<sup>2</sup> and the ineffectiveness of the Straits as a barrier against a *Völkerwanderung* was attested once again by the appearance of the same tribal name *Tectosages* both in an Asiatic Galatia round Ankara and in a European Gaul round Toulouse. Even after the barbarians' well-worn highway across the Straits had been obstructed by the foundation of Constantinople, the Goths and the Slavs in turn followed the trail of the Hittites and the Phrygians and the Gauls out of Europe into Asia—as deportees, if not as conquerors—while in the opposite direction a legendary feat of the Mysi and the Teucris<sup>3</sup> was performed in real life by Ottoman Turkish migrants who conquered and colonized Rumelia from an Anatolian base of operations in the fourteenth century of the Christian Era.

The nullity of the Narrow Seas as a cultural barrier is demonstrated so conclusively as to raise the question why it was that any Hellenes should ever have thought of trying to find a dividing line between an Hellenic and an Oriental World in a waterway which was actually the link between the Hellenic World's Asiatic and European provinces. How did any school of Hellenic thought ever come to think of the Aegean Sea, which was in reality the central thoroughfare of Hellas, as demarcating her eastern boundary, when the effect of drawing a cultural frontier along this line was to declare the Asiatic half of Hellas to be out of the Hellenic World's bounds? The explanation of this perverse cultural misinterpretation of a pair of nautical terms divorced from their original context is perhaps to be discovered in an abnormal and temporary political situation which placed the Asiatic and the European half of Hellas in an unfortunate relation with one another.

During the period between the conquest of the Continental Asiatic Greek city-states by the Lydian Empire and the conquest of the Continental European Greek city-states by Philip of Macedon, the European Greeks were able to look down upon the Asiatic Greeks for having lost their political independence, while the Asiatic Greeks could still look down upon the European Greeks on the score of their relative cultural backwardness; and it was not till after the opening of the post-Alexan-

<sup>1</sup> The Dardani who founded Dardanus on the Hellespont ('Dardanelles') were probably an Illyrian-speaking, not a Thracian-speaking, people, but their passage of the Straits tells the same tale as the Thracian-speaking peoples' migration across the same narrow seas.

<sup>2</sup> See II. ii. 281 and V. v. 209.

<sup>3</sup> See Herodotus, Book V, chap. 13, and Book VII, chap. 20. Presumably this legend was founded on the appearance of the tribal name Mysi-Moesi in both North-Western Anatolia and the Balkan Peninsula. This pair of homonyms did commemorate a migration; but the Hellenic observer who interpreted the evidence correctly thus far made the mistake of assuming that the Asiatic Mysi must have been the progenitors of the European Moesi because they happened to be the less insignificant of these two sister tribes in the pre-Alexandrine Age of Hellenic history.

drine Age that the superficiality of this temporary differentiation between the two halves of Hellas once more became apparent. The truth was that the Continental Asiatic Greek city-states lost their political independence to a Hellenized Lydia some 250 years before the Continental European Greek city-states lost theirs to a Hellenized Macedonia just because the Asiatic Greeks were culturally so much more precocious than their European kinsmen that the radiation of their culture brought the adjoining sub-Hellenic Kingdom of Lydia up to a level of cultural efficiency at which it was politically capable of subjugating its Greek spiritual pastors and masters about a quarter of a millennium before the same stage was duly reached in the parallel history of the relations between the European Greeks and the adjoining sub-Hellenic Kingdom of Macedon. In the meantime the European Greeks could find a facile psychological compensation for their oppressive consciousness of cultural inferiority to their Asiatic kinsmen by assuring themselves that the Asiatic Greeks' loss of a political independence which the European Greeks had so far managed to retain was a proof that the Asiatic Greeks were decadent, and that, if such decadence was the price of sophistication,<sup>1</sup> then the European Greeks' own ingenuousness was, on balance, a happier state.

This legend of the Asiatic Greeks being decadent was disproved, as we have noticed in another context,<sup>2</sup> by the sequel to Alexander's overthrow of the Achaemenian Empire. This sequel showed that the eclipse of Asiatic Greece between 494 and 334 B.C. had been due to the peculiarly adverse situation in which the Asiatic Greeks had found themselves in the Achaemenian Age. The Achaemenian conquest of Lydia and her Continental Asiatic Greek dependencies in 547 B.C. meant something much more serious for the Asiatic Greeks than just the replacement of one foreign political ascendancy by another. It meant the substitution

<sup>1</sup> One amusing symptom of the Asiatic Greeks' continuing intellectual vitality in the fifth century B.C. was the part played by Herodotus of Halicarnassus and by the Hippocratean school of medicine in Cos in propagating the legend that the politically subjugated Asiatic Greeks were in some sense beyond the pale of a Hellas who was nowhere quite fully herself except on the free soil of Europe. In putting into circulation a theory that was uncomplimentary to their own half of Hellas, the fifth-century Asiatic Greek men of science were giving evidence of their intellectual honesty, and at the same time they displayed their intellectual acumen in the discrimination with which they interpreted the theory in the light of the facts. In the Hippocratean treatise on *Influences of Atmosphere, Water, and Situation* the thesis that the Asiatics are on the whole less brave, tough, hard-working, and spirited than the Europeans is based (chap. 12), not on some imaginary difference of magic virtue in the soil of the two continents, but on a general theory of a correlation between physical environment and human *ethos* (see the passages quoted from *op. cit.*, chaps. 13 and 24, in II. i. 251-2). The Hippocratean argument starts from the premiss that in Asia the physical environment is more benign than it is in Europe; and, on the Hippocratean hypothesis that hard countries breed strong characters, it follows that the inhabitants of Asia are less warlike than those of Europe on the whole (chaps. 12 and 23). At the same time the variety of the physical environment in Europe breeds a variety in the physique of the European peoples (chaps. 23 and 24), while a variety in the *ethos* of the Asiatic peoples is produced by the variety in Asiatic political conditions. The relative unwarlikeness of a majority of the Asiatics is due not merely to the relative benignity of the Asiatic physical environment but also to the political fact that most Asiatics live under a monarchical régime which deprives them of the incentive to exert themselves and risk their lives. 'The Hellenes and non-Hellenes in Asia who are not under despotic rule, but are free agents and struggle for their own benefit, are as warlike as any populations in the World' (*op. cit.*, chap. 16, quoted in II. i. 471, n. 1).

<sup>2</sup> In IV. iv. 20-23.



of Persian masters who were barbarian converts to an alien civilization for Lydian masters who had been the conquered Hellenes' own cultural disciples; and the Asiatic Greeks merely kept on falling out of the frying pan into the fire when their Attic European kinsmen 'liberated' them from an Achaemenian yoke in 479 B.C. and when their Spartan European kinsmen replayed this comedy by 'liberating' them from an Athenian yoke in the last phase of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War of 431-404 B.C. in order to sell them back to the Achaemenidae in 386 B.C. As soon as the new order of the post-Alexandrine Age had released the Asiatic Greeks from the peculiar tribulations to which they had been subject during the preceding quarter of a millennium, the brilliant success with which they immediately rose to the occasion showed that their vitality was unimpaired. From 334 B.C. down to the generation of Justinian the Asiatic Greeks played as prominent a part in the life of the Hellenic World as they had played before the generation of Cyrus.

In the post-Alexandrine Age of Hellenic history the thesis that the conflict between Hellenism and the Oriental civilizations was a feud between 'Europe' and 'Asia' was once more so plainly contradicted by the facts that it fell into oblivion and ceased to work mischief, but the ghost of an erroneous Hellenic theory which had been effectively discredited by the logic of events in its Hellenic birthplace unfortunately returned to haunt a Modern Western World which had laid itself open to this visitation by its reception of the Hellenic culture in a fifteenth-century Italian Renaissance. In this new setting, History repeated itself with a singular exactness. A revival of the Hellenic concept of 'continents' which was innocuous so long as this concept was employed only in its proper nautical context bred a fresh crop of trouble when the nautical terminology was once again diverted to a cultural usage.

The Modern Westerners who adopted and adapted the Hellenic mariners' geographical terminology were the peoples on the eastern shores of the Atlantic, from Castile and Portugal northwards, who opened a new chapter in both Western history and World history by mastering the art of oceanic navigation at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of the Christian Era; and the Hellenic terminology proved still to make nautical sense in a situation in which making the sea passage between Europe and Asia meant not just swimming across the Dardanelles or ferrying over the Aegean but circumnavigating Africa now that the banks of the Narrow Seas which divided Asia from Europe by a hair's breadth had been placed out of bounds for Western maritime enterprise by the establishment of the Ottoman Empire astride those inland seawaters.

On the oceanic chart drawn by Western navigators in a Modern Age of Western history, 'Europe' meant the hinterland of the mariners' own home ports from Cadiz to Trondhjem and Helsingfors; 'Asia' meant the hinterland of another chain of ports, stretching from Maskat and Hormuz to Canton and Nagasaki, which the conquest of the Ocean had brought within the Western mariners' range; and 'Africa' meant the huge peninsula, jutting out from the south shore of the Straits of Gibraltar to the Cape of Good Hope, which had to be rounded by

travellers between Europe and Asia who were debarred by political obstacles from short-circuiting the circumnavigation of the Dark Continent by using the overland routes across the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles or the portages across Egypt and South-West Asia between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. This oceanic application of an Aegean nautical terminology fitted all the newly discovered geographical facts that had swum into the Western mariners' ken;<sup>1</sup> but the Modern Western geographers entangled themselves in their turn in the intellectual and moral toils that had caught their Hellenic predecessors when they set themselves to give the continents a cultural as well as a nautical meaning.

In taking the nautical term 'Europe' to serve as a substitute for the cultural term 'Western Christendom', the Modern Westerners could plead an excuse which the Hellenes could not have pleaded when they tentatively identified 'Europe' with 'Hellas' in the fifth century B.C. The Hellenic misuse of the name 'Europe' was the more wanton of the two misnomers, because 'Hellas' or τὸ Ἑλληνικόν was always a perfectly serviceable label for the Hellenic Society from the beginning to the end of its history, whereas the Modern Westerners found themselves awkwardly at a loss, by the end of the seventeenth century, for a collective name to designate their own society and culture. The traditional name 'Western Christendom' had ceased to be applicable when, within less

<sup>1</sup> This Modern Western chart of the continents in an oceanic setting justified retrospectively the enumeration of a separate continent of 'Africa' which its Hellenic inventors had never quite succeeded in distinguishing from 'Asia'. The Hellenes had been enticed into inventing this Continent of Africa (*Graecæ Libyæ*) by their passion for symmetry. On the Hellenic chart of the waters of the Eastern Mediterranean, the mouths of the Nile faced the mouths of the Aegean; and, if the *thalweg* of the sea-drowned river of which the Aegean was the lowest reach marked the boundary between Asia and Europe, the law of geographical symmetry required that the *thalweg* of the Nile should similarly demarcate Asia from another continent which could be labelled 'Libya' by an extension of the usage of the name of the country adjoining Egypt on the west. This Hellenic sailors' distinction between an 'Asiatic' and a 'Libyan' bank of the Nile would have made sense for a Nile boatman, but not for an Egyptian whose business it was to think, not in narrow terms of navigation, but in broad terms of culture. On the cultural map the Nile waterway was, of course, the spinal cord of the Egyptian World, as the Aegean Sea was the heart of Hellas. A subsequent increase in geographical knowledge led the Hellenic geographers to set back the western boundary of Asia from the east bank of the Nile to the east coast of the Red Sea; but a still uncut Isthmus of Suez presented them, on a miniature scale, with the same insoluble geographical problem as the vastly broader isthmus between the head of the Sea of Azov and the Hyperborean shore of Ocean Stream, and their eventual discovery that 'Libya' was circumnavigable made them still more doubtful about the legitimacy of trying to erect 'Libya' into a separate continent instead of treating it as a mere peninsula of Asia. It was left to Modern Western ocean-faring navigators to demonstrate that, on a marine chart, 'Africa' had a much better claim than 'Europe' had to rank as something more than a mere excrescence of Asia. From the cultural standpoint, on the other hand, the concept of 'Africa' never made any more sense than the concept of 'Europe' or of 'Asia'. Africa north of the Sahara, which was insulated culturally from Tropical Africa by an estranging desert, was linked up culturally with South-West Asia and Southern Europe by the conductive waters of the Mediterranean Sea—as was attested at the time of writing by the distribution of the Arabic language and culture and of the metropolitan territory of France. The Hellenic geographers' misgivings about the feasibility of distinguishing an 'Africa' from an 'Asia' were justified by the configuration of a latter-day Arabic World which stretched across South-West Asia and North Africa from Irāq to Morocco inclusive without a break. The administrative organization of Algeria to constitute three French departments which ranked juridically as an integral part of France herself was a political testimony to the geographical fact that, whatever the mariner's chart might say, the Maghrib was for practical purposes a European, not an African, country.

than half a century of the opening of the modern chapter of Western history, the outbreak of the Protestant Reformation had split the Western World in two on the ecclesiastical plane;<sup>1</sup> and the retention of the word 'Christendom' in the title of the Western World had become still more incongruous when, after the close of the Wars of Religion, the Westerners—Catholics and Protestants alike—had deliberately sloughed off their society's traditional chrysalis and had proceeded to propagate their culture all over the face of the planet in a dehydrated secular abstract of its original plenary form.

When the Western Society's historic name had thus been made obsolete by the early modern course of Western history, the Hellenistic-minded spokesmen of a Modern Western culture consulted their familiar Hellenic oracles for guidance in their search for a convenient alias for a 'Christendom' that had become an awkward terminological anachronism in the vocabulary of a post-Christian Western World.<sup>2</sup> The Hellenes' geographical concept of a *terra firma* articulated into 'continents' had served the Hellenes' Modern Western disciples well when they had adopted this Hellenic pattern of geographical thought in its original nautical usage. Why not follow a step farther in the Hellenic geographers' traces by giving the names of the continents a cultural as well as a navigational connotation? Reinterpreted on this Hellenic precedent, the name 'Europe' offered an alias for the name 'Christendom' that was free from the old name's now misleading religious associations. The Western minds that put this Herodotean cultural usage of the word 'Europe' into circulation in the Modern Western World might be forgiven for having failed to perceive that in taking this way of extricating themselves from one awkward plight they were implicating themselves in another; but, however excusable their error of judgement might be, its intellectual and moral consequences for both the West and the World were as unfortunate as if these coiners of a secular name for a de-consecrated Western Christendom had been actuated by malice prepense.

The most glaring intellectual weakness of this unlucky usage was that it was a desperate geographical misfit. A Western World that was now calling itself 'Europe' had never embraced the whole of the European continent up to the water boundaries assigned to it in the original Hellenic nautical usage of the word, while on the other hand the West had already expanded overseas into regions which could not be deemed to be parts of Europe on any reading of the map.

The quarter of Europe which was indisputably entitled to bear the name was the European hinterland of the shores of the chain of narrow seas running up from the mouth of the Aegean to the head of the Sea of Azov. This had been the first quarter of the continent to which the name 'Europe' had ever been applied; but this south-eastern nucleus of Europe had always lain outside the bounds of the Western World in the medieval as well as in the modern chapter of Western history; it had lain, and still lay, within the domain of the main body of Eastern Orthodox Christendom; and an abortive Medieval Western Christian attempt

<sup>1</sup> This point has been noticed already in I. i. 33-34.

<sup>2</sup> See Halecki, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

to annex that alien Christian body social to Western Christendom had defeated its own purpose by resulting in the establishment of Ottoman Muslim rule over the European as well as the Asiatic provinces of Orthodox Christendom with the exception of Russia.<sup>1</sup> A Modern Western World which thus fell short of being conterminous with Europe in one direction had, however, burst the bounds of Europe in another direction when it had inaugurated the opening of the modern chapter of Western history by the historic act of mastering the Ocean;<sup>2</sup> and an ocean-borne expansion of a hitherto merely West European society over the whole face of the planet, which had been initiated in and after the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of the Christian Era on the economic and political planes, was extended, as we have seen,<sup>3</sup> to the cultural plane as well, as soon as a former religious impediment to a reception of the Western culture by non-Western societies had been removed by the action of the Westerners themselves in secularizing their way of life at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As a label for the domain of the Western Civilization from that date onwards, the name 'Europe' was thus on the one hand too narrow to cover the West's thenceforth rapidly expanding non-European cultural empire, while on the other hand it was too broad to be reconcilable with the no less pertinent fact that South-Eastern Europe still lay outside the Western Society's cultural bounds.

This inapplicability to South-Eastern Europe of the Modern Western usage of the word 'Europe' as an alias for the Modern Western World not only made intellectual nonsense of the cultural situation in that culturally non-Western quarter of a 'continent' that had no unity, and indeed had no existence, in any other setting than a mariner's chart; this Modern Western usage of the word 'Europe' as a synonym for the West also made moral mischief by suggesting to self-confident and self-righteous Modern Western minds the preposterous implication that the cultural diversity of South-Eastern Europe from the western extremity of 'the European Continent' was the monstrous outcome of a scandalous miscarriage of History which could be, and should be, put right by some benevolently high-handed exercise of Modern Western power. In drawing this misguided moral from an erroneous interpretation of the facts, the Modern West was adopting an attitude towards the contemporary Islamic and Orthodox Christian worlds that was bound to breed mutual misunderstanding and ill-feeling.

The Modern Western assumption that South-Eastern Europe was part of the Western Civilization's patrimony *ex officio*, in virtue of the West's unauthorized appropriation of the name 'Europe' as a label for itself, was a 'geopolitical' dogma that was irreconcilable with the historical facts; yet the evidence of the facts did not deter nineteenth-century Western Liberals from pronouncing pontifically that the Turks were trespassers in Rumelia,<sup>4</sup> and that *a fortiori* these interlopers had no

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 151-2, 362, and 395-7, above.

<sup>2</sup> This point is noticed by Halecki in *op. cit.*, pp. 51 and 54.

<sup>3</sup> On pp. 516-18, above.

<sup>4</sup> 'Rumili', the Turkish name for 'Turkey-in-Europe', meant 'the land of Orthodox Christendom' (*Turci'd Rûm*), signifying the [East] Roman Empire). If South-Eastern

business to bear rule there, because they were 'Asiatics', not 'Europeans', in origin. These impulsive Gladstonians clamoured for the expulsion of the Turkish intruders from Europe 'bag and baggage'<sup>1</sup> without ever taking the trouble to put their draconian programme to the proof of confronting it with the elementary facts of Ottoman history. These facts were that the Ottoman Empire, like its forerunner the Greek Orthodox Christian Principality of Nicaea, had expanded over the European territories of Orthodox Christendom from a starting-point on Asiatic Orthodox Christian ground because it had a political and a social mission to perform for the whole of the main body of Orthodox Christendom on both sides of the Straits. Eastern Orthodox Christians had acquiesced in Ottoman Muslim rule, in preference to Western Christian rule, because their Ottoman conquerors had shown themselves capable of imposing peace on a distracted Orthodox Christendom whose confusion had merely been worse confounded by the escapades of the Western Crusaders.

In the nineteenth century of the Christian Era no less than in the fourteenth, the acid test for passing judgement on the Ottoman régime was the current state of the account between the benefits conferred by the *Pax Ottomanica* on the Pādishāh's subjects and the cost of the oppression that was the price of an Ottoman Peace; and in the nineteenth century an impartial judge might well have pronounced that the Porte had exhausted its mandate; but this verdict would have conferred a moral claim to liberation from an Ottoman Turkish yoke, not just upon the Porte's non-Turkish subjects in 'Turkey-in-Europe', but upon all its non-Turkish subjects, whatever religion they professed and whatever language they spoke and whatever continent they inhabited. A discredited Ottoman Turkish imperial people's African and Asiatic Arabic-speaking Sunnī Muslim co-religionists would have had the same good case for demanding liberation as the European Orthodox Christians, and the Asiatic Arabic-speaking Orthodox Christians and Maronites and Druses the same good case as the European Albanian-speaking Tosk and Serbo-Croat-speaking Bosniak Sunnīs. The test was the current balance-sheet of the Ottoman régime, and the issue was a subject's moral claim to be liberated from a régime that had forfeited its moral title to rule. In this moral issue the query whether the victim of misgovernment happened to be domiciled in the European, the Asiatic, or the African dominions of its discredited oppressors was pedantically irrelevant; and no approach to the nineteenth-century problem of the

Europe had been Western and not Orthodox Christian ground at the time when the 'Osmanlis occupied it, they would have called it, not 'Rumili', but 'Feringhistan' ('Frankland').

<sup>1</sup> 'Let the Turks now carry away their abuses in the only possible manner, namely by carrying off themselves. Their zaptiehs and their mudirs, their bimbashis and their yuzbashis, their kaimakams and their pashas, one and all, shall, I hope, clear out from the province they have desolated and profaned' (Gladstone, W. E.: *Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East* (London 1876, John Murray), p. 31).

'The profaned and desolated province' of this celebrated passage was not the whole of 'Turkey-in-Europe but only that portion of Rumelia that was inhabited by the Bulgars; but the more sweeping programme proclaimed in the simpler slogan 'Expel the Turks from Europe' was the ultimate objective of Gladstone and his fellow Turcophobes in a nineteenth-century Western World that had identified 'Europe' with itself.



Ottoman Empire's future could well have been more perverse than the Modern Western Liberal publicist's uncritical adoption of the Herodotean fantasy of a perennial feud between 'Europe' and 'Asia'—as if the 'European' subjects of the Ottoman Porte were entitled to liberation, not on a moral ground which was equally applicable to their 'African' and 'Asiatic' fellow victims, but on the geographical score of being inhabitants of a privileged continent.<sup>1</sup>

The Modern Western identification of the Western World with 'Europe', which had this distorting effect on Western policy towards the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century, persisted into the twentieth century to exacerbate an ideological quarrel between the West and a Communist Russia.

The self-deconsecration of the Western World towards the close of the seventeenth century of the Christian Era did not bring with it any essential change in the traditional Western attitude towards Orthodox Christendom. Since the establishment of a Western military, political, and economic ascendancy over the main body of Orthodox Christendom in the sequel to the collapse of the East Roman Power, the Medieval Westerners had come to look upon their Eastern Orthodox neighbours, no longer as their superiors or even as their peers, but as obstinately unsatisfactory poor relations who must be coerced into making a public confession of sin and profession of repentance, in the form of a solemn acknowledgement of the Papacy's ecclesiastical supremacy over the churches of the Greek Rite, as a condition *sine qua non* for being considered eligible for receiving Western aid. A latter-day post-Christian Western Society which could no longer logically condemn the 'native Christian' subjects of the Ottoman Empire as religious heretics could still preserve and justify a traditional Western contempt for them by censuring them as 'Europeans' who had inexcusably failed to keep up with 'the progress of European Civilization'. This censure was tantamount to a reiteration, in Modern Western secular terms, of the Medieval Western Christian demand that the Orthodox Christians should renounce their own traditional culture and should adopt in its place the contemporary culture of the West. The weak point in the latter-day Western 'geopolitical' formula for taking Orthodox Christendom to task was that a majority of those indicted for the moral offence of being

<sup>1</sup> The fantasy that the evil of nineteenth-century Ottoman misgovernment would be cured by expelling the Turks from 'Europe' would have been reduced *ad absurdum* if this programme had ever become practical politics. The partition of the Eurasian city of Constantinople by a political frontier following the *thalweg* of the Bosphorus would have been one of the curiosities of political map-making even for a generation that had lived to see the bisection of Jerusalem and Vienna and Berlin after the World War of A.D. 1939-45. One quaint result of applying the fantastic 'geopolitical' principle that political liberty was a European privilege would have been to disqualify the chief intellectual leader of a Modern Greek Westernizing movement that had expressed itself politically in the partially successful Greek uprising against Ottoman rule in A.D. 1821. Till the great Greek exodus from Anatolia and Eastern Thrace in and after A.D. 1922, the Modern Greeks, like the Ancient Greeks before them, were equally at home on the European and on the Asiatic side of the Aegean; and Adhamándios Korais was in no way peculiar among the Modern Greeks of his generation in being a Smyrniot of Chiot origin (see pp. 178-9, above). This eminent scholar-patriot would have been as surprised to be told that his Asiatic provenance made him ineligible for liberation from Ottoman rule as he would have been to hear that his Arabic surname (see p. 178, n. 4, above) debarred him from being reckoned as a Greek.

'lapsed Europeans' were actually not inhabitants of Europe on any defensible definition of the boundaries of that elusive continent. Half the Modern Greek people lived in Asia, while the whole of Russia defied the most determined efforts of geographical pedantry to partition her between an 'Asia' and a 'Europe' that melted into one another round the head of the Sea of Azov.

The self-secularization of the West thus left the Western attitude towards Orthodox Christendom essentially unchanged, but it did nevertheless temporarily relieve the tension between the two sister societies by changing the Orthodox Christian peoples' feeling towards the West from an invincible repugnance to a frank admiration. The seventeenth-century distillation of a secular abstract of the Western culture was promptly followed, as we have seen,<sup>1</sup> by a movement in Orthodox Christendom to adopt this attractive as well as anodyne new form of a previously repulsive alien civilization; and this spontaneous Greek, Serb, and Russian imitation of a latter-day secular Western way of life was, of course, flattering to the Westerners' self-conceit. The Tsar Peter Romanov's exemplary good conduct half persuaded the Western dominie to forget the bad mark inscribed in his black book against the name of the Oecumenical Patriarch Michael Cerularius, and the next two centuries of Orthodox Christian cultural history confirmed in Western minds this reassuring impression that the truant 'East Europeans' had at last seen the light and turned over a new leaf. The dismay and indignation in the West were therefore proportionately extreme when in A.D. 1917 Russia suddenly deviated from the broad way leading to Westernization which she had been following since the close of the seventeenth century, and when she added insult to injury by resuming her pre-Petrine ideological war against the West in the name, no longer of Christian Orthodoxy, but of a post-Christian heresy of Western origin. An impartial judge of the issue between the Russian version of Communism and the contemporary Western way of life might perhaps have given judgement against the Russian party to the suit, but he certainly would not have found an aggravating circumstance in Russia's alleged apostasy from an imaginary 'European Civilization' which would have had no geographical claim on Russia's allegiance even if it had had any existence in real life.

This mirage of a 'European Civilization' was another hallucination to which Modern Western Man condemned himself when he appropriated the word 'Europe' as a name for a deconsecrated Western World. His cultural misapplication of a nautical term inevitably led him into two historical aberrations. One of these was the notion that Orthodox Christendom and Western Christendom constituted a single society because their geographical domains, taken together, were deemed to be coextensive with the limits of the mariner's European continent. The second aberration was the notion that Hellenic history and Western history were—not distinct social experiences that might be philosophically contemporaneous as well as philosophically equivalent in value<sup>2</sup>—

<sup>1</sup> On pp. 132-3 and 161-5 above.

<sup>2</sup> For these two conceptions of the mutual relations between societies of the species called civilizations, see I. i. 172-7.

but historically continuous as well as chronologically successive acts in a single European drama which was deemed to be a unity in virtue of its having the wonder-working soil of a privileged continent as its scene of action throughout the play. This 'European' rendering of Western and Orthodox Christian and Hellenic history could not face the music of the historical facts.

The thesis that the Western and Orthodox Christian cultures were not two cultures but one culture in virtue of their combined domains being coextensive with 'Europe' had found one of its ablest advocates, down to the time of writing, in a distinguished twentieth-century Polish historian.<sup>1</sup> In his exposition of this theme, Halecki strengthens his case by conceding that Europe had been an intelligible field of historical study only during a limited period that was admittedly already at an end by the date at which the European author was writing his book as an exile in America.<sup>2</sup> The European Age, as Halecki defines it, was both followed and preceded by an age in which the intelligible field of study, instead of being delimited by the coasts of a continent, was constituted by the shores of a land-locked Sea. In Halecki's view the European Age had succeeded a Mediterranean Age<sup>3</sup> and was being succeeded by an Atlantic Age.<sup>4</sup> The making of Europe had been completed in the second half of the tenth century of the Christian Era, when Poland, Hungary, and the Scandinavian countries had been converted to Western Christianity and Russia converted to Orthodox Christianity.<sup>5</sup> The destruction of Europe had been completed in the fifth decade of the twentieth century, when the eastern half of the continent had been severed from the West by the descent of a Soviet Russian 'iron curtain'—a catastrophe that had been as lethal for Europe as the Primitive Muslim Arab conquest of South-West Asia and North Africa in the seventh century had been lethal for an antecedent Mediterranean World.<sup>6</sup> The transition from the Mediterranean to the European Age had been a gradual process, and the eventual transition from the European to the Atlantic Age had been more gradual still.<sup>7</sup> In round numbers of centuries, however, Halecki dates his European Age between A.D. 950 and A.D. 1950.<sup>8</sup>

This is a moderate and persuasive presentation of the case for giving the word 'Europe' a cultural connotation in addition to its plain nautical meaning. Yet even Halecki's presentation is vulnerable. For example, the assumption that, in 'the European Age', the combined areas of an Orthodox and a Western Christendom were conterminous with Europe is one that will not bear examination. During the first century of Halecki's European millennium, the centre of gravity of Orthodox Christendom still lay outside Europe, in an Anatolian Peninsula known as 'Asia Minor',<sup>9</sup> while a 'Europa Minor' in the shape of the Iberian Peninsula lay outside the domain of Western Christendom, in Dār-al-Islām. On the second of these two points, Halecki might perhaps reply that, in the

<sup>1</sup> Oskar Halecki, in *The Limits and Divisions of European History* (London 1950, Sheed and Ward).

<sup>2</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 29.

<sup>3</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 39–40. Cp. pp. 28–29 and 36–37.

<sup>4</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 53–54.

<sup>5</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 61.

<sup>6</sup> See *op. cit.*, p. 10.

<sup>7</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 54.

<sup>8</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 54 and 58.

<sup>9</sup> See I. i. 64 and II. ii. 79.

Iberian Peninsula in that century, the majority of the population seems still to have consisted of an Arab and Berber Muslim dominant minority's *musta'rib* Western Christian subjects; but this rejoinder will not revalidate his thesis that, during 'the European millennium', Europe and Christendom were coextensive; for, even if, during the first half of that millennium, Western Christendom was confined within Europe's coasts, Orthodox Christendom continued to straddle the Aegean Sea and the Straits, with one foot in Europe and the other in Asia, until the exodus of Orthodox Christians from Anatolia in A.D. 1922, while, during the second half of the same millennium, when Western Christendom was spreading into the New World, Orthodox Christendom's Russian offshoot spread right across the breadth of Asia till it reached the western shore of the Pacific and leaped over the Behring Straits into the Alaskan Peninsula of North America.

Moreover, the Orthodox and the Western Christendom were only two out of four sectors into which the circular wave of Christianity had come to be articulated in the course of its expansion.<sup>1</sup> The Roman sector in Western Europe and the Orthodox sector in Eastern Europe and Anatolia were balanced by a Monophysite sector extending from Armenia to Abyssinia inclusive through Syria and the Nile Valley and by a Nestorian sector extending from 'Irāq to the north-east corner of Intramural China; and neither of these two other quarters of Christendom had any foothold in Europe. During the first 250 years of Halecki's European millennium, before the mass-conversions to Islam on the eve of the fall of the 'Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad, a Monophysite Christendom that still embraced the peasantry of Egypt and a Nestorian Christendom that still embraced the peasantry of 'Irāq were perhaps each of them as strong in numbers as either their Orthodox or their Western sister Christian society; and, when the whole of Christendom, instead of merely two arbitrarily selected quarters of it,<sup>2</sup> is thus taken into account, it becomes manifest that either Asia or Africa could have disputed Europe's claim to style herself 'the Christian Continent' *par excellence* until at least the first four out of Halecki's ten European centuries had run out. If there was a moment—between the late medieval decline of the Monophysite and Nestorian Christian waves in Africa and Asia and the early modern advance of the Orthodox and Western Christian waves into Asia and the Americas—at which Christendom and Europe were in truth approximately conterminous, that moment cannot have had a longer duration than the hundred years immediately preceding the Western mariners' conquest of the Ocean in the later decades of the fifteenth century. Yet, even during that brief interval, the identity between Europe and Christendom was imperfect; for, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries of the Christian Era, an Islam that was still

<sup>1</sup> See II. ii. 360-9.

<sup>2</sup> Halecki's arbitrariness in deeming an Orthodox and a Western Christendom to constitute a unitary Christian society, to the exclusion of both a Monophysite and a Nestorian Christendom, is capped by his arbitrariness in excluding Muscovy, and *a fortiori* the Soviet Union, from a Europe which, for him, is synonymous with Christendom, when he has bestowed the freedom of Europe on Muscovy's predecessor Kievan Russia (op. cit., p. 92), as well as on a predominantly Anatolian East Roman Empire (op. cit., p. 93).

clinging to a remnant of its own domain in a European Andalusia was already encroaching on Christendom's domain in a European Rumelia as well as in an African Nubia<sup>1</sup> and in an Asiatic 'Irāq and Azerbaijan.<sup>2</sup>

While Europe thus failed to provide a geographical framework for the merger of Orthodox with Western Christendom in a single unitary Christian Civilization, it likewise failed to provide an historical framework for the merger of an Hellenic with a post-Christian Western culture in a single unitary Rationalist Civilization. The thesis that the Western and Hellenic cultures were not two cultures but one culture because they were both alike informed by some common distinctive quality that could be identified as being 'European' was one that could be sustained only if this hypothetical common 'European' quality could be shown to have been not merely distinctive but dominant in a *solidant* 'European' cultural tradition; and this condition in its turn required that, if any non-European contributions to this European cultural heritage could be detected, they should prove to be elements that were not of more than minor importance. It is evident that the thesis refutes itself as soon as it is thus elucidated; for it wrecks itself on two rocks at once: the Jewish contribution to a Western Civilization that was a Christian civilization as well as a Hellenistic one, and the Asiatic Greek contribution to Hellenism. The Asiatic Greeks, as we have seen, had been the pioneers of the Hellenic Civilization in the first chapter of its history, and Ionian Asiatic Greek men of science had been the intellectual fathers of a Rationalism which was taken by Modern Western minds to be the unbroken golden thread of a 'European' cultural tradition,<sup>3</sup> but this latter-day Western belief in a 'rationalist' civilization's continuity was achieved at the intellectual price of ignoring the spiritual history of the Hellenic World after the generation of Carneades<sup>4</sup> and the spiritual history of the Western World before the generation of Descartes.

A distortion of the historical facts which the chimaera of a 'European Civilization' demanded from its votaries was aggravated by the hybris which was the moral nemesis of this intellectual error. The Modern Western Narcissus who had once persuaded himself to believe in the reality of a distinctive 'European' tradition of civilization culminating in the way of life of the observer's own society in his own age was apt to lose his balance so completely as to equate this imaginary 'European Civilization' with 'Civilization' *sans phrase* and to deny the title to rank as civilizations to representatives of this species of society whose geographical domains happened to lie on the wrong side of the Argonauts' track.<sup>5</sup> A Modern Westerner who had ruled all non-Europeans out of

<sup>1</sup> See Trimmingham, J. S.: *Islam in the Sudan* (Oxford 1949, University Press), pp. 79-84.

<sup>2</sup> See Budge, E. A. Wallis: *The Monks of Küblai Khān* (London 1928, Religious Tract Society), pp. 76-88.

<sup>3</sup> A characteristically judicious and discriminating statement, by Edwyn Bevan, of the case for regarding Hellenic and Western history as the history of a single 'rationalist' civilization will be found in V. v. 6, n. 1.

<sup>4</sup> The metamorphosis of Hellenic philosophy into religion from the generation of Poseidonius onwards has been noticed in V. v. 546-9.

<sup>5</sup> The geopolitical counter-mancœuvre of equating 'Civilization' with 'Asiatic Civilization' would have been equally facile and, of course, equally illegitimate. On the analogy of the Modern Western mancœuvre that has been exposed above, this counter-mancœuvre



his reckoning of human achievement was indeed in danger of finding himself in a dizzy position. Now that he had piled his Western Pelion on an Hellenic Ossa, must he not be on the verge of scaling Olympus? The catastrophic ending of the Titans' impious enterprise according to the traditional version of the Hellenic myth gave a sardonic answer to the Westerner's conceited rhetorical question. The sin of *hybris* always makes the sinner prone to fall a victim to an egocentric illusion which is the intellectual corollary of Original Sin,<sup>1</sup> and in the *Weltanschauung* of a student of History this egocentric illusion is apt to conspire with the misconception of growth as a movement in a straight line<sup>2</sup> to produce a thorough-going misinterpretation of the history of Mankind.

This had proved to be the penalty that a 'European' must pay for the folly of deifying his own continent to the disparagement of the rest of the World; and the consequences of this 'European' folly were manifestly more serious for a post-Christian Frenchman or Englishman than for a pre-Christian Athenian or Peloponnesian; for the European Greeks who allowed themselves to feel superior to their Asiatic Greek contemporaries in the fifth century B.C. were at any rate free from that fanatical Judaic hallucination of being a 'chosen people' which, in the twentieth century of the Christian Era, insidiously haunted and misinspired the secular-minded heirs of a once Christian Western tradition. In adopting the name 'Europe' as a substitute for Western Christendom, the Modern Western World had replaced a misnomer that was merely an anachronism by a misnomer that was seriously misleading.

could have been executed in two steps. In the first place the Hellenic Civilization could have been called 'Asiatic' without departing farther from the truth than the departure made by Aeschylus and Herodotus and their Modern Western followers when they labelled as 'European' a civilization that bestrode both continents. In the second place the mantle of Hellenism could have been declared to have fallen upon the shoulders of Orthodox Christendom without doing any greater violence to the facts of history than was done by Westerners who claimed that the West was Hellas' sole heir, when the truth was that the two sister Hellenistic civilizations of Western and Eastern Orthodox Christendom were both equally entitled to claim heirship to the Hellenic heritage. This counter-Western inversion of a Western misinterpretation of history would have led straight to the conclusion that there was an 'Asiatic Civilization' which was tantamount to 'Civilization' with a capital 'C'.

<sup>1</sup> This egocentric illusion has been examined in I. i. 157-64.

<sup>2</sup> See I. i. 168-71.

## IX. D (ii), ANNEX

### THE MERCENARY SOLDIER'S ROLE AS A CULTURAL SPEARHEAD

If an assaulted society succumbs to Human Nature's instinctive irrational abhorrence of anything that is alien and unfamiliar when the challenge takes the form of an encounter with a militarily superior neighbour, the consequences of this instinctive reaction sometimes illustrate the truth that to yield to the promptings of fear is apt to be the most dangerous of all possible alternative courses.

The at first sight apparently most non-committal way for an assaulted society to enlist in its own defence its assailant's military technique is, not the hard course of acquiring, handling, and eventually manufacturing for itself the weapons and equipment, and mastering the drill, tactics, strategy, and military organization, that are the secrets of the assailant's military superiority, but the facile expedient of simply hiring representatives of this militarily superior impinging society to wield their own exotic weapons, execute their own exotic tactics and strategy, and apply their own exotic organization as mercenary soldiers, officers, and administrators in the assaulted society's service. In other contexts<sup>1</sup> we have observed how civilizations embodied in universal states have delivered themselves into the hands of the transfrontier barbarians when they have followed the clever-seeming device of setting a thief to catch a thief by recruiting barbarian mercenary troops to defend the *limes* against the barbarian war-bands that are assailing it. Civilizations have also brought the same fate on themselves by the still more hazardous manoeuvre of enlisting the military services of militarily superior neighbours when these neighbours have been, not barbarians, but representatives of a society of the employer-society's own species.

Instances in which the enlistment of mercenary troops from the ranks of a militarily superior alien civilization has paved the way for the establishment of this alien civilization's domination over the society that has thus with its own hands introduced a Trojan Horse into its precincts are the enlistment of Hellenic mercenary troops by the Achaemenian Imperial Government during the hundred years ending in Alexander's passage of the Dardanelles in 334 B.C.<sup>2</sup> and the enlistment of Toltec mercenaries to fight the fratricidal battles of the city-states of Yucatan in the last chapter of Yucatec history before the forcible incorporation of the Yucatec Civilization into the Mexic—if this is the correct reconstruction of that chapter of Central American history.<sup>3</sup> The enlistment of Norman and other Western Christian mercenaries by the East Roman Imperial Government during the 150 years ending in the overthrow of the East Roman Empire by so-called 'Crusaders' in A.D. 1204 likewise prepared the way for this eventual disaster—and in this case the ultimately disastrous consequence of employing mercenaries recruited from

<sup>1</sup> See V. v. 159-69; VI. vii. 329-38; and pp. 41-44, above.

<sup>2</sup> See VI. vii. 328-9.

<sup>3</sup> See I. i. 123-4.

a society in process of civilization is the more remarkable, considering that the East Roman Empire—like the Carthaginian Empire in its day—had been singularly successful in eluding the similar disaster which it had courted by enlisting the services of all manner of barbarians, ranging from the horse-archers of the Eurasian Steppe to the Scandinavian and English axe-men who manned the Varangian Imperial Guard.

This political risk to which a civilization exposes itself in giving military employment to members of an alien society of its own species is not eliminated when the employer-society abstains from enlisting an alien rank-and-file and confines itself to commissioning alien officers to take command of native troops. The handful of Western soldiers of fortune who were employed in this capacity by the governments of the native Indian successor-states of the Mughal Rāj in India during the hundred years ending in the final overthrow of the Sikh Power by British arms in A.D. 1849 were forerunners of an alien universal state of Western origin in the shape of the British Rāj.<sup>1</sup> This Indian experience indicates that alien military officers cannot be employed with impunity unless their function is restricted—as it was in Petrine Russia and in the Ottoman Empire under the régime inaugurated by Selīm III and Mahmūd II—to providing an alien haven for a corps of officers in which the personnel is still recruited in the main from native sources even after the reception of an alien military technique and alien art of war.

One of the lines along which the private Western military adventurers in a post-Mughal India blazed a trail for the British East India Company, and eventually for the British Crown, was their practice of undertaking the organization as well as the command of the armies of the Mughal Rāj's successor-states, insisting on their employers' assigning to them portions of their land revenues to finance this new-model military organization, and finally taking over the administration of the districts producing these revenues in order to ensure the collection of their dues. This was the method by which the East India Company succeeded in swiftly transforming its own relation with one local Indian state after another from a casual and temporary military alliance into a political control which was apt to grow progressively more effective until at last it became indistinguishable from a plenary sovereignty.

"The system soon reached the stage when the native ally was required to supply not men but money, and the English undertook to raise, train, and pay a fixed number of troops on receiving a subsidy equivalent to their cost. . . . Large sums had hitherto been spent by the native princes in maintaining ill-managed and insubordinate bodies of troops, and in constant wars against each other; they might economise their revenues, be rid of a mutinous soldiery, and sit much more quietly at home, by entering into contracts with a skilful and solvent administration that would undertake all serious military business for a fixed subsidy. But, as punctuality in money matters has never been a princely quality, this subsidy was apt to be paid very irregularly; so the next stage was to revive the

<sup>1</sup> See Compton, H.: *A Particular Account of the European Military Adventurers of Hindustan from 1784 to 1803* (London 1892, Fisher Unwin) and Grey, C., and Garrett, H. L. O.: *European Adventurers in Northern India, 1785-1849* (Lahore 1929, Punjab Government Press).

long-standing practice of Asiatic governments: the assignment of lands for the payment of troops. . . .

"The Oudh Vizier was a weak ruler whose country was in confusion, whose troops were mutinous, and whose finances were disordered by the heavy strain of the English subsidy. In these circumstances Lord Wellesley required the Vizier to disband his disorderly forces in order that more British troops might be subsidized for the effective defence of his dominions. . . . The Vizier ceded all his frontier provinces, including Rohilkund, to the Company, the revenue of the territory thus transferred being taken as an equivalent to the subsidy payable for troops. . . . And Oudh was thenceforward enveloped by the English dominion. This most important augmentation of territory transferred to the British Government some of the richest and most populous districts in the heart of India."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Lyall, Sir A.: *The Rise and Expansion of the British Dominion in India* (London 1894. John Murray), pp. 245-7.

TABLE OF BARBARIAN WAR-BANDS




# Barbarian War-Bands

| Civilization                   | Universal State                        | Frontier   | Barbarian   | Poetry  | Religion  |
|--------------------------------|--|--|---|---|---|
| Sumeric                        | The Empire of Sumer and Akkad          | NE.  | Gutians<br>Eurasian Nomads (Aryas)<br>Kassites  | The Sanskrit Epic                                     | The Vedic Pantheon<br>The Hittite Pantheon<br>Zoroastrianism  |
| Babylonic                      | The Neo-Babylonian Empire              | NW.<br>NE.   | Hittites<br>Eurasian Nomads (Scythae)<br>Medes and Persians   | The Sanskrit Epic (recultivated)                      |   |
| Indic                          | The Mauryan Empire<br>The Gupta Empire | NW.<br>NW.   | Sakas<br>Huns<br>Gujars   |   |   |
| Sinic                          | The T'w'in and Han Empire              | NW.  | Eurasian Nomads<br>(Hiongnu)<br>(To Pa)<br>(Juan Juan)  |   |   |
| Hellenic                       | The Roman Empire                       | NE.<br>NW.<br>N.   | Eurasian Nomads (Sicopi)<br>Insular Celts<br>Continental Teutons  | The Irish Epic<br>The Teutonic Epic                   | Far Western Christianity<br>First the Continental Teutonic Pantheon, then Arianism                            |
| Egyptiac                       | The Middle Empire<br>The New Empire    | NE.<br>SE.<br>SW.<br>S.<br>NE.<br>N.<br>NW.<br>E.<br>SE. | Eurasian Nomads ((Sarmatians)<br>(Huns)<br>Arabs<br>Berbers<br>Nubians<br>Hyksos<br>Achaesans<br>Libyans<br>Hebrews and Aramaeans<br>Eurasian Nomads ((Tatars)<br>(Furgut Cadrucks) | The Pre-Islamic Arabic Poetry<br><br>The Homeric Epic | Islam<br><br>Set-worship<br>The Olympian Pantheon<br>Yahweh-worship<br>Islam<br>Lamaistic Mahayanian Buddhism |
| Orthodox Christian (in Russia) |  |  |   |   |   |
| Far Eastern                    | The Tokugawa Shogunate                 | NE.  | Ainu  |   |   |
| Western                        | In Europe                              | NW.<br>N.<br>NE.   | Insular Celts<br>Scandinavians<br>Continental Saxons<br>Wends<br>Lithuanians<br>Eurasian Nomads (Magyars)<br>Boernaks   | The Irish Epic<br>The Icelandic Sagas                 | Far Western Christianity<br>The Scandinavian Pantheon   |
| Andean                         | In North America<br>The Incas Empire   | E.<br>SE.<br>W.<br>E.<br>S.                              | Red Indians<br>Amazonians<br>Araucanians  | The Muslim Jugoslav 'heroic' ballads                  | First Bogomilism, then Islam<br>Non-violent 'Zealotism'   |

|                                      |  |                                |   |  |  |
|--------------------------------------|--|--------------------------------|---|--|--|
| Syriac                               | The Achaemenian Empire                     | NW.<br>NE.                     | Macedonians<br>Parthians<br>Sakas   | The Alexander Romance  | Catholicism<br>Orthodox Christianity<br>Isma'ili Shi'ism<br>Isma'ili Shi'ism<br>Judaism<br>{Manichaeism<br>{Nestorianism |
|                                      | The Arab Caliphate                         | NW.<br>SW.<br>SE.<br>N.<br>NE. | Franks<br>East Roman 'Borderers'<br>Berbers<br>Arabs<br>Eurasian Nomads (Khazars)<br>Eurasian Nomads ({Turks}<br>{(Mongols)})<br>{(Khitans)<br>{(Kins)          |  |  |
| Far Eastern<br>(main body)           | ['Time of Troubles']                       | NE.                            | Eurasian Nomads (Mongols)   |  | Lamaistic Mahayanian<br>Buddhism   |
| Central<br>American                  | The Manchu Empire                          | NE.<br>NW.<br>N.               | Eurasian Nomads (Zungar Calmucks)<br>Chichimecs   |  |  |
| Orthodox<br>Christian<br>(main body) | The Spanish Vicereyn-<br>alty of New Spain | NW.                            | Serbs<br>Albanians<br>Rumeliot Greeks   | The Orthodox Christian Jugo-<br>slav 'heroic' ballads<br>The Albanian 'heroic' poetry<br>The Rumeliot Greek Armatole<br>and Klephtic ballads | Bektashi Sunnism   |
| Hindu                                | The Mughal Raj                             | NE.<br>SE.<br>S.<br>NW.        | Lazas<br>Kurds<br>Arabs<br>Arabs<br>Uzbeks<br>Afghans<br>Afghans<br>Achaemans<br>Hebrews and Aramaeans<br>Uzbeks<br>Afghans<br>Gaguzs<br>Phrygians<br>Achaemans |  | Nejdi Wahhabism<br>Kurdofani Mahdism   |
| Minoan                               | The British Raj                            | NW.<br>E.<br>NE.               |   | The Homeric Epic   | The Olympian Pantheon<br>Yahweh-worship  |
| Iranic                               | ['Time of Troubles']                       | NE.<br>NE.<br>NW.<br>NW.       |   |  |  |
| Hittite                              | The Royal Scythian<br>Horde                | NE.<br>NW.<br>NW.<br>NW.       |   |  |  |
| Eurasian<br>Nomadism                 | The Khazar Horde                           | NW.<br>NW.<br>NE.              | Sarmatians<br>Varangians<br>Pechenegs<br>Cosacs   | The Homeric Epic   | The Olympian Pantheon  |
|                                      | The Golden Horde                           | NW.<br>NE.                     | Kirghiz Qazaqs  | The Russian 'heroic' ballads   | Orthodox Christianity  |
|                                      |  |                                |   | The Kirghiz Qazaq 'heroic'<br>ballads  |  |

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